The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays Title The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Author Group of authors

Publisher Organization for security and co-operation in Europe Mission to Serbia

Translation to English Mirjana Stolic-Srdanov

Design and prepress comma | communications design

Print Fiducia 011 Print

Copies 200

ISBN 978-86-6383-035-6

The printing of this publication was made possible through the financial support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), within the project Consoli- dating the democratisation process in the security sector in Serbia.

The views herein expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Content

Preface 7

Ivana Jovanović 11 OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security 11

Aleksandra Obradović 23 OSCE and contemporary security challenges 23

Luka Glušac 33 Foreign (terrorist) fighters 33

Danko Aleksic 49 OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security 49

Selena Tasić 61 OSCE and contemporary security challenges 61

Jelena Nikolić 71 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia 71

Jelena Mitić 85 OSCE and contemporary security challenges 85

Marija Žužek 95 OSCE and contemporary security challenges 95 Milan Andrić 109 OSCE and contemporary security challenges 109

Aleksandra Tomić 121 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges 121 Preface

Security has always been among the top agenda items in the human society, practically throughout its entire history.

However, speaking of contemporary times, few have expected that it would ree- merge as the dominant issue precisely in the post-cold war period when it was presumed that the development and democracy building would finally push the security concerns to a less prominent place and create the conditions where basic security is almost taken almost for granted. Paradoxically, while in the severities and eighties, in the twilight of the authoritarian regimes, primarily in eastern Europe, human rights and democratization were in the focus of East- West relations, in the period that followed after the fall of the Berlin wall and especially at the turn of the new century, after year 2000, security has gradual- ly, but steadily risen to become the top preoccupation of democratic countries, both those in the established democracies and emerging ones. Instead of the past confrontation and the arms race between the superpowers and two mili- tary blocs, the main threat started to come from non-state actors, though not without certain states’ support. These were the threats emerging from inter- national terrorism, religious extremism, radicalism and state collapse in the volatile regions of the world, with regional but also global consequences.

Not surprisingly, as a result of these changes, the interest of the state institu- tions and state structures in charge of security, as well as of the researchers and academic community turned to analyzing and preventing these transna- tional threats. Security has become a frequent theme of political discourse and non-governmental engagement.

7 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

In Serbia, which is situated in a post-conflictual and not yet fully stabilized region, relatively close to the hotspots of most violent present day conflicts and exposed to its consequences, as the so-called migrant crisis has shown, the interest for addressing and studying security has visibly grown over the past years, including among the young academics and future practitioners.

It is not therefore surprising that Serbia as the 2015 OSCE Chairman in Office, following up on its predecessor Switzerland, has put the security issues as one of the priorities of its chairmanship. Both countries have been the initiators and the main supporters of the OSCE Declaration on Youth and Security which, albeit in a very brief form, adopted at the Belgrade Ministerial Council Meeting in December 2015.

Anticipating and preceding these trends, the OSCE Mission to Serbia has in the past years, in its activities connected with the security sector governance and reform, paid an increasing attention to sensibilize youth for the security issues, approaching the theme not primarily as “hard security” or traditional security, but as an area closely connected to the security of an individual, and as an issue which cannot and should not be separated from human rights and general democratization of the society. In this context, the Democratization Department of the Mission has organized over the years numerous workshops and seminars, or study visits or lectures, encouraging the participation of youth or specifically focused on youth groups from different segments of society, in- cluding national minorities, or those who are already beginning their career in the state institutions dealing with defense or security.

The essays contained in this brochure are written by the Mission’s Alumni MA and PhD holders, whose academic studies were supported by the Mission. The topic offered was “OSCE and contemporary security challenges” and the ten essays presented in the publication have been selected as the best ones in a competition which included a number of contributions.

Within this general theme, the essays provide a useful insight how the young academics and practitioners in Serbia approach the issue of international secu- rity, what are their main concerns and suggestions for improvements in deal- ing with the rising security challenges or threats in contemporary society, in particular in transitional societies. Their selection of specific topics within this general theme shows, not surprisingly, that transnational terrorism and radi- calization/extremism attract particular attention, but they do not ignore other issues or theoretical approaches to security, in particular the concept of human security which is explicitly or implicitly embraced as the most appropriate in practically all the essays. The importance of civil society in addressing security

8  Preface

threats and safeguarding at the same time human rights is also widely rec- ognized. Among the more specific issues, the phenomenon or foreign fighters, including the influence of social media on their recruitment, is being discussed, while in an another essay the issue of environmental security is addressed. The importance of regional security is also noticed by the many, and within that context some practical measures, like the improvement of border security are given due attention.

Of course, the role of the OSCE in the security field is an unavoidable subject, since the general theme is formulated in this way. The perception of the organ- ization, which is based both on the analysis of its main documents, beginning with the Helsinki Final Act, and on the OSCE practical activities, is mostly pos- itive or even laudatory, but not without some critical remarks or suggestions for an improvement. The democratic nature of the organization, which is en- shrined in the rule of consensus, is recognized as the comparative advantage of the OSCE compared to some other international organizations, but also as a weakness which sometimes inhibits its more active role. The post-conflict rehabilitation and the organization’s engagement on the ground, thorough its diverse field operations, is recognized as the particular quality of the OSCE. In this context, it is not unnoticed that the ability of the OSCE to agree and deploy the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is regarded as its impressive achievement, considering the limited success of other international organiza- tions, including the UN.

Among the critical observations regarding the OSCE, one of the authors cited its relatively low visibility in the international public, in particular compared to the UN, EU or NATO. This is regarded as undeserved, since the OSCE repre- sents the largest regional security organizations in the world. Not unrelated to that comment, one could observe that none of the essays paid due attention to the OSCE Code of Conduct in Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which is possibly one of the most original documents of the OSCE, dating back to 1994, and which is reflecting a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to security. This in spite of the fact that in the two years in the row – 2014 and 2015 - two OSCE workshops on the Code were organized in Belgrade, with the assistance of the Mission. This omission is a clear message to those engaged in the organization to include more prominent youth participation in future work- shops or seminars on the Code of Conduct, and to make this document better known to public, especially among young academics and practitioners.

On the whole, we believe that this collection of essays will be found as useful by its readers, both those who are doing research or are engaged in civic activ- ism in the field of security, and those who are already within the state struc-

9 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

tures whose competence is directly or indirectly related to security functions. The essays, while naturally reflecting a different degree of analysis or depth, are on the whole quite mature and thought provoking, which in the abundance of texts dealing with security are the qualities that should not remain unno- ticed, we are confident, by the potential readers.

Vladimir Bilandzic, Ph.D. OSCE Mission to Serbia Special Advisor on Confidence and Security Measures

10  Ivana Jovanović1

OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security

Summary: Border management in Europe, especially in the neighboring re- gions that are in the process of post-conflict stabilization or preventive interna- tional monitoring, is an important challenge for European states and European regional arrangements and organizations dedicated to preserving peace. The European Union and the OSCE, as frameworks for regional action, and the Euro- pean states through bilateral political, security, economic and technical co-op- eration, aim to improve the security of states and sovereign borders, as one of the most important preconditions for preserving and promoting the human di- mension of security. Achievement of OSCE’s goals within the third dimension of security–human security–requires a comprehensive approach to security chal- lenges and threats, with cohesive and integrated action in the politico-military and economic fields of security.

Keywords: OSCE, European Union, EU, human security, borders, migration, conflict

1 Ivana Jovanovic is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. She is an OSCE scholarship holder for PhD studies for the academic year 2014/2015. Her full biography is available on the last page.

11 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Introduction

As the marking of its fortieth anniversary of existence as a regional and inter- national arrangement dedicated to the maintenance of peace at the regional and international levels is in full swing, the OSCE today has a very complex agenda. Evolving from the consultative and security forum (conference) of par- ticipating states, which then established the guidelines for democratic devel- opment and democratic consolidation on the divided European continent, to an organization comprising fifty-seven participating states on three continents, the OSCE has reaffirmed its identity and continuity of action through civilian and military engagements in different parts of the world. In the modern world, a multidimensional approach to security is the only valid, efficient and credible approach to addressing security challenges and threats, with a view to preserv- ing international peace and stability, given the complexity of the threats and the consequences. At this point, we will mention the Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community which highlights the commitment of the OSCE to a comprehensive approach to security.2 The goals and activi- ties within the politico-military, economic and environmental and finally the human dimension are aimed at improving the situation of individuals in the broadest area, in various aspects of social, political and cultural life, including human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and free elections, rule of law, but also freedom of religion and fight against intolerance and discrimination.3

Border protection and management are a complex objective and task on more than one level, both for sovereign states and the states’ regional security ar- rangements. Border protection and management is a security challenge for the OSCE as a regional organization that has its own resources intended for the implementation of objectives in this area. Furthermore, it is a challenge for bilateral relations of cooperation or conflict between the participating states, partner states, and third countries. Finally, it is a challenge that requires coop- eration and partnership (sometimes in the form of inter-regional cooperation) between the OSCE and other organizations that share the same goals in inter- national politics and are based on the same democratic principles, including the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, as well as other organizations that have a narrow and specialized field of operation but may

2 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community, SUM(10) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 4, Summit Meeting, Astana, 2010. Available at: http://www.osce. org/cio/74985?download=true. 3 Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community, pp. 2-3.

12  OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security

contribute to the achievement of goals in one of the three dimensions of secu- rity: the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Development Program, etc.

Border management and security is a complex objective that can be brought under the ambit of all three dimensions of security, namely it requires coopera- tion and coordinated action through all three dimensions. Referring back to the Astana Declaration, the OSCE participating states have agreed that the “conflict cycle”, which includes early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, will remain one of OSCE’s key priorities in the future.4 Given the broad geographical distribution and international presence of missions in foci of crises across the globe, conclusion can be made that border management and security is an important technical and human element of the stabilization process in conflict regions. The outbreak of intrastate (Ukraine) or interstate conflicts increases the overall insecurity of a certain geographical area and in these conditions one of the main criteria and indicators of (in) stabili- ty and vulnerability is security and the manner of functioning of borders and cross-border circulation. Thus, in the case of intrastate or interstate conflicts, border management becomes one of the main priorities and conflict manage- ment instruments. In addition to the politico-military dimension, border man- agement and control is also connected to the other two dimensions–economic and human. The economic dimension relates to border management and to uni- form and complementary systems of border control through cooperation of the participating states, aimed at preventing illicit economic activities and illegal trade (in drugs and other illegal substances, cross-border crime, human traffick- ing). Finally, border management and control today is unavoidably linked to the human dimension of security, in terms of respect for and exercise of fundamen- tal human rights. In a globalized world, mobility of persons, services, goods and capital is one of the most important achievements pertaining to human rights and freedoms that is progressively improved at the interstate and international level, both in technical sense (reduced scope of requirements that an individual must fulfill) and in the spatial sense (expansion of the free movement areas).

4 Ibidem. See also: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, DECISION No. 3/11, Second day of the Eighteenth Meeting MC(18) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Vilnius, 2011, p. Available at: http://www.osce.org/ mc/86621?download=true

13 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Border management and security

Facing numerous challenges affecting border security, that come from all three dimensions of security, the OSCE is committed to protecting and promoting the freedom of movement of people and goods across borders and to ensur- ing economic development and prosperity through facilitation and promotion of cross-border cooperation.5 This objective of the OSCE implies finding and achieving a balance through partnership with other organizations, between se- curity as the primary objective of border management, on the one hand, and the goal of improving economic activity and regional well-being, on the other.6 Proceeding from the study authored by Herbert Salber and Alice Ackermann, we shall on this juncture present the basic elements of the OSCE’s approach to border management and security. It is based on the 2005 document The Border Security and Management Concept (BSMC), which sets the framework for coop- eration in this field.7 As stated by Salber and Ackermann, the BSMC brings four main novelties in the field of border management. First, it provides the OSCE with a mandate for promoting wide-ranging cross-border cooperation between border services, customs authorities, law enforcement and other competent na- tional structures.8 Further, it allows for the various segments of the OSCE exec- utive structures (the Secretariat, the field operations, and institutions) to work together and to assist and support the participating states in implementing this concept.9 The BSMC also indicates the importance of international cooperation with other international organizations and partners, which should be guided by complementary objectives and actions, comparative advantages and mutual interests. Finally, the BSMC provides a list of possible contributions that aim at making this concept operational and effective.10

The authors, Salber and Ackermann, indicate that the BSMC itself recognizes border management and security as a sensitive area of cooperation between the participating states. On the one hand, the border management mechanisms are a matter of the state’s free decision, in accordance with its internal situation, ge-

5 Herbert Salber and Alice Ackermann, The OSCE’s Comprehensive Approach to Border Security and Management, OSCE Yearbook 2009 Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg / IFSH (ed.), Volume 15, 2009, pp.289-290. 6 Salber and Ackermann, p.290. 7 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Border Security And Management Concept Framework For Co-Operation By The Osce Participating States, MC(13) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, 2005. 8 Salber and Ackermann, p.293. 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem.

14  OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security

ographical position, key national political, economic and social challenges, and the internal and external security strategy.11 On the other hand, they are aware that the national and regional well-being can be significantly improved through cross-border activities and free movement, which indicates the need for bilat- eral, regional and multilateral cooperation.12 The BSMC enumerates eight basic groups of aims that should be achieved through cross-border cooperation: pro- motion of free and secure movement of people, goods, services and investments; reducing the threat of terrorism, including by preventing the free movement of people, money and other things that have to do with terrorist and other criminal activities; prevention and fight against transnational cross-border crime, illegal migration, smuggling, corruption and trafficking in weapons, drugs and human beings; promotion of high standards in border services and competent national structures; promotion of dignified treatment of all individuals crossing borders, in conformity with relevant national legal frameworks, international law and the human rights principle, and relevant OSCE commitments; development of beneficial conditions for economic, social and cultural development in border areas; movement towards establishing common spaces of freedom, security and justice within in the OSCE and its participating states’ area; ensuring the securi- ty of the international transport circuit for supply of commodities.13

In its separate part, this document also indicates the main contributions that the OSCE can offer to the states on the path to achieving the objectives in the field of border control and management based on the thus far implemented programs and activities in this field.14 The way in which the OSCE’s can contrib- ute is firstly facilitation (political dialogue between participating states, tech- nical dialogue, confidence-building measures); further, listed as general forms of support are technical assistance in the development and implementation of national strategies and action plans and the development and implementation of training programs; specialized assistance in combating transnational organ- ized crime, illegal immigration, illicit trade, terrorism, as well as trafficking in conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; contribution in the field of free and secure movement of persons (technical assistance and expert advice on entry and exit procedures, awareness-raising on the rights of immi- grants and asylum seekers); activities related to economic and environmental issues, exchange of information and good practices, promotion and facilitation

11 Ibidem. 12 Ibidem. 13 Border Security and Management Concept Framework for Co-Operation by the Osce Participating States, pp. 2-3. 14 Border Security and Management Concept Framework for Co-Operation by the Osce Participating States, p.3.

15 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

of cross-border economic co-operation, facilitation of cross-border co-operation in case of natural disasters or state of emergency in border zones, etc.15

Given the strategic commitment of the OSCE to encourage and facilitate cooper- ation among the participating states in the field of border protection and securi- ty, it is important to stress the following: as a regional organization that has ade- quate resources and expertise, the OSCE can give the biggest contribution to the achievement of this goal by providing technical support (trainings, expert and technical assistance, national capacity building), as well as in the field of securi- ty, through direct involvement in cases of border disputes or conflict situations.

Migration and free movement of persons

This section will present the basic aspects of illegal migration as a complex se- curity challenge and as a social phenomenon that is simultaneously connected with all three dimensions of security–politico-military, economic and human. A separate part of the chapter will address illegal immigration as a security challenge in terms of border protection and management.

It is firstly important to point out the distinction between illegal immigrants and legal immigration. In terms of protection of external borders and internal security, the states’ security agendas, measures and activities are related to the fight against illegal immigration.

Migration is a complex demographic phenomenon with multiple socio-econom- ic, political and cultural causes and consequences. As a demographic phenom- enon, migration can be individual, group or mass. From the security viewpoint, group and mass immigrations, which most often have an element of being well-organized, are a special challenge, especially if the causes and the motive for migration are of military-security nature (internal, international conflicts, organized violence, etc.). Individual migrations usually do not pose a security challenge, unless they concern internationally known individuals whose activ- ities are associated with criminal, terrorist and other illicit activities.

15 Ibid, pp. 5-7.

16  OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security

The causes and/or direct motives for migration can be of political, security, eco- nomic or cultural nature, or they may be an outcome of a combination of sever- al of these factors. The political and security factors can be viewed as integrat- ed and they refer to the existence of a high-risk political and security situation in the immigrants’ country of origin that causes emigration, often in groups or en masse. This group of causes includes the state of war, various internal con- flicts, unsustainable internal political situations, such as, for example, totalitar- ian governments or revolutionary or systemic political changes at the national level. In this case, migrations are most often in groups or, in extreme cases, en masse, and may firstly aim at the neighboring countries and the region, and then at developed countries, where they seek not only an existential shelter but also a possible permanent residence. Presently, at least when it comes to Europe as a destination, economic factors are prevalent for immigration, both illegal and legal, that aims at the European Union. This factor most frequently results in individual or group immigrations, but if a significant time continuity exists, then the number and mass character of immigration can be manifested. The cultural factor is usually linked with some of the aforementioned factors and in most cases is not an independent and only cause of immigration.

Migrations and immigration have a dual security aspect, both from the view- point of persons who are subjects and main agents of migration and from the viewpoint of the states that are involved in the process. In historical terms, the European continent, i.e. the European Union member states, have been a traditional immigration area for persons coming from other continents. This is a trend that has for decades already, with occasional deviations, kept the con- tinuity of progression in number. When it comes to EU member states as coun- tries of destination for immigrants, it is important to make several distinctions: first reception countries, transit member states, and countries of destination. From the security viewpoint, the first reception countries and the countries of final destination are faced with the most complex situation and the biggest challenge. When it comes to the first reception countries, border protection and management have particular importance for the security of such countries. This objective, at the same time, entails a controversial challenge, considering that border protection, safety and security is the basic component of national security and the states’ sovereign right to manage their own borders. On the other hand, if a state border is conditionally threatened by group or mass in- flux of foreign population, the principles of the protection of human rights and especially adherence to the aims of human security call for the examination of the causes of these movements and for reaction in line with the principles of protection and preservation of human life. Countries of final destination of immigration are also facing certain security challenges, regardless of the cause or the main factor of emigration from the country of origin. Leaving aside the

17 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

economic and cultural aspects, these challenges become intensified especially if that country is involved in an armed conflict in the country of origin (e.g. conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, North and Central Africa).

Countries of the European continent, the EU Member States in particular, have been for decades already an important destination area for immigration from neighboring regions, former colonies, but also from crisis areas in other parts of the world. When it comes to neighboring regions, the causes of immigration and consequently the need for more efficient management and protection of external borders are an outcome of security and economic factors. Eastern Eu- rope is the main area of origin and simultaneously an important area of transit to ​​the European Union: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are countries of origin of a considerable number of illegal and legal immigrants and asylum seekers, and are the main transit point for migration waves from Asia. These Eastern European countries have a high emigration rate–it is believed that over the last several years a quarter of Moldova’s total population have left the coun- try. When it comes to migration waves outside the European continent, the Southern Mediterranean (North Africa and the Middle East) is a critical area as the area of origin and a transit point for migration waves toward Europe. The Middle East is the main transit area for immigration and asylum seekers from South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) and East and sub-Saharan Africa (Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia), who most frequently come to the European countries via Turkey. At the same time, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon are also the countries of origin of immigration. Immigration from the Asian continent is largely conditioned by intra-conti- nental movements as well, but the most common countries of origin of Asian immigration are China, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam.16

Illegal immigrations, in the conditions of globalized security, are a very serious and complex challenge. On the one hand, states have the sovereign right to exercise control over their borders and to define the conditions of entry to and exit from their territories, in accordance with the interests of national security, economic well-being, public morality and political stability. On the other hand, the principles of protection of human rights and fundamental norms and prin- ciples of humanitarian law impose an obligation to take into consideration the causes of mobility and immigration waves and to acceptably treat vulnerable

16 Statistics on immigration are available at the Eurostat website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population- demography-migration-projections/migration-and-citizenship-data and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum- and-managed-migration/data/main-tables

18  OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security

persons seeking protection in more stable areas in their vicinity or in more dis- tant surrounding areas. In this field, the OSCE as a regional organization that combines the experiences of participating states from three continents can give the biggest contribution through education programs, exchange of positive and negative practices, national technical and human capacity building, network- ing, and development of a joint bilateral or multilateral approach.

Border management as a challenge for the future

The complexity of security in the modern world and the complexity of the se- curity challenges faced by societies today require an integrated and holistic approach to managing the challenges and threats. International and internal armed conflicts as a form of violent politics produce various devastating conse- quences: forceful resettlement of the population as the consequence of forced mobility caused by violence; threat and pressure on the borders of neighboring countries; and regional instability in areas where the foci of conflicts are locat- ed. Over the past forty years, the OSCE encountered numerous crises and prob- lems, but contributed to their resolution in various ways. Today, the OSCE is faced with one of the greatest contemporary crises, the Ukrainian crisis, whose development and resolution will affect the overall security situation in Europe and Eurasia. OSCE’s engagement during this crisis has shown the organization’s relevance in conflict management and mediation, primarily through the estab- lishment and deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

For border security in Europe, stability of the former conflict areas, including among other the Western Balkans, is of particular importance. As Minister Dac- ic presented in 2014, on behalf of the Republic of Serbia’s OSCE Chairmanship in 2015, when addressing the future Chairmanship’s priorities, special atten- tion would be paid to the Western Balkans region which had for many years faced wars, hostilities, sanctions, foreign interventions, and serious violations of human rights.17 This region today is no longer a conflict zone in terms of in- ter-state wars, but it is still arguable that there are certain frozen conflicts that

17 Priorities of Serbia’s OSCE Chairmanship, as presented by Minister Dacic at the OSCE special meeting. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/o-ministarstvu/ministar/govori/13932-2014-07-15-11-03-27?lang=lat

19 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

may pose a significant challenge to regional stability. As Mr. Dacic stated when addressing the Chairmanship’s priorities, “particular attention would be given to reconciliation as part of the post-conflict rehabilitation phase as defined by OSCE documents and as a concept to be promoted by our two Chairmanships.”18 The room for cooperation and engagement of the OSCE in this region includes not only the activities of particular missions in a particular area but also, given the improved situation in the region, the possibility for enhanced horizontal cooperation between the OSCE missions on the ground.19

For the stability of borders in Europe and the OSCE’s role in managing this challenge, several points are important within the group of priorities of the Serbian Chairmanship. As Minister Dacic said, Serbia’s priorities for 2015 in- clude the continuation and support to all formats for resolving frozen conflicts, with special importance and role given to special representatives in specific regions and conflicts; furthermore, strengthening of the OSCE’s capacities and mechanisms to actively respond in all phases of conflict, from early warning to post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation; continuation of the systematic efforts of the OSCE in strengthening mediation activities.20 In these activities, the OSCE as an organization of regional cooperation in the field of security and human rights cooperates and improves cooperation with other similar or- ganizations that share the same goals–the Council of Europe, European Union, United Nations, NATO, but also with partnership forums for the Mediterranean and Asian regions. Mr. Dacic mentioned among his priorities, as special areas of partnership cooperation, the topics pertaining to the second dimension, such as transport and economic migration, but also those in other fields of activity, such as the fight against corruption and money laundering.21

The safe and efficient border management in the future and the OSCE’s contri- bution to this field must take into consideration some most important contem- porary facts, through all stages of planning, implementation and evaluation of this process. On the one side there is the complexity of threats and challenges which have multi-dimensional character and consequences, and trans-nation- ally of threats, where security challenges, apart from being related to several dimensions, also have a trans-national character and origin. In such conditions, the comprehensive approach of the OSCE, which bases its activities on the val- ues of human rights, democracy, rule of law and human freedom and dignity, has crucial importance for crisis and conflict management through provision

18 Ibidem. 19 Ibidem. 20 Ibidem. 21 Ibidem.

20  OSCE and the contemporary challenge of border management and security

of assistance to participating or unstable states in response to challenges and threats. From technical assistance in various fields, to direct involvement with- in the military-political dimension (prevention, mediation, peace building and post-conflict stabilization) and participation in the strengthening of national institutional capacities and civil sector in the states, the OSCE contributes to the improvement of the overall security situation and to maintaining the con- ditions for border stability in Europe.

References

Kernic Franc and Hauser Gunther (ed.), European Security in Transition, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006.

Dunja Poleti, Oblici prostorne pokretljivosti u Srbiji: migracije i mobilnost (Forms of Spatial Movements in Serbia: Migration and Mobility), in Synthesis, VI/1 (2014), Center for Humanities Synthesis, Belgrade, 2014, pp. 1-18.

Salber Herbert and Ackermann Alice, The OSCE’s Comprehensive Approach to Border Security and Management, OSCE Yearbook 2009 Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg / IFSH (ed.), Volume 15, 2009.

Sigler Mark, OSCE and European Security, CIDOB Journal Afers Internacionals, no. 38-39, pp. 59-66.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community, SUM(10) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 4, Summit Meeting, Astana, 2010. Available at: http://www.osce.org/ cio/74985?download=true

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decision No. 3/11, Decision No. 3/11 Elements of the Conflict Cycle, related to enhancing the OSCE’s capabilities in early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-conflict rehabilitation, Second day of the Eighteenth Meeting MC(18) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Vilnius, 2011. Available at: http://www.osce.org/ mc/86621?download=true

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Border Security And Management Concept Framework For Co-Operation By The Osce Participating States,

21 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

MC(13) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, 2005. Available at: http://www.osce.org/mc/17452?download=true

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Movement and Human Contacts, Final Report, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, PC.SHDM.GAL/7/13, Vienna, Austria, 15 July 2013. Available at: http://www.osce.org/ odihr/103581?download=true

Self-assessment tool for nations to increase preparedness for cross-border implications of crises, OSCE Secretariat, Transnational Threats Department Borders Unit, 2013. Available at: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/104490?download=true

Baseline study on cross-border mobility in the OSCE region, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Warsaw, 2014. Available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/118506?download=true

OSCE Commitments relating to Migration and Integration, A guide prepared for the OSCE Human Dimension, Seminar on “Migration and Integration”, Warsaw, 11-13 May 2005. Available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/14634?download=true

Eurostat:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration- projections/migration-and-citizenship-data

Eurostat:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/ main-tables Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia: http://www.mfa. gov.rs/sr/index.php/o-ministarstvu/ministar/govori/13932-2014-07-15-11-03- 27?lang=lat

Biography

Ivana Jovanović (born in 1985) is attending doctoral academic studies–Interna- tional and European Studies–at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. She completed her undergraduate studies at the Department of Inter- national Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences, after which she complet- ed her master studies at the Department for European Integration. The fields of her academic interests include multiculturalism, the rights of foreigners, immi- gration, internal security, and regional integration. She is the OSCE scholarship holder for doctoral studies in Serbia for the academic year 2014/2015.

22  Aleksandra Obradović

OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Belgrade, April 2015

Instead of marking the fortieth anniversary of its existence, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is facing the greatest crisis of Eu- ropean security since the end of the Cold War. The crisis in Ukraine is a big chal- lenge and an opportunity for the OSCE to show its relevance for international security relations. Having lost the importance it had during the Cold War, the OSCE showed through active participation in resolving the Ukrainian crisis that it had an important role in the European security architecture as a platform for dialogue, confidence building and overcoming of divisions. In addition to the OSCE’s role in resolving the Ukraine crisis, this essay will also tackle a series of transnational security challenges faced by the OSCE participating states, which demand a joint response in order to prevent a threat to international security. To maintain its importance for European security, the OSCE will have to use its mechanisms and respond efficiently both to the Ukraine crisis and to other security challenges.

23 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the most comprehensive regional security organization, comprising 57 participating states spanning Europe, Eurasia and the Euro-Atlantic region. In August 1975, thirty-five countries established common principles for peaceful coexistence from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The organization was founded with the idea to ensure peace, stability and democracy for more than a billion people. With the adoption of the Helsinki Charter in 1975 and the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was over time transformed into the organization (OSCE), a mechanism was created for dialogue and nego- tiations between the East and the West.1 The CSCE served as a bridge between the East and the West and a confidence building mechanism during the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act was the key agreement for stabilization in Europe during the Cold War, which paved the way for overcoming the divisions by introducing an innovative approach to security. One of the main values and comparative advantages of the organization is its comprehensive and cooper- ative approach to security that comprises three dimensions: politico-military (comprising arms control, the fight against terrorism, prevention and resolution of conflicts), the economic and environmental dimension (comprising economic growth and environmental protection) and the human dimension (comprising the protection of human rights, the rule of law, election monitoring).2

Another big advantage of the OSCE is that it comprises all countries of Europe, the former Soviet Union, as well as the USA and Canada. Although the OSCE lacks NATO’s military capabilities and EU’s economic resources, no other secu- rity organization has a mandate to act in such a broad geographical area. This makes OSCE the key actor in conflict prevention and resolution.

The OSCE after the Cold War

After the end of the Cold War, when the CSCE became the OSCE, the key mission was changed. The OSCE developed instruments that contribute to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, confidence building in the post-Soviet space. During the

1 Sinisa Tatalovic, Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi (Global Security and Ethnic Conflicts), Politička kultura (Political Culture), Zagreb, 2010. pp. 64-69. 2 Dragan R. Simic, Nauka o bezbednosti – Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti (The Science of Security– Contemporary Approaches to Security), FRY Official Gazette, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002, pp. 83-92.

24  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

nineties, the OSCE neglected its politico-military and economic dimensions and focused almost entirely on the promotion of human rights and democracy. Its ac- tivities were concentrated in the area east of Warsaw. Although the Helsinki Act was initiated by the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact and was initially viewed as a victory of the Soviet Union over the West, it actually contrib- uted to the spreading of Western values and interests to the area of Eastern Europe.

At the 1990 Ministerial Meeting in Paris, a prevailing position was that the era of confrontation and division in Europe was over. Unfortunately, the wars in Chechnya, the former Yugoslavia, and the Russian-Georgian conflict denied it. The OSCE failed to respond successfully to either of these crises.

During the 1990s, following the changes on the international scene after the end of the Cold War, the organization was significant enough to continue to exist, but not as significant as to play an important role in international relations. Russia and the West established relations through other organizations, Russia became a member of the Council of Europe and the G7, the NATO-Russia Council was founded, so it became less important for Russia to maintain its international relations through the OSCE. For all these reasons, the OSCE lost the importance it had had during the Cold War. Although there were attempts in the post-Cold War period to give the organization a more active role by deploying peacekeeping missions in the regions of the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Moldova and other troublesome territories, the OSCE was unable to find its final role within European security.3 OSCE’s missions were mostly taken over by NATO and the EU, with much more available funds.

OSCE’s annual budget was reduced by 25% in the past 10 years, which signifi- cantly contributed to the marginalization of the organization.

In recent years, the OSCE has struggled to maintain its importance on the in- ternational scene. Since 2011, participating states have attempted to adjust the organization’s activities to contemporary security challenges. At the 2012 Min- isterial Council meeting in Dublin, the states agreed to carry out an institution- al reform process, known as the “Helsinki +40 process.“4 The aim of the process is for the participating states to recommit to a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security through all three dimensions: politico-military, economic and human, as a way of responding to contemporary challenges. However, the new emerging security circumstances have set this process aside.

3 Sinisa Tatalovic, Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi (Global Security and Ethnic Conflicts), Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2010. pp. 64-69. 4 Javier Ruperez, The Helsinki Final Act, is there life after 40?, Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 2014, pp. 1-6

25 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The OSCE and the Ukraine crisis

In early 2014, nobody even assumed that only a few months later Europe- an security would be significantly compromised.5 The Ukrainian crisis, which started with mass anti-government protests, lead to the ousting of President Yanukovych and grew into a military confrontation, is the worst crisis not only of European but also of global security in the post-Cold War period. Since the escalation of the crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the relations be- tween Russia and the West have been at the lowest possible level. Russia has been openly designated as an adversary, leaving aside the need for economic cooperation because of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas.

The OSCE was almost forgotten until the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. How- ever, its response to the crisis has shown that it can play a constructive role in Ukraine and be a mediator between the East and the West.6 It turned out that the OSCE is the most adequate solution for overcoming the growing divi- sions. In many ways, the OSCE has become the least bad solution for solving the Ukrainian crisis. What is of crucial importance is that all stakeholders are members of the organization–Russia, Ukraine, the USA, EU participating states, as well as Canada and Turkey. No other international organization is an ade- quate solution for the Ukrainian crisis–the UN because of the Russian veto in the Security Council, the EU because of its direct involvement in the geopolit- ical struggle for Ukraine, and NATO due to its negative image in Russia. Thus, the current crisis has shown the OSCE’s relevance for European security.

The Swiss Chairmanship of the OSCE greatly contributed to resolving the Ukrainian crisis. Switzerland’s traditional neutrality was an important factor, just like a very active personal engagement of the Swiss Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson Didier Burkhalter. In his address to the UN Security Council in February already, he proposed some ideas, which soon came to pass. They in- cluded the establishment of a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), the establishment of a Contact Group, to include both Ukraine and Russia, and the appointment of a special representative for Ukraine.7 During its chairmanship, Switzerland also initiated the establishment of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security, headed by German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger. The panel

5 Wolfgang Ischinger, “The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, pp. 94-103 6 Wolfgang Ischinger, “The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 94-103 7 Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 44-58

26  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

should launch ideas and make recommendations on how to replace the existing policy of confrontation with the policy of cooperation and joint action.

The establishment of the observer mission in March 2014 was a major chal- lenge for the OSCE. The OSCE then showed the ability to reach a consensus among the 57 participating states despite the deep divide existing among them. This was the first mission that the OSCE launched in over a decade. The mission has a broad mandate, covers the entire territory of Ukraine, acts as the eyes and ears of the international community on the ground and is the only objective source of information.8 After flight MH17 was shot down over the Ukranian territory, the mission’s mandate was extended by six months.

The next important step that the OSCE took in conflict resolution was the estab- lishment of the observer mission on the Russian-Ukrainian border, at Russian checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk, in July 2014. This modest confidence-build- ing measure can also be expanded at a later stage.9

Also established was the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), consisting of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE represent- ative, which provided the framework for the signing of both Minsk Agree- ments.10 The most important step in resolving the Ukrainian crisis is to comply with the ceasefire agreement that was reached then and to start withdrawing heavy weaponry. The crisis cannot be resolved using military force, there is no military solution to the conflict.11

With a view to resolving the Ukrainian crisis, the OSCE primarily aims to pre- vent the spillover of the conflict across Ukraine’s borders and to undertake ac- tivities towards preventing the situation in Eastern Ukraine from becoming another frozen conflict. In addition to these primary goals, OSCE’s priorities should focus on monitoring the compliance with the ceasefire and the with- drawal of heavy weaponry, contribution to dialogue and assistance in the in- vestigation of cases of violation of humanitarian law and human rights, be- cause peacemaking starts with pragmatic solutions that enhance security and prevent the conflict from escalating and spilling over to neighboring countries.

8 Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 44-58 9 “Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” April 22, 2015 http://www.osce.org/cio/109266?download=true 10 “Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” April 22, 2015 http://www.osce.org/cio/109266?download=true 11 Wolfgang Ischinger, “The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 94-103

27 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The Ukrainian crisis has put the OSCE into the focus of contemporary interna- tional relations. On the one hand, it is a major challenge especially due to the manifested divisions between the participating states, while on the other hand it is an opportunity for the organization to prove its relevance for the Euro-Atlantic security structure. This is particularly important in the context of the “Helsinki +40 process“, which aims to restore confidence between the participating states and enable progress in the implementation of the OSCE’s common principles.12

Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis has put the OSCE into a dilemma. The organiza- tion now has to decide whether to remain committed to its core values set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and reaffirmed in Paris and Astana in 1990 and 2010. The dilemma is also whether its goal will continue to be to achieve the vision of creating a security community based on Western values, such as democracy, rule of law and human rights, which carries the risk of antagonising Russia and other authoritarian states that may block the OSCE’s activities.13 The alternative would be for the OSCE to revitalize its Cold War aspirations to restore confidence and overcome the divisions and to serve as a forum for both democratic and authoritarian regimes. During the Cold War, owing to the CSCE, it was possible to discuss conflicting attitudes, build trust, establish common rules despite the total ideological division between the participating states. The CSCE was neither a community of values like the EU nor an alliance against a common enemy like NATO. On the contrary, it respected both the Western and the Eastern secu- rity concepts. Even today, the OSCE’s strength has remained in the fact that the states which have very different values, culture and history mutually cooperate, achieve political compromise and consensus and thus build rules of cohabitation.

The OSCE and contemporary security threats

At present, the OSCE is mainly focused on Ukraine. Yet, the preoccupation with Ukraine has sidelined other important topics. This is made particularly obvious by the example of the “Helsinki +40 process“, which is oriented towards reform- ing the organization in order to effectively cope with new security challenges.

12 Christian Nunlist and David Svarin, Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, (Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich and foraus – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy, Zurich, December, 2014), 16 13 Ibidem, 7

28  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Other important activities of the OSCE have also been neglected, in particular those relating to the resolution of frozen conflicts in Moldova and the Southern Caucasus. The OSCE is mandated to resolve the existing conflicts in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where much still remains to be done.14 In recent years there has been a halt in the 5 + 2 process for resolving the conflict in Pridnestrovye; official meetings in the 5 + 2 format need to be resumed for the conflict to be ended. The political process in Georgia is still at risk. Since the OSCE failed to play an effective role in resolving this conflict, its mission to Georgia was closed in late 2008 as a result of Moscow’s refusal to renew its mandate. All these developments contribute to increased instability in the OSCE region, and its key role in maintaining peace and stability is feasible precisely through activities that are implementable in the areas hit by frozen conflicts.

The OSCE needs to efficiently respond not only to the Ukraine crisis but also to many other security challenges that its participating states are facing. Contem- porary security challenges that have a transnational character, such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking, are com- mon threats that affect all OSCE participating states and that require a common response and unity in countering them. In today’s globalized world, these threats easily cross borders. Tension and lack of trust between the states whose security and prosperity are intertwined leads to a “lose-lose situation“. The influence of the OSCE ultimately depends on the political will and engagament of participat- ing states. Given the security environment characterized by a growing distrust, it is very difficult to build a security community in the OSCE territory. One of the key tasks of the OSCE would be to continue to develop confidence-building measures aimed at preventing the escalation of conflicts. The OSCE could also be a relevant platform for discussion that would bring together Russia, NATO and the EU, around the same table, in order to find an efficient response to the growing global security threats. The OSCE could also be an effective tool in the contemporary security environment, responding to the whole spectrum of secu- rity challenges in the case where NATO or the EU are unable to act.

In addition to Ukraine, unresolved conflicts and instability in North Africa and the Middle East create a fertile ground for terrorism and significantly affect the security of the OSCE participating states. Increasingly intensive cooperation between criminal networks and ideologically motivated terrorists represents a new type of hybrid threat. Terrorism is a global threat and a common ene- my for all. Terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen have shown that Europe

14 Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 44-58

29 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

cannot remain isolated from the developments in other parts of the world and underlined the need for joint efforts of the international community in the fight against terrorism. The OSCE closely cooperates with all UN organizations and bodies that are aimed at countering terrorism. One of the ways of countering terrorism is to fight extremism and radicalization, where the OSCE actively par- ticipates. The OSCE can significantly contribute to European security through its activities aimed at preventing the divisions within societies and fostering a culture of tolerance and non-discrimination.15

It should be borne in mind that contemporary, transnational security threats are not the same as when the OSCE was founded. The OSCE was created with the aim of preventing military conflicts between states and in the 21st century there is a growing number of conflicts within states. The OSCE should conform to con- temporary security challenges and be a tool for peaceful change management. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the OSCE’s capacities in areas such as conflict prevention and facilitation of the achievement of sustainable peace solu- tions, as well as in the areas of protection of human rights, including minority rights, promotion of free elections, the rule of law and the fight against terrorism.

Conclusion

This year the OSCE marks the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Helsin- ki Final Act. Back in 1975, the leaders of the states that were deeply divided ideologically managed to sit at the same table, leaving aside the zero-sum16 approach, and to start a dialogue in order to prevent new conflicts. The same approach is necessary today in order to reduce tensions and restore the spirit of cooperation, with a view to achieving security, stability and prosperity in the OSCE region. In the coming years, the OSCE will definitely deal with the conse- quences of the geopolitical earthquake that broke out in Ukraine in 2014. Forty years after its establishment, the OSCE is facing a serious challenge to its vision of creating a security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

15 http://www.osce.org/what/terrorism April 28, 2015 16 Zero-sum approach is a situation in which the goals of two sides are so conflicting that a gain for one side entails a corresponding loss for the other side.

30  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Through its role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis, the OSCE has shown that it is a significant international security organization. However, in order to remain important for European security it must respond effectively not only to the Ukrainian crisis but also to other security challenges. Likewise, there is a need for funding, in line with the new requirements of the modern states’ security environment; participating states should invest more in the organization and thus contribute to a more secure international order.

It is of vital importance for the future of the OSCE to reaffirm the Helsinki prin- ciples and re-develop trust between the East and the West. It is encouraging that Germany and Austria will chair the organization in 2016 and 2017, as these countries are able to constructively shape the solutions for the benefit of all participating states. The current OSCE chair is Serbia, which continues to pursue the policy committed to reconciliation measures as part of post-conflict consolidation, which was also pursued by Switzerland during its chairmanship.

It should be borne in mind that in order to create a stable and functional Euro- pean security architecture, it is necessary to integrate Russia into it. Otherwise, the divisions and conflicts will deepen and continue. What cannot be expect- ed is that a shield be built on Russia’s borders, that Georgia and Ukraine join NATO, and that Russia simultaneously cooperate with the West in respect of other transnational security threats.

All participating states have agreed that progress needs to be made towards the creation of the Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Asian security community, but bearing in mind the new circumstances, this goal will be very difficult to achieve. The policy of confrontation, division and mistrust between the East and the West jeopard- izes not only this goal and the cooperative approach to security but also signif- icantly jeopardizes international security. Strong cooperation and firm political will be required to ensure peace, stability and prosperity in the entire OSCE area.

References

Dragan R Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti – Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti (The Science of Security–Contemporary Approaches to Security), FRY Official Gazette, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002

Siniša Tatalović, Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi (Global Security and Ethnic Conflicts), Politička kultura, Zagreb 2010.

31 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Javier Ruperez, The Helsinki Final Act, is there life after 40?, Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 2014.

Klas Bergman, The Helsinki Final Act, from dissidents to election observation, Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 2014.

Hana Umezawa, OSCE in interorganisational cooperation: Aspects of cooperation in peace and security, Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Brugge

Christian Nunlist and David Svarin, Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich and foraus – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy, Zurich, December, 2014

Raimonds Rublovskis, “The Challenges of OSCE within Global Security Environment of the 21st Century”, Latvian Institute on Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2015 http://liia.lv/ en/blogs/the-challenges-of-osce-within-global-security-envi

Judy Dempsey, “Sanctions and the OSCE mission in Ukraine” Carnegie Europe, April 24, 2015 http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56882

Dmitri Trenin, “The Disturbing Legacy of the Ukraine Crisis”, National Interest, February 12, 2015

Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2

Wolfgang Ischinger, “The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2

Dmitri Trenin, “From cooperation to competition”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2

“Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” April 22, 2015 http://www.osce.org/ cio/109266?download=true

“Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in 2014 The Swiss Chairmanship’s commitment to implementing its priorities”, April 20, 2015 https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/ eda/en/documents/recent/20141215-osze-vorsitz-umsetzung-prioritaeten_EN.pdf

32  Luka Glušac

Foreign (terrorist) fighters

Summary: The Arab Spring has made the problem of European countries’ na- tionals who fight on the battlefields across the Middle East highly topical. The states perceive as a threat their own nationals who, guided primarily by reli- gious reasons, join foreign fighting, as a rule on the side of non-state actors in armed conflicts, following the call to jihad. Foreign (terrorist) fighters go abroad because they see a distant conflict as a threat to the common transnation- al identity group. The paper first presents the foreign fighters phenomenon, through its definition and brief historical perspective and main features, then indicates its importance for the international community and finally provides an outline of the role and comparative advantages of the Organization for Se- curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in countering this security problem.

33 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Introduction

The armed conflicts in Syria and re-escalation of the conflict in Iraq caused by the invasion of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), have made topical the issue of European countries’ national who are fighting on the battlefields throughout the Middle East, blazing after the Arab Spring. Western states per- ceive as a threat their own nationals who, guided primarily by religious reasons, join the fighting, as a rule on the side of non-state actors in armed conflicts, fol- lowing the call to jihad. Most of the states announced, and a good part already adopted updates of their mostly criminal legislation, incriminating warfare on behalf of foreign armed formations in a foreign country. The international com- munity has also taken measures to counter this security challenge, for which reason the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions addressing this chal- lenge, which were followed by an adequate reaction and support of regional mechanisms, primarily the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

This paper is intended first to present the phenomenon of foreign fighters and indicate its importance for the international community, and then to outline the role, importance and comparative advantages of the OSCE in countering this security problem. In doing so, we are aware that the phenomenon of for- eign fighters is transnational by its nature, but also that the scope to which the international community is countering this problem is limited, and that the main thrust of the struggle is on individual states.

It should be pointed out at the outset that the scientific literature actually pro- vides a very small number of theoretical works addressing this topic and thus, as one of the leading experts on foreign fighters, David Mallet notes, an established term for the phenomenon1 does not even exist in the political science literature. This type of war activism remains largely understudied. There are descriptions of foreign fighter involvement in individual conflicts, but almost no cross-case analyses2 or theoretically informed attempts at explaining their appearance.3

1 David Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 54/1(2010): 106. 2 A rare exception is Malet’s book Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), which is the only one that examines this phenomenon more comprehensively. 3 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security, 35/3 (2010): p. 54.

34  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

A brief historical perspective on the phenomenon and its salient feature

Foreign fighters are a phenomenon that is neither new nor a uniquely Islamic specificum, which is best evidenced by the significant presence of foreign war- riors in the conflict in Ukraine. Conflicts of different causes and motives have attracted foreign volunteers throughout modern history. Examples of involve- ment of foreign fighters range from the Greek War of Independence during the 1820s, the civil war in Mexico during the 1830s, through the Texas Revolution in the 1840s, the Spanish Civil War almost a hundred years later and the Israeli War of Independence in the first post-war years, and the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the conflicts in Chechnya and Iraq, to the current conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. Precisely the Spanish Civil War, the Arab-Israeli wars and the war in Afghanistan are the most scrutinized historical examples of significant involvement of foreign fighters. The ongoing conflicts have clearly brought this problem into the focus of the public eye.

What all these conflicts in which this phenomenon is present have in common is that insurgents consistently recruited foreign fighters by framing the local war as one that threatened a shared transnational identity group and necessitated a defensive mobilization.4 Precisely the insertion of conflict into the matrix of threat to a common identity is the key to understanding the problem of for- eign fighters, because external assistance in the form of manpower is attracted by stressing the existential threats to a particular identity group, regardless of what underlies it: ideology, religion, language, etc. The mission is to deliver the message in such a way as to affect this “sense of identity” of geographically dis- tant individuals and thus trigger their involvement. Thus, theoretically, this phe- nomenon can be inserted into the matrix of the so called societal securitization.5

4 Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters?”, p. 97. 5 See more on societal securitization in: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

35 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Who are foreign fighters?

Thus far, researchers have used different terminology for essentially the same phenomenon, depending on the viewpoint which they took. According to Hegg- hamer, the cause is in the fact that foreign fighters constitute an intermediate (indirect) actor category lost between local rebels, on one hand, and interna- tional terrorists, on the other.6

Notions about foreign fighters are shaped by our state-centric perspective. When we speak about “foreign”, we refer to nationality: A volunteer is foreign if he holds the citizenship of a country external to conflict. Mendelsohn correctly notes that this ontology often fails to correspond to the foreign fighter’s sense of identity.7 Moreover, we tend to treat “foreign” and “non-foreign” (domestic) fighters as a dichotomy, ignoring the different levels of “foreignness”. In some places, simply traveling to the next village makes one a foreigner. Different identity markers – province of origin, ethnic group, tribe, sub-clan or any other –can determine one’s level of “foreignness”.8 Nevertheless, citizenship remains a major attribute for differentiating domestic from foreign fighters, both in the- oretical works and in the discourse of the international community.

David Malet defines foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict“.9 Building on this formulation, Hegghammer defines a foreign fighter as an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organiza- tion, and (4) is unpaid.10

These four criteria set foreign fighters apart from other types of violent actors who cross borders. Criterion (4) excludes mercenaries, who are paid and fol- low the highest bidder. Criterion (3) excludes soldiers, who are usually salaried

6 Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”, p. 55. 7 Namely, a Pashtun volunteer from Pakistan is likely to feel greater identification with fellow Pashtuns from Afghanistan than he would with a fellow Pakistani from Punjab. Yet, according to the methodology used not only by researchers but also by the states and the international community, the Punjabi fighting with government forces in the tribal areas is considered local, while a Pakistani Taliban fighting alongside his co-ethnics in Afghanistan is a foreign fighter. Barak Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends,“ Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 55/2 (2011), p. 192. 8 Ibid. 9 David Malet, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts” (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2008), p. 9. 10 Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”, pp. 57-8.

36  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

and go where their generals send them. Criterion (2) excludes returning dias- pora members or exiled rebels, who have a preexisting stake in the conflict. This distinction, which disappears in Idean Salehyan’s term “transnational in- surgent”11 or John Mackinlay’s “global insurgent”12, matters because ethnic or kinship links to insurgents presumably facilitate mobilization considerably.13 Finally, criterion (1) distinguishes foreign fighters from international terrorists, who specialize in out-of-area violence against noncombatants. This distinction is rarely made; most works on militant Islamism use generic terms such as ”jihadists” or “Salafi jihadists” to describe any transnational violent Islamist, whether he or she undertakes suicide bombings in a Western capital or mortar attacks in a war zone. In reality, most foreign fighters never engaged in out-of- area operations, but in one combat area at the time.14

In this paper, we use the Hegghammer’s definition. We emphasize that the term used in the Serbian language–“foreign fighters”–does not prejudge their inter- national legal status.15

The importance of recruitment

The nature of the relationship between the insurgents – shared ethnicity or some other tie such as religion – is irrelevant to the logic of transnational re- cruitment. Recruitment messaging emphasizes the necessity of a defensive ac- tion to preserve the existence of the community rather than the opportunity for individual gains. Most recruits do not see themselves as mercenaries. They genuinely believe that they are fighting in a defensive war.16 Malet notes that the historical data indicates that the recruitment of foreign fighters–from lo- cating potential recruits to framing the conflict–is essentially equivalent across cases, regardless of the issue of contention of the conflict.17

11 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 12 John Mackinlay, Globalization and Insurgency. Adelphi Papers No. 352 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002). 13 Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”, p. 58. 14 Ibid. 15 For an excellent overview of the status of foreign fighters in the international law, see: Sandra Kraehenmann, Foreign Fighters under International Law, Academy Briefing No. 7 (Geneva: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014). 16 Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters?”, p. 97. 17 Ibid, p. 109.

37 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Although the evolution in the roles and significance of foreign fighters is affect- ed by diverse factors, no element has generated more debate than the impact of the Internet on the nature of the jihadi threat and its influence on the foreign fighters’ problem. According to some, the Internet has become the instrument of choice (or necessity) for recruitment.18 Without the Internet, some potential recruits would probably not be aware of events outside their small universe and of the opportunities to get involved in a conflict.19

Why mostly Islamic foreign fighters?

It should be noted that despite the absolutely prevailing number of Islamic foreign fighters, compared to non-Islamic fighters, the available data do not in- dicate a single particular feature of Islamic communities. In ideological terms, the ubiquity of the Islamic foreign fighters in all conflicts after Afghanistan in 1980s coincides with the spreading of teachings of Abdullah Azzam, whose movement was dedicated to defending Muslims wherever they are. Over the years, segments of this movement shifted their orientation from simply de- fending Arab lands “under occupation” to a more ambitious program calling for the establishment of a Caliphate governed by the shari’ah law throughout the Muslim world and beyond.20 Thus, they imbed the call for mobilization into the matrix of the Muslim nation’s (ummah) facing an existential external threat.

The problem of returnee fighters

The foreign fighters’ phenomenon is about more than their contribution on their first battlefield; it encompasses a life cycle that starts when an individual begins to consider joining a fight in a country that is not his, continues through

18 Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters - Recent Trends“, pp. 199-200. 19 Ibid, p. 200. 20 Ibid, p. 191.

38  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

his involvement in the conflict, and ends with his actions once he leaves that arena.21 Stephanie Kaplan notes that the “foreign fighter problem is actually several problems”, that it needs to be disaggregated for the sake of better un- derstanding and development of effective policies. She suggests that the life cycle of foreign warriors be divided into three phases: the pre-war mobilization phase, the war phase and the post-war phase.22

The current worries about foreign fighters seem to center around the threat of „bleed out“23 as jihadi veterans, equipped with new knowledge of tactics, training, rectuite- ment, media, and technical skills in building bombs, take their skills elsewhere–po- tentially facilitating the initiation or escalation of terrorism in their home country or in other arenas, and enhancing the power of insurgencies and terrorist groups.24

The key question is what happens to these fighters when they leave, particu- larly how the earlier phases shape their future trajectory. While some foreign fighters return home and reintegrate into society, many do not. Their experi- ence is often a constitutive event that shapes who they are and what they do. Many find it hard to return to daily lives. They seek the company of people like them, and in many places their reputation in their community is tied to their identity as fighters. In some cases, Mendelsohn notes, even when a former fighter tries to leave his past behind, his state continues to identify him as a threat, thus pushing him back to the underground life and into the arms of comrades who face the same problem. Some of these individuals go on to form the infrastructure for the next generation of foreign fighters.25

The problem from the perspective of the international community

The most basic assumption that existing scholarship makes about “outsiders” is that they strengthen the domestic insurgents. As Bakke points out, from the

21 Ibid, p. 190. 22 Tally Helfont, “The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies,” in The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, ed. Michael P. Noonan, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2011), p. 3. 23 There is no adequate Serbian translation of this concept. 24 Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters - Recent Trends“, p. 199. 25 Ibid, p. 194.

39 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

perspective of the international community, however, the worry about foreign fighters (namely “transnational insurgents,” as she calls them) is fourfold.26

First, transnational insurgents might prolong a civil war by introducing more actors to the theater and complicating attempts at ending the war through in- tervention or negotiations (e.g. Syria). Second, many of today’s transnational insurgents are Islamists, so there is reasonable fear in Washington and Europe- an capitals that these actors transform the struggle which they join (e.g. Mali). Third, if transnational insurgents strengthen local insurgents or prolong the war, they can considerably impact the creation of a failed state or a safe haven and training ground for terrorists (like in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia). Finally, Western governments fear that by involvement in wars abroad, transna- tional insurgents acquire skills which they can use in their home country.

In the opinion of the British MI5 about foreign fighters, “the skills, contacts and status acquired overseas can make these individuals a much greater threat when they return to the UK, even if they have not been tasked directly to carry out an attack on their return”.27

Response of the international community Activities of the United Nations

The United Nations responded to the foreign fighter problem by adopting two resolutions (2170 and 2178) under Chapter VII of the Charter, which seeks to strengthen international cooperation, update the national legislations and cre- ate a common approach to countering this growing threat.

Resolution 2170 (2014), aimed primarily at suppressing ISIL’s actions, was the first to recognize the importance of foreign fighters. The Security Council de- manded that all foreign terrorist fighters withdrew from the war zones, con- demned their recruitment that contributed to violent radicalization and the spread of conflict and urged the Member States to intensify efforts to prevent

26 Kristin Bakke, „Help Wanted?: The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,“ International Security, 38/4 (2014): p. 150. 27 MI5 Security Service, “Foreign Fighters,” last modified April 28, 2015, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what- we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk/foreign-fighters.html.

40  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

at the national level, through various legal and practical measures, the recruit- ment and deployment to the battlefields in the Middle East.

In late September 2014, the Security Council adopted the thus far most com- prehensive resolution dealing with the problem of foreign fighters. By its Res- olution 2178, adopted on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council condemns the violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism and demands that all foreign fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflicts. The key positions of the resolution are related to the decision that Member States should prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participating in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities. The Security Council especially underlines the importance of engag- ing relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter violent extremism. The Security Council also emphasizes the importance of Member States’ efforts to develop non-violent avenues for conflict prevention in order to decrease the risk of radicalization to terrorism, and underscores the role education can play in countering terrorist narratives.

OSCE in countering foreign fighters “Normative” regulations

The key OSCE document on terrorism is the Consolidated Framework for the Fights against Terrorism (Decision No. 1063) adopted in late 2012, which high- lights operational principles and identifies the strategic focus of the OSCE’s counter-terrorism role to guide future activities. It aims at enhancing the pro- file and added value of the OSCE’s contribution to the global efforts to eradicate terrorism and at facilitating communication and strengthening co-operation with key partners and organizations.28

28 For overview of the OSCE documents relating to countering terrorism, see: http://www.osce.org/ node/26365?download=tru, last modified April 28, 2015.

41 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Based on this Consolidated Framework, a number of its earlier related acts and the mentioned positions of the United Nations, the OSCE Ministerial Summit in Basel, in December 2014, adopted the “Declaration on the OSCE Role in Counter- ing the Phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Context of the Imple- mentation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014)”. The Declaration calls upon the participating States to co-operate fully in coun- tering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, through exchange of infor- mation, prevention of movement (through effective border controls and controls on the issuance of identity papers and travel documents), enhanced international co-operation in monitoring the use of the Internet for the purposes of inciting violent extremism and radicalization29, and to further promote partnerships with civil society, the media and private companies in countering terrorism.30

The Declaration calls upon the OSCE executive structures to facilitate thematic discussions in the OSCE, in a manner complementary to the ongoing efforts at the UN, focused on the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, in order to improve the understanding of the phenomenon, to exchange experiences and good practices, etc. The OSCE should also offer assistance in capacity-building activities to the requesting States and organize appropriate events to identify potential weaknesses in the existing international legal and operational co-op- eration mechanisms. According to the Declaration, it is necessary to continue to promote OSCE efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, including through community policing approaches to preventing terrorism, in particular at the local level. Finally, the OSCE should develop, in close cooperation with partner organizations, such as the UN, a coherent ap- proach to help individual countries, guided by the principle of local ownership, taking into account The Hague - Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF (Foreign Terrorist Fighters) Phenomenon, adopted by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).31

In addition, the Serbian chairmanship of the OSCE in 2015 announced that it would devote special attention to the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, and also to violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, par- ticularly radicalization of youth. Ivica Dacic, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, announced a large OSCE conference on this issue in summer, 2015.32

29 See also: Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/06 on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. 30 In accordance with: Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/08. 31 The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon. Includes 19 good practice examples divided into thematic units. 32 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ivica Dačić Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Briefing to the UN Security Council, New York, 24 February 2015, http://www.un.int/serbia/sites/www.un.int/files/Serbia/214.pdf.

42  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

Comparative advantages of the OSCE

The OSCE has a comparative advantage over other international organizations (universal and regional) when it comes to dealing with the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. As Trapara notes, “the lack of legal status and absence of legal bindingness of OSCE’s decisions have actually proved to be an advan- tage, because this highlighted the informal moment of decision-making and action, which made this organization very flexible in meeting the tasks“.33 This is manifested here because not all states have the same vision for solving this problem, which makes the quest for a common denominator easier.

This phenomenon is permeated by a number of important thematic priorities for the OSCE that were recently reaffirmed by participating States. “Countering vio- lent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, following a multidimen- sional approach” and “promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures” are two areas identified as the OSCE strategic focus in the field of anti-terrorist activities, as stated by the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism. The best ap- proach to countering this phenomenon is at the intersection of these two prior- ities, but also of two out of three OSCE dimensions (defense policy and human).

Since radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters are rooted on the call for defensive mobilization for the purpose of preserving the identity group, the action at the local level is of crucial importance. Empowerment of primary so- cial groups and relationships between the majority and minority populations in combination with solving socio-economic problems is of utmost importance in order to reduce the possibility of movement of individuals to distant battlefields.

By adopting the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, the OSCE emphasized the need to review the “various social, economic, political and oth- er factors, including violent separatism and extremism, which engender con- ditions in which terrorist organizations are able to recruit and win support”.34 Very similar conditions are decisive also for mobilization of foreign fighters. Therefore, it is particularly important for the strategy against radicalization and mobilization of individuals for participation in armed conflicts abroad to

33 Vladimir Trapara, “Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji“ (“The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries”) Međunarodna politika (International Politics), 8/1 (2011): p. 100. 34 Ministerial Council, “The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism”, 4 December 2001, http://www.osce. org/atu/42524.

