India - First and Second Port of Calcutta Rehabilitation Projects

CIRCULATING CL4'Y TO BE RETURNED TO REPORTS DESK Report No.271 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AUDIT OF CALCUTTA PORT PROJECTS November 2, 1973 Operations Evaluation Department  PREFACE As one in an experimental series of studies of individual projects that the Operations Evaluation Division is currently carrying out, this audit deals with Bank assistance to the Port of Calcutta, principally con- centrated in the ten years 1958-68. Two loans were made - Loan 198-IN of June 25, 1958 in the amount of $29 million and Loan 294-IN of August 17, 1961 in the amount of $21 million - and others were considered, but finally not made. The main purpose of an audit, as presently conceived, is to answer, as profoundly as is possible within a limited period of time and with attention consequently confined to the particular project under review, the question of whether the objectives of the Bank's lending were achieved and, if not, why not. A particular effort is made to reappraise retros- pectively the economic validity of the investments supported by the Bank. Institution-building objectives are covered as well as physical objectives, especially in cases where several loans have been made so that developmnet over time can more effectively be traced. Consideration of the reasons why particular objectives may not have beenachieved naturally leads into some treatment of how important those objectives seem in retrospect and whether they were sought in the best manner. While this audit gives considerable attention to the performance of the Bank in its lending for the Port of Calcutta, it does not deal to any significant extent with procurement, although this was a matter of major discussion between the Indian authorities and the Bank at certain times. Detailed issues of procurement policy, important as they are, are never- theless somewhat peripheral to the main purpose of an audit and can better be analyzed in a study focussing on this particular subject. Lending to the Port of Calcutta came up for audit because disburse- ments out of the second loan ended in 1968, and, in order to obtain a random sampling of past Bank projects, the Operations Evaluation Division had decided arbitrarily to analyze projects for which loan disbursements were completed in that year. The five years that have elapsed since 1968 should be sufficient time for the results of a project to have materialized fairly fully, even though benefits should normally continue to accrue much longer. This study is based on a review of Bank files and discussions with Bank staff who had been involved with the project, followed by a one-month mission to India with a port expert who had had no previous involvement with the Bank's lending for Calcutta. The very full cooperation extended by the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and their staff and the support of the Government of India are deeply appreciated. -2- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CMPO: Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization CPC: Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta DLB: Dock Labor Board (of Calcutta) DWT: Deadweight Tons GOI: Government of India HSD: Hydraulic Studies Department (of CPC) KGD: King George's Dock KPD: Kidderpore Docks POL: Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants NOTES: Fiscal Years: Most figures are cited in this report for fiscal years, which run from April 1 to March 31. Currency Equivalents: 1957 - June 28, 1966: US$1.00 = Rs. 4.76 June 28, 1966 - 1972: US$1.00 = Rs. 7.50 (approx.) -3- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Summary 4 Audit of Calcutta Port Projects 9 The Port of Calcutta and the Bank 9 Project Implementation 14 Operation and Maintenance 17 Traffic Forecasts 19 Appraisal Economics 21 Economic Evaluation 23 Institutional Development 29 Long-Term Planning 31 Accounting Reform 33 Financial Performance 34 Conclusions 39 LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES 1. Cargo Handled at Major Indian Ports 1957/58 - 1971/72 2. Second-Plan Projects Supported by IBRD Loan 198-IN of 6/25/58: Costs, Construction Schedules and Procurement 3. Third-Plan Projects Supported by IBRD Loan 294-IN of 8/17/61: Costs, Construction Schedules and Procurement 4. Port of Calcutta: Traffic, Forecast and Actual 5. Increases from 1960 through 1970 in Selected Conference Line Freight Rates for SomeMajor Indian Ports 6. Port of Calcutta: River Dredging, Drafts and Ship Detention 7. Calcutta Port: Employment, Wages and Labor Productivity 8. Port of Calcutta: Revenues and Expenditures, Forecast and Actual 9. Calcutta Port Commissioners: Investment Programs and Their Financing, Projected and Actual 10. Calcutta Port Commissioners: Investment and its Financing, Projected and Actual 11. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta: Balances Sheets 1970-72 12. Calcutta Port Commissioners: Tariff Increases 1957/58 - 1971/72 CHARTS AND MAPS Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta - Organization Chart Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta - Hooghly Drafts Haldia Port Project - Location Map Port of Calcutta -4- SUMMARY The Bank made loans of $29 million in 1958 and $21 million in 1961 to the Comissioners for the Port of Calcutta (CPC), for rehabilitation and modernization of Calcutta Port, after Bombay the most important port in India, serving a hinterland of some 500,000 square miles and 200 mil- lion people. Disbursement of the loans ended in 1965 and 1968 respectively, after several deferrals of the closing dates and cancellation of $2.1 mil- lion from the second loan. In 1965-66 the Bank gave consideration to a third loan of $16 million for Calcutta and a loan of some $40 million for the Haldia satellite dock project, but these loans never came to fruition. Both loans made, which were for foreign exchange costs, were intended to be spent mainly on floating craft and civil works designed to maintain and improve access up the River Hooghly to the Port of Calcutta and on equipment and facilities to rehabilitate and modernize the docks. Project composition was substantially changed after loan signature in light of evolving circumstances - particularly hydraulic conditions in the Hooghly river - and, in the case of the second loan, cost underestimates. The equipment and works included in the revised projects (total costs, as executed, $47 million equivalent and $30 million equivalent, respectively) were procured as agreed, but with serious delays in some cases due to a variety of reasons - delays in final design, interim changes in the programs, foundation problems, slow Government approval of foreign pro- curement, bankruptcy of a British supplier and local contractors' dif- ficulties in obtaining materials. Vessels, mainly dredgers, accounted for more than 50% of planned loan expenditures and more than 70% of actual expenditures. Equipment and works are generally operating satisfactorily and being maintained well, although outage times for repair tend to be long, mainly due to shortages of domestic supplies of materials such as steel, and import license problems for spare parts. Traffic has fallen drastically short of the levels projeated-- in 1970/71, the worst year, it amounted to only 6 million tons compared with 14 million tons forecast - mainly due to prolonged industrial recession and lagging investment in Calcutta's hinterland, with Hooghly draft re- strictions also being an important constraint in the case of ore traffic and railways replacing coastal vessels for much of the coal traffic. The Bank-assisted projects did not achieve their major objectives - elimina- tion of ship detention and maintenance of 26 foot draft up to Calcutta - the former because other factors, especially labor strikes and shortage of appropriate railway wagons, have continued to cause serious congestion for prolonged periods, and the latter because the problem proved more in- tractable than expected. Despite this, the projects seem by and large to show satisfactory economic returns because they helped to halt the -5- deterioration of the Port of Calcutta and its access, which, if it had been allowed to continue, would likely have eliminated iron-ore exports altogether and involved very much more costly handling of a large propor- tion of other traffic (especially general cargo), mainly by lighterage and lightening. The main portions of the project show an economic rate of return of some 25%, on the basis of analysis at market prices, and at least 10% even with very rigorous assumptions about scarcity values of labor and foreign exchange. However there are some minor components of the projects which seem economically questionable - mainly the Libyan Tea Warehouse and the King George's Dock Extension (each with a total cost of some $1.7 million equivalent) due to limited utilization to date. A superior alternative to the projects that were financed by the Bank would have been an earlier start on the satellite dock at Haldia, but, due to repeated delays in preparation, this scheme was not ready for financing until 1965, at which time other factors came into play which eventually caused the Government of India to withdraw its request for Bank assistance and to undertake the project in 1968 without direct foreign assistance. CPC has generally adhered to all commitments made to the Bank. A Depreciation Study, required by the Bank in connection with the first loan, was completed on schedule in 1959 and the Renewals and Replacement Fund which it suggested duly established. Stores inventories and Revenue Re- serve Fund were both reduced significantly after 1961, as agreed by CPC in connection with the second loan. A plan for increasing income from CPC's property holdings, provided in response to Bank requests in 1961 negotiations, was closely adhered to through 1967. The Bank placed considerable emphasis on the need to carry out more basic hydrological and hydraulic studies and to do more long-term planning for the development of port facilities to serve Calcutta's large hinter- land. As agreed with the Bank, CPC established its own Hydraulic Studies Department in 1962. This department has worked effectively and contribu- ted substantially to improving dredging operations and helping both oper- ational and long-term investment planning. The history of the last ten years shows that this was an important need and a well-chosen focus for Bank effort. The Bank also gave considerable attention, in connection with both loans but especially in 1965/66 during discussion about a possible loan for Haldia, to reform of CPC's accounting system onto a modern commercial base. Difficulties were experienced with the large-scale changes involved, but these changes were eventually accomplished and the new system came into full operation for accounts of the year 1969/70. While data are now clas- sified in a new and improved manner, it cannot be said that introduction of the commercial system has induced a more commercial outlook on the part - 6 - of the port authorities nor has it led to the production of regular management information reports or costing studies. It does not appear to have affected management and operation of the port. The Bank was also concerned about maintaining and further strength- ening the financial position of the CPC, although no financial performance targets were agreed in connection with the loans, because the Bank relied on Government support of the Port Commissioners in the last resort. The financial position has seriously deteriorated. Reserves which amounted to some $30 million equivalent at the time of the second loan agreement were virtually used up by 1969 and the Government of India has had to provide some $30 million equivalent of operating subsidies over the last four years, mainly on a non-repayable basis, and to finance virtually the whole of CPC's on-going investment program in Haldia and works related to this project and Farakka Barrage. Large operating subsidies will continue to be needed at least through March 1974 when Haldia is scheduled to be completed. Traffic through Calcutta does not appear to have been responsive to the level of port charges, even though they are considerably higher than those at any other Indian port. They could almost certainly have been raised more rapidly than they were in the early 1960s without affecting traffic, and the Bank should probably have been more demonstrably reluc- tant to finance replacements with new loans without a sharp improvement in current financial performance; the Bank seems to have been unduly impressed at the outset with the apparently strong financial structure of CPC - debt-equity ratio of 51/49 in 1958 and large liquid reserves. Equally, in the most recent years, subsequent to the large tariff in- creases of 1966/67, port charges could probably have been raised somewhat more and more frequently than they have been. But there is clearly some level at which port traffic would begin to drop off, and this level may well be substantially short of the large (50-70%) tariff increase that would be necessary to attain reasonable financial viability under current conditions. Severe discouragement of traffic through the Port of Calcutta would be economically undesirable at the present time when the economy of north-east India is tending to recover from prolonged recession and poli- tical problems, when the Haldia docks are about to be opened and when underemployment of CPC workers remains considerable. It'is not clear who is the final beneficiary of the large Government subsidies provided, but they have probably been necessary, in approximately the amount provided, to cope with this temporary situation. The Bank strongly favored the pro- vision of subsidies since 1967. Despite the severe squeezes which it has faced - between falling traffic (some 40% down in the last five years) and rising costs merely to keep the port open (some 50% up in the last five years) and between rapidly -7- rising real wage-rates, nationally imposed for the class of labor in most excessive supply, and the regional impossibility of drastic cut-backs in the labor-force - CPC probably has had somewhat more flexibility than it has used. Bank supervision missions were helpful in making suggestions, and CPC seems to have considered carefully every constructive suggestion that emanated from such missions. In retrospect it appears that then, in the late 1960s, and earlier, the Bank might have helped more if it had given less, or at least differ- ent, emphasis in connection with accounting reform and much greater at- tention to questions of personnel and personnel management. A less costly and perhaps more expeditious, if basically less satisfactory, way to get to the improved costing, better tariffs and greater efficiency orientation - which the Bank sought and which are still barely achieved - might have been to focus on asset reclassification and revaluation and, for individual tariff services, time-and-motion type studies rather than the overall and fundamental accounting reform actually undertaken. Emphasis on the par- ticular questions which needed to be answered and followed regularly in management reports might have shown that the most important of them could be satisfactorily answered by the existing accounting system, together with measures of the type suggested above; it would likely have helped considerably to get a quicker benefit than has actually occurred, what- ever accounting reform was undertaken. The Bank had not set a good example, with project appraisal documents almost totally lacking in time targets and performance criteria, whether operational or financial. Studies of time-and-motion type would have helped not only to cost individual tariff services but also to identify ways for more effective use, by labor, of the equipment actually available, in order to speed operations and enable more careful handling. Shore labor has been cut substantially, although there remains much too little work to occupy fully all those remaining; but there has been a very large inflation of employment in maintenance. With some initiative, it would seem that CPC might have been able to bring more of its excesive labor-force into use by diversification of operations - for instance, pallet-making, bene- ficiating land and property for leasing out, mending and improving access roads and quay aprons. More effort on training would have been required for this and would have been needed to get fuller-benefit from some of the machinery, such as mechanical cargo-handling equipment, provided under the Bank loans. To make training effective would probably have required more emphasis on performance in promotion policy and less on seniority. And to undertake most of these initiatives - as well as other planning and coating and pricing studies which the Bank sometimes recom- mended and which would have helped to expand CPC's scope for choice - would almost certainly have required a larger body of well-qualifed junior officers than CPC seems to have been able to acquire, with its salary- levels,(by contrast with wage-levels) lagging severely behind inflation. - 8 - While the Bank devoted considerable effort to the Port of Calcutta and it was generally quite responsive and flexible in its relationship with CPC, the case does also suggest various specific ways in which lend- ing administration might have been better. From the beginning the Bank was generally a strong and persistent proponent of the need for a satellite port as the only long-term solution to Calcutta's draft problems and its assistance in the establishment of the Hydraulic Studies Department was a crucial indirect contribution to the realization of such a project. But hindsight suggests that on three occasions the Bank missed key oppor- tunities to expedite the scheme - first, in 1958, when it turned down a mission recommendation to provide technical assistance and make appropriate studies a condition of the first loan; second, in 1961, when it failed to specify the need for economic as well as technical studies; and third, in 1965, when it diverted attention from the main issue to subsidiary problems of accounting and tariff-making. Administration of the second loan of 1961 would have been sharply improved if loan negotiations had been post- poned a year, until schemes were more fully prepared and there was better possibility of reaching agreement on concrete financial targets; and also if full consideration had been given in 1967 to the possible adverse consequences on project completion and operation, especially in Indian circumstances of foreign exchange stringency, of refusal to permit further extension of the closing date. -9- AUDIT OF CALCUTTA PORT PROJECTS The Port of Calcutta and the Bank The Port of Calcutta, which was established in its modern shape mainly in the 1880s and 1920s, serves a hinterland of some 500,000 square miles containing more than a third of India's population, nearly 200 million people; it provides the only commercial access to the sea for most of them. Within Calcutta's hinterland lie most of India's pro- ducing mineral fields (including particularly iron ore, coal and oil), almost the entire steel and heavy engineering industries, and the majority of producing areas and processing plants for jute and tea. Calcutta's share of total traffic through Indian ports has fallen steadily over the last 25 years. A major part of its original hinter- land was lost with Partition in 1947, but it still accounted for 40% of freight tonnage through all major ports in 1950. This share fell to some 33% by 1957, 20% by 1965 and only a little more than 10% in 1971 (Appendix Table 1). But its traffic has always been of somewhat higher average value than that of other ports and this characteristic has been reinforced with the decline in its share of