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STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF UKRAINE
97th Joint FSC-PC Meeting (26 November 2025)
Agenda Item 1, Security dialogue: “Helsinki Final Act 50 years”
Mr Chairperson,
We are grateful to the Finnish Chairpersonship for convening this joint FSC-PC meeting and the organisation of the Security Dialogue dedicated to the fundamental document of our Organisation – the Helsinki Final Act. Let me also extend our sincere appreciation to the distinguished panellists for their valuable contributions to our discussion today.
Fifty years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, we gather not only to commemorate history, but to confront the profound reality of our time. The principles agreed in 1975 remain valid – but they are no longer taken for granted. They are not self-executing. They demand political will, integrity, and accountability. Today, their very survival is being tested in the most brutal way.
The Helsinki principles – sovereignty, territorial integrity, refraining from the threat or use of force, the inviolability of borders – were not abstract ideas for us. They were the foundation of our security, our development, our place in Europe.
And yet, one participating state deliberately dismantled these principles through military aggression, occupation and terror. Russia’s war against Ukraine is not only a violation of international law – it is an assault on the core logic of the Helsinki Final Act itself.
But the Helsinki Final Act is not the only document the Moscow regime violated by launching its aggression.
Since the very beginning of the aggression in 2014, Russia has violated about four hundred international treaties. Such documents include the UN Charter, 2 numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties, and even the most basic documents such as Geneva Conventions that form the basis of International Humanitarian Law. Such facts are well-known and properly documented, in particular in the OSCE within the framework of the Moscow mechanism.
There are no doubts that Russia`s disregard for international law is strategy of the Kremlin aimed at destroying the world order based on rules and replace it with the own vision of how international relations should function.
Colleagues,
The principles of the Helsinki Final Act can still serve as a foundation for European security today – but only if they are defended. The problem is not with the principles; the problem lies with those who believe they can violate them with impunity.
If the international community fails to respond decisively to aggression, then every principle becomes optional. Every border becomes provisional. Every commitment becomes reversible. A rules-based security order cannot survive selective application.
The concept of “Indivisible security” does not mean that one state may claim unlimited rights at the expense of its neighbours. It does not justify spheres of influence. And it certainly does not give the aggressor a veto over sovereign choices.
In today’s era of open war, indivisible security means something else:
that the insecurity created by one state cannot be contained within its own borders. The missiles that fall on Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv or Lviv shake the foundations of the entire OSCE area. The collapse of trust does not stay local – it spreads.
Indivisible security today means collective responsibility – to defend the victim, to isolate the aggressor, and to prevent the normalization of force as a tool of policy.
Colleagues,
The European security architects of 1975 did not foresee cyber warfare, disinformation, energy coercion, sabotage, weaponized migration, or the militarization of outer space. Today’s security order must address these domains explicitly.
Three elements are indispensable:
- A stronger norm on accountability – without consequences, principles erode.
- Resilience against hybrid threats – from infrastructure protection to countering malign influence. 3 - Real deterrence within the OSCE area – political, economic, and normative, to make aggression an unviable strategy.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine demonstrated that hybrid tools are not peripheral; they are central to modern conflict. They must be central to our security architecture as well.
The OSCE’s strength lies in its comprehensive approach and inclusivity – but these strengths can also be exploited by an actor acting in bad faith. To remain relevant, the OSCE needs:
- Mechanisms that limit the ability of a single state to paralyse the Organization;
- Reinforced tools for early warning and rapid response, not only reporting;
- Institutional protection for field operations, preventing political hostage- taking;
- And above all: a culture of accountability, where persistent violators cannot hide behind consensus rules to shield themselves from consequences.
The OSCE cannot be effective if it is structurally vulnerable to obstruction by the very State that undermines European security.
Colleagues,
The 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act is more than a milestone – it is a test. A test of whether the OSCE community is willing to defend the principles it claims to uphold. A test of whether aggressors can be deterred. A test of whether the vision of a peaceful, cooperative, rules-based Europe can survive the deepest geopolitical shock since 1975. For Ukraine, the path forward is clear:
- Peace will return when the principles of Helsinki are restored – not rewritten;
- Security will return when aggression is stopped – not rewarded;
- And stability will return when accountability is ensured – not avoided.
Our commitment to these principles is unbroken.
Thank you, Mr Chairperson.