43 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

include as many local actors as possible, because they have a crucial influ- ence on the relationship between individuals and primary community groups and the general connection between the individual and the local community. Therefore, the approach applied by the OSCE in preventing terrorism and coun- tering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) is particularly useful. By their joint efforts, the OSCE Secretariat Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) and its Action against Terrorism and Strategic Po- lice Matters units, and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which has a special program for human rights in the fight against terrorism, have developed a guide: “Preventing Terrorism and Counter- ing Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Communi- ty-Policing Approach.” This project, as the authors point out, “illustrates how the OSCE lives up to its trademark–a comprehensive and co-operative approach to security, drawing on its multidimensional expertise and networks to provide guidance on one of the most sensitive, yet crucial, challenges faced by its par- ticipating States: Prevention of Terrorism”.35

Figure 1 - Conditions conducive to terrorist radicalization in individual cases36

35 OSCE, Preventing Terrorism And Countering Violent Extremism And Radicalization That Lead To Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach (Vienna: OSCE, 2014): p. 20. 36 Ibid, p. 41

44  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

Mobilization for fighting abroad and terrorist radicalization have the same cen- tral characteristic. It is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to ac- cept (terrorist) violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. “Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case.”37 Yet, it is possible to map the basic conditions, at the intersection of which radicalization can occur. (Figure 1)

In order to systemically approach the fight against the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, following this guide, it is necessary to develop a similar tar- get document, which could serve to the states as a guideline and a collection of good practices. The OSCE is well positioned to lead this process, especially after 2012 and the formation of the said OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats De- partment (TNTD).38 Using also the expertise of the ODIHR, diverse professional resources of the organization, that other organizations lack, can be brought to- gether and incorporated into a comprehensive, coherent and human rights-based strategy to counter foreign fighters in all their forms and manifestations and to understand the conditions that lead to their radicalization and mobilization.

TNTD can especially contribute to countering the use of the Internet for re- cruiting foreign fighters, by organizing thematic events and disseminating good practice examples, in accordance with the Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/06 on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes.

One of the key comparative advantages of the OSCE relative to some other secu- rity arrangements is its presence on the ground. The OSCE’s main instruments for that are field operations. OSCE’s wide thematic coverage and flexibility in the choice of priorities for each individual operation enable it to incorporate preventive action against the recruitment of foreign fighters as one of the tasks. By its expertise, the OSCE could considerably help local authorities.

37 Ibid, p. 23 38 Ministerial Council Decision No. 9/11 on Strengthening Co-Ordination and Coherence in the OSCE’s Efforts to Address Transnational Threats

45 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Conclusion

Even though criminal measures are a necessary element in countering the threat of foreign fighters, they must in no way be the only means. If jihadists recruit foreign fighters by persuading them that they are faced with a poten- tially existential threat as members of a particular group, then further threat by punitive measures will hardly deter them from mobilization. In fact, crimi- nal prosecution will further encourage the existence-threatening discourse and make it seem that the fight is even more necessary for survival. A more efficient approach would be to focus on the prevention of recruitment, in which the OSCE can participate in many ways.

The ultimate solution to foreign fighter recruitments is to diminish the salience of the transnational groups through which recruitment is conducted. Identities are built through the structures of social transactions. Foreign fighter recruiters tend to be active in sub-culture groups, to which immigrants often turn, because they do not establish strong enough links with the majority population, not even with their own local, among other religious, community. More contact through alternative social channels strengthens particular identities and connections with other members. The result is willingness to fight for them, because “they identify more closely with other members abroad than they do with fellow cit- izens of the state in which they reside”.39 Therefore, a part of the solution is to intensify the process of integrating immigrants into domicile societies, which is a complex process into which all three OSCE dimensions are interwoven.

Bibliography

Books and Articles

Bakke, Kristin. “Help Wanted?: The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies.“ International Security 38/4 (2014): pp. 150-187.

Buzan, Barry et Al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

39 Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters?”, p. 113

46  Foreign (terrorist) fighters

Hegghammer, Thomas. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” International Security 35/3 (2010): pp. 53-94.

Hegghammer, Thomas. “ Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting.” American Political Science Review 107/1 (2013): pp. 1-15.

Helfont, Tally. “The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies.” in The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, edited by Michael P. Noonan, 2-10, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2011.

Kraehenmann, Sandra. Foreign Fighters under International Law. Academy Briefing No.7. Geneva: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014.

Mackinlay, John. Globalization and Insurgency. Adelphi Papers No. 352. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002.

Malet, David. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Malet, David. “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions.“ Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 54/1(2010): pp. 97-114.

Malet, David. “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts.” PhD diss., George Washington University, 2008.

Mendelsohn, Barak. “Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends.“ Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 55/2 (2011), pp. 189-202.

Salehyan, Idean. Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Trapara, Vladimir. ”The role of OSCE on the ground in countries in transition.” Međunarodna politika (International Politics) 8/1 (2011): pp. 99–125.

Documents

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/06 on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes.

47 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

OSCE Ministerial Council, “The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism”, 4 December 2001, http://www.osce.org/atu/42524.

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 9/11 on Strengthening Co-Ordination and Coherence in the Osce’s Efforts to Address Transnational Threats.

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/08.

OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach (Vienna: OSCE, 2014).

The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon.

Internet sources

MI5 Security Service, “Foreign Fighters,” last modified April 28, 2015, https:// www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international- terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk/foreign-fighters.html.

Statement by H.E. Mr. Ivica Dačić Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Briefing to the UN Security Council, New York, 24 February 2015, http://www.un.int/serbia/sites/ www.un.int/files/Serbia/214.pdf

48  Danko Aleksic

OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security

Resume: The scope and consequences of negative impacts on the environment, which have at the global level in recent decades become ever more pronounced, have made the issue of environmental security highly topical and embedded it in the international political agenda. As a major regional organization dealing with security issues, which in addition to European states also includes Canada and the United States, the OSCE has been significantly involved in environ- mental security issues. In addition to the strategic commitments set out in its relevant documents, the OSCE also conducts significant activities in the envi- ronmental security area. Certainly the most prominent among them is the part- nership in the ENVSEC Initiative, to which the OSCE, with its broad mandate in the field of security and numerous missions and field presence, has provided significant political support.

49 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with its 57 participating states, is the world’s largest regional security organization and aims to secure peace, democracy and stability. The OSCE conducts its activities in three “dimensions of security“: politico-military, economic-environmental, and the human dimension. The very concept of security can be viewed from a number of different angles, and can therefore be understood in different ways. This became particularly manifested in the post-cold war period, with the ex- pansion (inclusion of non-military issues), deepening (abandonment of the idea that the state is the only object that needs to be protected), and enrichment (transfer of knowledge from other disciplines) of the security concept.1

It is necessary here to mention what particular security sectors are recognized by the contemporary literature. Buzan distinguishes five sectors2 within which security can be analyzed/studied/defined, namely:

1. The Military Sector–deals with offensive and defensive capabilities of states, as well as their mutual relations, 2. The Political Sector–deals with the organizational stability of states and their systems of government, 3. The Economic Sector–deals with access to resources, finance and markets, 4. The Societal Sector–deals with the sustainability of language, culture, religion, and other elements of national identity, 5. The Environmental Sector–deals with the issues of environmental con- ditions necessary for survival.

Buzan states that distinctive patterns of interaction may be defined within each individual sector, but that they (sectors) are an inseparable part of the concept of security as a whole.

This paper will address the issue of environmental security–its definition, sig- nificance on the international political agenda, and the OSCE’s activities in this specific area. Before we start, it would be important to highlight a (possible) linguistic dilemma. Namely, the term used in the English language is environ-

1 For more details on the expansion and deepening of the security concept, see: Ejdus F., Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi (International Security: Theories, Sectors and Levels), (Public Enterprise “Official Gazette”, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade, 2012), 31-34. 2 Buzan B. et al., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 7-8.

50  OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security

mental security. It is translated into Serbian more often as ekološka bezbednost (ecological security) than as bezbednost životne sredine (environmental security) –which alternative the author considers correct. Ecology (ekologija) and envi- ronment (životna sredina) are not synonymous, although they are often used as such in everyday speech. It is also important to briefly review the meaning of terms that are inevitable in any security-related discussion, such as challenge, risk and threat. Ejdus3 provides definitions of these terms and indicates their mutual differences as follows:

a) Challenge–a situation which puts someone or something to the test, and which may have a positive or a negative outcome; b) Risk–a possibility of loss, injury, creation of an uncomfortable situation or destruction; generally has a negative connotation and always exists, except for the smaller or greater likelihood; c) Threat–a distinct intention to harm, destroy or punish.

These expressions, too, are often confused in the public discourse, partly due to the lack of knowledge of the subject matter and partly because of linguistic dilemmas in translation.

Environmental security – definition and relevance on the international agenda

Several decades ago, when environmental issues and problems became topical, the environmental movement was primarily tackling problems at the local lev- el–inadequate waste disposal, supply of drinking water for the local population, air pollution in urban areas, etc. No doubt, these problems continue to be topi- cal, especially in developing countries. However, a significant change occurred in the meantime–the extent and consequences of the negative impacts on the environment on a global scale have become too obvious to be sidelined from the political agenda. Climate changes (scientifically verified, threaten a large number of people and have very diverse negative effects), soil erosion (soil is an indispensible agricultural resource which takes a disproportionately long time

3 Ejdus F., Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi (International Security: Theories, Sectors and Levels), (Public Enterprise “Official Gazette”, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade, 2012), pp. 36-37.

51 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

to regenerate), ozone layer depletion (impacts all life forms on the Planet), de- sertification (mainly on account of arable land), ocean pollution and depletion of fish stocks, destruction of large forest areas (which contributes to climate change), extermination of plant and animal species (forever, thus impoverish- ing the Planet’s gene bank), depletion of non-renewable resources (their use contributes to pollution and climate changes), etc, are all issues that pose a new kind of threat to humanity at large. Considering the nature and the extent of the stated problems (they have global effects, their consequences do not rec- ognize any political state borders, and they may also lead to regional political tensions and even violence), their resolution, or at least the reduction of their negative consequences to the minimum, requires international cooperation. In- dividual states are often powerless in this respect, mainly because the “cause” of the problem and its “consequence” may be geographically very far apart. This is precisely why security issues and environmental issues in the modern world have been intertwined like never before and considering the dynamics of the global developments and the evolution of mankind at large, it can be argued that this trend will continue, maybe even with a greater intensity, in the future.

The fact that the concept of security itself can be viewed from a number of angles leads to the absence of a universal and comprehensive definition of se- curity. One definition that is widely used (mainly because it encompasses both subjective and objective aspects of threat) is the definition given by Arnold Wolfers, which reads: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked“4. This definition is significant because it includes both subjective and objective aspects. The definition of the concept of security has been approached differently by other authors. Thus, David Baldwin5 asks seven questions relating to conceptual specification:

1. Security for whom? 2. Security for which values? 3. How much security? 4. Security from what threats? 5. Security by what means? 6. Security at what cost? 7. Security in what time period?

4 Baylis J., Smith S., Owens P., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2008), 229. 5 Baldwin D., The Concept of Security (Review of International Studies, no. 23, 1997), 12.-17.

52  OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security

Explaining the significance of these questions, Baldwin highlights several im- portant aspects. First, he says that it is essential to define the referent object, i.e. what is being protected, and that absolute security is unattainable. Then, he emphasizes the importance of the security “costs“, because something else must always be sacrificed so that the resources can be devoted to security. Moreover, he emphasizes the importance of the time period in which security is contemplated, explaining that long-run and short-run security goals may differ greatly and sometimes even be in conflict. A similar logic permeates the four so-called Terriff’s questions that can be found in literature6 and that need to be answered in order to more accurately indicate the nature and key points of the particular approach to exploring security. These questions are:

- Who or what is the object of security? - What is the nature of the threat? - Who is responsible for security? - What procedures, ways and means are used to achieve, keep and im- prove security?

Like it is the case with the concept of security itself, environmental security can also be defined in several ways. According to one of the possible definitions7, environmental security is the maintenance of the local and the planetary bio- sphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterpris- es depend. According to the definition used by NATO8, environmental security means addressing security challenges emanating from the physical and natural environment. These challenges include extreme weather conditions, depletion of natural resources, pollution and so on–factors that can ultimately lead to disasters, regional tensions and violence.

It will be useful for further discussion to mention some other specific features of the environmental security sector. According to Buzan9, one of the most striking features of this sector is the existence of two different agendas10: a scientific agenda and a political agenda. The scientific agenda aims to provide an authoritative assessment of threat, while the political agenda is about shap- ing awareness in the public sphere on how to deal with the issues that have

6 Simić, D., Nauka o bezbednosti: Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti (The Science of Security: Contemporary Approaches to Security), (FRY Official Journal, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002), 22. 7 Buzan B. et al., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 8. 8 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm, accessed on 15 September 2015. 9 Buzan B. et al., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 71. 10 It is open to discussion whether “agenda” is the most appropriate term in the Serbian language. The author believes that, as a widely used internationalism, it is. Serbian terms such as “dnevni red” (English: agenda), “program rada” (work programme), etc., would surely be less suitable and somewhat confusing.

53 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

been raised. Buzan emphasizes that despite a very obvious overlap and inter- dependence between them, the two agenda follow completely different cycles: the scientific agenda must meet certain academic standards, while the political agenda can be shaped by governmental, media, and public standards, which are influenced much more by short-term events. Another feature of this sector is its complexity11, resulting from a large number of topics that it tackles: ecosystem disturbances, energy related problems, population problems, food problems, economy problems, civil unrest. Ecosystem disturbances are problems which mostly concern basic ecology. All other above mentioned topics largely overlap with topics from other security sectors, except that in this case they are viewed through an ecological prism.

Buzan emphasizes the environmental security paradox: the only way to se- cure societies from environmental threats is to change them.12 Here the au- thor expresses partial disagreement with Buzan. Changing the society, or rather changing the patterns of behavior and the attitude towards the environment, is the best way to minimize environmental threats. However, this certainly can- not be seen as the only way for a very simple reason–there are threats coming from the environment itself (the best example being volcanic eruptions) are they cannot be influenced. Further discussion leads to the question: what is the referent object in the environmental security sector? Buzan cites two referent objects: the environment itself and the nexus of civilization and environment.

The next very important question is: should environmental security be viewed on the global, regional or local scale? According to the conclusions emanating from the work of the Copenhagen School13,14 although contemporary environmental topics are usually viewed on a global scale, awareness of these topics has emerged from the discovery of global consequences of seemingly harmless individual and local practices/procedures. Causes and effects in the environmental sector may be found on different levels and in different regions. Moreover, whether the cause or the effect is being “securitized” makes a difference in perception.

At this juncture, before looking into the role of the OSCE, it would be useful to provide a few facts in support of the aforementioned claims about the rele-

11 Buzan B. et al., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 75. 12 Ibid. 76. 13 Ibid. 21.-23. 14 The Copenhagen School was created within the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), which was founded in 1985 by the decision of the Parliament of the Kingdom of Denmark. In 2003, the Institute was incorporated into the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). The School’s theoretical opinion was developed based on three main ideas: the securitization theory, sectoral approach to security, and the regional security complex theory. The most eminent authors emanating from the School are Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde.

54  OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security

vance of environmental issues in international politics and security. The 1987 report entitled Our Common Future15, also known as the Brundtland Commis- sion Report, states that the concept of security must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress16 at the local, regional, national and global levels. Principle 25 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development17 stated that peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible. The 2007 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the US politician Al Gore for their efforts to disseminate knowledge about climate changes and stopping them. Despite the occasional challenging of the Nobel Peace Prize it- self that can be heard from different sides, the decision from 2007 can still be taken as a proof that one environmental issue, which climate change certain- ly is, is considered relevant for global peace and security. Another illustrative example is the Kyoto Protocol, which was signed as a supplement to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Although it is aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (which should be a goal acceptable to all states), it still causes huge disagreements between the Global North and the Global South, the rich and the poor countries, the developed and the un- derdeveloped ones, which only confirms that environmental issues are difficult to separate from international politics. Another illustrative example is that of NATO–which is primarily a military alliance but has started to increasingly deal with non-military threats to security. Within NATO there is a Science for Peace and Security Committee (SPS), which, among other, deals with securi- ty and environmental issues. Moreover, within the Alliance there is also the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), founded in 2010, which is yet another confirmation of the growing importance given to non-traditional secu- rity challenges as a topic to be dealt with by NATO in the future. The impor- tance of environmental challenges, which is faced by the entire international community, was recognized by NATO back in 1969, when the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) was founded within the Alliance. Throughout the period until its integration with the aforementioned Science for Peace and Security Committee, the Committee on the Challenges of Mod- ern Society had been a unique forum where NATO member states and partner states exchanged know-how on social, health and environmental issues, both in the civilian and in the military sphere. Over the years, several groups have

15 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future; http://www.un- documents.net/our-common-future.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2015. 16 The Report uses the term “environmental stress”. The author chose the word “poremećaj” (“disturbance”) as the most adequate Serbian translation of this term. (Translator’s note: This footnote is irrelevant for the English translation of the text) 17 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio. declaration.1992/portrait.a4.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2015.

55 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

been established within NATO to address environmental challenges from var- ious angles.18 It is noteworthy that the European Council held in Thessaloniki in 2003 launched an initiative entitled Green Diplomacy Network, aimed at in- tegrating environmental issues into EU external relations issues, whereby the Union confirmed the importance it attaches to these issues and their relevance.

The OSCE and environmental security issues

As a large regional organization dealing with security issues, which in addition to European states also comprises Canada and the United States, the OSCE is significantly engaged in environmental security issues. It should be emphasized that one of the three “security dimensions” within which the OSCE conducts its activities is the Economic and Environmental Dimension. Environment was mentioned back in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu- rope Final Act19. Namely, this document, considered to be the founding docu- ment of the OSCE, includes a chapter entitled “Co-operation in the Field of Eco- nomics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment“. Subchapter 5 within this chapter is entitled “Environment“. It sets out the aims and fields of cooper- ation, as well as its forms and methods. Although it does not mention environ- mental security per se, if we consider the time (1975) and the circumstances in which the document was adopted, the subchapter itself was rather ambitiously conceived and formulated. Another important OSCE document that mentions the issue of environment is the 1990 Document of the Bonn Conference20. Nei- ther this document refers to environmental security per se, but it does highlight the importance of the issues and problems relating to this area. Given that the document was adopted only a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the environment is mentioned only in general, with emphasis on its importance in economic cooperation. The OSCE Ministerial Council held in Maastricht in December 2003, adopted the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension21. Chapter 1, entitled Challenges and threats in the economic and environmental dimension, expresses a growing concern for the state of the environment. It also states that

18 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm, accessed on 15 September 2015. 19 https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true, accessed on 15 September 2015. 20 http://www.osce.org/eea/14081?download=true, accessed on 15 September 2015. 21 http://www.osce.org/eea/20705?download=true, accessed on 15 September 2015.

56  OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security

environmental degradation, unsustainable use of natural resources and mis- management in the processing and disposal of waste have a substantial impact on human health, stability and security of states and can upset ecological sys- tems. These factors, together with problems of access to resources and negative effects of pollution, can cause tensions between countries. It is also stated that ecological disasters resulting from natural causes, economic activities or terror- ist acts may also pose a serious threat to stability and security. The document also provides a list of “responses and action” (Chapter 2) that the OSCE will take in accordance with its capabilities and mandate. In November 2007, the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council was held in Madrid. The outcome of this session was the document entitled Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security22, which did not mention the environment in general terms as had pre- viously been the case, but linked it directly to security. The conclusions present- ed in the Document specify, among other, that the OSCE, within its mandate, financial and human resources and capacity has a potential for widening and deepening its co-operation with other international organizations working in the area of environment and thereby making contributions to deal with future relevant risks and challenges in the OSCE region. It is also stated that the OSCE could raise awareness on the potential impact on security of environmental challenges, by using its forum for dialogue and exchange of experiences and best practices and also by integrating these considerations into its activities.

In addition to the strategic orientations set out in the said documents, the OSCE also conducts significant activities in the field of environmental security. Cer- tainly the most prominent of these is the partnership in the ENVSEC Initiative. The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) was launched at The Fifth Environment for Europe Ministerial Conference, held in Kiev in May 2003. It was a joint initiative of the OSCE, the UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) and the UNDP (United Nations Development Program). A year later, the Initia- tive was joined by three other organizations: NATO, the UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) and REC (The Regional Environment Centre for Central and Eastern Europe). Each of the abovementioned partner organiza- tions brought its own specificities and expertise to the ENVSEC initiative. The approach used within the Initiative consists of four basic steps:

1. In-depth vulnerability assessments of environmental and security risks– also includes identification of hotspots for rising tensions over environ- mental issues,

22 http://www.osce.org/mc/29550?download=true, accessed on 25 April 2015.

57 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

2. Strengthening of policies, awareness and participation in decision-mak- ing–building of capacities and frameworks to prevent and address envi- ronmental and security problems, 3. Joint management of environmental and security risks–support for coor- dination and concrete actions at country and regional level, 4. Solutions for safe environment and sustainable development–mobili- zation of financial support and technical expertise for environmental clean-up and remediation.

The OSCE itself, with its broad mandate in the field of security and numerous missions and presence on the ground, has secured significant political support for the Initiative.

Concluding observations

Given the population trends of the modern world, as well as the dynamics and intensity of technological development, we can reasonably conclude that the importance of environmental security will continue to grow in the future. As a large regional security organization, the OSCE will play an important role in dealing with environmental security challenges. Especially noteworthy is the role that the OSCE can play in conflict prevention and in post-conflict recon- struction, which will be briefly explained.

Namely, if we see the OSCE as a forum for high-level political dialogue on a number of security-related issues, than the environmental issues can be used through it as a means of conflict prevention. Given its presence on the ground, as well as its previous experience within the ENVSEC Initiative, the OSCE can play an important role in identifying potential hotspots where environmental problems threaten to lead to a conflict. The issue can then be raised at a high political level, from which political pressure would be exerted towards resolving the problem at an adequate lower level–through cooperation between states or local communities. Common environmental problems can connect people and communities in a very positive way, whereas joint efforts toward solving these problems create mutual trust and a sense of togetherness. Moreover, a peace- ful approach to solving the identified problems is promoted. Cooperation in the field of environment can therefore be a very powerful tool for preventing conflict, building mutual confidence, and promoting good neighborly relations,

58  OSCE and Modern Security Challenges: Environmental Security

all of which are patterns that can later be used for cooperation in other areas where there are disagreements or disputes.

Environmental security issues, but also the field of environment per se, can be used as an excellent ground for initial steps in post-conflict cooperation. Name- ly, unlike the issues of territory, history, linguistic, ethnic and religious identity, etc., issues relating to the environment are characterized by a very low level of political “sensitivity” and controversy. That is why they are suitable for taking the initial steps in the reconciliation, confidence-building and post-conflict sta- bilization initiatives, which can be successfully used in unstable regions such as the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, and some parts of Central Asia, where the OSCE is present on the ground. The OSCE is also an adequate forum for the exchange of experiences and can thus significantly contribute to improving governance in its participating states’ environmental sectors.

59  Selena Tasić

OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Summary: After the Cold War, a comprehensive approach to managing securi- ty challenges was anchored in numerous strategic documents of leading inter- national organizations applying a geographical and geopolitical approach. The main advantage of the OSCE, as an organization that basis its activities on a geographical approach, is its focus on human security through presence on the ground. Precisely this concept is the main comparative advantage of the OSCE vis-à-vis other international organizations of the same nature, because in the world of new challenges, risks and threats to human and national security, con- flicts that do not dwell on the military component alone, “hybrid” conflicts, both international and interstate, the OSCE bases its approach on dialogue, coopera- tion and international approach–using local expertise and information from the ground. Most importantly, the OSCE has a longstanding practice of inclusive security management, with numerous examples from the ground, through the inclusion of all stakeholders in the said process: state actors that use force, state actors that do not use force, as well as non-state actors that use force and non-state actors that do not use force.

61 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Introduction

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), as an interna- tional organization dealing with issues of cooperation and security at a global level since 1975, comprises most of the countries of the West and the East and therefore has one of the most significant roles in building politico-military, en- vironmental, economic and human security1 at the global level.2 After the mul- tilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between the East and the West, i.e. the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), grew into today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1994, the OSCE be- came the irreplaceable partner to governments at the global level in resolving the issues of conflict prevention, development of early warning systems, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.3

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the Cold War security paradigm and led to the awakening of the need for an expanded understanding of the security concept within the states themselves, which no longer implied only a militaristic approach to security. The establish- ment of a new concept of understanding the notion of security for the post-Cold War context meant the acceptance and implementation of new principles at the institutional level. The concept of democratic governance of the security sector also implied a new way of managing “new” threats, which could not be resolved by a military approach alone.4 This has led to the inclusion of political, economic, social and environmental aspects of threats into the understanding and setting of the broader concept of security (for more details, see: Buzan, 1991).

Although the role and the position of international organizations such as the EU and NATO were strengthened at that time, the OSCE and UN academic and expert circles had seen security for some time already as a necessity and the right of every citizen. Through cooperation with all levels of society in coun- tries in which it operates, as defined in the mandate of its operations, the OSCE

1 More on OSCE dimensions in: Ghebali, 2007 2 The history of the OSCE, namely the activity and organization of the CSCE, and the adoption of the Helsinki Act are linked to a completely different context of international relations. From today’s perspective, it is important to emphasize the disregarded role of the then “neutral” and ”non-aligned” policy of the former Yugoslavia, namely the cooperation between its leader Josip Broz Tito and the Finnish President Urho Kekkonen in this stage of establishment of a neutral institution such as the CSCE for the purposes of the dialogue during the Cold War and the crisis of détente (for more details, see: Bilandžić, Dahlmann and Kosanovic 2012; Kullaa 2012; Vasiljevic 2013, 18-19). 3 For more detail, see official OSCE website: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/conflict-prevention 4 For more details on democratic governance of the security sector, see: Tasic, 2014

62  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

clearly recognizes and implements a comprehensive approach to managing se- curity challenges.

This essay will analyze the role of the OSCE in the context of contemporary chal- lenges, risks and threats to national and human security, with special emphasis on the aspect of human rights on a global level and in the Western Balkans region, where the largest number of active missions are deployed. The essay will separate- ly analyze the role of non-state actors in managing security challenges, establish- ing regional cooperation and institutionalizing the rule of law–processes that were largely encouraged precisely by the OSCE’s activities in countries with post-conflict and post-authoritarian heritage. Finally, the essay will present the conclusions and potential recommendations for the OSCE’s further mandate in the region and the world when it comes to risks and threats faced by humanity today.

The role and importance of the OSCE in confronting contemporary risks and threats

The number of armed conflicts on a global scale, the growing need for military response to the growing violence and threats to fundamental human rights around the globe in the early 21st century lead to the key question that experts and academics keep raising on daily basis: where was the mistake made? Sev- eral years after the Cold War, consolidated democracies seemingly found a solu- tion for the establishment of the international legal framework, guided by the key principles of Kant’s concept of Perpetual Peace. The developed West, with emerging democracies of the former Eastern bloc, mostly focused on strength- ening the institutions of international character whose primary tasks were to establish cooperation and interconnection between developed democracies, to establish the conditions for safe life in all parts of the planet, “democratization” of weak states, strengthening of global economy and exchange, as well as the protection of legal orders of individual states through international law.

With the disappearance of the bipolar world order, conditions were created for the growth and development of the global free market, new technologies, sci- ence and economy, pooling of capacities for the protection of human rights but also environmental protection, strengthening of all levels of society with a view to further improving individual and collective freedoms. All these priorities re- ceived their formal legal framework under the auspices of the United Nations,

63 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

European Union, NATO, the OSCE, and other international organizations whose basic mandate is to maintain peace and protect the international legal order.

However, the beginning of the new millennium seriously disrupted the global security paradigm with the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001. NATO as a military and political alliance regained its importance and the internation- al postulates applied in the early 1990s in the war in the former Yugoslavia were reactivated. In terms of security, technological advances and the West’s insistence on democratization of weak states without prior consideration of the context brought a series of challenges, so-called “new threats” that required different approaches to resolving them.

After September 2001, the priorities of security sector governance in strong states have been more and more based on continuous introduction of reforms and innovations in the functioning of the security system. These reforms, as already mentioned, are mainly focused “on the need to act outside state territo- ry–new generations of peacekeeping missions and new forms of civil-military cooperation in and outside the country” (Stojanović 2009, 86).

The priorities of dealing with “new“ threats to national and international se- curity include, among other, the fight against organized crime, cyber-terrorism, terrorism, global warming, chemical weapons, human trafficking, etc. In the globalized world of the XXI century, it is the most developed and powerful states that bear the biggest consequences of the “new“ threats and challenges to security, given that their influence at the global security level is considered to be the biggest threat to security of other states. In this very segment the power of individual states proved to be very successful in triggering the so- called security dilemma5, ultimately leading to a potential escalation of the conflict, which is reflected today in the relations between the U.S., Russia, Iran, Israel, etc. In this vacuum, when the “hard“ and the “soft“ power of state gov- ernments prove to be ineffective, a wide space opens for strengthening the role of organizations that act solely through the framework of protection of inter- national law, respect for rights and freedoms, fostering of cooperation between countries and insistence on democratic ways of dealing with crisis situations.

5 “The view that war is a constant historical feature of international politics and is unlikely to disappear is based on the notion that states face what has been described as a security dilemma from which is largely impossible to escape. The idea of a security dilemma was first clearly articulated in 1950 by John Hertz. It was, he said: “a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening” to their own security (M.H.), John Baylis, International and Global Security, in: The Globalization of World Politics, second edition, John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds), Oxford University Press, UK, 2001, p. 257 (taken from Hadžić, 2005)

64  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

In that regard, the OSCE proved to be a crucial partner in managing security challenges and inducing the security sector reform process (hereinafter referred to as SSR) in states with post-conflict legacy. The SSR as a concept has a strong dimension of conflict prevention, which is an important part of the OSCE’s work. The 1994 Code on Politico-Military Aspects of Security contains a series of key concepts and principles relevant to SSR (OSCE, 1994). As an organization that, unlike the EU, has a geopolitical approach (for more details, see: Ghebali 2007), the OSCE is a patent cohesive factor for the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian dimensions. Through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the organization has access to 57 national parliaments of the participating States on three conti- nents (North America, Europe and Asia), including their defense committees, and therefore plays an important role in capacity building for parliamentary oversight (details: Galbreath 2007). The OSCE also implements a wide range of SSR-related activities on the ground, including the post-conflict context, where issues such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), border management and rule of law are some of the key priorities of activity.6 Examples of activity of OSCE missions in the SSR process include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Croatia, FYROM, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as the specially developed assistance programs in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and as of 2014, Ukraine. In this regard it is noteworthy that most likely none of the individual OSCE participating States would in any diplomatic form be accepted at the local level, especially by the defense system, in a way in which in these cases an international organization with a clear mandate based on prevention and dialogue was accepted. This is clearly manifested in the case of Ukraine, where cooperation of the Government was and remained continuous and focused on resolving the crisis (for further information, see: OSCE 2014).

Cooperation with non-state actors that do not use force

Inclusion of local non-state actors that do not use force in the reform process, especially when it comes to the security sector, largely depends on the condi- tions set by the international community as an external actor of the reform.

6 For more details on OSCE lessons learnt on the ground, see: Zannier, 2006.

65 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Namely, if one of the most important foreign policy goals of the government of a particular country is reintegration into the international community, as in the case of Western Balkan countries is their EU integration, then the process of meeting the conditions for such membership by the government is so much more efficient. Unlike, for instance, the controversial and problematic percep- tion of NATO in the Western Balkans, especially in Serbia as one of the main guarantors of (in) security in the region7, the OSCE has, through its missions’ activities, proved that for a successful fulfillment of the basic functions of its existence,8 it was necessary to have a long-term local presence and cooperation with all actors of the reform on the ground. As pointed out in the Resolution on Co-operation with Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations, adopted at the Annual Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels in 2006, all OSCE participating States have an obligation to recognize that “a strong and independent civil society free from interference of government contributes es- sentially to the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (OSCE PA 2013). Therefore, each mission undertaken by the OSCE in a particular country implies continuous cooperation with local civil society, precisely be- cause their roles are essentially similar and their cooperation is natural. Name- ly, the main function of civil society is reflected in the oversight of the work of institutions and the democratic control of processes and activities of secu- rity structures, through independent monitoring, development of studies and analyses, research and debate. Civil society organizations (CSOs) perform their oversight role by constantly raising awareness about the topics of importance for the security of citizens, by calling representatives of the system to account and by monitoring the implementation of action plans and agendas9. Civil so- ciety also has a crucial role in providing civilian expertise in the development of a normative framework. In addition to this type of expertise provision, CSOs can significantly contribute to staff capacity building in the security sector,10 both through trainings and through direct co-organization of events. Drafting of publications for citizens on the work of institutions, including the security services, also significantly contributes to the transparency of accountability of a collapsed system. The field of communications with the general public is one of the main comparative advantages of civil society vis-à-vis the state.

7 More on the issue of NATO in Serbia in: Ejdus, 2011 8 Security dialogue, setting of standards and monitoring of the implementation of commitments assumed by institutions, as well as the process of democratization and prevention of renewed conflict. For more information, see: OSCE 2014, 1 9 For more details about capabilities for the oversight role of SCOs over the security sector, see: Stojanovic 2009 10 For example, the UN Women Programme Office in Serbia has invested significant resources in the training of members of the security sector for cooperation with civil society, engendering of the security sector, etc. For more details about the projects of the UN Women Programme Office, see: http://rs.one.un.org/index. php?org=18&lang=en&page=44&type=2&id=167

66  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

To be able to perform these activities smoothly, the civil society, in addition to institutional support in the form of a formal legal framework allowing it to act, also needs strong international support, especially in countries with post-au- thoritarian and post-conflict legacy. In this regard, the OSCE is one of the few in- ternational organizations that have not fallen into the trap of “form without re- form”. Namely, with inadequate coordination of donor assistance, insufficiently specified system of evaluation of implemented initiatives and failure to include the pluralism of goals that are directly connected with the local needs of the particular area, most of the donors in the Western Balkans have fallen into a trap of “financing their own goals”, and creating a civil society that is dependent on donor assistance. This has happened precisely because of lack of presence on the ground. Contemporary challenges and threats to human and national security are transnational, but very contextually conditioned from country to country. For the activities of international organizations to be meaningful and effective, a big local support and a continuous source of information from the ground are required. This is yet another of immeasurable benefits of an organ- ization such as the OSCE, which establishes missions and field operations in agreement with the governments of the countries concerned. Examples of this are numerous and include a wide range of goals and activities that enhance the human security component. For example, one of the long-term activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities aimed at strengthening the integration of the Moldovan society is a project launched in 2005, focused on language training for civil servants in areas with minority population, within which in the period of 7 years 2,900 civil servants learned the language. Also, one of the most successful stories when it comes to the security sector reform in the Western Balkans is certainly the long-term involvement of the OSCE missions and operations in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the field of police reform11. A similar situation also applies to the projects aimed at strengthening media freedom. The introduction of the per- manent OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, who even has a local experience, has greatly improved the monitoring of Governments in the OSCE region when it comes to ensuring freedom of expression in individual countries. Also, the OSCE mission to Serbia has regular cooperation with academic insti- tutions and provides support both to the teaching staff of universities, schools and educational institutions and to students through scholarships and training. Moreover, some of the most effective civil society projects were supported pre-

11 For more information on examples of projects and accomplishments of the OSCE missions and operations, see: http://www.osce.org/stories?page=10, as well as the OSCE’s magazine Security Community: http://www.osce.org/ magazine

67 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

cisely by the OSCE’s departments for media, democratization, gender equality, etc. within the missions in Western Balkan states12.

Lessons learned and advantages of the OSCE

Under its basic mandate, which is based on a comprehensive approach to se- curity management through cooperation, the OSCE has since the 1990s played a pivotal role in the international arena in terms of the three main fields of activity: conflict prevention, the politico-military dimension of security, and the human security dimension.

The OSCE is the only regional security organization in which the West and Russia sit at the same table under the same conditions. In the current constel- lation of international relations, this is perhaps the biggest advantage of the OSCE, because this institution as an organization without military capabili- ties advocates solution through dialogue. This is demonstrated the best by the set of methods used to prevent the escalation of conflict in Ukraine. First, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) was established on 21 March 2014, following the decision of the Permanent Council reached by consensus of all 57 OSCE participating States. Since then, the mission has achieved concrete results in terms of provision of reliable information from the ground through independent reports from ten regions in Ukraine, including the problematic ter- ritories of Lugansk and Donetsk. According to the group of authors of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, the OSCE today is reposi- tioning itself through “... field operations whose mandate includes institutional inclusiveness, regional experience and the ability to respond rapidly”. (For more details, see: OSCE 2014). They further base their case on the fact that the OSCE field missions are aimed at “the process of providing resources and expertise in situations of crisis, transition or state-building” (ibid.). More importantly, these missions cannot be established or closed without the consent of the host state.

12 Some of the NGO projects with concrete results in particular areas: 1. Serbia’s OSCE Chairmanship and the role of youth: http://www.koms.rs/poziv-trening-projekat-predsedavanje-srbije-oebs-om-2015-i-uloga-mladih/ 2. Young people in Kosovo: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/74240?download=true 3. Young Roma and education in Montenegro: http://www.mladiromi.me/projekti/2013/121-obrazovanjem-do-integracije

68  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

In terms of comprehensiveness of approach to maintaining security, coopera- tion and the rule of law, the OSCE is surely, in addition to the UN agencies, the only international organization that has developed mechanisms for coopera- tion with non-state actors in society, such as NGOs, the academic communi- ty and the media, through focused dialogue, coordination of donor assistance, presence on the ground, constant monitoring of results and continuous moni- toring of media and civil society representatives.

References

Bilandžić Vladimir, Dahlmann, Ditmar i Kosanović, Milan. ed. 2012. From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and The Crisis of Detente. Internationale Beziehungen: Theorie und Geschichte, 10. Gottingen: Bonn University Press.

Bryden, Alan i Heiner Hänggi. 2005. Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. DCAF.

Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in Post Cold War Era. London: Harvester/Wheatseaf.

Ejdus, Filip, 2011. “Kognitivna disonanca i bezbednosna politika Srbije” (Cognitive Dissonance and Security Policy of Serbia), in Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana (The Western Balkans Security Observer), No. 20, May-August 2011, pp. 13-30

Galbreath, David J. 2007. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). New York, NY: Routledge.

Ghebali, Victor Yves, 2007. “Security Sector Governance in the OSCE region and Beyond.” In: Democratic Governance of the Security Sector beyond the OSCE Area: Regional Approaches in Africa and the Americas, Edited by Victor Yves Ghebali i Alexander Lambert, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): LIT Verlag, 1−20.

Hadzic, Miroslav. Švarm, Filip 2005. “Priručnik sa pojmovnikom za novinare - Bezbednosna pitanja” (Handbook with a Glossary of Terms for Journalists–Security Issues), Media Center Belgrade

Hadžić, Miroslav. 2000. Civilna kontrola vojske i policije (Civilian Control of the Army and Police), Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations

69 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

OECD. 2007. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd.org/development/ incaf/38406485.pdf

OSCE. 1994. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 91st Plenary Meeting of the Special Committee of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in Budapest on 3 December 1994, http://www.osce.org/fsc/41355

OSCE. http://www.osce.org/secretariat/conflict-prevention

OSCE. 2014. The Future of OSCE Field Operations (Options), OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, http://osce-network.net/fileadmin/user_osce- network/documents/The_Future_of_OSCE_Field_Operations__Options_.pdf

OSCE PA. 2013. Resolution on Strengthening Civil Society Institutions in the OSCE Region, https://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2013-istanbul-annual- session/2013-istanbul-final-declaration/1663-26

Security Community, The OSCE Magazine.

Stojanović, S. 2009. Godišnjak reforme sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji (Yearbook of Security Sector Reform in Serbia). Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Tasić, Selena. 2014. „Demokratsko upravljanje sektorom bezbednosti i uloga civilnog društva u reformi sektora bezbednosti.“ (Democratic Governance of the Security Sector and the Role of Civil Society in Security Sector Reform), Medijski dijalozi (Media Dialogues) 7(20): 669−689.

Tasić, Selena. 2014a. Uloga sektora bezbednosti u različitim kontekstima reforme sektora bezbednosti (The Role of the Security Sector in Various Contexts of Security Sector Reform), unpublished master’s theses, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Vasiljević, Maja. 2013. “View to Cold War Through the Pericentric Lenses: Tito’s Yugoslavia and Kekkonen’s Finland.” Limes plus IX(1): 9−28.

Ghebali Victor-Yves, Lambert Alexandre. 2007. “Democratic Governance of the Security Sector beyond the OSCE Area” DCAF

Zannier, Lamberto. 2006. “Lessons Learned from the Field.” U Developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept for the United Nations, Bratislava Proceedings of the Expert Workshop, 31−36, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%204%20Developing.pdf

70  Jelena Nikolić

Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

May 2015

Summary: The essay points to a comprehensive security concept developed within the OSCE system, which in addition to the state security also includes the human security aspect. Within the human dimension of security, the essay will present the mandate of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minor- ities and his role in countering the threats that may emerge from the societal sector which the essay underlines in particular. Further highlighted is the is- sue of language as a means for integration of national minorities and, in that respect, a means for maintaining the stability of the state’s political system. Finally, an overview is given of the OSCE’s role in improving the learning of the official language ​​of the state in primary and secondary education as a means for successful integration of national minorities in the Republic of Serbia.

71 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The concept of security and contemporary security challenges

After the end of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar structure of interna- tional relations, the concept of security in contemporary security studies and in international relations theory was redefined. The notion of security no longer applies only to military threats and national security but becomes expanded when the agenda of international security starts to also include non-military threats such as internal conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, climate change consequences, etc. The concept also becomes deepened because security is transferred from the state level to individual persons, social groups, the region and the entire international order in terms of global security. Representatives of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever developed a sectoral approach to security and provided a new analytical frame- work for such a security dynamics. According to this approach, there are five security sectors: military, political, societal, economic and environmental. Each of these sectors has its own referent object, characteristic relations and threats.

The military security sector as a traditional starting point of security studies implies the dynamics between the political units, in which there is a threat or the use of military force. Despite changes in the international order, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state continue to be the key referent object, and threats in this sector may come from other states but also from non-state actors.1

The referent object for the political sector is organizational stability within a particular political community. Given that the state is a dominant form of political organization, the referent object of contemporary security dynamics in this sector is the organizational stability of the state, i.e. the legitimacy of its institutions before the citizens. Threats in this case would include all those that would cause instability and threaten the political order, coming both from internal non-state actors such as, for example, instigation of secessionism, and external actors if recognition of one state is contested by other states.2

The societal sector is characterized by the relations of power between collective identities, and the identity of a political community is a referent object. Accord- ing to Waever, societal security is the ability of a society to persist in its essential

1 Ejdus 2012, 125-143 2 Ejdus 2012, 146- 151

72 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats, namely the ability to defend its identity from the observed threats.3 Social groups may ap- pear in the security dynamics independently from the state, in which case they attempt to protect their collective identity which may be manifested through language, religion, culture and lifestyle. If we, for example, talk about persons belonging to national minority groups, a security threat could be posed by the state in which they live if it in any way jeopardizes their collective identity.

The referent object in the economic sector depends on the level of analysis. If we talk about the individual level, that would be the individual well-being. At the state level, the referent object would imply the overall economic welfare, i.e. the attained level of economic development. Finally, the referent object at the inter- national level is the international liberal order which states seek to maintain.

Finally, the environmental sector implies relationships between man and nature, and the referent object would be civilization, or the biosphere.4 It is therefore difficult to define a referent object at an individual or state level because threats to environmental security affect the international society at large in the long run.

It should be borne in mind that this is an ideal typical division of the sector and that security threats often spill over from one sector to another. The same threats may reflect on different referent objects and at the same time cause instabilities in several sectors. This analytical framework reflects a compre- hensive understanding of security from the perspective of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The OSCE and the three dimensions of security

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is an intergovernmen- tal organization committed to maintaining peace and security on European soil. It was established during the Cold War period as a manifestation of strivings of the East and the West towards finding common values that would overbridge

3 Ejdus 2012, 115 4 Ejdus 2012, 116

73 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

the multiyear absence of cooperation between the two sides. Throughout his- tory, the war torn European soil posed a threat to stability in international relations and thus carried a need to establish an organization that would deal with maintenance of security precisely in that part of the world.

The OSCE as a regional organization with its 57 participating states covers the entire territory of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian regions. Estab- lished as a forum for dialogue between the East and the West in the Cold War period, as the then Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, it develops a comprehensive concept of security which encompasses both state security level and human security level. In the working session of the Conference, which lasted from 1973 to 1975, the issues discussed were divided into three baskets: security and confidence-building measures, co- operation on economic, scientific, technological and environmental protection issues, and finally, issues of human rights and movement of people, ideas and goods across borders, later known as the three dimensions of security (politi- co-military, economic and environmental, and human).5 The inclusion of such a broad range of issues reflects a comprehensive approach to security, which remains one of the greatest contributions of the OSCE. All three dimensions were developed over time through a series of documents that broadened the scope of obligations that the participating countries accepted.

Following the signature of the Helsinki Final Act, when the participating states assumed commitments arising from several provisions relating to human rights, a series of other documents were adopted under the auspices of the CSCE, of relevance for human rights. Over the years, the human dimension developed into a detailed catalogue of rights including mechanisms that are helpful to participating states when it comes to implementation. The human dimension is crucial in the OSCE’s peace-building efforts. Independent OSCE institutions–the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) are key instruments for ensuring the respect of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.6

The mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, seated in The Hague, is to focus on the interests and rights of national minorities in the terri- tory of the OSCE participating states. In its Helsinki Decisions of July 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe established this institution

5 http://react.usip.org/downloads/module1.pdf 6 OSCE Handbook 2000, 91

74 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

as “an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage”.7 This mandate was created largely in reaction to the situation in the former Yugosla- via which some feared could be repeated elsewhere in Europe, especially among the countries in transition to democracy, and could undermine the promise of peace and prosperity on which the organization is based. The High Commission- er has no mandate to actively intervene in the area where the conflict already erupted, his key role is prevention. If there are indicators for the outbreak of crisis in a particular area that can spill over into violence, he provides early warning and informs the OSCE Chairperson accordingly. The High Commission- er is independent in his work and there is no need for approval of the Permanent Council.8 Also, he may visit the states and areas inhabited by national minor- ities, if there is such a need, without permission or notification to the official authorities. Actions of the High Commissioner preclude involvement in matters of individual members of a national minority. He monitors and reports on the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in the territory of participat- ing states. Within his mandate, he issues recommendations and guidelines for the exercise of national minority rights. The recommendations that serve as a basis for research in this essay include The Hague Recommendations Regard- ing the Education Rights of Minorities of 1996 and the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies of 2012. Also, within his mandate, the High Commissioner on National Minorities undertakes small-scale projects that may improve the status of national minority rights in the OSCE participating states. A special emphasis placed on the role of this institution in the protection of the right to education of persons belonging to national minorities in the Republic of Serbia will be presented in the following pages of this essay.

Although the obligations assumed within the OSCE are not legally binding, they have political weight that ensures the fulfillment of these obligations by par- ticipating states. These three dimensions provide the ability to cope with the security challenges that may arise from all five aforementioned security sectors. Threats do not always appear in isolation and do not affect the referent object in one sector only. Most often there are spillovers and thus uncertainties emerging in the societal sector may easily spill over into the political sector and thereby cause instability of the state’s political system, which can often result in spill- over into the military sector. The human dimension of security is significant in that regard because the proclaimed principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, good governance and strong democratic institutions affect the ensurance

7 The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 1996, p. 1. 8 OSCE Handbook 2000, 32

75 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

of strengthening state institutions and reduction of the risk of internal tensions that may be caused by social discontent and human rights violations.

This essay will, because of its scope, focus only on the societal sector and the OSCE’s role in countering the threats arising from this sector. The threat to survival of collective identity as the referent object in this sector is a security threat for persons belonging to a particular national minority. This can further be a factor of instability within a particular political community, i.e. the state in which the national minority lives. Integration of a particular national minority into social and public life of the state is a precondition for stability of the po- litical system. Namely, in the following pages the essay will analyze the issue of the role of language in the integration of national minorities in Serbia as a precondition for stability of the political system and the OSCE’s role in dealing with this challenge.

Language as a means of integration–the role of the OSCE

Considering that language is a key characteristic of national identity, its role is of crucial importance for the respect and enjoyment of minority rights. The right to use their mother tongue is envisaged by the Framework Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which stipulates that “every person belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority language, in private and in public, orally or in writing”9, while the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages defines the principles and objectives upon which the states develop their policies, legislation and practice relating to regional or minority languages used within their territories.

Also, the right, as well as the duty of persons belonging to national minorities to participate in the social integration process is foreseen by a number of inter-

9 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Article 10

76 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

national documents.10 The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Socie- ties of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) states that “Integration policies should include measures that encourage cross-community dialogue and interaction based on tolerance and mutual respect. This covers a broad range of initiatives in various fields, including education, media and language policy“11. In addition, it is stated that “States have the obligation to protect and promote minority languages and the right of persons belonging to minorities to learn and use them, minorities share with the majorities the responsibility to participate in the cultural, social and economic life and the public affairs [...] This participation implies that persons belonging to minorities should acquire adequate knowledge of the State or official language(s)”.12

Insufficient knowledge of the official language of the state leads to reduced opportunities for participation of persons belonging to national minorities in education in the official language of the state, in professional training, then in employment and, finally, to their reduced participation in the decision-making process and in the broader social life.

Given that knowledge of the official language is a factor of social integration, the state should harmonize efforts related to the learning of minority and official languages, especially in areas where the instruction is in a minority language and where the opportunities for learning the official language are largely relat- ed to the educational system, as is the case in areas where persons belonging to a minority are a majority population. According to the Ljubljana Guidelines, states’ policies should balance the need for one or more shared language(s) as a common basis for the integration and functioning of society with the obliga- tion to safeguard and promote linguistic diversity, including by protecting the linguistic rights of minorities. Governments should provide accessible oppor- tunities to learn the State language.13 Further, The Hague Recommendations declare that minorities have not only have the right to maintain their identity through the medium of their mother tongue but that they also have the right to integrate into and participate in the wider national society by learning the State language. The explanation of recommendations 11-14, relating to pri- mary and secondary schooling of minorities, states that submersion-type ap-

10 The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note; High Commissioner on National Minorities, Recommendation No. 1; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Explanatory Report to Article 14; Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2012, Guideline 42 11 Ibid, guideline No. 11. 12 Ibid, explanatory note, guideline No. 42 13 The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies a, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), 2012, Guideline 42

77 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

proaches whereby the curriculum is taught exclusively through the medium of the State language and minority children are entirely integrated into classes with children of the majority are not in line with international standards. Like- wise, this applies to segregated schools in which the entire curriculum is taught exclusively through the medium of the minority mother tongue, throughout the entire educational process and where the majority language is not taught at all or only to a minimal extent.14

A closer clarification will be given of the legal framework in Serbia that regulates the issue of relationship between the exercise of the right to education in the mother tongue and the learning of the official State language. According to the Law on the Foundations of the Education System, education and pedagogy work is delivered in the Serbian language. For persons belonging to national minori- ties, the educational and pedagogical work is delivered in their mother tongue and may exceptionally be delivered bilingually or in the Serbian language.15 Ac- cording to the Law on Primary Education, when the curriculum is implemented also in a native minority language, the students shall master the Serbian curric- ulum as well.16 Also, it is envisaged that when educational and pedagogical work is implemented in the language and script of the national minority, the school is obliged to organize teaching of the Serbian language.17 The issue of the right to use the language for persons belonging to national minorities is regulated by the same law that envisages that when the instruction is given in the Serbian lan- guage, the instruction for minority students is given in the minority language with elements of national culture as an optional subject.18

Awareness about the poor knowledge of the Serbian language among persons belonging to the Albanian national minority comes from the civil society, in- stitutions, experts, participants of various initiatives, programs and projects, as well as from individuals from the Albanian community. The unsatisfactory level of knowledge of the official language of the Republic of Serbia is brought into direct connection with considerably reduced chances for persons belong- ing to the Albanian national minority to use the opportunities related to their education in the official language of the Republic of Serbia, to apply for employ- ment (especially in the public administration), to be more involved in the deci-

14 The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note; OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 1996, Explanatory Note, Recommendations No. 11, 12, 13, 14 15 The Law on the Foundations of the Education System (The RS Official Gazette, No. 55/2013), Art. 9, paragraph 2. 16 The Law on Primary Education (The RS Official Gazette, No. 55/2013), Art. 5, paragraph 2. 17 Ibid, Art.12 paragraph 4 18 Ibid, Art.12 paragraph 5

78 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

sion-making process.19 Also, it was noted that young Albanians from South Ser- bia, due to lack of proficiency of the Serbian language, decide to study in Tirana, Skopje, Tetovo or Pristina, and that precisely because of their poor knowledge of the Serbian language they are not able to study at the universities in Serbia, or later on, to seek employment in Serbia, i.e. outside their local communities. All this leads to difficulties in the integration of persons belonging to the Albanian minority in the social and public life in the Republic of Serbia. This also applies to persons belonging to other national minorities whose mother tongue is not close to the Serbian language, such as Hungarian, for example.

Within the effort to deal with these problems, the OSCE Mission to Serbia im- plemented in 2013 the project “The Improvement of Language Skills of the Minority Population in South Serbia” in the “Sezai Surroi” secondary School in Bujanovac. The aim was to improve the opportunities and the framework for integration of persons belonging to the Albanian and Roma national minorities through the improvement of the teaching of Serbian as non-mother tongue in secondary school. The project had two dimensions, the first of which entailed working with pupils in the secondary school, while the other dimension was focused on preparing persons belonging to the Albanian and Roma national minorities for the Serbian language studies at the University of Nis.

The idea of the project concerned the hiring of teaching assistants for Serbian as non-mother tongue. Selected assistants were recent graduates of the Serbian language and literature who were offered the opportunity to acquire their first work experience by participating in teaching in a multi-ethnic environment. Five teaching assistants, who had recently graduated the Serbian language and literature, and the sixth assistant who had graduated the Albanian language and literature and was teaching Albanian to other assistants in parallel, were selected.20 The initial idea to work on improving the teaching of Serbian lan- guage as a non-mother tongue was based on the experiences of students of the Bujanovac branch of the Subotica Faculty of Economics, who had difficulties in studying because of poor knowledge of the Serbian language, as well as experi- ences of selected candidates for the Centre for Basic Police Training in Sremska Kamenica who did not manage to pass the Serbian language proficiency test, for which reason they could not undergo the necessary training and meet the requirements for working in the police.21 Given that there is a legal framework

19 Study on the Possibilities for Improving the Teaching and Learning of the Serbian Language as a Non-Mother Tongue in the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, Government of Serbia Coordination Body for the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, 2014, p. 9 20 Ibid, p. 180 21 Ibid, p. 181

79 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

prescribing a mandatory teaching of the Serbian language to persons belonging to national minorities who attend education in their mother tongues, the OSCE Mission implemented a project within the educational institution. The instruc- tion was given by assistants with the support of two full professors who acted as mentors. The instruction with the help of assistants was a novelty that facilitat- ed the work of teachers and made the classes interesting for students, enabling them to adopt the language more easily with the help of new creative methods.

It is important to note that the experience gained during the running of this pro- ject was important for state institutions in their further addressing of the issue of improving the teaching of Serbian as non-mother tongue. The most important conclusions arising from the implementation of the project were the need to involve state institutions22 that would recognize the outcomes of this project as an example of good practice, the need to define a multi-annual plan for the improvement of language teaching, to do staff planning so that the use of teach- ing assistants becomes constant practice, the learning of Albanian (i.e. of the minority language in which the instruction is given) by teachers whose mother tongue is not Albanian, but who teach persons belonging to the Albanian na- tional minority.23 In addition, it was stated that it was necessary to improve and supplement the current textbooks, as well as to adjust the existing curriculum for the subject of Serbian as non-mother tongue. Such an initiative attempted to indicate different solutions and that changes within the system were possible.

Mentioned further is an example of support of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities in resolving this issue. Namely, the Office of the High Commissioner provided technical and financial support to the Office of the Co- ordination Body of the Government of Serbia for the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja for developing the “Study on the Possibilities for Im- proving the Teaching and Learning of the Serbain Language as a Non-Moth- er Tongue in the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja”, which was carried out in 2014. This study also draws on the experience gained dur- ing the implementation of the said project of the OSCE Mission to Serbia. The study analyzed the situation, problems and outcomes of teaching Serrbain as non-mother tongue in primary schools in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja. The analyses covered the curriculum, teaching methods and textbooks for the

22 The key partners identified were: the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, the Office of the Coordination Body for the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac andi Medvedja, the Institute for Evaluation of Quality of Education. See: Study on the Possibilities for Improving the Teaching and Learning of the Serbain Language as a Non-Mother Tongue in the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja; Office of the Coordination Body of the Government of the Republic of Serbia for the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, 2014, p. 184. 23 Ibid, p. 185

80 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

subject of Serrbain as non-mother tongue for primary school. Finally, based on the analysis, as well as on the attitudes and opinions of interested parties regarding the teaching of Serbian as non-mother tongue, the study provided a number of short-term, medium-term and long-term recommendations for the improvement of teaching. In that regard, the Office of the High Commissioner has also put in place the project for implementing certain recommendations presented in this study. Based on the previous experience of the OSCE Mission and the recommendations from the study, the Office of the Coordination Body, supported by the High Commissioner, has been implementing the project of hiring teaching assistants in primary and secondary schools in the municipal- ities in South Serbia. The total of 16 schools in three municipalities will get teaching assistants on this subject in the school year 2015/2016.24 Also, within this project, and as part of the efforts of the Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities to implement a part of recommendations from the study, underway is the work on the Albanian-Serbian, Serbian-Albanian dictionary as part of the improvement of resources for conduct of the instruction.

As a further systemic solution and based on the identified deficiencies and rec- ommendations resulting from the project conducted by the OSCE Mission to Serbia, as well as from the studies conducted by the Coordination Body, the process has started of amending the curriculum for the subject of Serbian as non-mother tongue for all three cycles of primary and secondary education. The OSCE Mission to Serbia has identified the need to improve the curriculum and textbooks for this subject. As a necessary activity prior to the achievement of these objectives, the OSCE Mission has, in cooperation with the Institute for Evaluation of Quality of Education, indicated the need and facilitated the organ- ization of a two-day meeting entitled “The Analysis of the Status of Teaching of Serbian as Non-Mother Tongue as Part of the Preparation for the Development of General Standards of Achievements for Serbian as Non-Mother Tongue”.25 The meeting was attended by teachers who teach Serbian as non-mother tongue in schools where Hungarian, Croatian, Albanian, Ruthenian, Slovak, Bosnian, Bulgarian and Romanian are taught as mother tongues, as well as by repre- sentatives of the national councils of national minorities, representatives of the OSCE Mission, the Coordination Body and the Pedagogical Institute of Vojvodi- na. Analyzed were the teaching and learning of Serbian as non-mother tongue within several topics, including the curricula for primary and secondary school, motivation of students in various schools, problems of teaching and the neces- sary know-how relating to Serbian as non-mother tongue. Based on the conclu-

24 See: http://www.kt.gov.rs/sr/news/arhiva-vesti/srpski-kao-nematernji-jezik.html, accessed on 27 September 2015 25 See: http://www.kt.gov.rs/sr/news/arhiva-vesti/srpski-kao-nematernji-jezik.html, accessed on 27 September 2015

81 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

sions of this meeting, the OSCE Mission facilitated and supported the forma- tion of the Working Group for the development of general standards of learning achievements for Serbian as non-mother tongue for the end of the first, second and third educational cycles.26 The standards are being developed within the Institute for Evaluation of Quality of Education with the support of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development and the OSCE Mission to Serbia.27 The Working Group has been envisaged to develop the standards by the end of 2015, after which a national testing of standards and the procedure of the adoption of standards by the Ministry and the National Education Council are envisaged to follow. Only after the standards are completed and introduced into schools, it will be possible to launch the work to amend the curricula, after which the amendment of textbooks for this subject will finally be possible.

The finalization of this process will contribute to the improvement of teaching of the Serbian language for all persons belonging to national minorities who attend classes in their mother tongues. The development of standards and work on amending the curriculum should contribute to improving the conditions for learning the Serbian language, especially for persons belonging to national mi- norities whose mother tongue is not close to Serbian language. Poor knowledge of the official language of the State is a particular obstacle for the integration of persons belonging to national minorities into the social and public life in the Republic of Serbia. The OSCE’s support and efforts to overcome these obstacles represent an attempt to facilitate the integration of minorities and in this con- nection to contribute to the overall stability of the state.