total tonnage, so that even in 1971 it still accounted for nearly 25% of the-value of Indian exports and better than 15% of imports. In freight tonnage Calcutta was overtaken by Bombay in the early 1950s and by Visakhapatnam, on the east coast, and Mormugao, on the west coast, in the late 1960s. But most of the tonnage of the last twoports is low-value iron-ore, and Calcutta remains more important than any other port except Bombay in general cargo. Calcutta contrasts with other major Indian ports in that it lies at a substantial distance from the sea - 126 miles up the River Hooghly. This fact accounts for a substantial part of its loss of relative im- portance in Indian trade. Calcutta has been squeezed between two con- flicting trends: on the one hand, deterioration of the Hooghly River channel, due to natural forces and engineering works upstream on the Hooghly and the Ganges, so that increasing expenditures have been required in an only partially successful effort to maintain the traditional 26-foot draft (enough for ships of some 10,000 DWT fully laden and 15,000 partial- ly laden); and,on the other hand, decreasing adequacy of even a 26-foot draft as ships have become larger and the economies of larger ships have become a more significant factor in certain very important trades. Cal- cutta has also suffered over the last ten years from significantly slower economic growth in most of its hinterland than in India as a whole. The 1950s and early 1960s, when much of the heavy industry was being built up under India's Five Year Plans, was a time of relative economic boom. The subsequent difficulties in operating and maintaining these plants effectively, - 10 - the declining attraction of the region for private investment and the acute political difficulties in the area in the late 1960s have not only cut the traffic through the port but also exacerbated the Port's tra- ditionally difficult labor problems.' The Bank first became involved with Indian ports in 1956. A major economic mission to review the draft Second Five Year Plan (for 1956/57- 60/61) identified transport as a key constraint in India's development. In October 1956 the Government of India (GOI) approached the Bank for assistance with port projects in the Second Plan. After correspondence and exchange of information, the Bank decided to mount a mission, headed by a specially hired Dutch expert, to examine the overall ports situation in India, with special emphasis on Calcutta, for which the project pro- posed was largest and seemed best prepared and most urgent. The mission took place in October-November 1957, and it produced appraisal reports for projects in both Calcutta and Madras; loans were negotiated in March, approved in April and signed June 25, 1958 (Loan 198-IN of $29.0 million for Calcutta and Loan 199-IN of $14.0 million for Madras). The loan to the Comissioners for the Port of Calcutta (CPC), which was in support of a five-year program of port rehabilitation and modernization, became effective in October 1958. Substantial changes were subsequently made in the program, with the Bank's agreement, and final loan disbursements occurred in 1965, after several deferrals of the closing date. In 1960 CPC applied for a second loan to provide further resources in pursuit of essentially the same objective of rehabilitation and moder- nization. This project was appraised early in 1961. Loan negotiations extended throughout the month of June. Loan 294-IN, in the amount of $21.0 million, was signed August 17, 1961 and became effective in September. Disbursements were substantially delayed, partly due to minor changes in the four-year investment program to be covered but mainly due to delays in final design and difficulties in reconciling the Bank's preference for international competitive bidding and the GOI's principle of not procuring abroad anything that could be produced at home. The list of goods under the loan was changed several times, and $2.2 million of the loan were eventually cancelled. Disbursements ended in 1968, three years beyond the original closing date. Aside from details of the coverage of the two loans, two matters dominated the negotiations for each and were reflected in the principal supplementary letters to the Loan Agreements. The first was financial performance. Agreed overall targets, such as operating ratio, were not established in connection with either loan. But the Bank was quite con- cerned in 1958 about the inadequate depreciation allowances that it felt the Commissioners had been making. It was agreed that consultants, - 11 - including foreign specialists, would be hired to study the matter. Their recommendations were partially implemented in 1959, but CPC's financial performance deteriorated and fell substantially short of what had been projected. There was consLderable discussion of possible ways to strengthen the financial situation at the 1961 negotiations. The GOI was not prepared to make any formal commitments since a committee (Ratnam Committee) which it had set up to study the matter had not yet reached final conclusions. Agreement was finally reached on a supplementary letter in which CPC com- mitted itself to try to strengthen itsfinancial performance, particularly in certain areas, and to improve its accounting system by the introduc- tion of auxiliary accounts. The inadequacies of CPC's accounting system, especially in respect of depreciation, was a common underlying theme throughout these discussions, and, in the negotiations for the second loan, the Bank urged retention of consultants to help with a major over- haul; CPC promised to introduce changes, but without outside help. The other matter which came to occupy an increasingly important place in discussions related to the longer term future of Calcutta port. The 1956 economic mission and the 1957 ports mission were both concerned by the lack of decisive action to prepare for the increasing traffic that was to be expected at Calcutta. The latter stressed the need for studies along three lines - the economics of additional mechanization of cargo handling to increase throughput on existing berths, the possibilities of expanding the King George Dock (KGD) system in the port, and, most par- ticularly, the feasibility of a satellite port in deeper water downstream of Calcutta. The mission itself recommended that the loan should be con- ditional on only one point - a firm commitment by CPC to carry out these studies. But it was finally decided by the Bank that itwouldbe inappro- priate to make the loan conditional on a commitment not directly related to execution of the works being financed. These topics were however dis- cussed at negotiations and the GOI hired the Bank's Dutch expert to advise. But the Bank continued to express he view that the hydrological and engi- neering studies required to settle the satellite port question were not being pressed hard enough. By 1960 CPC's investigations were converging to show that the Haldia site, about half way between Calcutta and the sea on the other side of the Hooghly (see map), would be the best of the various alternatives con- sidered for a satellite port, and the worsening siltation problems in the upper Hooghly were making the need for some such development, outside Calcutta, increasingly plain. A provision of Rs. 75 million for a start on a Rs. 250 million scheme at Haldia (including two riverside berths and three bulk and general cargo berths in a Dock system) was included in the draft Third Five Year Plan (for the years 1961/62 - 65/66). The Bank's major mission to review the Plan pointed out that Calcutta's 26 foot - 12 - draft, even if maintainable, would be quite insufficient .for bulk cargoes and it urged a larger provision in the Plan for Haldia, with a view to at least partial completion by the end of the Plan period. CPC's preliminary feasibility study on Haldia was issued in September 1960 and its second loan application included a major component for the new port. Late 1960 saw a major debate within the Bank between those favoring an early start on Haldia, at least riverside jetties, and those adopting a more cautious approach, pointing out the need for further studies, especially on hydrau- lic aspects, to reduce the risk of a major mistake. Early in 1961, GOI, CPC and the Bank agreed that substantial further studies were needed before major investment started. I Funds were included in the second loan for engineering work on Hal- dia by foreign consultants and, even more importantly, for the equipping of a Hydraulic Studies Department (HSD) that CPC was to set up. CPC had previously relied for such studies on the Central Water and Power Research Institute at'Poona, on the other side of India, and the Bank, concerned at slow progress on these studies since its first loan, made the esta- blishment of CPC's own HSD, originally suggested by consultants, the major issue in negotiations for the second loan. GOI and CPC refused the Bank's suggestions that establishment of HSD be made a condition of loan effectiveness and that a foreign institute or firm be brought in to give the new department major support in its early years. But they signed a supplementary letter promising that HSD would be set up, with a foreigner who had been advising under UN auspices as initial Director. Late in 1961 the Bank informally approved a tentative schedule of actions, mainly studies, drawn up by CPC and designed to enable submission to the Bank in September 1963 of a satisfactory loan application for Hal- dia. CPC pressed ahead with execution of the scheduled actions, the Bank was impressed with the effectiveness of the new HSD, and by Spring 1963 HSD had successfully accomplished the various studies relating to Haldia feasibility which had been requested by the eminent hydraulic engineer hired by the Bank as a special advisor. These studies had shown that, with the assistance of the Farakka Barrage which GOI had decided in 1961 to build on the Ganges to control flows into the Hooghly (see map) and with a reasonable amount of dredging, it should be possible to develop and maintain a stable channel in the estuary up to Haldia to a depth of at least 20-22 feet at low water, sufficient for vessels of about 35 foot draft at high tide (enough for ships of some 35,000 DWT fully laden), Late in 1963 CPC submitted to the Bank its application for a loan for the project. Just at this time the Bank learned, somewhat to its astonishment, that the GOI had given approval to a major project, promoted by - 13 - enterprising officials in the state of Orissa and being financed with large contractor credits, for construction of a new port at Paradeep only some 200 miles south of Calcutta (see map). The port was designed initially to handle mainly iron-ore exports, its advantage being that it would have substantially less draft restriction even than Haldia, being designed for 38 foot draft initially, with possibilities of sub- sequent increase. At the same time, with trends in ship economics as they were, the Bank began to fear that Haldia's 35 feet, while quite adequate for coal and general cargo traffic, might leave eastern India uncompetitive in the potentially important iron-ore trade. These develop- ments gave rise to a second major round in project preparation work on Haldia. In response to the Bank's questions, GOP set up a committee (Bhatia Committee) which prepared a major economic study, including a very thorough traffit analysis, concluding that Haldia should be proceeded with. Early 1965 saw the completion of the Bhatia Committee report on Haldia and a new application to the Bank from CPC for $16 million finan- cing of additional works and vessels for the Port of Calcutta itself. The Bank offered to consider the latter request after Haldia had been dealt with, and at the end of 1965, shortly after the Indo-Pakistani war of September, it sent a major mission to appraise Haldia for a $40 million loan. The Rs. 400 million scheme now proposed represented a considerable modification from that initially suggested in 1960; it included a river-side jetty only for oil, and the heart of the project was an impounded dock system with 7 deep-water berths, 4 for bulk traf- fic and 3 for general cargo. The mission found the basic economics of the scheme highly convincing. But it took a rather stricter attitude than previous Bank missions on the poor financial performance of CPC and it strongly espoused certain principles, for instance on manage- ment, accounting and tariff-making, which the Indian authorities found unpalatable. Compromise on most of the major points was reached by hard negotiations before the mission ended. Nevertheless, after having checked in detail the feasibility of building the project without foreign assistance, the GOI withdrew it from Bank consideration in 1966. Detailed design work continued and an important revision, to enable the dock system to take vessels up to about 44 feet draft, was made late in 1967. Major construction, by Indian contractors and with Indian-made equipment, got under way early in 1968. A rather unrealistic completion target of 1972 had been established, but it now seems that the project, including 3 bulk cargo berths, 1 container berth, 1 general cargo berth and a finger jetty, all in an impounded dock system, should be completed by middle or late 1974, a few months after the Farakka Barrage which has also been delayed from its original target completion date of 1971. After 1966 the Bank's attention was mainly concentrated on the Port of Calcutta proper, where works financed under the second loan were still - 14 - underway. In face of CPC's rapidly deteriorating financial situation, the Bank adopted the practice of following up supervision missions with detail- ed letters outlining the operational deficiencies identified and, later, proposing possible ways to increase efficiency and strengthen the finan- cial situation. The Haldia discussions had raised again the matter of CPC's accounting system, and in 1966-68 major efforts were made by GOI and CPC to develop and apply an appropriate commercial system. The last supervi- sion mission took place in February 1969, but the Bank's follow-up letter of suggestions never received more than a formal acknowledgment. Project Implementation The Bank's loans were intended essentially to cover the foreign ex- change costs of items in CPC's overall investment program which involved foreign exchange. These items accounted for most of CPC's total invest- ment at Calcutta, but there was always some investment going on outside the Bank projects. CPC saw the Bank loans as a kind of line of credit, and the Bank was quite flexible in accepting changes in the investment program in the light of intervening events, permitting reallocation of funds and changes in the list of goods. The Bank funds were disbursed en- tirely against foreign exchange expenditures, including expenditures for supplies to Indian manufacturers making equipment for CPC. There were in fact substantial changes between the investment pro- grams presented in appraisal reports and those actually executed. Full details for the items actually financed by the Bank and for those expec- ted to be so financed but subsequently dropped - either because the need for them had become less urgent or because they proved to be obtainable without expenditure in foreign exchange - are given in Appendix Tables 2 and 3; projected time schedules for letting and completion of contracts are not normally given, since the appraisal reports contained no more than an approximate terminal date for the project as a whole. The location of the fixed works is given in the maps. The following table summarizes planned and actual allocations of loan funds among major categories. Table 1 Planned and Actual Allocations of Loan Funds by Major Purpose (in US$ millions) Loan 198 (1958) Loan 294 (1961) Planned Actual Planned Actual River Navigation Civil Works 6.54 4.31 - 0.06 Vessels 6.40 12.09 10.15 7.84 Docks and Berths Civil Works 3.61 2.19 1.47 0.39 Vessels 5.07 7.62 3.95 6.54 Shore Facilities 4.36 2.27 1.44 1.33 Studies & Consultants 0.35 0.52 2.16 2.68 Contingencies/Cancellations 2.67 - 1.83 2.16 Total 29.00 29.00 21.00 21.00 - 15 - Vessels, mainly dredgers, accounted for more than 50% of planned expendi- tures out of the two loans and for more than 707 of actual expenditures. Efforts to improve Hooghly River navigation account for half of all loan funds, and expenditures within the dock area, except for dredging vessels, were cut substantially from original plans. 1958 saw a sharp and unexpected deterioration in Hooghly drafts, partly due to exceptionally low river flows, so that by the end of the year, in the season when they are normally worst, they were some 2-3 feet less than normal (see chart). Depth across the Balari Bar (see map) was only some 7 feet, enough at high tide for vessels drawing no more than about 20 feet. CPC took emergency measures, putting a dredger full time on the bar, but by October 1959 drafts were back at the same level. Moor- ings provided under the Bank loan were laid at Haldia to permit off-loading from larger ships to lighters. But it was clear that longer-term measures to restore the channel up to Calcutta were required, and CPC revised its investment program, dropping replacement or expansion items that were now of lesser priority than equipment required merely to preserve access to the port. In June 1960 a revised list of goods was agreed between CPC and the Bank, including 3 additional river dredgers and 1 more port dredger, to be financed by deletions of certain items, savings on the foreign costs of others, and loan contingencies. Some of the works and equipment financed out of the first loan had been ordered long before the loan was made, according to bidding proce- dures broadly acceptable to the Bank, and most of the major contracts, in- cluding those incorporated with the revision of the list of goods, were completed by the end of 1963 (see Appendix Table 2). But there were delays in letting of some contracts and in the execution of some work, so that a few important items were not completed until 1965 and 1966. The largest single item in the project (actual foreign exchange cost $4.3 million) was the Fulta Point river training scheme, involving straightening of the river bank and large-scale contract dredging; work started slowly, and in November 1960 the contractor's dredger sunk and lives were lost, but the project was eventually completed on schedule in 1961 and with a large saving on expected foreign exchange costs. Nearly $10.0 million was eventually spent on procurement and repairs for a total of five large suction hopper dredgers. $5.7 million was spent on port dredgers and ancillary vessels. $1.8 million each was spent on a major scheme for re- conditioning Kidderpore Dock (KPD) No. 1, including replacement of old hydraulic cranes by 59 electric cranes (see map), and on procurement of two floating cranes for heavy lifts. Other items were various other floating craft, diesel locomotives for the Port Railways, a small amount of mechanical cargo-handling equipment, conversion and modernization of certain berths in King George's Dock and various improvements to the dry docks, repair facilities and port workshops. - 16 - Deterioration at Balari again required modification of the second loan shortly after it was signed, but this time of lessermagnitude. CPC had been working to open up the Rangafalla channel on the east side of the Balari Bar with a view to its becoming the main access route; but, contrary to past experience, it began to silt seriously on opening in October 1961. The Bank agreed to meet the foreign exchange costs involved in having the Dutch dredging contractor who had been working at Fulta Point dig a new channel diagonally across Balari Bar, a move which proved very successful. But most of the works to be covered