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Response by the Delegation of Finland to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

15 avril 2025 OSCE

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The OSCE Secretariat bears no responsibility for the content of this document FSC.EMI/56/25 and circulates it without altering its content. The distribution by OSCE 15 April 2025 Conference Services of this document is without prejudice to OSCE decisions, as set out in documents agreed by OSCE participating States. ENGLISH only OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects on Security

FINLAND

Annual Information Exchange on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct

2025

1 INFORMATION EXHANGE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

FINLAND's information, year 2024

Section I: Inter-State elements

1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub-regional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?

Conventions and protocols ratified or accepted by Finland:

Relevant United Nations Conventions

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York on 14 December 1973

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, done at New York on 17 December 1979

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, done at New York on 15 December 1997

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, done at New York on 9 December 1999

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963

Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at Montréal on 4 April 2014

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970

Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010 and prevailing over the abovementioned Montreal Convention as between the States Parties to the Beijing Convention

2 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 26 October 1979 as amended 2005

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal on 1 March 1991

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, done at New York on 13 April 2005

Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October 2005

Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October 2005

Relevant Council of Europe Conventions

Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ETS 196)

Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ETS 217)

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS 90)

Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS 190)

Convention on Cybercrime (ETS 185)

Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (ETS 189)

European Convention on Extradition (ETS 24)

Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (ETS 98)

European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

3 (ETS 30)

Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS 99)

European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (ETS 116)

Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS 141)

Other conventions and protocols signed by Finland

Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (ETS 198)

Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS 182)

Third Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (ETS 209)

1.2 What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the above- mentioned agreements and arrangements?

The procedure for concluding international treaties is based on Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Finland. Due to the dualistic system, treaties and other international obligations must be both adopted in Finland and implemented domestically. The Finnish Constitution states that the provisions of international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are otherwise significant, or otherwise require approval by the Parliament under the Constitution, are subject to acceptance of the Parliament (Section 94).

Once the parliamentary approval has been obtained in cases where it is needed, the President ratifies the treaty according to Section 93 of the Constitution. If there is no need for the parliamentary approval, the President will ratify the treaty after it has been signed. Provisions that are of legislative nature shall be brought into force by an Act of the Finnish Parliament (Section 95). Other provisions than those of a legislative nature are to be brought into force by a Decree (of the Government), which specifically also indicates the date of entry into force of the obligation in Finland (Section 95).

The Finnish Criminal Code includes a separate Chapter 34(a) on terrorist offences, which was incorporated into the Criminal Code on 1 February 2003. The latest amendments to these provisions have entered into force in the beginning of 2022. (www.finlex.fi) The Finnish Government is currently overhauling counter-terrorism legislation to respond to current threats and to remove the ambiguity of current regulation. Penal scales will be revised to increase the punishments for terrorist offences.

National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022-2025

4 Finland’s priority in counterterrorism is the prevention of terrorism, which means addressing the root causes of and motivations for terrorism as well as factors relating to the spread of terrorism, which can lead to violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Finland´s National Counter- Terrorism Strategy was updated in 2022 through a broad-based co-operation between public authorities:

https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/164447

The national Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Violent Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2024-2027

Action plan defines measures for preventing and countering violent radicalisation and violent extremism. The Government issued a resolution on the action plan in July 2024. Current action plan is the fourth of its kind.

https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165775

National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior have partially updated the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which was originally published in 2021. The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on money laundering and terrorist financing is one of the phenomena that the ministries analyse in the risk assessment. Various methods of circumventing sanctions emerged as a key risk. The Government adopted a resolution on the partial update of the risk assessment and an action plan on 8 February 2024. Together, the risk assessment and the action plan describe Finland’s national understanding of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing as well as of the methods to manage those risks.

https://vm.fi/en/-/finland-updates-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing

1.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?

The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy lays down the key roles and missions of various governmental bodies in countering terrorism in Finland. Primary responsibility for counter- terrorism rests with the police, whose counter-terrorism capabilities comprise the intelligence capabilities of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO), the prevention and operational response capabilities of local police, the capabilities of the National Bureau of Investigation to gather information and investigate offences committed with terrorist intent, and cooperation among the authorities.

The Finnish Defence Forces and Customs support counter-terrorism efforts in their respective fields. The Finnish Border Guard contributes to counter-terrorism in the context of maintaining border security and by providing specialized personnel and materiel to support the Police as necessary.

5 1.4 Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining inter alia to: - Financing of terrorism; - Border controls; - Travel document security; - Container and supply chain security; - Security of radioactive sources; - Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes; - Legal co-operation including extradition; - Safe havens and shelter to terrorists and terrorist organisations.

Finland’s first national CBRNE Strategy was published in 2017 and updated in 2024.

https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165973

Financing of terrorism

Financing of terrorism is criminalised in the Finnish Criminal Code, in Chapter 34a, Section 5. The criminalisation of terrorist financing is consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, ratified by Finland in June 2002, and the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism. The obligation to freeze terrorist assets imposed by the UN Security Council has been implemented in the EU by decisions and regulations adopted by the Council.

The Sanctions Act (Act on the Enforcement of Certain Obligations of Finland as a Member of the United Nations and of the European Union, Act No 659/1967), together with the Criminal Code, provides for penalties and forfeitures to be imposed for violations of EU Council regulations, including those adopted to implement UN Security Council Resolutions.

Based on the fourth mutual evaluation report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), published in 2019, and on the recommendations proposed by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee following the report of the Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) on its follow-up visit to Finland in 2019 as well as on the UN Security Council Resolutions 2462 (2019) and 2482 (2019), a Government proposal for amendments to the terrorism financing provisions was submitted to the Parliament and approved on 9 April 2021. The adopted acts included a provision to criminalize financing of an individual terrorist. The provision does not require a link to a specific terrorist offence or its commission. In accordance with the definitions of the General Glossary of the FATF, it is punishable to finance a person who commits terrorist offences or participates in the commission of those offences. Public incitement to terrorist offences and its financing were criminalised in 2022.

The Act on the Freezing of Funds with a view to Combating Terrorism entered into force on 1 June 2013. The Act complements existing EU level freezing mechanisms and enables Finland to freeze funds of persons and entities suspected, prosecuted or convicted of involvement in terrorist crimes in Finland; of persons and entities designated by the Council of the European Union as being involved in terrorism within the EU; on the basis of a well-founded request by another State, persons and entities identified in that request as being involved in terrorism; and entities owned

6 or controlled by any of the above. The Act also prohibits the making available, directly or indirectly, of funds and economic resources to designated persons or entities.

The Financial Supervisory Authority is the authority supervising Finland´s financial and insurance sectors. It supervises the enforcement of the new Act on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing by the credit and financial institutions and provides training on the provisions of the new Act. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which functions in the National Bureau of Investigation, is responsible for detecting and preventing both money laundering and the financing of terrorism. FIU has carried out an active public-private-partnership initiative for five years. There are authorities as well as twenty companies from the private sector represented in the group. Also, crypto asset service providers take part in the public-private partnership work concerning raising awareness of different methods utilized in hiding assets through cryptocurrencies and other developed digital financing services. Situational awareness is shared and developed in close cooperation with the authorities and the private sector.

FIU has explicit powers to disclose information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for the purposes of applying the Sanctions Act and the Freezing Act. This is of relevance for the purposes of implementing targeted financial sanctions to prevent terrorist financing.

