But the internal tobacco documents say otherwise: "{Brown and Williamson) (the US subsidiary of BAT) will not support a youth smoking prevention programme which discourages young people from smoking." Tobacco Institute, 1983
What the evidence shows: Point-of-sale restrictions may have contributed to increases in non-commercial acquisition .... Legislation designed to prevent adolescents from purchasing cigarettes is an insufficient strategy for reducing adolescent smoking, as there are several other easily available sources of cigarettes for adolescents. Castrucci BC, et al;Journal of Adolescent Health, 2002
And the evidence indicates: A major motivation for teen smoking is the aspiration to adulthood ... The positioning of tobacco as 'adult' and 'forbidden' is, therefore, a thinly concealed pitch to aspirational and rebellious youth . Danger! Public Relations (PR) in the Playground, ASH, 2001.
What they say: "Lastly, we discussed the issue of taxation for tobacco products. While we recognize and respect the rights of governments to determine tax rates for consumer products, we wish to inform you ... of the possible adverse consequences of drastic increases in tobacco taxes ... (that) would not only defeat the purpose of the tax increase but could also undermine the work of the government on tobacco regulation and youth smoking prevention." PM, 2002
What they say: The tobacco multinationals' smoking prevention programmes emphasize limiting youth access to tobacco through the use of retailer schemes, identification cards and laws to increase the age limits for tobacco sales. "Philip Morris International actively supports laws worldwide that establish a minimum age of at least 18 for the lawful sale oftobacco products." PM, 1999
What they really acknowledge: "The 1982-83 round of price increases caused two million adults to quit smoking and prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to smoke . ... we were hit disproportionately hard. We don't need to have that happen again." PM, 1987
What they really intend: "If we can frame proactive legislation or other kinds of action on the youth access issue ... we will be protecting our industry for decades to come." PM, 1995
What the evidence from the World Bank (WB) shows: " .. .. the most effective way to deter children from taking up smoking is to increase taxes on tobacco." WB, 1999
Industry sponsored youth smoking prevention programmes distrad us from the interventions that work:
At the same time, they lead us to believe that their product is only harmful to young people.
YES NO
then the "Youth Smoking Prevention" programme you are considering is likely to be ineffective. Rather than protecting youth from tobacco, it may adually encourage an increase in youth smoking.
Five Recommended Action Points 1 2 Know the evidence on what works and what doesn't work to protect young people from tobacco. When individuals or groups offer to • fund a "youth smoking prevention'' programme, evaluate the programme elements against the evidence. Refuse all programmes that are based on weak and ineffective interventions.
~::) Require all prospective donors to ';;} your tobacco control programmes to complete a legally binding disclosure form that identifies all possible links with the tobacco industry.
/1 T
Turn down all offers of support, funding and/ or expert assistance that require you to trade the more effective Interventions (i.e. price increases, total ad bans) for less effective interventioMs (i.e. educational programmes, partial and/or voluntary ad bans).