by the second loan seem to have been at a much earlier stage of preparation when the loan was signed than in the case of the first loan, there were considerable delays in finalizing designs due to shortage of qualified staff, and a Bank supervision mission reported that no tenders were out even one year after the loan had become effective. Most of the orders were placed only in 1964 and 1965. Deliveries were mainly in 1966 and 1967, after the original closing date, and some projects were not completed until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Delivery of several craft was severely delayed by the bankruptcy of the British builder who had won the orders. Original cost estimates proved inadequate for many of the items in the list of goods, and the delays in procurement, in an inflationary si- tuation especially domestically, increased the deficiency. This, as well as changing priorities within CPC's investment program, caused a number of items to be dropped from the project (see Appendix Table 3). Principal items eventually financed were further dredgers ($8.0 million) and two pilot vessels ($3.5 million). About $2.8 million was spent on a survey vessel and craft and instruments for HSD, $1.3 million on four dock tugs, and about $1.0 million on consultant engineering, both for the project itself and for Haldia. Other smaller items were various civil works in the port's repair shops. Early in 1967 disbursements were terminated for all but a few spe- cific items, the Bank refusing further extension of the closing date for some other items, as GOI and CPC urged. The rather rigid attitude that the Bank adopted at this point - by contrast with earlier periods - apparently stemmed mainly from frustration with procurement procedures in India generally and in CPC in particular and from a feeling that discipline in loan administration should be tightened. As pointed out in the Preface, procurement aspects have not been thoroughly studied in this audit. But it is noteworthy that several of the cases of alleged poor performance by CPC and its Indian suppliers which were cited in Bank documents at this - 17 - 1/ time seem to have been misconceived. In fact the loan itself had almost certainly been committed too early, in view of the relatively poor state of preparation of most of the component projects in 1961. Secondly, there is no question that the refusal to extend disbursements did cause CPC some difficulties. Necessary spares could not be obtained under the loan for the No. 2 Swing Bridge and the KPD Water Recirculation Plant which had been built under the project, and the advancing of final payments to the contractor for the latter, to fall within the Bank's deadline, left CPC with no lever to ensure completion of the work after problems arose. A large order for machine tools, letting of which had been delayed by the Bank's dissatisfaction with the bidding procedures used by CPC's British consultant and insistence on retendering, had to be withdrawn. Operations and Maintenance All equipment provided under the loans appears to have been opera- ting satisfactorily. There were initial difficulties with some, such as the quay cranes in KPD and, more seriously, the KPD Water Recirculation plant, but these have been overcome with the aid of the suppliers. The domestically produced equipment has generally proved rather less sturdy than that procured abroad and gave greater teething troubles, but other- wise compares well and does have the advantage in Indian circumstances that spares are usually somewhat easier to obtain. Not all the craft and equipment provided under the Bank's loans could be inspected during the course of the audit, but those that were suggested that maintenance is quite good. However, out-of-commission time for maintenance, repairs and vessel survey does seem to be on the high side, especially for some items - and the principal reason appears to be the difficulty in getting spares and certain crucial materials expeditiously. The following table gives data for the principal floating craft procured under the Bank's loans, which may b5/compared with a reasonable upper limit of some 20% or 70 days a year.- 1/ For instance, with regard to the two locally procured dock tugs, the orderfor which had been greatly delayed by Bank refusal and eventual acceptance of procurement domestically, the scheduled delivery date had long been known to be beyond the loan closing date and it was actually adhered to quite closely, comparing well with foreign delivery dates, despite the difficulties of local manufacturers in getting supplies. Another delay highlighted by the Bank mission was in the KGD extension which had been included in the loan originally mainly at the Bank's urging, which was being executed by CPC with its own equipment at a considerable saving in foreign exchange and which now seems a component of somewhat dubious economic validity (see below). 2/ 12 hours a week for running maintenance and 1-3 weeks a year in dry dock and/or alongside for repairs. - 18 - Table 2 Floating Craft: Percent of Time Out-of-Commission for Maintenance, Survey & Repair Period 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 Average Maitena (1947/60) a/ 32.9 40.5 23.6 100.0 49.3 Bhagirathi (1957) 25.8 23.0 27.9 19.7 24.1 Churni (1961) 17.3 11.0 35.1 35.6 24.8 Ajoy (1961) n.a. 14.2 47.1 31.5 30.9 Maha Bahu (1963) 13.7 33.7 n.a. 27.4 24.9 Vir Bahu (1963) 34.0 24.4 n.a. 40.3 32.9 Grab Dredger 1 (1964) n.a. 27.7 45.2 1.9 24.9 Hopper Barge 2 (1964) n.a. 4.7 25.5 1.4 10.5 Hopper Barge 3 (1964) n.a. 20.8 1.4 26.3 16.2 Mohana (1965) 24.4 21.1 34.2 20.8 25.1 Hopper Barge 11 (1965) n.a. 31.0 29.3 70.4 43.6 Hopper Barge 12 (1965) n.a. 35.1 32.9 30.7 32.9 Subarnarekha (1966) 21.9 14.0 21.1 27.9 21.2 Grab Dredger 2 (1967) n.a. 37.5 3.6 48.8 30.0 Hopper Barge 6 (1967) n.a. 19.2 39.2 29.0 29.1 Ibpper Barge 7 (1967) n.a. 24.1 26.0 10.7 20.3 Hopper Barge 4 (1968) n.a. 9.9 26.3 11.5 15.9 Hopper Barge 5 (1968) n.a. 21.6 10.4 33.4 21.8 a/ Year shown is year of construction. Cases are quoted of a simple repair that would normally require 3 days in fact taking 3 weeks; major repairs and four-year survey can take 3-5 months. Crucial stores can take several months to obtain, when available domesti- cally, and up to a year or two if they have to be purchased from abroad. Unavailability of special materials often requires substitution by less appropriate ones, as for example mild steel for boiler quality plate, which tends to increase future outage for repair. Very much the same problems apply to important items of shore equipment. Of the average of 36 fork-lift trucks that CPC had in 1971-72 more than 25% were out of com- mission for repairs at any one time; of the 40 registered in November 1972 16 or 40% were out of commission, 9 of them awaiting spares. Tires have been a particular problem. Beyond high outage time for repairs an obstacle to optimum utilization of some vessels seems to be unduly long periods at base for crew holidays and rest; it is likely that effective working time of this expensive equipment could be increased somewhat by appropriate ad- ministrative measures. - 19 - Traffic Forecasts Traffic through the Port of Calcutta has declined drastically in recent years, amounting to only about 6 million tons in total in 1970/71 compared with 11 million tons in 1964/65, the peak year since the Second World War. All Categories of traffic have fallen, coal and ore exports and general cargo imports particularly severely and POL imports and gen- eral cargo exports least severely. Details are given in Appendix Table 4. Actual traffic has fallen below appraisal report forecasts in almost all years, but the really large divergences began to appear only after 1964/65. Up to that time import traffic kept fairly close to forecasts, but the Bank, and the CPC,whose traffic forecasts appear to have been accepted without change, proved persistently over-optimistic about the growth of export traffic. Actual dTy cargo exports in 1965/66, the last year of the Third Plan, for instance, were about 4.5 million tons compared to 7.3 and 7.9 million tons forecast in the first and second project appraisal reports respectively. The shortfall was not only a matter of foreign exports; actually the most important single shortfall, in terms of tonnage, was for coal which was by this time primarily a coastal trade. But there were also sizeable shortfalls, particularly against second appraisal projections (which apparently assumed completion of Haldia by 1971), in foreign exports of iron-ore and general cargo, especially iron and steel, and in imports of general cargo, especially machinery. By 1970/71 total traffic was less than half the level of 14 million tons projected in the Bank's 1961 appraisal report; it recovered sharply in 1971/72 but remained only slightly above 50% of the projec- tion. The major item which has kept close to forecasts and quite often exceeded them has been import of foodgrains. What are the reasons for the shortfalls? They differ between the major categories of traffic. We can illustrate by using the magnitudes of 1970/71, when the total shortfall from projected level was 8 million tons. Ore exports, mainly iron-ore, accounted for about 2 million tons, virtually entirely attributable to Calcutta's draft problem and,to some extent, the fact that Paradeep had been opened up in 1966 and was taking some 2 million tons of ore annually. Coal traffic, in which the short- fall was 2.4 million tons, has suffered to a slight extent from the draft problem but much more important have been the carrying capacity and pricing policy of the railways; in the early 1960s they were short of capacity for carrying coal fran India's coalfields, in the Calcutta area, to the south but by the end of the decade they had sufficient capacity and the strongly tapered freight rate structure encouraged this traffic; it is not clear whether this is more economic than movement by ship. Gen- eral cargo exports account for 1.6 million tons of the shortfall, and - 20 - general cargo imports for 1.9 million tons; for these the dominant factor has been lagging investnent and slower than expected growth of the Indian economy and particularly of Calcutta's hinterland, illustrated by the fact that West Bengal and Bihar regional product grew at only 2% p.a. in the second half of the 1960s compared with 4.5% for Indian national in- come. Although the Indian authorities and CPC in particular a ear to know less than would be useful about Calcutta's traffic hinterland- and changes that may have been occurring in it, available information suggests that there may not have been very much diversion of traffic from Calcutta to other ports, except in the case of ore, where it was actually more a case of Calcutta becoming uneconomic in international competition so that traf- fic that India might have retained was lost. There have been a few cases of diversion to other ports - for instance foodgrains entering via Visag and tea exports from Assam using the meter-gauge railway right across northern India to Kandla - but these cases appear to have been temporary shifts in response to physical bottlenecks and labor strikes at Calcutta rather than structural changes resulting from cost/price trends. It is surprising in some ways that more traffic has not been lost, for port charges at Calcutta have risen on average more than those at other Indian ports and are now about twice those at Bombay and Madras and greatly above those at many of the smaller principal ports, liner freight rates to Calcutta have tended to rise more than those to other ports, particu- larly Bombay (see Appendix Table 5), and stevedoring charges are generally a multiple of those at other Indian ports. Nevertheless Calcutta still receives significant amounts of traffic originating in Delhi and central India, tea exports appear to have come back from Kandla, and the prospect now is rather for potential expansion of Calcutta's hinterland - with the forthcoming completion of Haldia and also of Farakka, the latter opening up possibilities of long-distance barge traffic down the Ganges. Among the factors accounting for Calcutta's retention of most of its traditional hinterland appear to be the weakness of domestic long-distance road transport, the continuing concentration of many business houses and services in Calcutta, the absence of any strongly competing port for general cargo traffic in north-east India, and Calcutta's location and import/export balance both making it convenient as the terminal port for much of the liner trade. But had the political instability of the late 1960s in West Bengal continued, with its resultant labor difficulties, traditional patterns of traffic flow might well have been more permanently changed. Could or should the Bank's traffic forecasts have been better? It would be hard to argue that the recent declines in general cargo traffic, closely related to economic and political developments in north-east India, 1/ A complaint made in the Bank's appraisal reports and still seemingly valid. - 21 - could have been predicted in 1960. It probably would have been better to distinguish in the Bank's 1961 forecasts between that traffic which would likely continue to go to Calcutta itself and that which would materialize only if a deeper-draft port became available, since the investments finan- ced were not really related to the latter. It might also be argued that the 1-2 million ton overestimates typical for the years before 1965/66 could have been avoided had attention been given to national plans and traffic trends, for it is notable in these years that all-India port traffic generally kept up well with all-India projections d sometimes exceededthem, evenwhilethere were shortfalls at Calcutta.- But due re- cognition must be given to the great difficulty of forecasting traffic through Calcutta even on a short-term basis, illustrated by the fact that 1957/58 traffic turned out quite unexpectedly at 10.2 million tons com- pared with 8.4 million tons expected in March 1957 and 1967/68 traffic turned out at 9.0 million tons compared with 11.1 million tons expected in March 1967. As in some ways a residual in the overall economy, perhaps especially under Indian conditions, port traffic has been particularly unstable - and much more so than, for instance, railway traffic. It has reflected, often in amplified manner, fluctuations in crop production, in foreign exchange availability, in performance of India's heavy industry and in investment in the Calcutta region. Appraisal Economics Actually the Bank's projects really depended very little for their economic justification on the assumption of rising overall traffic, and it is not at all obvious that major alterations would have been made in them had the recent decline in traffic been precisely foreseen; a few elements might have been dropped and some emphases changed, but the same basic structure would probably have been retained. Both projects were largely of a rehabilitation/modernization nature, designed to result in a more efficient and economic operation of the basic facilities already existing; the draft difficulties of 1958-61 reinforced the emphasis, in the major restructuring of the first loan in 1960 and in the 1961 loan, on simply trying to keep the port open and operating. Many of the items covered by the Bank's loans were straight re- placements, of more modern and efficient design, of equipment that was overage and had very high maintenance and operating costs. This was true of virtually all the floating craft originally intended to be provided under the first loan, most of which were eventually purchased, out of either the first or the second loan. It also applies to the various works in KPD financed under the first loan, including the replacement of hydraulic with electric quay cranes, and the No. 2 Swing Bridge at KPD covered by the second loan. 1/ However, for the latest plan (Fourth Plan 1969/70-73/74) Calcutta's problems and the delay in Haldia account for 80% of the cut-back that has recently had to be made in the all-India port traffic forecast for 1973/74 from 77 to 66 million tons. - 22 - Beyond essential replacements, the first appraisal report put main emphasis on the reduction of congestion that was expected to result from the various improvements to be financed. Congestion was a very serious problem at Calcutta at the time of the appraisal mission's visit in November 1957 and it was attributed mainly to the growing quantity of difficult and heavy cargo such as machinery and steel imports and to na- vigational problems on the Hooghly, compounded by the bunching of ship arrivals. The mission emphasized that congestion was not a temporary problem and could not be easily relieved. It.paid particular attention to possibilities of speeding up cargo handling by better labor manage- ment and use of incentive schemes, and concluded that the potential here was quite limited without provision of substantially more and improved mechanical equipment; at the same time it was recognized that labor oppo- sition would prevent very rapid progress on mechanization of cargo handling. Many of theitems covered by the loan were oriented to overcoming or reducing the congestion problem - the Fulta Point scheme to ease naviga- tion and reduce time spent waiting for high tides, various conversions and small extensionsin KGD to increase berthing capacity, the floating cranes to help deal with heavy-lift cargo, the newquay cranes and a more than 50% increase in CPC's fork-lift and mobile crane park to speed cargo handling, improvements in repair facilities to make repairs quicker, and purchase of locomotives and realignment of track lay-out to hasten the passage of cargo through the port. The mission identified the main cost of congestion as the days spent by ships waiting at the mouth of the Hooghly, which it estimated at more than 5,000 days between October 1956 and October 1957. Relating the saving to be obtained by eliminating this detention to the one-third of project investment considered to be more of expansion than replacement nature, the mission concluded that this would yield a rate of return of at least 15%. The appraisal report for the second project, which was seen essen- tially as a stop-gap pending Haldia which would nevertheless remain useful after Haldia as general cargo continued to pass through Calcutta, did not attempt any quantification of economic benefits. The floating craft, which accounted for about two-thirds of the project, were considered essential to preserve access to the port and keep the docks dredged. Replacement items, which included some of the floating craft as well as other equip- ment, were expected to pay for themselves by savings in maintenance and repair costs, and the small amount of additional cargo-handling equipment included would bring benefits in the form of faster loading and discharge of general cargo. Within six months of signature of the first loan a Bank supervision mission found that congestion had in fact been 'virtually eliminated.' - 23 - Available records unfortunately do not go back beyond 1958/59, but the trends since then in congestion, at least as measured by the ship waiting time, suggest that numerous factors have been involved and that among the most important have been labor strikes and availability of suitable rail- way wagons for removing imports, neither of them much related to the items financed under the Bank loans. Appendix Table 6 gathers key data on ship waiting time and corresponding indicators on navigational condi- tions and numbers of vessels calling; data on cargo-handling are provided in Appendix Table 7; unfortunately no information is available on crucial indicators such as average freight clearance time. The figures show little correlation with one another except for 1966/67, the worst year as re- gards ship detention, when