When money transfer services are provided by banks, full license is required and the services are supervised by the Financial Supervision Authority. Any alternative money transmitting business provided other than by banks requires registration, and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws are applied to it. Particularly with regard to the non-profit sector, a special license issued by the National Police Board or a local police department is needed, as a rule, for money collection and the running of a non-money prize lottery in Finland. Organizing a small-scale money collection requires a written notification to a local police department. Money collection and the running of a lottery are supervised by the National Police Board and the police departments.

The Action Plan for National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2024-25 sets out the measures to react to and reduce the risks highlighted in the latest update of the National risk assessment, that was published on 8.2.2024. Renewed legislation on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System came to effect on 15 September 2022. At the same time, the scope of use of the legal act was extended. With the renewal, the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System can be used by even more authorities, and more efficiently than before making the combat against money laundering and financing of terrorism more efficient. The amendments to legislation implement the EU Financial Information Directive, and complement the implementation and regulation of the fifth EU Money Laundering Directive.

Border controls

The Finnish Border Guard is responsible for border control (checks and surveillance) at external land, sea and air borders in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code and national legislation. The Customs and police carry out border checks at certain border crossing points, namely at ports (cargo traffic) and at some small airports.

The Border Guard can prevent and combat terrorism mainly at border checks and by exchanging information with third country authorities. This is done in close co-operation with other law enforcement authorities (the police, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and Customs). Co-

7 operation is based on the Law on Police, Customs and Border Guard co-operation. Co-operation is conducted by common use of databases, operations, and intelligence, risk analysis and investigations. The Border Guard is using a national Entry-Exit System (EES) into which third country nationals' border crossings are recorded. Other law enforcement authorities have an access into the EES. Furthermore, the Border Guard is using SIS (Schengen Information System), VIS (Visa Information System) and national databases, against which all third country nationals are checked upon border checks. Systematic checks of EU citizens against relevant databases were introduced in April 2017.

The police and the Border Guard have placed liaison officers in certain Finnish consulates abroad. Liaison officers participate in visa issuance processes and thus can identify possible terrorism indicators. The Border Guard also participates in activities of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps with personnel and technical equipment.

Travel document security

Passports in Finland are issued with biometric identifiers. Passports are equipped with high quality security features and security printed. The photo is laser-printed. Identity cards contain a chip with the citizen certificate. Passports can be issued only within the national passport data system, which is controlled by the Finnish Police.

Security of radioactive sources

Finland complies with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with its implementing Import and Export Guidance (IAEA, Vienna, 2004). National regulations based on the Radiation Act include specific requirements on the security of radioactive sources. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety and security of radioactive sources by prior authorisation, regular inspections and national register of radioactive sources.

Relevant Finnish authorities have worked together to develop a national nuclear security detection architecture for nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. The authorities have defined common requirements for detection systems to optimize the compatibility and information sharing. The key operational capability will be based on mobile or relocatable technology with remote expert support for the front-line officers (reach-back).

STUK contributes significantly to the work of the ERNCIP (European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection) Thematic Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Radiological and Nuclear Threats.

The Finnish Customs controls the border crossing traffic of radioactive materials through license control, examinations based on risk analysis and random selection, as well as by radiation detection. While the implementation of radiation monitoring at borders is fully under the jurisdiction of the Finnish Customs, STUK’s role is to provide expert advice.

Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes

The role of internet and social media is significant in terms of violent radicalisation, dissemination of propaganda, recruitment and communication. The Finnish Cyber Security Strategy was revised

8 to respond to the changed security environment in 2024. The core of the strategy consists of four strategic guidelines: (1) a competent, innovative and inventive cyber ecosystem; (2) strong societal cyber resilience and operational reliability; (3) a solid national and international cooperation model; (4) timely responses to cyber threats and assured sovereignty.

https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165893

Legal co-operation including extradition

Extradition from Finland to a foreign country is regulated in the Act on Extradition. The European Convention on Extradition is applicable between the Member States of the Council of Europe. Extradition is conditioned on the fulfilment of certain minimum requirements. Those include, for example, the severity of the offence or length of sentence and dual criminality (i.e. the act or behavior is punishable in both states). The Finnish legislation contains prohibitions against extradition for political offences. According to Section 2(1) of the Act on Extradition between Finland and the other Nordic Countries, a Finnish citizen shall not be extradited for a political offence. Section 3 of the Act provides that a person who is not a Finnish citizen may be extradited for a political offence only if the offence or a similar act is punishable under Finnish law. According to Section 6 of the Extradition Act, no one shall be extradited for a political offence.

However, extradition is permitted if a political offence also includes or involves another offence which is not of a political nature, and if the act as a whole cannot be considered mainly political. In the Act on Extradition between Finland and other Member States of the European Union, the political nature of an offence is not a ground for refusing extradition.

2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory

2.1 Provide information on stationing of your States armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.

In Finland, military crisis management is regulated by the Act on Military Crisis Management. The Act takes into consideration the development of international crisis management activities, in order for Finland to be able to participate fully in crisis management tasks, especially within the framework of the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and also in other forms of international crisis management. In accordance with the Act, Finland may participate in international military crisis management authorized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, or exceptionally in other international military crisis management, with the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security or supporting humanitarian assistance operations or protecting the civilian population, taking into account the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. The implementing party may be the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) or some other international organisation or group of countries. The Act also includes regulations concerning soldiers’ right to use force in crisis management missions.

In 2024, Finland took part in eleven (11) military crisis management operations or missions with approximately 420 troops. The operations were led by NATO (KFOR, NMI), by the EU (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUMAM Mozambique and EUMAM UA)

9 and by the UN (UNIFIL, UNTSO and MINUSMA). Finland was also participating in OIR in Iraq and Kuwait. The operations OIR, MINUSMA and EUTM Mali were disbanded during 2024. For the year 2024 Finland designated the Light amphibious Company (approx.300 soldiers) for the NATO Response Force (NRF) Pool of Forces and the EOD Diver Detachment for the European Battle Group (EUBG).

The Finnish Defence Forces may also provide assistance, falling within its mandate, to another State, the European Union or an international organisation, taking into account the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. At the request of a competent ministry or authority, the Defence Forces may also take part in providing international assistance to support another Finnish authority.

In 2024, Finland acceded to the Agreement between the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regarding the Status of their Forces (NATO SOFA, signed in 1951 in London) and the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty (Paris Protocol, signed in 1952 in Paris). In addition, Finland is a party to the Agreement between the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces (NATO PfP SOFA, signed in 1995 in Brussels).

A bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Finland and the United States entered into force on 1 September 2024. The DCA clarifies the rules for cooperation and allows the parties to deepen cooperation in all security situations. The DCA deals with practical aspects of issues such as the entry of forces, the storage of defence materiel, criminal jurisdiction and taxation.

3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct

3.1 Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.

Finland seeks to fulfil its obligations under international arms control agreements in an open and transparent manner, and to follow both the letter and the spirit of the commitments undertaken. The provisions of arms control treaties and other international obligations, insofar as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by a Government Act. As described in Section II of this questionnaire, Finland has constitutionally established procedures to ensure that the performance of all authorities, officials and Government bodies is supervised.

3.2 Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.

Finland aims at contributing actively to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to nuclear disarmament, to the global regulation of autonomous weapon systems, the control of conventional arms, and to curbing the illicit arms trade. These aims are promoted politically, with financing, and through practical support measures on the ground. Where formal verification regimes are absent, the role of confidence-building measures (CBMs) is highlighted. Arms control

10 is increasingly linked to conflict prevention and crisis management, and to sustainable development. Finland supports endeavours contributing to military transparency, predictability and stability in Europe. Finland engages in an open dialogue with civil society on disarmament and arms control issues.