Conclusion

This essay presented the evolution of the perception of security threats in the Post-Cold War period, following the collapse of the bipolar structure of interna- tional relations. Three dimensions of security that reflect the extended security concept were presented. Special emphasis was placed on the human dimension and institutions within the OSCE system which have a key role in the imple- mentation of the principles of this dimension.

26 See: http://www.osce.org/serbia/132211 accessed on 28 September 2015 27 See: http://www.mpn.gov.rs/srpski-kao-nematernji-jezik-skup-nasta/, accessed on 27 September 2015

82 Special emphasis on language as a means of integration of national minorities into social and public life in the Republic of Serbia

An overview was given of the role of the OSCE in the improvement of learning of the official language of the state as a means for successful integration of nation- al minorities. The experiences gained from the project implemented by the OSCE Mission in South Serbia indicated the needs and deficiencies that need to be tackled. Experiences of teaching assistants involved in this project, as well as the outcomes of the study have shown that there is great interest among pupils and students, as well as their parents, to learn the Serbian language. This indicates that the problem is not the motivation of persons belonging to national minori- ties for learning the official language but that systemic changes are required in order to improve the teaching of Serbian as non-mother tongue. Also observed was the need for professional development and training of teachers who teach this subject. As an initial activity in tackling this problem, the study conducted by the Office of the Coordination Body for Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja has shown that only five percent of respondents (pupils of primary schools in the three municipalities) have satisfactory knowledge, functional ability for effec- tive written and oral communication in the Serbian language. The outcomes of the study have also shown that most of these pupils have acquired their knowl- edge of Serbian outside the school, in direct contact with persons belonging to the majority nation, or through the mass media28. Therefore, the knowledge was not acquired in the classroom. The essay gave an overview of the necessary changes in the education system of national minorities and of the role that the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the High Commissioner on National Minorities have had so far in the efforts to address these issues, as an opportunity to facilitate further integration of national minorities into social and public life in Serbia.

References

Ejdus, Filip. 2012. Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi (International Security: Theories, Sectors and Levels), Belgrade: The Official Gazette

Vukadinović, Lidija Č. 2010. Euroatlantizam i suvremeni međunarodni odnosi (Euro- Atlantism and Modern International Relations), Zagreb: The Political Culture

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (ed.), OSCE Handbook, Vienna, OSCE (2000)

28 See: http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/mladi-albanci-nedovoljno-poznaju-srpski-jezik_514706.html, accessed on 28 September 2015

83 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education of National Minorities & Explanatory Note, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), 1996

The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), 2012

Study on the Possibilities for Improving the Teaching and Learning of the Serbian Language as a Non-Mother Tongue in the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja; Office of the Coordination Body of the Government of the Republic of Serbia for the Municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, 2014

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe, 1994

The Law on Primary Education (The RS Official Gazette, No. 55/2013)

The Law on the Foundations of the Education System (The RS Official Gazette, No. 55/2013)

Internet pages

www.osce.org

www.osce.org/odihr

www.osce.org/hcnm

www.osce.org/fom

http://www.osce.org/serbia/

http://www.mpn.gov.rs

http://www.kt.gov.rs

84  Jelena Mitić

OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Summary: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as the largest regional security organization in the world, covers a wide range of activi- ties in the field of security. Preventive diplomacy, which it uses most frequently as an instrument of its activities, includes arms control, building confidence among states, monitoring of observance of human and minority rights, election monitor- ing, measures against human trafficking, fight against terrorism, monitoring of economic and environmental relations. The OSCE also supports governments in the region in the promotion of regional cooperation, especially in the fight against organized crime, given that organized crime is not only a contemporary security challenge but also a very important social issue. Organized crime has become the main threat to national, regional and international security; it directly jeopardiz- es and undermines the authority of states, thereby hindering their development. For Serbia, the OSCE is a very important strategic partner in the consolidation of peace, democracy and security in the region. One of the priorities of the OSCE Mission to Serbia is the fight against organized crime. Within the program areas on which the activities of the OSCE Mission to Serbia–Rule of Law and Human Rights– are focused, fight against organized crime is an important part.

Keywords: OSCE, contemporary security challenges, organized crime, fight against organized crime, OSCE Mission to Serbia, the Republic of Serbia, and organized crime.

85 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Even though it is the successor to, namely it emerged from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1975, the Organi- zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is essentially a new inter- national institution. At the Budapest Summit, held on 5 and 6 December 1994, the CSCE changed its name to OSCE at the proposal of the United States and on 1 January 1995 the decision became final. The scope and methods of work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, its position and role in European relations today differ substantially from the previous, Helsinki CSCE. First of all, when it comes to its essential function today, it is no longer promotion of the process of détente in Europe (which has been achieved) but rather the guiding and managing of the process of democratic transformation of former East and Southeast European socialist societies and regional stabili- zation.1 Although the main decision-making centers on the international scene are the European Union, NATO and the UN Security Council, the OSCE is an important factor in the post-Cold War era of international relations. The OSCE’s instrumental and operational aspect, i.e. its practical usability, is its dominant feature that has a tendency to develop further.

The modern world is characterized not only by the deepening of the old, but also by the emergence of new challenges, risks and threats that have affected both the internal and international relations. These challenges are manifested in dif- ferent forms, depending on the political, economic and cultural development of particular countries and regions. The development of modern society has led to the emergence of new security challenges, risks and threats, whereas the old ones acquired new forms and new dimensions. In the contemporary security en- vironment, the attention of political decision-makers has shifted from military to non-military threats. States are making great efforts in the very identification of security challenges, risks and threats and are endeavoring to list them in stra- tegic and normative documents, such as national security strategies and defense strategies. The European Security Strategy singles out five key threats to the security of the European Union. These are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.

Organized crime has become the main threat to national, regional and inter- national security. This type of crime directly jeopardizes and undermines the authority of states, thus hindering their development, threatening the society and its values. Organized crime has taken on a transnational dimension; it does not recognize borders between states and does not differentiate them by the

1 Acimovic Ljubivoje, “OEBS na početku XXI veka” (OSCE in Early 21st Century), MP 1, (2013): 7-23, downloaded on 12 April, 2015, doi: 10.2298 / MEDJP1301007A.

86  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

level of their economic development. It destabilizes governments, undermines parliamentarism, destroys public trust in state and legal institutions, and de- nies legality and social morality. As one of the contemporary security challeng- es, organized crime challenges security, not only individual but also collective, national and international. The fight against contemporary security challenges and threats, such as organized crime, requires the use of special mechanisms for their prevention, detection and suppression, as well as the mechanisms for the development of strategies to combat them.

The plurality of definitions of organized crime that can be found in literature is indicative of a multitude of its manifestations, the importance and the need to research into this phenomenon. Thus, for example, Schulte-Bockholt defines or- ganized crime as a group generally operating under some form of concealment with a structure reflective of the cultural and social stipulations of the societies that generate it; and which has the primary objective to obtain access to wealth and power through the participation in economic activities prohibited by state law. Organized crime is a form of crude accumulation of power based on the use of threat of physical violence, which emerges–and has emerged–in different socioeconomic formations across time and place, and is generated, by the spe- cific conditions of that time and place (Schulte-Bockholt, 2001:238). Professor Goran Boskovic more elaborately defines organized crime as property (profit) oriented continuous criminal activity, carried out by criminal organizations in different areas suitable for “criminal exploitation” and characterized by a high degree of interaction between members of the organization, differentiation of tasks and organized models adapting to the needs of operation on the criminal market and the use of criminal methods (violence, intimidation and corruption) and non-criminal methods (activity within the sphere of legal economic flows) through which connections are established, influence is exerted on holders of executive offices and criminal goals are achieved.2 As for the concept of organ- ized crime in the Serbian legislation, its status in the domain of normative definition of the notion was changed in 2009. Thus, the concept of organized crime is now uniformly defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on the Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in Suppression of Organized Crime, Corruption and Other Severe Criminal Offences. Such norma- tive definition of organized crime in Serbia is almost identical to the Council of Europe’s definition contained in the 2001 Recommendation concerning guid- ing principles on the fight against organized crime. According to these provi- sions, organized crime implies criminal offenses committed by organized crime

2 Bošković, G. (2014) “Organizovani criminal” (Organized Crime), The Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade, p. 8

87 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

groups or their members. An organized crime group means a group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes, punishable by imprisonment of four years or a more serious penalty, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit.3

The most important strategic document in the field of protection of national in- terests and security of the Republic of Serbia is the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia. When it comes to challenges, risks and threats, but also the security interests of the Republic of Serbia, there is a great similarity within the Southeast Europe region. One of the reasons for that is certainly the fact that many of them were related and spilled over from one state in the region to an- other, in the not so distant past. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, however, pays less attention to security aspects of organized crime; it rather views it as a criminological problem. The political ambitions of organized crime and the tendency of organized crime structures to influence political deci- sion-making and public opinion pose a particular threat to security of a country. Organized crime structures often corrupt political factors in a state, the media and other institutions and individuals and thus establish control over the po- litical developments in the state, which reflects negatively on the development of democracy and leads to a totalitarian regime. Particularly dangerous is the linkage between organized crime and terrorist organizations, because they often engage in criminal activities in order to generate funds for their activities aimed at achieving political goals, whereas organized crime groups aim at generating illegal profits to be used for further criminal activity. Organized crime has a par- ticular weight in the Balkan region and threatens its stability and integration into the European Union. In the Republic of Serbia, based on the experience thus far, this type of crime occurs in the form of violent crime, illegal drug traffick- ing, motor vehicle trafficking and human trafficking, as well as in the sphere of financial crime, money laundering, and other financial transactions supported by corruption. Key actors of organized crime have a flexible structure and modus operandi. They are quick in changing their field of work and are integrated into the European and global organized crime flows. Corruption can also be viewed in the framework of organized crime. It threatens the fundamental values of ​​ soci- ety and has an extremely negative effect on social development and integration processes, which ultimately results in the destabilization of internal situations in the region.4 The fight against organized crime should be the main priority in

3 Ibidem 4 Dragisic, Z. (2010), “Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije kao strategijska bezbednosna procena” (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia as a Strategic Security Assessment), Yearbook of the Faculty of Security, Belgrade, p. 103, 106, 114, 115

88  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

all countries in transition to democracy. These countries are a favorable soil for the development of organized criminal activities because they lack police capac- ities, legal instruments and often the political will to counter organized crime. Organized crime moves into them from other, more regulated and stable states, because it has better conditions for development. That is why organized crime flourishes in these countries today.

Some of the distinct features of organized crime in Serbia can be extracted from the content analysis of the document of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia published in 2001, entitled Criminal Groups and Individuals Engaged in Organized Crime in the Territory of the Republic of Serbia. Criminal groups are generally formed based on the territorial principle, but their radius operandi is mainly the whole territory of Serbia, but also Montenegro and other neighboring countries. Through the commission of this crime, criminal groups have generated huge capital, which they most frequently legalized through the purchase of real estate and various investments, such as oil trade and procure- ment of production machines. One could claim that organized crime, in all its manifestations and its growing scope, emerged in Serbia as late as in the early 1990s. The breakup of socialist Yugoslavia, economic sanctions, the beginning of civil wars starting from 1991, efforts of the new authoritarian regime to evade the sanctions and to preserve power, led to the flourishing of organized crime. During this period, which lasted for more than ten years, not only was organ- ized crime not prosecuted and suppressed but it was knowingly and deliberately encouraged. Many authors call this period the golden age of organized crime in Serbia. In that period, not a single conviction for organized crime was passed, not a single regulation of domestic law was adopted, and not a single interna- tional agreement on combating this type of crime was signed. Article 231 in- troduced the criminal offence under that name into the Criminal Code of Serbia only in 2005. After the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003, the fight against organized crime became a priority over all other aspects of police reform in Serbia and Montenegro. Bottom of FormThe threat of organized crime in Serbia started to be perceived more clearly at that time. The assassination was a high price that Serbia had to pay in order to initiate a more serious fight against organized crime. The very nature of organized crime is such that it constantly changes its forms and that its scope and consequences exceed country borders. Organized crime in Serbia thus becomes a problem of the entire region and the international community at large. The initial step in combating organized crime was made by the development of the National Strat- egy for Fight against Organized Crime, which the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted on 29 March 2009. By adopting of the Strategy, Serbia made a big headway in rounding up the so-called “first generation of reform” of the security sector and fulfilled one of the conditions for rapprochement to the European

89 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Union. The Strategy particularly underlines that an efficient fight against organ- ized crime requires the establishment of cooperation and confidence-building between state authorities, the private sector and civil society.

The OSCE supports governments in the region in the promotion of regional co- operation and especially in the fight against organized crime, considering that organized crime is not only a matter of security but also a social issue. It could be stated that Serbia has largely finalized one “era” in foreign policy relations, based not only on rejoining the existing international and regional organizations but also on joining new ones. For Serbia, the OSCE is a very important strategic partner in consolidation of peace, democracy and security in the region and countering organized crime. The OSCE Mission has been present in Serbia for fif- teen years already, with the view to backing democratic reforms by maintaining good relations with all ministries and assisting in the institution building pro- cess. The OSCE Mission to Serbia is engaged in a wide range of activities, where the fight against organized crime is a very important part, in addition to police reform, democratization and media development, within the program area on which Mission’s activities are focused, namely the rule of law and human rights.

An important headway in the fight against organized crime was made on 3 April 2003, when the OSCE Mission to the then State Union of Serbia and Mon- tenegro (SCG) hosted a coordination meeting of representatives of the inter- national community, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice. This meeting enabled the OSCE and the said ministries to establish the framework for the Strategy for the Fight against Organized Crime and confirmed the role of the OSCE as a coordinator of international support to police and judiciary reform programs. Police reform plays a pivotal role in the stabilization pro- cess of a country. That is why the introduction of democratic principles in the work of the police is extremely important for the development of a democratic society. A special place belongs also to the combating of organized crime and rebuilding of relations between the police and the public. The fight against organized crime has always been one of the priorities of the OSCE Mission to Serbia. The OSCE Mission has actively supported police trainings and one of the first programs since the establishment of the mission was precisely in that area. The Mission and the Ministry of Interior are working on the training re- form and modernization of police education. An important task of every state and the international community is to counter organized crime on the legal, judicial and criminology levels. In that fight, the police and judicial authorities are the most important specialized authorities. Through the implementation of its projects in the field of security and cooperation, the OSCE Mission to Serbia significantly contributes to capacity building in all areas of social life, within the programs concerning democratization, rule of law, human rights, and the

90  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

media, while paying particular attention also to the provision of assistance in the implementation of police reform projects.

After the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, the activities of the OSCE Mission, carried out in close cooperation with the Government of the then Ser- bia and Montenegro, were aimed at establishing a strategy to support the Serbi- an authorities in the fight against organized crime. The Mission has up till now assisted the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MoI) in the drafting of projects related to the development of anti-corruption initiatives and police accountability and supported the MoI Directorate for Combating Organized Crime. As the main partner of the Ministry of Interior in the implementation of the police reform process, the OSCE Mission to Serbia has assisted the police in the field of ed- ucation and training, accountability and internal control programs, local com- munity policing. It undoubtedly provides a lot of support to Member States in the fight against organized crime by paying a lot of attention to raising public awareness about the fight against organized crime. Moreover, the OSCE Mission to Serbia cooperates with the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime by provid- ing assistance related to the classification of collected data and functioning of the information exchange system.

In order to meet its obligations related to political, security, economic, envi- ronmental and human rights issues, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly brings together 57 countries from Europe, Central Asia and North America. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly was established with a view to promoting greater in- volvement of national parliaments and facilitating inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation in developing democracies. The Assembly provides a forum for parliamentary diplomacy, monitors elections and strengthens international co- operation. At the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly session in Belgrade in 2011, twenty-five resolutions that were included in the Belgrade Declaration of the Parliamentary Assembly were approved. The adoption of these resolutions greatly contributed to the shaping of policy of the OSCE and the national legisla- tion. Among other, the Serbian delegation submitted a draft resolution entitled Combating Illicit Trade in Human Organs, as an organized crime-related area.

In the course of 2013, the OSCE Mission to Serbia launched the project “Strengthening the Capacity of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime of Serbia for Conducting Efficient Investigations and Promoting Regional Cooper- ation“, with the aim of helping the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime of Serbia to achieve maximum benefit from the donation of software of the Italian Ministry of Justice intended for case management and increased exchange of data and evidence.

91 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

In 2014, as a follow-up to its activities in the fight against organized crime, the OSCE Mission to Serbia launched a project at Mt. Zlatibor for strengthening the police capacity of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro in the fight against organized crime. This OSCE project was aimed at improving the knowledge and skills of crime analysts from the said countries’ ministries of interior for gath- ering and analyzing trends in the fight against organized crime. The OSCE thus provides assistance in the development of police capacity to assess serious and organized crime threats in accordance to EUROPOL standards. The project was entitled “Enhancing Capacities for Strategic Analysis and Strategic Assessment in the Criminal Investigation Directorates of the Serbian, Montenegrin and FY- ROM Ministries of Interior“. International forms of organized crime increasing- ly require international networking of police institutions in order to enable the implementation of joint defense strategies and appropriate multipolar meas- ures that will bring the desired results.

In the Republic of Serbia, as the country chairing the OSCE in 2015, the Annual Police Experts Meeting was held in May in Belgrade. Following the trends of contemporary security threats, Serbia focused on cyber security. The main topic of the meeting was the linkage between organized crime, human trafficking and irregular migration, as well as the management and reform of the security sector. The main priority of the Serbian Chairmanship is surely to support all ef- forts toward a peaceful democratization process, to use its own past experiences, while understanding the important role that the OSCE has played in supporting the post-conflict transition and reform processes across the Western Balkans.

Conclusion

From the former Helsinki CSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has gone far in transforming itself into a new international institu- tion that has nowadays become the largest regional security organization in the world. Preventive diplomacy, which it most frequently uses as an instrument of its activities, includes support to governments of the region in the promotion of regional cooperation, and especially in the fight against organized crime, con- sidering that organized crime is not only a matter of security but also a social issue. The modern world is characterized not only by the deepening of the old but also the emergence of new security challenges that have affected both in- ternal and international relations. One of the contemporary security challenges

92  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

is organized crime, which directly jeopardizes and undermines the authority of states, thereby hampering their development. For Serbia, the OSCE is a very im- portant strategic partner in the consolidation of peace, democracy and security in the region and the fight against organized crime. The OSCE Mission has been present in Serbia for fifteen years already and the fight against organized crime has always been one of its priorities. The threat of organized crime in Serbia started to be perceived more clearly after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. The fight against organized crime then became a priority over all other aspects of police reform in Serbia and Montenegro. As the OSCE is the main partner of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia in the imple- mentation of the police reform process and the fight against organized crime, its activities are of great importance for the maintenance of political stability and peace not only in Serbia but in the Western Balkans region as well. The OSCE is an important international institution with its values and objectives by which the foreign policy strategic priorities of the Republic of Serbia abide. The OSCE Mission to Serbia not only played an important role in the aftermath of the 2003 events but even today has a role in supporting the course and intensity of the fight against organized crime, thus contributing to the strengthening of institu- tions in combating this type of crime and to the establishment and maintenance of peace and security that facilitate full individual freedom.

References

Aćimović, Lj. (2013) “OEBS na početku XXI veka” (OSCE in Early 21st Century)

Bošković, G. (2014) “Organizovani kriminal“ (Organized Crime), The Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade

Dragišić, Z. (2010), “Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije kao strategijska bezbednosna procena“ (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia as a Strategic Security Assessment), Yearbook of the Faculty of Security, Belgrade, p. 103, 106, 114, 115

Đorđević, S. (2009) „Borba protiv organizovanog kriminala: Evropska unija i Zapadni Balkan“(Fight against Organized Crime–European Union and Western Balkans), the Security Review, No. 2/2009, Belgrade

93 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Nikač, Ž. (2003), “Transnacionalna saradnja u borbi protiv kriminaliteta – Europol i Interpol” (Transnational Cooperation in the Fight against Crime–Europol and Interpol), Institute for Textbook Publishing and Teaching Aids, Belgrade.

Stojarova, V. (2007) “Organized Crime in the Western Balkans“, Institute for Comparative Political Research Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University, Czech Republic.

Trapara, V. (2011) “Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji“(The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries)

Zorić, J., Pavićević, M., Stopić, M. (2008) “Borba protiv organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji-zakonodavstvo i praksa“(Fight against organized crime in Serbia–Legislation and Case Law), Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade

http://www.osce.org/sr/serbia

http://www.oscepa.org/

94  Marija Žužek

OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Summary: Security threats of the contemporary world, by their morphology, increasingly more deviate from traditional forms of disrupting peace and sta- bility. In that respect, terrorism, energy, cybercrime and the participation of for- eign fighters in the war hotbeds of other states determine the main directions of contemporary security challenges. Their common denominator is that they represent transnational threats. This is precisely the key to countering them, a new approach in resolving them is primarily based on preventive action based on regional cooperation and intensified international networking as a sine qua non condition for global peace and stability. Taking into account the core mis- sion, vision and goals of the OSCE contained in the achievement of modern democratic values through the development of institutions and processes, as well as the results achieved, conclusion can be made that the OSCE is a success- ful international organization, especially when it comes to post-conflict activi- ties. Although this international organization is an important cohesive factor of cooperation and stability in Europe–it is still facing certain challenges.

95 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

The beginning of the new millennium was marked by specificities contained in the fact that the modern world is, increasingly more and with more frequency, facing new security challenges, which by their morphology significantly depart from traditional, conventional, well-known models of security problems.1 Pre- cisely the change of their morphology directly implies that–due to their unpre- dictability–they become challenges.2

One of the big novelties was also the manner in which organized groups of the same or similar orientation or background achieved their goals by using modern technologies outside the territory that was the object of their activities with the basic premise of achieving political goals.3

In that respect, terrorism, energy, cybercrime and the participation of foreign fighters on some battlefields in the classic sense of warfare, determine the basic directions of modern security challenges.

The attack against the towers in New York triggered a broad range of debates on terrorism as a contemporary phenomenon.4 The aforementioned is based on the fact that, according to all elements (selection of targets, goals to be achieved, membership in a group for/against, sophistication of actions, etc.), it is a striking example of the new forms of terrorist attacks. In that respect, the use of cutting edge technologies and equipment, efficient organization of com-

1 For more details, see: Baldwin D.A., The concept of security, Cambridge, Univ Press, 2001., Baylis J., Wirtz J., Cohen E. and Gray C., Strategy in the Contemporary World - Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2002, Friedman T., The World is Flat: A Brief History of Twenty-first Century, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005, Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Alexandria Press, Belgrade, 2008. 2 For more details, see: Fukuyama Francis, The Last Man in a Bottle: An Essay on the Tenth Anniversary of the Publication of ‘The End of History’ and “Responses to Fukuyama,” The National Interest, No. 56 Summer 1999., Huntington Samuel P, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1991., Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster 1996. 3 For more details, see: Brown Michael E., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict - revised edition (International Security Readers), The Mit Press, Cambridge, London, 2001., Buzan Barry, People, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991., Eller Jack David, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on Ethnic Conflict, University of Michigan Press, 1999., Hofmann Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998., Horowitz Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Updated Edition With a New Preface, University of California Press, 2000., Laqueur Walter, The New Terrorism – Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford, University Press, 1999., Lutz James and Brenda, Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2004. 4 For definitions of terrorism, see: Simeunović Dragan, Terorizam (Terrorism), Faculty of Law, Belgrade, 2009, Simić R. D., Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti (The Science of Security –Contemporary Approaches to Security), FRY Official Gazette, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002, Whittaker J. David, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Routledge, London, 2004., Lutz James and Brenda, Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2004.

96  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

plex operations against multiple targets and locations, coordination of activi- ties and the skills applied, as well as the willingness to sacrifice their own lives, largely exceed all previous experiences when terrorist attacks are concerned.

Considering that the said event took place in the territory of the United States, which has the most advanced security services,5 but which were neither able to foresee such terrorist acts nor had an adequate response to what happened,6 the conclusion is made that the new security challenges, by their nature, require a new approach–which must necessarily be different from the traditional one.

The fact that these attacks were committed by trained people, educated and spe- cialized to use computers7 and weapons, while at the same time willing to con- sciously sacrifice their own lives, was also a sociological shock that was not recog- nized on time.8 In that respect, the reactions that targeted particular groups could not solve such a problem but rather opened a new dimension of preventive work.9

The situation is similar in the Balkans, or more precisely, in Bosnia and Her- zegovina, where there is an evident difficulty when it comes to controlling the so-called “sleepers”. Namely, they are citizens who live a normal life, are often educated and respectable in their communities, who in no way cause suspicion about their activities. Such groups are usually well organized and have clearly defined functional and hierarchical structures, are ideologically motivated and closed for communication. Also indicative is that in addition to homogeneity, such groups of people are financially very stable, which gives a special tone to possibilities for their active engagement.

The experience gained up till now and the working methods of security servic- es were unable to respond to this challenge given the complexity of the new modes of terrorist activity, which required urgency in finding a new approach to this phenomenon. The new methodology required a more complex approach, which primarily included monitoring of the activities of potential members of

5 For more details, see: Gregory F. Traverton and Bryan C. Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, 2008. 6 For more details, see: Friedman T., Longitudes and Attitudes - Exploring the world before and after September 11, Penguin books, London, 2003., Huntington, S. P. (1997), The Erosion of American National Interests, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, 1 5, Kegley Charles, W., Jr., Wittkopf R. Eugene, World Politics - Trends and Transformations, Wadsworth, Belmont, Ca., 2004., Tardy Thierry, Peace Operations After 11 September 2001, Frank Cass, London, Great Britain, 2004. 7 For more details, see: Nye J., Power in a Global Information Age – From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, New York, 2004. 8 For more details, see: Goldstone Richard J., Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004., Halevy Efraim, Man in the shadows, St.Martin’s Press, USA, 2006., Hamilton M., The Sociology of Religion, Clio, Belgrade, 2003., Samuel Huntington, Third Wave, Stubovi Kulture, Belgrade, 2004. 9 For more details, see: Saideman Stephen M., The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, 2001.

97 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

such groups, but not in the physical sense but rather by moderns methods of controlling the flow of funds and questionable transactions, infiltration within the group, the use of electronic data flow control, propaganda work, etc. The aforementioned is the only way to essentially understand the motives and rea- sons for their possible terrorist activity, with primary aim of prevention.10

In countering this type of security challenges, in addition to the aforemen- tioned, an extremely important role is also played by the broader social com- munity, civil society institutions, the intellectual elite, together with the poli- ticians, with a view to better understanding the political discontent that could result in terrorist attacks as a method of achieving political goals–their actions can sometimes play even a crucial role. In other words, coordinated joint activ- ity of civil society, the political establishment and security services may have a decisive role in preventing a terrorist act, namely their actions may sometimes act decisively preventively in order to prevent a terrorist act.

***

Another dimension of long-term contemporary security challenges tackled in the essay is energy (energy sources, security of energy infrastructure, etc.). The fact that the issue of energy supply has become increasingly topical in recent years is, no doubt, a mode of political trade and a type of pressure upon countries that are in any way dependent on others. The countries that posses or monopolize energy sources use that fact in a direct or indirect manner for predominantly political purposes. The same argument is often used by countries that are transit zones.

One of the most specific examples of energy as a contemporary security chal- lenge is Ukraine. Namely, Ukraine is at the same time an energy-dependent country and a transit zone. The beginning of destabilization of the situation in Ukraine some years ago caused the energy supply crisis not only in that coun- try’s territory but also in a good part of European countries. Such a situation more considerably affects the countries that are financially less developed, giv- en their inability to be supplied by alternative energy sources.

Energy dependence of countries is directly related to their political stability. On the other hand, this type of dependence is often an instrument of political influ- ence of big powers aimed at achieving their interests in the energy-dependent

10 Very often, the aforementioned implies close cooperation with members of these groups who are nationals of countries that are potential targets of terrorist attacks and who are often themselves perpetrators of terrorist acts.

98  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

countries. The same applies to countries that have energy sources or a surplus of energy sources.

In that respect, the strong engagement and insistence of the United States and the European Union on diversification of supply in energy sources with a view to making sure that countries are less dependent on a single supplier, is not incidental. This is the case with the Western Balkans, which is traditionally supplied with energy sources imported from Russia, but with emerging alter- native options such as liquid gas from Kuwait, gas from Azerbaijan, shale oil from the United States, etc.

However, the projects that would provide for alternative ways of supply and alternative types of energy sources require enormous sums of money which leave financially less developed countries with no possibility of choice and in the sphere of further dependency and possibility of being exposed to pressures.

Although great efforts are invested at the international level towards finding a trade-off solution, based on the aforementioned, as well as on the fact that energy dependence is but a part of economic dependence, creation of a “vicious circle” in this sphere opens up yet another security challenge for the coming period, to which an adequate response still does not exist.

***

Cybercrime is a topic that certainly preoccupies the security services the most and to which it is simply impossible to find an adequate and effective preven- tive response, and practice has shown that action can mostly be taken only post festum. It is astonishing that it is no longer a question whether “successful” attacks on large and costly information systems such as, for instance, defence systems–of some of the most developed countries of the world–are possible, but rather whether someone is targeting them.

In that regard, a serious security challenge is posed by hacker attacks aiming at political or even terrorist activity.

Detection of hacking attacks while they are in progress does not necessarily imply the possibility of preventing them while they last or preventing their duration. In addition, an insight into the range of consequences has been con- siderably challenged because it implies the detection of perpetrators, their lo- cation, their motives and aims and the like.

99 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Considering the aforementioned, even if all of the said is identified, the basic issue raised is whether there is a possibility of any action against the cyber attacker who is located outside any legal and any other jurisdiction of the coun- try that is targeted by the attack.

The current efforts in networking and cooperation of countries at the regional and broader international level are visible in that regard. However, the main obstacle is the lack of harmonization between national regulations of individu- al countries, relating primarily to the functional jurisdiction of certain security services. Namely, some Southeast European countries still do not have appro- priate centers at the national level (Center for Emergency Response Team– CERT). This deficiency considerably hinders the developed countries’ struggle with this phenomenon as well, given the absence of borders for this type of crime, i.e. of real functioning models of cooperation in this field.11

On the other hand, the need for cooperation and joint fight against cybercrime has caused another problem in less developed countries that further complicates the establishment of an adequate methodology for the fight against, and cooperation in this field. Namely, in their strong commitment to dealing with this problem, a large number of countries adopted legal regulations of “umbrella type”,12 i.e. regulations without adequate by-laws or adequate mechanisms to allow the iden- tification of criminal offenses, prosecution of perpetrators and their punishment.

Another problem is the mutual difference between individual national legal systems and, in that connection, lack of possibility to establish a unified and harmonized legal framework for responding to such situations at the interna- tional, i.e. global level.

***

The participation of foreign fighters in certain hotbeds is also one of the burn- ing contemporary security challenges. Namely, in addition to the problem of existing hotspots, the bilateral and multilateral relations among countries are further complicated by the increasingly active participation of citizens of one state in the war zones of other states.

11 That is why it often happens that during the attack hackers are located in the territory of a country that does not have a developed mechanism of prevention, detection, response, suppression and punishment for these activities. 12 The Balkan countries, to be specific.

100  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

The capacities of legal systems of countries faced with such phenomena, as well as the possibility to prevent them and adequately punish the responsible persons who opt for such an engagement remains questionable. Namely, the imposition of sanctions on these countries is not an adequate way for solving the problem of foreign fighters, considering that they abolish the states which the fighters come from from every liability.

In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to have a coordinated action from the countries where foreign fighters come from and countries where they fight, which implies alignment of the legal framework with international conven- tions, which would allow for joint action. In that regard, it is also necessary to intensify diplomatic efforts and to direct them toward a common course of action with a view to countering this contemporary security challenge.

Not so rare cases of participation of nationals of certain countries of the region, specifically of Southeast Europe, in the war zones of other countries, have led to confrontation with the fact that legal regulation and prosecution of persons directly involved in combat operations and persons who facilitate the departure to the war affected locations must necessarily be carried out in cooperation with other countries in the region.13

In that respect, a large number of legally binding regulations with draconian penal provisions has been adopted in the Southeast European region, but the full effect of their implementation remains to be seen.

What is significant is that the problem has been identified, but nevertheless, at the international level it remains a security challenge for the future.

***

The common denominator for contemporary security challenges highlighted by this essay, including terrorism, energy, cybercrime and participation of foreign fighters in certain war hotspots, is that they represent transnational threats.

In that respect, confrontation with the new security challenges and one of the key factors in preventive action should be contained in the new approach which is based on a more intense international networking and regional cooperation.

13 Almost as a rule, persons who are or were directly involved in combat operations and persons engaged in facilitating the departure to the warring location, hide in the territories of neighboring states.

101 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The inability of any, even the most developed country, to independently prevent or remediate the consequences of transnational threats, i.e. security phenom- ena, implies that the aforementioned tighter linkage of countries and their co- operation–through international organizations or regional initiatives–is a con- dition sine qua non of global peace and stability.

Tighter linkage and cooperation of countries through, and based on, the cat- alytic function of international organizations would facilitate the creation of adequate conditions for the defining the joint action strategies including the definition of potential threats, development of long-term action plans and clos- er cooperation of all relevant stakeholders, both within countries and inter- nationally. Given that international, regional and sub-regional organizations (and initiatives) are focused on specific fields of operation, this would enable a synergy of their action and coordination of activities, which would greatly contribute to the advancement of the prevention concept.

No doubt, the aforementioned mode and model of tighter linkage would signif- icantly contribute to confrontation and adequate fight against contemporary security challenges. In addition, it would enable the creation of conditions to more easily overcome the problems of Euro-Atlantic integration flows of less developed countries and contribute to the creation of a platform for dialogue and realistic and practical cooperation.

International organizations that deal with security issues today are based on these principles and, with the consensus of their member states, have the capac- ity to provide the preconditions for achieving the planned goals in that direction.

One of the challenges, however, is posed by different political aspirations and interests of countries, as well as by their positions when it comes to security threats, which directly influences the manner of adoption, but also the outcome of political decisions themselves.

Practice has shown that, very often, due to the lack of coordination between all agencies dealing with security, omissions occur. The next respective challenge is reflected in the consolidation of political decisions in this field and their im- plementation. Apart from the collision of functional competences of security services, financial support is often the main problem in the implementation of plans, which may often result in postponement of action or failure.

On the other hand, another extremely important role of international organ- izations is action in the post-conflict period–in the form of monitoring peace process or ceasefire, strengthening confidence and dialogue, removing the con-

102  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

sequences and causes of the conflict with a view to building durable peace. In that sense, if a peace agreement so stipulates, control of arms and military forces is an important segment of this role.

Taking into account the core mission, vision and goals of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) contained in the achievement of modern democratic values through the development of institutions and pro- cesses, as well as the results achieved, conclusion can be made that the OSCE is a successful international organization, especially when it comes to post-con- flict action. In that regard, this international organization is a key cohesive factor of cooperation and stability.

After the Cold War ended, and before the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, there was an opinion that the OSCE had lost its essential and practical role. The events that followed showed just the opposite. The few claims were refuted and it became evident that the role of the OSCE in some conflicts was irreplaceable. This confirmed that the organization, despite the many challenges, had brought concrete results and justified its existence.

Although it has no possibility to act during conflicts, by its post-conflict action missions in the former Yugoslavia, the frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as its monitoring mission in Ukraine, the OSCE has undoubtedly made an outstanding contribution to building confidence and dialogue as a key prerequisite for a durable peaceful solution in these crisis areas.

Acknowledging the fact about the complexity of the OSCE Mission in the for- mer Yugoslavia, as well as the complexity of the post-war period, its role in institution and capacity building in Bosnia and Herzegovina was very effective in some segments.

Article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement is a unique example in the world of establishing confidence and cooperation between the warring parties relating to control of weapons and military assets after the end of the war conflict. The realistic indicator of the confidence built in that respect and the crown of invest- ed efforts is the transformation of this Process into regional frameworks in late 2014. Although upon the request of the countries signatories of this Agreement, the OSCE has remained a part of this Process, the signatory countries will con- tinue the management independently. In that connection, an idea was launched that such a successful mission can and should, by its experiences, provide a ser- vice for the purpose of transfer of knowledge also to other regions such as, for instance, the Eastern Partnership countries (European Union) or North Africa.

103 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The above directly indicates the importance and vitality of the OSCE’s role, with a concrete contribution to the OSCE’s core mission–regional cooperation and confidence building regarding security.

On the other hand, frozen conflicts are by their nature a constant threat to re- gional security. They are very non-specific and require constant communication with the conflicting parties, a clear understanding and sensibility of action. Although the results achieved thus far have shown success in respect of halting further conflicts, further work is required with a view to finding durable solu- tions with the agreement of all conflicting parties and other relevant factors.

The Ukraine crisis has shown all the complexity of relations in the region and escalated into an armed conflict that threatened to spread to other regions.

However, even without the possibility to fully prevent this conflict, the OSCE has showed the importance of its role immediately upon the signing of the ceasefire, having taken on the role of chief observer and defined the three areas of future action: transnational threats, border security and arms control.14

Especially important is the fact that the OSCE was the only organization that got consent of all stakeholders for its mission.

The above becomes even more important in light of the fact that the United Nations (UN), which by nature should have assumed this role, was not ready, due to the specificities of the region and the conflict on the one hand, and the fact that Russia as a permanent member of the Security Council would have quite expectedly used its veto, on the other hand.

Likewise, NATO, which had the capabilities and the willingness to be actively involved, could not have contributed to a peaceful solution, considering that Russia would have had a negative attitude regarding active engagement of the Alliance in this part of the Russian border.

The European Union (EU), through its defense forces, i.e. common security and defense policy (CSDP), has neither the capabilities nor the willingness of all Member States for a more active engagement at this point of time–even if Rus- sia so agreed.

14 OSCE observers were primarily deployed at border crossings around Lugansk and Donetsk (two out of the total of 21 border crossings), with a view to monitoring the transfer of potentially hazardous substances. Following the Minsk ceasefire agreement of September 2014, even though the monitoring is applied by the presence of unarmed observers, all OSCE observers engaged in overseeing the exchange of fire had military experience.

104  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

In the long run, these conflicts are by their nature specific, but by the way in which they unfold, they represent a classic form of security threats that are long lasting but have low intensity. As for the modern methods of warfare, enhanced engagement of foreign fighters in terrorist activities, energy and eco- nomic leveraging for the purpose of achieving political goals, and the strength- ened role of cyber security threats, are to be expected.

The role of the OSCE thus becomes more complex, but on the other hand gains importance, especially in view of the situation in the Western Balkans, where such threats did not exist during the OSCE field operations. This also indicates that the OSCE as an organization will have to focus its future activities on two tracks, namely, in classical terms by using successful experiences from the post-war period in the former Yugoslavia, and simultaneously by developing new strategies and mechanisms for contemporary security threats.

The implementation of these tasks is primarily hindered by the lack of money, the reluctance of some countries to actively participate and differing political views when it comes to the role of the OSCE. In that respect, the forthcoming period will require more political dialogue and the intensification of regional cooperation with a view to defining the future role of the OSCE and reaching a compromise when contemporary security challenges are concerned.

In addition, funding is also a challenge of its own kind. Namely, until the Minsk agreement in September 2014, the funds used for the Mission to Ukraine came from the OSCE reserve funds and amounted to EUR 2,000,000 a month. Accord- ing to estimates, the total annualized amount of funds is EUR 46.8 million and the question is whether–and until when–the countries will be able to finance it.

Contemporary security challenges also require a transformation in terms of preventive action, given their unpredictability and absence of borders. This is directly indicative of the need for active engagement in defining new strategies as contemporary responses to contemporary security threats, with the partici- pation of all countries and intense cooperation with other relevant internation- al organizations dealing with some of the security segments.

105 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Overview of framework references

Baldwin D.A., The concept of security, Cambridge, Univ Press, 2001.

Baylis J., Wirtz J., Cohen E. and Gray C., Strategy in the Contemporary World - Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Brown Michael E., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict - revised edition (International Security Readers), The Mit Press, Cambridge, London, 2001.

Buzan Barry, People, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991.

Eller Jack David, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on Ethnic Conflict, University of Michigan Press, 1999.

Friedman T., Longitudes and Attitudes - Exploring the world before and after September 11, Penguin books, London, 2003.

Friedman T., The World is Flat: A Brief History of Twenty-first Century, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005.

Fukuyama Francis, The Last Man in a Bottle: An Essay on the Tenth Anniversary of the Publication of ‘The End of History’ and “Responses to Fukuyama,” The National Interest, No. 56 Summer 1999.

Goldstone Richard J., Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004.

Gregory F. Traverton and Bryan C. Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, 2008.

Halevy Efraim, Man in the shadows, St.Martin’s Press, USA, 2006.

Hamilton, M., The Sociology of Religion, Clio, Belgrade, 2003.

Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave, Stubovi Kulture, Belgrade, 2004.

Hofmann Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998.

Horowitz Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Updated Edition With a New Preface, University of California Press, 2000.

106  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Huntington Samuel P, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1991.

Huntington, S. P. (1997), The Erosion of American National Interests, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, 1 5

Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster 1996.

Kegley Charles, W., Jr., Wittkopf R. Eugene, World Politics - Trends and Transformations, Wadsworth, Belmont, Ca., 2004.

Laqueur Walter, The New Terrorism – Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford, University Press, 1999.

Lutz James and Brenda, Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2004.

Nye J., Power in a Global Information Age – From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, New York, 2004.

Saideman Stephen M., The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, 2001.

Simeunović Dragan, Terorizam (Terrorism), Faculty of Law, Belgrade, 2009.

Simić R. D., Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti (The Science of Security–Contemporary Approaches to Security), FRY Official Gazette, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002.

Tardy Thierry, Peace Operations after 11 September 2001, Frank Cass, London, Great Britain, 2004.

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Alexandria Press, Belgrade, 2008.

Whittaker J. David, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Routledge, London, 2004.

107  Milan Andrić

OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Summary: Today’s world, especially Europe as a synonym of democracy and the rule of law, is facing the greatest crisis of security since the end of the Cold War. The distrust and division, the policy of confrontation and the logic of absolute winners and losers, the “conflict” between Eastern real politics and American ideology of “excellence”, threaten the cooperative approach to security. New-old security chal- lenges, risks and threats have emerged–of civil armed conflicts, organized crime, cyber crime, terrorism, migration, human trafficking, pandemics, all the way to climate change. In such a security context, it seems that there is absence of better security cooperation between international security actors because “Great Powers continue to fear each other and there is little room for trust”1, which opens the space for the OSCE to take a leadership role in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

This paper deals with the basic security challenges, risks and threats in Europe and the possibility for specific activities of the OSCE on the ground.

Keywords: OSCE, cooperative security, preventive diplomacy, security chal- lenges, risks and threats, field operations, great powers

1 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Udruženje za studije SAD u Srbiji (Serbian Association for American Studies), Belgrade 2009, p. 6

109 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is the broadest form of alliance of states for cooperation in security. Presently, it comprises 56 partici- pating states that span the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia and North Amer- ica and 12 partner states for co-operation. A comprehensive approach to secu- rity, covering all three dimensions of the Helsinki Final Act (politico-military, economic, environmental, and human rights and freedoms) distinguishes the OSCE from any other organization. The OSCE has managed to increase its role in mediating conflicts, especially with regard to the so-called “long conflicts” in Moldova and the Caucasus. Despite the proven success of field operations, which influenced the creation of “pioneer measures” in confidence-building and reconciliation at the national and local levels in post-conflict societies, the OSCE suffers from a poor visibility among the general public2. Under-representation in the public does not fully reflect the significance and the results of the OSCE field operations, which may adversely affect the very image of the organization.

However, what can be a problem or an advantage for OSCE compared to other organizations is that the OSCE has no founding treaty that would produce legal obligations or a respective legal status for entering into international agree- ments and having privileges and immunities. Taking into account its diversity, certain “political elites” of great powers do not consider it an international or- ganization but rather an “instrument” for the promotion of peace and security. This observation should not be understood as having a negative connotation, but rather as being an advantage when it comes to quick decision-making and action on the ground in all stages of conflict (early warning, preventive diplo- macy, observation operations on the ground, conflict resolution and post-con- flict rehabilitation). The use of the term “preventive diplomacy” in the context of the OSCE implies the application of diplomacy to prevent the emergence of disagreements between the parties, in order to prevent transformation of dis- agreements into conflicts, to eliminate conflicts when they occur and to limit and prevent the conflicts from acquiring such proportions that it becomes im- possible to rapidly eliminate them.3 Preventive diplomacy is at the same time

2 Erwan Fouéré, Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE?, Centre for European Policy Studies, 24 April 2014, pdf, pp. 1-3 3 Margaretha af Ugglas, Conditions for successful preventive diplomacy, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994, p. 12.

110  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

the most visible comparative advantage of the OSCE compared to the United Nations and regional security organizations in Europe.4

Today’s security context, the number of security actors, the transition, the de- cline of global power and influence of the United States, the strengthening of Russia and China, as well as the expansion and consolidation of the European Union, have influenced the OSCE to develop its own mechanisms. One of the key mechanisms, the one that gives supremacy to this organization compared to others, are operations on the ground (field presence), where conflicts actu- ally occur or in their vicinity. Field operations are conducted under memoran- dums of understanding, concluded between the OSCE and the authorities of the receiving State. OSCE started its first field operation after the Cold War, in response to conflicts that erupted in the territory of the SFR Yugoslavia and the USSR. After that period, the OSCE began, in line with the comprehensive approach to security, to pay attention to other security challenges, risks and threats, aiming at early warning and conflict prevention, and then at contrib- uting to the resolution of the already erupted conflicts and at post-conflict re- habilitation. As the main form of “friendly” intervention in the receiving states, as we already mentioned, the OSCE operations use “preventive diplomacy” be- cause they exclude coercion as an instrument.5 The extent of importance of field operations is also indicated by the fact that over 80 per cent of the total OSCE’s budget goes to these operations.

In the following pages, after defining “contemporary challenges, risks and threats”, which burden the security context of Europe, this paper will give an overview of field operations conducted by the OSCE.

Security challenges, risks and threats

The list of security challenges, risks and threats varied in history, following globalization. As was mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the modern world is characterized by the deepening of the old and emergence of new chal-

4 Victor – Yves Ghebali, “Preventive Diplomacy as Visited from the OSCE, 3rd International Security Forum”, Kongresshaus Zurich, 1998, pp.19–21 5 Vladimir Trapara, “Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji” (The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries), Original research paper, Belgrade, 2011, p. 102.

111 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

lenges, risks and threats that have affected both internal and external relations and are manifested in various forms, depending on the political, economic and cultural development of countries and regions. The changes that occurred as a result of the development of modern society brought new security challenges, risks and threats, while the old ones acquired new dimensions and substantially changed their appearances. After the end of the Cold War, when the threat of the “known enemy” ceased to be present, people started again to moderately fear a large number of other threats. Some threats, such as terrorism, migration, pandemics and civil wars had existed before, but were not at the forefront, some were not so alarmingly manifested as in the modern world (climate change), while some, owing to new technologies, emerged for the first time in history (IT threats).6 We should not forget the threats which Professor Samuel Huntington “predicted” in 1993 in his article and later book titled “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”, referring to a possible clash of civilizations especially on religious grounds between the Muslim and Christian civilizations.

States are trying to recognize security challenges, risks and threats, and to list them in strategic and normative documents, such as the national security strategy and the defense strategy. The European Union, led by Kantian ideals, started the European Security Strategy with the sentence: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.”7. The European Security Strategy singles out five key threats to security of the European Union, namely: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. In addition to basic threats, also listed are other threats such as pandemics, cli- mate change, maritime piracy and the threat of energy dependence. What the European Security Strategy does not mention is the fact that modern society has become dependent on information-communication technologies. This de- pendence has produced new security risks and threats. New technologies have not only produced new threats but have also made it more difficult to identify and distinguish security threat actors. In the new milieu, cyber space, threat actors can be various: state, inter-state and transnational actors. They are most frequently malicious individuals, criminal groups, terrorist organizations, eco- nomic operators, but also states and their institutions (national armies and

6 Filip Ejdus: Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi (International Security: Theories, Sectors and Levels), Official Gazette, Belgrade, 2012, p. 32 7 Bezbedna Evropa u boljem svetu: Evropska strategija bezbednosti (Safe Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy), ISAC Fund (International and Security Affairs Centre), Belgrade, 2006, pp. 3-21.

112  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

intelligence services), with different motives for destructive action: economic, political, ideological, religious or military.8

In the global multipolar and multilateral environment, in which complex in- terdependence of states is manifested, no state is able to independently solve the increasingly complex problems of preserving and strengthening the na- tional security. Therefore, security in modern conditions is increasingly viewed globally, and national security is becoming ever more significantly linked with the security situation in the immediate and distant environment. The exist- ence and growth of asymmetric threats of transnational character enhances the need to develop approaches in maintaining and improving security, based on cooperation and pooling of national security capabilities of national states. One form of cooperation and association of national states are field operations under the auspices of the OSCE.

The OSCE field operations

In the last two and a half decades since the first field operations were intro- duced, part of Europe is still greatly affected by global changes.

After the war in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it was assumed, as the Eu- ropean Security Strategy says, that new violent conflicts in the European Union countries and the OSCE participating states were no longer possible. Of course, this assessment proved to be wrong because conflicts broke out in Macedonia (2001), Georgia (2008) and Kyrgyzstan (2010), or still last in Ukraine (2014). Fre- quent violent conflict outbreaks are disastrous, given that the states in which they happen are mostly oriented towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Today, with the EU members making up half the membership of the OSCE, the EU needs to show greater responsibility and far-sightedness in its dealings with the OSCE.9

On the other hand, the UN missions that were sent to Europe are currently limited to the ones in Kosovo and Cyprus. Since it is unlikely that the UN will

8 Nenad Putnik, Milica Bošković, Savremeni bezbednosni izazovi – haktivizam kao novi oblik društvenog konflikta (Contemporary Security Challenges–hactivism as a new form of social conflict), Faculty of Security, Belgrade, 2013 9 Erwan Fouéré, Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE?, Centre for European Policy Studies, 24 April 2014, pdf, pp. 1-3

113 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

return to Europe with major land operations, this is a challenge for the OSCE and the European Union. The current situation in Ukraine is such an example.10 In fact, Ukraine’s crisis brought the OSCE to the forefront as a universal, flex- ible organization suitable for rapid response to security challenges, risks and threats through “preventive diplomacy” and “field operations”.

The OSCE is the first and only international organization that has a special monitoring mission in Ukraine, which currently has about 500 staff (the OSCE participating states approved an expansion to 1000). According to the Head of Mission Ertugula Apakan, the extention of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Eastern Ukraine may be purposeful “only if members of the monitoring mission are granted full access throughout the entire territory of Eastern Ukraine, including territories that are currently not under control of the government and those along the border with Russia. Until such issues are resolved, additional monitors will have little impact on monitoring the imple- mentation of peace agreement from Minsk”.11

The crisis in Ukraine actually mirrors the institutional changes both in the OSCE area and beyond. The political conflict is accompanied by mutually ex- clusive perceptions. From a Western perspective, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine represent gross violations of international law and basic OSCE principles. In the Russian view, these acts are legitimate measures to defend the rights of Russians against the background of a putsch in Kiev. More complicated processes of interaction and escalation, usually promoted by several sides, are no longer taken into account. As long as these black-and-white views prevail, a real dialogue will not be possible.12 The crisis in Ukraine actually mirrors the institutional changes both in the OSCE area and beyond. The political conflict is accompanied by mutually ex- clusive perceptions. From a Western perspective, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine represent gross violations of international law and basic OSCE principles. In the Russian view, these acts are legitimate measures to defend the rights of Russians against the background of a putsch in Kiev. More complicated processes of interaction and escalation, usually promoted by several sides, are no longer taken into account. As long as these black-and-white views prevail, a real dialogue will not be possible. Henry

10 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, pp. 2-27 11 Internet:http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=04&dd=24&nav_category=78&nav_id=984337, accessed on 27 April 2015 12 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, pp. 2-27

114  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Kissinger, in his interview with the British newspaper The Independent, on the occasion of publication of his new book “World Order”, has a different view of the crisis in Ukraine. “I disagree with Putin, but why didn’t somebody, some- where along the road, propose a solution that would have addressed both sides’ concerns within the context of an independent Ukraine? When Europe said Ukraine has to choose between Europe and Russia in a commercial negotiation, maybe saying the opposite, saying let’s do it together, might have made great progress”13, Kissinger said.

For now, there are no standard guidelines under which field operations work, except for the generalized principles of the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security.14 Previously, operations followed the guidelines relating to the spe- cificities of the particular operation and were originally contained in the 1992 Helsinki Final Act.15 Despite this fact, field operations are the best mechanism for crisis resolution and post-crisis rehabilitation of society.

Field Operations are established by the Permanent Council, which decides about their mandates and budgets. The conduct of these operations is secured by the Permanent Council and the Chairperson. International officials within the operations are diplomats seconded by participating states and are paid by them. This has reduced the cost of operations for the OSCE, but the real prob- lem exists in the form of vacancies, frequent staff turnover and insufficient training, distorted equitable geographical distribution (over 40 per cent of the staff of these operations come from the United States, Britain, France and Ger- many).16 Although the OSCE field operations are based on individual, tailored mandates, they share a number of common features and primarily represent a collective and co-operative effort of the whole Organization aiming at a peace- ful resolution of crises.17

However, not all states are “good hosts”. Whereas most host states in South Eastern Europe have a relatively positive attitude, the South Caucasian and Central Asian states are, to different degree, more skeptical towards the OSCE field operations. As highlighted by the article entitled “The Future of OSCE

13 Internet: http://srbin.info/2014/09/28/savremeni-svet-sukob-rusko-kineske-realpolitike-i-americke-ideologije/, (modern-world-conflict-russian-chinese-real politics-and-american-ideology), accessed on 27 April 2015 14 Dragan Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti (Science of Security), FRY Official Journal, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002, p. 172. 15 See: Internet: http://www.osce.org/mc/39530, accessed on 24 April 2015 16 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji (The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries), Original research paper, Belgrade, 2011, p.119. 17 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, pp. 2-27

115 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Field Operations”, a few host states have demonstrated their desire to limit the OSCE scope of operation or downgrade it. This is happening particularly in resource-rich countries where the opinion that the contacts and services of the OSCE are not needed sometimes prevails, based on the idea that the field operations’ mandates have already been fulfilled”.18 Also, in the last ten years Russia has criticized the functioning of field operations and her criticism is hav- ing a growing impact, reflecting Russia’s growing power and ability to impose her own list of priorities in the Euro-Atlantic-Eurasian dialogue on security relations. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan developed a document in 2002, criticizing the OSCE field operation practices,19 and referring among other to the insufficient control of field operations by the OSCE’s central authorities.

OSCE tomorrow

Given the security context prevailing in Europe and the world today, globaliza- tion, transition and wandering in politics, it is clear that the states alone, without the help and cooperation of the Great Powers through cooperative security, will not be able to counter the contemporary security challenges, risks and threats. As noted by professor Dragan Simic,“... regardless of truly democratic and peace- ful efforts of the OSCE, the cooperative security concept has, regrettably, both for this initially ‘Conference in continuity’ and then an international organiza- tion, remained largely a normative vision, unattained in reality and insufficient- ly clear in the theoretical-philosophical sense”.20 Also, in the coming period the OSCE may also face the challenges which will, according to Wolfgang Zellner, be brought about by the “EU enlargement” that could cause the overlapping of func- tions of the two organizations, or create an opportunity to deepen cooperation.21

Despite these observations, the OSCE’s role through preventive diplomacy, field operations and other mechanisms should in the coming period gain even great-

18 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, pp. 2-27 19 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji (The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries), Original research paper, Belgrade, 2011, p.119. 20 Dragan Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti (The Science of Security), the FRY Official Gazette, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2002, p. 84 21 Vladimir Trapara, “Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji” (The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries), Original research paper, Belgrade, 2011, p. 119

116  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

er importance. The OSCE of tomorrow should enhance the dialogue with all international actors with a view to restoring peace and stability in Europe. This argument is supported by the fact that the OSCE is the recipient of “Kaiser-Ot- to” award for 2015.22

However, it is necessary to increase the transparency of the OSCE, primarily of its capabilities for rapid and effective action on the ground, and for achieving results. It seems that the current crisis in Ukraine encourages states and other security actors to more significantly pay attention to the Organization. They now actively use the OSCE as a mediator in conflict resolution, while on the other hand, as mentioned above, there is still very little understanding for the OSCE’s potential capabilities and its readiness to influence the revitalization of dialogues related to European security.

One of the recommendations of Wolfgang Zellner is to develop thematic mis- sions, that would deal with new transnational security threats and risks in the entire OSCE area (or in some regions), instead of the existing local missions that deal with a wide range of issues at the level of individual states.23

In the year of Serbia’s OSCE Chairmanship, one of the priorities of this organi- zation should be stabilization of the crisis in Ukraine and more aggressive re- sponse to cyber threats through the full support of the implementation of the adopted confidence-building measures (CBMs). “With the confidence-building measures, the OSCE participating states provide a single platform for tackling various cyber threats, at the same time protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights.”24 Also, according to the Joint Work Plan of Switzerland and Serbia for the chairmanship of the organization,25 OSCE should in the future “develop activities based on the Dublin Ministerial Council Declaration on strengthening good governance and fight against corruption, money laundering and financing of terrorism, including addressing recovery of stolen property, solving global and re- gional environmental problems in the context of promoting security cooperation and addressing the issue of sustainable water management and water scarcity”.

22 The Kaiser-Otto Culture Foundation has been awarding this prize since 2005 in the German town of Magdeburg. The prize is awarded once in two years for exceptional contribution to European integrations and stability in Europe and in the neighbouring regions. Internet: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/latest/500/500. html?id=26979406, accessed on 26 April 2015 23 Vladimir Trapara, “Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji” (The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries), Original research paper, Belgrade, 2011, p. 119. 24 Internet, http://mondo.rs/a787040/Info/Srbija/Dacic-Sajber-bezbednost-prioritet-za-Srbiju-kao-predsedavajucu- OEBS-u.html, accessed on 20 April 2015 25 Internet, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/teme/oebs-2015-predsedavanje-srbije?lang=lat, accessed on 20 April 2015

117 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Also, the OSCE should enhance cooperation and partnership with the United Nations, which is crucial for addressing security challenges, risks and threats to the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. “The OSCE is engaged in political dia- logue, coordination and exchange of information with the UN on thematic and regional issues both on the political and expert level. All OSCE structures coop- erate with a wide range of UN bodies and organizations in order to strength- en security in all three dimensions in the OSCE area and in the neighboring regions. We highly appreciate this close cooperation. We are ready to make it more operational and more results-oriented by reviving talks with the staff, targeted exchange of staff and pragmatic implementation of the existing insti- tutional framework”26. In addition to promoting cooperation with the United Nations, on the basis of the 1999 Istanbul Platform for Security Cooperation, the OSCE’s priority should be to develop cooperation with other relevant re- gional and international organizations that share the OSCE goals and values ​​in order to capitalize on synergies for preserving security.

Conclusion

The aim of this essay was to describe, examine and explain the role of the OSCE in addressing contemporary security challenges, risks and threats, especially through field operations, as well as to reaffirm the relevance of this organiza- tion, which is primarily committed to maintaining the comprehensive security architecture of Europe.