the problem arose particularly from sharp in- crease in grain imports required and a near doubling in foodgrain vessels visiting Calcutta; the problems were compounded by labor unrest and refusal to make optimum use of the bulk foodgrain handling facilities installed with US AID assistance in 1965 (reflected in labor productivity figures) and by shortage of appropriate railway wagons. The fact is that conges- tion, which may occur at any one of a number of stages - access up the Hooghly, berthing, loading and discharge, evacuation of goods from the port area - has resulted at different times from a large range of factors, under each of these stages, ranging from accidents temporarily blocking the river channels to delays by exporters in bringing their cargo to port. But the sharp increases in 1963/64 and 1964/65 seem to have been due - mainly to labor problems and strikes (particularly in the latter year: pilots' go-slow March 1964 to January 1965 and two-month strike January- March 1965) and to shortages of railway wagons for heavy lifts rather than to the fact that total traffic reached new peaks in those years. Again in 1966-68 the main problems were strikes and go-slows (shore labor and stevedores) and rail wagon shortage. Economic Evaluation With the multiplicity of factors at work and the highly complex nature of the Bankprojects themselves, it was not easy to choose an appropriate framework for retrospective economic analysis of the invest- ments. What would have happened if none of the investment supported by the Bank had been undertaken - and Calcutta port had been allowed en- tirely to die - is a question with such enormous ramifications that it would be almost impossible to answer; it would also not be very useful to answer since Calcutta port was far too important an installation for the economy of India and especially of north-east India, not to be kept in basic operating order with necessary replacements, at least until a subs- titute was available. We have tried instead to deal with certain discrete parts of the projects, which might be considered to lie at the margin in -24 - decision-making about how far to maintain or expand the port in particular respects, with the idea that if these investments prove to have been eco- nomically valid then a fortiori the rest of the investments were also. Within the Bank-assisted program as a whole we have focussed prin- cipally on the objective, which dominated in the revision of the first loan and the making of the second loan, of keeping the port of Calcutta itself accessible to an expanding trade of ocean-going vessels. Essen- tially this meant trying to maintain 26 foot draft permanently right up to Calcutta. Except on days of very low tides this had been maintained fairly successfully, mainly by natural forces, in most years up to 1957. Drafts dropped sharply in 1958 and further through 1961 when the average was down to about 22 feet (see chart). In 1962-63 dredging and the rela- ted civil works began to have some effect in stabilizing the level at an average draft of some 23 feet, with normally some 35-75 days per year above 26 feet instead of almost none as in 1958-62 (Appendix Table 6). This large dredging effort has been sufficient to maintain Calcutta as an important port for ocean-going vessels, carrying traffic in the amounts discussed earlier, even though it did not fully meet the hopes held in 1960. A great deal of this effort was concentrated on the 60-mile stretch of the river between Haldia and Calcutta, and it is reasonable to ask what would have happened to Calcutta traffic if this had not been under- taken, and it had been accepted in 1960 that Calcutta itself would gra- dually become inaccessible to the larger ocean-going vessels. This is the economic question upon which we have focussed. About 40% of the in- vestmentsi partially financed by the Bank related directly to this part of the effort, and we have analyzed the return to these investments in the form of net cost savings that they made possible on traffic that would probably have continued even if drafts had further deteriorated and in the form of net value to India of traffic that would probably have been lost altogether under these circumstances.2/ 1/ i.e. Fulta Point training works, cutting of Balari channel, dred- gers Churni, Maitena and Subarnarekha, and the launches for them, the Grab Dredgers and related Hopper Barges provided in the second loan, KGD conversion of "D" berth and extension, and appropriate shares of consultant costs and of workshop equipment provided. 2/ The basic judgment underlying the analysis is that, if the addi- tional work between Haldia and Calcutta that the Bank's loans made possible had not been done, then Hooghly drafts would have deterio- rated after 1961 from average 22 feet in that year to about 20 feet in 1966 and 18 feet by 1971; they would begin to improve again (footnote continued on page 25) - 25 - This analysis can only be illustrative, but the results are inter- esting. They indicate that, at market prices (as described in the foot- note), the internal rate of return to the investment involved would be around 25%. And, using severe shadow prices of Rs. 12.00 per US dollar for foreign exchange and zero for unskilled labor, the return would still be 10%. These results show that the effort to keep Calcutta accessible to ocean-going ships by heavy dredging, even if not as successful as originally hoped, was clearly worthwhile. Another alternative to the dredging of the upper Hooghly, besides the mainly lighterage/lightening operation assumed in this analysis, would have been early construction of riverside jetties at Haldia, as planned inthe earlier schemes for Haldia and strongly favored by some in the Bank 2/ (continued from page 24) only in 1975 when Farakka should begin to have some effect on the upper Hooghly; average draft might be back at about 20 feet in 1980. With an effective draft of 18 feet it was assumed that the following would be the disposition of traffic: iron-ore exports would have tapered off rapidly as available drafts went down, and terminated in 1966; coal exports would have gone entirely to smaller vessels, increasing freight rates by an average of $1.00/ton; the same would have happened to the bulk of oil imports, but a portion would have been lightered from Haldia anchorage; all foodgrains (other than those which have actually been transferred to smaller ships at Hal- dia and Saugor) would have been so transferred, adding about $4.70 (Rs. 35) per ton costs; about 65% of foreign general cargo imports and exports and 35% of coastal general cargo would have been treated in the same way, at a cost of $5.33 (Rs. 40) per ton. A small off- setting factor in cases where lighterage/lightening was involved would be reduced ship turnaround time due to elimination of the need to negotiate the upper Hooghly; on the other hand no allowance was made for any reduction from actual historical ship detention times. The proportions of traffic to which these premia were applied were gradually scaled up from 0 in 1961 to the proportions cited above by 1971 when the average draft was assumed to have declined to 18 feet. The treatment afforded different kinds of traf- fio was based on inspection of all available data and particularly information on the size-distribution of ships visiting Calcutta,_ and their cargoes, for different classes of traffic. The analysis was carried though 1980, using CPC traffic projections for 1973-80, allowing for effective operation of Haldia from 1975 on and inclu- ding a figure for residual value of the Bank-assisted investments by 1980. To allow for price inflation from the early 1960s, when most of the investments were made, to 1972 the Indian wholesale price index was used. - 26 - in the 1960 discussion. This hypothesis was not tested because of the following principal considerations, suggesting that it would not in fact have been more economic: (a) there is limited frontage at Haldia appro- priate for riverside jetties, beyond the oil jetty that was built, with- out preempting the area needed for the enclosed dock now under construc- tion, (b) costs would probably have been quite high, about Rs. 25 million ($3.3 million) for a single general cargo jetty and (c) due to fast tides in the area, throughput of an unprotected riverside jetty at this location would probably have been quite limited - to about 125,000 tons a year. Early construction of such a jetty would also have required earlier invest- ment to improve land transport facilities out of Haldia than actually took place. There area few specific small components of the investment programs assisted by the Bank about which some doubts arise as to economic justi- fication, and these we tried to check in some detail in the course of the audit. In total they amount to only about 8% of the total investment made. The first is the KGD Western Arm extension which, to the extent it was implemented, cost a total of Rs. 12.6 million or about $1.7 million equivalent. A scheme similar to this was dropped from the first loan when the draft problems arose in 1958-60. The Bank strongly urged its inclusion in the second project and pressed for its early execution as a means to provide protected berthing capacity for more ships. Rather than expedite the project with the aid of outside contractors CPC seems in prac- tice to have kept to its original intention of moving slowly ahead with the scheme; it was accomplished mainly with CPC's own equipment, at a large saving over original estimates in foreign exchange, and completed to its present stage only in 1968 instead of 1966 as planned. Quay walls have not been built, but some dolphin berths installed. It has been used only to a limited extent and merely as a holding area; this is partly because traffic has been so unexpectedly low in the years since it was finally completed. However, even in earlier years ship traffic never ex- ceeded the level reached in 1959/60, which had been satisfactorily coped with without additional berthing capacity, and Bank supervision reports of the middle 1960s persistently complained about the rather large amounts of berthing space that were unutilized even when congestion and detention problems were serious. A second small item, which has been of some use but less than ori- ginally envisaged, is the large 'Libyan' Tea Warehouse included in the first project and finally completed in 1966 at a total cost of Rs. 12.7 million (aboutS1.7million equivalent), slightly less than expected but also with less equipment installed than planned. The 600,000 square foot warehouse was originally planned in the second half of the 1950s in con- nection with the Tea Board's effort to bring more tea auctions from London to Calcutta. The Tea Board guaranteed occupation for 60 years at a - 27 - satisfactory rental. By the time it was completed Tea Board plans had changed and more reliance was being placed on privately owned warehousing capacity. The Board arranged for the new warehouse to be temporarily oc- cupied by a local tea merchant .firm, which retained it until the end of 1971. Available figures on this firm's monthly stock position and ware- housing capacity suggest that up to about 30-40% of the Libyan Warehouse has provided essential capacity in the peak months (December-February) for the years 1966-71; but it is not clear whether even this amount of capa- city might not have been available elsewhere. There have been some dis- putes about the rental payments, and CPC has not received to date the full amount guaranteed by the Tea Board. In July 1972 a new arrangement was reached in principle for the warehouse to be taken over by the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation (CIWTC), a Government concern, for warehousing river freight, but details of the transfer have not yet been finalized. Third is the KPD Water Recirculation scheme, whose economics are thrown in doubt mainly by the long delay between incurrence of the major costs and effective operation. Investment, which took place mainly between 1965 and late 1967, amounted to some Rs. 7.8 million (about $1.0 million equivalent). The purpose of the scheme was to,enable recircula- tion of water at the entrance lock to KPD, reducing the need for make-up water from other sources and hence the intrusion of silt into the dock; the benefits would occur mainly in the form of reduced expenditure on dredging within the docks. Whether or not the scheme will-be effective. remains to be seen. Delays in project execution and, more-importantly, design faults of which the effect was somewhat exacerbated by the Bank's 1967 'guillotine' on the second loan prevented the scheme from operating until late 1971. Fourth and finally there is the mechanical cargo handling equipment provided under the Bank loans - principally 15 mobile cranes and 20 fork- lift trucks under the first loan and 9 mobile cranes and 10 fork-lifts under the second - at a total delivered cost of some Rs. 10.3 million, or about $1.3 million equivalent. The expectation was that the equip- ment would significantly speed up cargo-handling operations. The con- signment under the first loan was delivered mainly in 1958 and that under the second loan mainly in 1964. Unfortunately, detailed records on cargo- handling do not go back beyond 1962; these records indicate no impact of the 1964 consignment. Data on average discharge and loading per ship per day do indicate a sharp improvement between 1957/58 and 1958/59 (see Appendix Table 7), but this improvement was only partially sustained and it is not clear how representative the single year 1957/58 is of the si- tuation prior to the large increase in cargo-handling equipment that the Bank made possible. The available data on shore labor gang productivity - 28 - indicate no significant change between the early 1960s and early 1970s. CPC itself takes the view that the handling equipment did not affect pro- ductivity or speed of operation but only reduced the drudgery involved. But it may be that a significant improvement in the overall figures should not have been expected for, even though the equipment represented large increases to the existing stock that CPC had, it was small in absolute terms - enough for fully mechanized operation at only three or four of the 33 general cargo berths in the port. If the Bank-supported projects were, with a few possible minor ex- ceptions, economically worthwhile the question still arises whether greater or earlier effort on Haldia would not have been more so. Overriding poli- tical and economic problems in Calcutta's hinterland have been such that the mere availability of a more efficient modern port would probably not have greatly affected the quantum of general cargo traffic offered, but it would have enabled additional iron-ore exports, at least in recent years, and it might have held more coal traffic to the sea route; in addi- tion there would have been some significant cost-savings on traffic trans- ferred from Calcutta, due to the larger size of vessel that Haldia can take and reduced ship turn-around time. These berefits would add to a substantial amount. In general terms it is clear that the earlier Haldia would have been completed the better. However in 1960-61 Haldia was not really an alternative, the decision to carry out further studies of an impounded dock scheme there - rather than to invest immediately on river- side jetties - was probably correct, and most of the components of the Bank's second project seem indeed to have been warranted irrespective of Haldia, as the Bank argued at the time. But the Bank, in its preoccupa- tion with the hydraulic complexities of the Hooghly, failed to insist on simultaneous study of economic aspects of the Haldia scheme. Had it done so, fully satisfactory feasibility studies could probably have been com- pleted by the end of 1963, final design could have been done in 1964 and construction might well have been able to start as early as 1965 and be completed in 1970. This would clearly have been desirable. Instead, the process of project preparation dragged out and the GOI decided in 1966, mainly in light of overall balance of payments conside- rations and aid prospects at the time, to build the project without foreign assistance. Construction is likely to take 7 years (1968-74) instead of the 5 years expected by the Bank in 1965 and the 6 years that would probably actually have been feasible with the participation of foreign contractors and the availability of foreign assistance to enable freer import of supplies. Total construction costs are now estimated at about Rs. 800 million, including 7-8% (Rs. 60 million) foreign exchange, compared with Rs. 560 million, including nearly 40% (Rs. 205 million) foreign exchange, for the slightly larger scheme appraised by the Bank in - 29 - 1965; more than half of the difference between these total figures is ac- counted for by interim price inflation. In theory, then, a simple ana- lysis could be made to show whether the benefits (principally additional ore exports) from having Haldia operating one year or more earlier than is actually likely would have been sufficient to justify the additional foreign exchange cost of the foreign-assisted scheme, or at what shadow price of foreign exchange the two alternatives would have been equally good. A thorough study of this question - taking account of indirect foreign exchange costs, likely cost overruns on the Bank-appraised scheme, the value to CPC and its Indian contractors of the training and experience gained from present methods - might be worthwhile. It is not clear which way the analysis would fall, but there is no doubt that construction of Haldia is a major feat of Indian engineering. Even when Haldia is completed CPC will at best be able to offer 34-35 foot drafts, but the hope is, by the combined effects of the channel stabilization made possible by diversions at Farakka together with inten- sive capital dredging, to reach 40 foot draft in the approach to Haldia by 1980. This would permit bulk carriers of some 60,000 DWT, a reasonable size at present but no larger than Paradeep is already able to accomodate, and less than what may be becoming the normal size for such vessels in the early 1980s. Institutional Development The basic organizational structure of the Port of Calcutta has not changed substantially over the past twenty years. The port is run by a 24-member Board of Commissioners, with the Chairman and Deputy Chairman appointed by the Ministry of Transport in Delhi and the other members appointed, nominated or elected to represent a fairly broad range of central, regional and local Government, labor, and local business and commercial interests; the latter have the largest representation. The Chairman, a senior civil servant appointed from outside, and the Deputy Chairman, an engineer long with CPC, are directly responsible for the day- to-day running of the port and now have 13 department heads reporting to them, of whom some 5 represent an informal executive committee. A cur- rent organization chart is given at the end of this paper. Powers to approve contracts (up to Rs. 10,000 by the Chairman and up to Rs. 700,000 by the Commissioners) have remained unchanged since 1957, so that they have more than halved in real terms, and all capital expenditures, of whatever size, have to receive prior approval of Central Government authorities. CPC's Chairman is also ex-officio Chairman of the Dock Labor Board (DLB) which was formed in 1953 to decasualize the stevedore companies' - 30 - casual labor. Cargo-handling ashore is thus done by CPC labor while that on board ship (except for coal) is done by workers registered with the DLB and temporarily hired out to the stevedore companies. Over the last decade various other groups of workers, previously employed directly by private companies, have come under DLB