Finland is a party and active contributor to the implementation of all central arms control treaties and agreements: - Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) - Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (CWC) - The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) - The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) - Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) - Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Finland is one of the largest contributors to the ATT’s Voluntary Trust Fund, which promotes the universalization and the implementation of the treaty.

Finland supports the humanitarian aims of the Convention on Cluster Munitions but is currently not in a position to join the convention. Finland follows closely the implementation of the convention, and continues to evaluate progress in military technologies and monitor the situation.

Finland continues to value and implement its commitments under further instruments and initiatives: - 2011 Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies - Stockholm initiative on nuclear disarmament - CEND initiative - Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy - Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas - G7 Global Partnership Program - Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism - Proliferation Security Initiative - International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification - Nuclear Security Contact Group - Global Health Security Agenda

Finland is active in international cooperation to prevent proliferation and the use of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The European Union’s WMD Strategy serves as a guideline for Finnish action. Finland works to enhance the effectiveness of international export control regimes as a key tool to preventing proliferation.

Finland participated actively in the NPT 2020 Review Conference, contributing to the implementation of the Treaty as a whole. Finland continues active participation in the current review cycle and a representative from Finland chaired the 2023 NPT PrepCom. In addition, Finland will chair one of the main committees at the 2026 Review Conference.

11 The EU Strategy on small arms and light weapons (SALW) provides the framework for Finland’s SALW -related actions. The regional activities of the EU and the OSCE in SALW control are also important. Finland supports the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and is a major donor to the UN Trust Facility for Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and the UN funding facility SALIENT. Finland also places great value to the work and negotiations of the Open-Ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition. Finland supports humanitarian mine action which reduces the post- conflict threat and impact of landmines and unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions. During 2021–2025, Finland supports humanitarian mine action in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia and Ukraine with 15 million euros.

Finland monitors developments in the field of international arms control, anticipates their effects on national defence and takes them into account in Defence Forces development programmes. The defence establishment, for its part, fulfils the various obligations included in international arms control agreements as well as supports and participates in inter-authority cooperation relating to arms control.

Finland participates actively in international military and civilian crisis management, guided by Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy as well as Finland´s National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management.

In 2024, Finland had seven seconded staff in the OSCE, including in the OSCE Secretariat, as well as the OSCE Programme Offices in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. In the OSCE area, Finland has made substantial contributions, inter alia, to the EU civilian crisis management missions in Ukraine (EUAM), Armenia (EUMA), Georgia (EUMM), Moldova (EUPM and EUBAM), and Kosovo (EULEX) as well as to the EUSR offices for the South Caucasus and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In military crisis management in the OSCE area, Finland participates to the NATO KFOR and UN UNMIK missions in Kosovo, the UN UNFICYP in Cyprus, the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU).

Finland has continued to support OSCE’s projects and programs in fulfilment of the OSCE principles and commitments through extra-budgetary contributions. In 2024, about 2,4 million euros were channelled to different OSCE projects. The geographic focus of the project cooperation was in Ukraine, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Finland is committed to UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and has integrated them in its internal and external policies. Finland’s fourth National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security covers the years 2023-2027. Finland underlines the need for comprehensive implementation of the 1325 agenda. Finland will continue to give political and financial support to further these aims in the OSCE and other international forums.

If the international assistance is based on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union; if it involves significant military resources or if it may involve the use of military force, if it is of significance from the foreign and security policy perspective or is far-reaching and important in principle, the decisions on the provision of assistance are made by the President or the Government in accordance with the Act on the Making of Decisions Concerning the Provision of and Request for International Assistance.

12 Assistance that may involve the use of military force requires the involvement of the Parliament in the decision-making process. In cases falling outside the scope of the above-mentioned Act, the decision on the participation of the Defence Forces in provision of international assistance is taken by the Ministry of Defence, after consulting the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the Act on the Defence Forces. International assistance described above was not provided in 2024.

Section II: Intra-State elements

1. National planning and decision-making process

1.1 What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?

(This reply also partly covers some aspects of question 2.1.)

The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The Chief of Defence (CHOD) is responsible for all matters related to the exercise of military command, including operational readiness of the FDF. Administratively, the FDF and the CHOD are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The MOD is responsible for the general guidance of the defence administration, as well as for the defence policy guidelines and international defence policy co-operation including resources of the FDF. The Defence Command functions as the supreme headquarters of the CHOD and as the central administrative authority for the defence establishment. In addition to strategic planning and command, it is also responsible for the development and coordination of the activities of the individual services as well as for international co-operation. The three single service headquarters are responsible for the performance, development and operations of their own service in accordance with the tasks assigned by the CHOD and will be supported by the introduction of the integrated, network- enabled command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system.

Finnish Parliament makes the decisions on the central principles of defence by using its legislative, supervisory and budgetary powers in accordance with the Constitution. The Finnish Government is responsible for the highest executive power in all security situations. The Government also draws up reports on security and defence for Parliament to discuss and approve.

It is the task of the Government Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy to prepare and give guidance on important issues regarding foreign, security and defence policy.

All Ministries are responsible for preparations for crises and national defence arrangements in their respective areas of responsibility. Under the leadership of the State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, the officials responsible for readiness matters in the Ministries are in charge of readiness preparations in their sector and related work across the state administration. It is the remit of the Security Committee to assist the government and ministries in matters pertaining to comprehensive security. The Security Committee follows the development of Finnish society and its security and coordinates proactive preparedness, which is related to comprehensive security.

13 The Ministry of Finance provides the guidelines for the defence budget, which is approved annually by the Parliament. The MOD establishes the financial guidelines for defence planning. The CHOD executes the financial steering of the Defence Forces.

Part of the defence expenditure is “outsourced”, meaning that some areas (infrastructure, some logistics and maintenance), have been contracted at the central level (either by the MOD, Defence Command or any other central level defence institution) with service suppliers from outside the MoD and/or Defence Forces.

A decision to participate in a military crisis management operation is taken, on the basis of a Government proposal, by the President of the Republic. Before making its proposal, the Government must consult or report to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee or consult the Parliament, depending on the operation and Finnish contribution in question. The decision to place a military unit on high readiness (standby unit) in, for example an EU Battle Group for military crisis management operations, will also be taken by the President of the Republic on the basis of a Government proposal submitted after the government has consulted the Parliament. During the operation the MOD may make minor adjustments to the Finnish contribution. The MoD may also decide to second individual military personnel to military tasks of limited nature in military crisis management or similar tasks in other international crisis management. In both situations, a prior consultation with the MFA is required.

1.2 How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?

Finland’s foreign and security policy is founded on value-based realism. As described in the Government report on Finnish foreign and security policy, the main goals of Finland’s foreign and security policy are to safeguard Finland’s independence and territorial integrity, to avoid becoming involved in a military conflict and to improve the security and wellbeing of the people of Finland. Finland works to prevent military threats and to reduce tensions. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165723

Finland’s security environment changed fundamentally when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. After the invasion, Finland reassessed its security policy situation and applied for NATO membership on 17 May 2022. Finland became a member of NATO on 4 April 2023.

Finland condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and is implementing European Union sanctions. Finland has supported Ukraine in many ways, including training Ukrainian military personnel and sending arms assistance, which Finland remains committed to continue.

The Government Defence Report (2024) reviews the operating environment of Finland’s defence and evaluates the development needs of defence. It defines the defence policy guidelines for the sustainment and development of Finland’s defence capability as part of NATO.

https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/166004/PLM_2024_7.pdf?sequence=4 &isAllowed=y

14 Finland continues to participate actively in international training and exercises, military crisis management and other international co-operation and activities. Participation in military crisis management is part of conducting Finland’s foreign and security policy and international co- operation. Finland participates in increasingly complex crisis management operations in ever more demanding and high-risk operating environments. Finland takes into account the changes in international crisis management and evaluates its participation in operations from the standpoint of effectiveness and national goals. By participating in military crisis management, Finland simultaneously improves the Defence Forces’ capabilities and capacities.