26 Part of speech of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, First Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dacic, at the briefing held at the UN Security Council on the priorities of Serbia’s chairmanship of the OSCE and the co-operation between the OSCE and the UN. For details, see: Internet http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/ index.php/2015-01-15-13-45-30/14870-2015-02-25-12-57-03?lang= lat, accessed on 20 April 2015

118  OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Literature

Dragan Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka (Science of Security, the FRY Official Gazette, Faculty of Political Sciences), Belgrade, 2002,

Filip Ejdus i Marko Savković, Rečnik evropske bezbednosti, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, (Dictionary of European Security, Center for Civil-Military Relations), Belgrade 2010,

Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic, European Security in Transition, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006,

John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Udruzenje za studije SAD u Srbiji, (Serbian Association for American Studies), Belgrade 2009,

Margaretha af Ugglas, Conditions for successful preventive diplomacy, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994,

Živorad Kovačević, International Negotiation, Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, 2004

Victor – Yves Ghebali, “Preventive Diplomacy as Visited from the OSCE, 3rd International Security Forum”, Kongresshaus Zurich, 1998

Vladimir Trapara, “Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji” (The Role of OSCE Field Operations in Transition Countries), Original research paper, Belgrade, 2011

Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions,

Erwan Fouéré, Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE?, Centre for European Policy Studies, 24 April 2014

Nenad Putnik, Milica Bošković, Savremeni bezbednosni izazovi – haktivizam kao novi oblik društvenog konflikta, (Contemporary Security Challenges–hactivism as a new form of social conflict), Faculty of Security, Belgrade, 2013

Safe Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, ISAC Fund (International and Security Affairs Centre), Belgrade, 2006

119  Aleksandra Tomić

The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Belgrade, April 2015

Summary: This essay aims at analyzing contemporary security challenges and their implications for the security dynamics within the space of the Organiza- tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first part explains the evolu- tion of the OSCE, i.e. how it was transformed through adaptation to security requirements of the given time and to characteristics of security challenges with a view to providing an adequate response. Further follows a description of the changed nature of contemporary challenges in a globalized world and the OSCE’s vision of creating a security community as a strategy for countering them. The sudden crisis in Ukraine, as the greatest security challenge for the OSCE participating States, however, denies the possibility of creating such a security community. Thus, internal instability, caused by the outbreak of this crisis, in collusion with other challenges emerging from destabilizing southern neighborhood regions affect the security of the OSCE space. At the time when the existing security architecture is eroded, the OSCE is faced with a challenge of finding an adequate response and preserving the acquired reputation of the largest security organization.

121 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

The effect of security challenges on the evolution of the OSCE

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as the largest interna- tional security organization, was created and developed under the influence of the security dynamics and challenges in the area it covered, but at the same time it also influenced the change and the transformation of the security environ- ment. With its 57 participating States, stretching almost across the entire north- ern hemisphere, the OSCE is an organization with extremely high significance for security, while on the other hand the large area and the diversity between the participating States can also be a limiting factor. Forty years after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, it seems that the current security challenges are returning the OSCE back to the similar position which it had when it started to function.

The organization’s predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was established in 1975, during the period of détente and the easing of tensions between the two blocs in the Cold War era, with a view to creating a forum for dialogue between the East and the West. By the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, the states agreed on the principles that should lead to the establishment of a stable and comprehensive process of détente. After the fall of the “iron curtain”, the initial reason for creating the CSCE no longer existed, which resulted in the need to redefine its goals, but also to transform it.

The emergence of new democracies and the challenges of their inclusion into the pan-European security concept led to the pursuit of new goals, the estab- lishment and strengthening of democracy, human rights and security, rule of law, enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe1. With that the Helsinki CSCE practically ceased to exist, which was confirmed by its transfor- mation into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995. The institutional change led not only to the extension of the organization’s jurisdiction but also to the establishment of permanent and ad hoc bodies au- thorized to act both in general terms and in internal individual cases.2 The change in the type of conflicts, from interstate to internal ones, shifted the focus of the OSCE toward new goals, from crisis management, building of dem- ocratic institutions, implementation of international acts, to promotion of hu-

1 OSCE, 1990 2 Aćimović, 2013, 9,10

122  The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

man rights, provision of overall support and election monitoring3 Thus, as the security challenges changed, the role of the OSCE also changed so that it could effectively respond to them.

In the early 21st century, transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, cyber threats, etc., assumed the highest place on the security agenda, while it seemed that the space from Vladivostok to Vancouver was deeply com- mitted to peace and cooperation. However, the unexpected crisis in Ukraine has drawn attention to new challenges that returned the OSCE back to a situation similar to the time of its creation and its role of balancing between the East and the West. This complicates the security structure, already compromised by dest- abilizing factors in the periphery, from Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. What implications these challenges will have for the very role of the OSCE and whether the changes in the security dynamics will once again cause the transformation of the organization, remains to be seen in the coming period.

The features of contemporary challenges

The globalization process has given rise to entirely new types of threats both at the national, and at the regional, global and individual levels. At the beginning of the 21st century numerous transnational challenges and threats were given top priority on security agendas. Due to the implications which they have for the security dynamics not only of the OSCE region but also of other parts of the world, the changes in the characteristics of global challenges are crucial for understanding individual security threats.

The changing nature of warfare and armed conflicts, as well as the specificity of the actors, instruments and institutions influence the character and the scope of contemporary security challenges.4 Although the number of wars and armed conflicts is declining, other forms of violence are constantly on the rise, contrib- uting to the overall feeling of insecurity. The sharp divide between organized and “dis-organized” violence has disappeared and the distinction between crim-

3 Ibid, 13 4 Krause, 2014, 1

123 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

inal or economic, and political or ideological violence has become blurred.5 The availability of small arms as well as new technologies contributes to the emer- gence of new challenges such as cybercrime, but also accelerates the growth of the number of non-state actors involved in armed conflicts and facilitates their management. The inefficiency of institutions is often one of the key problems in dealing with contemporary challenges, while its direct consequence is failure of the state to provide security to its citizens.

In the conditions of transnational interconnection and weakening of national borders, all these features contribute to easy spillover of new challenges and a kind of powerlessness in adequately responding to them. The destabilizing areas from Central Asia, through the Southern Mediterranean, but also Central America are a direct threat to the southern borders of the OSCE participating States. Terrorism, organized crime, and irregular migration are but some of the threats that are a product of the new circumstances in the security dynamics. The weakness of some states further complicates the whole problem, due to their inability to resist and prevent the penetration of such threats.

As a reaction to contemporary developments, a vision was created, as adopted at the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, to develop a “free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.“6 This would represent a pluralistic form of security complex where participating States exclude the possibility of the use of force and act together in dealing with contemporary challenges.7 However, the sudden crisis in Ukraine and the straining of relations between the East and the West once again showed that the state-centric approach in international relations was a reality and that creation of a security community was far from reality.

The Ukrainian crisis

The current crisis in Ukraine is a major challenge not only in the European region but at the global level as well. The tightening of relations between the

5 Ibid. 6 OSCE, 2010 7 Ejdus, 2012, 119

124  The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

OSCE participating States raises the issue of effectiveness of existing tools that are available to the OSCE for responding to crisis situations. The implications of border changes in Europe and, consequently, the breach of fundamental prin- ciples of international law and the Helsinki Final Act are much bigger. They have triggered an avalanche of other challenges, from political to economic and energy issues, including the unavoidable human dimension. Polarity and geopolitics have become key aspects.

Once again, Europe is divided. Optimistic visions of “a Europe whole and free and at peace” from the late 20th century, backed by neo-liberal teachings, have once again turned the European stage over to realistic paradigms of constant tension and conflict of interest in an anarchic system. Geopolitics returns to the scene through the front door. According to the British geographer H. Mack- inder, the central part of the Eurasian continent is the “heartland”, which in this case explains the geo-strategic importance of Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The well-known Mackinder’s syllogism reads: “Who rules Eastern Europe com- mands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia). Who rules the World-Island commands the World”.8 Besides him, not so long ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski, explaining his concept of geopolitical piv- ot, cited Ukraine as an example of a country over which geopolitical players compete due to its importance for the control of Eurasia.9 The current crisis in Ukraine confirmed his claims.

The conflict of geopolitical and military interests between Russia and the West has led to a security dilemma and the tightening of relations. The sanctions im- posed against the Russian Federation only worsened mutual relations and led to a no-win situation for all those involved. Therefore, the Ukrainian crisis pos- es a challenge and requires the development of a comprehensive approach that will manage to prevent further deterioration of the already strained relations. The complexity of this crisis is reflected in the spillover of the political crisis to other sectors and levels of security. The economic and energy factors undoubt- edly affect the development and course of events. Precisely due to the economic implications, but also due to the potential destabilization of other sensitive areas of Eastern Europe, it is in the interest of all states to approach the reso- lution of this crisis from a pragmatic viewpoint. The Minsk Agreements (2014, 2015) indicate the commitment of all parties to finding a peaceful solution and ceasefire. On the other hand, the failure to put words into deeds indicates the sensitivity of the issue. Given the implications for the human dimension

8 Miletic, 1993, 343 9 Brzezinski, 1998. 46

125 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

and the security of citizens, as well as the growing problem of migration from Ukraine, this is clearly a large-scale crisis.

The OSCE’s vision of creating a security community that would prevent the emer- gence of a security dilemma and discontinue territorial claims and conflicts in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok proved to be unsustainable. The difficul- ties that the OSCE is facing in terms of the inability to settle the conflicts have led to a situation in which the OSCE is also facing its own challenge–how to re- main a relevant player in such conditions. However, given the OSCE’s persistence and constant struggle to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe during its forty years of existence, the current instability cannot erode the legitimacy it enjoys.

The OSCE, as an umbrella security organization, has a pivotal role in finding the way for peaceful dispute resolution. Its activity so far, through the spe- cial monitoring mission established in March 2014, has focused on continuous monitoring and reporting from the ground. Although it is a civilian mission, it contributes significantly to the strengthening of dialogue between the conflict- ing parties and its power stems from the fact that its mandate was approved by the consensus of all 57 participating States. However, the limited scope of this instrument and the seriousness of the crisis indicate the need to consider possible changes of the way in which the OSCE operates and finding new mech- anisms that would contribute to greater efficiency.

The Mediterranean Region

Apart from the internal crisis in Ukraine, the OSCE is also faced with challeng- es coming from its southern rim, from the Mediterranean partner countries shaken by internal unrest, but also with the imminent threats of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Cooperation with the Mediterranean partner countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia) dates back to the time of the Helsinki process when the Mediterranean Chapter was incorporated into the Final Act, emphasizing that European security cannot be treated separately from security in the Mediterranean area, due to their interrelation.10

10 OSCE, 1975, 36

126  The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

The Mediterranean region is shaken by its own problems. The Arab Spring has brought forth not only a wave of demonstrations and discontent in the Arab world but also an eruption of transnational threats. Some of them, including ter- rorism, the migration problem, human trafficking and arms trafficking, but also the challenges of transition, characterize the security environment of the region, which also impacts the European security. Owing to its comprehensive approach to security and its broad membership, the OSCE has the capacity to assist the transition process in these countries, as well as to establish dialogue with a view to resolving the crisis and taking cooperative action to combat the threats, al- though due to the outbreak of the internal crisis and the tightening of relations between the participating States, this task is currently not on the priority list.

However, the neglect of this region affects the complexity of the security situ- ation in the Mediterranean with direct implications for Europe’s security. This was demonstrated by the tragedy of 700 people in the Mediterranean Sea11, which has put the issue of migration and human trafficking on the top of the se- curity agenda. According to the European Parliament President Martin Schulz, “The lack of a truly European asylum and migration policy is now turning the Mediterranean into a graveyard. “12 The same is true for the OSCE. The problem of this organization is its broad membership, where states are not equally af- fected by the same threats. In such conditions it is difficult to reach a consensus on the priorities and actions that would satisfy all participating States. The Helsinki + 40 Process13 thus referred to the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, without mentioning the creation of a similar Euro-Mediterranean security community.14 However, not only did the creation of a security commu- nity prove to be impossible at this point of time but it was also understood that to discard the Mediterranean dimension would be completely retrograde.

11 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet 12 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150423STO45411/html/Schulz-%E2%80%9CLack- of-European-migration-policy-turning-Mediterranean-into-graveyard%E2%80%9D 13 OSCE, 2012 14 Wohlfeld, 2014, 6

127 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Afghanistan and the region of Central Asia

On the other hand, Afghanistan remains a source of threat in Central Asia with direct influence on the security and stability of its neighboring countries and the entire region. This country’s high ranking in the index of state weakness15, as well as its unabated conflict with the Taliban, make it a failed state. More- over, the interconnected threats of drugs, crime and corruption impair human security and require a common approach by the international community. The announcement by U.S. President Barack Obama that the U.S. will keep 9,800 of its troops until the end of 2015 indicates the instability and inability of the Afghan government alone to deal with the threats on the ground.16

Direct threats from the southern neighborhood affect the security of the OSCE participating States from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). An additional challenge for this region is weakness of states, which are very poorly ranked according to the index of weakness (Uz- bekistan 48, Tajikistan 55, Kyrgyzstan 58, Turkmenistan 74, Kazakhstan 111).17 Their inability to adequately respond to internal challenges and to deliver pub- lic goods to their own citizens, impact the susceptibility of these states to de- structive influences from the region.

The role of the OSCE is therefore indispensable in empowering these states. Its capacities to support democratic reforms, participate in the creation of efficient institutions, promote the rule of law and human rights are crucial for empow- ering the states of the region for coping with security challenges. To this end, the OSCE is working on strengthening cross-border cooperation and on creat- ing a regional approach that would contribute to common confrontation with threats and to finding efficient ways to combatting them.

15 Messner, 2014, 23 16 http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-meets-with-afghan-president-ghani-amid-troop-drawdown- concerns-1427209840 17 Messner 2014, 24, 26

128  The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Terrorism and radicalization

The entire international community, including the OSCE region, is faced with the global threat of terrorism and extremism. The activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, as well as the announcements of Al Qaeda about the creation of a new stronghold in South Asia indicate a global outreach of the threat of Islamic terrorism. These advancements, as well as a large number of murders of foreign journalists and rapid recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters are a constant reminder that terrorism remains the biggest threat of the modern age.18 It is precisely because of its transnational character that the fight against terrorism requires joint action by the international community.

The attack against the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, in January 201519 shows that the terrorist network has ramifications all over the conti- nent and that no state is capable of responding to such challenges by itself. The sophisticated and far-reaching propaganda of the Islamic State on a daily basis recruits hordes of extremists from different countries of the world who are willing to give their own lives for the creation of a caliphate. Also, for many of them, Iraq and Syria have become a destination from which they directly contribute to the attainment of this goal. Radicalization thus threatens not only national, but also global and human security.

“Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear- cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism.”20 Therefore, the challenge for the OSCE is precisely to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicaliza- tion that lead to terrorism. Radicalization, however, does not occur in a vacu- um. Its causes lie in social, economic, political marginalization, which creates conditions for discontent of certain categories of society, thereby contributing to their susceptibility to radical teachings. The role of the OSCE is to develop mechanisms, through a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security, for strengthening democratic institutions, establishing the rule of law and pro- moting dialogue between the government and civil society, for the purpose of creating a security environment that will be less susceptible to radicalization.

18 Wuchte, 2014, 1,2 19 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 20 OSCE, 2014, 23

129 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Conclusion

Based on the overview of security dynamics in the OSCE space, as well as in the neighboring regions, a sharp rise is noticeable in the challenges and threats faced by the participating States. Polarization and confrontation between them infringe the fundamental principles of cooperation and collaboration that are at the core of the OSCE’s existence. Such developments can provide justification to sceptics regarding the relevance of the role of the OSCE as a security insti- tution, due to its inability to preserve peace and stability within its own space. However, the fact is that the OSCE, with its broad membership and a multi- dimensional concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security remains an important actor in dealing with contemporary challenges.

The Ukrainian crisis has called into question the stability of the European order and security architecture, but has also triggered an avalanche of other security issues related to economic, energy and human dimensions. On the other hand, conflict areas with regional threats, stretching along the southern borders of the OSCE space, carry security challenges of transnational character and direct- ly impact the security of the participating States. The reach of these challenges and threats does not stop at the regional level, but rather has a global impact.

Comprising three intertwined dimensions, the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human, the OSCE has the capacity and the tools to effi- ciently respond to contemporary threats. The main challenge, actually, is the dissonance between the participating States, as well as their (lack of) resolve in the implementation of the assumed commitments and in adherence to the or- ganization’s adopted principles. Thus, even 40 years after its creation, dialogue and cooperation remain the OSCE’s primary goals. Known for its merits in the establishment of dialogue during the Cold War crisis and for its contribution to overcoming the crisis, in the 21st century the OSCE still has the legitimacy and capacity to once again justify its security role in the modern world.

130  The OSCE and contemporary security challenges

Bibliography

Aćimović Ljubivoje, “OEBS na početku XXI veka- Mesto, uloga i dometi” (OSCE in Early 21st Century: the Place, Role and Scope), Debates and articles, Vol. LXV, No. 1, pp. 7-23, 2013.

Brzezinski Zbigniev, „The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives“, Basic Books, New York 1998.

Ejdus Filip, “Međunarodna bezbednost: Teorije, sektori i nivoi“ (International Security: Theories, Sectors, Levels), Official Gazette and Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade, 2012

„Fragile States Index“, edited by J. J. Messner, The Fund for Peace, Washington, D. C. 2014

Krause Keith, „The Shifting Face of Violence: New Challenges“, Presentation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 4 October 2014

Miletić Andreja, “Geopolitika” (Geopolitics), in: Milan Matić, Milan Podunavac, Prir, “Enciklopedija političke kulture“ (Encyclopedia of Political Culture), Savremena administracija, Belgrade, 1993, 341-345

OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, March 2014

OSCE, “Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community“, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana, 3 December 2010.

OSCE, “Charter of Paris for A New Europe“, Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe, Paris, 19-21 November 1990.

OSCE, “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act“, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1975.

OSCE, “Decision on the OSCE Helsinki +40 Process“, Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe, Dublin 2012.

Wohlfeld Monika, “OSCE’s Mediterranean Engagement on the Eve of the 40th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act“, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Documenti IAI 14/15- December 2014.

131 The OSCE and contemporary security challenges: A collection of essays

Wuchte Thomas, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters and OSCE Counter-terrorism Strategic Priorities“, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, 7 November 2014.

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/current-challenges-to-euro-atlantic-security- strategies-for-co-operation-and-joint-solutions , accessed on 23 April 2015

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150423STO45411/ html/Schulz-%E2%80%9CLack-of-European-migration-policy-turning- Mediterranean-into-graveyard%E2%80%9D , accessed on 24 April 2015

http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-meets-with-afghan-president-ghani-amid-troop- drawdown-concerns-1427209840 , accessed on 25 April 2015

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 , accessed on 25 April 2015

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead- mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet , accessed on 26 April 2015

132

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi Zbirka eseja OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi Zbirka eseja Naslov OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Autor Grupa autora

Izdavač Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju Misija u Srbiji

Dizajn i prepress comma | communications design

Štampa Fiducia 011 Print

Tiraž 200 primeraka

ISBN 978-86-6383-035-6

Objavljivanje ove publikacije je omogućeno u okviru projekta Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji „Konso- lidovanje procesa demokratizacije u sektoru bezbednosti u Republici Srbiji”, koji je finansijski podržala Švedska agencija za međunarodnu razvojnu saradnju (Sida).

Stavovi izrečeni u knjizi pripadaju isključivo autorima i ne predstavljaju nužno zvaničan stav Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji i Švedske agencije za međunarodnu razvojnu saradnju. Sadržaj

Predgovor 7

Ivana Jovanović 11 OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica 11

Aleksandra Obradović 23 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi 23

Luka Glušac 33 Strani (teroristički) borci 33

Danko Aleksić 49 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine 49

Selena Tasić 61 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi 61

Jelena Nikolić 71 Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji 71

Jelena Mitić 85 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi 85

Marija Žužek 95 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi 95 Milan Andrić 109 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi 109

Aleksandra Tomić 119 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi 119 Predgovor

Bezbednost je uvek bila među prvim tačkama dnevnog reda u ljudskom druš- tvu, praktično kroz čitavu njegovu istoriju.

Međutim, kada govorimo o savremenom dobu, mali broj ljudi je očekivao da će se ona ponovno pojaviti kao dominantno pitanje upravo u periodu posle hladnog rata kada se pretpostavljalo da će razvoj i jačanje demokratije najzad potisnuti bezbed- nosne preokupacije na manje istaknuto mesto i stvoriti uslove u kojima se osnovna bezbednost uzima skoro zdravo za gotovo. Paradoksalno, dok su u sedamdesetim i osamdesetim godinama prošlog veka, u sumraku autoritarnih režima, prvenstveno u istočnoj Evropi, ljudska prava i demokratizacija bili u fokusu odnosa Istok-Zapad, u periodu koji je usledio nakon pada Berlinskog zida, posebno na prelazu u novi vek, posle 2000. godine, bezbednost je postepeno ali postojano postajala glavna preoku- pacija demokratskih zemalja, kako onih sa razvijenim demokratijama tako i onih sa demokratijama u usponu. Umesto prošlih sukoba i trke u naoružanju između veli- kih sila i dva vojna bloka, glavna pretnja je počela da dolazi od ne-državnih aktera, iako ne bez podrške određenih država. To su bile pretnje proistekle iz međunarod- nog terorizma, verskog ekstremizma, radikalizma i urušenih država u nestabilnim regionima sveta, sa regionalnim, ali i globalnim posledicama.

Nije iznenađujuće da se kao rezultat tih promena, interesovanje državnih institu- cija i državnih struktura zaduženih za bezbednost, kao i istraživača i akademske zajednice, okrenulo analizi i prevenciji tih transnacionalnih pretnji. Bezbednost je postala česta tema političkog diskursa i nevladinog angažovanja.

U Srbiji, koja se nalazi u post-konfliktnom i još uvek ne u potpunosti stabilizova- nom regionu, relativno blizu žarišta najnasilnijih sukoba današnjice i izložena

7 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

je njihovim posledicama, kao što je takozvana migrantska kriza, interesovanje za rešavanje i proučavanje bezbednosti vidno je poraslo tokom proteklih godina, između ostalog i među mladim naučnicima i budućim praktičarima.

Stoga ne iznenađuje da je Srbija kao predsedavajući OEBS-a za 2015. godinu, sledeći svog prethodnika Švajcarsku, postavila bezbednosna pitanja kao jedan od prioriteta svog predsedavanja. Obe zemlje su bile inicijatori i glavni zagovornici Deklaracije OEBS-a o mladima i bezbednosti koja je, iako u vrlo kratkom obliku, usvojena na sastanku Ministarskog saveta u Beogradu, u decembru 2015. godine.

Predvidevši ove trendove i prethodeći im, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji je u poslednjih nekoliko godina, u svojim aktivnostima vezanim za upravljanje sektorom bez- bednosti i njegovu reformu, sve veću pažnju posvećivala senzibilizaciji mladih za bezbednosna pitanja, prilazeći temi ne prvenstveno kao “tvrdoj bezbednosti” ili tradicionalnoj bezbednosti, nego kao oblasti koja je tesno povezana sa bez- bednošću pojedinca i kao problemu koji ne može i ne treba da se odvoji od ljud- skih prava i opšte demokratizacije društva. U tom kontekstu, Odeljenje za de- mokratizaciju Misije je tokom godina organizovalo brojne radionice i seminare, odnosno studijske posete ili predavanja, podstičući učešće mladih ili posebno se usredsređujući na grupe mladih iz različitih segmenata društva, uključujući i nacionalne manjine, ili one koji počinju svoje karijere u državnim institucijama koje se bave odbranom ili bezbednošću.

Eseje sadržane u ovoj brošuri napisali su svršeni masteranti i doktoranti Misije, čije akademske studije je Misija podržala. Ponuđena tema je bila „OEBS i savre- meni bezbednosni izazovi”, a u ovoj publikaciji je predstavljeno deset eseja koji su izabrani kao najbolji u konkurenciji u kojoj je učestvovao veliki broj priloga.

U okviru ove opšte teme, eseji daju koristan uvid u način na koji mladi naučnici i praktičari u Srbiji prilaze pitanju međunarodne bezbednosti, koje su njihove glavne preokupacije i predlozi za poboljšanja u suočavanju sa rastućim bezbed- nosnim izazovima i pretnjama u savremenom društvu, posebno u društvima u tranziciji. Njihov izbor određenih tema u okviru ove opšte teme pokazuje, što ne iznenađuje, da transnacionalni terorizam i radikalizacija/ekstremizam privla- če posebnu pažnju, ali oni ne zanemaruju ni druga pitanja odnosno teoretske pristupe bezbednosti, posebno koncept ljudske bezbednosti koji je eksplicitno ili implicitno prihvaćen kao najprikladniji u praktično svim esejima. Važnost civilnog društva u suočavanju sa bezbednosnim pretnjama, uz istovremenu za- štitu ljudskih prava, takođe je široko prepoznata. Među konkretnijim pitanjima, razmatra se fenomen stranih boraca, uključujući i uticaj društvenih medija na njihovo vrbovanje, dok se u drugom eseju razmatra pitanje bezbednosti životne sredine. Važnost regionalne bezbednosti su takođe konstatovali mnogi, te je u

8  Predgovor

tom kontekstu nekim praktičnim merama, kao što je poboljšanje bezbednosti granica, posvećena dužna pažnja.

Naravno, uloga OEBS-a u oblasti bezbednosti je nezaobilazna tema, budući da je opšta tema formulisana na ovaj način. Percepcija organizacije, koja se zasni- va kako na analizi njenih glavnih dokumenata, počevši od Helsinškog Završnog akta, tako i na praktičnim aktivnostima OEBS-a, uglavnom je pozitivna ili čak pohvalna, ali ne bez nekih kritičkih primedbi ili sugestija za poboljšanje. Demo- kratska priroda organizacije, koja je sadržana u pravilu konsenzusa, prepoznata je kao komparativna prednost OEBS-a u odnosu na neke druge međunarodne or- ganizacije, ali i kao slabost koja ponekad koči njegovu aktivniju ulogu. Post-kon- fliktna sanacija i angažovanje organizacije na terenu, kroz njene različite opera- cije na terenu, prepoznati su kao poseban kvalitet OEBS-a. U tom kontekstu, nije nezapaženo da se sposobnost OEBS-a da se dogovori i pošalje Specijalnu posma- tračku misiju u Ukrajinu smatra njegovim impresivnim postignućem, uzimajući u obzir ograničen uspeh drugih međunarodnih organizacija, uključujući UN.

Među kritičkim zapažanjima u vezi sa OEBS-om, jedan od autora je naveo nje- govu relativno malu vidljivost u međunarodnoj javnosti, posebno u odnosu na UN, EU ili NATO. To se smatra nezasluženim, jer OEBS predstavlja najveću regionalnu bezbednosnu organizaciju na svetu. Ne nevezano za taj komentar, moglo bi se primetiti da se ni u jednom od eseja ne posvećuje dužna pažnja OE- BS-ovom Kodeksu ponašanja u vojno-političkim aspektima bezbednosti, koji je možda jedan od najizvornijih dokumenata OEBS-a i datira još iz 1994. godine, a koji odražava sveobuhvatni i multidimenzionalni pristup bezbednosti. Ovo upr- kos činjenici da su dve godine zaredom – 2014. i 2015. – dve OEBS-ove radionice o Kodeksu organizovane u Beogradu, uz pomoć Misije. Ovaj propust je jasna poruka onima koji se bave organizacijom da uključe i značajnije učešće mladih u budućim radionicama ili seminarima o Kodeksu ponašanja, kao i da sa ovim dokumentom bolje upoznaju javnost, naročito mlade naučnike i praktičare.

Sve u svemu, verujemo da će ova zbirka eseja korisno poslužiti njenim čitaocima, kako onima koji rade istraživanja ili su angažovani u građanskom aktivizmu u obla- sti bezbednosti, tako i onima koji su već u državnim strukturama, a čija nadležnost je direktno ili indirektno vezana za bezbednosne funkcije. Mada prirodno odražavaju različit stepen analize ili dubine, eseji su u celini prilično zreli i navode na razmišlja- nje, što u obilju tekstova koji se bave bezbednošću predstavlja osobine koje ne bi trebalo da ostanu nezapažene, uvereni smo, od strane potencijalnih čitalaca.

Dr Vladimir Bilandžić Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji Specijalni savetnik za jačanje mera poverenja i bezbednosti

9  Ivana Jovanović1

OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica

Sažetak: Upravljanje granicama u Evropi i, naročito, u susednim regionima koji se nalaze u procesu postkonfliktne stabilizacije ili preventivnog međuna- rodnog monitoringa, predstavlja značajan izazov za evropske države i evropske regionalne aranžmane i organizacije posvećene očuvanju mira. Evropska unija i OEBS, kao okviri za regionalno delovawnje, i evropske države, kroz bilateralnu političko-bezbednosnu i ekonomsko-tehničku saradnju, imaju za cilj da unapre- de bezbednost država i suverenih granica, kao jednog od najzačajnijih preduslo- va za očuvanje i unapređenje ljudske dimenzije bezbednosti. Ostvarenje ciljeva OEBS-a u okviru treće dimenzije bezbednosti – ljudske bezbednosti – podrazu- meva sveobuhvatan pristup bezbednosnim izazovima i pretnjama, uz povezano i integrisano delovanje na političko-vojnom i ekonomskom planu bezbednosti.

Ključne reči: OEBS, Evropska unija, EU, ljudska bezbednost, granice, migracije, konflikt.

1 Ivana Jovanović je doktorantkinja na Fakultetu političkih nauka, Univerziteta u Beogradu. Stipendista je OEBS-a za doktorske studije za akademsku 2014/2015. godinu. Biografija u celosti dostupna na poslednjoj strani.

11 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uvod

U jeku obeležavanja četrdeset godina postojanja kao regionalnog i međunarod- nog aranžmana posvećenog održavanju mira na regionalnom i međunarodnom planu, OEBS danas ima veoma složenu agendu. Od konsultativnog i bezbed- nosnog foruma (konferencije) država učesnica koji je tada postavio smernice za demokratski razvoj i demokratsku konsolidaciju na podeljenom evropskom kontinentu, do organizacije koja broji pedesetsedam država članica sa tri konti- nenta, OEBS svoj identitet i kontinuitet delovanja potvrđuje kroz civilne i vojne angažmane u različitim delovima sveta. U savremenom svetu, višedimenzio- nalni pristup bezbednosti predstavlja jedini validan, efikasan i kredibilan pri- stup rešavanju bezbednosnih izazova i pretnji, u cilju očuvanja međunarodnog mira i stabilnosti, uzimajući u obzir kompleksnost pretnji i posledica. Na ovom mestu će biti pomenuta komemorativna deklaracija iz Astane (Astana Comme- morative Declaration Towards a Security Community) koja upravo apostrofira posvećenost OEBS-a sveobuhvatnom pristupu bezbednosti.2 Ciljevi i aktivnosti u okviru političko-vojne dimenzije, ekonomsko-ekološke i na kraju ljudske di- menzije, imaju za cilj unapređenje položaja pojedinaca na najširem području, i to u raznim aspektima društvenog, političkog i kulturnog života: ljudska prava, osnovne slobode, demokratija i slobodni izbori, vladavina prava, ali i sloboda veroispovesti i borba protiv netolerancie i diskriminacije.3

Zaštita i upravljanje granicama predstavljaju kompleksan cilj i zadatak na više nivoa, za suverene države, ali i za regionalne bezbednosne aranžmane država. Zaštita i upravljanje granicama jeste bezbednosni izazov za OEBS kao regionalnu organizaciju koja raspolaže svojim resursima u pravcu sprovođenja ciljeva u ovoj oblasti. Dalje, to je izazov i za bilateralne odnose saradnje ili konflikata između država članica, država partnera, i trećih država. Na kraju, to je izazov koji zahteva saradnju i partnerstvo (ponekad u formi inter-regionalne saradnje) između OE- BS-a i drugih organizacija koje imaju iste ciljeve u međunarodnoj politici i počiva- ju na istim demokratskim principima: Organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija, Evropska unija, Savet Evrope, kao i druge organizacije, koje imaju uže i specijalizovano područje delovanja, ali mogu doprineti ostvarenju ciljeva u nekoj od tri dimenzije bezbednosti: Međunarodna organizacija za migracije, Svetska banka, Svetska tr- govinska organizacija, Program za razvoj Ujedinjenih nacija, i druge.

2 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community, SUM(10) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 4, Summit Meeting, Astana, 2010. Available at: http://www.osce. org/cio/74985?download=true. 3 Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community, pp.2-3.

12  OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica

Upravljanje granicama i bezbednost granica predstavljaju kompleksan cilj koji se može podvesti pod sve tri dimenzije bezbednosti, odnosno koji zahteva sarad- nju i koordinisano delovanje kroz sve tri dimenzije. Vraćajući se na deklaraciju iz Astane, države članice OEBS-a su se saglasile da „konfliktni ciklus”, koji uklju- čuje rano upozorenje, prevenciju koflikta, krizni menadžment i postkonfliktnu rehabilitaciju, ostaje jedan od ključnih prioriteta za OEBS i u budućnosti.4 Ima- jući u vidu rasprostranjenost misija i međunarodno prisustvo u kriznim žarišti- ma sveta, može se zaključiti da upravljanje i bezbednost granica predstavljaju važan tehnički i humani element procesa stabilizacije u konfliktnim regionima. Izbijanjem unutardržavnih (Ukrajina) ili međudržavnih konflikata, povećava se ukupna nebezbednost određenog geografskog područja, a u tim uslovima jedno od glavnih merila i pokazatelja (ne)stabilnosti i ugroženosti jeste bezbednost i način funkcionisanja granica i prekogranična cirkulacija. Dakle, u slučaju unu- tardržavnog ili međudržavnog konflikta, upravljanje granicama postaje jedan od osnovnih prioriteta i instrumenata za upravljanje konfliktom. Osim politič- ko-vojne dimenzije, upravljanje i kontrola granica su povezani i sa druge dve dimenzije – ekonomskom i ljudskom. Ekonomska dimenzija odnosi se na uprav- ljanje granicama i unificirane i komplementarne sisteme kontrole kroz sarad- nju država učesnica, koji imaju za cilj sprečavanje nedozvoljenih ekonomskih radnji i nelegalne trgovine (narkoticima i drugim nedozvoljenim sredstvima, prekograničnog kriminala, trgovine ljudima). Na kraju, upravljanje i kontrola granica je danas neizostavno povezano sa ljudskom dimenzijom bezbednosti, u smislu poštovanja i ostvarivanja osnovnih ljudskih prava. U globalizovanom svetu, mobilnost ljudi, usluga, roba i kapitala predstavlja jednu od najznačajni- jih tekovina, prava i sloboda koja se progresivno unapređuje na međudržavnom i međunarodnom planu, kako u tehničkom smislu (smanjujući obim zahteva koje pojedinac treba da ispuni), tako i u prostornom smislu (širenjem područja slobodnog kretanja).

4 Ibidem. Videti i: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, DECISION No. 3/11, Second day of the Eighteenth Meeting MC(18) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Vilnius, 2011, p. Available at: http://www.osce.org/ mc/86621?download=true

13 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Upravljanje i bezbednost granica

Suočavajući se sa brojnim izazovima koje utiču na bezbednost granica, a koji dolaze iz sve tri dimenzije bezbednosti, OEBS je posvećen zaštiti i unapređenju slobode kretanja ljudi i dobara preko granica, kao i osiguravanju ekonomskog razvoja i prosperiteta kroz olakšavanje i unapređenje prekogranične saradnje.5 Ovaj cilj OEBS-a podrazumeva da se kroz partnerstvo sa drugim organizacijama pronalazi i ostvaruje balans između bezbednosti kao primarnog cilja upravlja- nja granicama, na jednoj strani, i cilja unapređenja ekonomskih aktivnosti i regionalnog blagostanja, na drugoj strani.6 Polazeći od studije autora Zelbera i Akermanove (Herbert Salber, Alice Ackermann), na ovom mestu će biti pred- stavljeni osnovni elementi pristupa OEBS-a u oblasti upravljanja i bezbednosti granica. Osnovu predstavlja dokument „The Border Security and Management Concept” (BSMC) iz 2005. godine koji postavlja okvir za saradnju u ovoj oblasti.7 Kako navode Zelber i Akermanova, BSMC donosi četiri osnovne novine u oblasti upravljanja granicama. Najpre, obezbeđuje mandat OEBS-u za unapređenje vi- šestruke međugranične i prekogranične saradnje između različitih pograničnih službi, carinskih vlasti, policijskih snaga i drugih relevantnih nacionalnih tela i autoriteta.8 Dalje, omogućava različitim strukturama OEBS-a (Sekretarijat, ope- rativna tela, institucije) da rade zajedno i da pomažu i podržavaju države čla- nice u implementaciji ovog koncepta.9 BSMC takođe ukazuje na značaj među- narodne saradnje sa drugim međunarodnim organizacijama i partnerima, koja treba da bude vođena komplementarnim ciljevima i delovanjima, komparativ- nim prednostima i zajedničkim interesima. I na kraju, BSMC obezbeđuje listu mogućih doprinosa koji mogu učiniti ovaj koncept operativnim i učinkovitim.10

Autori Zelber i Akermanova ukazuju da i sam BSMC prepoznaje upravljanje i bezbednost granica kao osetljivu oblast saradnje između država učesnica. Sa jedne strane, mehanizmi upravljanja granicama predstavljaju stvar slobodne odluke država u skladu sa njenom unutrašnjom situacijom, geografskim polo- žajem, ključnim nacionalnim političkim, ekonomskim i socijalnim izazovima,

5 Herbert Salber and Alice Ackermann, The OSCE’s Comprehensive Approach to Border Security and Management, OSCE Yearbook 2009 Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg / IFSH (ed.), Volume 15, 2009, pp.289-290. 6 Salber and Ackerman, p.290. 7 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Border Security And Management Concept Framework For Co- Operation By The Osce Participating States, MC(13) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, 2005. 8 Salber and Ackerman, p.293. 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem.

14  OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica

i strategijom unutrašnje i spoljne bezbednosti.11Sa druge strane, svesni su da nacionalno i regionalno blagostanje mogu biti značajno unapređeni prekogra- ničnim aktivnostima i slobodnim kretanjem, što ukazuje na potrebu bilateral- ne, regionalne i multilateralne saradnje.12 BSMC nabraja osam osnovnih grupa ciljeva koji treba da budu ostvareni kroz prekograničnu saradnju: unapređenje slobodnog i bezbednog kretanja ljudi, roba, usluga i investicija; smanjenje pret- nje terorizmom, uključujući i sprečavanje slobodnog kretanja lica, novca i drugih aktivnosti koja imaju veze sa terorističkim i drugim kriminalnim aktivnostima; prevencija i borba protiv transnacionalnog prekograničnog kriminala, ilegalnih migracija, krijumčarenja, korupcije i ilegalne trgovine oružjem, drogama i lju- dima; unapređenje visokih standarda u vezi sa aktivnostima upravljanja gra- nicama i kompetentnosti nacionalnih struktura; unapređenje dostojanstvenog tretmana svih lica koja prelaze granice, u skladu sa važećim nacionalnim propi- sima, međunarodnim pravom i načelom ljudskih prava i odgovarajućih obaveza OEBS-a; stvaranje povoljnih uslova za ekonomski, društveni i kulturni razvoj u pograničnim oblastima; kretanje ka izgradnji zajedničkog područja slobode, bezbenosti i pravde u okviru OEBS regiona i država članica; osiguravanje bezbed- nosti međunarodnih ruta preko kojih se odvija snabdevanje ključnim dobrima.13

U posebnom delu, ovaj dokument ukazuje i na glavne doprinose koje OEBS može da pruži državama na putu ostvarivanja ciljeva u oblasti kontrole i upravljanja granicama, na osnovu do sada realizovanih programa i aktivnosti u ovom obla- sti.14 Način na koji OEBS može da doprinese jeste napre facilitacija (politički di- jalog između participirajućih država, tehnički dijalog, mere izgradnje poverenja); dalje, kao opšte forme podrške navode se tehnička pomoć u izradi i implementa- ciji nacionalnih strategija i akcionih planova i razvoj i implementacija programa obuke; specijalizovana pomoć u borbi protiv transnacionalnog organizovanog kriminala, ilegalne imigracije, nedozvoljene trgovine, terorizma, kao i trgovine konvencionalnim, biološkim, hemijskim i nuklearnim oružjem; doprinos u obla- sti slobodnog i bezbednog kretanja ljudi (tehnička pomoć i ekspertsko saveto- vanje kod ulaznih i izlaznih procedura, podizanje svesti o pravima imigranata i tražilaca azila); aktivnosti u vezi sa ekonomskim i ekološkim pitanjima, raz- mena informacija i pozitivne prakse, unapređenje i podsticanje prekogranične ekonomske saradnje, unapređenje prekogranične saradnje u slučaju prirodnih katastrofa ili vanrednog stanja u pograničnim područjima, i drugo.15

11 Ibidem. 12 Ibidem. 13 Border Security And Management Concept Framework For Co-Operation By The Osce Participating States, pp.2-3. 14 Border Security And Management Concept Framework For Co-Operation By The Osce Participating States, p.3. 15 Ibid, pp.5-7.

15 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Imajući u vidu strateško opredeljenje OEBS-a da podstiče i olakša saradnju dr- žava učesnica u oblasti zaštite i bezbednosti granica, ovde je važno napomenuti sledeće. Kao regionalna organizacija koja raspolaže odgovarajućim resursima i ekspertizom, OEBS može da najveći doprinos u ostvarivanju ovog cilja obezbe- di na području tehničke podrške (obuke, stručna i tehnička podrška, podizanje nacionalnih kapaciteta), kao i na području bezbednosti, kroz neposredni anga- žman u slučajevima graničnih sporova ili konflikte situacije.

Migracije i slobodno kretanje lica

U ovom delu biće predstavljeni osnovni aspekti ilegalne migracije kao komplek- snog bezbednosnog izazova i kao društvenog fenomena koji je istovremeno po- vezan sa tri dimenzije bezbednosti – političko-vojnom, ekonomskom i ljudskom. Poseban deo poglavlja biće posvećen ilegalnoj imigraciji kao bezbednosnom iza- zovu sa aspekta zaštite i upravljanja granicama.

Važno je najpre napomenuti distinkciju između ilegalnih imigranata i legalne imi- gracije. U terminima zaštite spoljnih granica i unutrašnje bezbednosti, bezbedno- sna agenda, mere i aktivnosti država se odnose na borbu protiv ilegalne imigracije.

Migracije predstavljaju složeni demografski fenomen sa višestrukim društve- no-ekonomskim, političkim i kulturnim i uzrocima i posledicama. Kao demo- grafski fenomen, migracije mogu biti individualne, grupne i masovne. Sa as- pekta bezbednosti, grupne i masovne imigracije, koje najčešće imaju element organizovanosti, predstavljaju poseban izazov, naročito ako su uzroci i nepo- sredni povod za migraciju vojno-bezbednosne prirode (unutrašnji međunarodni sukobi, organizovano nasilje, i dr.). Individualne migracije najčešće ne pred- stavljaju bezbednosni izazov, osim ukoliko se ne radi o međunarodno poznatim pojedincima čije je delovanje povezano sa kriminalnim, terorističkim i drugim nedozvoljenim aktivnostima.

Uzroci i/ili neposredni povod migracija mogu biti političke, bezbednosne, eko- nomske ili kulturne prirode, ili mogu biti posledica kombinacije nekoliko nave- denih faktora. Političko-bezbednosni faktori se mogu posmatrati integralno, i oni se odnose na postojanje političke i bezbednosne situacije visokog rizika u dr- žavi porekla imigranata koja prouzrokuje iseljavanje, često grupno ili masovno. U ovu grupu uzroka spadaju ratno stanje, unutrašnji sukobi po različitim osno-

16  OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica

vama, neodrživa unutrašnja politička situacija, na primer, totalitarna vlada, ili revolucionarne ili sistemske političke promene na nacionalnom nivou. U ovom slučaju, migracije su najčešće grupne ili, u ekstremnom slučaju masovne, i mogu biti usmerene najpre ka susednim zemljama i regionu, a onda ka razvijenim zemljama, u kojima se traži ne samo egzistencijalno utočište, već i mogućnost za trajno prebivalište. Ekonomski faktori su danas, bar kada je u pitanju Evropa kao destinacija, preovlađujući faktor za imigraciju, ilegalnu i legalnu, usmerenu ka Evropskoj uniji. Ovaj faktor najčešće rezultira individualnim ili grupnim imi- gracijama, ali ako postoji značajan vremenski kontinuitet, onda do izražaja može doći i brojnost i masovnost imigracije. Kulturni faktor je najčešće povezan sa ne- kim od prethodnih faktora, i najčešće nije samostalni i osnovni uzrok imigracije.

Migracije i imigracija imaju dvostruki bezbednosni aspekt, kako sa stanovišta lica koja su subjekti i nosioci procesa migracije, tako i sa stanovišta država koje su uključene u taj proces. U istorijskom smislu, evropski kontinent, od- nosno države članice Evropske unije, predstavljaju tradicionalno imigraciono područje za lica koja dolaze sa drugih kontinenata. U pitanju je trend koji već decenijama, uz povremena odstupanja, zadržava kontinuitet progresije brojno- sti. Ovde je važno napomenuti nekoliko distinkcija kada su u pitanju države članice Evropske unije kao zemlje destinacije imigracije: zemlje prvog prijema, tranzitne države članice, i zemlje krajnje destinacije. Sa bezbednosnog aspekta, najkompleksniji položaj i najveći izazov jeste na strani zemalja prvog prijema i zemalja krajnje destinacije. Kada su u pitanju zemlje prvog prijema, zaštita i upravljanje granicama ima poseban značaj za bezbednost te zemlje. Ovaj cilj nosi sa sobom istovremeno kontroverzan izazov, budući da zaštita, bezbednost i sigurnost granica predstavlja osnovnu komponentu nacionalne bezbednosti i suverenog prava država na samostalno upravljanje svojim granicama. Na dru- goj strani, ukoliko je državna granica uslovno ugrožena grupnim ili masovnim prilivom stranog stanovništva, načela zaštite ljudskih prava i posebno posve- ćenost ciljevima ljudske bezbednosti nalažu razmatranje uzroka tih kretanja i reagovanje u skladu za načelima zaštite i očuvanja ljudskog života. Zemlje kraj- nje destinacije imigracije, bez obzira koji je uzrok ili glavni faktor iseljavanja iz zemlje porekla, se takođe suočavaju sa izvesnim bezbednosnim izazovima. Ako se ostave po strani ekonomski i kulturni aspekti, ovi izazovi se intenziviraju na- ročito ako ta zemlja ima upliva u oružanom sukobu u zemlji porekla (na primer, konflikti u Iraku, Avganistanu, severnoj i centralnoj Africi).

Zemlje evropskog kontinenta, naročito članice Evropske unije, predstavljaju već decenijama značajno područje destinacije imigracije iz susednih regiona, bivših kolonijalnih područja, ali i kriznih područja u drugim delovima sveta. Kada su u pitanju susedni regioni, uzroci za imigraciju i posledično potreba za efikasnijim upravljanjem i zaštitom spoljnih granica, su rezultat bezbednosnih i ekonom-

17 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

skih faktora. Istočna Evropa je glavno područje porekla i istovremeno značajno tranzitno područje ka Evropskoj uniji: Rusija, Ukrajina, Moldavija i Belorusija su zemlje porekla značajnog broja ilegalnih i legalnih imigranata i tražilaca azila, i glavna tranzitna tačka za migracione talase iz Azije. Navedene zemlje istočne Evrope imaju visoku emigracionu stopu – smatra se da je za poslednjih neko- liko godina Moldaviju napustila četvrtina od ukupnog broja stanovnika. Kada su u pitanju migracioni talasi van evropskog kontinenta, kritično područje je južni Mediteran (severna Afrika i Bliski Istok) kao područje porekla i tranzitna tačka migracionih talasa ka Evropi. Bliski Istok je glavno tranzitno područje za imigraciju i tražioce azila iz južne Azije (Pakistan, Avganistan, Šri Lanka, Ban- gladeš) i istočne i sub-saharske Afrike (Sudan, Eritreja, Somalija, Etiopija), koji najčešće dolaze u evropske zemlje preko Turske. Istovremeno, Sirija, Irak, Iran, Palestina, Jordan i Liban, predstavljaju i zemlje porekla imigracije. Imigracija sa azijskog kontinenta je umnogome uslovljena i intra-kontinentalnim kreta- njima, ali najčešće zemlje porekla azijske imigracije su Kina, Avganistan, Šri Lanka, Pakistan, Indija, Bangladeš, Filipini, i Vijentam.16

Ilegalne imigracije predstavljaju, u uslovima globalizovane bezbednosti, veoma ozbiljan i kompleksan izazov. Na jednoj strani, države imaju suvereno pravo da vrše kontrolu svojih granica i definišu uslove za ulazak i izlazak sa svoje terito- rije, u skladu sa interesima nacionalne bezbednosti, ekonomskog blagostanja, javnog morala i političke stabilnosti. Na drugoj strani, principi zaštite ljudskih prava i osnovne norme i načela humanitarnog prava nalažu obavezu uzimanja u obzir uzroka mobilnosti i imigracionih talasa, i prihvatljivi tretman ugroženih lica koja traže zaštitu u stabilnijim područjima u bližem ili daljem okolnom području. U ovoj oblasti, OEBS kao regionalna organizacija koja kombinuje isku- stva zemalja članica sa tri kontinenta, može da obezbedi najveći doprinos kroz programe edukacije, razmene pozitivnih i negativnih praksi, razvijanje naci- onalnih tehničkih i ljudskih kapaciteta, umrežavanje i razvijanje zajedničkog bilateralnog ili multilateralnog pristupa.

16 Statistički podaci o imigraciji dostupni su na portalu za statistiku Evropske unije. Dostupno na: http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/migration-and-citizenship-data i http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/main-tables

18  OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica

Upravljanje granicama kao izazov za budućnost

Kompleksnost bezbednosti u savremenom svetu i kompleksnost bezbednosnih izazova sa kojima se suočavaju društva danas zahteva integrisani i sveobuhvatni pristup u upravljanju izazovima i pretnjama. Oružani međunarodni i unutrašnji konflikti kao oblik nasilne politike, uzrokuju različite razorne posledice: nasilna preseljenja stanovništa kao posledicu iznuđene pokretljivosti izazvane nasiljem, zatim ugroženost i pritisak na granice susednih zemalja i regionalnu nestabil- nost područja gde se nalazi žarište sukoba. OEBS se tokom proteklih četrdeset godina suočio sa brojnim krizama i problemima, čijem je rešavanju doprineo na različite načine. Danas se OEBS suočava sa jednom od najvećih savremenih kriza, Ukrajinskom krizom, od čijeg razvoja i razrešenja zavisi sveukupno stanje bezbednosti u Evropi i Evroaziji. Angažovanje OEBS-a tokom ove krize pokazalo je relevantnost organizacije na području upravljanja konfliktom i medijacije, pre svega kroz formiranje i slanje Specijalne posmatračke misije u Ukrajinu.

Za bezbednost granica u Evropi, posebno je važna stabilnost bivših konfliknih područja, između ostalog i Zapadnog Balkana. Kako je ministar Dačić, ispred Republike Srbije koja predsedava OEBS-om u 2015. godini, naveo tokom 2014. godine u prioritetima budućeg predsedavanja, da će se regionu Zapadnog Balka- na koji se dugi niz godina suočavao sa ratovima, neprijateljstvima, sankcijama, stranim intervencijama, i ozbiljnim kršenjem ljudskih prava, posvetiti posebna pažnja.17 Ovaj region danas više ne predstavlja konfliktno područje u smislu međudržavnih ratova, ali se ipak može tvrditi da postoje izvesni zamrznuti kon- flikti koji mogu da predstavljaju značajan izazov za regionalnu stabilnost. Kako je Dačić naveo u prioritetima predsedavanja, „naročita pažnja biće posvećena pomirenju, kao delu faze postkonfliktne rehabilitacije, na način definisan u do- kumentima OEBS, i kao konceptu koji će naša dva predsedavanja unaprediti.”18 Prostor za saradnju i angažman OEBS-a u ovom regionu uključuje ne samo delovanje pojedinih misija na određenom području, već i imajući u vidu pobolj- šano stanje u ovom regionu, i mogućnosti za unapređenu horizontalnu saradnju misija OEBS na terenu.19

17 Prioriteti predsedavanja Srbije OEBS-om izneti od strane ministra Dačića na specijalnom sastanku OEBS-a. Dostupno na: http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/o-ministarstvu/ministar/govori/13932-2014-07-15-11-03- 27?lang=lat 18 Ibidem. 19 Ibidem.

19 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Za stabilnost granica u Evropi i ulogu OEBS-a u upravljanju ovim izazovom, važno je nekoliko tačaka u okviru grupe prioriteta predsedavanja Republike Srbije. Kako je ministar Dačić naveo, sledeći su prioriteti Srbije tokom 2015. godine: nastavak i podrška formatima za rešavanje zamrznutih konflikakta, uz poseban značaj i ulogu specijalnih predstavnika u konkretnim regionima i su- kobima; zatim, jačanje kapaciteta i mehanizama OEBS kako bi organizacija mo- gla da reaguje u svim fazama konflikta, od ranog upozorenja do postkonfliktne rehabilitacije i pomirenja; nastavak sistematičnih napora OEBS u jačanju ak- tivnosti posredovanja.20 U tim aktivnostima, OEBS kao organizacija regionalne saradnje na polju bezbednosti i ljudskih prava, sarađuje i unapređuje saradnju sa drugim srodnim organizacijama koje su posvećene istim ciljevima – Savetom Evrope, Evropskom unijom, Ujedinjenim Nacijama, NATO, ali i sa partnerskim forumima za mediteranski i azijski region. Dačić je u svojim prioritetima kao posebna područja partnerske saradnje naveo teme druge dimenzije, kao što su transport i ekonomske migracije, ali i u drugim oblastima rada, kao što su borba protiv korupcije i pranje novca.21

Bezbedno i efikasno upravljanje granicama u budućnosti i doprinos OEBS-a u ovoj oblasti mora da uzme u obzir nekoliko najvažnijih savremenih činilaca, kroz sve faze planiranja ovog procesa, implementacije i evaluacije. Na jednoj strani stoje kompleksnost pretnji i izazova koje imaju višedimenzionalni karak- ter i posledice, i transnacionalnost pretnji, gde bezbednosni izazovi, osim što su povezani sa nekoliko dimenzija, imaju transnacionalni karakter i poreklo. U tim uslovima, sveobuhvatan pristup OEBS-a koji svoje delovanje zasniva na vrednostima ljudskih prava, demokratije, vladavine prava i ljudske slobode i do- stojanstva, ima krucijalan značaj za upravljanje krizama i konfliktima kroz pru- žanje pomoći participirajućim ili nestabilnim državama u odgovoru na izazove i pretnje. Od tehničke pomoći u različitim oblastima, do neposrednog angažma- na u okviru vojno-političke dimenzije (prevencija, posredovanje, izgradnja mira i postkonfliktna stabilizacija), i učešća u jačanju nacionalnih insitucionalnih kapaciteta i civilnog sektora u državama, OEBS doprinosi unapređenju sveuku- pnog stanja bezbednosti, i očuvanju uslova za stabilnost granica u Evropi.

20 Ibidem. 21 Ibidem.

20  OEBS i savremeni izazov upravljanja i bezbednosti granica

Izvori

Kernic Franc and Hauser Gunther (ed.), European Security in Transition, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006.

Poleti Dunja, Oblici prostorne porketljivosti u Srbiji: migracije i mobilnost, u Sintezis, VI/1 (2014), Centar za humanističke nauke „Sintezis”, Beograd, 2014, str.1-18.

Salber Herbert and Ackermann Alice, The OSCE’s Comprehensive Approach to Border Security and Management, OSCE Yearbook 2009 Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg / IFSH (ed.), Volume 15, 2009.

Sigler Mark, OSCE and European Security, CIDOB Journal Afers Internacionals, no. 38-39, pp. 59-66.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community, SUM(10) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 4, Summit Meeting, Astana, 2010. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/ cio/74985?download=true

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decision No. 3/11, Decision No. 3/11 Elements of the Conflict Cycle, related to enhancing the OSCE’s capabilities in early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-conflict rehabilitation, Second day of the Eighteenth Meeting MC(18) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Vilnius, 2011. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/ mc/86621?download=true

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Border Security And Management Concept Framework For Co-Operation By The Osce Participating States, MC(13) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, 2005. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/mc/17452?download=true

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Movement and Human Contacts, Final Report, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, PC.SHDM. GAL/7/13, Vienna, Austria, 15 July 2013. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/ odihr/103581?download=true

Self-assessment tool for nations to increase preparedness for ross-border implications of crises, OSCE Secretariat, Transnational Threats Department Borders Unit, 2013. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/104490?download=true

21 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Baseline study on cross-border mobility in the OSCE region, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Warsaw, 2014. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/odihr/118506?download=true

OSCE Commitments relating to Migration and Integration, A guide prepared for the OSCE Human Dimension, Seminar on ”Migration and Integration”, Warsaw, 11-13 May 2005. Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/odihr/14634?download=true

Eurostat:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration- projections/migration-and-citizenship-data

Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/ main-tables

Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije: http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/o- ministarstvu/ministar/govori/13932-2014-07-15-11-03-27?lang=lat

Biografija

Ivana Jovanović (rođena 1985. godine) pohađa doktorske akademske studije – Međunarodne i evropske studije – na Fakultetu političkih nauka, Univerziteta u Beogradu. Osnovne studije završila je na smeru za Međunarodne odnose na Fakultetu političkih nauka, gde je nakon toga završila i master studije na smeru za Evropske integracije. Oblasti njenog akademskog interesovanja obuhvataju: multikulturalizam, prava stranaca, imigraciju, unutrašnju bezbednost, i regi- onalne integracije. Stipendista je OEBS-a u Srbiji za doktorske studije za aka- demsku 2014/2015. godinu.

22  Aleksandra Obradović

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Beograd, april 2015. godine

Umesto obeležavanja četrdesetogodišnjice svog postojanja, Organizacija za evropsku saradnju i bezbednost (OEBS) se suočava sa najvećom krizom evrop- ske bezbednosti od završetka Hladnog rata. Kriza u Ukrajini je veliki izazov i pri- lika da OEBS pokaže svoju relevantnost za međunarodne bezbednosne odnose. Nakon što je izgubio značaj koji je imao tokom Hladnog rata, aktivnim učešćem u rešavanju ukrajinske krize OEBS je pokazao da ima važnu ulogu u evropskoj bezbednosnoj arhitekturi kao platforma za dijalog, izgradnju poverenja i pre- vazilaženje podela. Pored uloge koju OEBS ima u rešavanju krize u Ukrajini, ovaj rad baviće se i nizom transnacionalnih bezbednosnih izazova sa kojima se suočavaju države članice OEBS-a i koje zahtevaju zajednički odgovor kako međunarodna bezbednost ne bi bila ugrožena. Da bi ostao značajan za evropsku bezbednost, OEBS će morati, koristeći svoje mehanizme, efikasno da odgovori kako na ukrajinsku krizu tako i na ostale bezbednosne izazove.

23 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS) je najsveobuhvatnija regionalna bezbednosna organizacija, koja sa svojih 57 članica obuhvata celu Evropu, Evroaziju i evro-alantski region. U avgustu 1975. godine, 35 zemalja je uspostavilo zajedničke principe za miran zajednički zivot od Vankuvera do Vla- divostoka. Osnovana je sa idejom da obezbedi mir, stabilnost i demokratiju za više od milijardu ljudi. Usvajanjem Helsinške povelje 1975. i nastankom Konfe- rencije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (KEBS) koja je vremenom transformi- sana u organizaciju (OEBS) zapravo je stvoren mehanizam za dijalog i pregovore između Istoka i Zapada.1 KEBS je služio kao most između Istoka i Zapada i mehanizam izgradnje poverenja tokom Hladnog rata. Završni akt iz Helsinkija je bio ključni sporazum stabilizacije u hladnoratovskoj Evropi i otvorio je put prevazilaženja podela uvodeći inovativan pristup bezbednosti. Jednu od glav- nih vrednosti i komparativnu prednost organizacije predstavlja sveobuhvatan i kooperativan pristup bezbednosti koji uključuje tri dimenzije: političko-vojnu (koja obuhvata kontrolu naoružanja, borbu protiv terorizma, prevenciju i reša- vanje sukoba), ekonomsko-ekološku dimenziju (pod kojom se podrazumevaju ekonomski razvoj i zaštita prirodna sredine) i ljudsku dimenziju (koja uključuje zaštitu ljudkih prava, vladavinu prava, praćenje izbora).2

Takođe velika prednost OEBS-a je i to što uključuje sve zemlje Evrope, bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza, kao i SAD i Kanadu. Iako OEBS-u nedostaju vojna sposobnost, koju ima NATO i ekonomski resursi koje poseduje EU, nijedna druga bezbedno- sna organizacija nema mandat da deluje na tako širokom geografskom prostoru. Ovo čini organizaciju ključnim akterom u prevenciji i rešavanju konflikata.

OEBS nakon Hladnog rata

Nakon kraja Hladnog rata kada je KEBS prerastao u OEBS, ključna misija je promenjena. OEBS je razvio instrumente koji doprinose jačanju demokratije, vladavini prava, izgradnji poverenja u post-sovjetskom prostoru. Tokom deve- desetih OEBS je zanemario vojno-političku i ekonomsku dimenziju i gotovo se isključivo fokusirao na promovisanju ljudskih prava i demokratije. Njegove ak-

1 Siniša Tatalović, Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi, Politička kultura, Zagreb 2010. 64-69 2 Dragan R Simić., Nauka o bezbednosti – Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002., 83-92

24  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

tivnosti su bile koncentrisane na prostoru istočno od Varšave. Iako je Helsinški akt bio iniciran od strane Sovjetskog Saveza i ostalih članica Varšavskog pakta i u početku posmatran kao pobeda Sovjetskog Saveza nad Zapadom on je zapravo doprineo da se zapadne vrednosti i interesi prošire na prostor Istočne Evrope.