registration. Total DLB labor now numbers some 15,000 (see Appendix Table 7). Direct CPC employees have increased from some 40,500 as of December 31, 1957 to 42,600 as of December 31, 1971. With the decline in traffic overall productivity, measured in terms of tons of dry cargo handled per employee, has of course declined sharply from peaks above 220 tons for 1957/58 and 1964/65 to the range of 100-130 tons in the last three years (Appendix Table 7). Measured in terms of gross port revenues per employee, adjusted for price inflation, overall productivity was about the same in 1971/72 as in 1957/58. There have however been important changes in the distribution of the CPC labor force. Operational staff, althoughstill the largest group, has dropped substantially from over 25,000 in 1960 to less than 21,000 in 1972. Most of this reduction has been in shore labor, some 20-40% of whom have nevertheless had normally to be sent home without work in re- cent years. But the reduction in operations staff still represents an important achievement in view of the increase in CPC's fleet of vessels over the period and consequent need for more staff in that sector. Ad- ministrattive departments have increased staff by some 20% since 1960 to reach 5,300 in 1972. But the really large increases in employment have been in the engineering departments mainly responsible for maintenance. They have grown nearly 60% from about 10,400 employees in 1960 to about 16,400 in 1962. A significant part of this increase is due to inclusion of CPC employees concerned with Haldia construction but even if these are left aside, and no allowance is made for those in the engineering de- partments in 1960 who were concerned with capital construction, we still find a 42% increase in maintenance staff over the period. This seems extremely large, even allowing for the admittedly substantial increase in CPC's fleet over the same period. A calculation relating maintenance staff to gross operating assets in constant prices suggests that this ratio'has steadily risen in the last three years. The Bank encouraged CPC to reduce its labor force, although it generally tempered its emphasis on this point in view of the extreme poverty and widespread unemployment so evident in Calcutta. In 1968, in face of CPC's increasingly acute financial difficulties, the Bank urged that the GOI should take over responsibility for paying those shown by scientific studies to be redundant. This was not done. Except on one occasion, the Bank seemed to be thinking almost entirely of cargo- handling labor - where important reductions have been underway, both - 31 - among CPC and among DLB workers, despite the fact these groups remain seriously underemployed. The persistent rise in maintenance employees and the overstaffing that is visible in the maintenance shops would probably have warranted more attention. There has been a strong trend toward equalization of wages in CPC, partly as a result of the large increases for lower-paid workers decreed by Central Government Wage Boards. The average wage of the lower-paid workers (Classes III and IV) has risen from only a little over 15% of that of officers (Classes I and II) in 1961/62 to nearly 30% in 1970/71 (Appendix Table 7). In terms of current Rupees the average wage of the lower-paid has risen about 105% over this period, that of officers less than 20%, compared with a rise in the cost-of-living index over the same period of 70-80%..!/ This does not seem seriously to have affected the caliber of CPC's higher grade staff, but it has made it difficult to recruit and retain younger officers of high quality; this is particularly so in the pilotage service but it seems to be true of other branches of CPC activity too. Even with the port's financial problems, more rapid increase of salaries for higher-grade staff would probably have been in the port's long-run interests. In the two areas in which the Bank concentrated its effort in re- gard to institutional development - long-term planning and accounting - important changes have been accomplished. In both areas there are weak- nesses as well as strengths in what has been achieved. Long-Term Planning In the field of long-term planning the Bank's principal focus and impact was on hydraulic aspects. As promised in connection with the second loan, CPC set up its own Hydraulic Studies Department in 1962, with Dr. McDowell, an expert previously provided by the UN, as first Director. Under contract with the Bank, various Dutch experts made brief visits to advise on the structure and early work programs of HSD - par- ticularly on the questions that needed to be answered in connection with Haldia. Since 1964 the department has been run by the man who was initial- ly McDowell's deputy, and no foreign specialists have been hired on a long- term basis. Several supervision missions in the late 1960s considered HSD to be the best run of all CPC's departments. It now has a staff of slightly under 250, divided among four departments - hydraulic engineering, dredging research, river research and special assignments. Its principal work has been for CPC but it has also successfully carried out a few assignments, on a consultancy basis, for other Indian ports, the West Bengal State Government and other entities. 1/ According to the Reserve Bank of India indices for Calcutta, 67% for urban non-manual employees and 78% for working class. - 32 - The Department has set up and maintained an effective system for gathering, collating and analyzing hydrological data. It has an extensive network of gauging stations for measuring tides, velocities, density and silt load; it carries out regular hydrographic surveys and tracer exper- iments. Analysis of the data collected provides a detailed knowledge of the behavior of the river bed, tidal streams and siltation processes. A large tidal fixed bed model of the river and its tributaries is expected to be completed and calibrated during 1973. HSD produces analyses of short-term operational importance - draft forecasts and advice on dredging, for instance - but its main effort has been in connection with planning of capital projects such as Haldia and related works and the measures that are being taken to prepare for com- pletion of Farakka. Among the principal benefits of HSD operations over the last ten years are: - recommendations to optimize the use of dredging plantand reduce ineffective dredging, - predictions of shoaling so that pre-dredging can be under- taken, - availability of extensive and detailed knowledge about river Hooghly, - confirmation that adequate depths could be maintained at Haldia, even under adverse stream-flow conditions, - detailed schemes to enable advantages of Farakka to be maxi- mized, - planning of progressive river training works to stabilize the river channel and reduce dredging requirements, - determination of the correct location of the oil jetty and the new lock entrance at Haldia. HSD works closely with other departments of CPC. It has had major impact on all the principal investment schemes that CPC presently has under way - Haldia itself, the Bhagirathi-Hooghly training works underway at a cost of Rs. 100 million to prepare for Farakka, procurement of a large estuarine dredger (Rs. 100 million) to assist in deepening the access channel to Haldia and a further project under consideration to expedite the deepening of this access channel. In other aspects of long-term planning, which the Bank sporadically discussed but never seems to have followed up in detail, CPC remains re- latively weak. The small planning cell, located in the Secretary's De- partment, seems to suffer from shortage of dynamic staff, and the small number of highly qualified officers is overburdened with urgent current problems and production of statistics. Longer-term planning, to the ex- tent it is done, seems to be dispersed among the main operating departments. Traffic forecasting machinery remains weak, and traffic promotion and - 33 - generation scarcely receive attention. Issues such as how.to use the direct inland water route up the Ganges that will be opened up by Farakka to generate traffic for the port, what to do with the Calcutta coal and ore berths when Haldia is completed, whether and when to sell the Calcutta Jetties, how to employ CPC's large labor force more productively, whether and when to build a deep-water facility for bulk cargoes at Saugor Island, would warrant hard pursuit by a strong central planning unit.. Accounting Reform Accounting reform is less of a success story than hydraulic stu- dies, even though major changes have been accomplished here too. After CPC's Chief Accountant had been unable to fulfill the commitment made in the 1961 loan to,develop auxiliary accounts, to show costs and revenues by service, a new CPC Chairman brought in a local accounting firm in 1963 to review the situation. It proposed a set of auxiliary accounts and an appropriate method for classifying expenditures and receipts for this purpose, and it dealt with the revaluation of assets to replacement values. But the report, issued in October 1963, was more a proposal than a solu- tion, and despite spasmodic questions from the Bank as to the action to be taken, the matter lay largely dormant in inconclusive discussions between GOI, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, CPC and the Bombay Port Trust which, at the Bank's advice, had also hired a consult- ant firm to deal with accounting reform. Then in November 1965 GOI set up a cell in the Ministry of Transport, headed by a senior officer of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, to go into the matter of accounting reform for ports, with aview to coming out with a standard system for all ports. The Bank pressed the matter hard during the appraisal of Haldia and in subsequent discussions, making a loan for Haldia (which was at that time still expected to be made) contingent on concrete evidence of progress in introducing reforms at Calcutta. The main theme of the Bank was the need to reassess asset values at their replacement costs and to charge to revenue depreciation allowances based on these asset values and reason- able standard lives. At Bank urging, CPC produced a target schedule of steps designed to enable application of a modernized accounting system, incorporating this feature, starting in 1967/68, and advisory assistance was obtained from the accounting firm that had done the 1963 report. With a very large effort in reclassification of assets and establishment of appropriate service lives and in reorganization of accounting categories on the basis of a system of 999 cost centers, a modernized accounting system was applied informally in 1968/69 and officially from 1969/70 on. This was mainly the achievementof a former Chief Accounts Officer of CPC, - 34- kept on expressly for the job, and of the Accounts Officer specially assigned to the Ministry of Transport. Similar systems have also been applied in the other major ports of India. With minor modifications introduced over the last three years, the new accounting system is working smoothly and the staff is becoming accustomed to it; audit, which is carried out by the Government Auditor General, was completed about 8 months after the end of the year for 1971/72 compared with 15 months for 1970/71. The main advantages of the new sys- tem are that it presents revenue and expenditure accounts (including de- preciation based on reasonable service lives) by major service category and also by responsibility centers and that it provides a more meaningful consolidated balance sheet. Assets are given at historic costs in the main accounts, and depreciation allowances are calculated on this basis. But replacement value of assets other than land is given in a footnote to the accounts. While the new accounting system classifies figures in a new and potentially more useful way, it is very hard to identify ways in which this has affected modes of managing and operating the port. It does not seem to have induced or assisted the development of a more commercial outlook on the part of management. By a quirk of circumstance effective depreciation allowances are actually slightly lower than they would have been had the old system been retained. Regular management reports based on the new system do not appear to be produced, and the useful monthly Performance Report issued by the Planning Cell since two or three years ago contains no financial data. Experiments have started with quarterly reports on actual revenues and expenditures as compared with budget, by department, but management seems to have shown little interest. The major service categories used can show very broadly which areas of port operation are losing money, but this was largely known before at a gen- eral level. The finer breakdown by particular tariff-service that would be necessary to provide the most useful information, or the time-and- motion type of studies by particular operation that might be more appro- priate, do not appear to be done, certainly not on a regular basis. There is no evidence so far of any major management decision having been significantly affected by the new accounting system. Financial Performance Although the Bank-assisted investment projects appear by and large to have been economically worthwhile the financial performance of CPC has been very disappointing compared with Bank appraisal report projec- tions. The appraisal report for the first loan projected debt-service coverage of some 2.0-2.5 and financing of over 50% of the investment - 35 - program by internally generated funds; actual debt-service coverage for this period, through the early 1960s, was only about 1.2-1.3 and self- financing,less than 25%. The much lower levels of debt-service-coverage and internal self-financing projected in the second appraisal report (about 1.2-1.3 and 10% respectively) were more nearly attained for a while, but performance dropped sharply in 1965/66 and never recovered. (See Appendix Tables 8 and 9). CPC's accounts show losses after interest and depreciation for each year since 1965/66 and they would show losses for each year since the early 1960s had depreciation been charged on,a replacement cost basis. The accounting losses of 1965/66-67/68 were covered by drawing down CPC's reserve funds. Since 1968/69 they have been covered by large,Government operating subsidies and by capitalization of losses in the balance sheet. The following table shows the situation for the last four years. Table 3 CPC Losses 1968/69-1971/72 and Their Coverage (Rs. million) 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 Total Net Deficit in Accounts 37.7 95.9 89.8 58.3 281.7 Government Op. Subsidy 50.0 29.0 97.1 176.1, Losses Capitalized 37.7 45.9 60.8 -38.8 105.6 Depreciation not charged n.a. 16.2 15.3 14.9 46.4 The last line reflects the difference between depreciation on historical cost basis, as actually charged, and depreciation on replacement cost basis and should really be added to losses to provide a truer picture. The subsidy payments are shown according to the year in which they were committed. GOI agreed to a subsidy at the rate of 50% of CPC's expendi- tures on river dredging and conservancy in 1969 and at the rate of 80% in 1972, and the payments shown for these years reflect adjustments to make 'up the full 80% with effect from 1968/69. CPC has been able to capitalize losses by spending less on capital works than what was secured for these, mainly from Government (see Appendix Table 9) and by using re- serve funds. The effective debt-equity ratio, on the basis of the official accounts, has been around 99/1 (see Appendix table 11). - 36 - CPC has maintained its debt-service payments to the Bank and to other creditors on schedule. In May 1967 the Bank informed the 001 that it might have to start meeting CPC's debt obligations. Formally, they have continued to be met from CPCts earnings. But in reality CPC's ex- penditures on river dredging and conservancy are of little benefit to others than users of the port. Hence it is an arbitrary matter whether CPC debt-service obligations, amounting to some Rs. 260 million over the past four years, are considered to have been met mainly from Government subsidy and capitalized losses or from earnings. The drastic deterioration in CPC's financial condition has been mainly a phenomenon of the last 7 years, and it is ,hard to see that CPC, given its labor situation, could have done very much more at this stage to prevent it than it did in fact do. Between 1965/66 and 1970/71 traf- fic dropped nearly 40% at the same time as operating expenditures increased more than 50%, almost entirely due to increases of equivalent size in 'the wage bill (53%, with less than 2% increase in employment), which accounts for more than 70% of CPC operating costs. Despite the fall in traffic gross revenues increased some 25%, mainly due to large tariff increases between mid-1966 and mid-1967. Tariffs could probably have been increased more, but there is clearly some.limit to the extent this can be done with- out affecting traffic, and CPC's large property holdings could probably have been exploited to yield more rapidly rising revenues, but the pro- perty market in Calcutta was not at all strong in this period due to political problems. These same problems made substantial reduction of the labor force an impossibility and required that centrally decreed wage increases be met. Whenever Bank supervision missions made constructive and specific suggestions in these years., CPC seems to have examined them carefully and, if it found them practicable and within its capabilities, it took action. For instance,,it cut back its railway trackage a little, as suggested by the 1968 mission, and it has been encouraging unprofitable short-haul railway operations to die, as recommended by the 1969 mission; port charges for exports, which had been increased much less than those for imports in order to encourage export trade, were partially adjusted in 1970, as recommended by the 1969 mission, but, on the other hand, the very thorough study of the price-elasticity of actual and potential traf- fic which the 1968 mission usefully recommended does not seem to have been attempted, because CPC lacked the requisite staff. These steps, however, could not have been sufficient greatly to alter the situation, and the Bank was by this time strongly promoting the large Government sub- sidies which some in the Bank had favored as early as 1960. CPC has in fact adhered closely to its undertakings to the Bank in regard to financial performance. The depreciation study required by the - 37 - Bank in connection with the first loan was carried out by a team inclu- ding foreign experts as the Bank recommended and delivered by the due date of April 1, 1959. The Renewals and Replacements Fund which this study recommended was established with effect from 1960/61 and tariffs were increased significantly in January 1960, including increases on coal and foodgrains as proposed by the consultants. At the time the second loan was made, CPC undertook to try to strengthen its financial position "with a view to earning sufficient revenue to cover all opera- ting expenses, including adequate depreciation, and to leave a reasonable margin to meet unexpected increases in expenditures as they arise," and it promised to give particular attention to four items - development of land holdings, reduction of stores, use of Revenue Reserve Fund to reduce borrowing requirements and revision of rate structure. These areas of emphasis were largely reiterated in the Ratnam Committee Report completed in September 1961. Late in 1961 CPC produced a plan for increasing revenues from its property holdings which the Bank seems to have found acceptable. It was proposed to rent out an additional 200 acres between 1962 and 1967 and, by this together with increase of existing rentals, to raise gross re- venues from property to.Rs. 18.3 million in 1966/67. Both targets were very closely adhered to. A more tentative longer-term plan given in the 1961 note and proposing a further increase of some 300 acres in the area rented out between 1967 and 1972 has not been fulfilled, but this seems to have been largely because of the weakness in the local land market in this period and partly because CPC did not have the funds to undertake the land-fill and other works required to beneficiate the land. The Bank raised the matter in 1968, but CPC did not feel much more could be done at that time. CPC now has about 2,200 tenants occupying 3.8 million square feet of warehouse space and some 1,200 acres of land, out of the total of 3,360 acres it owns at Calcutta and Budge-Budge.1'/ Average gross annual rental on the land is about Rs. 13,000 per acre. According toaCMPOVmap most of this land falls within a range of Rs. 3,000-5,000 per Katha (or Rs. 180,000-300,000 per acre) registered value, and some in higher categories. CMPO officials suggest that current market values are at least double these registed values, which would mean that CPC's leased out land may be worth some Rs. 500,000/acre ($66,000) and the gross re- turn currently being earned is only some 2.5%. With the renewal of growth in Calcutta there should be scope for substantially increasing rents; the limits on periodic rental increases built into earlier rental agreements did not allow for inflation and seem to require revision. 