2. Existing structures and processes

2.1 What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, intelligence services and the police?

All forces and services mentioned above are subordinate to politically nominated ministers of the Government, which in turn is accountable to the Parliament. The parliamentary committees regularly call in the ministers in their respective fields of competence to hearings on issues of concern. The parliamentary committees are also entitled to monitor the actions of the executive bodies. Individual MPs may pose questions in writing, to which the competent minister has the obligation to reply and also an oral questioning procedure is practiced.

All forces and services mentioned above base their action on relevant legislation, which defines the basis and limitations of their powers. No action may arbitrarily infringe on the fundamental rights of individuals, which are extensively enshrined in the Constitution since a reform in 1995. In case of violations a range of adequate legal and other recourse is available.

The respective forces and services are subjected as follows:

 Armed forces; same authorities and procedures as mentioned in answer to question 1.1.  Internal security forces; no forces belonging to this category.  Military intelligence operates within the Defence Command under the Ministry of Defence.  The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service operates under the Ministry of the Interior.  All police activities are controlled by the National Police Board.  The Finnish Border Guard operates under the Ministry of the Interior.

These services are based on the relevant laws and controlled by the respective ministries, Government and Parliament, and through this, linked to the parliamentary control.

2.2 How is the fulfilment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?

The Parliamentary Ombudsman has been charged with legal supervisory competence, which extends over the activities of all authorities and other bodies performing public functions. He or she may act on complaints or at his or her own initiative. The Ombudsman submits an annual report to the Parliament on his or her work, including observations on any shortcomings in legislation. Additionally, the Chancellor of Justice of the Government supervises the lawfulness of the official acts of the Government, the President of the Republic and all authorities and other bodies performing public functions. The Chancellor of Justice submits an annual report to the

15 Parliament and the Government on his or her activities and observations on how the law has been obeyed. The Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice may prosecute or order that charges be brought in matters falling within the purview of their supervision of legality. The State Financial Inspectors have the right to control the use of budgetary finances.

The Intelligence Ombudsman supervises the legality of civil and military intelligence and the realization of basic and human rights in intelligence activities. The Ombudsman is an autonomous and independent authority that started his/her oversight activities as of June 2019, i.e. when the acts on civilian and military intelligence entered into force.

2.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?

The four pillars of Finland's defence specified in the standing Government’s Defence Report to the Parliament are the following:

 National defence capabilities  NATO defence and deterrence  Defence Cooperation  Total defence as part of comprehensive security

Finland’s defence is based on a strong national defence capability as part of the NATO’s collective deterrence and defence. Finland participates in the planning of The Alliance’s defence and collective deterrence.

The Army plays a decisive role in defending the country and repelling aggression. The Navy and The Air Force have important roles in territorial surveillance and in protection of territorial integrity.

The Act on the Defence Forces and other respective legislation stipulates the tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces within governmental structure and provides the legal framework for carrying out those tasks in accordance with the constitutional framework.

Organisational oversight is conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the Parliament, especially through the Parliamentary Ombudsman, as well as through topic related authorities such as environmental authorities. Furthermore, criminal cases that are not dealt with as disciplinary cases in the Defence Forces are prosecuted by public prosecutor and decided within the civilian court system.

The Finnish Border Guard is responsible for border security in Finland as part of Finland`s internal security, subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. The main duties are to control Finland's borders on land and at sea, to carry out border surveillance, to conduct border checks on persons at land border crossing points, ports and airports, and to perform search and rescue operations, particularly at sea. The Border Guard also performs police duties, seeks to prevent, expose and investigate severe cross-border crimes in collaboration with other law enforcement authorities in Finland and implements customs controls at border crossing points where the Finnish Customs is not present. The Finnish Border Guard carries out national defence tasks in collaboration with the Finnish Defence Forces.

3. Procedures related to different forces personnel

16 3.1 What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?

Liability for military service is based on the Constitution, the reformed Conscription Act of 2007 and the Conscription Decree of 2007. Every male Finnish citizen is by law liable for military service and therefore subject to call-up. The period of liability is for male citizens between the ages of 18 to 60.

Under the Conscription Act of 2007, Regional Offices organise call-ups in every municipality, beginning no earlier than on 15 August and ending no later than on 15 December. The call-up is applied to 18 to 29-year-old men (only once). Information on and a notice of the call-up are sent by the Regional Office. A medical examination is also done in municipal health centres in advance to check the ability for military service.

The call-up takes one day during which general information is given. After the medical examination done by a physician, the fitness for military service is determined and the decision for military service is made or a three-man call-up board grants exemption from military service. The board consists of one senior officer, another officer of a lower rank and one representative from the municipality. In general, military service is carried out within the two years following call- up, at the age of 19 or 20 but at the latest before the end of the year when a man turns 30.

Since 1995, it has also been possible for women to perform military service on a voluntary basis. There are no call-ups for women but Regional Offices provide information and medical examinations. A female conscript has the rights and duties equal to those of a male one. The difference is that within 30 days from starting military service she has a right to leave without having to give an explanation or her superior can terminate the service but only for well-justified reasons. After the end of the 30-day period, she is equally liable for service as any man until the end of the year she turns 60.

The total amount of conscripts is around 21 000 of which some 650 conscripts complete their basic military training at the Border Guard Units. Conscript service at the Border Guard Units is similar to service in Units of the Defence Forces. Conscripts are selected through the call-up organisation explained above.

3.2 What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?

Military service is compulsory for men, but on statutory grounds that have been provided in acts and decrees, there are some alternatives to the exemption from military service. Unarmed military service is allowed. For women the military service is possible on a voluntary basis.

A limited or permanent exemption for health reasons can be granted by the military authorities if the health or physical fitness does not fulfil the requirements for military service. A medical certificate is required.

Those registered as permanent residents on the autonomous Åland Islands have a right not to do military service. No alternative service is arranged and no application is required from them. However, they can serve on voluntary basis.

17 According to the reformed Non-Military Service Act (1446/2007) a man who on grounds of conviction is unable to perform any kind of military service within the Defence Forces will be exempted from military service and he will be liable for civilian service instead. A special application for exemption is required.

A Finnish man who has dual (or multiple) citizenship as well as a man who has been granted Finnish citizenship under the age of 30 are also required to perform military service, but if they have performed it in their second or previous country, they can be exempted from peacetime military service in Finland. A free-form application is required.

A Finnish man who has dual (or multiple) citizenship can be exempted from military service in peacetime if he lives permanently abroad, has no family ties in or connections to Finland, has no property in Finland and will receive no legacy from Finland. A free-form application is required. If living permanently abroad has continued at least 7 years, no application is required.

The legislation for all the above-mentioned cases is based on:

 Conscription Act 1438/2007,  Conscription Decree 1443/2007,  Act on Women’s Voluntary Military Training 285/2022,  Decree on Women’s Voluntary Military Training 1122/2023,  Act on the Provision of Health Care in the Defence Forces 322/1987,  Non-Military Service Act 1446/2007,  Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1144/1991

3.3 What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces personnel as well as conscripts?

Legal and administrative procedures protecting the rights of personnel in the Finnish Defence Forces are based, in general, on law. Protection of the personnel in regular employment is very much the same as with all state civil servants. Detailed provisions are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act (750/1994). The only major differences between personnel employed by the Defence Forces and other state civil servants is that defence personnel can be transferred to another office without their own consent and that there are certain restrictions on political activities for military personnel.