Na Sastanku ministara u Parizu 1990. bilo je rasprostranjeno stanovište da je era konfrotacija i podela u Evropi završena. Nažalost to stanovište je deman- tovano ratovima u Čečeniji, na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, i rusko-gruzijskim sukobom. Na sve ove krize OEBS nije uspeo uspešno da odgovori.

Nakon promena na međunarodnoj sceni posle završetka Hladnog rata, tokom devedesetih godina organizacija je bila dovoljno značajna da nastavi svoje po- stojanje, ali ne i da igra važnu ulogu u međunarodnim odnosima. Rusija i Zapad su uspostavili odnose kroz druge organizacije, Rusija je postala članica Saveta Evrope, G7, osnovan je savet NATO-Rusija, tako da je za Rusiju postalo manje značajno da održava svoje međunarodne odnose kroz OEBS. Usled svega toga OEBS je izgubio značaj koji je imao tokom Hladnog rata. Iako je u posthladno- ratovskom periodu bilo pokušaja da se organizaciji da aktivnija uloga slanjem misija održavanja mira na prostor bivše Jugoslavije, Gruzije, Moldavije i u druge problematične teritorije, OEBS nije uspeo da pronađe svoju konačnu ulogu u sa- stavu evropske bezbednosti.3 NATO i EU su većinom preuzele OEBS-ove misije uz mnogo više raspoloživih finansijskih sredstava.

OEBS-ov godišnji budžet je smanjen za 25% u poslednjih 10 godina, što je zna- čajno doprinelo marginalizaciji organizacije.

Poslednjih godina OEBS se borio da očuva svoj značaj na međunarodnoj sceni. Od 2011. drzave članice nastoje da prilagode delovanje organizacije savreme- nim bezbednosnim izazovima. Na sastanku Saveta ministara u Dablinu 2012., države su se dogovorile da sprovedu institucionalno reformski proces, poznat kao „Helsinki +40 proces”.4 Cilj procesa je da se države članice ponovo posvete sveobuhvatnom pristupu saradnje u bezbednosti kroz sve tri dimenzije: politič- ko-vojnu, ekonomsku i ljudsku i na taj način odgovore na savremene izazove. Međutim novonastale bezbednosne okolnosti su ostavile ovaj proces po strani.

3 Siniša Tatlović, Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi, Politička kultura, Zagreb 2010. 64-69 4 Javier Ruperez, The Helsinki Final Act, is there life after 40?, Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 2014 1-6

25 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

OEBS i ukrajinska kriza

Početkom 2014. niko nije ni pretpostavljao da će samo nekoliko meseci kasnije evropska bezbednost biti značajno ugrožena.5 Kriza u Ukrajini koja je počela masovnim protestima protiv vlasti, dovela do zbacivanja predsednika Janukovi- ča i prerasla u vojnu konfrotaciju predstavlja najveću krizu ne samo evropske, već i globalne bezbednosti od kraja Hladnog rata. Od eskalacije krize i ruske aneksije Krima odnosi između Rusije i Zapada su na najnižem mogućem nivou. Rusija je otvoreno označena kao suparnik, ostavljajući po strani potrebu za eko- nomskom saradnjom usled evropske zavisnosti od ruskog gasa.

OEBS je bio gotovo zaboravljen sve do izbijanja ukrajinske krize, međutim svo- jim odgovorom na krizu pokazao je da može da igra konstruktivnu ulogu u Ukrajni i bude medijator između Istoka i Zapada.6 Ispostavilo se da je OEBS najpodesnije rešenje za prevazilaženje rastućih podela. Na mnogo načina OEBS je postao najmanje lose rešenje za rešavanje ukrajinske krize. Od suštinskog značaja je to da su svi ključni akteri članovi organizacije – Rusija, Ukrajina, SAD, članice EU, kao i Kanada i Turska. Nijedna druga međunarodna organiza- cija nije odgovarajuće rešenje za ukrajinsku krizu – UN zbog ruskog veta u SB, EU zbog direktnog učešća u geopolitičkoj borbi za Ukrajinu, a NATO usled svoje negativne slike koju ima u Rusiji. Dakle, aktuelna kriza je pokazala relevantnost OEBS-a za evropsku bezbednost.

Veliki doprinos rešavanju ukrajinske krize imalo je švajcarsko predsedavanje OEBS-om. Tradicionalna neutralnost Švajcarske je bila bitan faktor, ali takođe i veoma aktivan lični angažman ministra spoljnih poslova Švajcaraske i predse- davajućeg OEBS-om, Didijea Burkhaltera. On je u svom obraćanju pred Savetom bezbednosti UN već u februaru predložio ideje, koje su ubrzo i ostvarene. To su osnivanje specijalne posmatračke misije (Special Monitoring Mission to Ukra- ine – SMM), zatim osnivanje Kontakt grupe, koje će uključiti Ukrajinu i Rusiju i imenovanje specijalnog predstavnika za Ukrajinu.7 Za vreme svog predseda- vanja Švajcarska je inicirala i osnivanje Panela eminentnih ličnosti o evropskoj bezbednosti na čelu sa nemačkim diplomatom Volfgangom Išingerom. Panel bi trebalo da pokrene ideje i iznese preporuke kako da se zameni postojeća politika konfrontacije politikom saradnje i zajedničkog delovanja.

5 Wolfgang Ischinger, „The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 94-103 6 Wolfgang Ischinger, „The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 94-103 7 Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 44-58

26  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Osnivanje posmatračke misije u martu 2014. bio je veliki izazov za OEBS. Tada je OEBS pokazao sposobnost da postigne konsenzus između 57 država članica uprkos dubokim podelama koje postoje među njima. To je prva misija koju je OEBS pokrenuo nakon više od jedne decenije. Misija ima širok mandate, pokriva celu teritoriju Ukrajine i predstavlja oči i uši međunarodne zajednice na terenu i jedini objektivni izvor informacija.8 Nakon rušenja aviona MH17 nad teritori- jom Ukrajine mandat misije je produžen za šest meseci.

Naredni značajan korak OEBS-a u rešavanju sukoba bilo je osnivanje posma- tračke misije na rusko-ukrajinskoj granici na ruskim kontrolnim punktovima Gukovo i Donjeck, u julu 2014. Ova skromna mera izgradnje poverenja može biti proširena u kasnijoj fazi.9

Osnovana je i Trilateralna kontakt grupa (TCG), koja se sastoji od visokih pred- stavnika Ukrajine, Ruske Federacije i predstavnika OEBS-a, koja je pružila okvir za potpisivanje oba Sporazuma iz Minska.10 Najbitniji korak u rešavanju ukra- jinske krize jeste da se poštuje tada postignut dogovor o prekidu vatre i da se otpočne povlačenje teškog naoružanja. Kriza ne može biti rešena koristeći vojnu silu, vojno rešenje za konflikt ne postoji.11

U cilju rešavanja ukrajinske krize, primarne težnje OEBS-a su sprečavanje preli- vanja konflikta preko ukrajinskih granica, kao i aktivnosti usmerene na spreča- vanje situacije koja bi dovela do toga da istočna Ukrajina postane još jedan za- mrznut konflikt. Pored ovih primarnih ciljeva, prioriteti OEBS-a treba da budu usmereni na praćenje poštovanja prekida vatre i povlačenja teškog naoružanja, doprinos dijalogu i pomoć u istraživanju slučajeva kršenja humanitarnog i ljud- skih prava, jer mir počinje pregmatičnim rešenjima koje povećavaju bezbednost i sprečavaju eskalaciju konflikta i njegovo prelivanje u susedne zemlje.

Ukrajinska kriza je stavila OEBS u fokus savremenih međunarodnih odnosa. S jedne strane predstavlja veliki izazov posebno zbog izražene podeljenosti između država članica, dok sa druge strane predstavlja priliku da organizacija dokaže svoju relevantnost za evro-atlantsku bezbednosnu strukturu. To je naročito važno

8 Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 44-58 9 „ Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” April 22, 2015 http://www.osce.org/cio/109266?download=true 10 „ Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” April 22, 2015 http://www.osce.org/cio/109266?download=true 11 Wolfgang Ischinger, „The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 94-103

27 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

u kontekstu „Helsinki +40 procesa” čiji je cilj da povrati poverenje između država članica i omogući napredak u implementaciji zajedničkih principa OEBS-a.12

Takođe, kriza u Ukrajni je dovela OEBS u dilemu. Organizacija sada treba da odluči da li će ostati privržena svojim osnovnim vrednostima utvrđenim u Hel- sinškoj Povelji i reafirmisanim u Parizu i Astani 1990. i 2010. Takođe, dilema je i da li će i dalje njen cilj biti ostvarivanje vizije o stvaranju bezbednosne zajed- nice zasnovane na zapadnim vrednostima, kao sto su demokratija, vladavina prava i ljudska prava, što ima za rizik antagonizam Rusije i drugih autoritarnih država koje mogu svojim vetom blokirati aktivnosti OEBS-a.13 Alternativa gore navedenom je revitalizovanje hladnoratovske težnje organizacije da uspostavi poverenje i prevaziđe podele i služi kao forum i za demokratske i za autori- tarne režime. Tokom Hladnog rata zahvaljujući KEBS-u bilo je moguće da se diskutuje o suprostavljenim stavovima, gradi poverenje, uspostave zajednička pravila uprkos totalnoj ideološkoj podeljenosti članica. KEBS nije bio ni zajed- nica vrednosti kao što je EU niti savez protiv zajedničkog neprijatelja kao što je NATO. Nasuprot tome poštovan je i zapadni i istočni koncept bezbednosti. I danas snaga OEBS-a je u tome što države veoma različitih vrednosti, kultura i istorije sarađuju, postižu politički kompromis i konsenzus i tako grade pravila za zajednički život.

OEBS i savremene bezbednosne pretnje

Danas je glavni fokus OEBS-a na Ukrajini, međutim zaokupiranost Ukrajinom skrenula je organizaciju sa drugih značajnih tema. To je posebno očigledno na primeru „Helsinki +40 procesa”, čije je težište usmereno na reformu organiza- cije u cilju efikasnog suočavanja sa novim bezbednosnim izazovima. Takođe zanemarene su i druge važne aktivnosti OEBS-a, posebno one koje se odnose na rešavanje zamrznutih konflikata u Moldaviji i na jugu Kavkaza. OEBS ima man- dat za rešavanje već postojećih konflikata u Transnistriji, Nagorno-Karabahu,

12 Christian Nunlist and David Svarin, Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, (Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich and foraus – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy, Zurich, December, 2014), 16 13 Christian Nunlist and David Svarin, Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, (Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich and foraus – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy, Zurich, December, 2014), 7

28  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Južnoj Osetiji i Abkhaziji gde je ostalo mnogo toga da se uradi.14 U proteklom periodu je došlo do zastoja u procesu 5+2 za rešavanje konflikta u Pridnjestrov- lju, neophodno je da se nastave zvanični sastanci u formatu 5+2 kako bi se sukob priveo kraju. Politički proces u Gruziji je i dalje ugrožen. OEBS nije uspeo da odigra efektivnu ulogu u rešavanju ovog konflikta. OEBS-ova misija u Gruziji je zatvorena krajem 2008. godine kao rezultat ruskog odbijanja da obnovi njen mandat. Razvoj svih ovih događaja utiče na povećanje nestabilnosti u regionu OEBS-a, a njegova ključna uloga u očuvanju mira i bezbednosti je ostvarljiva upravo kroz aktivnosti koje mogu biti sprovedene u područjima zahvaćenim zamrznutim sukobima.

Neopodno je da OEBS efikasno odgovori ne samo na krizu u Ukrajni, već i na mnoge druge bezbednosne izazove sa kojima se suočavaju njegove države člani- ce. Savremeni bezbednosni izazovi koji imaju transnacionalni karakter kao što su terorizam, organizovani kriminal, ilegalne migracije, proliferacija oružja za masovno uništenje, sajber pretnje, trgovina narkoticima, naoružanjem i ljudima su pretnje koje su zajedničke svim državama članicama OEBS-a i one zahtevaju zajednički odgovor i jedinstvo u cilju suočavanja sa njima. U današnjem globali- zovanom svetu ove pretnje lako prelaze granice. Tenzije i nedostatak poverenja između država čiji su bezbednost i prosperitet međusobno povezani dovodi do „lose-lose” situacije. Uticaj OEBS-a u krajnjoj liniji zavisi od političke volje i an- gažmana država članica. Imajući u vidu bezbednosno okruženje koje karakteri- še rast nepoverenja veoma je teško izgraditi bezbednosnu zajednicu na teritoriji OEBS-a. Jedan od ključnih zadataka OEBS-a bi bio dalje razvijanje mera iz- gradnje poverenja u cilju prevencije eskalacije konflikata. OEBS takođe može da bude releavantna platforma za diskusiju koja će dovesti zajedno Rusiju, NATO i EU kako bi pronašli efikasan odgovor za sve veće globalne bezbednosne pretnje. OEBS bi mogao da bude i efikasno sredstvo u savremenom bezbednosnom okru- ženju za odgovor na čitav spektar bezbednosnih izazova u slučaju kada NATO ili EU nisu u mogućnosti da deluju.

Pored Ukrajine nerešeni konflikti i nestabilnost u Severnoj Africi i na Bliskom Istoku stavraju plodno tlo za terorizam i imaju značajan uticaj na bezbednost članica OEBS-a. Sve veća saradnja između kriminalnih mreža i ideološki moti- visanih terorista predstavljaju novu vrstu hibridnih pretnji. Terorizam je global- na pretnja i zajednički neprijatelj za sve. Teroristički napadi u Parizu i Kopen- hagenu su pokazali da Evropa ne može ostati izolovana od dešavanja u ostatku sveta i podvukli su potrebu da međunarodna zajednica treba da udruži svoje napore u borbi protiv terorizma. OEBS blisko sarađuje sa svim organizacijama

14 Lamberto Zannier, „Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2, 44-58

29 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

i telima UN-a koje za cilj imaju borbu protiv terorizma. Jedan od načina suoča- vanja sa terorizmom je borba protiv ekstremizma i radikalizacije na kom polju OEBS aktivno učestvuje. OEBS može značajno da doprinose evropskoj bezbed- nosti svojim aktivnostima usmerenim na sprečavanju podela unutar društva i negovanju kulture tolerancije i nediskriminacije.15

Treba imati u vidu da savremene, transnacionalne bezbednosne pretnje nisu iste kao kada je OEBS osnovan. Nastao je sa ciljem sprečavanja vojnih konflikata između država, a u 21. veku je sve veći broj konflikata unutar država. OEBS treba da se prilagodi savremenim bezbednosnim izazovima i bude sredstvo za mirno sprovođenje promena. Iz tog razloga je neophodno osnažiti potencijale OEBS-a u oblastima poput prevencije konflikata i posredovanja u postizanju trajnih mi- rovnih rešenja kao i u oblastima poštovanja ljudskih prava, uključujući prava manjina, promocije slobodnih izbora, vladavine prava i borbe protiv terorizma.

Zaključak

Ove godine OEBS obeležava četrdesetogodišnjicu potpisivanja Finalnog akta iz Helsinkija. Tada, 1975. lideri duboko ideološki podeljenih država su uspeli da sednu za isti sto, ostavljajući po strani zero-sum16 pristup i otpočeli dijalog kako bi sprečili nove sukobe. Danas je isti takav pristup neophodan kako bi se sma- njile tenzije i povratio duh saradnje, a u cilju postizanja bezbednosti, stabilnosti i prosperiteta u regionu OEBS-a. U godinama koje dolaze OEBS će se definitivno baviti posledicama geopolitičkog zemljotresa koji se desio 2014. u Ukrajni. Če- trdeset godina nakon osnivanja OEBS se suočava sa ozbiljnim izazovom svoje vizije o stvaranju bezbednosne zajednice od Vankuvera do Vladivostoka.

Svojom ulogom u rešavanju ukrajinske krize OEBS je pokazao da je značajna međunarodna bezbednosna organizacija. Ali kako bi ostao bitan za evropsku bezbednost mora da efikasno odgovori kako na ukrajinsku krizu tako i na osta- le bezbednosne izazove. Takođe, neophodna su finansijska sredstva, koja su u skladu sa novim zahtevima savremenog bezbednosnog okruženja države, čla-

15 http://www.osce.org/what/terrorism April 28, 2015 16 Zero-sum pristup predstavlja situaciju u kojoj su ciljevi dve strane toliko suprostavljeni da dobitak jedne strane predstavlja direktan gubitak za drugu stranu.

30  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

nice bi trebalo više da investiraju u organizaciju i tako doprinesu bezbednijem međunarodnom poretku.

Za budućnost OEBS-a od vitalnog značaja je da reafirmiše helsinške principe i da ponovo razvije poverenje između Istoka i Zapada. Ohrabrujuće je to da će Ne- mačka i Austrija predsedavati organizacijom u 2016. i 2017., to su zemlje koje imaju mogućnost da na konstruktivan način oblikuju rešenja za dobrobit svih članica. Trenutno Srbija predsedava OEBS-om i nastavlja sa politikom posveće- nom merama pomirenja, kao dela postkonfliknte konsolidacije, koju je vodila i Švajcarska za vreme svog predsedavanja.

Treba imati u vidu činjenicu da bi se stvorila stabilna i funkcionalna evropska bezbednosna arhitektura neophodno je da Rusija bude integrisana u nju. Ako Rusija ostane neuključena, podele i sukobi će se produbiti i nastaviti. Ne može se očekivati da se gradi štit na ruskim granicama, da se Gruzija i Ukrajina pri- ključe NATO-u, a da Rusija paralelno sarađuje sa Zapadom pa pitanju ostalih transnacionalnih bezbednosnih pretnji.

Sve države članice su se složile da je neophodno napraviti napredak ka stvara- nju evro-atlantske, evro-azijske bezbednosne zajednice, imajući u vidu novona- stale okolnosti biće veoma teško da se postigne ovaj cilj. Politika konfrontacije, podela i nepoverenja između Istoka i Zapada ne samo da ugrožava ovaj cilj i ko- operativni pristup bezbednosti već značajno ugrožava i međunarodnu bezbed- nost. Biće neophodna jaka saradnja i čvrsta politička volja kako bi se obezbedio mir, stabilnost i prosperitet na celom prostoru OEBS-a.

Literatura

Dragan R Simić., Nauka o bezbednosti – Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002

Siniša Tatalović, Globalna sigurnost i etnički sukobi, Politička kultura, Zagreb 2010.

Javier Ruperez, The Helsinki Final Act, is there life after 40?, Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 2014.

Klas Bergman, The Helsinki Final Act, from dissidents to election observation, Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 2014.

31 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Hana Umezawa, OSCE in interorganisational cooperation: Aspects of cooperation in peace and security, Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Brugge

Christian Nunlist and David Svarin, Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich and foraus – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy, Zurich, December, 2014

Raimonds Rublovskis, „The Challenges of OSCE within Global Security Environment of the 21st Century”, Latvian Institute on Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2015 http://liia.lv/ en/blogs/the-challenges-of-osce-within-global-security-envi

Judy Dempsey, “Sanctions and the OSCE mission in Ukraine” Carnegie Europe, April 24, 2015 http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56882

Dmitri Trenin, „The Disturbing Legacy of the Ukraine Crisis”, National Interest, February 12, 2015

Lamberto Zannier, ”Ukraine and the crisis of European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2

Wolfgang Ischinger, „The Ukraine crisis and European security”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2

Dmitri Trenin, „From cooperation to competition”, Horizons, winter 2015, issue 2

„Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” April 22, 2015 http://www.osce.org/ cio/109266?download=true

„Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in 2014 The Swiss Chairmanship’s commitment to implementing its priorities”, April 20, 2015 https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/ eda/en/documents/recent/20141215-osze-vorsitz-umsetzung-prioritaeten_EN.pdf

32  Luka Glušac

Strani (teroristički) borci

Sažetak: Arapsko proleće dovelo je aktuelizovanja problema državljana evrop- skih država koji se bore na frontovima širom Bliskog Istoka. Države percipiraju kao pretnju svoje državljane koji se vođeni prevashodno religioznim razlozi- ma pridružuju borbi u inostranstvu, po pravilu na strani nedržavnih aktera u oružanim sukobima, sledeći poziv u džihad. Strani (teroristički) borci odlaze u inostranstvo jer doživljavaju neki udaljeni sukob kao pretnju zajedničkoj tran- snacionalnoj identitetskoj grupi. U radu se prvo predstavlja fenomen stranih boraca, kroz njegovo određenje, kratki istorijat i osnovna obeležja, potom se ukazuje na njegov značaj za međunarodnu zajednicu, da bi se onda skicirala uloga i komparativne prednosti Organizacije za evropsku saradnju i bezbednost (OEBS) za suprotstavljanje ovom bezbednosnom problemu.

33 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uvod

Oružani sukobi u Siriji i re-eskalacija sukoba u Iraku nadiranjem ISIL-a (Islam- ske države Iraka i Levanta), aktuelizovali su pitanje državljana evropskih drža- va koji se bore na frontovima širom Bliskog Istoka, razbuktalim nakon Arap- skog proleća. Zapadne države percipiraju kao pretnju svoje državljane koji se vođeni prevshodno religioznim razlozima pridružuju borbi, po pravilu na strani nedržavnih aktera u oružanim sukobima, sledeći poziv u džihad. Većina drža- va je najavila, a dobar deo već i usvojio, novele svojih, po pravilu krivičnih, zakonodavstava, inkriminišući ratovanje za račun strane oružane formacije u inostranstvu. Međunarodna zajednica je takođe preduzela mere da se suprot- stavi ovom bezbednosnom izazovu, pa je tako Savet bezbednosti UN usvojio dve rezolucije, kojima je tretirao ovaj izazov, nakon čega je sledila i odgovorajuća reakcija podrške regionalnih mehanizama, prevashodno Organizacije za evrop- sku bezbednost i saradnju.

Namera nam je da u ovom radu nakon predstavljanja fenomena stranih bo- raca ukažemo na njegov značaj za međunarodnu zajednicu, te potom skicira- mo ulogu, značaj i komparativne prednosti OEBS-a za suprotstavljanje ovom bezbednosnom problemu. Pritom smo svesni da je fenomen stranih boraca po svojoj prirodi transnacionalan, ali i da je domašaj međunarodne zajednice u suprotstavljanju ovom problemu ograničen, te da najveći teret borbe pada na pojedinačne države.

Na samom početku valja odmah naglasiti da je u naučnoj literaturi zapravo vrlo malo teorijskih radova na ovu temu, pa kako jedan od vodećih stručnjaka za strane borce, Dejvid Malet, primećuje, političke nauke čak nemaju ni usaglašen termin za ovu pojavu.1 Ova vrsta ratnog aktivizma i dalje je izuzetno neistra- žena. Postoje opisi umešanosti stranih boraca u pojedinačnim konfliktima, ali gotovo da nema unakrsnih analiza2 ili teorijski potkovanih pokušaja da se obja- sni njihova pojava.3

1 David Malet, „Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 54/1(2010): 106. 2 Redak izuzetak je Maletova knjiga Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), koja jedina na obuhvatniji način sagledava ovu pojavu. 3 Thomas Hegghammer, „The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security, 35/3 (2010): 54.

34  Strani (teroristički) borci

Kratki istorijat fenomena i ključno obeležje

Strani borci kao fenomen niti su novi, niti su isljučivo islamski specificum, što najbolje dokazuje i značajno prisustvo inostranih ratnika u sukobu u Ukrajini. Sukobi različitih uzroka i povoda privlačili su inostrane volontere kroz celu mo- dernu istoriju. Primeri učešća stranih boraca sežu od grčkog rata za nezavisnost tokom 1820-ih, građanskog rata u Meksiku tokom 1830-ih, preko Teksaške re- volucije 1840-ih, Španskog građanskog rata, gotovo sto godina kasnije i izrael- skog rata za nezavisnost tokom prvih posleratnih godina i rata u Avganistanu toko 1980-ih, sukoba u Čečeniji i Iraku, sve do aktuelnih sukoba na Bliskom Istoku i Ukrajini. Upravo su Španski građanski rat, izraelsko-arapski ratovi i rat u Avganistanu najproučavaniji istorijski primeri značajnog učešća stranih boraca. Tekući sukobi su, jasno, doveli u žižu javnosti ovaj problem.

Zajedničko svim sukobima u kojima je ovaj fenomen prisutan je da su pobunjenici regrutovali strane borce predstavljajući lokalni rat kao pretnju zajedničkoj tran- snacionalnoj identitetskoj grupi i zahtevajući odbrambenu mobilizaciju.4 Upravo je postavljanje sukoba u matricu pretnje zajedničkom identitetu ključ za razume- vanje problema stranih boraca, jer se spoljna pomoć u vidu ljudstva privlači na- glašavanjem egzistencijalne pretnje po određenu identitetsku grupu, nezavisno od toga na čemu se ona bazira: ideologiji, religiji, jeziku, itd. Zadatak je preneti poruku na način da se geografski udaljenom pojedincu pogodi ta zajednička „identitetska žica”, što bi predstavljalo okidač za njegovo angažovanje. Stoga se, teorijski gleda- no, ovaj fenomen može staviti u matricu tzv. socijetalne sekuritizacije.5

Ko su strani borci?

Istraživači su do sada za suštinski istu pojavu koristili različite termine, u za- visnosti od toga sa kog su joj aspekta prilazili. Heghamer uzrok tome nalazi u činjenici da strani borci spadaju u kategoriju intermedijarnog (posrednog) akte-

4 Malet, „Why Foreign Fighters?”, 97. 5 Više o socijetalnoj sekuritzaciji u: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

35 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

ra izgubljenog između lokalnih pobunjenika, s jedne, i međunarodnih terorista, sa druge strane.6

Koncept stranih boraca oblikovan je našom državnocentričnom perspektivom. Kada govorimo o „stranim”, mislimo na državljanstvo: dobrovoljac je (ino)stran ako ima državljanstvo države izvan sukoba. Mendelson ispravno primećuje da ova ontologija često ne odgovara realnom identitetu samog ratnika.7 Da- kle, skloni smo da „inostrani” (strani) i „neinostrani” (domaći) tretiramo kao dihotomiju, ignorišući različite nivoe „inostranosti”. U nekim mestima, samo putovanje nekog do sledećeg sela daje mu atribut inostranosti. Različite odred- nice identiteta – pokrajina porekla, etnička grupa, pleme, klan ili bilo koji dru- gi – mogu odrediti nečiji nivo „inostranosti”.8 Ipak, državljanstvo ostaje glavni atribut za razlikovanje domaćih i stranih boraca, kako u teorijskim radovima, tako i diskursu međunarodne zajednice.

Dejvid Malet definiše strane borce, kao „nedržavljane država u sukobu, koji se pridružuju pobuni tokom građanskog rata”.9 Naslanjajući se na ovu formulaci- ju, Heghamer definiše stranog borca kao lice koji se (1) pridružilo, i operiše u okviru granica pobune, (2) nema državljanstvo države u sukobu ili povezanosti sa nekom oružanom frakcijom, (3) nema afilijaciju ni sa jednom vojnom organi- zacijom, i (4) nije plaćen.10

Ova četiri seta kriterijuma razlikuju strane borce od drugih tipova nasilnih akte- ra koji deluju prekogranično. Kriterijum (4) isključuje plaćenike, koji su plaćeni i vode se najvišom ponudom. Kriterijum (3) isključuje vojnike, koji su najčešće plaćeni i idu tamo gde ih komanda pošalje. Kriterijum (2) isključuje povratnič- ke pripadnike dijaspore ili pobunjenike u izgnanstvu, koji imaju prethodno po- stojeću vezu sa sukobom. Ova razlika, koja nestaje u terminu „transnacionalni pobunjenik” Ideana Salehjana11 ili „globalni pobunjenik” Džona Mekinleja12, je važna jer etnička ili druga povezanost sa pobunjenicima značajno olakšava mo-

6 Hegghammer, „The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”, 55. 7 Naime, paštunski dobrovoljci iz Pakistana verovatno će osećati veću identifikaciju sa Paštunima iz Avganistana, nego sa Pakistancima iz Pandžaba. Ipak, prema metodologiji koju koriste istraživači, ali i države i međunarodna zajednica, pandžabski ratnik u sukobu sa vladinim snagama u plemenskim oblastima smatra se lokalnim, dok su pakistanski talibani koji se bore zajedno sa svojim sunarodnicima u Avganistanu inostrani. Barak Mendelsohn, „Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 55/2 (2011), 192. 7 8 Ibid. 9 David Malet, „Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts” (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2008), 9. 10 Hegghammer, „The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”, 57-8. 11 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 12 John Mackinlay, Globalization and Insurgency. Adelphi Papers No. 352 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).

36  Strani (teroristički) borci

bilizaciju.13 Konačno, kriterijum (1) razlikuje strane borce od međunarodnih te- rorista, koji su specijalizovani za nasilje protiv neboraca u globalnom okruženju. Ova razlika se retko pravi. Većina radova o militantnom islamizmu koristi ge- neričke termine kao što su „džihadisti” ili „salafijski džihadisti” da opišu svakog transnacionalnog nasilnog islamistu, bez obzira da li on ili ona preduzima sa- moubilačke bombaške napade u nekoj zapadnoj prestonici ili vrši minobacačke napade u ratnoj zoni. U stvarnosti, većina stranih boraca se nikada ne uključuje u operacije van njihove zone (out of area), već se bori u jednoj borbenoj zoni.14

U ovom radu, mi koristimo Heghamerovu definiciju. Naglašavamo da terminom koji koristimo na srpskom jeziku – „strani borac” – ne prejudiciramo njihov me- đunarodnopravni status.15

Značaj regrutacije

Priroda odnosa između pobunjenika – zajednički etnicitet ili druga veza kao što je religija – irelevantna je za logiku transnacionalnog regrutovanja. Prilikom re- grutovanja naglašava se pre neophodnost defanzivne akcije da bi se očuvalo po- stojanje zajednice nego prilika za individualnu dobit. Većina regruta sebe ne vide kao plaćenike. Oni zaista veruju da se bore u odbrambenom ratu.16 Malet ukazuje da podaci to kojih je on došao ukazuju da je regrutacija stranih boraca – od loci- ranja potencijalnih regruta do stavljanja sukoba u odgovarajući „ezgistencijalni” okvir – suštinski ista u svim slučajevima, nezavisno od uzroka sukoba.17

Iako je evolucija u ulogama i značaju stranih boraca pod uticajem različitih faktora, nijedan element ne generiše debatu više od uticaja interneta na prirodu džihadističke pretnje i njenog uticaja na problem inostranih ratnika. Po nekima, internet je postao omiljeni (ili nužni) instrument za regrutaciju.18 Bez Interneta,

13 Hegghammer, „The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”, 58. 14 Ibid. 15 Za odličan pregled statusa stranih boraca u međunarodnom pravu videti: Sandra Kraehenmann, Foreign Fighters under International Law, Academy Briefing No.7 (Geneva: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014). 16 Malet, „Why Foreign Fighters?”, 97. 17 Ibid, 109. 18 Mendelsohn, „Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends”, 199-200.

37 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

neki potencijalni regruti verovatno ne bi uopšte bili svesni dešavanja izvan nji- hovog malog univerzuma i mogućnosti da se uključe u neki sukob.19

Zašto uglavnom islamski strani borci?

Treba istaći da uprkos apsolutno preovlađujućem broju islamskih stranih bora- ca, u odnosu na neislamske borce, dostupni podaci ne ukazuju ni na jednu samo njima svojstvenu osobinu islamskih zajednica. Ideološki gledano, sveprisutnost islamskih stranih boraca u svim sukobima nakon Avganistana 80-ih godina XX veka, koincidira se širenjem učenja Abdulaha Azama, čiji pokret potenci- ra odbranu muslimana gde god da su. Tokom godina, segmenti ovog pokreta pomerili su svoju orijentaciju od samo odbrane arapskih zemalja „pod okupa- cijom” ka ambicioznijem programu kojim pozivaju na uspostavljanje kalifata, vođenog šerijatskim pravom diljem muslimanskog sveta i šire.20 Tako oni poziv za mobilizaciju stavljaju u matricu suočavanja muslimanske nacije (ummah) sa egzistencijalnom spoljnom pretnjom.

Problem boraca povratnika

Fenomen stranih boraca nije važan samo zbog njihovog doprinosa na svom prvom bojnom polju. On obuhvata životni ciklus koji počinje kada pojedinac počne da razmatra ulazak u borbu u zemlji koja nije njegova, nastavlja se kroz njegovo učešće u sukobu, a završava se sa njegovim postupanjem kada napošta predmetni sukob.21 Stefani Kaplan napominje da je problem inostranih ratnika zapravo višeslojan, koji treba da bude razložen radi boljeg razumevanja i izradu

19 Ibid, 200. 20 Ibid, 191. 21 Ibid, 190.

38  Strani (teroristički) borci

delotvornih politika. Ona predlaže da delimo životni ciklus inostranih ratnika u tri faze: predratnu mobilizaciju, ratnu fazu i posleratnu fazu. 22

Trenutno je najveća pažnja usmerena oko pretnje „bleed out”-a23, jer džihadski veterani, opremljeni novim znanjima o taktici, treningu, regrutovanju, upotrebi medija i tehničkim veštinama pravljenja eksplozivnih naprava, mogu ta znanja da prenesu dalje – potencijalno da organizuju ili potpomognu pokretanje ili eskalaciju terorizma u svojoj ili drugim državama, povećavajući snagu pobunje- nika i terorističkih grupa.24

Ključno je pitanje šta se dešava sa tim borcima, nakon što odu, a posebno kako će prethodne faze oblikovati njihovu buduću putanju. Dok se neki strani borci vraćaju kući i reintegrišu u društvo, mnogi se ne vraćaju. Njihovo iskustvo često ih odredi u smislu ko su i šta rade. Mnogima je teško da se vrate svakodnevnom životu. Oni traže društvo sličnih, a na mnogim mestima njihov status zavisi od prevolađujućeg stava lokalne zajednice prema sukobu u kojem su učestvovali. U nekim slučajevima, primećuje Mendelson, čak i kada bivši borac pokušava da ostavi svoju prošlost iza sebe, njegova država ga i dalje identifikuje kao pretnju, time ga gura nazad u podzemni život i u naručje saboraca koji se suočavaju sa istim problemom. Neki od ovih pojedinaca direktno učestvuju u stvaranju infra- strukture za sledeću generaciju stranih boraca.25

Problem iz perspektive međunarodne zajednice

Osnovna pretpostavka koju postojeća literatura daje u vezi sa spoljnim akteri- ma (eng. outsiders) je da oni jačaju domaće snage. Kako Bake ističe, iz perspek- tive međunarodne zajednice, međutim, zabrinutost oko stranih boraca (odn. „transnacionalnih pobunjenika”, kako ih ona naziva) je četvorostruka.26

22 Tally Helfont, „The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies,” in The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, ed. Michael P. Noonan, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2011), 3. 23 Ne postoji adekvatan prevod na srpski jezik ovog koncepta. 24 Mendelsohn, „Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends”, 199. 25 Ibid, 194. 26 Kristin Bakke, „Help Wanted?: The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,” International Security, 38/4 (2014): 150.

39 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Prvo, transnacionalni pobunjenici mogu produžiti građanski rat uvođenjem više aktera u teatar, komplikujući pokušaje da se putem intervencije ili pregovora okonča rat (npr. Sirija). Drugo, mnogi od današnjih transnacionalnih pobunjeni- ka su islamisti, te postoji opravdana bojazan u Vašingtonu i evropskim presto- nicama da ovi akteri transformišu borbu kojoj se pridružuju (npr. Mali). Treće, ako transnacionalni pobunjenici jačaju lokalne pobunjenike ili produžuju rat, oni mogu i da bitnu utiču na stvaranje propale države (eng. failed state) ili sigurnog utočišta i poligona za teroriste (kao u Avganistanu, Iraku, Pakistanu i Somaliji). Konačno, zapadne vlade strahuju da, učešćem u ratovima u inostranstvu, tran- snacionalni pobunjenici stiču veštine koje mogu da koriste u matičnoj državi.

Prema mišljenju britanskog MI5 o stranim borcima, „veštine, kontakti i status stečeni u inostranstvu mogu od ovih pojedinaca da naprave mnogo veću pretnju kada se vrate u Veliku Britaniju, čak i ako nisu dobili zadatak da izvrše napad u matičnoj državi.”27

Odgovor međunarodne zajednice Aktivnosti Ujedinjenih nacija

Ujedinjene nacije su na problem stranih boraca odgovorile usvajanjem dve rezolucije (2170 i 2178), na osnovu Glave VII Povelje, kojima se teži jačanju međunarodne saradnje, inoviranjem nacionalnih zakonadavstava i kreiranju zajedničkog pristupa u suprotstavljanju ovoj rastućoj pretnji.

Rezolucija 2170 (2014), prevashodno usmerena na suzbijanju delovanja ISIL-a, prva je prepoznala značaj stranih boraca. Savet bezbednosti je zatražio povla- čenje svih stranih boraca za ratnih područja, osudio njihovo regrutovanje, koji doprinose nasilnoj radikalizaciji i širenju konflikta i pozvao države članice da pojačaju napore da na nacionalnom nivou, kroz različite pravne i praktične mere, onemoguće regrutaciju i odlazak na bojišta na Bliskom Istoku.

Krajem septembra 2014. godine, Savet bezbednosti je usvojio do sad najsveo- buhvatniju rezoluciju kojom tretira problem stranih boraca. Rezolucijom 2178,

27 MI5 Security Service, „Foreign Fighters,” last modified April 28, 2015, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what- we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk/foreign-fighters.html.

40  Strani (teroristički) borci

donetom na osnovu Glave VII Povelje, Savet bezbednosti osuđuje nasilni ek- stremizam, koji služi kao pogodno tle za terorizam i poziva sve strane borce da se razoružaju i prekinu učešće u oružanim sukobima. Ključni stavovi rezolucije odnose na odluku da države članice treba da spreče i suzbiju regrutovanje, or- ganizovanje, transport i opremanje pojedinaca koji putuju u druge države (dr- žave u kojoj nemaju boravak/državljanstvo) radi vršenja, planiranja, priprema ili učestvovanja u terorističkim aktima ili pružanja ili pohađanja terorističkih obuka i finansiranje njihovih putovanja i aktivnosti. Takođe, Savet bezbednosti je posebno podvukao značaj uključivanja lokalnih zajednica i nevladinih ak- tera u razvijanju strategija za suprotstavljanje nasilnom ekstremizmu. Savet bezbednosti je takođe istakao značaj napora da se razviju nenasilni metodi za prevenciju konflikta u cilju smanjenja rizika od radikalizacije ka terorizmu i podvukao značaj obrazovanja u umanjenju efikasnosti terorističkih narativa.

OEBS u suprotstavljanju stranim borcima „Normativa”

Ključan dokument OEBS-a u oblasti terorizma je Konsolidovani okvir za borbu protiv terorizma (Odluka 1063) usvojen krajem 2012. godine, kojim se definišu operativni principi i identifikuje strateški fokus OEBS-ove antiterorističke uloge u budućnosti. Cilj Konsolidovanog okvira je jačanje profila i stvaranje dodatne vrednosti OEBS-ovog doprinosa globalnim naporima da se iskoreni terorizam i unapređenje komunikacije i saradnje između glavnih partnera i organizacija.28

Na osnovu njega, niza svojih ranijih povezanih akata i pomenutih stavova Uje- dinjenih nacija, OEBS je na Ministarskom samitu u Bazelu, decembra 2014. godine, usvojio „Deklaraciju o ulozi OEBS-a suprotstavljanju fenomenu inostra- nih terorističkih ratnika u kontekstu sprovođenja rezolucija 2170 (2014) i 2178 (2014) Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija”. Deklaracijom su države članice pozvane da u potpunosti sarađuju u suprotstavljanju fenomenu stranih tero- rističkih boraca, kroz razmenu informacija, sprečavanje putovanja (graničnim kontrolama i kontrolom izdavanja ličnih i putnih isprava), pojačanu međuna- rodnu saradnju u praćenju upotrebe interneta u svrhu podsticanja nasilnog ek-

28 Za pregled akata OEBS-a u oblasti borbe protiv terorizma videti: http://www.osce.org/node/26365?download=tru, last modified April 28, 2015.

41 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

stremizma i radikalizacije29 i jačanje partnerstva sa civilnim društvom, mediji- ma i privatnim kompanijama u borbi protiv terorizma.30

Deklaracijom je traženo od OEBS-ovih organa da organizuju tematske diskusije unutar organizacije, komplementarne sa naporima UN, fokusirane na ovaj feno- men, radi njegovog boljeg razumevanja, širenja primera dobre prakse itd. OEBS bi takođe trebalo da ponudi pomoć u građenju kapaciteta država (koje to zatraže) i da organizuje odgovarajuće skupove da bi se identifikovale potencijalne slabo- sti u postojećim međunarodnim pravnim i operativnim mehanizmima saradnje. Prema slovu Deklaracije, potrebno je da se nastavi unapređivanje OEBS-ovog pristupa nasilnom ekstermizmu i radikalizaciji koja vodi terorizmu, uključujući kroz koncept policije u zajednici, u cilju prevencije terorizma, posebno na lokal- nom nivou. Konačno, OEBS treba da osmisli, u bliskoj saradnji sa partnerskim organizacijama, kao što je UN, koherentan pristup za pomoć pojedinačnim dr- žavama, vođen principom lokalnog vlasništva, uzimajući u obzir Hag-Marakeš Memorandum o dobrim praksama za efikasniji odgovor na fenomen inostranih terorističkih ratnika, koji je usvojio Globalni antiteroristički forum.31

Pored toga, Srbija kao predsedavajuća OEBS-om 2015. godine najavila je da će posebnu pažnju posvetiti fenomenu stranih terorističkih boraca i nasilnom ek- stremizmu i radikalizaciji koja vodi ka terorizmu, posebno mladih. Ivica Dačić, predsedavajući OEBS-a, najavio je i veliku OEBS-ovu konferenciju posvećenu ovim pitanjima za leto 2015.32

Komparativne prednosti OEBS-a

OEBS je u komparativnoj prednosti u odnosu na druge međunarodne organiza- cije (univerzalne i regionalne) kada je reč o suočavanju sa fenomenom stranih terorističkih boraca. Kako primećuje Trapara, „nedostatak pravnog statusa i od- sustvo pravne obaveznosti odluka OEBS-a su se zapravo pokazali kao prednost,

29 Videti i: Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/06 on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. 30 U skladu sa: Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/08. 31 The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon. Reč je o 19 primera dobre prakse podeljenih na tematske celine. 32 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ivica Dačić Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Briefing to the UN Security Council, New York, 24 February 2015, http://www.un.int/serbia/sites/www.un.int/files/Serbia/214.pdf.

42  Strani (teroristički) borci

jer je došao do izražaja neformalni momenat u odlučivanju i delovanju, koji je učinio ovu organizaciju vrlo fleksibilnom u ispunjavanju zadataka”.33 To ovde dolazi do izražaja, jer nemaju sve države identičnu viziju rešavanja ovog proble- ma, te je traženje zajedničkog imenitelja lakše.

Kroz ovaj fenomen se prepliće više važnih tematskih prioriteta za OEBS, koje su nedavno ponovo potvrdile države učesnice. „Borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koja vodi ka terorizmu, uz primenu multidimenzionalnog pri- stupa” i „unapređenje i zaštita ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda u kontekstu protivterorističkih mera” su dve strateške oblasti na koje se OEBS usredsređuje u oblasti protivterorističkih aktivnosti, kao što je navedeno u Konsolidovanom okviru OEBS-a za borbu protiv terorizma. Upravo se u preseku ova dva priorite- ta, ali i dve od tri OEBS-ove dimenzije (vojno-političke i ljudske), nalazi i najbolji pristup za suprotstavljanje ovom fenomenu.

Kako se u korenu radikalizacije i regrutacije stranih boraca nalazi poziv na od- brambenu mobilizaciju u cilju opstanka identitetske grupe, stoga je delovanje na lokalu od ključnog značaja. Jačanje primarnih društvenih grupa i odnosa između većinskog i manjinskog stanovništva u kombinaciji sa rešavanjem so- cio-ekonomskih problema od posebnog je značaja za smanjenje mogućnosti od- laska pojedinaca na udaljena ratišta.

Usvajajući Akcioni plan za borbu protiv terorizma iz Bukurešta, OEBS je istakao potrebu da se sagledaju „različiti socijalni, ekonomski, politički i drugi faktori, uključujući nasilni separatizam i ekstremizam, koji stvaraju uslove u kojima su terorističke organizacije u stanju da vrbuju i zadobijaju podršku.”34 Vrlo slični uslovi odlučujući su i za mobilizaciju stranih boraca. Stoga je posebno važno u strategiju protiv radikalizacije i mobilizacije pojedinaca za učešće u oružanim sukobima u inostranstvu što više uključiti lokalne aktere, jer oni presudno utiču na odnos pojedinaca sa primarnim društvenim grupama i opšte povezanosti pojedinca sa lokalnom zajednicom. Stoga je pristup koji je OEBS primenio u sprečavanju terorizma i borbi protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koja vodi ka terorizmu (NERVT) posebno koristan. Zajedničkim radom Odeljenja za transnacionalne pretnje pri Sekretarijatu OEBS-a (TNTD), i njegovih jedinica za borbu protiv terorizma i strateška policijska pitanja, i OEBS-ove Kancelarije za demokratske institucije i ljudska prava (ODIHR), koja vodi poseban program za ljudska prava i borbu protiv terorizma, nastao je vodič „Sprečavanje terorizma i

33 Vladimir Trapara,”Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji,” Međunarodna politika, 8/1 (2011): 100. 34 Ministerial Council, „The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism”, 4 December 2001, http://www.osce. org/atu/42524.

43 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koja vodi ka terorizmu: Pri- stup putem rada policije u zajednici”. Ovaj projekat, kako i autori ističu, „ilustru- je kako OEBS opravdava svoj zaštitni znak – sveobuhvatan i kooperativan pri- stup bezbednosti, korišćenjem svoje multidimenzionalne ekspertize i mreža, kako bi usmerio napore u jednom od najosetljivih, a ipak presudnih, izazova sa kojima se suočavaju njegove države učesnice: sprečavanju terorizma.”35

Mobilizacija za ratovanje u inostranstvu i teroristička radikalizacija imaju istu centralnu osobinu. To su dinamični procesi tokom kojih pojedinac postepeno prihvata (terorističko) nasilje kao moguć, možda čak i legitiman, način delova- nja. „Mogući pokretači terorističke radikalizacije su različiti i složeni i mešaju se na jedinstven način u svakom pojedinačnom slučaju.”36 Ipak, mogu se mapirati osnovni uslovi, u čijem preseku može doći do radikalizacije (slika 1).

Slika 1 – Uslovi koji dovode do terorističke radikalizacije u pojedinačnom slučaju37

Da bi se sistemski pristupilo borbi protiv fenomena stranih terorističkih boraca, na tragu ovog vodiča, potrebno je izraditi sličan ciljani dokument, koja bi mo-

35 OEBS, Sprečavanje terorizma i borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koja vodi ka terorizmu: pristup putem rada policije u zajednici (Beč: OEBS, 2014): 20. 36 Ibid, 23. 37 Ibid, 41.

44  Strani (teroristički) borci

gao da posluži državama kao smernica i zbirka dobre prakse. OEBS je odlično pozicioniran da vodi taj proces, posebno nakon 2012. godine i formiranja pome- nutog Odeljenja za transnacionalne pretnje (TNTD) pri Sekretarijatu OEBS-a.38 Koristeći i ekspertizu ODIHR-a, mogu se ujediniti različiti stručni resursi orga- nizacije, koje nemaju druge organizacije, i ugraditi u sveobuhvatnu, koherentnu i na ljudskim pravima zasnovanu strategiju za borbu protiv stranih boraca u svim njegovim oblicima i manifestacijama i za sagledavanje uslova koji dovode do njihove radikalizacije i mobilizacije.

TNTD može posebno dati svoj doprinos u suzbijanju korišćenja interneta za re- grutaciju stranih boraca, organizovanjem tematskih događaja i širenjem prime- ra dobre prakse, a u skladu sa Odlukom 7/06 Ministarskog saveta o suzbijanju upotrebe interneta za terorističke svrhe.

Jedna od ključnih komparativnih prednosti OEBS-a u odnosu na neke druge bezbednosne aranžmane, jeste prisustvo na terenu. Glavni instrument OEBS-a za to su operacije na terenu. OEBS-ov širok tematski zahvat i fleksibilnost u iz- boru prioriteta za svaku pojedinačnu operaciju pruža mu mogućnost da ugradi preventivno delovanje protiv regrutacije stranih boraca kao jedan od zadataka. OEBS bi svojom ekspertizom mogao značajno da pomogne lokalnim vlastima.

Zaključak

Iako su krivične mere nužan element suprotstavljanju pretnji stranih boraca, one nikako ne smeju biti jedino sredstvo. Ako džihadisti regrutuju strane borce ubeđujući ih da im preti potencijalno egzistencijalna pretnja kao članovima određene grupe, onda će ih dalja pretnja kaznenim merama teško odvratiti od mobilizacije. Zapravo krivičnim gonjenjem samo će se dodatno podržati egzi- stencijalno-preteći diskurs i učiniti da se borba čini još neophodnijom za opsta- nak. Efikasniji pristup bi bio da naglasak na prevenciji regrutacije, u čemu OEBS na više načina može da učestvuje.

38 Ministerial Council Decision No. 9/11 on Strengthening Co-Ordination and Coherence in the Osce’s Efforts to Address Transnational Threats.

45 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Ključno za rešenje problema regrutacije stranih boraca je smanjenje dostupno- sti i privlačnosti transnacionalnih grupa preko kojih se regrutovanje obavlja. Identiteti se izgrađuju kroz društvene interakcije i prihvatanje normi. Regruti stranih boraca posebno su aktivni u subkulturnim grupama, kojima se imi- granti često okreću, jer ne uspostavljaju dovoljno jake veze sa većinskim sta- novništvom, pa ni sa svojom lokalnom, između ostalog i verskom, zajednicom. Više kontakata putem alternativnih društvenih kanala jača posebne identitete i veze sa drugim članovima. Posledica je spremnost da se bore za njih, jer se „bli- že identifikuju sa ostalim članovima te grupe, makar ona bila u inostranstvu, nego sa sugrađanima države u kojoj žive.”39 Stoga je deo rešenja u intenziviranju procesa integracije imigranata u domicilna društva, što je kompleksan proces u koji su utkane sve tri OEBS-ove dimenzije.

Bibliografija

Knjige i članci

Bakke, Kristin. „Help Wanted?: The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies.” International Security 38/4 (2014): 150-187.

Buzan, Barry et Al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Hegghammer, Thomas. „The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” International Security 35/3 (2010): 53-94.

Hegghammer, Thomas. „ Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting.” American Political Science Review 107/1 (2013): 1-15.

Helfont, Tally. „The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies.” in The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, edited by Michael P. Noonan, 2-10, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2011.

Kraehenmann, Sandra. Foreign Fighters under International Law. Academy Briefing No.7. Geneva: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014.

39 Malet, „Why Foreign Fighters?”, 113.

46  Strani (teroristički) borci

Mackinlay, John. Globalization and Insurgency. Adelphi Papers No. 352. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002.

Malet, David. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Malet, David. „Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions.” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 54/1(2010): 97-114.

Malet, David. ”Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts.” PhD diss., George Washington University, 2008.

Mendelsohn, Barak. „Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends.” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 55/2 (2011), 189-202.

Salehyan, Idean. Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Trapara, Vladimir. „Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji.” Međunarodna politika 8/1 (2011): 99–125.

Dokumenta

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/06 on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes.

OSCE Ministerial Council, „The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism”, 4 December 2001, http://www.osce.org/atu/42524.

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 9/11 on Strengthening Co-Ordination and Coherence in the Osce’s Efforts to Address Transnational Threats.

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/08.

OEBS, Sprečavanje terorizma i borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koja vodi ka terorizmu: pristup putem rada policije u zajednici (Beč: OEBS, 2014).

The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon.

47 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Internet izvori

MI5 Security Service, „Foreign Fighters,” last modified April 28, 2015, https:// www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international- terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk/foreign-fighters.html.

Statement by H.E. Mr. Ivica Dačić Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Briefing to the UN Security Council, New York, 24 February 2015, http://www.un.int/serbia/sites/ www.un.int/files/Serbia/214.pdf

48  Danko Aleksić

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine

Sažetak: Obim i posledice negativnih uticaja na životnu sredinu koji su na globalnom nivou u poslednjih nekoliko decenija sve izraženiji aktuelizovali su temu bezbednosti životne sredine i uvrstili je na međunarodnu političku agen- du. Kao velika regionalna organizacija koja se bavi pitanjima bezbednosti a koja pored država Evrope obuhvata i Kanadu i SAD, i sam OEBS je značajno angažo- van na pitanjima bezbednosti životne sredine. Pored strateških opredeljenja iznetih u značajnim dokumentima Organizacije, OEBS sprovodi i značajne ak- tivnosti u oblasti bezbednosti životne sredine. Svakako je najprominentnija od njih partnerstvo u ENVSEC inicijativi kojoj je OEBS, sa svojim širokom manda- tom u oblasti bezbednosti i brojnim misijama i prisustvom na terenu, obezbedio značajnu političku podršku.

49 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uvodna razmatranja

Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS), sa svojih 57 država članica, najveća je regionalna bezbednosna organizacija na svetu i ima za cilj obezbeđivanje mira, demokratije i stabilnosti. Svoje aktivnosti OEBS sprovodi u tri „dimenzije bezbednosti”: političko-vojnoj, ekonomsko-ekološkoj i ljudskoj. Na sam pojam bezbednosti može se gledati iz većeg broja uglova, pa se stoga on može razumevati na više načina. Ovo naročito dolazi do izražaja u periodu posle završetka hladoga rata, kada je došlo do proširivanja (uključivanje i ne-vojnih pitanja), produbljivanja (napušta se ideja da je država jedino što treba zaštititi) i obogaćivanja (usvajanje saznanja iz drugih disciplina) koncepta bezbednosti.1

Na ovome je mestu potrebno pomenuti koji su to sektori bezbednosti koje pre- poznaje savremena literatura. Buzan razlikuje pet sektora2 u okviru kojih se bezbednost može analizirati/proučavati/definisati, a to su:

1. vojni sektor – obuhvata ofanzivne i defanzivne kapacitete država, kao i njihove međusobne odnose, 2. politički sektor – razmatra organizacionu stabilnost države i njenog si- stema vlasti, 3. ekonomski sektor – razmatra pristup resursima, finansijama i tržištima, 4. socijetalni sektor – razmatra održivost jezika, kulture, religije i ostalih elemenata nacionalnog identiteta, i 5. sektor životne sredine – razmatra pitanja uslova sredine neophodnih za opstanak.

Buzan naglašava da se u okviru svakog pojedinačnog sektora mogu definisati specifični obrasci interakcije, ali da oni (sektori) predstavljaju neodvojivi deo celine pojma bezbednosti.

U ovome tekstu bavićemo se bezbednošću životne sredine – njenom definicijom, značajem na međunarodnoj političkoj agendi kao i aktivnostima OEBS u ovoj specifičnoj oblasti. Pre početka razmatranja, značajno bi bilo istaći jednu (even- tualnu) jezičku nedoumicu. Naime, termin koji se koristi na engleskom jeziku jeste environmental security. Na srpski jezik najčešće se prevodi kao ekološka

1 Za više detalja o proširivanju i produbljivanju koncepta bezbednosti pogledati: Ejdus F., Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi (JP Službeni glasnik, BCBP, Beograd, 2012, 31.-34. 2 Buzan B. et all., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 7.-8.

50  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine

bezbednost a ređe kao bezbednost životne sredine – što je varijanta koju autor smatra ispravnom. Ekologija (eng. Ecology) i životna sredina (eng. Environment) nisu sinonimi, iako se u svakodnevnom govoru kao takvi često koriste. Značajno je prodiskutovati i značenje termina koji su neizbežni u svakoj diskusiji na temu bezbednosti, a to su: izazov, rizik i pretnja. Ejdus3 daje definicije ovih termina i ukazuje na njihove međusobne razlike na sledeći način:

a) Izazov – situacija koja nekoga ili nešto stavlja na probu, a može imati ili pozitivan ili negativan ishod; b) Rizik – mogućnost gubitka, povrede, stvaranja neugodne situacije ili uni- štenja; uglavnom ima negativno značenje i uvek postoji, samo sa ma- njom ili većom verovatnoćom; c) Pretnja – izrazita namera da se povredi, uništi ili kazni.

I ovi se izrazi u javnom diskursu često mešaju, što zbog nepoznavanja proble- matike a što zbog jezičkih nedoumica u prevodjenju.

Bezbednost životne sredine – definicija i značaj na međunarodnoj agendi

Pre nekoliko decenija, kada su pitanja i problemi iz oblasti životne sredine po- stali aktuelni, pokret za zaštitu životne sredine bavio se prvenstveno proble- mima na lokalnom nivou – neadekvatnim odlaganjem otpada, snabdevanjem pitkom vodom lokalne populacije, zagađenjem vazduha u urbanim sredinama, i slično. Nesporno je da su ovi problemi još uvek aktuelni, naročito u zemljama u razvoju. Ipak, u međuvremenu je došlo do značajne promene – obim i posledice negativnih uticaja na životnu sredinu na globalnom nivou postali su suviše očigledni da bi mogli biti skrajnuti sa političke agende. Klimatske promene (na- učno potvrđene, ugrožavaju veliki broj ljudi i imaju jako raznolike negativne efekte), erozija zemljišta (resursa neophodnog za poljoprivredu, a kome je za obnavljanje potreban nesrazmerno dug vremenski period), tanjenje ozonskog omotača (utiče na ceo živi svet na Planeti), širenje pustinja (uglavnom na račun plodnog zemljišta), zagađenje okeana i iscrpljivanje ribljih zaliha, uništavanje velikih površina šuma (doprinosi klimatskim promenama), istrebljivanje biljnih

3 Ejdus, F., Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi (JP Službeni glasnik, BCBP, Beograd, 2012.), 36.-37.

51 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

i životinjskih vrsta (zauvek, čime se osiromašuje genofond Planete), iscrpljiva- nje neobnovljivih resursa (njihovo korišćenje doprinosi zagađivanju i klimat- skim promenama) i slično, pitanja su koja predstavljaju novu vrstu pretnje čo- večanstvu u celini. Uzevši u obzir karakter i obim pomenutih problema (imaju globalne efekte, njihove posledice ne poznaju političke granice država, a mogu da dovedu i do regionalnih političkih tenzija pa i nasilja), za njihovo rešavanje, ili u najmanju ruku za svođenje njihovih negativnih posledica na najmanju moguću meru, neophodna je međunarodna saradnja. Pojedinačna država je tu često nemoćna, prevashodno zbog toga što „uzrok” problema i njegova „posledi- ca” mogu da budu geografski veoma udaljeni. Upravo su zbog toga pitanja bez- bednosti i pitanja životne sredine u savremenom svetu isprepletena kao nikada pre, a uzevši u obzir dinamiku globalnih kretanja i razvoja čovečanstva u celini možemo tvrditi da će tako, a moguće i još intenzivnije, ostati i u budućnosti.

Činjenica da se na sam pojam bezbednosti može gledati iz većeg broja uglo- va dovodi do toga da ne postoji jedna univerzalna i sveobuhvatna definicija bezbednosti. Jedna od definicija koja se široko koristi (prevashodno zbog toga što obuhvata i subjektivne i objektivne aspekte pretnje) jeste definicija koju je dao Arnold Volfers a koja glasi: ”Bezbednost je, u objektivnom smislu, odsustvo pretnji usvojenim vrednostima a u subjektivnom smislu, odsustvo straha da će te vrednosti biti napadnute”4. Ova je definicija značajna jer uključuje i subjektivne i objektivne aspekte. Određenju pojma bezbednosti neki drugi autori imali su drugačije pristupe. Tako Dejvid Boldvin5 navodi sedam pitanja za specifikaciju pojma bezbednosti:

1. Bezbednost za koga? 2. Bezbednost za koje vrednosti? 3. Koliko bezbednosti? 4. Bezbednost od kojih pretnji? 5. Bezbednost kojim sredstvima? 6. Bezbednost po koju cenu? 7. Bezbednost u kom periodu?