1/ It has another 9 square miles approximately at Haldia. 2/ Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization. - 38 - With regard to stores, the Ratnam Committee suggested trying to reduce them to a ceiling of Rs. 18.0 million and CPC, in reviewing the recommendation, felt that Rs. 20.0 million would be an appropriate tar- get. These estimates were presumably in relation to 1961 prices and volume of work underway. They would have meant bringing down stores from some 16% of combined annual expenditures on port operation and capital works to about 10-11% and from some 120% of annual expenditures on stores to about 70-75%. Stores have in fact been steadily reduced, to such an extent that today they may well be too low, at only about 5% of combined annual expenditures on port operation and capital works and about 66% of annual expenditures on stores. These figures are fairly high, but so are delays in procurement in India. CPC also steadily drew down its Revenue Reserve Fund, starting in 1962, in order to reduce the need for borrowing. The Fund fell from Rs. 53.0 million as of March 31, 1961, by steps, to Rs. 38.0 million by March 31, 1965, after which date it was rapidly depleted to help cover the operating deficits of succeeding years. As regards revision of rate structure the Ratnam Committee recom- mended a general increase of charges for the year 1963/64, with parti- cular emphasis on foodgrains and coal, and such a change was introduced with effect from April 1, 1963. The Bank recognized, from 1958, the need for larger tariff increases than emanated from the various consultant studies and Government commit- tees, and it was persistently concerned about CPC's poor financial per- formance, but it never seems to have pursued the matter effectively or to have convinced the Indian authorities of the need for action. In retros- pect it appears to have been unduly impressed with the apparently strong financial structure of CPC - debt-equity ratio of 51/49 in 1958 and large liquid reserves - and insufficiently concerned with poor current financial performance. While it certainly recognized the problem of in- adequate depreciation, it does not seem to have appreciated the full financial implications of an entity's taking on more debt to pay for replacements in a situation where traffic expansion was expected to be fairly moderate. Had this been fully appreciated the Bank would pro- bably not have been prepared to lend with such modest financial per- formance as CPC was then giving. In 1961 CPC made a rough revaluation of its assets, as of March 31, 1960, which the Bank used in its appraisal report, but it did not point out the magnitude of the difference between the 1.7% return CPC.was actually earning on these assets, after inadequate allowance for depreciation, and the 5 or 6% plus adequate depreciation which would have conformed more closely to normal standards. The struc- ture of Bank forecasts seems always to have erred on the optimistic side, - 39 - with revenues growing more than traffic and operating costs less. The Bank was not always consistent with regard to depreciation and asset- revaluation and seems sometimes to have been confused by CPC financial statements. It may have been a tactical error to negotiate the 1961 loan at a time when the Indian authorities could refuse to make any firm financial commitments on the grounds that the Ratnam Committee re- port was not yet ready. The combination of reasonable economic results and poor financial performance for a single scheme usually means that the entity responsible for it has not been able to appropriate the benefits to itself, and this is clearly true in this case. Yet who has benefitted from the poor finan- cial .performance of CPC is very hard to say. A proper treatment of this would require a much more detailed analysis than has been possible here of CPC's wage rates relative to those of other employers of similar labor, of CPC's rather complex tariff structure, of the short- and long-run mar- ginal costs of its different tariff services, and of changes in whole- sale and retail prices and transport mark-ups for various goods going through the port. From a purely financial standpoint, it may be noted that CPC's gross revenues in 1971-72 would have had to be about 66% higher than they actually were to enable all operating costs (including the minimum wage for underemployed labor) to be covered, an adequate provision for depreciation and a 6% return on revalued assets. Those benefitting most from the subsidized services would appear to be coal- shippers, foodgrain merchants, most general cargo exporters (excluding tea and gunnies), users of the railway services and those renting CPC property; but whether or not these benefits are passed on to, or shared with, producers and final consumers is impossible to say. Foreign ship- ping lines are also benefitting directly from CPC's subsidized rates but CPC's fear that increased charges to them would be quickly passed back to India in the form of higher freight rates, in foreign exchange, is probably justified. These benefits are being financed mainly by the Government in the form of its operating subsidy and other assistance and to some extent at the expense of future generations, by inadequate allo- cations for replacement and use of reserve funds and capitalization of losses. Conclusions The assistance provided by the Bank to CPC made it possible to keep Calcutta open as a port for ocean-going vessels of medium size, and this was less expensive than other alternative ways of handling cargo to and from most of Calcutta's very large hinterland. The Bank-assisted projects were economically worthwhile in broad concept and in detail, with the - 40 - possible exception of a few minor elements, chiefly the KGD extension and the Libyan Tea Warehouse, due to low utilization. Port charges that are high by comparison with those of other Indian ports but substantially below the high costs of operating Calcutta port do not seem to have dis- torted traffic allocation on India's transport system. CPC's poor financial performance has however laid very heavy finan- cial burdens on the Government - in the form of operating subsidies of some Rs. 200 million and almost total reliance on Government for finan- cing of CPC's large on-going investment program, mainly in Haldia and works related to thisl9roject and to Farakka. The prospect is for further substantial deficits,- at least until Haldia begins to handle a large volume of bulk traffic, and the GOI has already undertaken to sustain the 80% of river dredging and conservancy costs at least through 1973/74. While there must still be a limit to the extent to which port charges can be raised without affecting traffic and it.would not be opportune to dis- courage traffic at a stage, as now, when it is just recovering and when Haldia is about to be completed, it would seem that port charges could and should have been raised substantially more quickly than they were in the early 1960s and that there has in recent years been room for raising them somewhat more again. Although it was concerned about the problem, the Bank did not find an effective way of convincing the Indian author- ities to take more substantial and expeditious action. The Bank made a significant contribution to development of CPC and to India more broadly with its insistence on the creation of the Hydrau- lic Studies Department and its financial and technical assistance to this end. The experience of the last ten years and of the complex hy- draulic problems which CPC has to face leaves no doubt that this was a high-priority need and a correct focus of Bank attention. The Bank's broader hope that CPC would become a more streamlined and commercially oriented organization seems to have been only very par- tially realized. Knowledge of, and contact with, the traffic hinterland apparently remains very small, and there is little or no effort at traf- fic promotion. Little centralized long-term planning is done. Initia- tive seems to be less encouraged than deference to Delhi. By a major effort, the new commercial accounting system has been introduced, but the usual budget and management information reports, studies and analyses are not being produced, and it is having little effect on the management and operation of the port. Partly this is because of the great constraints under which the port has been functioning - a long decline in the demand for its services due to the economic recession, nationally imposed wage increases of major magnitude for the very class of labor which is in most abundant and excessive supply, extreme difficulty in discharging any labor, and rising costs of keeping the port open at all to ships of moder- ate size. 1/ A small Rs. 12.5 million tariff increase was to be approved in December 1972, but most of this will be required simply to meet extra labor costs arising from a new central wage award. - 41 - It is a question, in retrospect, for the Bank whether change of the accounting system warranted quite the emphasis it was given, at least in the form that this emphasis took. Actually, in the 1961 ne- gotiations, the Bank's representatives decided that a wholesale reform of the accounting system was too large a job to insist upon, and it was this that led to the reference to the need for preparation of auxiliary accounts. When the subject was taken up again in the middle 1960s it seems to have been assumed that in order to produce such auxiliary ac- counts the whole accounting system would have to be changed. And certainly the new system provides the framework and the basis for many useful management applications. But a simpler change, emphasizing the necessary work on asset reclassification and revaluation for deprecia- tion purposes together with time-and-motion type studies, more loosely linked to the accounting system, for analysis of individual tariff services might have led to quicker and more useful results for applica- tion in improving efficiency and in setting tariffs - which were the Bank's end objectives. Irrespective of this, it does seem that whatever changes were agreed upon in the accounting field, more attention should have been given to the types of reports that would result from the changes and the questions that these reports might help to answer - on costs and profitability of individual services, budget performance, financial trends,etc. More generally, in the matter of management re- porting, the Bank did not set the example it might have done through its loans, with their lack of agreed schedules for execution of project works, absence of targets of financial and technical performance, and very little identification of indicators which would show whether the improvements financed were having the desired effect. Reasonable per- formance data could have been collected without any reform of the ac- counting system and would have helped to identify bottlenecks and scope for improvement of operations with the.equipment and facilities avail- able. If less emphasis might well have been given to overall accounting reform it does seem that more emphasis should have been given to per- sonnel and labor matters. Given the great difficulty - and doubtful desirability in Calcutta conditions - of substantial cut-backs in the labor force, attention could usefully have been given to expanding CPC's areas of activity to peripheral activities, making use of facilities as well as labor presently underemployed, and meeting needs not now being met: for example, pallet-making, surfacing quay aprons, repairing and upgrading access roads, filling and beneficiating vacant CPC land, and warehousing (the recent transfer of Libyan Warehouse to CIWTC seems questionable from this point of view). Such operations might well have required some effort on training and retraining, which appears a weak area of CPC activity, largely confined at present to the Mechanical Engineering Department. Training is virtually non-existent in the -42 - operational departments; supervisors have been increased relative to supervised in the shore labor, but deficiency of training and supervi- sion still seem to mean that less advantage is being obtained from mechanical cargo handling equipment than would be possible. Time-and- motion studies also have a role to play here in identifying better ways to handle particular jobs, as well as the costs of carrying them out. The DLB made breakthroughs in 1970 in several respects, inclu- ding introduction of greatly improved incentive schemes which had a major effect on stevedore productivity and speed (see Appendix Table 7), but incentive arrangements for CPC labor, cargo-handling and other, seem poor; promotions depend on seniority rather 'than performance or training. If CPC is to get enough high-quality officers to apply ima- gination to these possibilities for improving labor use and extending opportunities, as well as to the other needed studies of hinterland, traffic-elasticity, improved exploitation of CPC property, planning of the next development after Haldia, etc., it will almost certainly have to increase salaries for higher-level staff considerably. More Bank attention to these personnel matters could probably have played a use- ful role, both directly and indirectly, to make the constraints.of which CPC is so well aware seem less tightly binding. CPC executed the Bank-assisted projects quite effectively and adhered closely to the commitments it made to the Bank; equally, the. Bank, which devoted considerable effort to the Port of Calcutta, was generally responsive and reasonably flexible in handling its side of the relationship. There were delays in project execution, but many of them were unavoidable in light of the changing needs of the situation and the Bank's inability under policies of the time to finance local procurement except under special circumstances. There are a few points connected with loan administration where, in retrospect, it seems as though it would have been better if the decision in the Bank had gone the other way. Three of these relate to opportunities that the Bank had for expediting construction of a satellite port, of which it was generally - and, in retrospect, rightly - a strong proponent. First, it would seem that two or three years would have been gained' had the Bank followed the 1957 mission's recommendations and provided technical assistance for 'execution of hydraulic studies in connection with the first loan, instead of the.second. And secondly, time on Haldia could again have been gained if the Bank had raised in 1960-61, along with the technical questions about the project, the economic questions whose resolution took most of 1964-65. Thirdly,,it seems.unfortunate, given the great importance of the project and the excessively long delays to which it had already been subject, that the Bank in 1965 prolonged ne- gotiations on secondary issues to a point at which other considerations came into play to cause construction finally to be started only in 1968. Aside from Haldia, it is clear that, especially if the issue of hydraulic - 43 - planning had been dealt with in connection with the first loan, but probably even in the absence of this, the second loan should have been negotiated a year later than it actually was, when the component pro- jects had been better prepared and had full Government approval and when the Ratnam CoImmittee recommendations were available as the basis for more meaningful agreement on financial performance targets. Finally it seems that more attention should have been given in advance to the ne- gative effects on project completion and operation of the refusal in 1967 to extend the second loan's closing date for most items. These points may have some relevance when parallel decisions have to be made in the administration of other lending.  APPENDTX TABLE 1 CARGO RANDLED AT MAJOR IND1AN PORTS - 1957/58-1971/72 (in '000 metric ton, excluding bunker fuel) 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-6 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 CALCUTTA 10,132 9,227 9676 9,391 9,199 10,091 10,800 10,928 9,729 9,974 8,878 7.663 6 5,6 7,24 1.port-Coastal 1,227 1,269 1,298 1,483 1,722 1,845 2,119 2,019 1,624 1,417 1,500 1,297 1,341 1,375 1,700 Forenig 4,377 3,879 3,735 4,009 3,163 3,635 3,909 4,064 3,660 4,375 3,385 2,703 2,058 1,872 3,051 Total 5,604 5.148 5.033 5,492 4.885 5,480 6,02B 6,083 5,284 5 792 4.885 4,000 3.399 33247 4751 Expor-s Coa-tal 1,274 1,185 1,249 1,406 1,866 2,214 2,007 1,759 1,344 974 755 680 826 275 675 Foreign 3,254 2,894 3,394 2.493 2,448 2,397 2,765 3,086 3,101 3,208 3,238 3,183 2,595 2,443 1.868 Total 4.528 4,079 4,643 3.899 4.314 4.611 4,772 4,845 4,445 4,182 3.993 3.863 3.421 2 718 2,543 BOM(BAY 13.167 11,759 13,342 14,349 13,911 15.966 17,354 18,878 17,910 17.007 16.923 19,022 15172 14.103 14.714 T.ports -coaal 1,264 1,309 1,367 1,363 1,436 1,581 1,538 1.343 1,66 1,489 1,682 1,728 1,500 1,700 1,169 Foreign 8,427 7,329 8,568 9,357 8,594 9,826 10,234 i2,011 11,398 10,480 10,905 13,044 10,196 8,955 10,174 Total 9,711 8.638 9,927 10,720 10.030 11,407 12.272 13,354 12,864 11,960 12.587 14.772 11.696 10,655 11.343 Exports - coastal 752 1,550 1,824 1,931 2,105 2,339 2,876 3,167 2,908 2,899 2,120 2,248 1,614 1,738 1,940 20reign 2,704 1,571 1,591 1,698 1,776 2,220 2,206 2,357 2,138 2,148 2,216 2,002 1,862 1,710 1,431 Total 3 456 3.121 3,415 3,629 3 861 4 559 5.082 5,524 5.046 5 047 4.336 4250 3,476 3.448 3,371 HADRAS 2 544 2 479 2 763 3 039 3 468 3 785 4 166 4 398 4872 5,856 5,863 6,378 6,440 6 926 5.51 Imports - Coastal 668 618 769 768 878 1,027 1,117 1,145 1,126 972 985 906 530 183 122 Foreign 1,247 1,147 1,072 1,360 1,391 1,561 1,472 1,848 2,173 2,896 2,806 3,116 3,006 3,555 3,297 Total 1.915 1.765 1 841 2 128 2.269 2.588 2 589 2.993 3,299 3,868 3.793 4.022 3,536 3.738 3.419 Exports -Coatal 38 51 48 50 63 60 56 52 50 45 38 31 343 428 210 Fogn 591 663 874 861 1,136 1,137 1,521 1,353 1,523 1,943 2,032 2,325 2,561 2,760 1,922 Total 629 714 922 911 199 1197 1 577 405 1.573 988 2,070 2 356 2.904 3188 2132 VISHAKKPATNA1 2,476 2,485 2,391 2.763 2,756 3,121 3.396 3,741 4,460 5,878 6,445 8,050 8,312 8.766 8.669 Iporta -Coastal 18 8 11 13 16 31 27 32 21 23 25 23 98 131 67 Foreign 1,146 1,346 1,211 1,373 1,380 1,687 1,822 1,877 1,887 2,204 2,388 2,669 2,231 2.208 2,712 Total 1.164 1.354 1,222 1,386 1.396 1.718 1.849 1 909 1.908 2,227 2.413 2.692 2,329 2.339 2.779 Export- Coastal 324 554 585 588 622 715 619 678 669 604 481 570 334 289 294 Forelgn 988 577 > 584 789 738 688 928 1,154 1,883 3,947 3,551 4,788 5,649 6,138 5,596 Total 1,312 1,131 1 169 1,,377 1360 1,403 1.547 1,832 2,552 3,651 4,032 5.358 5.983 6,427 5,890 0CE 1.828 1,808 1.977 2,010 2285 2,362 2.455 2.711 2,871 3,670 5,424 5,189 4,795 4,843 4.276 1mport- CoaStal 816 806 853 913 1,018 1,031 1,157 1,074 1,050 698 228 230 243 156 242 Foreig 610 549 696 709 859 928 877 1,186 1,362 2,374 3,504 3,552 3,126 3,292 2,943 Total 1 426 1.355 1 549 1,622 1877 1.959 2 034 2,260 2,412 3,.072 3 732 3,782 3.369 3 448 3,185 Export- Coastal 140 137 146 150 168 146 156 191 195 320 1,027 906 916 946 747 Foreign 262 316 282 238 240 257 265 260 264 278 665 501 510 449 344 Total 402 453 426 388 408 403 421 451 459 598 1,692 1,407 1,426 1.395 1,091 KANDLA 858 1 087 1 142 1,573 1.387 1.742 1.779 2,312 2, 506 2,661 2.465 2,035 2,110 1.605 2.033 1,porte - Coastal 265 369 355 335 399 409 474 451 493 549 531 579 766 676 795 Forelga 354 528 486 896 715 1,000 1,017 1,603 1,844 1,875 1,729 1,130 1,038 791. 