Legal protection of conscripts is based on clear rules of competence and procedures and on the supervisory function of the higher authorities. The constitution proclaims the basic norms and authorization to issue more specific rules and regulations. Conscripts are guaranteed by law the possibility to appeal over the actions of his/her military superiors. A conscript who is dissatisfied with the actions taken by his/her military superiors may have these actions investigated by a higher military superior. In case a military superior has imposed a disciplinary punishment on a conscript, he/she may appeal to a general Court of First Instance.

In addition to the above-mentioned, it is possible to have any actions by military personnel as well as complaints about their treatment, general facilities or medical care etc. in the Defence Forces to be investigated by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. These complaints can be issued in writing or directly to the Ombudsman via internet. The Ombudsman regularly visits several garrisons every year. During these visits, conscripts can discuss privately with the Ombudsman.

18 Based on the EU whistleblowing legislation, the Finnish Defence Forces has, after a trial which began in 2020, launched in 2021 an internal whistleblowing channel whereby any actions of military personnel can be brought to the attention of the legal division for further investigation either by name or anonymously.

4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law

4.1 How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g. through military training programmes and regulations?

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Law of War are endorsed through military programmes and regulations at all levels. They are part of the training and education for officers taking BA (Bachelor of Military Science) and MA (Master of Military Science) degrees as well as for conscripts. Reservist are being trained in IHL in rehearsal training and exercises as well as in training provided by the National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK). There are over 20 legal advisors in the Finnish Defence Forces who teach and advise military personnel on International Humanitarian law thus ensuring that IHL and the Law of War are taken into account in the Finnish Defence Forces.

The Finnish Defence Forces conducts teaching and information sequences to all personnel including conscripts and reservists concerning International Humanitarian Law. This training is under constant development. Furthermore, there is active cooperation with police and prosecution authorities which comprises also questions related to IHL.

Personnel taking part in crisis management missions are given special training prior to transferring to the area of operation. Personnel training for international operations receive special instructions on humanitarian law, the law of war and combating human trafficking as well as special rules for behaviour, which include among other things a zero-tolerance on human trafficking. The training was further developed in 2020 with special real-life simulating situations.

The Defence Forces send participants regularly to the following courses on IHL:  Course in San Remo arranged by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law,  Vienna Course on International Law for Military Advisers organized by Austrian Ministry of Defence, the ICRC and the European Security and Defence College,  Course on LOAC for military personnel organized by the Finnish Red Cross,  Courses in NATO School concerning IHL and other operational issues,  Workshop on the Code of Conduct arranged by the Swiss General Staff and the Swiss Military College,  Course on the Law of Armed Conflict for senior officers of armed forces medical services arranged by the International Committee of Military Medicine

Since 1988, the Government of Finland has provided, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, yearly financial support to the Finnish Red Cross for the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law in Finland. Dissemination has included tailored training for relevant professional military and civilian audiences, such as military staff, prosecutors and judges, as well as general IHL training for wider public.

19 In addition, Finland has an active national Committee for International Humanitarian Law that also promotes and disseminates IHL. This Committee works under the auspices of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and it brings together IHL experts from different ministries, the Defence Forces, universities and from organisations such as the Finnish Red Cross, the Finnish Branch of Amnesty International and the Finnish Society for the Law of War and Military Law. This national Committee was already established in 1993 with the mandate to especially:  Co-ordinate the implementation and dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and other international humanitarian law instruments as well as,  Promote international humanitarian law and raise awareness about the Geneva Conventions and their protocols,  The committee also shares information about IHL training and different activities in Finland,  Prepares for the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and other relevant international conferences,  It also monitors new developments in international humanitarian law and considers their implications for Finland.

As a whole, the Committee offers a valuable venue for expert discussions on international humanitarian law. Stakeholders can easily share information and launch initiatives on IHL. We consider their role very important in enhancing both awareness and implementation of the Geneva Conventions.

4.2 What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?

To ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually held liable under national and international law for their actions, conscripts are trained to be fully familiar with the Code of Conduct in accordance with Article 83 of the 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva Convention. The training includes the basics of the Code of Conduct, the set of ten rules for the soldier (an updated version was issued in 2024) and internationally recognized distinctive emblems. Each soldier is given a copy of the Soldier's Manual, which deals with the essential matters from the soldier's point of view.

Familiarization with the Code of Conduct takes place, as part of the training in security policy, during the basic training period for all conscripts. The combatant's training during the special training period includes lessons related to the Code of Conduct relevant to the training activities of the conscripts.

The Public Information Division of the Defence Staff has compiled the teaching material on security policies, which also includes material for teaching the Code of Conduct. This material includes instructions for the teacher, slides and videos. All company-level units have used this material.

See also answers to 4.1 and 4.2.

4.4 What has been done to provide for the individual service member’s exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country’s armed forces are politically neutral?

Protection of the personnel in regular employment is very much the same as with all state civil servants. Detailed provisions are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act. The only major differences between personnel employed by the Defence Forces and other state civil servants is that defence personnel can be transferred to another office without their consent and that there are certain restrictions on political activities of military personnel (one cannot be a member of a political party nor be put up as a candidate for parliamentary elections).

Legal protection of conscripts is based on clear rules of competence and procedures as well as on the supervisory function of the authorities. The constitution proclaims the basic norms and authorization to issue more specific rules and regulations.

By virtue of the Conscript Act, no person may, without an acceptable reason, be placed in a different position due to age, origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, and state of health, disability, gender, sexual orientation or any other reason related to the individual.

In every Finnish garrison, there is a Conscript Committee whose main purpose is to look after and develop the service conditions of conscripts. The members of the Committee are chosen by election among those conscripts who serve in the respective garrison. Only conscripts have the right to vote in these elections. Finnish conscripts are also free to join the Union of Conscripts, which is a national organization for lobbying and representing the interests of conscripts.

According to the Finnish Penal Code, a soldier or a person in military service in the Border Guard (excluding conscripts), who joins a political party or an association engaged in, or clearly

21 supportive of, party politics, or fails to resign the membership of a party or an association referred to above can be prosecuted for unlawful political activity.

4.5 How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?

Under the Constitution of Finland, the competence to conclude treaties is given to the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. According to the Constitution, the acceptance by the Parliament of international obligations and their denouncement is required for such treaties and other international obligations that contain provisions of a legislative nature, are otherwise significant, or otherwise require approval by Parliament under the Constitution. The acceptance by the Parliament is required also for the denouncement of such obligations. The provisions of treaties and other international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by an Act. Otherwise, international obligations are brought into force by a Decree issued by the President of the Republic.

Finland follows the so-called dualistic tradition; i.e. treaties become internally applicable law only through a domestic legislative act. The incorporation is normally a statute of blanco, a legislative act, which merely refers to the treaty. The hierarchical level of the statute in blanco is either both an Act of Parliament and a decree issued by the President or merely a decree, depending on the consideration mentioned above.

Finland fosters the strengthening of multilateral cooperation and international law. Finland adheres to its international obligations closely. This system is in-built in the Finnish Security and Defence policy so that, for example, when taking new international obligations, Finland brings its internal law and workings into conformity with the obligations.

Section III: Public access and contact information

1. Public access

1.1 How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?

Parliamentary and administrative proceedings concerning defence matters are subject to the general rule on the publicity of official documents to which public access is guaranteed by law – The Act on the Openness of Government Activities. This access may only be limited on grounds of national security or on other grounds specified in law, which, inter alia, regulate classification of documents and handling of classified documents.