Obrazlažući značaj ovih pitanja Boldvin ističe nekoliko važnih aspekata. Pre svega, da je od suštinske važnosti definisati referentni objekat tj. ono što se štiti, kao i da je apsolutnu bezbednost nemoguće postići. Takođe, naglašava i značaj „cene” bezbednosti, jer se uvek mora odreći nečega drugog kako bi se sredstva

4 Baylis J., Smith S., Owens P., The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Owford University Press, 2008), 229. 5 Baldwin D., The Concept of Security (Review of International Studies, no. 23, 1997), 12.-17.

52  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine

usmerila na oblast bezbednosti. Ističe, takođe, i značaj vremenskog perioda u kome se bezbednost posmatra, uz obražlozenje da dugoročni i kratkoročni ci- ljevi bezbednosti mogu biti jako različiti, a nekada i u konfliktu. Slična logika provlači se i kroz četiri tzv. Terifova pitanja koja se mogu pronaći u literaturi6 a na koja je potrebno odgovoriti kako bi se tačnije ukazalo na prirodu i ključna mesta konkretnog pristupa istraživanju bezbednosti. Ta pitanja su:

- Ko je ili šta je objekat bezbednosti? - Kakva je priroda pretnje? - Ko je odgovoran za bezbednost? - Kojim se postupcima, sredstvima i načinima dostiže, čuva i unapređuje bezbednost?

Kao što je to slučaj i sa samim pojmom bezbednosti, i bezbednost životne sredine moguće je definisati na više načina. Prema jednoj od mogućih definicija7, bezbed- nost životne sredine predstavlja održavanje lokalne i planetarne biosfere kao ne- ophodnog osnova od koga zavise sve ljudske težnje. Prema definiciji koju koristi NATO8, bezbednost životne sredine predstavlja suočavanje sa izazovima bezbed- nosti koji potiču iz fizičke i prirodne sredine. U ove se izazove ubrajaju ekstremni vremenski uslovi, iscrpljivanje prirodnih resursa, zagađivanje itd. – faktori koji u konačnici mogu da dovedu do katastrofa, regionalnih napetosti i nasilja.

Za dalju diskusiju biće korisno navesti još neke specifičnosti sektora bezbedno- sti životne sredine. Prema Buzanu9, jedna od najznačajnijih specifičnosti ovo- ga sektora jeste postojanje dve različite agende10: naučne i političke. Naučna agenda ima za cilj da pruži utemeljenu procenu pretnji, dok se politička agenda bavi oblikovanjem svesti u javnoj sferi o tome kako se nositi sa pitanjima koja su pokrenuta. Buzan naglašava da, iako postoji jako očigledno preklapanje i međuzavisnost između ove dve prethodno pomenute agende, one imaju pot- puno različite tokove: naučna agenda mora da zadovolji određene akademske standarde, dok politička agenda može da bude oblikovana prema standardima administracije, medija i javnosti, koji su svi pod mnogo većim uticajem kratko- ročnih događaja. Karakteristika ovoga sektora jeste i komplikovanost11 do koje

6 Simić, D., Nauka o bezbednosti: Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti (Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002), 22. 7 Buzan B. et all., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 8. 8 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm , pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine 9 Buzan B. et all., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 71. 10 Može se diskutovati o tome da li je „agenda” na srpskom jeziku najprikladnija reč. Autor veruje da, kao široko upotrebljavan internacionalizam, jeste. Izrazi na srpskom jeziku kao što su dnevni red, program rada i slično sigurno bi bili manje prikladni pa donekle i zbunjujući. 11 Buzan B. et all., Security – a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998), 75.

53 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

dovodi veliki broj tema kojih se dotiče: poremećaji ekosistema, problemi koji se tiču energetike, populacioni problemi, problemi hrane, problemi ekonomije, građanski nemiri. Poremećaji u ekosistemima jesu problemi koji se u najvećoj meri tiču bazične ekologije. Sve ostale teme koje su prethodno navedene u ve- likoj se meri preklapaju sa temama iz drugih sektora bezbednosti, samo su u ovome slučaju posmatrane kroz ekološku prizmu.

Buzan naglašava paradoks bezbednosti životne sredine: jedini način da se druš- tvo sačuva od pretnji koje potiču iz životne sredine jeste da se promeni.12 Autor na ovome mestu izražava delimično neslaganje sa Buzanom. Promena društva, tačnije promena obrazaca ponašanja i odnosa prema životnoj sredini, jeste naj- bolji način da se umanje pretnje koje dolaze iz životne sredine. Međutim, to se svakako ne može posmatrati kao jedini način iz jako jednostavnog razloga – postoje pretnje koje dolaze iz životne sredine (najbolji primer jesu vulkanske erupcije) a na koje je nemoguće uticati. Dalja diskusija vodi ka pitanju šta je referentni objekat u sektoru bezbednosti životne sredine? Buzan navodi dva re- ferentna objekta: životnu sredinu kao takvu i vezu civilizacije i životne sredine.

Sledeće važno pitanje jeste da li bezbednost životne sredine treba posmatrati na globalnom, regionalnom ili lokalnom nivou? Prema zaključcima proisteklim iz rada Kopenhaške škole13, 14, iako se savremene teme u oblasti životne sredine posmatraju obično na globalnom nivou, svest o njima proizašla je iz otkrivanja globalnih posledica na prvi pogled bezopasnih individualnih i lokalnih praksi/ postupaka. Uzroci i posledice u sektoru životne sredine mogu se nalaziti na različitim nivoima i u različitim regionima. Takođe, razliku u percepciji čini i to da li se „sekuritizuje” uzrok ili posledica.

Na ovome mestu, a pre razmatranja uloge OEBS-a, bilo bi korisno navesti i ne- koliko činjenica u prilog prethodno navedenim tvrdnjama o relevantnosti pita- nja iz oblasti životne sredine u međunarodnoj politici i bezbednosti. U izveštaju pod nazivom Naša zajednička budućnost15, poznatijem kao Izveštaj Brundtland komisije, iz 1987. godine navodi se da koncept bezbednosti mora biti proširen

12 Ibid. 76. 13 Ibid. 21.-23. 14 Kopenhaška škola nastala je u okviru Kopenhaškog instituta za istraživanje mira (The Copenhagen Peace Research Institute – COPRI) koji je osnovan 1985. godine odlukom parlamenta Kraljevine Danske. Institut je 2003. godine inkorporiran u Danski institut za međunarodne odnose (The Danish Institute for International Studies – DIIS). Teorijsko mišljenje Škole razvijano je na tri osnovne ideje: teoriji sekuritizacije, sektorskom pristupu bezbednosti i teoriji regionalnih bezbednosnih kompleksa. Najeminentniji autori proistekli iz Škole jesu Bari Buzan, Oli Viver i Jap de Vilde. 15 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future; http://www.un- documents.net/our-common-future.pdf , pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine

54  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine

kako bi obuhvatio i rastući uticaj poremećaja16 životne sredine na lokalnom, regionalnom, nacionalnom i globalnom nivou. Princip 25. Deklaracije iz Rija17 usvojene 1992. godine kaže da su mir, razvoj i zaštita životne sredine međuza- visni i neodvojivi. Nobelova nagrada za mir 2007. godine dodeljena je Međuvla- dinom panelu o klimatskim promenama (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – IPCC) i američkom političaru Alu Goru za aktivnosti u širenju znanja o klimatskim promenama i njihovom zaustavljanju. Bez obzira na povremena osporavanja Nobelove nagrade za mir kao takve koja se mogu čuti sa različitih strana, odluka iz 2007. godine ipak se može uzeti kao potvrda da se jedno pi- tanje iz oblasti životne sredine, a promena klime to svakako jeste, smatra rele- vantnim za globalni mir i bezbednost. Ilustrativan je i primer Kjoto Protokola, koji je potpisan kao dodatak na Konvenciju UN o klimatskim promenama. Iako ima za cilj smanjivanje emisije gasova koji izazivaju efekat staklene bašte (što bi trebalo da bude cilj prihvatljiv za sve države), ipak izaziva ogromna nesla- ganja između Globalnog Severa i Globalnog Juga, bogatih i siromašnih država, razvijenih i nerazvijenih, što samo potvrđuje da je pitanja životne sredine teško odvojiti od međunarodne politike. Indikativan je i primer NATO, koji je kao jed- na prevashodno vojna alijansa počeo sve više da se bavi i nevojnim pretnjama bezbednosti. U okviru NATO postoji Komitet Nauka za mir i bezbednost (Science for Peace and Security Committee – SPS) koji se između ostaloga bavi i pitanjima bezbednosti i životne sredine. Takođe, u okviru Alijanse postoji i Odeljenje za nove bezbednosne izazove (Emerging Security Challenges Division – ESCD) osno- vano 2010. godine, što je opet samo potvrda sve većeg značaja koji se pridaje netradicionalnim bezbednosnim izazovima kao temi sa kojom će se NATO u budućnosti suočiti. Značaj izazova koji potiču iz prirodne sredine a sa kojima se suočava celokupna međunarodna zajednica NATO je prepoznao još 1969. godi- ne, kada je u okviru Alijanse osnovan Komitet za izazove savremenog društva (Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society – CCMS). Sve do njegovog spa- janja sa ranije pomenutim Komitetom Nauka za mir i bezbednost, Komitet za izazove savremenog društva predstavljao je jedinstven forum za članice NATO i države partnere u okviru koga su razmenjivali znanja i iskustva o socijalnim, zdravstvenim i temama iz oblasti životne sredine, kako u civilnoj tako i u vojnoj sferi. Tokom godina, u okviru NATO osnovano je i nekoliko grupa koje se iz ra- zličitih uglova bave izazovima iz oblasti životne sredine.18 Značajno je pomenuti da je na Evropskom savetu održanom u Solunu 2003. godine pokrenuta i inicija- tiva pod nazivom Mreža zelene diplomatije (Green Diplomacy Network) koja ima

16 U Izveštaju se koristi termin „environmental stress”. Kao najadekvatniji prevod na srpski jezik autor je odabrao reč „poremećaj”. 17 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992; http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio. declaration.1992/portrait.a4.pdf, pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine 18 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm , pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine

55 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

za cilj uključivanje pitanja životne sredine u pitanja spoljnih odnosa EU, čime je Unija potvrdila značaj koji tim pitanjima daje kao i njihovu relevantnost.

OEBS i pitanja bezbednosti životne sredine

Kao velika regionalna organizacija koja se bavi pitanjima bezbednosti a koja pored država Evrope obuhvata i Kanadu i SAD, i sam OEBS je značajno an- gažovan na pitanjima bezbednosti životne sredine. Treba naglasiti da je jedna od tri „dimenzije bezbednosti” u okviru kojih OEBS sprovodi svoje aktivnosti i ekonomsko-ekološka dimenzija. Životna sredina se pominje još u Finalnom do- kumentu iz Helsinkija (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act)19. Naime, u ovome dokumentu, koji se i smatra osnivačkim dokumentom OEBS-a, postoji poglavlje koje nosi naziv „Saradnja u oblasti ekonomije, nauke i tehnologije, i životne sredine”. U okviru ovoga poglavlja nalazi se potpoglavlje 5. – „Životna sredina”. U njemu se navode ciljevi i oblasti saradnje, kao i njeni oblici i metodi. Iako ne pominje bezbednost životne sredine kao takvu, samo potpoglavlje je, uzevši u obzir vreme (1975. godina) i okolnosti u kojima je Do- kument usvajan, prilično ambiciozno i zamišljeno i formulisano. Sledeći znača- jan dokument OEBS-a koji se dotiče pitanja životne sredine jeste Dokument sa konferencije u Bonu (Document of the Bonn Conference)20 iz 1990. godine. Ni u ovome se dokumentu ne pominje bezbednost životne sredine kao takva, ali se naglašava značaj pitanja i problema iz te oblasti. Uzevši u obzir da je dokument usvajan samo godinu dana po padu Berlinskog zida i završetku Hladnog rata, ne čudi činjenica da se životna sredina pominje samo uopšteno, uz isticanje nje- noga značaja u ekonomskoj saradnji. Na Ministarskom savetu OEBS održanom u Mastrihtu u decembru 2003. godine usvojen je Strateški dokument OEBS za ekonomsku i ekološku dimenziju (OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension)21. U poglavlju 1, koje nosi naziv „Izazovi i pretnje u ekonomskoj i ekološkoj dimenziji”, ističe se rastuća zabrinutost za stanje životne sredine. Navodi se i da degradacija životne sredine, neodrživo korišćenje pri- rodnih resursa i propusti u upravljanju otpadom i njegovom odlaganju imaju značajan uticaj na zdravlje ljudi, stabilnost i bezbednost država i da mogu da

19 https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true , pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine 20 http://www.osce.org/eea/14081?download=true , pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine 21 http://www.osce.org/eea/20705?download=true , pristupljeno 15.09.2015. godine

56  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine

naruše ekološke sisteme. Ovi faktori, zajedno se problemima pristupa resursima i negativnim efektima zagađenja, mogu da izazovu napetosti izmedju država. Navodi se i da ekološke katastrofe koje potiču od prirodnih uzroka, ekonomske aktivnosti kao i teroristički akti takođe mogu da predstavljaju ozbiljnu pretnju stabilnosti i bezbednosti. Dokument navodi i listu „odgovora i akcija” (poglavlje 2) koje će OEBS preduzeti a u skladu sa svojim mogućnostima i mandatom. U novembru 2007. godine sednica Ministarskog saveta OEBS održana je u Madri- du. Sa te je sednice proizašao dokument pod naslovom Madridska deklaracija o životnoj sredini i bezbednosti (Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security)22 u kome se životna sredina ne pominje generalno, kao što je to do tada bio slučaj, već se direktno dovodi u vezu sa bezbednošću. U zaključcima iznetim u Doku- mentu navodi se, između ostaloga, da OEBS, u okviru svoga mandata, finansij- skih i ljudskih resursa i kapaciteta ima potencijala za proširivanje i produbljiva- nje saradnje sa drugim međunarodnim organizacijama koje sprovode aktivnosti u oblasti životne sredine a time i da doprinese suočavanju se budućim rele- vantnim rizicima i izazovima u regionu OEBS-a. Navodi se i da OEBS, koristeći svoj forum za dijalog i razmenu iskustava i najboljih praksi, može da doprinese podizanju svesti o potencijalnim uticajima koje na bezbednost mogu da imaju izazovi potekli iz životne sredine, a da potom zaključke do kojih se dođe uključi u svoje buduće aktivnosti.

Pored strateških opredeljenja iznetih u napred navedenim dokumentima, OEBS sprovodi i značajne aktivnosti u oblasti bezbednosti životne sredine. Svakako je najprominentnija od njih partnerstvo u ENVSEC inicijativi. The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) pokrenuta je na 5. Ministarskoj konferenciji Ži- votna sredina za Evropu (The Fifth Environment for Europe Ministerial Conferen- ce) koja je u maju 2003. godine održana u Kijevu. Bila je to zajednička inicijativa OEBS, UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) i UNDP (United Nations Development Program). Godinu dana kasnije ovoj su se inicijativi priključile još tri organizacije: NATO, UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Eu- rope) i REC (The Regional Environment Centre for Central and Eastern Europe). Svaka od napred navedenih partnerskih organizacija u ENVSEC inicijativu je unela svoje određene specifičnosti i ekspertizu. Pristup koji se koristi u okviru Inicijative sastoji se od četiri osnovna koraka:

1. Detaljna procena ugroženosti od bezbednosnih rizika koji potiču iz život- ne sredine – obuhvata identifikaciju neuralgičnih tačaka u kojima može doći do podizanja tenzija oko pitanja životne sredine,

22 http://www.osce.org/mc/29550?download=true , pristupljeno 25.04.2015. godine

57 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

2. Osnaživanje i stimulisanje politika, javne svesti i učešća u odlučivanju – izgradnje kapaciteta i okvira za sprečavanje i nošenje sa bezbednosnim izazovima koji potiču iz životne sredine, 3. Zajedničko upravljanje bezbednosnim rizicima koji potiču iz životne sre- dine – podrška koordinaciji i konkretnim akcijama na državnom i regio- nalnom nivou, 4. Rešenja za bezbednu životnu sredinu i održivi razvoj – obezbeđivanje finansijske podrške i tehničke ekspertize za rešavanje problema u oblasti životne sredine.

Sam OEBS, sa svojim širokom mandatom u oblasti bezbednosti i brojnim misi- jama i prisustvom na terenu, obezbedio je Inicijativi značajnu političku podršku.

Zaključna razmatranja

Uzevši u obzir populaciona kretanja u savremenom svetu kao i dinamiku i inten- zitet tehnološkog razvoja, možemo opravdano zaključiti da će značaj bezbednosti životne sredine u budućnosti rasti. Kao velika regionalna bezbednosna organi- zacija, i OEBS će imati važnu ulogu u suočavanju sa izazovima bezbednosti koji potiču iz životne sredine. Ovde se naročito ističe uloga koju OEBS može odigrati u prevenciji konflikta kao i u post-konfliktnoj izgradnji, što će biti kraće objašnjeno.

Naime, ako OEBS posmatramo kao forum za politički dijalog na visokom nivou o brojnim pitanjima koja se tiču bezbednosti, onda se kroz njega pitanja život- ne sredine mogu iskoristiti kao sredstvo prevencije konflikta. Uzevši u obzir pri- sustvo na terenu kao i dosadašnje iskustvo u okviru ENVSEC inicijative, OEBS može odigrati značajnu ulogu u identifikaciji potencijalnih neuralgičnih tačaka na kojima problemi iz oblasti životne sredine prete da dovedu do konflikta. Potom tema može da bude pokrenuta na visokom političkom nivou sa koga bi se kasnije izvršio politički pritisak za rešavanje problema na adekvatnom nižem nivou – saradnjom država ili lokalnih zajednica. Zajednički problemi u oblasti životne sredine mogu da povezuju ljude i zajednice na veoma pozitivan način, dok zajed- nički napori ka rešavanju ovih problema stvaraju međusobno poverenje i osećaj zajedništva. Pritom se promoviše miroljubivi pristup rešavanju identifikovanih problema. Saradnja u oblasti životne sredine može stoga da bude jako moćno sredstvo za sprečavanje konflikta, izgradnju međusobnog poverenja i promociju

58  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi: bezbednost životne sredine

dobrosusedskih odnosa, što su obrasci koji kasnije mogu biti korišćeni u saradnji u drugim oblastima u kojima postoje nesuglasice ili sporovi.

Pitanja iz oblasti bezbednosti životne sredine, ali i sama oblast životne sre- dine kao takva, mogu biti upotrebljena kao odlično polje za početne korake u post-konfliktnoj saradnji. Naime, za razliku od pitanja teritorije, istorije, jezič- kog, nacionalnog i verskog identiteta i slično, pitanja koja se tiču oblasti životne sredine karakterišu se jako niskim nivoom političke „osetljivosti” i problematič- nosti. Upravo su zbog toga pogodna za preduzimanje početnih koraka u inicijati- vama pomirenja, izgradnje poverenja i post-konfliktne stabilizacije, što može biti uspešno iskorišćeno u nestabilnim regionima kao što su Zapadni Balkan, Kavkaz i neki delovi Centralne Azije, a na kojima je OEBS prisutan na terenu. OEBS je i adekvatan forum za razmenu iskustava, i kao takav može značajno da doprinese poboljšanju upravljanja u sektoru životne sredine u svojim državama članicama.

59  Selena Tasić

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Sažetak: Nakon Hladnog rata sveobuhvatan pristup u upravljanju bezbed- nosnim izazovima utemeljen je u brojnim strateškim dokumentima vodećih međunarodnih organizacija sa geografskim i geopolitičkim pristupom. OEBS, kao organizacija koja svoje aktivnosti temelji na geografskom pristupu, kao osnovnu prednost ima usmerenost na ljudsku bezbednost kroz prisustvo na terenu. Upravo je ovaj koncept i osnovna komparativna prednost OEBS-a u od- nosu na ostale međunarodne organizacije istog karaktera, jer u svetu novih izazova, rizika i pretnji po ljudsku i nacionalnu bezbednost, konflikata koji ne počivaju samo na vojnoj komponenti, «hibridnih» konflikata, međunarodnih i unutardržavnih- OEBS svoj pristup temelji na dijalogu, saradnji i međunarod- nom pristupu- uz korišćenje lokalne ekspertize i informacija sa terena. Ono što je najvažnije, OEBS ima duogogodišnju praksu ispunjenu primerima sa terena, inkluzivnog upravljanja bezbednošću, kroz uključivanje svih aktera u pomenuti proces: državnih koji koriste silu, državnih koji ne koriste silu kao i nedržavnih aktera koji koriste i nedržavnih aktera koji koriste silu.

61 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uvod

OEBS (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/OSCE) kao međuna- rodna organizacija koja se bavi pitanjima saradnje i bezbednosti na globalnom nivou od 1975. godine pokriva najveći broj zemalja Zapada i Istoka i samim tim ima jednu od najznačajnijih uloga u izgradnji političko-vojne, ekološke, eko- nomske i ljudske bezbednosti1 na globalnom nivou.2 Nakon što je multilateralni forum za dijalog i pregovaranje između Zapada i Istoka tj. Konferencija za evrop- sku bezbednost i saradnju (KEBS) 1994. godine prerasla u današnju Organiza- ciju za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, OEBS postaje neprikosnoveni partner vladama na globalnom nivou na rešavanju pitanja prevencije sukoba, izgradnje sistema ranog upozoravanja, upravljanja krizom i postkonfliktne rehabilitacije.3

Pad Berlinskog zida i raspad Sovjetskog saveza promenio je hladnoratovsku bez- bednosnu paradigmu i doveo do osvešćivanja potrebe za proširenim shvatanjem koncepta bezbednosti unutar samih država, koje više ne podrazumeva samo mi- litaristički pristup bezbednosti. Uspostavljanje novog koncepta shvatanja pojma bezbednosti, za posthladnoratovski kontekst značilo je prihvatanje i primenu novih načela na institucionalnom nivou. Koncept demokratskog upravljanja sek- torom bezbednosti podrazumevao je i nov način rukovođenja „novim” pretnjama, koje se ne mogu rešavati samo vojnim pristupom.4 To je dovelo do uključivanja političkih, ekonomskih, socijalnih i ekoloških aspekata pretnji u shvatanje i po- stavku šireg koncepta bezbednosti (detaljnije: Buzan 1991).

Iako tada dolazi do jačanja uloge i pozicije međunarodnih organizacija poput EU i NATO, u akademsko-ekspertskim krugovima OEBS-a i UN-a bezbednost se već uveliko posmatra kao potreba i pravo svake građanke i građanina. Kroz saradnju sa svim nivoima društva u zemljama u kojima deluje, definisanu u mandatu svojih operacija, OEBS jasno prepoznaje i primenjuje sveobuhvatan pristup upravljanju bezbednosnim izazovima.

1 Više o dimenzijama OSCE u Ghebali, 2007 2 Istorijat nastanka OEBS-a, odnosno delovanje i organizovanje KEBS-a, te donošenje Helsinškog akta vezuje se za sasvim drugačiji kontekst međunarodnih odnosa. Iz današnje perspektive, važno je istaći zapostavljenu ulogu tada „neutralne” i „nesvrstane” politike bivše Jugoslavije tj. saradnje njenog vođe Josipa Broza Tita i finskog predsednika Urha Kekonena (Kekkonen) u ovoj fazi uspostavljanja jedne neutralne institucije kao što je KEBS za potrebe dijaloga u periodu Hladnog rata i krize detanta (detaljnije: Bilandžić, Dahlman i Kosanović 2012; Kullaa 2012; Vasiljević 2013, 18−19). 3 Videti detaljnije na zvaničnom sajtu OEBS-a: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/conflict-prevention 4 Detaljnije o demokratskom upravljanju sektorom bezbednosti u: Tasić 2014.

62  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Ovaj rad će analizirati ulogu OEBS-a u kontekstu savremenih izazova, rizika i pretnji po nacionalnu i ljudsku bezbednost sa posebnim osvrtom na aspekat ljudskih prava na globalnom nivou i u regionu Zapadnog Balkana u kome je naj- veći broj aktivnih misija. Posebno će biti analizirana uloga nedržavnih aktera u upravljanju bezbednosnim izazovima, uspostavljanju regionalne saradnje i in- stitucionalizaciji vladavine prava − procesi koji su umnogome bili podstaknuti upravo aktivnostima OEBS-a u zemljama sa postkonfliktnim i postautoritarnim nasleđem. Na završetku, biće izloženi zaključci i potencijalne preporuke za dalji mandat OEBS-a u regionu i svetu kada su u pitanju rizici i pretnje sa kojima se čovečanstvo suočava danas.

Uloga i značaj OEBS-a u suočavanju sa savremenim rizicima i pretnjama

Količina oružanih sukoba na globalnom nivou, rastuća potreba za vojnim odgo- vorom na porast nasilja i ugrožavanja osnovnih ljudskih prava širom planete na početku 21. veka, dovodi do ključnog pitanja koje stručnjaci i akademici svakod- nevno postavljaju: gde je napravljena greška? Nekoliko godina nakon Hladnog rata, konsolidovane demokratije naizgled su pronašle rešenje za utemeljenje me- đunarodnog pravnog okvira vodeći se ključnim principima Kantovog koncepta Večnog mira. Razvijeni Zapad sa „dolazećim” (eng. emerging) demokratijama biv- šeg istočnog bloka, bio je uglavnom usmeren na jačanje institucija internacional- nog karaktera čiji su osnovni zadaci bili: uspostavljanje saradnje i povezanosti ra- zvijenih demokratija, uspostavljanje uslova za bezbedan život na svim delovima planete, „demokratizacija” slabih država, jačanje globalne ekonomije i razmene, kao i zaštita pravnih poredaka zasebnih država kroz međunarodno pravo.

Nestankom bipolarnog svetskog poretka stvoreni su uslovi za rast i razvoj glo- balnog slobodnog tržišta, novih tehnologija, nauke i privrede, udruživanje kapa- citeta za zaštitu prava čoveka, ali i zaštitu čovekove sredine, jačanje svih nivoa društva u cilju daljeg unapređenja individualnih i kolektivnih sloboda. Svi ovi prioriteti dobili su svoj formalno-pravni okvir pod okriljem Ujedinjenih nacija, Evropske unije, NATO-a, OEBS-a i drugih međunarodnih organizacija koje za osnovni mandat imaju očuvanje mira i zaštitu međunarodnog pravnog poretka.

Međutim, početak novog milenijuma ozbiljno je poremetio globalnu bezbed- nosnu paradigmu terorističkim napadom na SAD 2001. godine. NATO kao voj-

63 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

no-politički savez ponovo je dobio na značaju, te su se međunarodni postulati primenjeni početkom devedesetih godina 20. veka u ratu u bivšoj Jugoslaviji ponovo aktivirali. U bezbednosnom smislu, tehnološki napredak i insistiranje Zapada na demokratizaciji slabih država bez prethodnog sagledavanja kontek- sta donelo je niz izazova, takozvanih „novih pretnji”, koje su zahtevale drugačije pristupe njihovom rešavanju.

Nakon septembra 2001. godine prioriteti upravljanja sektorom bezbednosti u jakim državama sve se više temelje na kontinuiranom uvođenju reformi i ino- vacija u funksionisanje sistema bezbednosti. Ove reforme su, kao što je već navedeno, uglavnom usmerene „na potrebu za delovanjem van teritorije države − nove generacije mirovnih misija i nove oblike civilno-vojne saradnje u zemlji i van nje” (Stojanović 2009, 86).

Među prioritete suočavanja sa „novim” pretnjama po nacionalnu i međunarod- nu bezbednost spadaju: borba protiv organizovanog kriminala, sajber-teroriz- ma, terorizma, globalnog zagrevanja, hemijskog naoružanja, trgovine ljudima itd. U globalizovanom svetu XXI veka, upravo razvijene i jake države snose naj- veće posledice „novih” pretnji i izazova po bezbednost, budući da se njihov uticaj na globalnom bezbednosnom planu smatra najvećom pretnjom po bezbednost drugih država. Upravo u ovom segmentu, pokazalo se da moć zasebnih država vrlo uspešno aktivira tzv. bezbednosnu dilemu5 i finalno dovodi do potencijalne eskalacije sukoba što se danas ogleda u odnosima između SAD, Rusije, Irana, Izraela itd. Upravo u ovom praznom prostoru kada se i „tvrda” i „meka” moć Vlada država pokazujuneefikasnima, otvara se širok prostor za jačanje uloge organizacija koje deluju isključivo kroz okvir zaštite međunarodnog prava, po- štovanja prava i sloboda, negovanje saradnje između zemalja i insistiranje na demokratskim načinima rešavanja kriznih situacija.

OEBS se u tom smislu pokazao kao krucijalan partner u upravljanju bezbedno- snim izazovima i indukovanju procesa reforme sektora bezbednosti (u daljem tekstu RSB) u državama sa postkonfliktnim nasleđem. RSB kao koncept ima jaku dimenziju sprečavanja sukoba, što je važan deo rada OEBS-a. Kodeks iz 1994. o političko-vojnim aspektima bezbednosti sadrži niz ključnih koncepata

5 „Shvatanje da je rat konstantno istorijsko obeležje međunarodne politike i da je malo verovatno da će nestati, zasnovano je na uverenju da su države suočene sa onim što se naziva bezbednosna dilema, od koje ne mogu da pobegnu. Ideju bezbednosne dileme prvi put je jasno artikulisao John Hertz 1950 godine. To je bilo, kao što je rekao: “temeljno uverenje po kome napori država da očuvaju sopstvenu bezbednost, nezavisno od njihovih namera vode uvećanju nesigurnosti ostalih, jer svi preduzete mere objašnjavaju kao odbrambene dok mere drugih doživljavaju kao potencijalnu pretnju” po sopstvenu bezbednost (M.H), John Baylis, International and Global Security, u: The Globalization of World Politics, second edition, John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds), Oxford University Press, UK, 2001, p. 257 (preuzeto od Hadžić, 2005)

64  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

i principa od značaja za RSB (OSCE 1994). Kao organizacija koja za razliku od EU ima geopolitički pristup (detaljnije: Ghebali 2007), OEBS predstavlja svojevr- stan kohezioni faktor evroatlantske i evroazijske dimenzije. Kroz Parlamentarnu skupštinu OEBS-a, organizacija ima pristup 57 parlamenata država članica sa tri kontinenta (Severne Amerike, Evrope i Azije), uključujući i njihovim odborima za odbranu, te stoga igra važnu ulogu u izgradnji kapaciteta zakonodavnog nad- zora (detaljnije:Galbreath 2007). OEBS takođe sprovodi širok spektar aktivnosti vezanih za RSB na terenu, uključujući i postkonfliktni kontekst, gde pitanja kao što su razoružanje, demobilizacija i reintegracija (DDR), kontrola malog i lakog naoružanja (SALW), upravljanje granicama i vladavina prava predstavljaju neka od ključnih prioriteta delovanja.6 Primeri delovanja misija OEBS-a u procesu RSB uključuju Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Albaniju, Hrvatsku, FYROM, Kosovo, Kirgistan, Crnu Goru i Srbiju, kao i posebno razvijene programe pomoći u Jermeniji, Azer- bejdžanu i Kazahstanu i od 2014. godine u Ukrajini. U tom smislu važno je na- pomenuti da najverovatnije nijedna od zasebnih država članica OEBS-a u bilo kojoj diplomatskoj formi ne bi bila prihvaćena na lokalnom nivou, posebno ne od strane sistema odbrane, na način na koji je u pomenutim slučajevima bila pri- hvaćena međunarodna organizacija sa jasnim mandatom koji se temelji na pre- venciji i dijalogu. To se jasno pokazalo na primeru Ukrajine gde je saradnja Vlade bila i ostala kontinuirana i usmerena na rešavanje krize (opširnije: OSCE 2014).

Saradnja sa nedržavnim akterima koji ne koriste silu

Uključivanje lokalnih nedržavnih aktera koji ne koriste silu u reformski proces, posebno kada je u pitanju sektor bezbednosti, umnogome zavisi i od uslova koje postavlja međunarodna zajednica kao eksterni akter reforme. Naime, ukoliko jedan od najvažnjih spoljnopolitičkih ciljeva vlade određene zemlje predstavlja reintegracija u međunarodnu zajednicu, kao što je to u slučaju država Zapadnog Balkana integracija u Evropsku uniju, utoliko je proces ispunjavanja uslova za to članstvo od strane vlade efikasniji. Za razliku od recimo kontroverznog i proble- matičnog poimanja NATO-a na Zapadnom Balkanu, posebno u Srbiji kao jednoj od glavnih garanta (ne) bezbednosti u regionu7, OEBS je kroz aktivnosti svojih

6 Više o lekcijama sa terena OEBS-a videti u: Zannier 2006. 7 Više o problematici NATO u Srbiji u: Ejdus, 2011

65 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

misija dokazao da je za uspešno ispunjavanje osnovnih funkcija svog postojanja8 potrebno dugoročno lokalno prisustvo i saradnja sa svim akterima reforme na terenu. Kako je istaknuto u Rezoluciji o saradnji sa civilnim društvom i nevladi- nim organizacijama, usvojenoj na godišnjem sastanku Parlamentarne skupštine OEBS-a u Briselu 2006. godine, sve države članice OEBS-a imaju obavezu da pri- znaju da „jako i nezavisno civilno društvo oslobođeno od uticaja Vlade doprinosi suštinskoj promociji ljudskih prava, demokratije i vladavine prava” (OSCE PA 2013). Samim tim, svaka misija koju OEBS preuzima u određenoj zemlji podra- zumeva kontinuiranu saradnju sa lokalnim civilnim društvom, upravo iz razloga što je njihova suštinska uloga slična i saradnja prirodna. Naime, osnovna funk- cija civilnog društva ogleda se u nadzoru nad radom institucija i demokratskoj kontroli procesa i aktivnosti bezbednosnih struktura, kroz nezavisni monitoring, izradu studija i analiza, istraživanja i debate. Nadzornu ulogu OCD vrše stalnim aktuelizovanjem i reaktuelizovanjem tema od značaja za bezbednost građana/ ki, pozivanjem na odgovornost predstavnika sistema i monitoring sprovođenja akcionih planova i agendi9. Civilno društvo takođe ima krucijalnu ulogu u pru- žanju civilne ekspertize prilikom kreiranja normativnog okvira. Pored tog vida pružanja ekspertize, OCD mogu značajno da doprinesu jačanju kapaciteta zapo- slenih u sektoru bezbednosti,10 kako kroz obuke ili treninge, tako i kroz direk- tno zajedničko organizovanje događaja. Izrada publikacija za građane/ke o radu institucija, pa i službi bezbednosti, takođe značajno doprinosi transparentnosti odgovornosti urušenog sistema. Oblast komunikacije sa javnošću predstavlja jednu od glavnih komparativnih prednosti civilnog društva u odnosu na državu.

Da bi ove aktivnosti obavljalo neometano, civilnom društvu je pored instituci- onalne podrške u vidu formalno-pravnog omogućavanja da deluje, potrebna i snažna međunarodna podrška, posebno u zemljama sa postautoritarnim i po- stkonfliktnim nasleđem. OEBS je u tom smislu jedna od retkih međunarodnih organizacija koja nije upala u zamku „forme bez reforme”. Naime, neadekvat- nom koordinacijom donatorske pomoći, nedovoljno specifikovanim sistemom evaluacije sprovedenih inicijativa i neuključivanjem pluralizma ciljeva koji su u direktnoj sprezi sa lokalnim potrebama područja, većina donatora na Zapadnom Balkanu je upala u zamku „finansiranja sopstvenih ciljeva” i stvaranja civilnog društva koje je zavisno od donatorske pomoći. To se desilo upravo zbog manjka prisustva na terenu. Savremeni izazovi i pretnje po ljudsku i nacionalnu bez-

8 Bezbednosni dijalog, postavljanje standarda i monitoring sprovođenja preuzetih obaveza od strane insitucija, zatim proces demokratizacije i prevencija ponovnog konflikta. Više o tome: OSCE 2014, 1 9 Više o kapacitetima za nadzornu ulogu OCD nad sektorom bezbednosti videti u Stojanović 2009 10 Na primer, kancelarija UN Women u Srbiji uložila je značajna sredstva u obuku pripadnika sektora bezbednosti za saradnju sa civilnim sektorom, orodnjavanje sektora bezbednosti itd. Više o projektima UN Women kancelarije videti na:http://rs.one.un.org/index.php?org=18&lang=en&page=44&type=2&id=167

66  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

bednost su transnacionalni, ali veoma kontekstualno uslovljeni od zemlje do zemlje. Kako bi aktivnosti međunarodnih organizacija imale smisao i učinak, potrebna je velika lokalna podrška i kontinuiran izvor informacija sa terena. Ovo je još jedna od nemerljivih prednosti organizacije poput OEBS-a koja u saglasnosti sa Vladama zemalja uspostavlja misije i operacije na terenu. Pri- meri za ovo su brojni i obuhvataju širok spektar ciljeva i aktivnosti koje jačaju komponentu ljudske bezbednosti. Primera radi, jedna od dugoročnih aktivno- sti Visokog komesara OEBS-a za nacionalne manjine u cilju jačanja integracije moldavskog društva je projekat koji je počeo 2005. godine usmeren na jezičku obuku državnih službenika u oblastima sa manjinskih stanovništvom, u okviru koga je za 7 godina 2,900 službenika naučilo jezik. Takođe, jedna od najuspešni- jih priča kada je reforma sektora bezbednosti na Zapadnom Balkanu u pitanju, svakako je dugoročno učešće OEBS misija i operacija u Srbiji, Crnoj Gori, Bosni i Hercegovini i Kosovu u oblasti reforme policije11. Slična situacija važi i za projekte usmerene na jačanje slobode medija. Uvođenjem stalne predstavnice OEBS-a za medije, koja pritom poseduje lokalno iskustvo, umnogome je pobolj- šan monitoring Vlada u OEBS regionu kada je u pitanju omogućavanje slobode izražavanja u pojedinačnim zemljama. OEBS misija u Srbiji takođe ima redovnu saradnju sa akademskim institucijama i pružanje podrške kako nastavnom ka- dru unverziteta, škola i obrazovnih ustanova, tako i studentima kroz stipendije i obuke. Takođe, neki od najučinkovitijih projekata civilnog društva bili su upravo podržani od OEBS-ovih odeljenja za medije, demokratizaciju, rodnu ravnoprav- nost itd. u okviru misija u državama Zapadnog Balkana12.

Naučene lekcije i prednosti OEBS-a

Pod okriljem svog osnovnog mandata koji se zasniva na sveobuhvatnom pristu- pu upravljanjem bezbednosti kroz saradnju, OEBS je od devedesetih godina XX veka do danas imao ključnu ulogu u međunarodnoj areni kada su u pitanju tri

11 Više o primerima projekata i postignuća OEBS misija i operacija na sledećem linku: http://www.osce.org/ stories?page=10 kao i u OEBS-ovom časoopisu Security Community: http://www.osce.org/magazine 12 Neki od projekata NVO sa konkretnim rezultatima u pojedinačnim oblastima: 1. Predsedavanje Srbije OEBS-om i uloga mladih: http://www.koms.rs/poziv-trening-projekat-predsedavanje-srbije-oebs-om-2015-i-uloga-mladih/; 2. Mladi na Kosovu: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/74240?download=true; 3. Mladi Romi i obrazovanje u Crnoj Gori: http://www.mladiromi.me/projekti/2013/121-obrazovanjem-do-integracije

67 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

osnovna polja delovanja: prevencija konflikata, političko-vojna dimenzija bez- bednosti i dimenzija ljudske bezbednosti.

OEBS je jedina regionalna bezbednosna organizacija u kojoj Zapad i Rusija sede za istim stolom pod jednakim uslovima. U današnjoj konstelaciji međunarodnih odnosa, ovo je možda najveća prednost OEBS-a, jer ova institucija kao organiza- cija bez vojnih kapaciteta zagovara rešenje kroz dijalog. Najbolju argumentaciju za ovo predstavlja set metoda korišćen kako bi se sprečila eskalacija sukoba u Ukrajini. Prvo, specijalna Misija OEBS-a za praćenje (Special Monitoring Missi- on/SMM) nastala je 21. marta 2014. godine, nakon konsenzusom postignute od- luke Stalnog saveta svih 57 država članica OEBS-a. Od tada, misija postiže kon- kretnerezultate u pogledu pružanja verodostojnih informacija sa terena kroz nezavisne izveštaje iz deset regiona u Ukrajini, uključujući i sporna područja Lugansk i Donjeck. Kako navodi grupa autora OEBS-ove mreže akademskih in- stitucija, OEBS se danas iznova pozicionira kroz „…terenske operacije koje u okviru svog mandata sadrže institucionalnu inkluzivnost, regionalno iskustvo i sposobnost brzog reagovanja” (detaljnije: OSCE 2014). Oni dalje svoju argumen- taciju temelje na činjenicama da su OEBS terenske misije usmerene na „proces pružanja resursa i ekspertize u periodima krize, tranzicije ili izgradnje države” (ibid.). Ono što je još važnije, ove misije se ne mogu ni uspostaviti ni prekinuti bez saglasnosti matične države.

Kada je u pitanju sveobuhvatnost pristupa očuvanju bezbednosti, saradnje i vladavine prava, OEBS je zasigurno pored UN agencija, jedina međunarodna organizacija koja ima razvijene mehanizme saradnje sa nedržavnim akterima u društvu poput nevladinog sektora, akademske zajednice i medija kroz usmeren dijalog, koordinaciju donatorske pomoći, prisustvo na terenu, stalan monitoring rezultata i kontinuirano praćenje predstavnika medija i civilnog sektora.

68  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Literatura

Bilandžić Vladimir, Dahlmann, Ditmar i Kosanović, Milan. ed. 2012. From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and The Crisis of Detente. Internationale Beziehungen: Theorie und Geschichte, 10. Gottingen: Bonn University Press.

Bryden, Alan i Heiner Hänggi. 2005. Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. DCAF.

Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in Post Cold War Era. London: Harvester/Wheatseaf.

Ejdus, Filip, 2011. „Kognitivna disonanca i bezbednosna politika Srbije.” U Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana, broj 20, Maj-avgust 2011, 13-30

Galbreath, David J. 2007. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). New York, NY: Routledge.

Ghebali, Victor Yves, 2007. „Security Sector Governance in the OSCE region and Beyond.” U Democratic Governance of the Security Sector beyond the OSCE Area: Regional Approaches in Africa and the Americas, Uredili Victor Yves Ghebali i Alexander Lambert, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): LIT Verlag, 1−20.

Hadzic, Miroslav. Švarm, Filip 2005. „Priručnik sa pojmovnikom za novinare Bezbednosna pitanja”,Medija Centar Beograd.

Hadžić, Miroslav. 2000. Civilna kontrola vojske i policije. Beograd: Centar za civilno- vojne odnose.

OECD. 2007. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd.org/development/ incaf/38406485.pdf

OSCE. 1994. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 91st Plenary Meeting of the Special Committee of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in Budapest on 3 December 1994, http://www.osce.org/fsc/41355

OSCE. http://www.osce.org/secretariat/conflict-prevention

69 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

OSCE. 2014. The Future of OSCE Field Operations (Options), OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, http://osce-network.net/fileadmin/user_osce- network/documents/The_Future_of_OSCE_Field_Operations__Options_.pdf

OSCE PA. 2013. Resolution on Strengthening Civil Society Institutions in the OSCE Region, https://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2013-istanbul-annual- session/2013-istanbul-final-declaration/1663-26

Security Community,The OSCE Magazine.

Stojanović, S. 2009. Godišnjak reforme sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji. Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose.

Tasić, Selena. 2014. „Demokratsko upravljanje sektorom bezbednosti i uloga civilnog društva u reformi sektora bezbednosti.„ Medijski dijalozi 7(20): 669−689.

Tasić, Selena. 2014a. Uloga sektora bezbednosti u različitim kontekstima reforme sektora bezbednosti. Neobjavljen master rad, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu.

Vasiljević, Maja. 2013. „View to Cold war Through the Pericentric Lenses: Tito’s Yugoslavia and Kekkonen’s Finland.” Limes plus IX(1): 9−28.

Ghebali Victor-Yves, Lambert Alexandre. 2007. „Democratic Governance of the Security Sector beyond the OSCE Area” DCAF

Zannier, Lamberto. 2006. „Lessons Learned from the Field.” U Developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept for the United Nations, Bratislava Proceedings of the Expert Workshop, 31−36, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%204%20Developing.pdf

70  Jelena Nikolić

Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

Maj 2015

Sažetak: Rad ukazuje na sveobuhvatan koncept bezbednosti razvijen u okviru sistema OEBS-a, koji obuhvata, osim bezbednosti države, i nivo ljudske bezbed- nosti. U okviru ljudske dimenzije bezbednosti biće predstavljen mandat OE- BS-ovog Visokog komesara za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, kao i njegova uloga u suočavanju sa pretnjama koje mogu doći iz socijetalnog sektora na koji rad posebno obraća pažnju. Ukazuje se na pitanje jezika kao sredstva za integraciju nacionalnih manjina, i u tom smislu sredstva za očuvanje stabilnosti političkog poretka države. Biće predstavljen prikaz uloge OEBS-a u unapređenju učenja zvaničnog jezika države u osnovnom i srednjem obrazovanju kao sredstva za uspešnu integraciju nacionalnih manjina u Republici Srbiji.

71 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Pojam bezbednosti i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Nakon završetka hladnog rata i kraja bipolarne strukture međunarodnih odnosa dolazi do redefinisanja koncepta bezbednosti u savremenim studijama bezbed- nosti kao i teoriji međunarodnih odnosa. Pojam bezbednosti prestaje da se od- nosi samo na vojne pretnje i nacionalnu bezbednost već biva proširen kada na dnevni red međunarodne bezbednosti dolaze i nevojne pretnje kao što su unu- trašnji sukobi, terorizam, organizovani kriminal, posledice klimatskih promena i druge. Koncept takođe biva produbljen jer se bezbednost sa nivoa države prenosi i na pojedninca, društvene grupe, region i čitav međunarodni poredak u smislu globalne bezbednosti. Predstavnici Kopenhaške škole studija bezbednosti Beri Buzan i Ole Vejver razvili su sektorski pristup bezbednosti i pružili novi analitič- ki okvir za ovakvu bezbednosnu dinamiku. Prema ovom pristupu postoji pet sek- tora bezbednosti, a to su vojni, politički, socijetalni, ekonomski i ekološki. Svaki od ovih sektora ima svoj referentni objekat, karakteristične odnose i pretnje.

Vojni sektor bezbednosti kao tradicionalno polazište studija bezbednosti podra- zumeva dinamiku između političkih jedinica u kojoj postoji pretnja ili upotreba vojne sile. Ključni referentni objekat uprkos promenama u međunarodnom po- retku ostaje teritorijalni integritet i suverenitet države, a pretnje u ovom sekto- ru mogu dolaziti od drugih država ali i od nedržavnih aktera.1

Politički sektor za referentni objekat podrazumeva organizacionu stabilnost u okviru određene političke zajednice. Kako je dominantni oblik političkog or- ganizovanja država to je referentni objekat savremene bezbednosne dinamike u ovom sektoru organizaciona stabilnost države, a to znači legitimitet njenih ustanova pred građanima. Pretnje bi u ovom slučaju bile sve one koje bi izazvale nestabilnost i ugrozile politički poredak, kako od strane unutrašnjih nedržavnih aktera, poput na primer podsticanja secesionizma, tako i spoljnih aktera ukoliko dolazi do osporavanja priznanja jedne države od strane drugih država.2

Socijetalni sektor odlikuju odnosi moći između kolektivnih identiteta, a refe- rentni objekat jeste identitet jedne političke zajednice. PremaVejveru socijetal- na bezbednost jeste sposobnost društva da očuva suštinske osobine pred mo-

1 Ejdus 2012, 125-143 2 Ejdus 2012, 146- 151

72  Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

gućim pretnjama, odnosno sposobnost odbrane identiteta od opaženih pretnji.3 U bezbednosnoj dinamici društvene grupe se mogu pojavljivati nezavisno od država te u tom slučaju one nastoje zaštititi svoj kolektivni identitet koji mogu izražavati putem jezika, religije, kulture i načina života. Ukoliko bismo na pri- mer govorili o predstavnicima nacionalne manjinske grupe bezbednosna pret- nja bi mogla biti država u kojoj žive ukoliko preti da na bilo koji način ugrozi njihov kolektivni identitet.

Referentni objekat u ekonomskom sektoru zavisi od nivoa analize. Ukoliko go- vorimo o nivou pojedinca to bi bilo blagostanje pojedinca. Na nivou države refe- rentni objekat bilo bi ukupno ekonomsko blagostanje, odnosno postignuti nivo privrednog razvoja. Na kraju, referentni objekat na međunarodnom nivou jeste međunarodni liberalni poredak koji države teže da očuvaju.

Konačno, ekološki sektor podrazumeva odnose čoveka i prirode, a referentni objekat bila bi civilizacija, ili biosfera.4 Iz tog razloga teško je definisati referen- tni objekt na individualnom ili nivou države jer pretnje po ekološku bezbednost uglavnom pogađaju međunarodno društvo u celini na dugoročnom planu.

Treba uzeti u obzir da se radi o idealtipskom razgraničenju sektora i da često dolazi do prelivanja bezbednosnih pretnji iz jednog u drugi sektor. Iste pretnje mogu se održavati na različite referentne objekte i istovremeno izazvati nesta- bilnosti u više sektora. Ovaj analitički okvir odražava sveobuhvatno poimanje bezbednosti iz perspektive Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju.

OEBS i tri dimenzije bezbednosti

Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju međuvladina je organizacija zasnovana na ideji očuvanja mira i bezbednosti na evropskom tlu. Nastala je u hladnoratovskom periodu kao izraz težnji Istoka i Zapada ka iznalaženju zajed- ničkih vrednosti koje bi premostile dugogodišnju zatvorenost dveju strana za saradnju. Ratovima opterećeno evropsko tle bilo je kroz istoriju pretnja stabil-

3 Ejdus 2012, 115 4 Ejdus 2012, 116

73 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

nosti u međunarodnim odnosima te je nosilo potrebu za osnivanjem organiza- cije koja bi se bavila očuvanjem bezbednosti upravo u ovom delu sveta.

OEBS je regionalna organizacija koja sa svojih 57 država učesnica pokriva prostor cele Evrope, evro-atlantski i evro-azijski region. Nastala kao forum za dijalog iz- među Istoka i Zapada u hladnoratovskom periodu, kao Konferencija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, u Završnom aktu iz Helsinkija iz 1975. godine ona razvija sveobuhvatni koncept bezbednosti koji podjednako podrazumeva nivo državne, ali i ljudske bezbednosti. U radnom delu konferencije koja je trajala od 1973. do 1975. godine pitanja koja su razmatrana podeljena su u tri korpe: bezbedno- sne i mere izgradnje poverenja, saradnja na ekonomskim, naučno-tehnološkim i pitanjima zaštite životne sredine, i na kraju, pitanja ljudskih prava i kretanja ljudi, ideja i robe preko granica, kasnije poznate kao tri dimenzije bezbednosti (vojno-politička, ekonomsko-ekološka i ljudska).5 Uključivanje takvog širokog spektra pitanja odražava sveobuhvatan pristup bezbednosti koji ostaje jedan od najvećih doprinosa OEBS-a. Sve tri dimenzije razvijale su se vremenom, kroz niz dokumenata koji su širili krug obaveza koje su zemlje učesnice prihvatale.

Od potpisivanja Završnog akta iz Helsinkija kada su države učesnice preuzele obaveze iz nekoliko odredaba koje se odnose na ljudska prava donet je još čitav niz dokumenata pod okriljem KEBS-a koji je relevantan za ljudska prava. Tokom godina ljudska dimenzija razvila se u detaljan katalog prava koji sadrži i me- hanizme koji pomažu zemljama učesnicama u implementaciji. Ljudska dimen- zija ključna je u naporima OEBS-a za izgradnjom mira. Nezavisne institucije OEBS-a – Kancelarija za demokratske ustanove i ljudska prava (ODIHR), Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina (HCNM) i Predstavnik za slobodu me- dija (RFOM) ključni su instrumenti za osiguranje poštovanja ljudskih prava, demokratije i vladavine prava.6

Mandat Visokog komesara za pitanja nacionalnih manjina sa sedištem u Hagu, jeste da ukaže na interese i prava nacionalnih manjina na prostoru zemalja učesnica OEBS-a. U Helsinškim odlukama iz jula 1992. godine, Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju ustanovila je ovu instituciju kao instrument za sprečavanje sukoba u najranijoj mogućoj fazi.7 Ovaj mandat je u velikoj meri nastao kao odgovor na situaciju u bivšoj Jugoslaviji za koju su mnogi strahovali da bi se mogla ponoviti negde drugo u Evropi, naročito u državama u procesu tranzicije ka demokratiji i koja bi mogla da potkopa ideju mira i prosperiteta

5 http://react.usip.org/downloads/module1.pdf 6 OSCE Handbook 2000, 91 7 Haške preporuke o pravu nacionalnih manjina na obrazovanje i objašnjenje, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, 1996, str. 1

74  Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

na kojoj počiva organizacija. Visoki komesar nema mandat da aktivno deluje na prostoru gde je konflikt već izbio, njegova ključna uloga jeste prevencija. Ukoliko postoje indikatori za izbijanje krize u određenom području koje se može preliti u nasilje on izdaje rano upozorenje, i o tome obaveštava Predsedavajućeg OEBS-om. Visoki komesar nezavisan je u svom radu, i ne postoji potreba za dozvolom od strane Stalnog saveta.8 Isto tako on može posetiti države i oblasti u kojima žive nacionalne manjine, ako za to ima potrebe, i bez dozvole ili oba- veštenja zvaničnih vlasti. Delovanje Visokog komesara isključuje angažman u pitanjima pojedinačnog pripadnika neke nacionalne manjine, već on nadzire i izveštava o stanju prava pripadnika nacionalnih manjina na teritoriji zemalja učesnica. U okviru svog mandata izdaje preporuke i smernice za implemen- taciju prava nacionalnih manjina. Preporuke koje su osnova za istraživanje u ovom radu jesu Haške preporuke o pravu nacionalnih manjina na obrazova- nje iz 1996. godine i Ljubljanske smernice za integraciju raznolikih društava iz 2012. godine. Takođe, u okviru svog mandata Visoki komesar za nacionalne manjine sprovodi projekte manjeg obima koji mogu unaprediti stanje prava nacionalnih manjina u državama učesnicama OEBS-a. Poseban osvrt na ulogu ove institucije u zaštiti prava na obrazovanje pripadnika nacionalnih manjina u Republici Srbiji biće predočen u narednom delu rada.

Iako obaveze preuzete unutar OEBS-a nisu pravno obavezujuće one imaju po- ličku težinu koja obezbeđuje ispunjenje ovih obaveza od strane država učesnica. Ove tri dimenzije pružaju mogućnost suočavanja sa bezbednosnim izazovima koji mogu poteći iz svih pet sektora bezbednosti o kojima je bilo reči prethodno. Pretnje se ne pojavljuju uvek izolovano i ne utiču na referentni objekat samo u jednom sektoru. Najčešće dolazi do prelivanja te tako neizvesnosti koje se jave u socijetalnom sektoru mogu lako da se preliju u politički sektor i time izazovu nestabilnost političkog poretka u nekoj državi, što vrlo često može rezultirati prelivanjem i u vojni sektor. Ljudska dimenzija bezbednosti značajna je u tom pogledu što proklamovani principi demokratije, vladavine prava, ljudskih prava, dobrog upravljanja, čvrstih demokratskih institucija utiču na osiguranje jačanja državnih institucija i smanjenje opasnosti od unutrašnjih tenzija koje mogu biti izazvane socijalnim nezadovoljstvom ili kršenjem ljudskih prava.

Zbog obima rada pažnja će biti usmerena samo na socijetalni sektor i ulogu koju OEBS ima u suočavanju sa pretnjama koje dolaze iz ovog sektora. Ugroženost opstanka kolektivnog identiteta kao referentnog objekta u ovom sektoru pred- stavlja bezbednosnu pretnju po pripadnike određene nacionalne manjine. To dalje može predstavljati faktor nestabilnosti u okviru određene političke zajed-

8 OSCE Handbook 2000, 32

75 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

nice, odnosno države u kojoj ta nacionalna manjina živi. Kao preduslov stabil- nosti političkog poretka javlja se integrisanost određene nacionalne manjine u društveni i javni život države. Naime, dalje u radu biće analizirano pitanje uloge jezika u integraciji nacionalnih manjina u Srbiji kao preduslova za stabilnost političkog poretka i uloge OEBS-a u suočavanju sa ovim izazovom.

Jezik kao sredstvo integracije – uloga OEBS-a

Imajući u vidu da jezik predstavlja ključno obeležje nacionalnog identiteta, nje- gova uloga je od velikog značaja za poštovanje i uživanje manjinskih prava. Pravo na korišćenje maternjeg jezika predviđeno je Okvirnom konvencijom za zaštitu prava nacionalnih manjina Saveta Evrope, kojom je propisano da „svaki pripadnik nacionalne manjine ima pravo da koristi slobodno i bez ometanja svoj manjinski jezik, privatno i javno, usmeno ili pismeno”9, dok su Evropskom poveljom o regionalnim ili manjinskim jezicima definisana načela i ciljevi na kojima države grade svoju politiku, zakonodavstvo i praksu u vezi sa regional- nim ili manjinskim jezicima koji se upotrebljavaju u okviru njenih teritorija.

Takođe, pravo, kao i dužnost pripadnika nacionalnih manjina da učestvuju u procesu društvene integracije predviđeno je u više međunarodnih dokumena- ta.10 U Ljubljanskim smernicama za integraciju raznolikih društava Visokog komesara OEBS-a za pitanja nacionalnih manjina navodi se da „politika inte- gracije treba da obuhvati mere koje podstiču dijalog između zajednica i njiho- vu interakciju na osnovu tolerantnosti i uzajamnog poštovanja. To obuhvata širok spektar inicijativa u raznim oblastima, uključujući obrazovnu, medijsku i jezičku politiku”11. Pored toga navodi se i da „države imaju obavezu da zaštite i unaprede manjinske jezike i prava lica koja pripadaju manjinama da uče i koriste te jezike, a manjine u isto vreme dele s većinom odgovornost za učešče u kulturnom, socijalnom i ekonomskom životu i javnim poslovima […] To učešće

9 Okvirna konvencija za zaštitu prava nacionalnih manjina, član 10. 10 Haške preporuke o pravu nacionalnih manjina na obrazovanje i objašnjenje, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, preporuka br. 1; Okvirna konvencija za zaštitu prava nacionalnih manjina, objašnjenje uz čl. 14; Ljubljanske smernice za integraciju raznolikih društava, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, 2012 smernica br. 42 11 Ibid, smernica br 11.

76  Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

podrazumeva da lica koja pripadaju manjinama treba da steknu odgovarajuće znanje državnog ili zvaničnog jezika”.12

Nedovoljno poznavanje zvaničnog jezika države dovodi do smanjenja mogućno- sti učešća pripadnika nacionalnih manjina u obrazovanju na zvaničnom jeziku države, u stručnom osposobljavanju, zatim u zapošljavanju i, na kraju, smanje- nog učešća u procesu donošenja odluka i širem društvenom životu.