1,004 Total 619 897 841 1 231 1.114 1,409 1,491 2,054 2,337 2,424 2,260 1.709 1,804 1.467 1.799 Exports- Coatal 51 46 44 65 114 98 90 90 74 86 94 153 53 34 56 For1eg1 188 144 257 277 159 235 198 168 95 151 111 173 253 104 178 Total 239 190 301 542 273 333 288 258 169 237 205 326 306 138 234 MORIUGAD - - - 6,401 6,497 5,459 5,956 6,620 7.860 8,086 8.132 8.778 9,029 11.004 11.700 Imports-Coastal - - - - 19 96 108 144 156 211 210 209 185 266 356 Foreign - - - 184 143 15 7 73 63 1 6 208 160 56 86 60 Total - - - 164 162 1Il 115 217 239 397 418 369 241 352 436 Etports-Coastal - - - - - 2 2 1 1 1 15 - 3 - - Foreign - - - 6,217 6,335 5,346 5,839 6,402 7,620 7,688 7,699 8,409 8,785 10,652 11,264 Total - - 6217 6,335 5,348 5.841 6,403 7,621 7,689 7.714 8,409 8.788 10,652 11,264 PARADIP - - - - - - - 67 896 1.238 1.731 2,157 1.906 Iports - CoataI - - - - - - - - - Foreign - .- - - - - - - - 42 9 - - Total - - - - - - - - - 42 9 - - - Eoports -Coastal - - - - - - - - - - - Fortegn - - - - - - - - - 67 854 1,229 1,731 2,157 1,906 Total - - - - - - - - - 67 854 1,229 1,731 2.157 1.906 Total 1411 01gt Port 31,005 26645 31,21 39.526 39.503 42.526 45.966 49586 5,206 53 199 55,926 58 553 54.409 55.369 56.143 Imports - coastal 4.276 4,379 4,653 4,875 5,48 6,020 6,540 6,208 5,936 5,350 5,161 4,972 4,663 4,487 4,451 Foreigo 16,161 14,778 15,760 17,88B 16,245 18,652 19,838 22,662 22,407 24,390 24,969 26,383 21,711 20,759 23,261 Total 20,439 19.157 20,413 22.763 21.733 24.672 26.378 28,870 28,343 29.740 30.130 31.355 26.374 25,246 27712 txporte- Costal 2,579 3,523 3,896 4,190 4,938 5,574 5,806 5,938 5,241 4,929 4,530 4.588 4,089 3,710 3,922 Fortigo 7,987 6,165 6,982 12,573 12,832 12,280 13,722 14,780 16,624 18,530 20,366 22,610 23.946 26,413 24,509 Total 10.566 9,688 10.878 16.763 17.770 17,854 19.528 20.718 21.865 23.459 24.896 27.198 28.035 30.123 28431 Source: Statistical Abstract of the Indian Unio (1967) Statit1al Handbook of the Indn Uono (1969) Central Statticaol Organizton Department of Statistisc, Governent of India  игмм Ровт соггчкssгоиввs: ь п-еwа enOreпs s0ee0areo вч Iв 19в ]ы ое бrxs/]в: ' теиигь Агоп сиwгrelп � cs п оо гнневг5 в 0 ёгг г r атп/в0игемьчг � `.1(вв.) i1�пв ев) с°i . ёг°"" re_8 п�п�г т�°°ооо�ан п.iл � ё3iг. vo и Рвtпг Тгв4п1 8 гЧв Ь•э10 45,326 30.600 1961 _ , э1.)15 3в,696 Ы.ок1 -]Х 1954-5в 195В 1 40 МгсM1/iпе4еп g в1/loeel гвlырв с Ьп1ед га т.. пЕ т. ёкева•ав ц.гв г• нс0 и.гпЕпе .1.ггу _ х,ю0 ь,з2s - 1959/ЬО г р 1т аЕЕдкгдglпе сгвЕ[ fo ИаСlавгlоп гИ ег вг1. в - ]],]55 ивп0вд tluelne <eneteu<tten, теlп- веvвв(240гт )евР =иеlвг 1,619 13,143 14в , -11г ]/Ы 1/Ь4 10 Lx 81аЬе1 1у [в 1nclWe гw ru дегв. Р41о[ veesel l.8]Ь 1э,]55 - ]55 - 959/б0cto 1,390 9,Ы5 всlс с пв[ ис<1лп гедиеггд гре[в 2 PAgnlJoycб AgntlSBe(tlб Ег, евгИ) _ 4 Э,101 4,В6В в,0]0 -31; З/ЬО 11/62 Ь 9/6] э2 ь 43 Iпtllen ctet]у fи i п exchen е, Ьиг двLвуед отрlег[оп диеедlЕf4гп1г4ее procur3ng вгtвlв. Пgл{)пу випЧ в/]3, Ьиг Ч11 Ье гесл.гггд. 2 МсИ0г v еее Уагосе 212 ,590 °к1у ВИгьа ьгАг)ип�(122 Рс, евсИ) Асгив] [ - - - - - - 19]9 Б 19Ы - 1пдlап де]егее Еглт 1в ргпlесс Ь, Сес. ап Норрег еге - о 1.350 9.225 1.400 1В,535 ыеlлг иееi вlивl [з]3д£г�) ивlв[ 1.194 В.935 . 1, 9В +]5R 6159 3/5В ]] ик В в1 е tnterln ln. .г[tап хп г е . 1,000 л Sooe тlпог modt(1св[lапв вддед, 1пс. вtг• churnl (]]] [г )вгп _ ],] ] 35.39] 1.501 2],в0 - 2; 9/59 в/Ы 3] ик е п. гопдlгtв g оггдеег. 1,09э л - В.198 • (+365У) Мампе (405 Е[.) - ).992 29.9 0 - 29.940 l/Ьэ 3/66 38 DиссИ е в1 - гервlгвгапдоlгегегег - е дграг[игев fгw гtопв диlауад svel3вbfltty of vвvваllга д < д-и ,366 л 9,4Ю м вгап - в гт п те ger, 9е Ntгaю1f240 f[.) Ьи11г 194]впе - 1.30 9.045 Бвб 9.]]l -11й 5/60 В/60 l - пеВвг'п. гаг ryrencM1)г.б ЬгеиеИ[г[гт И пВ Ьге[оег Gunga. ЭпЫ _ 3)0 н 35 - Уевеоl воlд га СосИ р г 1п 1966. chaпge dieeel [Ьи11[ 19211 _ 25 1 9]0 л - 9]е -45У - - - 1М4вп 3огв1 1,В00 л 3.3]5 • вге зlлkе1vвпв,ЕВ гвгв,бв ugM1 Е ев)� есевс 150 1,5в5 м 1, 91 3,0]] - 6; L1/5в 10/ЬО 3э lпаtвп c1e11ycforelgv гнс g со , п8еввг ЬЬЬ э.э45 3,345 ЧоrЧ ехвсигад, Ьи[ дегв4lв теvеllаЫв. gвпвгвlвсв g пд С ЬеггИег0 0l1 _ xt9 , Э 1э,0В0 34.]23 +1tй - lsta '60 - Indten ге1 9l3 31.363 *oJec 959/ЬО са е пд 1 пев 1пч п и бer[h _ - - - ' � - � - - - [о[frеггrевлихсавпЕ0крд edBlnBnpraбm. s1t• 1,050 1963 в: 1вга1 вЬв1 (аг Ввд1у десегlоке[ад aack иllв неге ге- 6 iпвгвl3 еlесггlс егвпвв 1.в19 13,Ы3 30,020 ]1.Ы] - 5Я 1956-5В 1950l59 1964 гг.пп. - вl8пас р. 3) сгепев Ыу о иогkедгvеll аЕсег lnlctel tlкffi- cultlee Б ете11 дгlвуе. г в АРО ВегсИв 2г-36 825 is] г - � _ 183 62R . 1 2. +1t92 - - l96 - - 1пВ4о [в8оааввl ггвпеlгпеfiеав,пЬислдесеllе плвvвt вЫв. ве г о4®епе 90 ]5 .г1/0.впgпЕвliв Пвгввпг _ ]J 54В - ] 0 -хд - - п.в. - . ecf t пвсоlеуlтатlпевпагвг тюпд вегИог бut ЕигсИвг двт rtver et . 1'lgигепlпВ/г ррlпдИи.а ьееп ивеЕи] Рог в 3.196 ].400 200 l].ЬОО - А�1ёУ: 5/59 9161 Ис ЧА1оу (1в5гЕс�)+3�® 11 ь �т l3 _ х, 16,Ь]0 6,]l0 19,180 +]3г - : 8/ЬО ]/65 Ь 1/ЬЬ 55 ь 65 д1е епд 1 пгХВа°дие na611t 6 Iогв11в1о гвgыса 2 а�рег бergev: 1,260 + 9,450 н � Р гг ь eгerieta. retgп гпвг 1п 3 Б кт З(220 fc. ев.) _ 1,9]5 14,e13 2,112 16,934 +55R 4163 ]/64 2> U[ gloбal , 1осе1 eovte еп неЕгс ввqпе w1d [а 85 3 230 Со[ Ев гевгвгсИ. JM1егпвв(]J Е[.) =ив1в[ 1] 1,46] г]0 1.]Ы +41г к959-62 196г 196] Сегюп g в1 Oelfvery вп ec�edute. э vOCk-ebвtar иипсhев ,590 1,000 ocet ыпиЕвегига гедпгед го еаув, квгвЫ, ке[е41 [51 Е[. ев.1 А_ 109 1 01В 548 1,366 -Пд 1/Ы ll/Ы,12/65,1/БЧ )4,з5,36 хпдгап evnaatl двlс ry вгигдпlв [в Ьи[ ех- и 5в еа Свтеlе - з,98Э uel [ - - - - . - . - с111Ыевдь Исв fгт иав Иепев даlе[ад !п 1959/БО. 840 л Б,'05 м `,ВОО л всИгаи=а�пв С.О Чо.е1г(234 ft.)э g в _иеlв[ l,]ОЬ 9, 1,404 1,199 +44й В!Ы 5/64 31 И[ р .1 forlcoecdw п1959/60 герlеге вп гдlе[ingпr гп-впг 1 PlOe[lna п 1.910 1L.<00 1д.400 , вгаб д е. (]0 сопе, 160 �[0.` хеИ`ВОВвИ _ 1,841 19,815 ,96Р 15,1В] +10Ь 13/60 51Ьэ х9 ригсИ g е1 г.7 4вос4 Р с41![1ев, КGв ЮЬ г,395 1,100 - Р*о1е<г ln г v]-[гп г впд NPDY(1vc1. ггппев) _ 249 t,860 1,605 ),д)3 + 2Я 195в 1959 i964 - Gгп.б �вР. ггвп -g .1 е 25-toncc е(кпгlпе.а Е - п дие [ ггвпев rhieh Ив.с вlпгг ног4ед veil�cИ ir В�рв: ;52 В90 1 052 2,9hR 0 , кР0. 5av М _ 1�945 1,460 , -10; t958 1959 1960/61 - т - га р -3всв1 го)eM1t 1пс1п 4агЧе оре - .-g1a6a1 в лр (fordC 1в) • еапlртелгСt гоЕ, в И111<иогkвИав е е 13] ]]8 1,264 ].042 ?960 ь :9 р 1re3M1Opeel ь Че1 У - 1]Ь 1.Зг0 1,ЬЬЬ ].)86 +35Я 1958 1959 Б 196d 963/6] ыЫ - с � - всвl veli�l3t[у рге- - в . 9 р -Ч nt епвlвод4 геуиl'ед, .�легеа ь.� Р 9 р vввг150 соп СM1еlпТевсег. 9 в п fng 610 5,0>5 вИед вг ь р _ >45 5,5вВ 946 6,596 +29; 195в/59 1959/61 10-14 иппдв- lосов. -р л1 0.18. ltnes вгд _ 6,150 ТИ1е о пг1в11е Че1�Т г В _ - - - - - - - - - - - в1959/60 го Егсе г Еог е lпgли decWging р вгее Р о[ to PreJcmp вмед аиг- 5h1p Ч се п - ;04 �9i9 5,в06 10; (Ьоесв ) э/бо 1t/Б) вп гоосlвсг fncludeA е нсllв, (слсl.гг паи иаг.г Бпег.)г - 4s 1,Ов] 4,] _ 44 ]mf ai .� в11 ,°e;i ч�е 1r6 гв гп.,),п• 3mPCOVe Р1га Ргв[ессЕоп. acn 36В l,33о 1.ЫВ 1964 Ргвlасг 1п lкд пн ofPei4na 1п 6 Св Jвtty = 10 ]5 Ь51 ц] -ьМ 195в-ЬО 1961 ]965 4В 1паlвп lасвl edtfflculгt.e [и бcelning врргв- Converalon вЕ ьс ге Ас вг 1(РО 1р8 1]]3 Р е[г Р1уев вее Р4г ga locel3y. _ Э9 443 >в5 1.238 -211 (ceeclfleго:l 8/39 11/Ы 31 ыК g вЬв1 8г 9ИЫ вп Хл. 1 Е.0.. д У = R.500 00] - - - - _ 9гИгтв двlеУед ln 959/60 tn .1аи о[ йн Т<в ЧвгвИоп.. (�гfЬуеп') ;Вр 1э 465 с пе р пг1[lea. _ 1 г,55] 11.]3s 13.ЬВ9 - Ьй 1956-59 1959 1966 В5 �dlsn- с vorta - осеl пв£аггiеп е9и1Р- - сИп[с/o1av. -g о в1 те ив1 в г4еоеп�е оогг 1вЬ, i olving medlel w пгlидlпg г 11п- ме oдling ],425 1,800 Ев*псапеггисгlрп, ве g саег 6equtpmenгea � =ивlвг 5]I 4.]2] 2.J16 ь.]0] -1П. 195]/5В i958/59 tM в1от1 псlРеlгl[]lf[vвГедlS тлЫ1е гг гп оlеи Че1д ввр Р гге. гвгk рр г вгпдеll, РеlосгпБ Тгl[[оп 625 - 625 _ 515 3.863 - 3.861 W]У _ - - - т - _ 2.6]4 , 5 13,9о0 31,954 � _ - - - т 0 i А L _ Zl),500 41,9]б _ 29,000 11,500 1]2,503 J5D,002 Эд . - 1969 _ - _ + псlев ед arLBhe г РгаlвfгСлвде ЕагдсЬвгlыпв . ehovn вг [Иv оег® of с Pege аге nodtftaa гп 1пгlпдг сИы епд вге пог [псlид<д 1п емв Еагесеве гагаl ппоип[е I MALCUTTA PORT C~MMISSIONERS: THRD-PLAN PRJECTS SUPPORTED BY WBRD LOAN 294-1N OP 8/17/61 APPENDI6 5AB1E 3 CWSTS, CONSTRCION SCHDULE AND P=UREM El.p.ed ime 000 5 T $orRs. '000r) D.A T E S (year-ormont/ar) orderto I -atolty Foreign Exchang0e Local Total Total I Plnningo PlacingO Completiono Corpletion, of main, In m In R.. @ 7.5/1 Currecy (-r.) (tn R-pees) cast incr.ee &De.i'n Order Op r~ton (onth.) Contactore Te.derinR tark. flot' orks. for Navtgation, Cutttngrnewcaneo rlovroBal-ro Foorest 59 443 - 2,115' 2,558M -hi echereaddd to projor le '* In 1961. Bar Actual 59 43 2,031 2,474 - 3% - 1961 1962 - Dutc negot'n. by agreemen oith Bank, % - dral rit r7rr- gencyesituatorrated by Rengefelle annel eiting roon efter opening in or. 1961 Floatin.g Graft far Navigation Esruarine Dredgr: Forrcaet 3,678 27,584 1,500 29,84 hows orly rhe po=rt1on of tot cost,1not Mohana (425 ft.) Actal 416 3.120 10,379 23,499 (-54%) 1/63 3/66 38 Dutch 820bal coeredruder Lon 19-IN project Total actualcorerer Rs. 43.4e1n, compared with Re. 37.3 Bln ertiated, ar Inc_reas f 16%, mainly aoo nted for by Imort du.ty lrbIlity. Riro Suctio Dredger: Forecat 1,090 14,175 1,000 15,175 foer Soreaee due to re..e beln doslgned Srbarnarrtba <295 ft.) Actual 2,631 19,883 5,657 23,342 +68% 4/65 3/67 23 Germa glob.l Iorg or lginallyplanned,and.ubequent atrtn;aL., incras in impot duy. 2 Pilot -oerl. (274 ft. arth): Forcast 3,572 26,790 2,020 27,790 S=r alteration ore. mde a a-trrl 2n Sågar & stdre Actua 3,476 26.69 409 26,478 - 3% 11/62 9/64 & 10/64 22 4 23 UK global catrotta, to enableattalnmert af rortre- -al Perforane onditios, ad boarding bat retplaced. Light Vessel (117 ft.) Forecast 588 4,410 200 4,610 roferred by CPC rod liminated fro pro- octua1 - - - - - - - - - - ject by egreement with bP 02 n 1964/65. survey e.el: F.orrast 420 3,652 1,500 4,650 b Ine ne a Tribent (200 ft.) Actual 1,298 9,735 609 20,544 +127% 12/63 10/65 22 UK global dorlded after orIginal roer estatre. Impraroeret.sa forbon/Berrtin 00D Weern Bro Extrrsion Forocast 630 4,725 7,000 11,725 1966 d Thi - scheme, wIcb rar ror bt ck whn nead Actual 64 480 12,807 t2,567 + 7% 1961 1961 1960 04 & dlt. lal../d.pual. for addit1oal brth. seemed reret,o waeventuallyocarrid rort maily depart- etally, avin I foreignex.chane rod usirg CPC dredgere. 02D Water tcrroolatio Forrcast 840 6,300 2.3o8 8,00 1966 Indtan-c. worbe-locel schem tended to redooe silttonl In acrual 326 2,445 5,321 7,766 -12% 1962 1965 1971 72 t -pumps -120ba1 620, atill ror corplerely ~mplaerred. Installationat ofpus P ar delayed to lat 1967 by brat corrtror dlIficulrte~, rnd then rOl tobrcaton bad to br changed far Greb Drrdger: Farece5t 527 3,953 1,500 5,453 1gb cot ovrr n b log delirery mainly GD No. 2 (224 ft.) Actual 1,309 9,81 3,536 13,354 +145% 20/64 9/67 30 U0 global due Olqutdrtion 00 butlder, 4 breakdorre. trab Dredge (224 ft.) FoecaSt 527 3,953 1,500 5,453 BUinrated fTræ porort in 1964/65 by cPC Actual - - - - - - - - - - to lreement b 00. 2 topper Barges: Forecast 630 4,723 5,000 9,725 Hihbost ovrrrn &2lon delivery due 10- ,B 6 6 RB 7 (220 ft. a.) kr6ual . 1,929 24,467 4,370 19,037 +96% 11/64 3/67 & 4/67 28 6 29 UK global quidation f 00 bilder, lort del"ery v-yag an brekdown. 1 Hopper Boole (229 ft.) Foorcast 315 2,363 2,508 4,863 ElI~iaed fræ p~rot in 1964/65 by 020 Actual - -- - - - - - - in agreemenowit IBRD. 2 Fappr arg.1: vreraet 630 4,725 5,00t 9,725 The- ereiorigtnally ro be sppl-rd n 0 4 & b 5 (181 ft. ta.) Actual 2,015 15,112 5,020 20,132 +107% 3/67 11/68 b 3/69 20 & 24 Ut global Noo. 1966 by l UK buildr eH 6 & 7 bor builder'e liquidationrqurd tha they be r-rndred. 4 Bork Togt: Golp & Tagar Foorer 945 7,088 3,500 10,588 (04T:) 9/65 4/67 21 UK global Coet ro originally nd-ertiatd. 00 (89 ft. e.) & Bokut b Aotual 1,292 9,690 7,004 16,694 +58% (649:6 2/66 12/67 & 2/68 23 & 25 India local veeler edrrpepraftertriale in Orto (98 fT. 12.> Calctta. lndlanrvesselawre deltvered ti~~~ i-d6 rbdo 3 LUncheh (78 ft.) F.orrear 378 2,835 1,200 4,035. Procred lo.lly, out.de loa project. Actual - -- - - Indirtan - Shr -ailities Replaer N.. 2 tit Br. (mPD) Forerret sB9 4,425 1,200 5,625 3/66 Small delay duroeol odic r rcdlrg Actual 522 3,915 8,826 12,741 +127% 1961-62 7/64 50/66 26 kusrian toinly global of rook to ft with traffi nee. Larto Rto proat overrun due toaddit~onal foo.. datIo rook required rod Irpoot duty liability. Wortkhop/Sblpyard Equlment Foraeas 450 3,375 1,650 5,225aperati kctual 495 3,638 8,433 12,073 +131% 1963-66 1964-67 6 - 24 ælora g0 lobal & toorgr globalo ,1D Mechanical Cargo Handl60g rorecaat 490 3,000 100 3,100 00 ord sære Prrncpal itre wrr 9 00bile ranel and Equipment kctual 328 2.365 1,176 3,561 +15% 1963-66 194-67 6 - 24 Jaese glol 10 rook 11f6 tre. Satisfactorlly Hydrll Studie (ord Forecast 1,110 6,325 4,200 B2,525 trcluding procormet of -Reerob Lnh Equisentthrefor) kotoel 1,54 11,355 7.625 19,180 +53% - - - - 'Invettgator', dellvred July 1362, and R geearchVee 'Alnu-dblrb', deltre9rd October 0963. Consultat Engineerig Forecast 1,050 7,875 1.000 6,875 (for pr-ooc ard Haldia) Acttl 1, 163 6,723 1,248 9,971 +12% 6/67 UK Contingencies Forecast 1,830 13,724 4,150 17,874 T 0 T A L Forecast 2t,000 157,500 47,400 284,900 1965 Out,tanding balanoe of 1or finally can- Actual 18,B37 141.278 84,333 225,611 460% - 1968 - -elled July 14, 1969. It- nt ilud.d rn rg alproet but d,delterby gr eeetbetweCadthBan. Te ,forcastaounte for these teme roprsent forecat of the tI th b i.t. of Good. for the loan..wermdtfied toinclud te ad trot ludd the forrcasttotal mo.t ho~ ethe bott.a of the .age.  00RT 07 CAL-0rrrA (1ne1. HALD1A st.an 1966/69 for '0, only) TRAF=IC, M0RE4ST AND ACTUAL (Inc1. bunker fuel) (n1 '0000metr1c1ton/ 1938/39 1949/50 1954/55 1955156 1956157 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1%3/64 1964/65 1965/6 1966/67 1967168 1966169 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 IBRD F-rst ApPr1ai11 Foreca-t (1957) 0RY0CARG 8 943 8.120 6493 2 7 7 719 9.366 11,292 Eoporto 6 832 5 008 4 614 4.657 4.527 5608 130 Bulk-Cosl (2ne0. b.nker) 2,922 3,067 2,096 1,977 2,139 2,196 8lk-0res 414 106 565 682 786 - 1,017 2,626 General corgo 13 2 1..633 1.613 1L790 1.002 1L945 2 656 oo 65I 19 -o- Gu ,03 960 993 951 952 914 965 1crap 60 I 104 149 127 51 152 Tea 101 163 181 168 192 203 203 6ugar 12 1 2 29 203 251 ron &Steel - 41 19 19 11 0g Ton 529 64 23 23 - ) 574 1082 0ther 607 359 350 503 291 Importa 2,022 3.212 I31 2.3/0 3.192 3,756 3,960 1k-I-tt 679 625 262 699 426 509 711 Bulk-Foodgraino 263 1,067 462 209 732 71 913 General Crgo 2.337 1.430 1,415 1.662 2.094 2.539 2>438 Machinery 104 132 76 104 194 Ion 6 0teel 105 140 215 412 792 ) 1,422 ) 613 Eloy. Plant & Materiala - 50 31 01 62 Chemicals & Sda - 33 97 113 130 203 406 0o met. 16 34 63 54 94 55 104 24 29 10 ) 914 1,219 0ther 1,057 909 907 869 731 209 106G 1(PO1 400 /76 1,06 1,132 0.291 1910 630 Export5 (incl. bunker) - I 99 39 60 91 122 lmportl 40/ 795 973 1.293 1,290 1,29 508 T0TAL 1SEA-BORN 9,.3 6.915 7,939 8.159 9,010 11,276 11,922 19RD Seon(AppalIForeoant 1961) DRy0CR90 9.031 8,138 8334 7,777 .9872 969 20297 11861 11557 12.435 E4port 6.725 41399 4..751 3.4] 5,471 6.232 6.74 7757 1,5 6.773 B.lk-Coal (nc1. bun.er) 2,174 1,885 1,705 1,422 2,438 2,438 2,42 2,645 2,645 3.048 0ulk-0res 0,903 786 1,126 060 1,016 1,727 1,930 2,032 2,134 2,540 05aneral101 1.530 I,506 1.930 I 752 1.017 2.007 2 060 2,090 2_800 3125 Jut - - 97 37 39 41 41 41 41 42 Gunnies 933 914 1,04 9.5 905 965 991 925 915 945 Scrap 40 92 10 178 173 205 203 112 132 152 Toa 345 176 175 163 183 195 143 203 203 234 6ugar 90 31 16 ) 1090 IStool 20 21 4 995 637 655 757 1,529 1,519 ) 1,769 010 ro - 6 461 7ther 327 288 419 ) 1mpor20 4.326 3.939 3.53 3.937 3.708 3.454 3.556 3,261 3 698 3.662 Bulk-Foodgrains 1,129 1,323 1,329 1,829 1,324 1,024 2,422 124 1,321 914 Geerl. aoo 2,714 2.236 194 2.10 2184 1 930 2134 2337 2.377 2708 -achiney 00 456 241 209 203 203 375 406 400 508 ro 4 Stee 852 558 429 406 406 406 508 305 005 225 R1.y. Plont 4 atr1,0.1 152 250 173 -----------.-nluded other Gen l ro) - ---- Cheiclsol 4 loda 125 132 214 290 190 181 175 175 175 161 0the0 metal 195 100 114 102 122 102 102 102 102 12 Fertlloor 60 51 64 42 36 31 1 26 26 20 othor 930 703 659 1,165 1,247 1,027 1,075 1,323 1,369 1,755 009 CARGO 1P0L/ 1.267 1,006 2.401 2,600 I 676 I 778 2.776 2.776 1.770 3xport. (inc3. 4unkr) o-/ lmports 1,287 1,209 1,451 T09TAL 6EA-110NE 20,316 9,346 9,705 9,129 10,855 11,362 12,075 13,961 13,335 14,213 Exports 6,832 5 008 4.620 657 4,27 4715 4 199 4.751 4,Q0 4 351 4,643 4,63 4,867 4 462 4 1 4013 1.618 3,361 669 2 Bl4k--ol (ncl. bhnker) 2922 3067 2..436 1.977 2..139 2.174 1 8d5 1 705 1 385 1,740 2.151 1.97 I,700 2.366 2137 924 917 970 661 706 -SBuker - 370 134 109 115 98 65 54 46 97 32 41 72 20 20 19 9 8 18 0000619 1,3 ,267 1,144 757 1,008 947 824 660 004 162 162 159 272 266 374 360 450 52/ 407 171 Coastal (oyo.) 2 0,539 1,430 1,638 693 854 1,027 89 691 844 1,122 1,592 1,334 1,159 66 537 355 940 543 257 493 - C6oatal (Ind.7 ) 212 12 102 112 100 281 416 565 440 935 314 206 191 195 104 10 221 6ulk-Oors (foreign) 616 la 565 882 786 1,003 786 1,116 731 632 549 700 911 1,014 911 603 457 390 430 236 10n000106060 3.294 1.635 613 1790 1,2 L538 152 1330 1.93 1979 1.3 2049 2.174 2 050 2.150 2406 1.444 1.998 1590 127 t 606 - - - 37 2 5 15 29 20 26 44 45 60 36 33 101 Gun 2.930 965 993 932 952 933 914 1 004 954 967 1.078 1,104 1207 1 207 92 94 830 687 654 008 - 0000103 0,0. 0.0. 9% 60 88 060 629 867 852 866 5 973 1,715 965 750 702 709 610 610 /01 - Coastal n.2. 0.5. 37 55 69 66 106 117 102 119 128 131 2 152 162 270 122 77 42 27 5Srp 60 I 104 149 127 40 92 190 215 270 65 297 27 271 551 291 206 262 21 50 101 163 121 146 192 045 126 175 159 174 162 163 120 109 151 161 154 26 124 225 Sugar 12 1 2 4 29 60 31 16 3 149 075 296 67 70 222 I 1 2 1 Iron 6oSeel - 41 19 19 11 10 61 45 64 01 72 70 109 281 577 566 620 490 048 234 Pg -Io 526 64 25 23 - - 6 06 35 23 2 - - 36 169 339 165 127 52 0%her 907 559 350 503 291 320 288 419 409 404 374 280 289 237 197 210 196 301 289 206 porta 3211 32.12 2,39 237 3192 9.316 3939 9.582 3.970 3.205 3,571 4.138 4255 3859 4.475 3.685 2.622 1 980 1 872 2 894 2ulk-lt 7consta17 409 915 462 499 426 473 390 560 357 392 40 39 329 323 181 266 280 201 151 300 lk-FoodgraOno (foreign) 095 1,067 642 229 732 1,129 1,313 1.329 1,600 993 2,092 1,153 1,690 1,523 1,422 1,841 1,005 069 952 1.003 2Cs. 1.337 1.40 1415 1662 20 2,714 2236 1.94 811 1,820 2,081 2189 2.2M 2.013 1872 1.578 1.457 991 969 2511 Machlnery 106 192 76 10 195 400 436 241 181 179 202 250 511 280 147 114 116 117 102 99 09on 46Stee1 105 10 215 412 793 652 556 429 345 240 316 322 628 267 152 151 119 122 191 409 020y. Plont 6 Materia1s - 58 51 61 60 152 92 173 15 291 256 176 125 67 25 19 26 20 25 53 Cheocl.6. 6 lod. - 53 97 113 13 125 132 214 172 118 153 127 109 121 61 50 54 57 22 06 0toe oetal. 