Mass media, the Internet as well as the publicity activities by the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces themselves are means to disseminate public information on defence matters. The Ministry of Defence Media and Communications Unit also replies to individual questions and letters from the public. Articles in the major daily papers and TV appearances are a frequent way to communicate to the public on the activities of the Ministry of Defence as well the Defence Forces. Further information on defence matters is available at the Ministry's website at www.defmin.fi and at the website of the Defence Forces at www.mil.fi.

22 It is highly significant for the Finnish policy of openness that the public not only have access to information but that they also understand the wider framework of our defence planning and the relevant background information related to the armed forces.

1.2 What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?

Besides the Code itself, there are no other publications regarding the Code translated into Finnish language.

1.3 How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State’s armed forces?

See answer 1.1 of this section.

2. Contact information

2.1 Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management Political Department Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland P. O. Box 176, 00023 Government, Finland Email: POL-10@gov.fi

Defence Policy Department Ministry of Defence P. O. Box 31, 00131 Helsinki, Finland Email: kirjaamo.plm@gov.fi

23 Section IV: Implementation of UNSCR 1325 "Women, Peace and Security", Voluntary information exchange

1. PREVENTION

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Party by: ratification P(R), accession P(a), Law and date of ratification, succession P(s), accession, Name of the treaty acceptance P(A), succession, approval acceptance, or approval P(AA), or Not party

Universal legal instruments

Protocol Supplementary to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized P( R ) party by date of ratification 1. Crime to Prevent, Suppress and Punish ratification 10.02.2004 Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000)

United Nations Convention on All Forms of Discrimination P(R) (Party by date of ratification: 4 September 2. Against Women (1979) ratification); 1989.

The Council of Europe legal instruments

P(A) Party by European Convention Against Trafficking in Human 3. acceptance; date of acceptance: 30 May 2012. Beings (2005) CETS No: 197

European Convention on Preventing and P(A) Party by 4. Combatting Violence Against Women and date of acceptance 17 April 2015. acceptance; Domestic Violence (2011) CETS No: 210

Yes No Other arrangements 5. National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security X

24 6. National legislation to implement the UN CEDAW convention (if a party), with particular reference to combating discrimination in employment, education, access to health X services and participation in institutions ensuring democratic oversight and public scrutiny of the security sector.

7. Other related information, clarification or details to share: Finnish Defence Forces has created its own WPS action plan, which is guiding the implementation of Finland’s NAP in defence forces and in military operations.

Type of Measure Yes No

Mechanism to assess risk of abuse of small arms to commit or facilitate serious 1. x acts of gender-based violence and violence against women and children

Inclusion of women’s organisations and women in religious, ethnic minority or 2. community groups in measures X - to counter and prevent terrorism and violent extremism

- to raise awareness of the potential risks of exploitation and radicalization1 X

Inclusion of gender perspective and special needs of women and girls in a national 3. X counter-terrorism strategy2

Inclusion of specific matters related to the protection of women’s and girls’ rights in 4. X the basic education of armed forces. Availability of specialised in-service training for armed forces personnel on the 5. protection of women’s and girls’ rights. X

Inclusion of specific matters related to the protection of women’s and girls’ rights in 6. the pre-deployment training for international peacekeeping missions. X

Plans to address and gather information from local women’s populations in areas 7. X at risk of conflicts.

Mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender mainstreaming 8. X into operations

1 See also similar question 3a in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

2 See also similar question 3a in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

25 Feedback mechanisms: 9. - from operations to chiefs of defence or military planners X - between forces leading multi-national missions and forces providing X personnel to such missions Membership of a regional network or leadership network such as the WPS Chiefs 10. X of Defence Network

Other related information, clarification or details to share: no specific mechanism to assess risk of abuse of small arms (1), however the risks related to small arms deployment are being minimized through small arms register and holder permits.

2. National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security

Finland’s current National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security was published on 13 March 2023. This is Finland’s fourth National Action Plan (NAP), extending from 2023 to the end of 2027. The NAP is the result of a broad-based stakeholder collaboration. Its key objective is to strengthen women’s participation in the area of peace and security, and thereby support efforts to build sustainable peace.

The five main objectives of Finland’s fourth NAP are:  Women’s meaningful participation and diversity have a stronger role in conflict prevention and in building sustainable peace.  Women’s leadership, meaningful participation and diversity and gender mainstreaming have a stronger role in peace processes and mediation.  Women’s meaningful participation and diversity and the gender perspective are better integrated into security, preparedness and crisis management.  Women and girls have more security, their rights are better safeguarded and their diverse needs are better met during crises.  The Women, Peace and Security agenda is better implemented and context sensitivity has a stronger role in national and international action.

Progress in achieving the NAP objectives is monitored on a regular basis and a report published. A more accurate and effective reporting system is currently being developed. Finland's consistent work on Women, Peace and Security issues was regarded as particularly important in a situation where gender equality questions and the progress made in them are under pressure. The greatest challenges were associated with undersized personnel and budgetary resources.

To support more effective implementation of the WPS NAP goals Finland organized specialized WPS workshops for government officials at different levels in 2024. The aim of these was to help government officials to better identify opportunities for WPS implementation in their everyday work. Furthermore, a thematic workshop on gender, armed conflicts and the laws of war for government officials and Defense Forces was organized together with the Finnish Red Cross.

With regard to the Defence Administration, the main objectives have been: 1. Better gender balance in the security sector and crisis management.

26 Objectives related to a better gender balance include increasing the number of women in voluntary conscript service and military personnel, as well as in crisis management operations. The aim is that women will account for at least 7% of all crisis management personnel and that the number of gender advisers and contact persons are increased.

2. Incorporate the gender perspective into planning, implementation, evaluation in the security sector and crisis management Crisis management operations and peacekeeping operations have been developed so that the gender perspective is better considered in their planning, implementation and monitoring. The Defence Administration also participates in NORDEFCO cooperation to develop crisis management activities that promote equality and non-discrimination.

3. The development of training and education of gender perspective in all military training. Training has been developed in cooperation with the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). Women, Peace and Security related training has been developed in the National Defence University and the International Centre for the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces will ensure that the gender perspective is included in the training of conscripts, staff and crisis management personnel. In pre-deployment training the personnel get basic information about the gender perspective.

An implementation and progress report is given annually to the Committee of Foreign Affairs. The report is prepared by the MFA in coordination with other implementing bodies and actors.

3 Measures to prevent sexual and gender-based harm

3.1 Horizon scanning, intelligence and risk?

How do you include systematic gender analysis of areas at risk of conflict, including gender disaggregated socio-economic indicators, power over resources and decision- making, increases in sexual and gender-based violence, on-line and other threats of violence against women in public life, journalists and those providing humanitarian assistance?

These actions are part of the operational activities of the Finnish military crisis management forces. The force's Gender Focal Point (GFP) supports the force in the planning and implementation of these actions. However, there are differences in the quality of the implementation of these actions in different operations. In some operations, these actions have been of higher quality than in others.

How do you incorporate a gender perspective into actions preventing and combatting the tensions, which lead to conflict, such as increases in sexual and gender-based violence, terrorism, violent extremism and human trafficking?

The Finnish military crisis management forces are monitoring whether phenomena like this increase in their area of operations. If this is observed, they are reported to higher staffs and local security authorities.

3.2 Planning

27 How do you incorporate a gender perspective into operational planning? The Army Staff and the Naval Staff draw up an operational plan for each military crisis management operation, which deals with the gender perspective in the operation.