Poznavanje zvaničnog jezika predstavlja faktor društvene integracije, zato je potrebno da država uskladi napore vezane za učenje manjinskih i zvaničnog jezika, posebno u sredinama gde se obrazovanje odvija na jeziku nacionalne manjine i gde su mogućnosti za učenje zvaničnog jezika u velikoj meri veza- ne za obrazovni sistem, kao što je to u sredinama gde pripadnici nacionalnih manjina čine većinsko stanovništvo. Prema Ljubljanskim smernicama politika država treba da bude takva da uspostavi ravnotežu između potrebe za jednim ili više zajedničkih jezika koji predstavljaju zajedničku osnovu za integrisanje i funkcionisanje društava i obaveze u pogledu očuvanja i unapređenja jezičke ra- znolikosti, između ostalog i zaštitom jezičkih prava manjina. Vlade treba svima da pruže dostupnu mogućnost da nauče državni jezik.13 Dalje, prema Haškim preporukama utvrđuje se da manjine ne samo da imaju pravo da očuvaju vla- stiti identitet posredstvom maternjeg jezika, već imaju i pravo da se uključe i učestvuju u široj nacionalnoj zajednici, tako što će učiti službeni jezik države. U objašnjenu preporuka 11-14, a koje se odnose na osnovno i srednje obrazo- vanje manjina navodi se da pristupi koji zagovaraju utapanje, kada se program sprovodi isključivo na službenom jeziku države i kada su deca pripadnika ma- njine sasvim integrisana u razrede sa decom pripadnika većine nisu u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima. To se takođe odnosi na odvojene škole u kojima se čitav nastavni program predaje isključivo posredstvom maternjeg jezika ma- njine tokom čitavog obrazovnog postupka, i u kojima se jezik većine uopšte ne uči, ili se uči minimalno.14

Bliže će bit pojašnjen zakonski okvir u Srbiji koji reguliše pitanje odnosa ostva- rivanja prava na obrazovanje na maternjem jeziku i učenja zvaničnog jezika države. Prema Zakonu o osnovama sistema obrazovanja i vaspitanja, obrazov- no-vaspitni rad ostvaruje se na srpskom jeziku. Za pripadnike nacionalnih ma- njina obrazovno-vaspitni rad ostvaruje se na maternjem jeziku, a izuzetno se

12 Ibid, objašnjenje uz smernicu br. 42 13 Ljubljanske smernice za integraciju raznolikih društava, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, 2012, smernica 42 14 Haške preporuke o pravu nacionalnih manjina na obrazovanje i objašnjenje, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, 1996, objašnjenje uz preporuke br. 11, 12, 13, 14

77 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

može ostvarivati i dvojezično ili na srpskom jeziku.15 Prema Zakonu o osnov- noj školi, kada se nastavni plan i program ostvaruje i na jezicima nacionalnih manjina, učenik savlađuje nastavni plan i program srpskog jezika.16 Takođe, predviđeno je da kada se obrazovno-vaspitni rad ostvaruje na jeziku i pismu na- cionalne manjine, škola je u obavezi da za učenike organizuje nastavu srpskog jezika.17 Pitanje prava na upotrebu jezika za pripadnike nacionalnih manjina regulisano je istim zakonom kojim se predviđa da kada se nastava izvodi na srpskom jeziku, za učenike pripadnike nacionalne manjine se organizuje nasta- va na jeziku pripadnika nacionalne manjine sa elementima nacionalne kulture kao izbornim predmetom.18

Saznanja o slabom znanju srpskog jezika među pripadnicima i pripadnicama albanske nacionalne manjine dolaze iz civilnog društva, institucija, stručnja- ka, učesnika različitih inicijativa, programa i projekata, kao i od pojedinaca iz albanske zajednice. Nezadovoljavajući nivo znanja zvaničnog jezika Republike Srbije dovodi se u direktnu vezu sa znatno umanjenim šansama da pripadnici albanske nacionalne manjine koriste mogućnosti u vezi sa obrazovanjem na zvaničnom jeziku Republike Srbije, da se prijavljuju na konkurse za zapošljava- nje (posebno u državnoj upravi), da budu u većoj meri uključeni u proces dono- šenja odluka.19 Takođe uočeno je da se mladi Albanci sa juga Srbije zbog nedo- voljnog znanja srpskog jezika odlučuju na studiranje u Tirani, Skoplju, Tetovu ili Prištini i da upravo zbog slabog poznavanja srpskog jezika nemaju mogućnosti da studiraju na univerzitetima u Srbiji, niti da kasnije traže zaposlenje u Srbiji, odnosno van svojih lokalnih zajednica. Sve ovo vodi otežanoj integraciji pripad- nika albanske nacionalne manjine u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji. Ovo se takođe odnosi i na pripadnike drugih nacionalnih manjina čiji maternji jezik nije blizak srpskom jeziku, kao što je na primer mađarski.

U naporima da se suoči sa ovim pitanjima Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji 2013. godine sprovela je projekat „Unapređenje jezičkih sposobnosti pripadnika nacionalnih manjina na Jugu Srbije” u Srednjoj školi „Sezai Suroi” u Bujanovcu. Cilj projekta je bio unapređenje mogućnosti i okvira za integraciju pripadnika albanske i romske nacionalne manjine putem usavršavanja nastave Srpskog kao nemater- njeg jezika u srednjoj školi. Projekat je imao dve dimenzije, prva je podrazume-

15 Zakon o osnovama Sistema obrazovanja i vaspitanja (Sl. Glasnik RS, br. 55/2013), čl. 9 st. 2 16 Zakon o osnovnom obrazovanju i vaspitanju (Sl. Glasnik RS, br.55/2013) čl. 5 st. 4 17 Ibid, čl.12 st. 4 18 Ibid, čl 12.st.5 19 Studija o mogućnostima unapređenja nastave I učenja Srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika u opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, Služba Koordinacionog tela Vlade Republike Srbije za opštine Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, 2014, str. 9

78  Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

vala rad sa učenicima u srednjoj školi, dok je druga bila usmerena na pripremu pripadnika albanske i romske nacionalne manjine za studije srpskog jezika na Univerzitetu u Nišu.

Ideja projekta podrazumevala je angažovanje asistenata u nastavi srpskog je- zika kao nematernjeg. Izabrani asistenti bili su tek svršeni studenti srpskog je- zika i književnosti koji su dobili priliku da steknu prvo radno iskustvo učešćem u nastavi u multietničkoj sredni. Odabrano je pet asistenata u nastavi koji su završili srpski jezik i šesta asistentkinja koja je završila albanski jezik i književ- nost, a koja je uporedo držala časove albanskog jezika ostalim asistentima.20 Polazna ideja za rad na unapređivanju nastave srpskog jezika kao nematernjeg zasnovana je na iskustvima studenata odeljenja Ekonomskog fakulteta Subo- tice u Bujanovcu, koji su imali poteškoća u studiranju zbog slabog poznavanja srpskog jezika, kao i iskustva odabranih kandidanta za osnovnu policijsku obu- ku u Sremskoj Kamenici koji nisu uspeli da polože test poznavanja srpskog jezi- ka, zbog čega nisu mogli da prođu neophodnu obuku i steknu uslov za rad u po- liciji.21 Imajući u vidu da postoji zakonski okvir koji propisuje obaveznu nastavu srpskog jezika za pripadnike nacionalnih manjina koji pohađaju obrazovanje na maternjem jeziku, Misija OEBS-a je realizovala projekat u okviru obrazovne in- stitucije. Nastavu su izvodili asistenti uz podršku dvoje redovnih profesora koji su imali ulogu mentora. Izvođenje nastave uz pomoć asistenata bila je novina koja je olakšavala rad profesorima, a učenicima činila čas zanimljivjim, omogu- ćavajući im da uz pomoć novih krativnih metoda lakše usvoje jezik.

Važno je istaći da su iskustva ovog projekta bila značajna za dalje obraćanje državnih institucija po pitanju unapređenja nastave srpskog jezika kao nemater- njeg. Najvažniji zaključci koji su pristekli iz realizacije projekta bili su potreba za uključivanjem državnih institucija22 koje će rezultate ovog projekta prepoznati kao primere dobre prakse, potreba za definisanjem višegodišnjeg plana za una- pređivanje nastave jezika, sistematizacija radnih mestakako bi asistenti u nasta- vi postali praksa i konstanta, učenje albanskog jezika(odnosno jezika nacionalne manjine na kom se obazovanje izvodi), među profesorima i nastavnicima koji- ma albanski nije maternji a predaju nastavu pripadnicima albanske nacionalne manjine.23 Takođe, ukazano je na neophodnost unapređenja i dopune postojećih udžbenika kao i prilagođavanja postojećeg nastavnog plana i programa za pred-

20 Ibid, str. 180 21 Ibid, str. 181 22 Kao kljčni partneri prepoznati su Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja, Služba Koordinacionog tela za opštine Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđu, Zavod za vrednovane kvaliteta obrazovanja i vaspitanja. Videti: Studija o mogućnostima unapređenja nastave i učenja Srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika u opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, Služba Koordinacionog tela Vlade Republike Srbije za opštine Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, 2014, str. 184. 23 Ibid, str. 185

79 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

met srpski kao nematernji. Ovakvom inicijativom pokušano je da se ukaže na drugačija rešenja kao i na to da su promene unutar sistema moguće.

Dalje se navodi primer podrške Visokog komesara OEBS-a za pitanja nacional- nih manjina u rešavanju ovog pitanja. Naime, Kancelarija Visokog komesara pružila je stručnu i finansijsku podršku Službi Koordinacionog tela Vlade Re- publike Srbije za opštine Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđu za izradu „Studije o mogućnostima unapređenja nastave i učenja srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika u opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa” koja je sprovedena 2014. godine. Ova studija takođe se oslanja na iskustva stečena realizacijom pomenutog projekta Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji. Studija se bavi analizom stanja, problema i rezultata nastave srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika u osnovnim školama u Preševu, Buja- novcu i Medveđi. Izvršena je analiza nastavnog plana i programa,načina ostva- rivanja nastave, kao i analiza udžbenika za predmet srpski kao nematernji jezik za osnovne škole. Konačno, na osnovu izvršenih analiza, kao i stavova i mišljena zainteresovanih strana u vezi sa učenjem srpskog kao nematernjeg, studija daje niz kratkoročnih, srednjoročnih i dugoročnih preporuka za unapređenje nasta- ve. S tim u vezi, Kancelarija Visokog komesara takođe sprovodi projekat imple- mentacije određenih preporuka iznesenih u ovoj studiji. Na osnovu prethodnog iskustva Misije OEBS-a i preporuka iz studije Služba Koordinacionog tela uz podršku Visokog komesara sprovodi projekat angažovanja asistenata u nastavi u osnovnim i srednjim školama u opštinama na jugu Srbije. Ukupno 16 škola u tri opštine će dobiti asistente u nastavi na ovom predmetu u toku školske 2015/2016 godine.24 Takođe, u okviru ovog projekta, i kao deo napora Kancela- rije Visokog komesara za pitanja nacionalnih manjina za implementacijom dela preporuka iz studije, vrši se izrada albansko-srpskog, srpsko-albanskog rečnika kao deo unapređenja sredstava za sprovođenje nastave.

Kao dalje sistemsko rešenje, a na osnovu uočenih nedostataka i preporuka koje su proizašle iz projekta Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji, kao i studije Koordinacionog tela, započet je proces izmene nastavnog plana i programa za predmet Srp- ski kao nematernji jezik za sva tri ciklusa osnovnog i srednjeg obrazovanja. Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji identifikovala je potrebu za unapređenjem nastavnog plana i programa kao za unapređenjem udžbenika za ovaj predmet. Kao neop- hodnu aktivnost koja prethodi realizaciji ovih ciljeva Misija OEBS-a u saradnji sa Zavodom za vrednovanje kvaliteta obrazovanja i vaspitanja ukazala je na potrebu i omogućila organizovanje dvodnevnog sastankapod nazivom „Analiza stanja nastave srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika kao deo pripreme razvoja opštih

24 Dostupno na: http://www.kt.gov.rs/sr/news/arhiva-vesti/srpski-kao-nematernji-jezik.html, pristupljeno 27.09.2015. godine

80  Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

standarda postignuća za srpski kao nematernji jezik”.25 Skupu su prisustvova- li nastavnici koji predaju Srpski kao nematernji jezik u školama u kojima se izučavaju mađarski, hrvatski, albanski, rusinski, slovački, bosanski, bugarski i rumunski kao maternji jezici, kao i predstavnici nacionalnih saveta nacionalnih manjina, predstavnici Misije OEBS-a, Koordinacionog tela i Pedagoškog zavoda Vojvodine. Analizirani su nastava i učenje srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika u okviru nekoliko tema, a to su nastavni programi za osnovnu i srednju školu, motivacija učenika u različitim školama, problemi nastave i neophodna znanja i umenja u oblasti srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika. Na osnovu zaključaka sa ovog sastanka Misija OEBS-a omogućila je i podržala fomiranje Radne grupe za razvoj opštih standarda postignuća za srpski kao nematernji jezik za kraj prvog, drugog i trećeg ciklusa obrazovanja.26 Razvoj standarda realizuje se pod okvirom Zavoda za vrednovanje kvaliteta obrazovanja i vaspitanja uz podršku Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja i Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji.27 Predviđeno je da Radna grupa izradi standarde do kraja 2015. godine, nakon čega je predviđeno nacionalno testranje standarda i procedura usvajanja stan- darda od stane Ministarstva i Nacionalnog prosvetnog saveta. Tek nakon zavr- šetka izrade i uvođenja standarda u škole moguć je proces započinjanja rada na izmeni nastavnog plana i programa, nakon čega je konačno moguća i izmena udžbenika za ovaj predmet.

Završetak ovog procesa doprineće unapređenju nastave srpskog jezika za sve pripadnike nacionalnih manjina koji nastavu pohađaju na maternjem jeziku. Izrada standarda i rad na promeni nastavnog plana i programa trebalo bi da doprinese poboljšanju uslova učenja srpskog jezika, posebno za pripadnike na- cionalnih manjina čiji maternji jezik nije blizak srpskom jeziku. Slabo poznava- nje zvaničnog jezika države predstavlja posebnu prepreku integraciji pripadnika ovih nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji. Podrška OEBS-a i napori da se ove prepreke prevaziđu predstavljaju težnju ka olakšanju integracije manjina, i s tim u vezi ka celokupnoj stabilnosti u državi.

25 Dostupno na: http://www.kt.gov.rs/sr/news/arhiva-vesti/srpski-kao-nematernji-jezik.html, pristupljeno 27.09.2015. godine 26 Dostupno na: http://www.osce.org/serbia/132211 pristupljeno 28. 09.2015 27 Dostupno na: http://www.mpn.gov.rs/srpski-kao-nematernji-jezik-skup-nasta/, pristupljeno 27.09.2015

81 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Zaključak

Rad predstavlja razvoj percepcije bezbednosnih pretnji u posthladnoratovskom periodu, nakon kraha bipolarne stukture međunarodnih odnosa. Predstavljene su tri dimenzije bezbednosti koje odražavaju koncept proširenog pojma bezbed- nosti. Poseban naglasak stavljen je na ljudsku dimenziju i institucije unutar si- stema OEBS-a koje imaju ključnu ulogu u implementaciji principa ove dimenzije.

Predstavljen je prikaz uloge OEBS-a u unapređenju učenja zvaničnog jezika dr- žave kao sredstva za uspešnu integraciju nacionalnih manjina. Iskustva pro- jekta koje je realizovala Misija OEBS-a na jugu Srbije ukazala su na potrebe i nedostatke na kojima je potrebno raditi. Iskustva asistenata angažovanih na ovom projektu, kao i rezultati studije pokazuju da postoji velika zainteresova- nost kod učenika, kao i kod njihovih roditelja za učenjem srpskog jezika. To uka- zuje da problem nije u motivaciji pripadnika nacionalnih manjina za učenjem zvaničnog jezika već da su potrebne sistemske promene u unapređenju nastave predmeta srpski kao nematernji. Takođe uočena je protreba rada na profesio- nalnom usavršavanju i obuci nastavnika koji predaju ovaj predmet. Kao počet- na aktivnost u obraćanju ovom problemu studija koju je izvršila Služba Koor- dinacionog tela za opštine Preševo Bujanovac i Medveđu pokazala je da samo pet posto ispitanika (učenika osnovnih škola u tri opštine) ima zadovoljavajuće znanje, funkcionalnu sposobnost za efikasnu pismenu i usmenu komunikaciju na srpskom jeziku. Rezultati studije takođe pokazuju da se uglavnom radi o učenicima koji su svoje znanje srpskog stekli van nastave, u neposrednom kon- taktu s pripadnicima većinskog naroda, ili kroz praćenje medija28. Dakle, ne radi se o znanju stečenom na nastavi ovog predmeta. Rad daje prikaz neophodnih izmena u sistemu obrazovanja nacionalnih manjina, kao i ulogu koju su Misija OEBS u Srbiji i Visoki Komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina do sada imali u naporima za rešanjem ovih pitanja, kao mogućnosti olakšavanja dalje integra- cije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Srbiji.

28 Dostupno na: http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/mladi-albanci-nedovoljno-poznaju-srpski-jezik_514706.html pristupljeno 28.09.2015

82  Poseban osvrt na jezik kao sredstvo integracije nacionalnih manjina u društveni i javni život u Republici Srbiji

Literatura

Ejdus, Filip. 2012. Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi. Beograd: Službeni glasnik

Vukadinović, Lidija Č. 2010. Euroatlantizam i suvremeni međunarodni odnosi. Zagreb: Politička kultura

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (ed.), OSCE Handbook, Vienna, OSCE (2000)

Haške preporuke o pravu nacionalnih manjina na obrazovanje i objašnjenje, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, 1996

Ljubljanske smernice za integraciju raznolikih društava, OEBS Visoki komesar za pitanja nacionalnih manjina, 2012

Studija o mogućnostima unapređenja nastave i učenja Srpskog kao nematernjeg jezika u opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, Služba Koordinacionog tela Vlade Republike Srbije za opštine Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, 2014

Okvirna konvencija za zaštitu prava nacionalnih manjina, Savet Evrope, 1994

Zakon o osnovnom obrazovanju i vaspitanju (Sl. Glasnik RS, br.55/2013)

Zakon o osnovama sistema obrazovanja i vaspitanja (Sl. Glasnik RS, br. 55/2013)

Internet stranice:

www.osce.org

www.osce.org/odihr

www.osce.org/hcnm

www.osce.org/fom

http://www.osce.org/serbia/

http://www.mpn.gov.rs

http://www.kt.gov.rs

83  Jelena Mitić

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Sažetak: Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS) kao najveća regionalna, bezbednosna organizacija u svetu, pokriva širok spektar aktivnosti iz oblasti bezbednosti. Preventivna diplomatija, koju najčešće koristi kao in- strument svojih aktivnosti, uključuje kontrolu naoružanja, povećanje poverenja među državama, praćenje poštovanja ljudskih prava i prava manjina, posma- tranje izbora, mere protiv trgovine ljudima, borbu protiv terorizma, praćenje ekonomskih i ekoloških odnosa. Takođe OEBS podržava vlade regiona u unapre- đenju regionalne saradnje i posebno u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, s obzirom na to da organizovani kriminal nije samo savremeni bezbednosni iza- zov već i vrlo važno društveno pitanje. Organizovani kriminal je postao osnovna pretnja koja ugrožava državnu, regionalnu i međunarodnu bezbednost, direk- tno ugrožava i potkopava autoritet država, čime onemogućava njihov razvoj. Za Srbiju OEBS predstavlja izuzetno važnog strateškog partnera u učvršćivanju mira, demokratije i bezbednosti u regionu. Jedan od prioriteta Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji predstavlja i borba protiv organizovanog kriminala. U okviru programske oblasti na koju su usmerene aktivnosti Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji, vladavine prava i ljudskih prava, borba protiv organizovanog kriminala predstavlja važan deo.

Ključne reči: OEBS, savremeni bezbednosni izazovi, organizovani kriminal, borba protiv organizovanog kriminala, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji, Republika Srbija i organizovani kriminal.

85 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Iako predstavlja naslednicu, odnosno nastala je na temeljima Konferencije o bezbednosti i saradnji u Evropi (KEBS), održane u Helsinkiju 1975. godine, Or- ganizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS) u suštini predstavlja novu međunarodnu instituciju. Na Samitu u Budimpešti, 5. i 6. decembra 1994. godi- ne, na predlog Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, KEBS menja ime u OSCE (ОЕBS), a od 1. januara 1995. godine odluka postaje pravosnažna. Predmeti i načini delovanja, mesto i uloga u evropskim odnosima u kojima je danas uključena Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, bitno se razlikuju od ranijeg, helsinškog KEBS-a. Pre svega, kada je u pitanju njegova esencijalna funkcija danas, to više nije unapređenje procesa detanta u Evropi (koji je ostvaren), već usmeravanje i upravljanje procesom demokratskog preobražaja ranijih socijali- stičkih društava Istočne i Jugoistočne Evrope i regionalna stabilizacija.1 Iako su glavni centri odlučivanja, kada se radi o međunarodnom ambijentu, Evropska Unija, NATO i Savet bezbednosti UN, OEBS predstavlja značajan činilac post- hladnoratovske ere međunarodnih odnosa. OEBS- ov instrumentalno-operativ- ni aspekt, odnosno njegova praktična upotrebljivost, predstavlja dominantnu karakteristiku sa tendencijom daljeg razvoja.

Savremeni svet karakteriše ne samo produbljivanje starih već i nastanak novih izazova, rizika i pretnji, koji su zahvatili i unutrašnje i međunarodne odnose. Ovi izazovi se ispoljavaju u različitim oblicima, zavisno od političkog, ekonomskog i kulturnog razvoja pojedinih zemalja i regiona. Razvoj modernog društva doveo je do pojave novih bezbednosnih izazova, rizika i pretnji, dok su stari dobili nove pojavne oblike i nove dimenzije. U savremenom bezbednosnom okruženju pažnja donosilaca političkih odluka preusmerena je sa vojnih na nevojne pret- nje. Države ulažu velike napore u samom prepoznavanju bezbednosnih izazova, rizika i pretnji i trude se da ih popišu u strategijsko-normativnim dokumenti- ma, kao što su strategija nacionalne bezbednosti i strategija odbrane. Evropska strategija bezbednosti navodi pet ključnih pretnji po bezbednost Evropske unije. To su terorizam, proliferacija oružja za masovno uništenje, regionalni sukobi, neuspele države i organizovani kriminal.

Organizovani kriminal je postao osnovna pretnja koja ugrožava državnu, regi- onalnu i međunarodnu bezbednost. Ova vrsta kriminala direktno ugrožava i potkopava autoritet država, čime onemogućava njihov razvoj, ugrožava društvo i njegove vrednosti. Organizovani kriminal je poprimio transnacionalnu dimenzi- ju, ne poznaje granice između država i ne pravi razliku po nivou njihove ekonom- ske razvijenosti. On destabilizuje vlade, podriva parlamentarizam, ruši poverenje

1 Aćimović Ljubivoje “ OEBS na početku XXI veka”, MP 1, (2013): 7–23, preuzeto april 12, 2015, doi:10.2298/ MEDJP1301007A.

86  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

građana u državne i pravne institucije, negira zakonitost i društveni moral. Kao jedan od savremenih bezbednosnih izazova, organizovani kriminal dovodi u pita- nje bezbednost, ne samo individualnu, već i kolektivnu, državnu i međunarodnu. Borba protiv savremenih izazova i pretnji bezbednosti, kao što je i organizovani kriminal, zahteva primenu posebnih mehanizama za njihovo sprečavanje, otkri- vanje i suzbijanje, kao i mehanizama za formulisanje strategije za tu borbu.

Pluralitet definicija organizovanog kriminala, koji se može naći u literaturi, govori o mnoštvu njegovih pojavnih oblika, značaju i potrebi naučnog istra- živanja tog fenomena. Tako na primer Schulte-Bockholt definiše organizovani kriminal kao grupu koja, generalno, funkcioniše prikriveno, sa strukturom koja je refleksija kulturnih i socijalnih uslova u društvu u kome deluje i čiji je pri- marni cilj stvaranje pristupa bogatstvu i moći kroz učestvovanje u kriminalnim aktivnostima ekonomskog karaktera. Organizovani kriminal je forma grube akumulacije moći zasnovane na korišćenju pretnje i nasilja, koja ima različi- te socio-ekonomske pojavne oblike u vremenu i prostoru i koja je generisana specifičnim uslovima okruženja (Schulte-Bockholt, 2001:238). Profesor Goran Bošković opširnije definiše organizovani kriminal kao imovinsko (profitno) ori- jentisanu kontinuiranu kriminalnu delatnost, koju vrše kriminalne organizacije u različitim oblastima pogodnim za “kriminalnu eksploataciju”, a odlikuje ga visok stepen interakcije između članova organizacije, diferencijacija zadataka i organizovani modeli koji se prilagođavaju potrebama delovanja na kriminal- nom tržištu i korišćenje kriminalnih metoda (nasilja, zastrašivanja i korupcije) i nekriminalnih metoda (delovanje u sferi legalnih ekonomskih tokova), kojima se uspostavljaju veze, vrši uticaj na nosioce vlasti i ostvaruju kriminalni ciljevi.2 Što se tiče pojma organizovanog kriminala u srpskom zakonodavstvu, 2009. go- dine izmenjeno je postojeće stanje stvari u domenu normativnog određenja poj- ma. Tako je pojam organizovanog kriminala jedinstveno određen i u Zakoniku o krivičnom postupku i Zakonu o organizaciji i nadležnosti državnih organa u suzbijanju organizovanog kriminala, korupcije i drugih posebno teških krivičnih dela. Takvo normativno određenje organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji je gotovo identično definiciji Saveta Evrope sadržanoj u Preporuci o vodećim principima borbe protiv organizovanog kriminala iz 2001. godine. Prema navedenim odred- bama organizovani kriminal predstavlja krivična dela koja vrše organizovane kriminalne grupe ili njeni pripadnici. Pod organizovanom kriminalnom grupom podrazumeva se grupa od tri ili više lica, koja postoji određeno vreme i deluje sporazumno s ciljem vršenja jednog ili više krivičnih dela za koje je propisana

2 Bošković, G. (2014) “Organizovani kriminal”, Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd, str. 8.

87 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

kazna zatvora od četiri godine ili teža kazna, radi sticanja, posredno ili nepo- sredno, finansijske ili druge koristi.3

Najvažniji strateški dokument u oblasti zaštite nacionalnih interesa i bezbed- nosti Republike Srbije jeste Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije. Kod izazova rizika i pretnji, ali i kod bezbednosnih interesa Republike Srbije postoji velika sličnost u okviru regiona jugoistočne Evrope. Jedan od razloga za to je svakako to što su mnogi od njih bili povezani i prelivali se iz jedne u drugu državu u regionu, u ne tako davnoj prošlosti. Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, međutim, manju pažnju posvećuje bezbednosnim aspektima organizovanog kriminala, već ga isključivo posmatra kao kriminološki problem. Političke ambicije organizovanog kriminala i težnja organizovanih kriminalnih struktura da utiču na donošenje političkih odluka i javnog mnjenja predstavlja posebnu opasnost po bezbednost jedne zemlje. Organizovane kriminalne struk- ture neretko korumpiraju političke faktore u državi, medije i druge institucije i pojedince i na taj način uspostavljaju kontrolu nad političkim tokovima u državi što se negativno odražava na razvoj demokratije i vodi ka totalitarnom režimu. Naročito je opasna povezanost između organizovanog kriminala i terorističkih organizacija, zbog toga što se one često bave kriminalnim delatnostima radi sti- canja sredstava za svoje aktivnosti usmerene na postizanje političkih ciljeva, dok je cilj organizovanih kriminalnih grupa sticanje nelegalnog profita koji se kori- sti za dalje kriminalne aktivnosti. Organizovani kriminal ima posebnu težinu u regionu Balkana i ugrožava njegovu stabilnost i integraciju u Evropsku uniju. U Republici Srbiji, na osnovu dosadašnjih iskustava, kriminal ove vrste javlja se u obliku nasilničkog kriminala, ilegalne trgovine narkoticima, motornim vozilima i ljudima, kao i u sferi finansijskog kriminala, pranja novca i drugih finansijskih transakcija koje podržava korupcija. Ključni nosioci organizovanog kriminala imaju prilagodljivu strukturu i način delovanja. Brzo menjaju polje delovanja i integrisani su u evropske i svetske tokove organizovanog kriminala. Korupcija se takođe može posmatrati u okviru organizovanog kriminala, ona ugrožava te- meljne vrednosti društva i ostvaruje izuzetno negativan uticaj na razvoj društva i integracione procese, što kao krajnju posledicu ima destabilizaciju unutrašnjih i prilika u regionu.4 Borba protiv organizovanog kriminala treba da bude glavni prioritet u svim zemljama u tranziciji ka demokratiji. Ove zemlje su naročito po- godne za razvijanje organizovanih kriminalnih aktivnosti zbog toga što nemaju policijske kapacitete, pravne instrumente, a neretko ni političku volju da se su- protstave organizovanom kriminalu. U njih se organizovani kriminal doseljava

3 Ibidem 4 Dragišić, Z. (2010) “Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije kao strategijska bezbednosna procena”, Godišnjak Fakulteta bezbednosti, Beograd, str. 103, 106, 114, 115.

88  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

iz drugih, uređenijih i stabilnijih država, jer ima povoljnije uslove za razvoj. Zbog toga u tim državama organizovani kriminal danas cveta.

Neke od izraženih karakteristika organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji mogu se iz- dvojiti na osnovu analize sadržaja dokumenta Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije koji je objavljen 2001. godine pod nazivom “Kriminalne grupe i pojedinci koji se bave organizovanim kriminalom na teritoriji Republike Srbije”. Kriminalne grupe su uglavnom formirane prema prostornom određenju ali je radius operandi delovanja najvećim delom cela teritorija Srbije, ali i Crna Gora i druge zemlje u okruženju. Vršenjem ovog krivičnog dela, kriminalne grupe stekle su veliki kapital koji su najčešće legalizovale kroz kupovinu nekretnina i razne investicije poput trgovine naftom i nabavke proizvodnih mašina. Može se reći da se organizovani kriminal, u svim svojim pojavnim oblicima i povećanom obimu, javlja u Srbiji tek početkom devedesetih godina prošloga veka. Raspad socijalističke Jugoslavije, ekonomske sankcije, početak građanskih ratova, počev od 1991. godine, nastojanje novog autoritarnog režima da te sankcije izigra i da očuva vlast, doveli su do procvata organizovanog kriminala. U tom periodu, koji je trajao više od deset godina, organizovani kriminal ne samo što nije krivično gonjen i suzbijan, već je svesno i planski podstican. Mnogi autori taj period na- zivaju i zlatnim dobom organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji. U tom periodu čak nije bilo ni jedne osude za organizovani kriminal, nijedan propis unutrašnjeg prava nije bio donet, nijedan međunarodni ugovor o suzbijanju te vrste kriminala nije potpisan. Kao Krivično delo pod tim imenom uvedeno je, članom 231, u Krivični zakonik Srbije tek 2005. godine. Nakon ubistva premijera Zorana Đinđića, 12. marta 2003. godine, borba protiv organizovanog kriminala je postala prioritet u odnosu na sve druge aspekte reforme policije u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori. Opasnost od organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji počela je tada jasnije da se uočava. Atentat je bio visoka cena koju je Srbija platila da bi pokrenula ozbiljniju borbu pro- tiv organizovanog kriminala. Sama priroda organizovanog kriminala je takva da stalno menja svoje oblike a njegov obim i posledice prelaze granice jedne zemlje. Organizovani kriminal u Srbiji samim tim postaje problem čitavog re- giona i šire međunarodne zajednice. Početni korak u suzbijanju organizovanog kriminala učinjen je izradom Nacionalne strategije za borbu protiv organizova- nog kriminala, koju je Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila 29. marta 2009. godine. Usvajanjem Strategije Srbija je postigla veliki pomak u zaokruživanju tzv. „prve generacije reformi” sektora bezbednosti i ispunila je jedan od uslova približava- nja Evropskoj uniji. U Strategiji se posebno ističe da je za efikasnu borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala neophodno uspostavljanje saradnje i stvaranje pove- renja između državnih organa, privatnog sektora i civilnog društva.

OEBS podržava vlade regiona u unapređenju regionalne saradnje i posebno u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala s obzirom na to da organizovani kriminal

89 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

nije samo pitanje bezbednosti već i društveno pitanje. Može se reći da je Srbija u velikoj meri završila jednu “eru” u spoljnopolitičkim odnosima, zasnovanu ne samo na povratku u postojeće već i učlanjivanju u nove međunarodne i re- gionalne organizacije. Za Srbiju OEBS predstavlja izuzetno važnog strateškog partnera u učvršćivanju mira, demokratije i bezbednosti u regionu i borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Misija OEBS je uspostavljenja u Srbiji već petnaest godina, sa ciljem da podrži demokratske reforme, tako što održava dobre odnose sa svim ministarstvima i pomaže u procesu jačanja institucija. Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji bavi se širokom lepezom aktivnosti, od kojih je borba protiv organizova- nog kriminala, pored reforme policije, demokratizacije i razvoja medija, veoma važan deo, u okviru programske oblasti na koju su usmerene aktivnosti Misije a to je vladavina prava i ljudskih prava.

Bitan pomak u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala je učinjen 3. aprila 2003. godine kada je Misija OEBS-a u tadašnjoj Državnoj zajednici Srbiji i Crnoj Gori (SCG) bila domaćin koordinacionog sastanka predstavnika međunarodne zajed- nice i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova i Ministarstva pravde. Ovaj sastanak je omogućio OEBS-u i spomenutim ministarstvima da utvrde okvire strategije za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala, i potvrdio ulogu OEBS-a kao koordinatora međunarodne podrške programima reforme policije i pravosuđa. Reforma poli- cije igra centralnu ulogu u procesu stabilizacije jedne zemlje. Zbog toga je uvo- đenje demokratskih principa u rad policije od izuzetne važnosti za razvoj demo- kratskog društva. Posebno mesto pripada i suzbijanju organizovanog kriminala i ponovnoj izgradnji odnosa između policije i javnosti. Borba protiv organizovanog kriminala je oduvek bila jedan od prioritet Misije OEBS-a u Srbiji. Misija OEBS aktivno podržava obuku policije, a jedan od prvih programa od uspostavljanja misije bio je baš iz te oblasti. Misija i Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova rade na reformi obuke i modernizaciji obrazovanja policije. Bitan zadatak svake države i međunarodne zajednice je da se na zakonskom, sudskom i kriminalističkom nivou suprotstavljaju organizovanom kriminalu. U toj borbi najvažnije specijali- zovane organe čine policija i organi pravosuđa. Misija OEBS u Srbiji kroz realiza- ciju svojih projekata, na polju bezbednosti i saradnje, značajno doprinosi jačanju kapaciteta u svim oblastima društvenog života, u okviru programa demokrati- zacije, vladavine prava i ljudskih prava, medija, a posebna pažnja se posvećuje i pružanju pomoći u primeni projekata u oblasti reforme policije.

Nakon ubistva premijera Đinđića aktivnosti Misije OEBS-a, uz blisku saradnju sa Vladom tadašnje Srbije i Crne Gore, usmerene su ka utvrđivanju strategije za pružanje podrške srpskim vlastima u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Mi- sija je do sada pomagala Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova Srbije u izradi pro- jekata vezanih za razvijanje antikorupcijske inicijative i odgovornosti u policiji i pružala podršku Upravi za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala MUP-a. Kao

90  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

glavni partner Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova u realizaciji procesa reforme policije, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji pomaže policiji u oblasti obrazovanja i obuke, programima odgovornosti i unutrašnje kontrole, rada policije u lokalnoj zajed- nici. Nesumnjivo pruža veliku podršku državama članicama u borbi protiv orga- nizovanog kriminala tako što veliku pažnju posvećuje podizanju svesti javnosti o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Takođe, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji sarađuje sa Tužilaštvom za organizovani kriminal tako što pruža pomoć kod sistemati- zacije prikupljenih podataka i funkcionisanja sistema za razmenu informacija.

Kako bi ispunila obaveze na planu političkih, bezbednosnih, ekonomskih, eko- loških i pitanja ljudskih prava, Parlamentarna skupština OEBS-a okuplja 57 zemalja iz Evrope, centralne Azije i Severne Amerike. Parlamentarna skupšti- na OEBS-a je, inače, uspostavljena sa ciljem promovisanja većeg uključivanja parlamenata država članica, kao i olakšavanja međuparlamentarnog dijaloga i saradnje u demokratijama u razvoju. Skupština predstavlja forum za parla- mentarnu diplomatiju, prati izbore i jača međunarodnu saradnju. Na zaseda- nju Parlamentarne skupštine OEBS-a, u Beogradu 2011. godine, odobreno je 25 rezolucija koje su bile uvrštene u Beogradsku deklaraciju Parlamentarne Skupštine. Usvajanjem ovih rezolucija u velikoj meri se doprinosi oblikovanju politike OEBS-a i nacionalnog zakonodavstva. Između ostalog, delegacija Srbije podnela je nacrt rezolucije pod nazivom Borba protiv ilegalne trgovine ljudskim organima, kao oblast iz domena organizovanog kriminala.

U toku 2013. godine Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji pokrenula je projekat “Jačanje ka- paciteta Tužilaštva za organizovani kriminal Srbije za sprovođenje efikasnih istraga i unapređenje regionalne saradnje”, sa ciljem da pomogne Tužilaštvu za organizovani kriminal Srbije da ostvari maksimalnu korist iz donacije softvera Ministarstva pravde Italije koji je namenjen upravljanju predmetima i poveća- nju razmene podataka i dokaza.

Kao nastavak svojih aktivnosti u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, 2014. godine, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji pokrenula je projekat za jačanje kapaciteta polici- ja Srbije, Makedonije i Crne Gore u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, koje je održan na Zlatiboru. Cilj ovog OEBS-ovog projekta bio je da kriminalistički ana- litičari iz ministarstava unutrašnjih poslova pomenutih zemalja unaprede zna- nje u vezi metoda prikupljanja i analize trendova u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Na taj način OEBS pomaže u razvijanju kapaciteta policije da pro- ceni pretnje iz oblasti ozbiljnog i organizovanog kriminala, u skladu sa EURO- POL-ovim standardima. Projekat je nosio naziv “Jačanje kapaciteta za stratešku analizu i strateške procene u Upravama kriminalističke policije ministarstava unutrašnjih poslova Srbije, Crne Gore i BJR Makedonije”. Međunarodni oblici organizovanog kriminala u sve većoj meri zahtevaju međunarodno povezivanje

91 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

policijskih institucija kako bi se omogućila realizacija zajedničkih odbrambenih strategija i implementacija odgovarajućih multipolarnih mera koje će doneti željene rezultate.

U Republici Srbiji, kao zemlji koja ove godine predsedava OEBS-om, u maju 2015. godine, biće održan Godišnji sastanak stručnjaka policije, u Beogradu. Prateći trendove savremenih bezbednosnih pretnji, Srbija će se fokusirati na sajber bez- bednost (cyber-security). Planirano je da glavna tema ovog sastanka bude veza između organizovanog kriminala, trgovine ljudima i ilegalnih migracija, kao i upravljanje i reforma sektora bezbednosti. Glavni prioritet predsedavanja Srbije je svakako da podrži sve napore ka mirnom procesu demokratizacije, da iskoristi sopstveno iskustvo iz prošlosti, shvatajući važnu ulogu OEBS-a koju je odigrao u podršci procesima postkonfliktne tranzicije i reforme, širom Zapadnog Balkana.

Zaključak

Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju je, od nekadašnjeg helsinškog KEBS-a, prešla dug put transformacije u jednu novu međunarodnu instituciju koja danas predstavlja najveću regionalnu bezbednosnu organizaciju u svetu. Preventivna diplomatija, koju najčešće koristi kao instrument svojih aktivnosti, uključuje i podršku vlada regiona u unapređenju regionalne saradnje i posebno u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, s obzirom na to da organizovani kri- minal nije samo pitanje bezbednosti već i društveno pitanje. Savremeni svet karakteriše ne samo produbljivanje starih već i nastanak novih bezbednosnih izazova koji su zahvatili i unutrašnje i međunarodne odnose. Jedan od savre- menih bezbednosnih izazova je i organizovani kriminal koji direktno ugrožava i potkopava autoritet država, čime onemogućava njihov razvoj. Za Srbiju OEBS predstavlja izuzetno važnog strateškog partnera u učvršćivanju mira, demokra- tije i bezbednosti u regionu i borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Misija OEBS je uspostavljenja u Srbiji već petnaest godina, a borba protiv organizovanog kriminala je oduvek bila jedan od njenih prioritet. Opasnost od organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji počela je jasnije da se uočava nakon ubistva premijera Zorana Đinđića. Tada je borba protiv organizovanog kriminala postala prioritet u odno- su na sve druge aspekte reforme policije u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori. Kao glavni partner Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije u realizaciji procesa reforme policije i borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, aktivnosti OEBS-a imaju veliki značaj za održavanje političke stabilnosti i mira ne samo u Srbiji već i u regionu

92  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Zapadnog Balkana. OEBS predstavlja važnu međunarodnu instituciju sa svojim vrednosnim ciljevima koji prate spoljnopolitičke strateške prioritete Republike Srbije. Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji ne samo da je imala važnu ulogu nakon 2003. godine, ona i danas ima ulogu da podrži kurs i snagu u borbi protiv organizo- vanog kriminala, i na taj način doprinese jačanju institucija u borbi protiv ove vrste kriminala, doiprinese uspostavljanju i održavanju mira i bezbednosti koji omogućavaju punu individualnu slobodu.

Literatura

Aćimović, Lj. (2013) “ OEBS na početku XXI veka”.

Bošković, G. (2014) “Organizovani kriminal”, Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd.

Dragišić, Z. (2010) “Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije kao strategijska bezbednosna procena”, Godišnjak Fakulteta bezbednosti, Beograd, str. 103, 106, 114, 115.

Đorđević, S. (2009) „Borba protiv organizovanog kriminala: Evropska unija i Zapadni Balkan.” Revija za bezbednost br. 2/2009, Beograd.

Nikač, Ž. (2003) „Transnacionalna saradnja u borbi protiv kriminaliteta – Europol i Interpol”,

Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna, Beograd.

Stojarova, V. (2007) «Organized Crime in the Western Balkans» Institute for Comparative Political Research Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University, Czech Republic.

Trapara, V. (2011) «Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemljama u tranziciji».

Zorić, J., Pavicević, M., i Stopić, M. (2008) «Borba protiv organizovanog kriminala u Srbiji-zakonodavstvo i praksa», Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd.

http://www.osce.org/sr/serbia

http://www.oscepa.org/

93  Marija Žužek

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Sažetak: Bezbednosne pretnje savremenog sveta sve više po svojoj morfologiji odstupaju od tradicionalnih oblika narušavanja mira i stabilnosti. U tom smislu, terorizam, energetika, Cyber criminal i učešće stranih boraca na ratnim žarišti- ma drugih država, determinišu osnovne pravce savremenih bezbednosnih izazo- va. Njihov zajednički imenitelj jeste da oni predstavljaju transnacionalne pretnje. Upravo u tome i leži ključ suočavanja sa njima, novi pristup u njihovom rešavanju primarno je zasnovan na preventivnom delovanju koje u svojoj osnovi ima re- gionalnu saradnju odnosno intenzivnije međunarodno povezivanje kao sine qua non globalnog mira i stabilnosti. Uzimajući u obzir osnovnu misiju, viziju i ciljeve OEBS sadržane u dostizanju savremenih demokratskih vrednosti kroz razvoj insti- tucija i procesa, kao i postignute rezultate, može se zaključiti da OEBS predstav- lja uspešnu međunarodnu organizaciju, naročito kada je u pitanju postkonfliktno delovanje. Iako ova međunarodna organizacija predstavlja važan kohezioni faktor saradnje i stabilnosti u Evropi – pred njom ipak stoje određeni izazovi.

95 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Početak novog milenijuma obeležile su specifičnosti sadržane u činjenici da se savremeni svet sve više i češće suočava sa novim bezbednosnim izazovima koji po svojoj morfologiji predstavljaju značajno odstupanje od tradicionalnih, uobičajenih i poznatih modela bezbednosnih problema.1 Upravo promena njihove morfologije direktno implicira na to da – usled sopstvene nepredvidivosti – postaju izazovi.2

Jednu od velikih novina predstavljao je i način na koji organizovane grupacije iste ili slične opredeljenosti odnosno pripadnosti, ostvaruju ciljeve upotrebom savremenih tehnologija, a van teritorije koja je predmet njihovog delovanja sa osnovnom premisom ostvarivanja političkih ciljeva.3

U tom smislu, terorizam, energetika, Cyber criminal i učešće stranih boraca na pojedinim ratištima u klasičnom smislu ratovanja, determinišu osnovne pravce savremenih bezbednosnih izazova.

Napad na kule u Njujorku pokrenuo je široki spektar rasprava o terorizmu kao savremenom fenomenu.4 Navedeno se temelji na činjenici da on zaista, prema svim elementima (izbor meta, ciljevi koji se žele postići, pripadnost grupi za/ protiv, sofisticiranost delovanja i slično), predstavlja eklatantan primer novih oblika terorističkih napada. U tom smislu, korišćenje najsavremenih tehnologi- ja i opreme, efikasna organizacija kompleksnog delovanja na više ciljeva i loka- cija, koordinacija aktivnosti i korišćenih veština, kao i spremnost za žrtvovanje

1 Videti opširnije: Baldwin D.A., The concept of security, Cambridge, Univ Press, 2001., Baylis J., Wirtz J., Cohen E. and Gray C., Strategy in the Contemporary World – Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2002., Friedman T., The World is Flat: A Brief History of Twenty-first Century, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005., Volc N. Kenet, Teorija međunarodne politike, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Alexandria Press, Beograd, 2008. 2 Videti opširnije: Fukuyama Francis, The Last Man in a Bottle: An Essay on the Tenth Anniversary of the Publication of ‘The End of History’ and “Responses to Fukuyama,” The National Interest, No. 56 Summer 1999., Huntington Samuel P, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1991., Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster 1996. 3 Videti opširnije: Brown Michael E., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict – revised edition (International Security Readers), The Mit Press, Cambridge, London, 2001., Buzan Barry, People, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991., Eller Jack David, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on Ethnic Conflict, University of Michigan Press, 1999., Hofmann Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998., Horowitz Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Updated Edition With a New Preface, University of California Press, 2000., Laqueur Walter, The New Terrorism – Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford, University Press, 1999., Lutz James and Brenda, Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2004. 4 Za definicije terorizma videti opširnije: Simeunović Dragan, Terorizam, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, 2009., Simić R. D., Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti, SL SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002., Whittaker J. David, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Routledge, London, 2004., Lutz James and Brenda, Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2004.

96  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

sopstvenih života u velikoj meri prevazilaze sva dosadašnja iskustva kada su teroristički napadi u pitanju.

Imajući u vidu da se dati događaj dogodio na teritoriji Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, koje poseduju najrazvijenije bezbednosne službe,5 a koje nisu mogle predvideti takve terorističke akte, niti su imale adekvatan odgovor na ono što se dogodilo,6 dolazi se do zaključka da novi bezbednosni izazovi po svojoj prirodi zahtevaju novi pristup – koji se nužno mora razlikovati od tradicionalnog.

Činjenica da su ove napade izvršili obučeni ljudi, obrazovani i specijalizovani da koriste kompjutere7 i oružje, a pri tome spremni da svesno žrtvuju svoje živote, takođe je predstavljala sociološki šok za koji se nije znalo na vreme.8 U tom smi- slu, reakcije koje su usledile prema određenim grupacijama nisu mogle da reše takav problem već su otvorile novu dimenziju preventivnog rada.9

Slična situacija je i na Balkanu, tačnije u Bosni i Hercegovini, gde postoji izra- zita poteškoća kontrole tzv. „spavača”. Naime, u pitanju su građani koji vode sasvim uobičajen život, vrlo često su obrazovani i ljudi od ugleda u svojim za- jednicama koji ničim ne izazivaju sumnju u svoje delovanje. Takve grupe su po pravilu dobro organizovane sa jasno definisanim funkcionalnim i hijerarhijskim strukturama, ideološki motivisane i zatvorene za komunikaciju. Takođe, indi- kativno je da su pored homogenosti, ovakve grupacije ljudi izuzetno finansijski stabilne, što daje poseban ton mogućnostima njihovog aktivnog delovanja.

Dosadašnja iskustva i metode rada službi bezbednosti nisu mogle da odgovore ovom izazovu uzimajući u obzir kompleksnost novih načina terorističkih delo- vanja, što je zahtevalo urgentnost u pronalaženju novog pristupa ovoj pojavi. Nova metodologija zahtevala je složeniji pristup koji se u prvom redu ogleda u praćenju aktivnosti potencijalnih pripadnika ovakvih grupa, ali ne u fizičkom smislu već savremenim metodama kontrole protoka finansijskih sredstava i upitnih transakcija, infiltraciju u okvire grupe, korištenje kontrole protoka elek- tronskih podataka, propagandni rad i slično. Navedeno predstavlja jedini način

5 Videti opširnije: Gregory F. Traverton and Bryan C. Gabbard, Assesing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, 2008. 6 Videti opširnije: Friedman T., Longitudes and Attitudes – Exploring the world before and after september 11, Penguin books, London, 2003., Huntington, S. P. (1997), The Erosion of Americian National Interests, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, 1 5, Kegley Charles, W., Jr., Wittkopf R. Eugene, World Politics – Trends and Transformations, Wadsworth, Belmont, Ca., 2004., Tardy Thierry, Peace Operations After 11 September 2001, Frank Cass, London, Great Britain, 2004. 7 Videti opširnije: Nye J., Power in a Global Information Age – From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, New York, 2004. 8 Videti opširnije: Goldstone Richard J., Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004., Halevy Efraim, Man in the shadows, St.Martin’s Press, USA, 2006., Hamilton M., Sociologija religije, Clio, Beograd, 2003., Hantington Semjuel, Treći talas, Stubovi Kulture, Beograd, 2004. 9 Videti opširnije: Saideman Stephen M., The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, 2001.

97 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

za suštinsko razumevanje motiva i razloga njihovog eventualnog terorističkog delovanja sa prevashodnim ciljem prevencije.10

U suočavanju sa ovakvom vrstom bezbednosnih izazova, pored gore navedenih, izuzetno važnu ulogu ostvaruje i šira društvena zajednica, institucije civilnog društva, intelektualna elita, zajedno sa političarima u cilju razumevanja poli- tičkog nezadovoljstva koji bi mogli dovesti do terorističkih napada kao metode ostvarivanja političkih ciljeva – svojim delovanjem ponekad mogu igrati i ključ- nu ulogu. Drugim rečima, koordinisana zajednička aktivnost civilnog društva, političkog establišmenta i bezbenosnih službi može imati presudnu preventiv- nu ulogu u cilju sprečavanja terorističkog akta, odnosno, svojim delovanjem ponekad mogu igrati i ključnu ulogu, odnosno presudno preventivno delovati u cilju sprečavanja terorističkog akta.

***

Drugu dimenziju dugoročnih savremenih bezbednosnih izazova izdvojenu u eseju predstavlja energetika (energetski izvori, bezbednost energetske infra- structure i slično). Aktuelizacija teme energetskog snabdevanja u proteklih ne- koliko godina nedvosmisleno predstavlja vid političke trgovine i vrste pritiska na zemlje koje su u bilo kom smislu zavisne od drugih. Zemlje koje poseduju odnosno stvaraju monopolizaciju energenata, koriste tu činjenicu na direktan ili indirektan način u prevashodno političke svrhe. Istim argumentom neretko se služe i zemlje koje predstavljaju tranzitne zone.

Jedan od najkonkretnijih primera energetike kao savremenog bezbednosnog izazova je Ukrajina. Ona je naime i energetski zavisna zemlja, a u isto vreme i tranzitna zona. Početak destabilizacije situacije u Ukrajini od pre nekoliko go- dina, izazvao je krizu snabdevanja gasom ne samo na teritorije te zemlje, već i dobrog dela evropskih zemalja. Takva situacija značajno pogađa zemlje slabije finansijske razvijenosti, uzimajući u obzir njihovu nemogućnost snabdevanja alternativnim energentima.

Energetska zavisnost zemalja direktno je vezana i za njihovu političku stabilnost. Sa druge strane, zavisnost ove vrste neretko je i instrument političkog uticaja ve- likih sila za ostvarivanje svojih interesa u energetski zavisnim zemljama. Isto se odnosi i na zemlje koje raspolažu energetskim izvorima ili viškom energenata.

10 Veoma često, navedeno podrazumeva blisku saradnju sa pripadnicima ovih grupa koji su državljani potencijalne zemlje terorističkog napada i, koji vrlo često i sami predstavljaju izvršioce terorističkih akata.

98  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

U tom smislu nije slučajan snažan angažman i insistiranje Sjedinjenih Američ- kih Država i Evropske unije na diversifikaciji snabdevanja energentima u cillju obezbeđivanja smanjenja zavisnosti od samo jednog snabdevača. To je slučaj sa snabdevanjem energentima zemalja Zapadnog Balkana koji se tradicionalno uvozi iz Rusije, gde se pojavljuju alternativne opcije poput tečnog gasa iz Kuvaj- ta, gasa iz Azerbejdžana, naftnih škriljaca iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i td.

Međutim, projekti koji bi obezbedili alternativne načine snabdevanja i alterna- tivne vrste energenata, iziskuju enormne svote novca koje zemlje slabije finan- sijske razvijenosti ostavljaju bez mogućnosti izbora i u sferi dalje zavisnosti i mogućnosti pritisaka.

Iako se u međunarodnim okvirima ulažu veliki napori za iznalaženje kompro- misnog rešenja, na osnovu prethodno iznetog, a i činjenice da energetska zavi- snost predstavlja samo deo ekonomske zavisnosti, stvaranje „začaranog kruga” u ovoj sferi takođe otvara novi bezbednosni izazov za naredni period na koji još uvek ne postoji adekvatan odgovor.

***

Cyber kriminal je tema koja zasigurno najviše zaokuplja pažnju bezbednosnih službi i na koju je prosto nemoguće pronaći adekvatna i efikasna preventivna reakcija, a praksa je pokazala da se uglavnom može delovati tek post festum. Zapanjuje činjenica da više nije pitanje da li su mogući „uspešni” napadi na ve- like i skupocene informacione sisteme npr. odbrane – nekih od najrazvijenijih zemalja sveta – već da li to neko ima za cilj.

U tom smislu, ozbiljan bezbednosni izazov predstavljaju hakerski napadi sa ci- ljem političkog ili pak terorističkog delovanja.

Detektovanje hakerskog napada dok je u toku, ne podrazumeva nužno mogućnosti njegovog sprečavanja dok traje, kao ni vreme koliko će trajati. Pored toga, sagle- davanje spektra posledica u velikoj meri je dovedeno u pitanje jer podrazumeva utvrđivanje počinioca, lokacije na kojoj se nalazi, njegovog motiva i cilja i slično.

Uzimajući u obzir izneto, čak i utvrđivanjem svega navedenog, otvara se kao osnovno pitanje mogućnost eventualnog delovanja protiv cyber napadača koji se nalazi van pravne i svake druge jurisdikcije zemlje koja je meta napada.

Postojeći napori u povezivanju i saradnji zemalja na regionalnom i širem me- đunarodnom planu su u ovom smislu vidljivi. Međutim, osnovna prepreka je neusaglašenost nacionalnih propisa pojedinačnih zemalja koja se prevashod-

99 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

no odnosi na funkcionalne nadležnosti određenih službi bezbednosti. Pojedine zemlje Jugoistočne Evrope naime, još uvek ne poseduju odgovarajuće centre na nacionalnom nivou (Center for Emergency Responce Team-CERT). Taj ne- dostatak u velikoj meri otežava i borbu razvijenijih zemalja sa ovom pojavom, uzimajući u obzir nepostojanje granica za ovaj vid kriminala, odnosno realnih funkcionalnih modela saradnje u ovoj oblasti.11

Potreba za saradnjom i zajedničkom borbom protiv Cyber kriminala sa dru- ge strane, kod zemlja slabije razvijenosti iznedrila je jedan novi problem koji dodatno komplikuje ustanovljenje adekvatne metodologije za borbu protiv – i saradnju na ovom polju. Naime, u svojoj snažnoj opredeljenosti da se suoče sa ovim problemom, veliki broj zemalja donosio je pravnu regulativu „krovnog karaktera”,12 odnosno regulative bez adekvatnih podzakonskih akata ili ade- kvatnih mehanizama koji bi omogućili ustanovljavanje krivičnog dela, procesu- iranje počinioca i njihovo sankcionisanje.

Drugi problem predstavlja međusobna različitost pojedinačnih nacionalnih pravnih sistema – i u vezi sa time – nemogućnost uspostavljanja jedinstvenog i usaglašenog pravnog okvira za reagovanje u ovakvim situacijama na međuna- rodnom odnosno globalnom planu.

***

Učešće stranih boraca na pojedinim ratnim žarištima takođe predstavlja jedan od gorućih savremenih bezbednosnih izazova. Naime, pored problema postojećih žarišta sukoba, bilateralni i multilateralni odnosi zemlja dodatno se usložnjavaju sve aktivnijim učešćem državljana jednih – na ratnim područjima drugih država.

Kapaciteti pravnih sistema zemalja koje se sreću sa ovakvim pojavama, kao i mogućnost da se one preduprede i adekvatno sankcionišu odgovorne osobe koje se opredele na takav angažman – još uvek je upitna. Naime, uvođenje sankcija ovim zemljama nije adekvatan način za rešavanje problema stranih boraca uzi- majući u obzir da aboliraju državu iz koje oni dolaze od bilo kakve odgovornosti.

U cilju rešavanja ovog problema, potrebna je koordinisana akcija zemalja iz kojih strani borci dolaze i onih u kojima se bore što podrazumeva usklađivanje pravnog okvira sa međunarodnim konvencijama čime bi se omogućilo zajednič-

11 Upravo iz tog razloga, neretko se dešava da se hakeri u toku napada nalaze upravo na teritoriji zemlje koja nema razvijen mehanizam preventive, detektovanja, reagovanja, suzbijanja i kažnjavanja ovakvog delovanja. 12 Konkretno zemlje Balkana.

100  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

ko delovanje. U tom smislu, neophodno je i intenziviranje diplomatskih napora i njihovo usmeravanje u zajedničkom pravcu delovanja u cilju suočavanja sa ovim savremenim bezbednosnim izazovom.

Neretki slučajevi učešća državljana pojedinih država regiona, konkretno Jugoi- stočne Evrope, na ratnim područjima drugih zemalja doveli su do suočavanja sa činjenicom da se pravno regulisanje i procesuiranje osoba direktno uključenih u borbena dejstva i osoba koje omogućavaju odlazak na zaraćenu lokaciju – ne- izostavno mora izvesti u saradnji sa ostalim zemljama u regionu.13

U tom smislu, u regionu Jugoistočne Evrope donet je veliki broj pravno obave- zujućih propisa sa drakonskim kaznenim odredbama, čiji pun efekat implemen- tacije još ostaje da se vidi.

Ono što je značajno, jeste da je problem identifikovan, ali da i pored toga – na međunarodnom planu predstavlja bezbednosni izazov budućnosti.

***

Zajednički imenitelj za savremene bezbednosne izazove koje je ovaj esej izdvo- jio poput terorizma, energetike, Cyber criminala i učešća stranih boraca na po- jedinim ratnim žarištima, jeste da oni predstavljaju transnacionalne pretnje.

U tom smislu, suočavanje sa novim bezbednosnim izazovima i jedan od ključnih faktora u preventivnom delovanju trebali bi biti sadržani u novom pristupu koji u svojoj osnovi ima intenzivnije međunarodno povezivanje i regionalnu saradnju.

Nemogućnost bilo koje, pa ni najrazvijenije zemlje da samostalno predupredi ili sanira posledice transnacionalnih pretnji odnosno bezbednosnih fenomena, implicira da navedeno čvršće povezivanje zemalja i njihova saradnja – kroz me- đunarodne organizacije ili regionalne inicijative –predstavlja sine qua non glo- balnog mira i stabilnosti.

Čvršće povezivanje i saradnja zemalja kroz, i na osnovu katalizatorske funkcije međunarodnih organizacija omogućila bi stvaranje adekvatnih uslova za de- finisanje strategija za zajedničko delovanje koje podrazumeva definisanje po- tencijalnih pretnji, izradu dugoročnih akcionih planova i tešnju saradnju svih relevantnih fakora – kako unutar zemalja – tako i na međunarodnom planu.

13 Gotovo po pravilu lica koja su ili su bila direktno uključena u borbena dejstva i lica koja se bave omogućavanjem odlaska na zaraćenu lokaciju, skrivaju se na teritorijama susednih država.

101 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uzimajući u obzir da su međunarodne, regionalne i subregionalne organizacije (i inicijative) usmerene i imaju specifične oblasti delovanja, na taj način bila bi omogućena sinergija njihovog delovanja i koordinacija aktivnosti, što bi u veli- koj meri doprinelo unapređenju koncepta preventive.

Nedvosmisleno je da bi prethodno iznet način i model čvršćeg povezivanja zna- čajno doprineo suočavanju i adekvatnoj borbi sa savremenim bezbednosnosnim izazovima. Pored toga, navedeno bi omogućilo stvaranje uslova za lakše prevazila- ženje problema Evro-Atlantskih integrativnih tokova slabije razvijenih zemalja i doprinelo stvaranju platforme dijaloga realne i praktične saradnje sa druge strane.

Međunarodne organizacije koje se danas bave bezbednosnim pitanjima zasni- vaju se na ovim principima, a uz konsenzus svojih članica imaju kapacitet da obezbede preduslove da se planirani ciljevi u ovom pravcu i ostvare.

Jedan od izazova predstavljaju međutim različite političke aspiracije i interesi zemalja, kao i njihovi stavovi kada su u pitanju bezbednosne pretnje što direk- tno uslovljava i način donošenja, i ishod samih političkih odluka.