16 54 63 54 95 195 106 114 125 118 140 135 120 103 107 16 97 56 97 99 Fertlizor 55 104 24 29 10 60 51 64 76 82 111 190 118 231 387 480 465 209 1ll 166 064er 1,057 905 07 869 731 930 725 659 722 788 895 91 1,020 912 992 6 56 454 322 583 WETCARGO(POL) 400 795 1,0Ø6 lM d.291 1.9 1,208 1451 1,522 1.747 1,989 1 %7 1 941 6.527 1.432 1 300 0.315 1,55 2.653 1 926 Exporoa (incL bunkor) . - 33 39 61 - - .. 60 69 97 113 172 114 100 137 130 78 69 Import5 400 795 973 0093 1230 1.260 1,22! 1451- 1522 1.62 3 909 j j60 1929 2425 1.316 1,20 6170 1.420 2 1857 Coastal 457 92 1,050 2,196 1,251 Foreign 773 2576 70 160 6o6 TOTALSEA-B009E 9.343 8 915 7.939 9,159 9.D10 10.31 9.346 9.785 9.501 9.32D .1.2o3 10.936 11093 9.84 10.105 6.903 7.955 6,886 6,016 7,359 of h.61 o astoel 2,251 2,940 3,649 6,126 4,195 3,916 2,00S 2,280 1,667 2,607 foreign 6,759 6,553 5,654 6,060 6,763 7,147 5,950 4.666 4,347 4,952 694200 0941006 WHARVES n.a. 1,669 2,425 2,506 2,233 2.543 1,650 1,714 1.646 1,694 1,761 1,613 1,612 1,139 850 739 571 529 064 509  APPENDIX TABLE 5 INCREASES FROM 1960 THROUGH 1970 IN SELECTED CONFERENCE LINE FREIGHT RATES FOR SOME MAJOR INDIAN PORTS CALCUTTA VISAKHAPATNAM MADRAS BOMBAY Date increase cumulative Date % increase cumulative Date % increase cumulative / Date % increase cumulative USA, Atlantic and 1.11.62 10.0 1.11.62 10.0 1.11.6? 10.0 Gulf of Mexico 10.11.63 10.0 10.11.63 10.0 10.11.63 10.0 3.15.64 10.0 10.11.65 7.5 10.11.65 7.5 10.11.65 7.5 9.22.65 10.0 10.11.67 10.0 10.11.67 10.0 10.11.67 10.0 9.23.67 10.0 1. 1.69 10.0 1. 1.69 10.0 1. 1.69 10.0 1. 1.69 10.0 11.11.69 5.0 165.3 11.11.69 5.0 165.3 11.11.69 5.0 165.3 12. 1.69 5.0 153.7 Canada (Halifax, St. 1.11.62 10.0 John & Montreal) 10.20.63 10.0 11.15.65 7.5 11.15.65 7.5 11.15.65 7.5 12. 1.65 10.0 2. .68 10.0 2. .68 10.0 2. .68 10.0 2. 1.68 10.0 4. 1.69 10.0 1. 1.69 10.0 1. 1.69 10.0 4. 1.69 10.0 4. 1.70 5.0 165.3 1. 1.70 10.0 143.1 1. 1.70 10.0 143.1 4. 1.70 5.0 139.8 USA & Canada Pacific 1.11.62 10.0 1.11.62 10.0 Ports 10.11.63 10.0 10.11.63 10.0 11.20.65 7.5 10.11.65 7.5 11. 1.65 10.0 12.18.68 7.5 - - - 12.18.68 7.5 2.18.68 7.5 3. 1.69 10.0 3. 1.69 10.0 3. 1.69 10.0 1.20.70 5.0 161.5 2. 1.70 5.0 161.5 1.20.70 5.0 136.6 UK & Continent 10.24.63 10.0 10.24.63 10.0 10.24.63 10.0 10.24.63 10.0 9.15.66 7.5 9.15.66 7.5 9.15.66 7.5 9.15.66 7.5 7.15.70 12.5 133.0 7.15.70 12.5 133.0 7.15.70 12.5 133.0 7.15.70 12.5 133.0 East Africa 1.31.66 2.0 4. 1.64 7.5 1.31.68 7.5 - - - - - - 8. 1.67 7.5 1. 1.69 10.0 120.6 4. 1.70 7.5 124.2 Far East 10. 1.61 10.0 10. 1.61 10.0 . 1.66 7.5 . 1.66 7.5 3. 1.66 7.5 3. 1.66 7.5 9. 1.66 7.5 9. 1.66 7.5 9.15.66 7.5 9.15.66 7.5 10. 1.69 7.5 136.6 10. 1.69 7.5 136.6 10. 1.69 7.5 124.2 10. 1.69 7.5 124.2 Sources: Operations Research Group, Baroda: "Overseas Transport and Freight Structure in India's Export Trade" (June 1969) and Merchant Marine Directory 1971.  APPENDIX TABLE 6 PORT OF CALCUTTA: RIVER DREDGING, DRAFTS & SHIP DETENTION SHIP DETENTION River Dredging No. of days No. of days General Imports Foodgrain Imports All Import Vessels General Exports Coal Exports Total No. of No. of Effective Direct Costs Spoil Lifted 26 ft. draft with bore No. of Ave. detent- No. of Ave. detent- Total Days No. of Ave. detent- No. of Ave. detent- Vessels Dredgers Number (Rg. mins.) (mIn. tons) Available tidesa/ Ships ion (days) Ships ion (days) Waiting Ships ion (days) Ships ion (days) Calling 1938/39 273 1943/44 80 70 b/ 1948/49 3 1.1 2.1 6.2 106 1949/50 3 1.2 2.3 6.1 50/51 4 1.6 2.5 7.9 51/52 3 1.6 3.1 7.1 52/53 3 1.7 3.6 6.6 108 53/54 3 1.4 3.5 5.0 103 1954/55 3 1.8 3.8 6.9 55/56 3 1.5 4.1 5.7 34 344 1,287 56/57 3 1.6 4.9 6.0 120 325 1,378 57/58 4 1.8 3.8 6.9 165 324 1,590 58/59 4 2.3 6.1 7.9 11 143 218 812 296 1,741 1959/60 4 2.6 6.1 8.9 10 0.4 224 0.5 417 283 1,820 60/61 5 3.1 6.4 9.8 35 157 0.1 279 0.05 84 231 1,788 61/62 6 3.4 8.3 9.5 0 156 0.03 148 0.2 44 316 1,799 62/63 6 3.2 10.6 9.7 15 161 0.4 156 0,3 427 nil 367 0.4 1,817 63/64 6 3.7 9.6 12.8 53 160 1.1 216 1.1 1,141 0.1 312 3.9 1,806 1964/65 6 3.6 10.5 10.9 36 157 3.0 232 2.8 3,000 0.5 293 3.9 1,782 65/66 6 3.9 11.9 12.4 36 143 666 0.3 202 0.06 260 505 0.3 215 1.1 1,671 66/67 7 4.1 13.1 13.6 57 141 504 2.0 369 9.1 4,920 490 0.05 151 2.0 1,640 67/68 7 3.9 14.9 17.3 76 130 488 2.1 285 5.1 3,150 485 0.08 122 1.3 1,464 68/69 6 4.0 12.1 13.8 122 136 1.5 125 5.4 2,050 nil 120 0.9 1,381 1969/70 6 4.6 14.2 20.0 81 140 580 0.2 80 0.3 161 500 nil 131 0.5 1,220 70/71 6 4.4 15.8 21.0 65 128 427 1.0 121 0.2 205 674 nil 100 nil 1,070 71/72 6 3.6 15.0 19.6 53 133 0.5 1.8 nil 101 nil 1,244 72/73 c/ 0.6 0.2 nil nil a/ Calendar years: eg. 108 days with bore tides occurred in 1952 and are therefore shown against FY1952/53. b/ For CY1947. c/ First six months only.  "2'o. - 0 . E ne r--3. . .3' sf . - --8. 0 3-e30310-. . ..'30. 00. - . - . 0 . - e ., ,. 0..-0 -l- no....f~ O s .* r'tÉ -r . 3f O O ..0. 0 l0 1 Ø e r - e3 '- .0 9 .. . 2'e - Q f.l -~ 9 flt0..0 .00.00..00 00 +0 .0. .0 -e. . L .. - - - r•rr: .00'.0.00.0 0.0 0.0..0.0-* 0 F C f W W ©M © - M M ste O ..Il.0. -i-s - 0t)e L030 . 0 o - ol .. 1 . .000 000.O.00...-. 1000 0 0...00..0 .. no . a . 00 - 0 . 0 .000..10' '. - - 0 0 .0 .0 . 0. .00 .0 .. 0. M 0' - 00. 0 0 00 1' 10 .0 ...00.0.0 -. . ' - 1 ..0 f . Ml 0 .0.-0.0-1 - 1 d . n . le - N D • 1 0- • . 0' 0' . 0 . 0 0.0 . l 10 ..0 .0 0. .0 0. . .o .0 .g fl N Ol 3f N 'f. -. . .000 . . . . ... C I APPENDIX TABLE 8 PORT OF CALCUTTA: REVENUES & EXPENDITURES, FORECAST & ACTUAL (in Ra. million) 1949/50 1954155 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 IBRD First Appraisal Projection (1957) Revenues 48.1 50.3 58.6 66.3 from goods 11.1 14.2 13.7 16.9 from vessels 8.2 8.8 9.5 9.6 from land/buildings 7.5 12.5 12.6 13.1 Erom, railways 2.0 2.5 5.5 2.8 - ---- miscollaneous 76.9 88.7 99.7 108.7 120.5 125.0 130.0 135.0 140.0 145.0 150.0 Total Operating Expenses Dredging 3.2 5.3 5.5 6.4 Labor a/ 10.3 11.0 11.3 12.3 Other 45.8 62.7 63.5 64.8 Total 59.3 79.0 80.3 83.5 86.0 86.0 90.0 93.8 96.0 100.0 104.0 Gross Surplus 17.6 9.3 19.4 25.2 34.0 37.0 40.0 42.0 44.0 45.0 46.0 "Depreciation" 6/ 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.7 3.0 5.0 7.5 9.5 11.5 13.0 14.0 Interest 10.0 10.6 10.5 9.7 10.0 11.6 13.0 14.7 16.4 18.1 21.1 Net Income 4.4 (3.9) 6.3 12.7 21.0 20.4 19.5 17.8 16.1 13.9 10.9 Debt Service 13.2 13.2 13.2 12.5 13.0 14.5 15.8 17.4 19.0 21.4 31.1 Debt Service Coverage 1.3 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.5 IBRD Second Appraisal Projection (1961) Revenues from goods 79.8 79.9 77.8 85.4 96.5 100.0 104.5 114.7 115.5 117.0 from vessels 19.4 18.8 18.7 20.0 22.6 22.8 23.5 25.9 26.1 26.5 from land/buildings 10.2 12.0 11.5 11.8 12.3 16.0 18.0 18.5 18.5 19.5 from railways 15.2 15.6 17.9 15.1 15.5 15.5 16.0 16.8 17.0 17.0 miscellaneous 3.0 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 Total 127.6 129.6 129.7 136.1 150.7 158.3 166.0 180.4 181.6 184.5 Operating Expenses Dredging 5.8 8.1 8.5 8.8 10.4 11.8 12.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 Labor a/ 15.9 17.1 15.9 15.9 19.2 20.1 20.7 21.5 21.5 21.6 Other 76.9 85.1 86.5 87.7 89.1 90.7 92.8 95.8 95.8 96.3 Total 98.6 110.3 110.9 112.4 118.7 122.6 125.5 129.8 129.8 130.4 Gross Surplus 29.0 19.3 18.8 23.7 32.0 35.7 40.5 50.6 51.8 54.1 "Depreciation" b/ 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.9 9.6 9.8 10.8 14.3 15.1 Interest 10.9 12.3 14.0 15.6 21.3 25.4 29.5 32.6 32.6 33.3 32.8 Net Income 15.6 4.8 2.6 6.0 8.4 7.4 1.4 8.2 7.8 6.5 Debt Service 13.4 14.5 16.2 17.7 23.6 28.3 39.1 42.4 44.0 47.6 Debt Service Coverage 2.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 ACTUAL Revenues from goods 48.1 50.3 58.6 66.3 79.8 79.9 77.8 88.9 92.6 105.6 111.3 113.6 114.8 116.2 139.4 130.7 130.2 134.3 194.1 iron vease.l1 11.1 14.2 13.7 16.9 19.4 18.8 18.7 19.9 19.8 20.9 23.8 26.3 25.2 36.9 48.8 56.4 38.7 33.7 39.1 from land/buildings 8.2 8.8 9.5 9.6 10.2 12.0 11.5. 11.9 12.8 14.2 14.6 15.2 16.0 18.0 20.7 20.9 25.0 26.1 25.9 from railways 7.5 12.5 12.6 13.1 15.2 15.6 17.9 16.4 20.1 25.0 23.5 25.3 24.4 27.4 27.6 25.9 26.6 26.5 28.8 miscellaneous 2.0 2.5 5.3 2.8 3.0 3 3.8 4.1 5.3 4.0 4. 9.1 15.6 13.1 14.3 8.1 11.9 16.0 9.8 Total 76.9 88.3 99.7 108.7 137.6 139.6 029.7 141.3 158.6 169.7 177.2 189.5 191.0 311.6 250.8 243.0 233.4 236.6 297.7 Operating Expenses Dredging 3.2 5.3 5.5 6.4 5.8 8.1 8.5 8.8 10.9 15.6 14.6 17.0 19.3 18.9 23.2 22.6 22.2 24.5 23.8 Labor a/ 10.3 11.0 11.3 12.3 15.9 17.1 15.9 15.4 16.6 19.7 21.3 21.7 22.7 24.7 25.5 26.4 29.9 31.2 34.2 Otbec 45.8 62.7 63.5 64.8 76.9 85.1 86.5 93.9 93.0 101.7 101.2 115.6 127.1 144.1 1533 168.2 210.7 204.7 235.0 Total 59.3 79.0 80.3 85.5 98.6 110.3 110.9 018.1 128.5 137.0 137.0 154.3 169.1 187.7 202.5 217.2 282.8 260.4 295.1 Gross Surplus 17.6 9.3 19.4 25.2 29.0 19.3 18.8 23.1 30.1 32.7 40.1 35.2 21.9 23.9 48.3 24.8 (30.4) (23.8) 4.6 Depreciation" b/ 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.0 6.6 11.0 10.3 13.5 20.4 22.4 24.5 25.8 26.3 26.4 Interest c/ 10.0 10.6 10.3 9.7 10.9 12.3 14.0 15.8 19.5 21.7 23.8 23.5 25.6 34.1 35.2 38.0 39.7 39.7 43.0 Net Income 4.4 (3.9) 6.3 12.7 15.6 4.8 2.6 4.3 7.6 4.4 5.3 1.4 (17.2) (30.6) (9.3) (37.7) (95.9) (89.8) (58.3) Debt Service 13.2 13.2 13.2 12.5 13.4 14.5 16.2 18.0 21.7 27.5 33.3 32.2 57.5 52.8 55.9 60.8 64.4 64.7 69.8 Debt Service Coverage 1.3 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.4 (0.5) (0.4) 0.1 a/ Cargo handling labor only. b/ Debt amortization requirements (including Sinking Fund appropriations) only through 1959/60; this plus Renewals & Replacement Fund appropriations for 1960/61 through 1968/69; depreciation calculated on the basis of historical costs of net assets, using established asset lives, for last three years. c/ Excludes interest chargeable to Haldia Dock Project and capitalized. I APPENDIX TABLE 9 CALCUTTA PORT COMMISSIONERS: INVESTMENT PROGRAMS AND THEIR FINANCING, PROJECTED & ACTUAL Period 1966/67-1971/72 Period 1957/58-1962/63 (6 years) Period 1961/62-1965/66 (5 years) (6 years) Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Actual Total % of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total % of (Rs. m1n) Total (Rs. m1n) Total (Rs. m1n) Total (Rs. m1n) Total (Rs. m1n) Total Fixed Investment Project 198-IN 280.0 100.0 194.1 79.0 157.5 47.9 153.0 54.0 74.5 9.6 Project 294-IN - - 6.4 - 147.4 44.9 67.3 23.8 155.1 20.1 Haldia (incl. Est. Dredger) - - 1.8 - ) 29.0 10.3 383.0 49.6 Capitalized Debt Chges. Haldia - - - - ) 9.0 3.2 79.0 10.2 Bhagirathi/Hooghly Works - - - - ) 23.7 7.2 - - 26.4 3.4 Purchase of 13 diesel locos - - - - ) - - 23.4 3.0 Other non-project - - 43.3 17.6 ) _ 24.5 8.7 31.6 4.1 TOTAL 280.0 100.0 245.6 100.0 328.6 100.0 282.8 100.0 773.0 100.0 Financing Net Income + S.F. accretions 108.7 - 56.8 - 33.2 - 17.8 - -291.8 - "Depreciation" 49.5 - 19.5 - 35.4 - 44.4 - 145.8 - less Amortization -14.3 - -17.1 - -35.4 - -38.1 - -138.7 - Net Internal 143.9 51.4 59.2 24.1 33.2 10.1 24.1 8.5 -284.7 -36.8 Govt. Operating Subsidy - - - - - - - - 176.1 22.8 IBRD Loan 198-IN 138.0 49.3 93.2 37.9 90.0 27.4 90.4 32.0 66.9 8.7 IBRD Loan 294-IN - - - - 100.0 30.4 47.3 16.7 94.1 12.2 Government Loans 13.0 4.6 97.0 39.5 105.5 32.1 66.0 23.3 532.5 68.8 Debentures - - - - - - 25.0 8.8 85.0 11.0 Total Borrowing 151.0 53.9 190.2 77.4 295.5 89.9 228.7 80.8 778.5 100.7 Government Grants - - - - - - - - 27.8 3.6 TOTAL 294.9 105.3 249.4 101.5 328.7 100.0 252.8 89.3 697.7 90.3 Change in Working Capital +14.9 - +3.8 - +0.1 - -30.0 - -75.3 -  CALCUTTA PORT COMMISSIONERS: INVESTMENT & ITS FINANCING, PROJECTED & ACTUAL APPENDIX TABLE 10 (in Rs. millions) Total for Periods 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/1964 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 Covered IBRD First Appraisal Projection (1957) Investment Project 198-IN 22.2 34.8 82.3 66.7 55.8 18.2 280.0 Financing Net Income 21.0 20.4 19.5 17.8 16.1 13.9 108.7 "Depreciation" 3.0 5.0 7.5 9.5 11.5 13.0 49.5 less Amortization -3.0 -2.9 -2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -3.3 -17.3 Net Internal 21.0 22.5 24.2 24.6 25.0 23.6 140.9 IBRD Loan 198-IN 6.1 9.1 42.3 39.2 33.3 8.0 138.0 Government Loan 13.0 - - - - - 13.0 Total 40.1 31.6 66.5 63.8 58.3 31.6 291.9 Change in Working Capital +17.9 -3.2 -15.8 -2.9 +2.5 +13.4 +11.9 IBRD Second Appraisal Projection (1961) Investment Project 198-TN 117.5 40.0 - - - 157.5 Project 294-IN 4.1 41.3 70.4 31.6 - 147.4 Non-project investment 8.2 - - - 15.5 23.7 Total 129.8 81.3 70.4 31.6 15.5 328.6 Financing Net Income 8.4 7.4 1.4 8.2 7.8 33.2 "Depreciation" 2.3 2.9 9.6 9.8 10.8 35.4 less Amortization -2.3 -2.9 -9.6 -9.8 -10.8 -35.4 Net Internal 8.4 7.4 1.4 8.2 7.8 33.2 IBRD Loan 198-IN 70.0 20.0 - - - 90.0 IBRD Loan 294-IN 1.6 27.3 54.4 16.7 - 100.0 Government Loans 30.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.5 105.5 Total 110.0 74.7 75.8 44.9 23.3 328.7 Change in Working Capital -19.8 -6.6 -5.4 +13.3 +7.8 +0.1 ACTUAL Investment Project 198-IN 15.4 20.6 21.6 56.0 45.6 34.9 29.1 30.8 12.6 69.7 2.8 2.0 - - - 341.1 Project 294-IN - - - - 0.2 6.2 18.4 14.6 27.9 93.9 33.6 14.7 2.0 10.9 - 222.4 Haldia (incl. Est. Dredger) - - - - - 1.8 6.4 10.4 10.4 19.6 37.6 74.2 86.1 81.2 84.3 412.0 Capitalized Debt Charges, Haldia - - - - - - - 5.3 3.7 6.4 8.6 7.9 13.0 19.4 23.7 88.0 Bhagirathi/Hooghly Works - - - - - - - - - 0.4 0.2 2.4 6.3 8.5 8.6 26.4 Purchase of 13 diesel locos - - - - - - - - - - 16.7 5.2 1.0 0.2 0.3 23.4 Other non-project 8.0 4.2 5.7 11.6 7.2 6.6 3.6 3.1 4.0 4.0 5.9 6.5 5.8 4.4 5.0 85.6 Total 23.4 24.8 27.3 67.6 53.0 49.5 57.5 64.2 58.6 194.0 105.4 112.9 114.2 124.6 121.9 1198.9 Financing Net Income 15.6 4.8 2.6 4.3 7.6 4.4 5.3 1.4 -17.2 -30.6 -9.3 -37.7 -95.9 -89.8 -58.3 -292.8 R & R Fund appropriations - - - 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 - - - 12.2 Depreciation appropriations 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 5.8 9.5 8.7 11.9 18.7 20.7 22.8 25.8 26.3 26.4 187.9 less Amortization -2.5 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -5.8 -9.5 -8.7 -11.9 -18.7 -20.7 -22.8 -24.7 -25.0 -26.8 -185.9 Sinking Fund Accretions (net) 2.4 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.7 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.5 4.7 4.1 3.6 5.2 5.6 6.6 57.0 Net Internal 18.0 7.8 5.1 8.1 12.1 8.1 10.0 6.0 -12.1 -24.2 -3.5 -32.4 -89.6 -82.9 -52.1 -221.6 Government Operating Subsidy - - - - - - - - - - 50.0 29.0 97.1 176.1 IBRD Loan 198-IN - 9.4 9.7 29.1 20.5 24.5 16.3 22.0 7.1 66.9 - - - - - 205.5 IBRD Loan 294-IN - - - - 0.2 4.3 14.7 9.7 18.4 69.4 19.1 5.6 - - - 141.4 Government Loans 15.0 20.0 10.0 30.0 15.0 7.0 10.0 11.5 22.5 34.5 88.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 120.0 673.5 Debentures, net changes - - - - - - 15.0 10.0 - 10.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 1100 Total Borrowing 15.0 29.4 19.7 59.1 35.7 35.8 56.0 53.2 48.0 180.8 127.1 110.6 110.0 115.0 135.0 1130.4 Government Capital Grants - - - - - - - - - - - - 10.0 10.0 7.8 27.8 Total 33.0 37.2 24.8 67.2 47.8 43.9 66.0 59.2 35.9 156.6 123.6 78.2 80.4 71.1 187.8 1112.7 Change in Working Capital +9.6 +12.4 -2.5 -0.4 -5.2 -5.6 +8.5 -5.0 -22.7 -37.4 +18.2 -34.7 -33.8 -53.5 +65.9 -86.2  APPENDIX TABLE 11 COMMISSIONERS FOR THE PORT OF CALCUTTA: BALANCE SHEETS 1970-72 (AS AT MARCH 31) (Ra. millions) ASSETS L IABII ITIE S 1968 1970 1971 1972 1968 1970 1971 1972 (Proforma) (Proforma) Current Assets Current LiAbilities Cash in hand and in banks 34.4 57.2 21.8 32.5 Accounts payable n.a. 46.2 23.0 24.7 Accounts receivable 65.7 69.6 90.2 81.1 Advances and deposits n.a. 21.8 22.7 27.0 Government Subsidy due - 12.5 21.5 98.6 Accrued wages and bills payable n.a. 34.5 40.1 45.1 Payments in advance and - 4.1 4.9 7.8 other balances Unclaimed debt service 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 Stores and materials 25.5 22.2 21.0 21.6 Short-term Govt. loan - - 35.0 31.1 125.6 165.6 159.4 241.6 Other miscellaneous items s.a. 73.5 87.7 101.4 Investments 113.2 176.9 209.4 230.3 Revenue Reserve Fund (Cost) - n.a. 1.0 0.7 0.7 Long-term Debt Fire Insurance Fund (Cost) 9.9 0.7 5.9 1.3 Debentures 287.2 312.2 327.2 342.2 Vessels Replacement Fund (Cost) 16.5 8.8 2.1 9.3 Government loans 318.2 499.1 593.5 707.0 Interest Equalization Fund (Cost) 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 IBRD loans 296.2 268.2 251.0 232.8 Indian Seamen's Home Building 901.6 1079.5 1171.7 1282.0 Fund (Cost) 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 Other Liabilities General Sinking Fund (market) 95.3 108.9 117.4 127.2 Pension Fund Provision - 9.0 17.3 26.8 General Sinking Fund - interest accrued n.a. 1.1 1.2 1.5 Indian Seamen's Home Building Fund 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 129.7 122.8 129.5 142.2 Interest Equalization Fund 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 Fixed Assets Total Liabilities 1045.6 1298.3 1432.0 1573.5 Gross Fixed assets to Surplus and Reserves operation 1025.4 1081.5 1116.6 1126.6 Capital Reserve 57.0 93.9 118.7 125.9 Leus accumulated depre- caation 320.5 348.7 371.5 394.4 Capital Assets Replacement Reserve - - - 1.4 Net Fixed Assets in Operation 704.9 732.8 745.1 732.2 Revenue Reserve Fund 3.2 5.0 5.8 6.6 Work in Progress 134.3 280.8 366.4 473.9 Accumulated Deficits - -83.5 -141.4 -105.6 839.2 1013.6 1111.5 1206.1 60.2 15.4 - 19.9 28.3 Deferred Charges (financial) 11.3 11.7 11.7 11.9 TOTAL ASSETS 1105.8 1313.7 1412.1 1601.8 TOTAL LIABILITIES 1105.8 1313.7 1412.1 1601.8 MEMO ITEM: Fixed Assets with all items Current ratio 1.11 0.94 0.76 1.05 other than land at replace- ment values,- Long-term debt to equity ratio 93/7 99/1 - 98/2 Gross fixed assets in operation 1784.6 1775.3 1773.9 (without asset revaluation) a/ Leas accumulated depreciation needed 680.3 674.3 701.3 Long-term debt to equity ratio 70/30 74/26 74/26 Net fixed assets in operation 1104.3 1101.0 1072.6 (with asset revaluation) a/ a/ Taking long-term debt net of Sinking Fund balance.  APPENDIX TABLE 12 CALCUTTA PORT COMMISSIONERS: TARIFF INCREASES 1957/8 - 71/72 Additional Revenue Expected Approx. Breakdown of Increased Revenues Fiscal Date of as % of prev. Vessels Port Year Increase year's op. rev. in Rs million Imports Exports & other Railways 1957/58 - 1958/59 n.as 1.3% 1.50 - - - 1.50 1959/60 1/15/60 11.9% 13.55 10.31 2.24 1.10 - 1960/61 - 1961/62 - 1962/63 - 1963/64 4/1/63 5.2% 7.89 1.13 1.28 1.80 3.68 1964/65 - 1965/66 8/1/65 7.8% 12.90 2.55 3.48 3.90 2.97 1966/67 6/1/66 9.2% 15.oo 7.90 1.88 5.02 0.20 6/28/66 4.9% 8.oo 3.50 2.50 2.00 - 2/23/67 0.4% 0.70 - - - 0.70 1967/68 4/1/67 19.3% 34.80 29.50 0.30 3.80 1.20 1968/69 4/4/68 4.6% 10.00 8.5o - 1.50 - 1969/70 - 1970/71 6/25/70 4.1% 8.00 - 8.00 - - 1971/72 - Cumulative Total 112.34 63.39 19.68 19.02 10.25  COMMISSIONERS FOR THE PORT OF CALCUTTA HOOGHLY DRAFTS 32 32 ____ __ i l vi 20 26 1 ~r j 1x ixIv 1-26 22 22 20 20 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 TOP GRAPH LINE INDICATES MAXIMUM DRAFTS EACH MONTH AVAILABLE FOR FEW DAYS ONLY. LOWER GRAPH LINE INDICATES MINIMUM ORAFTS EACH MONTH. Wori Bak-7496  COMMISSIONERS FOR THE PORT OF CALCUTTA ORGANIZATION CHART GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT & SHIPPING IIL COMMISSIONERS FO THE PEAT OF CALCUTTA 124) CHAIRMAN DOPuT CHAIRMAN SECR N TETTIE ROCKS OPRAIN SENIORC DIENCTE SENIOR SENIOR - Rl-LMDIA E R CHIE CUNTS MANAGEREPG T E T E N RE EE NR AG NENG E WEAVE PAARTJE NCCTS ENGINEERS ENGNERIEGIEE ENGINEER 115,315) KIN GEORGES I E R O E E(9 E66 OFF EKE(2,024) GEAD DEPU TYD TE CHIEF ACUTACONSDIRECToR CHIEF ACCOUNTS MARINE MECHANICAL FFICER INCDEPARTMENT ENGINEER NCAFE SEIORSEIO SEIOPSEIO DDUTExEUIVUEEUTV E M I RCHIA EN INEER E ENGE OFFIGE ~~~HODGOLY ENGINEERMAIERIWYEE L M HVTE , ERMAPR R NINRETRSOE RLI EUPDTDR DOCKS JETTIESDOK ALASEORS IO MANAGER AND MASTER OPERING EOR WHARVES (AOR UD XCTV I I GENERALWRLANdNOaRS-IOO HARSOUR DOCK OORNG aR ofND DG3GI RN NOTE Number -nMaket f,11-wig th 1-i of -h head. of -h 13 main depa ent show num- of naffemPloVed aso1 12/31/71 World Ban-7262  꺼  & ロコ ス】 ロ しJ ひ ■■J へ」 7コ