How do you plan to address and gather information from local women’s populations in areas at risk of conflict?

Finnish military crisis management forces keep in touch with the local women and collect information.

3.3 Awareness and understanding of WPS at all levels and types of security personnel.

What training do you give on incorporating a gender perspective and protecting the rights of women and girls to security personnel at basic education, officer training and specialised in-service training?

The Finnish Police Board organises training on prevention of discrimination and abuse to all police personnel. Military training has been developed in cooperation with the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). The Defence Forces will ensure that the gender perspective is included in the training of conscripts, staff and crisis management personnel. In pre-deployment training the personnel get basic information about the gender perspective. Gender perspectives are incorporated as a cross-cutting theme into all civilian crisis management trainings organised by Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland).

How do you train security personnel to protect women and girls, men and boys from sexual and gender-based violence?3

This is part of the training described above.

3.4 Vetting of security personnel, especially pre-deployment

What measures do you take to vet and prevent the recruitment, retention, promotion and deployment of security personnel with a record of sexual or gender-based violence or other violations of human rights?4

Prior to each deployment to civilian crisis management missions, a security clearance of the selected candidate is requested from Finnish national authorities. In case of a record of alleged violations of human rights in the security clearance report, CMC Finland provides the candidate a possibility to elaborate the alleged violation. However, in case of a record of sexual or gender- based violence or other violations of human rights, a candidate will not be seconded to the position in question, nor will they be considered for secondment at a minimum, a limited timeframe. In case the person applied for secondment in the future, CMC Finland would assess each case individually based on the gravity of the violation. Finnish soldiers who are sent on operations must not have a criminal background. Everyone's criminal record is checked.

3 See also similar question 6a in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report. 4 See also similar question 2 and 8 in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

28 3.5 Other preventative measures

Prior to secondment, in case of security forces personnel, CMC Finland requests a statement from the current employer (Police, Border authorities, military) on the staff member’s suitability for secondment, including information on any violations of serious nature. However, the security forces personnel seconded by CMC Finland are primarily seconded as civilian personnel, with a few exceptions. The management of operations should observe the occurrence of such phenomena. Offenses lead to suspension of service and criminal investigation in the home country.

4 Leadership, accountability and assurance

4.1 Integrating WPS into the command climate

How do you integrate a gender perspective and WPS into your policy and operational framework, including military manuals, national security policy frameworks, codes of conduct, protocols, standard operating procedures and command directives?

CMC Finland requires that each seconded person signs the organisation’s Code of Conduct document which includes WPS and a gender perspective. CMC Finland applies a zero tolerance for sexual and gender-based violence or other human rights violations. In the Defence Forces, gender perspective is intended to be mainstreamed in all activities. In part, the gender perspective has been included in these documents, but the work is still in progress.

4.2 Accountability and Performance assessment

What measures, systems or procedures do you have on individual and collective accountability for acting in accordance with such policies or directives?

CMC Finland receives performance evaluation reports for each individual from the mission/organization after the secondment. In case of reports on sexual or gender-based violence or other violations of human rights, the individual may be repatriated and will not be considered for further secondments in the near future.

CMC Finland also trains all Finnish civilian crisis management secondees on the organization’s code of conduct policy in pre-deployment trainings. Acting against policies and instructions leads to various disciplinary measures.

4.3 Assurance

How do you provide specialist advice to operational commanders on WPS?

Gender Advisers (GENADs) have been appointed to all services. GENADs at all services and at the National Defence University (NDU) are responsible for providing advice to operational commanders on WPS as required in the NATO directive Bi-SC 40-1. At the Military Crisis Management Missions there is also a Gender Focal Point (GFP) appointed.

29 What systems or measures do you use to co-ordinate specialist advice on WPS throughout your security forces and to provide democratic oversight?

Referring to the NATO directive Bi-SC 40-1, GENAD advises the command group on operationalising NATO WPS Agenda and supports comprehensive integration of gender perspective and gender mainstreaming. These activities include, but are not limited to, peacetime, operations/missions, crisis/conflict analysis, policy, concept, capability, doctrine, procedure, exercises and education and training. The GENAD reports to the Commander and where it is possible the GENAD Office is organisationally placed within the Command Group (CG).

GFPs are to support integration of gender perspective and facilitate gender mainstreaming in their functional area. They report through the chain of command and maintain a functional dialogue with GENAD in order to ensure the coherent and consistent integration of gender perspective throughout the NCS and its activities.

5 Sharing of good practice

5.1 How do you share good practice and learn from others?

In the defence sector this is mostly done through lessons learned activity.

6 PARTICIPATION

A. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States

Please indicate if your State has the following measures in place to increase women’s participation in security forces and decision making, including at all stages of any peace-making process. More detailed information of such measures can be included in Part B below.

Yes No Type of Measure

1. Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics on applicants to X armed forces

2. Policies to attract female candidates (targeted campaigns, review of X accession tests etc.)

3. Policies to promote equal opportunities for women and men across the X security sector 4. Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of armed forces personnel: - By rank X - By promotion X - By retention X

30 5. Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of complaints by armed forces personnel of: - Discrimination X - sexual harassment X - gender based harassment X - sexual violence X - gender-based violence X

6. Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of complaints by civilian personnel in the security sector of: - discrimination X - sexual harassment X - gender based harassment X - sexual violence X - gender-based violence X

7. Anonymous staff surveys/climate assessment surveys or similar (monitoring X incidences of behaviour contrary to military standards of conduct)

8. Collection and monitoring of sex-disaggregated statistics of: - personnel deployed on operations and peace-keeping X missions X - and by rank 9. Collection and monitoring of sex-disaggregated statistics of decision makers X in the security sector 10. Other related information, clarification or details to share:

Recruitment within the Ministry of Defence The ministry's recruitment practices are based on the principle of gender equality. The employer operates in such a way that representatives of different genders apply for open positions. Gender equality is considered even as the job posting is being prepared. The most qualified applicant is selected for the position, regardless of gender, gender identity, gender expression or ethnic background. All positions in the ministry are suitable for men, women, gender minorities and people with different ethnic backgrounds. Gender equality is considered in all stages of the recruitment process, including the recruitment substitutes and trainees. In the Ministry of Defenses’ recruitment interviews, interviewers include representatives of different genders in order to achieve as equal a recruitment as possible. Career advancement within the Ministry of Defence The ministry supports the development of the personnel's professional skills and the diversification of work tasks. The employer creates equal opportunities for everyone to advance in their career. Keeping civil servants' knowledge and skills up-to-date is ensured by enabling participation in training, and supporting voluntary training. Equal career advancement opportunities are also considered in substitute appointments. Civil servants' readiness and willingness to develop professional skills, diversify work tasks,