Praksa je pokazala da, vrlo često, usled nedostatka koordinacije svih službi koje se bave bezbednošću, dolazi do propusta. Naredni izazov u tom pravcu ogleda se u konsolidaciji političkih odluka u ovoj oblast ii njihovoj implementaciji. Pored kolizije funkcionalnih nadležnosti službi koje se bave bezbednošću, neretko i finansijska podrška predstavlja glavni problem u realizaciji planova, što često može dovesti do odlaganja delovanja ili neuspeha.

Sa druge strane, još jedna uloga međunarodnih organizacija koja je od izuzetnog značaja jeste i delovanje u postkonfliktnom periodu – u vidu monitoringa mirov- nog procesa ili primirja, jačanja poverenja i dijaloga, otklanjanje posledica i uzroka konflikta na putu izgradnje trajnog mira. U tom smislu, ukoliko mirovni sporazum to predviđa, kontrola naoružanja i vojnih snaga je važan segment ove uloge.

Uzimajući u obzir osnovnu misiju, viziju i ciljeve Organizacije za evropsku bez- bednost i saradnju (OEBS) sadržane u dostizanju savremenih demokratskih vrednosti kroz razvoj institucija i procesa, kao i postignute rezultate, može se zaključiti da OEBS predstavlja uspešnu međunarodnu organizaciju, naročito kada je u pitanju postkonfliktno delovanje. U tom smislu, ova međunarodna organizacija predstavlja ključni kohezioni faktor saradnje i stabilnosti.

Po okončanju Hladnog rata, a pre konflikata na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije, po- stojalo je mišljenje da OEBS više nema svoju suštinsku i praktičnu ulogu. Doga- đaji koji su kasnije usledili – pokazali su upravo suprotno. Malobrojne tvrdnje

102  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

demantovane su i postalo je evidentno da je uloga OEBS-a u nekim konfliktima bila nezamenljiva. Time je potvrđeno da je ova organizacija – i pored mnogih izazova donela konkretne rezultate i opravdala svoje postojanje.

Iako nema mogućnost delovanja u toku konflita, svojim misijama postkonfliktnog delovanja na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije, zamrznutnih konflikata u Nagorno Ka- rabahu, Transistriji, Abhaziji i Južnoj Osetiji, te u posmtračkoj misiji u Ukrajini, OEBS je nesporno dao izuzetan doprinos izgradnji poverenja i dijaloga kao ključ- nog preduslova za trajno mirovno rešenje na navedenim kriznim područjima.

Uvažavajaći činjenicu o složenosti Misije OSCE na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije, kao i kompleksnost posleratnog perioda, njena uloga u izgradnji institucija i jačanju kapaciteta u Bosni i Hercegovini je u određenim segmentima bila vrlo učinkovita.

Član IV Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma predstavlja jedinsveni primer u svetu uspostavljanja poverenja i saradnje između zaraćenih strana u oblasti kontrole naoružanja i vojne efektive po oknčanju ratnih sukoba. Realan pokazatelj iz- građenog poverenja u tom smislu i kruna uloženih napora predstavlja transfor- mascija ovog Procesa u regionalne okvire krajem 2014. godine. Iako na zahtev strana zemalja potpisnica ovog Sporazuma – OEBS ostaje deo ovog Procesa – zemlje potpisnice će samostalno nastaviti upravljanje. S tim u vezi, inicirana je ideja da ovako uspešna misijia može i treba svojim iskustvima da posluži u cilju transfera znanja i nekim drugim regionima kao npr. zemljama Istočnog Partnerstva (Evropske unije) ili Severne Afrike.

Upravo izneto direktno ukazuje na važnost i vitalnost uloge OSCE, uz konkretan doprinos osnovnoj misiji OSCE – a to je regionalna saradnja i izgradnja povere- nja kada je bezbednost u pitanju.

Sa druge strane, zamrznuti konflikti predstavljaju po svojoj prirodi konstantnu pretnju regionalnoj bezbednosti. Vrlo su nespecifični i zahtevaju stalnu komu- nikaciju sa stranama u sukobu, izraženo razumevanje i senzibilitet delovanja. Iako su dosadašnji rezultati pokazali uspeh u delu zaustavljanja daljih konlika- ta, predstoji dalji rad u cilju iznalaženja trajnih rešenja uz dogovor svih strana u sukobu kao i drugih relevantnih faktora.

Kriza u Ukrajini je pokazala svu kompleksnost odnosa u regionu i eskalirala u ratni sukob koji je pretio da se proširi i na druge regione.

Ipak, i bez mogućnosti da navedeni sukob u potpunosti spreči, OEBS je pokazao važnost svoje uloge odmah nakon potpisivanja primirja, preuzevši ulogu glav-

103 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

nog posmatrača uz definisanje tri oblasti budućeg delovanja: transnacionalnih pretnji, sigurnosti granica i kontrole naoružanja.14

Naročito važna je činjenica da je OSCE bila jedina organizacija koja je dobila saglasnost svih zainteresovanih strana za svoju misiju.

Navedeno posebno dobija na značaju imajući u vidu da Organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija (UN), koja bi, po prirodi trebalo da preuzme tu ulogu – nije bila spremna, kako zbog specifičnosti regiona i sukoba sa jedne, tako i zbog činjenice da bi Rusi- ja kao stalni član Saveta bezbednosti vrlo očekivano uložila veto sa druge strane.

Isto tako, NATO koji je posedovao kapacitete i spremnost da se aktivno angažu- je ne bi mogao da doprinese mirovnom rešenju, uzimajući u obzir da bi Rusija imala negativan stav kada je u pitanju aktivno učesće Alijanse na tom delu ruske granice.

Evropska unija (EU) kroz svoje odbrambene snage odnosno zajedničku bezbed- nosnu i odbrambenu politiku (CSDP) nema kapacite, ali ni spremnost svih čla- nica za aktivniji angažman u ovom momentu – čak ni u slučaju da se Rusija sa time saglasi.

Dugoročno posmatrano, navedeni konflikti su po svojoj prirodi specifični, ali po načinu kako se odvijaju, predstavljaju klasičan oblik bezbednosnih pretnji koje su dugotrajne ali niskog ineziteta. Što se tiče savremenih metoda ratnih dej- stava, za očekivati je i pojačan angažman stranih boraca u terorističkim aktiv- nostima, energetska i ekonomska uslovljavanja u svrhu ostvarivanja političkih ciljeva, te pojačana uloga Cyber bezbednosnih pretnji.

Uloga OEBS time postaje kompleksnija ali sa druge strane dobija na značaju, naročito ukoliko se posmatra situacija na Zapadnom Balkanu gde ovakve pret- nje nisu postojale tokom delovanja OEBS na terenu. To ukazuje i da će OEBS kao organizacija morati da usmeri svoje buduće delovanje na dva koloseka i to: u klasičnom smislu koristeći uspešna iskustva iz postratnog perioda u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, i istovremeno razvijati nove strategije i mehanizme za savremene bezbednosne pretnje.

14 Posmatrači OSCE bili su primarno angažovani na graničnim prelazima oko Luganska i Donjecka (dva od ukupno 21 graničnih prelaza) sa ciljm nadgledanja transfera potencijalno opasnih materija. Nakon dogovora o primirju u Minsku septembra 2014. godine, iako se monitoring primenjuje prisustvom posmatrača bez oružja, svi posmatrači OSCE angažovanini nanadgledanju razmene vatre imali su vojno iskustvo.

104  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Izazove za implementaciju ovih zadataka predstavlja prevashodno nedostatak novca, nespremnost nekih zemalja da aktivno učestvuju i različiti politički sta- vovi kada je uloga OEBS u pitanju. U tom smislu, naredni period će zahtevati više političkog dijaloga i intenziviranje regionalne saradnje u cilju definisanja buduće uloge OEBS-a i postizanja kompromisa kada su savremeni bezbednosni izazovi u pitanju.

Pored toga, finansijska sredstva takođe predstavljaju izazov „svoje vrste”. Nai- me, do dogovora u Minsku septembra 2014. godine, za Misiju u Ukrajini korišće- na su sredstva iz rezervnih fondova OEBS u visini od 2.000.000 evra na meseč- nom nivou. Prema procenama, ukupna potrebna visina sredstava na godišnjem nivou iznosi 46,8 miliona evra, i postavlja se pitanje da li će – i do kada – zemlje biti u mogućnosti da navedeno finansiraju.

Savremeni bezbednosni izazovi zahtevaju transformaciju i u smislu preventiv- nog delovanja uzimajući u obzir njihovu nepredvidivost i nepostajanje granica. Navedeno direktno upućuje na potrebu aktivnog angažmana na definisanju no- vih strategija kao savremenih odgovora na savremene bezbednosne pretnje uz učešće svih zemalja i intenzivnu saradnju sa ostalim relevantnim međunarod- nim organizacijama koje se bave nekim od segmenata bezbednosti.

Pregled okvirne literature

Baldwin D.A., The concept of security, Cambridge, Univ Press, 2001.

Baylis J., Wirtz J., Cohen E. and Gray C., Strategy in the Contemporary World – Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Brown Michael E., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict – revised edition (International Security Readers), The Mit Press, Cambridge, London, 2001.

Buzan Barry, People, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991.

Eller Jack David, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on Ethnic Conflict, University of Michigan Press, 1999.

Friedman T., Longitudes and Attitudes – Exploring the world before and after september 11, Penguin books, London, 2003.

105 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Friedman T., The World is Flat: A Brief History of Twenty-first Century, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005.

Fukuyama Francis, The Last Man in a Bottle: An Essay on the Tenth Anniversary of the Publication of ‘The End of History’ and “Responses to Fukuyama,” The National Interest, No. 56 Summer 1999.

Goldstone Richard J., Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004.

Gregory F. Traverton and Bryan C. Gabbard, Assesing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, 2008.

Halevy Efraim, Man in the shadows, St.Martin’s Press, USA, 2006.

Hamilton M., Sociologija religije, Clio, Beograd, 2003.

Hantington Semjuel, Treći talas, Stubovi Kulture, Beograd, 2004.

Hofmann Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998.

Horowitz Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Updated Edition With a New Preface, University of California Press, 2000.

Huntington Samuel P, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1991.

Huntington, S. P. (1997), The Erosion of Americian National Interests, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, 1 5

Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster 1996.

Kegley Charles, W., Jr., Wittkopf R. Eugene, World Politics – Trends and Transformations, Wadsworth, Belmont, Ca., 2004.

Laqueur Walter, The New Terrorism – Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford, University Press, 1999.

Lutz James and Brenda, Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2004.

106  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Nye J., Power in a Global Information Age – From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, New York, 2004.

Saideman Stephen M., The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, 2001.

Simeunović Dragan, Terorizam, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, 2009.

Simić R. D., Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti, SL SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002.

Tardy Thierry, Peace Operations After 11 September 2001, Frank Cass, London, Great Britain, 2004.

Volc N. Kenet, Teorija međunarodne politike, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Alexandria Press, Beograd, 2008.

Whittaker J. David, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Routledge, London, 2004.

107  Milan Andrić

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Sažetak: Današnji svet, naročito Evropa kao sinonim demokratije i vladavine prava, suočava se sa najvećom krizom bezbednosti od kraja hladnog rata. Ne- poverenje i podele, politika konfrontacije i logika apsolutnog pobednika i gubit- nika, „sukob” istočne realpolitike i američke ideologije „izuzetnosti”, ugrožavaju kooperativni pristup bezbednosti. Pojavili su se novi – stari bezbednosni izazovi, rizici i pretnje, od građanskih oružanih sukoba, organizovanog kriminala, viso- kotehnološkog kriminala, terorizma, migracija, trgovine ljudima, pandemije pa do klimatskih promena. U ovakvom kontekstu bezbednosti, čini se da izostaje bolja saradnja međunarodnih aktera bezbednosti jer „Velike sile nisu prestale da se plaše jedna druge, i sve je manje prostora za poverenje”1, što otvara pro- stor OEBS-u da preuzme vodeću ulogu u mirnom rešavanju konflikata.

U radu se sagledavaju osnovni bezbednosni izazovi, rizici i pretnje u Evropi kao i mogućnost konkretnih aktivnosti OEBS-a na terenu.

Ključne reči: OEBS, kooperativna bezbednost, preventivna diplomatija, bezbed- nosni izazovi, rizici i pretnje, operacije na terenu, velike sile

1 Džon Miršajmer, Tragedija politike velikih sila, Udruženje za studije SAD u Srbiji, Beograd 2009, str.6

109 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uvod

Organizacija za bezbednost i saradnju u Evropi predstavlja najširi oblik povezi- vanja država radi saradnje u bezbednosti. Trenutno, broji 56 država članica ra- sprostranjenih na području Evrope, Azije i Severne Amerike i 12 država partne- ra za saradnju. Sveobuhvatni pristup bezbednosti, koji pokriva sve tri dimenzije iz Helsinškog završnog akta (političko-vojne, ekonomske, ekološke i ljudska prava i slobode), razlikuje OEBS od bilo koje druge organizacije. OEBS je uspeo da poveća svoju ulogu u posredovanju sukoba, naročito u pogledu takozvanih „dugih sukoba” u Moldaviji i na Kavkazu. Uprkos dokazanom uspehu operacija na terenu, koje su uticale na stvaranje „pionirskih mera” izgradnje poverenja i pomirenja na nacionalnom i lokalnom nivou u postkonfliktnim društvima, OEBS pati od slabe vidljivosti u javnosti2. Nedovoljna zastupljenost u javnosti, ne odslikava u punoj meri značaj i rezultate OEBS operacija na terenu, što može loše uticati i na sam imidž ove organizacije.

Međutim, ono što OEBS-u može da predstavlja problem ili prednost u odnosu na druge organizacije je to što OEBS nema svoj osnivački ugovor koji bi proizvo- dio pravne obaveze, ni odgovarajući pravni status da zaključuje međunarodne ugovore i poseduje privilegije i imunitete. Uzimajući u obzir njegovu različitost, pojedine „političke elite” velikih sila ne smatraju ga međunarodnom organizaci- jom, već više „instrumentom” za unapređenje mira i bezbednosti. Ovu konstata- ciju ne treba shvatiti u negativnom kontekstu, već zapravo kao prednost za brzo odlučivanje i delovanje na terenu u svim fazama konflikta (rano upozorenje, preventivna diplomatija, posmatračke oparacije na terenu, rešavanje sukoba i postkonfliktna rehabilitacija). Upotreba termina „preventivna diplomatija” u kontekstu OEBS-a podrazumeva primenu diplomatije da bi se sprečilo nasta- janje nesuglasica između strana, da bi se sprečilo prerastanje nesuglasica u sukob, za eliminisanje sukoba kada se dogode i da ograniči i spreči širenje ovih sukoba da ne postanu nedostižni za brzu eliminaciju.3 Preventivna diplomatija je u isto vreme najvidljivija komparativna prednost OEBS-a u odnosu na Ujedi- njene nacije i regionalne organizacije za bezbednost u Evropi.4

2 Erwan Fouéré, Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE?, Centre for European Policy Studies, 24 April 2014, pdf, str 1-3 3 Margaretha af Ugglas, Conditions for successful preventive diplomacy, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994, str. 12. 4 Victor – Yves Ghebali, „Preventive Diplomacy as Visited from the OSCE, 3rd International Security Forum”, Kongresshaus Zurich, 1998, str.19–21

110  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Današnji bezbednosi kontekst, broj aktera bezbednosti, tranzicija, opadanje glo- balne moći i uticaja SAD, jačanje Rusije i Kine, kao i proširenje i konsolidacija Evropske unije, uticali su na OEBS da razvije sopstvene mehanizame. Jedan od ključnih, koji i daje prednost ovoj organizaciji u odnosu na druge, jesu operacije na terenu (prisustvo na terenu), tamo gde se odigravaju sukobi ili blizu njih. Operacije na terenu funkcionišu na osnovu memoranduma o razumevanju, koje OEBS zaključuje sa vlastima države prijema. Prve operacije na terenu OEBS je počeo da izvodi nakon hladnog rata, kao odgovor na sukobe koji su izbili na teritoriji SFRJ i SSSR. Nakon tog perioda, OEBS je u skladu sa sveobuhvatnim pristupom bezbednosti, počeo da obraća pažnju i na druge bezbednosne izazove, rizike i pretnje u cilju ranog upozorenja i sprečavanja sukoba, a zatim doprinosa rešavanju sukoba koji su već izbili, te postkonfliktne rehabilitacije. Kao glavni oblik „prijateljske” intervencije u zemlјama prijema, kao što smo već napome- nuli, operacije OEBS-a koriste „preventivnu diplomatiju”, jer isklјučuju prinudu kao sredstvo.5 Koliki značaj imaju operacije na terenu, govori i podatak da preko 80 procenata ukupnog budžeta OEBS-a ide na ove operacije.

U dalјem tekstu ovog rada, nakon definisanja „savremenih izazova rizika i pret- nji”, daće se osvrt na operacije na terenu koje sprovodi OEBS, a koje opterećuju bezbednosni kontekst Evrope.

Bezbednosni izazovi, rizici i pretnјe

Spisak bezbednosnih izazova rizika i pretnji menjao se kroz istoriju, prateći glo- balizaciju. Kao što je u uvodnom delu rada napomenuto, savremeni svet ka- rakteriše produblјivanje starih i nastanak novih izazova, rizika i pretnji, koji su zahvatili i unutrašnje i međunarodne odnose, a ispolјavaju se u različitim oblicima, zavisno od političkog, ekonomskog i kulturnog razvoja država i regi- ona. Promene koje su se dogodile razvojem modernog društva donele su nove bezbednosne izazove, rizike i pretnje, dok su stari dobili nove dimenzije i bitno promenili svoj pojavni oblik. Okončanjem Hladnog rata, kada je prestala opa- snost od „poznatog neprijatelјa”, lјudi su ponovo počeli umereno da se plaše većeg broja drugih opasnosti. Neke od njih kao što su terorizam, migracije, pan-

5 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemlјama u tranziciji, Izvorni naučni rad, Beograd, 2011, str. 102

111 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

demije i građanski ratovi postojale su i ranije, ali nisu bile u prvom planu, neke nisu bile u toj meri zabrinjavajuće izražene kao u današnjem svetu (klimatske promene), dok su se neke, zahvalјujući novim tehnologijama, pojavile prvi put u istoriji (informatičke pretnje).6 Ne treba zaboraviti ni pretnje koje je profesor Samjuel Hantington „predvideo” 1993. godine u svom članku, a kasnije i knji- zi pod nazivom „Sukob civilizacije i ponovno uspostavlјanje svetskog poretka”, koji govori o mogućem sukobu civilizacija naročito na religijskoj osnovi između islamske i hrišćanske civilizacije.

Države se trude da prepoznaju bezbednosne izazove, rizike i pretnje i da ih popi- šu u strategijsko-normativnim dokumentima, kao što su strategija nacionalne bezbednosti i strategija odbrane. Evropska unija, vođena kantovskim idealima, Evropsku strategiju bezbednosti, započela je rečenicom: „Evropa nikada nije bila tako napredna, tako bezbedna, ni tako slobodna. Nasilјe iz prve polovine HH veka ustupilo je mesto periodu mira i stabilnosti, bez presedana u evropskoj istoriji”7. Evropska strategija bezbednosti navodi pet klјučnih pretnji po bezbednost Evrop- ske unije, to su: terorizam, proliferacija oružja za masovno uništenje, regionalni sukobi, neuspele države i organizovani kriminal. Pored osnovnih, navedene su i pretnje poput pandemija, klimatskih promena, piraterije na moru i ugrožavanja energetske zavisnosti. Ono što ne stoji u Evropskoj strategiji bezbednosti je činje- nica da je savremeno društvo postalo zavisno od informaciono – komunikacionih tehnologija. Ova zavisnost iznedrila je i nove bezbednosne rizike i pretnje. Nove tehnologije nisu samo iznedrile nove pretnje već su i otežale sposobnost identi- fikovanja aktera bezbednosnih pretnji i njihovog razlikovanja. Akteri pretnji u novom ambijentu, sajber prostoru, mogu biti različiti – državni, unutar državni i transnacionalni subjekti. To su najčešće zlonamerni pojedinci, kriminalne gru- pe, terorističke organizacije, privredni subjekti, ali i države i njihove institucije (nacionalne armije i obaveštajne službe), sa različitim motivima za destruktivno delovanje: ekonomskim, političkim, ideološkim, religijskim ili vojnim.8

U globalnom multipolarnom i multilateralnom okruženju, u kome je izraže- na složena međuzavisnost država, nijedna država nije u stanju da samostal- no rešava sve složenije probleme očuvanja i jačanja nacionalne bezbednosti. Zbog toga se bezbednost u savremenim uslovima sve više sagledava globalno, a nacionalna bezbednost je sve značajnije povezana sa stanjem bezbednosti u bližem i dalјem okruženju. Postojanje i rast asimetričnih pretnji transnacional-

6 Filip Ejdus : Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2012, str. 32. 7 Bezbedna Evropa u bolјem svetu: Evropska strategija bezbednosti, ISAC Fund (International and Security Affairs Centre), Beograd, 2006, str. 3-21. 8 Nenad Putnik, Milica Bošković, Savremeni bezbednsoni izazovi – haktivizam kao novi oblik društvenog konflikta, Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2013

112  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

nog karaktera jača potrebu za razvijanjem pristupa u očuvanju i unapređenju bezbednosti, zasnovanom na saradnji i udruživanju bezbednosnih kapaciteta nacionalnih država. Jedan vid saradnje i udruživanja nacionalnih država su i operacije na terenu pod pokrovitelјstvom OEBS-a.

OEBS operacije na terenu

U poslednje dve i po decenije od kako su uvedene prve operacije na terenu, deo Evrope je i dalјe u velikoj meri pogođen globalnim promenama.

Nakon rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, pretpostavlјalo se, kao što i Evrop- ska strategija bezbednosti kaže, da novi nasilni konflikti u zemlјama Evropske unije i članicama OEBS-a nisu mogući. Naravno, ova procena se pokazala kao pogrešna jer su se desili konflikti u Makedoniji (2001), Gruziji (2008) i Kirgi- stanu (2010), ili još traju u Ukrajni (2014). Česti nasilni konflikti koji izbijaju jesu poražavajući, imajući u vidu da su države u kojima se koflikti dešavaju uglavnom okrenute Evroatlanskim integracijama. Ovde bi i Evropska unija čije članice čine polovinu članstva u OEBS-u, trebalo da pokaže veću odgovornost i dalekovidost u svojim kontaktima sa OEBS-om.9

Sa druge strane, UN misije koje su poslate u Evropu su trenutno ograničene na one koje postoje na Kosovu i na Kipru. Pošto je malo verovatno da će se UN vratiti u Evropu sa većim operacijama na kopnu, ovo predstavlјa izazov za OEBS i Evropsku uniju. Trenutna situacija u Ukrajni jeste jedan takav primer.10 Zapravo, Ukrajinska kriza istakla je u prvi plan OEBS kao univerzalnu, fleksi- bilnu organizaciju podesnu za brzo reagovanje na bezbednosne izazove, rizike i pretnje putem „preventivne diplomatije” i „operacija na terenu”.

OEBS je prva i jedina međunarodna organizacija koja ima specijalnu misiju za nadzor u Ukrajini, koja trenuto broji oko 500 članova (države članice OEBS-a odobrile povećanje članova misije na 1000). Prema rečima šefa te misije Ertugu-

9 Erwan Fouéré, Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE?, Centre for European Policy Studies, 24 April 2014, pdf, str 1-3 10 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, str. 2-27

113 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

la Apakana „povećanje posmatračke misije OEBS u istočnoj Ukrajini može imati svrhu, samo ako članovi posmatračke misije imaju potpuni pristup svim delo- vima istočne Ukrajine, uklјučujući i teritorije koje trenutno nisu pod kontrolom vlade i one duž granice sa Rusijom. Dok se takva pitanja ne reše, dodatni posma- trači će imati malo uticaja na nadzor primene mirovnog sporazuma iz Minska.”11

Kriza u Ukrajni je zapravo odraz institucionalne promene kako na prostoru OE- BS-a tako i van tih prostora. Politički sukob je propraćen uzajamno isklјučivim percepcijama. Sa stanovišta Zapada, aneksija Kremlјa Rusiji i njena intervencija u istočnoj Ukrajni predstalјa nezamislive prekršaje međunarodnog prava i osnov- nih OEBS principa. Sa stanovišta Rusije, ovi potezi su legitimne mere koje brane prava Rusa u smislu puča koji se odigrao u Kijevu. Daleko kompleksniji procesi u smislu interakcije i eskalacije, koji su obično promovisani od strane više učesnika, više se i ne uzimaju o obzir. Dokle god preovlađuju crno-bele tehnike razmišlјanja, pravi dijalog neće biti moguć.12 Henri Kisindžer, u intervjuu za britanski list In- dependent povodom izdavanja svoje nove knjige „Svetski poredak” ima drugačije viđenje krize u Ukrajini. On kaže: „Ne slažem se sa Putinom, no zašto neko nije, negde u toku te krize, predložio rešenje koje bi adresirao zabrinutosti obe strane u kontekstu nezavisne Ukrajine? Kada je Evropa rekla da Ukrajina mora da bira između Evrope i Rusije u komercijalnim pregovorima, trebalo je reći nešto druga- čije – uklјučimo se u to zajedno – to je moglo ostvariti veliki progres”.13

Za sada, nema standardnih smernica po kojima funkcionišu operacije na tere- nu, osim vrlo uopštenih načela iz Istanbulske povelјe za evropsku bezbednost iz 1999 godine.14

Ranije, operacije su vođene smernicama koje su se odnosile na specifično- sti same operacije, a prvobitno su bile sadržane u Helsinškom dokumentu iz 1992.15 I pored ove činjenice operacije na terenu prdstavlјaju najbolјi mehani- zam za rešavanje kriza i postkriznu rehabiltaciju društva.

Operacije na terenu ustanovlјava Stalni savet, koji odlučuje i o njihovom man- datu i budžetu. Vođenje ovih operacija obezbeđuju Stalni savet i Predsedavaju- ći. Međunarodni zvaničnici u okviru operacija su diplomate prekomandovane

11 Internet:http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=04&dd=24&nav_category=78&nav_id=984337, pristuplјeno 27.04.2015. godine 12 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, str. 2-27 13 Internet: http://srbin.info/2014/09/28/savremeni-svet-sukob-rusko-kineske-realpolitike-i-americke-ideologije/, pristuplјeno 27.04.2015. godine 14 Dragan Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002, str. 172. 15 Videti: Internet: http://www.osce.org/mc/39530 pristuplјeno 24.04.2015. godine

114  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

od strane država članica, koje one i plaćaju. To smanjuje troškove operacija za OEBS, ali pravi problem u vidu upražnjenih mesta, česte rotacije službenika i njihovog nedovolјnog treninga, a u praksi narušava i ravnomernu geografsku raspodelu (preko 40 posto pripadnika osoblјa ovih operacija je iz SAD, Velike Britanije, Francuske i Nemačke).16 Iako su OEBS operacije na terenu zasnovane na individualnim, skrojenim mandatima, one imaju veliki broj zajedničkih oso- bina, pre svega predstavlјaju kolektivan i kooperativan napor celokupne orga- nizacije da se dođe do mirnog rešenja krize.17

Međutim, nisu sve države „dobri domaćini”. Dok većina zemalјa u južno-istočnoj Evropi ima relativno pozitivan stav, južni Kavkaz i zemlјe centralne Azije izra- žavaju u različitoj meri dosta skeptične stavove prema OEBS operacijama na terenu. Kao što se ističe u tekstu pod naslovom „Buduće aktivnosti Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju na terenu” – nekoliko zemalјa domaćina je izrazilo želјu da se ograniči polјe delovanja OEBS-a ili da mu se potpuno umanji značaj. Ovo se dešava posebno u zemlјama koje imaju bogate resurse gde preo- vlađuje mišlјenje da kontakti i usluge OEBS-a nisu ponekad potrebne, a sve ovo je potkovano idejom da su mandati vezani za opreacije na terenu već ispunje- ni”.18 Takođe, Rusija u poslednjih desetak godina kritikuje dosadašnje delovanje operacija na terenu i ta njena kritika ima sve veći uticaj, u onoj meri u kojoj raste i moć same Rusije i njena sposobnost da nametne svoju listu prioriteta u evroatlantsko-evroazijskom dijalogu o bezbednosnim odnosima. Rusija, Be- lorusija, Kazahstan i Kirgistan su 2002. godine sastavili dokument koji kritikuje praksu operacija OEBS-a na terenu,19 koje se između ostalog odnose i na nedo- volјnu kontrolu operacija od strane centralnih tela OEBS-a.

OEBS sutra

Imajući u vidu bezbednosni kontekst u kome se Evropa i svet danas nalaze, glo- balizaciju, tranziciju i lutanje u politici, jasno je da same države bez pomoći i sa-

16 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemlјama u tranziciji, Izvorni naučni rad, Beograd, 2011, str. 119 17 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, str. 2-27 18 Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, pdf, str. 2-27 19 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemlјama u tranziciji, Izvorni naučni rad, Beograd, 2011, str. 119

115 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

radnje Velikih sila kroz kooperativnu bezbednost, neće biti u mogućnosti da se suprostave savremenim bezbednosnim izazovima, rizicima i pretnjama. Kako zapaža profesor Dragan Simić „…bez obzira na istinski demokratska i mirolјubi- va zalaganja OEBS-a, zamisao kooperativne bezbednosti je, nažalost, i za ovu u početku „Konferenciju u kontinuitetu”, a potom, međunarodnu organizaciju, ostala uglavnom normativna vizija, nedostignuta u stvarnosti, a u teorijsko-fi- lozofskom smislu nedovolјno jasno utemelјena20. Takođe, OEBS se u narednom periodu može suočiti i sa izazovima koji će po Volfgangu Zelneru doneti „proši- renje Evropske unije” koje može usloviti preklapanje funkcija dve organizacije, ili pak stvoriti priliku za produblјenje saradnje.21

I pored ovih zapažanja, uloga OEBS-a kroz sprovođenje preventivne diplomatije, operacija na terenu i drugih mehanizama u narednom periodu treba da dobije na još većem značaju. OEBS sutra treba da pojača dijalog sa svim međunarodnim akterima u cilјu obnavlјanja mira i stabilnosti u Evropi. U prilog ovoj konstataciji govori i činjenica da je OEBS dobitnik nagrade „Kajzer-Oto” za 2015. godinu22.

Međutim, neophodno je povećati transparentnost OEBS-a pre svega njegovih spo- sobnosti za brzo i efikasno delovanje na terenu, kao i samih rezultata. Čini se da trenutna kriza u Ukrajni podstiče države i druge bezbednosne aktere da značajni- je obrate pažnju na organizaciju. One sada aktivno koriste OEBS kao posrednika u rešavanju sukoba, dok sa druge strane, kao što je već ranije napomenuto i dalјe postoji vrlo malo razumevanja za OEBS-ove potencijalne sposobnosti i njegovu spremnost da utiče na revitalizaciju dijaloga vezanih za evropsku bezbednost.

Jedan od predloga Volfganga Zelnera jeste razvijanje tematskih misija, koje bi se bavile novim transnacionalnim bezbednosnim pretnjama na celom prostoru OEBS-a (ili u pojedinim regionima), umesto postojećih lokalnih misija koje se bave širokim spektrom pitanja na nivou pojedinih država.23

U godini kada Republika Srbija predsedava OEBS-om, jedan od prioriteta ove orga- nizacije treba da bude stablizacija krize u Ukrajini i oštrije suprostavlјanje sajber pretnjama kroz punu podršku implementaciji usvojenih mera za jačanje poverenja (CBMs). „Uz mere za jačanje poverenja, OEBS državama članicama nudi jedinstve- nu platformu za reševanje problema različitih sajber pretnji, u isto vreme štiteći

20 Dragan Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002, str 84 21 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemlјama u tranziciji, Izvorni naučni rad, Beograd, 2011, str. 119 22 Nagradu dodelјuje Fondacija kulture „Kajzer-Oto” od 2005. godine u nemačkom gradu Magdeburgu. Ova nagrada dodelјuje se svake druge godine za izuzetan doprinos evropskim integracijama i stabilnosti u Evropi i susednim regionima. Internet: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/latest/500/500.html?id=26979406, pristuplјeno 26.04.2015. godine 23 Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemlјama u tranziciji, Izvorni naučni rad, Beograd, 2011, str. 119

116  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

osnovne slobode i lјudska prava”.24 Takođe, prema zajedničkom radnom planu Švaj- carske i Srbije za predsedavanje organizacijom,25 OEBS bi u narednom periodu tre- bao da „razvije aktivnosti na osnovu Dablinske ministarske deklaracije o jačanju dobrog upravlјanja i borbi protiv korupcije, pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, uklјučujući i bavlјenje povraćajem ukradene imovine, rešavanje globalnih i regio- nalnih problema životne sredine u kontekstu promovisanja bezbednosne saradnje i bavlјenje pitanjem održivog upravlјanja vodom i nestašicom vode”.

Takođe, OEBS treba da unapredi saradnju i partnerstvo sa Ujedinjenim nacijama koje je klјučno za rešavanje bezbednosnih izazova, rizika i pretnji na evroatlant- skom i evroazijskom prostoru. „OEBS je angažovan na političkom dijalogu, koordi- naciji i razmeni informacija sa UN o tematskim i regionalnim pitanjima kako na političkom, tako i ekspertskom nivou. Sve strukture OEBS-a sarađuju sa širokim spektrom tela i organizacija UN u cilјu jačanja bezbednosti u sve tri dimenzije na prostoru OEBS-a i u susednim regionima. Visoko cenimo ovu blisku saradnju. Spremni smo da je učinimo operativnijom i više orijentisanom na rezultate putem oživlјavanja razgovora sa osoblјem, cilјanom razmenom osoblјa i pragmatičnom implementacijom postojećeg institucionalnog okvira”26. Pored unapređenja sarad- nje sa Ujedinjenim nacijama, na osnovu Istanbulske platforme za bezbednosnu saradnju iz 1999. godine, prioritet OEBS-a treba da bude razvijanje saradnje i sa drugim relevantnim regionalnim i međunarodnim organizacijama koje dele ci- lјeve i vrednosti OEBS-a u cilјu kapitalizacije sinergija na očuvanju bezbednosti.

Zaklјučak

Cilј ovog rada bio je da se opiše, istraži i objasni uloga OEBS-a u rešavanju savremenih izazova, rizika i pretnji bezbednosti, naročito kroz operacije na te- renu, kao i da se još jednom ukaže na značaj postojanja ove organizacije, koja pre svega ima za cilј očuvanje sveobuhvatne bezbednosne arhitekture Evrope.

24 Internet, http://mondo.rs/a787040/Info/Srbija/Dacic-Sajber-bezbednost-prioritet-za-Srbiju-kao-predsedavajucu- OEBS-u.html, pristuplјeno 20.04.2015. godine 25 Internet, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/teme/oebs-2015-predsedavanje-srbije?lang=lat, pristuplјeno 20.04.2015. godine 26 Deo govora predsedavajućeg OEBS-u, prvog potpredsednika Vlade Srbije i ministra spolјnih poslova Ivice Dačića, na brifingu koji je održao u Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija o prioritetima predsedavanja Srbije OEBS-u i saradnji OEBS-a i UN-a. Detalјnije videti: Internet http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/2015-01-15-13-45- 30/14870-2015-02-25-12-57-03?lang=lat, pristuplјeno 20.04.2015

117 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Literatura

Dragan Simić, Nauka o bezbednosti, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002,

Filip Ejdus i Marko Savković, Rečnik Evropske bezbednosti, Centar za civilno vojne odnose, Beograd 2010,

Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic, European Security in Transition, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006,

Džon Miršajmer, Tragedija politike velikih sila, Udruženje za studije SAD u Srbiji, Beograd 2009,

Margaretha af Ugglas, Conditions for successful preventive diplomacy, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994,

Živorad Kovačević, Međunarodno pregovaranje, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 2004

Victor – Yves Ghebali, „Preventive Diplomacy as Visited from the OSCE, 3rd International Security Forum”, Kongresshaus Zurich, 1998

Vladimir Trapara, Uloga OEBS operacija na terenu u zemlјama u tranziciji, Izvorni naučni rad, Beograd, 2011,

Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers, The Future of OSCE Field Operations, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions,

Erwan Fouéré, Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE?, Centre for European Policy Studies, 24 April 2014,

Nenad Putnik, Milica Bošković, Savremeni bezbednsoni izazovi – haktivizam kao novi oblik društvenog konflikta, Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2013

Bezbedna Evropa u bolјem svetu: Evropska strategija bezbednosti, ISAC Fund (International and Security Affairs Centre), Beograd, 2006

118  Aleksandra Tomić

OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Beograd, april 2015.

Sažetak: Cilj ovog rada je analiza savremenih bezbednosnih izazova i njihovih implikacija na bezbednosnu dinamiku unutar prostora Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju. U prvom delu je objašnjen razvoj OEBS-a, odnosno njego- va trasformacija kroz prilagođavanje bezbednosnim zahtevima datog vremena i karakteristikama bezbednosnih izazova radi pružanja adekvatnog odgovora. Zatim sledi opis izmenjene prirode savremenih izazova u globalizovanom svetu i vizija OEBS-a o kreiranju bezbednosne zajednice kao strategija suočavanja sa njima. Iznenadna kriza u Ukrajini, kao najveći bezbednosni izazov država člani- ca OEBS prostora, međutim opovrgava mogućnost stvaranja takve bezbednosne zajednice. Stoga, unutrašnja nestabilnost, nastala izbijanjem ove krize, u sprezi sa ostalim nadolazećim izazovima iz destabilizujućih regiona južnog susedstva utiču na bezbednost OEBS prostora. U vremenu kada je postojeća bezbednosna arhitektura narušena, pred OEBS-om se nalazi izazov pronalaženja adekvatnog odgovora i očuvanja uspostavljene reputacije najveće bezbednosne organizacije.

119 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Uticaj bezbednosnih izazova na razvoj OEBS-a

Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, kao najveća međunarodna or- ganizacija u polju bezbednosti, nastala je i razvijala se pod uticajem bezbed- nosne dinamike i izazova na prostoru koji obuhvata, ali je istvremeno i sama uticala na promenu i transformaciju bezbednosnog okruženja. Sa 57 članica, koje zauzimaju gotovo celu severnu hemisferu, OEBS predstavlja organizaciju sa izuzetno velikim bezbednosnim značajem, dok sa druge strane veliki prostor i različitost između država članica može biti i ograničavajući faktor. Četrdeset godina nakon usvajanja Finalnog akta iz Helsinkija čini se da sadašnji bezbed- nosni izazovi vraćaju OEBS u sličnu poziciju s početka funkcionisanja.

Preteča organizacije, Konferencija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, nastala je 1975. godine, u periodu detanta i popuštanja zategnutosti između dva bloka u hlad- noratovkoj eri, sa ciljem kreiranja foruma za dijalog između istoka i zapada. Usvaja- njem Završnog akta iz Helsinkija države su se sporazumele o principima i načelima koji treba da dovedu do uspostavljanja postojanog i sveobuhvatnog procesa detan- ta. Nakon pada „gvozdene zavese” nestaje razlog prvobitnog stvaranja KEBS-a što utiče na neophodnost redefinisanja njenih ciljeva, ali i njenu transformaciju.

Stvaranje novih demokratija i izazovi njihovog uključivanja u panevropski kon- cept bezbednosti, doveli su do okretanja ka novim ciljevima, uspostavljanja i jačanja demokratije, ljudskih prava i bezbednosti, vladavine prava, istaknutih u Povelji za novu Evropu iz Pariza 19901. Time praktično prestaje da postoji helsinški KEBS, a transfomacija u Organizaciju za evropsku bezbednost i sarad- nju 1995. godine će to i potvrditi. Institucionalna promena dovela je ne samo do proširenja nadležnosti organizacije, već i do formiranja stalnih i ad hoc tela ovlašćenih za delovanje kako na opštem planu, tako i u unutrašnjim pojedinač- nim sučajevima2. Promena vrste konflikata, od međudržavnih ka unutrašnjim, uputile su OEBS ka novim ciljevima, od rešavanja kriza, izgradnje demokrat- skih institucija, implementacije međunarodnih akata, do unapređenja ljudskih prava, pružanja sveukupne podrške i praćenja izbora.3 Dakle, u skladu sa pro- menom bezbednosnih izazova menjala se i uloga OEBS-a radi sprovođenja de- lotvorne reakcije na njih.

1 OSCE, 1990 2 Aćimović, 2013, 9,10 3 Ibid, 13

120  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Na početku 21. veka transnacionalne pretnje poput terorizma, organizovanog kriminala, sajber pretnji i dr., zauzimale su najviše mesto na bezbednosnoj agendi, dok se činilo da je prostor od Vladivostoka do Vankuvera duboko privr- žen miru i sradnji. Međutim, neočekivana kriza u Ukrajini ukazala je na nove izazove koji vraćaju OEBS u situaciju sličnu vremenu početka njegovog nasta- janja i uloge balansa između Istoka i Zapada. To usložnjava bezbednosnu struk- turu, već ugroženu destabilizujućim faktorima na periferiji, od centralne Azije, Bliskog Istoka i Severne Afrike. Kakve će implikacije imati ovi izazovi na samu ulogu OEBS-a, i da li će još jednom promene u bezbednosnoj dinamici usloviti transformaciju ove organizacije, ostaje da se vidi u narednom periodu.

Odlike savremenih izazova

Proces globalizacije iznedrio je sasvim nove vidove pretnji kako na nacional- nom, tako i na regionalnom, globalnom i nivou pojedinca. Na početku 21.veka brojni transnacionalni izazovi i pretnje zauzeli su vrh bezbednosnih agendi. Zbog implikacija koje one imaju na bezbednosnu dinamiku ne samo OEBS re- giona već i drugih delova sveta, promene u karakteristikama globalnih izazova predstavljaju ključ za razumevanje pojedinačnih bezbednosnih pretnji.

Izmenjena priroda ratovanja i oružanih konflikata, kao i specifičnost aktera, instrumenata i institucija utiču na karakter i domašaj savremenih bezbedno- snih izazova.4 Iako je broj ratova i oružanih konflikata u opadanju, drugi vidovi nasilja ostaju u stalnom porastu i doprinose sveopštem osećaju nebezbednosti. Nekada jasne razlike između organizovanog i decentralizovanog nasilja nestaju, a distinkcije između kriminalnog ili ekonomskog i političkog ili ideološkog na- silja postaju zamagljene.5 Dostupnost lakog naoružanja kao i novih tehnologija doprinose stvaranju novih izazova poput sajber kriminala, ali i pospešuju rast broja nedržavnih aktera uključenih u oružane sukobe i njihovo rukovođenje. Neefikasnost institucija često predstavlja jedan od ključnih problema u suoča- vanju sa savremenim izazovima, dok je njena direktna posledica uskraćivanje bezbednosti građanima.

4 Krause, 2014, 1 5 Ibid.

121 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

U uslovima transnacionalne povezanosti i slabljenja državnih granica, sve ove osobine utiču na lakoću prelivanja i jednu vrstu nemoći u pružanju adekvatnog odgovora na nove izazove. Destabilizujuće oblasti od centralne Azije, preko juž- nog Mediterana, ali i Srednje Amerike predstavljaju direktnu pretnju na južnim granicama država članica OEBS-a. Terorizam, organizovani kriminal, ilegalne migracije samo su neke od pretnji koje su produkt novih okolnosti u bezbed- nosnoj dinamici. Slabost pojedinih država usložnjava ceo problem, njihovom nemogućnošću da se odupru i spreče prodor takvih pretnji.

Kao reakcija na savremena dešavanja, stvorena je vizija, usvojena na sastanku OEBS-a u Astani 2010. godine, kreiranja „slobodne, demokratske, zajedničke i nedeljive Evro-atlantske i Evroazijske bezbednosne zajednice koja se proteže od Vankuvera do Vladivostoka”.6 To bi predstavljalo pluralističku formu bez- bednosnog kompleksa u kojoj države članice isključuju mogućnost upotrebe sile, i zajednički nastupaju u suočavanju sa savremenim izazovima7. Međutim, iznenadna kriza u Ukrajini, i zaoštravanje odnosa između Istoka i Zapada još jednom su pokazali da je državocentrični pristup u međunarodnim odnosima realnost i da je stvaranje bezbednosne zajednice daleko od realnosti.

Ukrajinska kriza

Aktuelna kriza u Ukrajini predstavlja veliki izazov ne samo u evropskom re- gionu, već i na globalnom nivou. Zaoštravanje odnosa između članica OEBS-a otvara pitanje delotvornosti postojećih alata koji stoje OEBS-u na raspolaga- nju u odgovaranju na krizne situacije. Implikacije menjanja granica u Evropi i samim tim narušavanja osnovnih principa međunarodnog prava i Helsinškog Završnog akta su mnogo veće. Pokrenule su lavinu drugih izazova, od političkih, preko ekonomskih do energetskih pitanja, uključujući i nezaobilaznu ljudsku dimenziju. Polarizovanost i geopolitika postaju ključni aspekti.

Još jednom Evropa je podeljena. Optimistične vizije „jedne, mirne i slobodne Evrope” s kraja 20. veka, poduprte neoliberalnim učenjima, ponovo prepuštaju evropsku pozornicu realističkim paradigamama stalne napetosti i sukoba inte-

6 OSCE, 2010 7 Ejdus, 2012, 119

122  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

resa u anarhičnom sistemu. Geopolitika se vraća na velika vrata. Pozivajući se na britanskog geografa H. Makindera, predeo središnjeg dela evroazijskog kon- tinenta predstavlja „predeo srca” heartland, što u ovom slučaju objašnjava geo- strateški značaj Ukrajine i Istočne Evrope. Poznati Makinderov silogizam glasi „Ko vlada Istočnom Evropom, vlada predelom srca. Ko vlada predelom srca vla- da svetskim ostrvom (Evroazija). Ko vlada svetskim ostrvom, vlada svetom.”8 Pored njega, ne tako davno, Zbignjev Bžežinski je, objašnjavajući svoj koncept geopolitičkog stožera, naveo Ukrajinu kao primer države za koju se nadmeću geopolitički igrači zbog njenog značaja za kontrolu Evroazije.9 Aktuelna kriza u Ukrajini potvrdila je njihove tvrdnje.

Sukob geopolitičkih i vojnih interesa između Rusije i Zapada doveo je do bez- bednosne dileme i zaoštravanja odnosa. Uvedene sankcije Ruskoj Federaciji samo su dodatno pogoršale međusobne odnose i dovele do situacije u kojoj niko ne profitira. Stoga Ukrajinska kriza predstavlja izazov i zahteva kreiranje sve- obuhvatnog pristupa koji će uspeti da spreči dalje narušavanje već zategnutih odnosa. Kompleksnost ove krize ogleda se u prelivanju političke krize na druge sektore i nivoe bezbednosti. Ekonomski i energetski faktori nesumnjivo utiču na razvoj i tok događaja. Upravo zbog ekonomskih implikacija, ali i zbog po- tencijalne destabilizacije drugih osetljivih područja istočne Evrope, interes je svih država da se rešavanju ove krize priđe sa pragmatične strane. Sporazumi iz Minska (2014, 2015) ukazuju na privrženost svih strana ka pronalaženju mir- nog rešenja i prekidu vatre. S druge strane, neuspeh u sprovođenju reči u dela ukazuje na osetljivost ovog pitanja. Uzimajući u obzir implikacije na ljudsku dimenziju i bezbednost građana, kao i sve veći problem migracija iz Ukrajine, jasno je da je reč o krizi širokih razmera.

Vizija OEBS-a o kreiranju bezbednosne zajednice koja će sprečiti nastajanje bez- bednosne dileme i onemogućiti teritorijalne pretenzije i sukobe na prostoru od Vankuvera do Vladivostoka pokazala se kao neodrživa. Teškoće sa kojima se OEBS suočava u pogledu nemogućnosti smirivanja sukoba dovele su do situa- cije u kojoj se OEBS nalazi i pred sopstvenim izazovom- kako ostati relevantan igrač u takvim uslovima. Međutim, imajući u vidu istrajnost i neprekidnu borbu OEBS-a za obezbeđivanje mirne i stabilne Evrope tokom svog četrdesetogodiš- njeg postojanja, trenutna nestabilnost ne može narušiti legitimitet koji uživa.

OEBS, kao krovna bezbednosna organizacija, ima krucijalnu ulogu u iznalaže- nju načina za mirno rešavanje spora. Dosadašnje delovanje, preko specijalne

8 Miletic, 1993, 343 9 Brzezinski, 1998. 46

123 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

posmatračke misije uspostavljene marta 2014. godine, fokusirano je na konti- nuirano nadgledanje i izveštavanje sa terena. Iako civilna misija, ona značajno doprinosi osnaživanju dijaloga između sukobljenih strana, a njena snaga pro- izlazi iz činjenice da je dobila mandat konsezusom svih 57 država članica. Pa ipak, ograničeni domet ovog instrumenta i ozbiljnost krize upućuju na potrebu uzimanja u razmatranje moguće promene samog delovanja OEBS-a, odnosno pronalaženja novih mehanizama koji bi doprineli većoj efikasnosti.

Region Mediterana

Pored unutrašnje krize u Ukrajini, OEBS se suočava sa izazovima koji dolaze sa južnog oboda, iz partnerskih mediteranskih država potrešenih unutrašnjim ne- mirima, ali i nadolazećim pretnjama Islamske države Iraka i Sirije. Saradnja sa partnerskim državama Mediterana (Alžir, Egipat, Izrael, Jordan, Maroko i Tunis) datira iz vremena Helsinškog procesa kada je u Završni akt inkorporirano me- diteransko poglavlje koje naglašava da se bezbednost Evrope ne može tretirati odvojeno od mediteranske, usled njihove međuzavisnosti.10

Region Mediterana potresaju sopstveni problemi. Arapsko proleće iznedrilo je ne samo talas demonstracija i nezadovoljstva u arapskom svetu, već i erupciju transnacionalnih pretnji. Neke od njih, kao što su terorizam, problem migraci- ja, trgovina ljudima i oružjem, ali i izazovi tranzicije karakterišu bezbednosno okruženje regiona, koje svojim dejstvom utiče i na evropsku bezbednost. Zbog sveobuhvatnog pristupa bezbednosti i širokog članstva, OEBS ima kapacitete za pomaganje procesa tranzicije ovih zemalja, kao i uspostavljanja dijaloga radi rešavanja krize i kooperativnog delovanja na suzbijanju pretnji, mada usled izbijanja unutrašnje krize i zaoštravanja odnosa između članica taj zadatak se trenutno ne nalazi na spisku prioriteta.

Međutim, zanemarivanje ovog regiona utiče na usložnjavanje bezbednosne situ- acije na Mediteranu sa direktnim implikacijama na bezbednost Evrope. To poka- zuje stradanje 700 ljudi u Sredozemnom moru11, koje je stavilo na vrh bezebd- nosne agende pitanje migracija i trgovine ljudima. Prema rečima predsednika

10 OSCE, 1975, 36 11 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet

124  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Evropskog parlamenta Martina Šulca „odsustvo istinske evropske politike kad je reč o azilantima i migrantima pretvara Mediteran u groblje.”12 Isto važi i za OEBS. Problem ove organizacije je u širokom članstvu, gde države nisu jednako pogođe- ne istim pretnjama. U takvim uslovima teško je postići kosenzus o prioritetima i akcijama koje će zadovoljiti sve članice. Pa tako i Helsinki +40 Process13 se odnosio na Evro- atlantsku i Evroazijsku bezbednosnu zajednicu, bez napomena o stvara- nju slične Evro- mediteranske bezbednosne zajednice.14 Međutim, ne samo da se pokazalo da je stvaranje bezbednosne zajednice u ovom trenutku nemoguće, već je shvaćeno i da je potpuno retrogradno odbaciti mediteransku dimenziju.

Avganistan i region Centralne Azije

Sa druge strane, Avganistan ostaje izvor pretnje u Centralnoj Aziji sa direktnim uticajem na bezbednost i stabilnost susednih država i čitavog regiona. Rangira- nje ove države pri samom vrhu po indeksu slabosti15, kao i sukob sa Talibanima koji ne jenjava čine ovu državu urušenom. Pored toga, međupovezane pretnje droge, kriminala i korupcije narušavaju ljudsku bezbednost i zahtevaju zajednički pristup međunarodne zajednice. Najava američkog predsednika Baraka Obame da će zadržati 9800 američkih vojnika do kraja 2015. ukazuju na nestabilnost i nemogućnost avganistanske vlasti da se same izbore sa pretnjama na terenu.16

Direktne pretnje iz južnog susedstva utiču na bezbednot OEBS članica Central- ne Azije (Kazahstan, Kirgistan, Tadžikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). Dodat- ni izazov za ovaj region je slabost država, koje se prema indeksu slabosti veoma loše rangiraju (Uzbekistan 48, Tadžikistan 55, Kirgistan 58, Turkmenistan 74, Kazahstan 111)17. Nemogućnost da adekvatno odgovore na unutrašnje izazove i isporuče javna dobra sopstvenim građanima, utiču na podložnost ovih država destruktivnom uticaju iz regiona.

12 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150423STO45411/html/Schulz-%E2%80%9CLack- of-European-migration-policy-turning-Mediterranean-into-graveyard%E2%80%9D 13 OSCE, 2012 14 Wohlfeld, 2014, 6 15 Messner, 2014, 23 16 http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-meets-with-afghan-president-ghani-amid-troop-drawdown- concerns-1427209840 17 Messner 2014, 24, 26

125 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Stoga je uloga OEBS-a nezamenljiva u osnaživanju ovih država. Njeni kapaciteti u pomaganju demokratskih reformi, učestvovanju u stvaranju efikasnih institucija, promocije vladavine prava i ljudskih prava krucijalni su za osposobljavanje država regiona u suočavanju sa bezbednosnim izazovima. Radi ostvarenja tog cilja, OEBS radi na osnaživanju prekogranične saradnje i kreiranju regionalnog pristupa koji će doprineti zajedničkom suočavanju i pronalaženju efikasnih načina suzbijanja pretnji.

Terorizam i radikalizacija

Čitava međunarodna zajednica, uključujući i OEBS region, suočava se sa glo- balnom pretnjom terorizma i ekstremizma. Delovanje Islamske države Iraka i Sirije i Boko Harama u severnoj Nigeriji, kao i najave Al Kaide o stvaranju novog uporišta u južnoj Aziji ukazuju na globalni domet pretnje islamskog terorizma. Ova napredovanja, kao i veliki broj ubistava stranih novinara, ali i rapidno re- grutovanje stranih terorističkih boraca su stalni podsetnik da terorizam ostaje najveća pretnja savremenog doba.18 Upravo zbog svog transnacionalnog karak- tera, borba protiv terorizma zahteva zajedničku akciju međunarodne zajednice.

Napad na francuski satirični časopis Šarli Ebdo, januara 2015.19, pokazuje da je mreža terorista razgranata na čitavom kontinentu, i da nijedna država nije sposobna sama da odgovori na takve izazove. Sofisticirana i dalekosežna pro- paganda Islamske države svakodnevno regrutuje horde ekstremista iz različitih zemalja sveta spremnih da daju svoj život za stvaranje kalifata. Isto tako, za veliki broj njih, Irak i Sirija postaju odredište odakle direktno doprinose ispu- njavanju istog cilja. Radikalizacija na taj način ugrožava ne samo nacionalnu bezbednost, već i globalnu i ljudsku.

„Teroristička radikalizacija je dinamičan proces u kom pojedinac postepeno pri- hvata terorističko nasilje kao moguć, možda čak i legitiman način delovanja. Ne postoji jedan jedinstveni profil koji obuhvata sve teroriste, niti postoji jasan put koji navodi pojedince na terorizam.”20 Stoga je izazov za OEBS upravo spreča- vanje i borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koji vode terorizmu.

18 Wuchte, 2014, 1,2 19 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 20 OEBS, 2014, 23

126  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

Radikalizacija se, međutim, ne dešava u vakuumu. Njeni uzroci leže u socijal- noj, ekonomskoj, političkoj marginalizaciji koja stvara uslove za nezadovoljstvo određenih kategorija društva i time utiče na njihovu podložnost radikalnim učenjima. Uloga OEBS-a je da kroz sveobuhvatni i kooperativni pristup bezbed- nosti, razvije mehanizme za jačanje demokratskih institucija, uspostavljanje vladavine prava i promovisanje dijaloga između vlasti i civilnog društva, radi kreiranja bezbednosnog ambijenta koji će biti manje podložan radikalizaciji.

Zaključak

Na osnovu pregleda bezbednosne dinamike u OEBS prostoru, kao i susednim re- gionima, uočava se nagli porast izazova i pretnji sa kojima se suočavaju države članice. Polarizacija i konfrontacija između njih narušavaju osnovne principe ko- operacije i saradnje, koje su u srži postojanja OEBS-a. Takav razvoj događaja može dati opravdanje skepticima u pogledu relevantnosti uloge OEBS-a kao bezbedno- sne institucije, usled nemogućnosti da održi mir i stabilnost unutar sopstvenog prostora. Međutim, činjenica je, da OEBS sa svojim širokim članstvom i multi- dimenzionalnim konceptom zajedničke, sveobuhvatne, kooperativne i nedeljive bezbednosti, ostaje značajan akter u suočavanju sa savremenim izazovima.

Ukrajinska kriza dovela je u pitanje stabilnost evropskog poretka i bezbednosne arhitekture, ali i pokrenula lavinu drugih bezbednosnih pitanja, ekonomske, energetske prirode, kao i ljudske dimenzije. S druge strane, duž južnih granica OEBS prostora, protežu se konfliktna područja sa regionalnim pretnjama, koje sa sobom nose bezbednosne izazove transnacionalnog karaktera i direktno uti- ču na bezbednost država članica. Domet ovih izazova i pretnji se ne zadržava na regionalnom nivou, već ima globalni uticaj.

Obuhvatajući tri isprepletane dimenzije, političko- vojnu, ekonomsko- ekološku i ljudsku, OEBS ima kapacitete i instrumente da efikasno odgovori na savreme- ne pretnje. Glavni izazov, u stvari, jeste nesaglasje između država članica, kao i njihova (ne)rešenost u sprovođenju preuzetih obaveza i pridržavanju usvojenih načela organizacije. Stoga, i 40 godina nakon nastanka, dijalog i kooperacija ostaju primarni ciljevi OEBS-a. Poznata po svojim zaslugama za ostvarivanje dijaloga tokom hladnoratovske krize i po doprinosu u njenom prevazilaženju, OEBS i u 21. veku ima legitimitet i kapacitet da još jednom opravda svoju bez- bednosnu ulogu u savremenom svetu.

127 OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi • Zbirka eseja

Bibliografija

Aćimović Ljubivoje, „OEBS na početku XXI veka- Mesto, uloga i dometi”, Rasprave i članci, Vol. LXV, br. 1, str. 7-23, 2013.

Brzezinski Zbigniev, „The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives”, Basic Books, New York 1998.

Ejdus Filip, „Međunarodna bezbednost: Teorije, sektori i nivoi”, Službeni glasnik i Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, Beograd, 2012.

„Fragile States Index”, edited by J. J. Messner, The Fund for Peace, Washington, D. C. 2014

Krause Keith, „The Shifting Face of Violence: New Challenges”, Presentation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 4 October 2014

Miletić Andreja, „Geopolitika” u: Milan Matić, Milan Podunavac, Prir, „Enciklopedija političke kulture”, Savremena administracija, Beograd 1993, 341-345

OEBS, „Sprečavanje terorizma i borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koja vodi ka terorizmu; Pristup putem rada u policiji”, Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, Beč, mart 2014.

OSCE, „Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana, 3 December 2010.

OSCE, „Charter of Paris for A New Europe”, Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe, Paris, 19-21 November 1990.

OSCE, „Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1975.

OSCE, „Decision on The OSCE Helsinki +40 Process”, Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe, Dublin 2012.

Wohlfeld Monika, „OSCE’s Mediterranean Engagement on the Eve of the 40th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act”, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Documenti IAI 14/15- December 2014.

Wuchte Thomas, „Foreign Terrorist Fighters and OSCE Counter-terrorism Strategic Priorities”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Beč, 7 November 2014.

128  OEBS i savremeni bezbednosni izazovi

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/current-challenges-to-euro-atlantic-security- strategies-for-co-operation-and-joint-solutions pristupljeno 23. 04. 2015.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150423STO45411/ html/Schulz-%E2%80%9CLack-of-European-migration-policy-turning- Mediterranean-into-graveyard%E2%80%9D pristupljeno 24. 04. 2015.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-meets-with-afghan-president-ghani-amid-troop- drawdown-concerns-1427209840 pristupljeno 25. 04. 2015.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 pristupljeno 25. 04. 2015.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead- mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet pristupljeno 26. 04. 2015.

129