31 advance in their careers and, if the civil servant wishes, accept international assignments are discussed in connection with their annual development discussion. The employer supports independent study and willingness for task and personnel rotation. Ministry gender equality working groups The Minister of Defence has set up a working group on operational gender equality to plan and support gender mainstreaming at the ministry and in the Defence Administration. The Government’s joint network of working groups on operational gender equality and non-discrimination supports the groups in their work. Gender impact assessment The objective is to assess all the decisions, budgeting, and legislation beforehand from a gender equality perspective. The aim is to promote gender equality and prevent any undesirable effects in terms of it. It is possible to make corrective proposals for reducing discrimination and any undesirable impacts, thus promoting gender equality and removing obstacles to gender equality based on the impact assessments. Surveys in the Ministry of Defence The Ministry’s personnel survey examines issues related to gender equality and gender harassment on an annual basis. Statutory workplace surveys are carried out in cooperation with the occupational health care service provider every four to five years. The surveys also address issues related to equality and non-discrimination. Women’s participation in voluntary military service Women’s participation in voluntary military service and military tasks will be encouraged further. In addition, information and analyses concerning women’s voluntary military service will be increased in order to augment women’s interest towards military service. Shared accommodation to be permanent practice from beginning of 2024 In December 2023, the Government issued a new decree amending the Act on Voluntary Military Service for Women. By this decree, the shared accommodation of conscripts and women performing voluntary military service is made a permanent practice in the brigade-level units and other units of the Defence Forces and the Border Guard. Participation in shared accommodation will continue on a voluntary basis, and consent to shared accommodation is required from everyone in the same accommodation space. In addition, a person who consents to shared accommodation may withdraw their consent at any time. Shared accommodation only applies to accommodation in barracks, and washing and other sanitary facilities remain separate for men and women. Report of the Parliamentary Committee The Parliamentary Committee submitted its report in November 2021 proposing that the compulsory enrollment day should be organized for the entire age group. Among other things, the Committee estimates that a joint enrollment day would provide more extensive information regarding military service. The Ministry of Defence has established a cross- administrative working group tasked with examining and planning the extension of enrollment in accordance with the Committee’s target state. The working group will examine the impacts of developing a neutral enrollment process on legislation and the authorities’ responsibilities, activities, and resources. Prevention and handling of discrimination and inappropriate behavior in the Defence Forces In 2022, the Defence Forces updated comprehensive instructions on the prevention and handling of discrimination and inappropriate behavior. The guidelines contain concrete instructions for both supervisors and those who have experienced discrimination or harassment, on how to promote a good operating culture, how to prevent inappropriate behavior, and how to deal with problematic situations.

32 B. More detailed information for sharing good practice on participative measures between participating States

1. Measures to increase the number of women in general and in decision-making positions in the armed forces and the ministry of defence (and other security forces- optional).

In Finland, conscript service is mandatory for men. Women can perform conscript service as volunteers. Completing conscript service is a prerequisite for training leading to a permanent military position and for obtaining a permanent military position. There are no ready statistics on those who applied for training leading to permanent military service and who started in permanent military service. Number of male and female applicants and those who completed conscript training in 2024:

Women Men Applicants 1555 30 005 TOTAL Commenced to Conscript Training 940 24 925 TOTAL Completed Conscript Training 838 21 162

The numbers and shares of women both in conscript service and in permanent military positions are slowly increasing. However, we think that the increase in the number of women is slow, and we are trying to recruit more women for military positions with the help of various measures.

2. What are the numbers and percentages of complaints raised by women and men about discrimination, harassment, sexual or gender-based violence?

In the Defence Forces, sexual harassment and other inappropriate treatment are monitored with a work atmosphere survey that is carried out once a year and with a wider equality survey that is carried out once every three years. All results of work environment surveys and gender equality surveys are reviewed by gender.

2 Measures to increase the numbers of women and specialist WPS advisers in peacekeeping forces.

Recruitment for the peacekeeping operations has been successful in the year 2024. Most meaningful measure is and has been high-quality conscript service and meaningful activities in the reserve, from which personnel are recruited for peacekeeping operations.

3 Democratic oversight of Security Forces and WPS

The Finnish MFA reports on the WPS NAP implementation to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Finland on an annual basis. Crisis management operations report of their own

33 activities to the Army Command. Defence Command reports on the activities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for the annual parliamentary report). A monitoring group, coordinated by MFA Finland and consisting of government officials, civil society and members of academia meets regularly to discuss the successes and challenges of WPS NAP implementation.

3.3 PROTECTION

A. Checklist of measures taken by participating States

Type of Measure Yes No

1. Specialist Advisers on WPS: -Gender Advisers X -Gender Focal Points X -Women Protection Advisers X 2. Policies to protect women and others in conflict and post-conflict areas from sexual abuse and exploitation by your State’s security personnel5 X

3. Policies, which set out the duties of commanders and other superiors to prevent abuse or exploitation by their subordinates. X

4. Collection and monitoring of reported cases of exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces: -referred -investigated X - acted upon X

5. Measures to increase your State’s capacity to investigate alleged violations of X human rights and fundamental freedoms in areas of conflict or post-conflict including sexual and gender-based violence6

More detailed information for sharing good practice on protective measures between participating States

The defence sector of Finland uses NATO definitions in all materials, which are presented for example in Bi Sc Directive 40-1.

In the defence sector operational reporting instructions are developed in such a way that specific issues affecting women and girls are considered in all operations. Reporting is good in some operations, but in some operations it still needs to be developed.

5 See also similar question B2 in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report as well as question 3a in NATO Sexual Exploitation

and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report. 6 See also similar question 4a in similar question in NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

34 How are military, para-military and security forces trained to respond to sexual violence and gender-based harm?

This is covered in all military training and pre-deployment training. The occurrence of such crimes must be accompanied and must be addressed within the limits allowed by the mandate of the operation. Crimes must be reported to the local security authorities if they operate in the conflict area.

2 Investigating alleged violations

2.1 How do you identify, record, investigate and prosecute any alleged violations, cases of exploitation and abuse perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces? What experience do you have of such investigations and prosecutions?

The Defence Forces have instructions on how to report incidents that have been observed or are directed at oneself. Milder cases are handled by the Defence Forces. Clear crimes, such as rape and violence, are handled by the civil police and the civil court.

In case of reports on sexual or gender-based violence during a civilian crisis management secondment, the individual may be repatriated and will not be considered for further secondments at least in the near future.

2.2 What are the number and percentage of reported cases of exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces that are referred, investigated and acted upon?

There have been very few such cases in recent years, 0 to 3 per year.

2.3 How do you ensure access to justice for victims of conflict related violence including cases of exploitation and abuse by military, para-military and security forces?

Crimes committed in the defence forces and security forces are investigated by the civilian police and resolved in the civilian judiciary. There is no military court in Finland.

3.4 SUSTAINING PEACE

A. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States

Type of Measure Yes No

1. Measures to ensure the involvement of women from the outset in seeking a x peaceful settlement of potential or actual conflicts.

2. Measures to support those who have experienced sexual or genderbased x violence during or post-conflict to support their recovery from trauma

35 3. Measures to support the role of women as agents of change and transformation x in areas emerging from conflict

4. Measures to support capacity building in the security and other sectors of x fragile states or post-conflict situations to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially relating to women and girls

1.1 How do security personnel support and seek to embed the involvement of women in peacekeeping and throughout the peace building and post -conflict process?

Some military crisis management operations train local security officials to take these issues into account. In some crisis management operations, contact is made with local women's organizations and efforts are made to support their activities.

1.2 What training are your security personnel given as regards survivor focus?

According to our information, these issues are not included in the training of the Defence Forces.

1.3 What roles do your security personnel or other personnel play in support of demobilisation, access to humanitarian assistance or to facilitate re-integration post- conflict?

Some military crisis management operations promote demilitarization and support the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, such operations are rarer, and there are currently no such operations.

3.5 Final reflections

1. What do you consider biggest obstacles as well as what are the priorities for your country on WPS in the context of the Code of Conduct?

In the Finnish Defence Forces, awareness of the use of the gender perspective is slowly increasing. The biggest challenge is the implementation of the WPS agenda and the verification of its operational usability. As a NATO member, the Finnish Defence Forces implements the alliance's WPS action plan and the network of gender advisors. This contributes significantly to the achievement of the goals of the WPS agenda.

Informations clés

Organisation Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE)

Type de document report

Date d'adoption 15 avril 2025

Source OSCE