Morocco - Irrigated Areas Agriculture Services

 ICRR 11179 Report Number : ICRR11179 ICR Review Operations Evaluation Department 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 02/05/2002 PROJ ID : P005499 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Irrigated Areas Agriculture Project Costs 34.7 21.7 Services US$M ) (US$M) Country : Morocco Loan /Credit (US$M) Loan/ US$M ) 25.0 15.1 Sector (s): Board: RDV - Agricultural Cofinancing extension and research US$M ) (US$M) (100%) L/C Number : L3688 Board Approval 94 FY ) (FY) Partners involved : Closing Date 06/30/2000 06/30/2001 Prepared by : Reviewed by : Group Manager : Group : John R. Heath Alice C. Galenson Alain A. Barbu OEDST 2. Project Objectives and Components a. Objectives (i) Raise agricultural production and farmers' income in the irrigated areas with special efforts to reach women, who are mainly responsible for livestock management; (ii) Improve the organization and operating efficiency of the agricultural services within the Regional Authorities for Agricultural Development (ORMVAs); (iii) Promote commodity and service oriented farmer organizations to take an increasing share of development responsibilities; and (iv) Involve the university teaching and research staff in field extension and research . b. Components (i) Transfer of technology to and from farmers in the large -scale irrigation areas of the ORMVAs, including the strengthening of adaptive research, agricultural extension, women's programs (72 percent of estimated project cost ); (ii) Supporting services, including soils and plant analysis, pest and disease warning systems, and testing/demonstration of small equipment (5 percent of estimated project cost ); (iii) Promotion of farmer organizations, with provision for changes in the legal and regulatory framework , technical assistance, training and some initial investments (16 percent of estimated project cost ); (iv) Monitoring and evaluation of agricultural development (4 percent of estimated project cost ); and (iv) Studies of farm mechanization, farmer associations and product marketing (2 percent of estimated project cost ). c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates Government cuts resulted in the project budget being cut by 34 percent overall: specifically, cuts were 24 percent for extension, 62 percent for the women's program, 60 percent for the promotion of farmer organizations, and 31 percent for adaptive research and supporting services . Cuts were made progressively throughout the project cycle : at negotiations, in 1996, at mid-term, and in 1999. The loan amount was cut commensurately . Closing occurred one year later than expected owing to cumulative delays in project implementation . 3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives: All objectives were substantially relevant . Objective (i). Partially achieved. Agricultural production and farmer incomes are reported to have increased by a modest amount but it is not clear to what extent this is attributable to the project . There was some small increase in the outreach to women, but this was limited to work by female extension agents operating in a specialized program (which was eventually pruned by 62 percent); the overall extension effort was not sensitized to the special needs of women farmers. Objective (ii). Partially achieved. Agricultural services were partially reorganized . There was an increase in the volume of services provided but quality probably did not increase and it is not clear to what extent farmers adopted new technologies. Objective (iii). Not achieved. There was no improvement of the legal and regulatory framework bearing on farmer associations and, contrary to expectations at appraisal, the land reform cooperatives are still managed and funded by the ORMVAs. Objective (iv). Achieved. Staff were contracted for research and training . (But now the project is closed, the ORMVAs have not set aside funds to continue contracting university staff ). 4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts: In the area covered by the nine ORMVAs, the value of agricultural output rose by 15 percent in real terms, average cropping intensity increased from 107 percent to 113 percent, and the yields of sugar beet, sugar cane, maize, and some other crops rose significantly . The area in cereals and industrial crops has declined, while higher value crops---horticulture, tree and fodder crops ---are being grown more widely. The number of farmer organizations increased from 1,178 to 2,165 between 1995 and 2000. Managers and staff in ORMVAs are now convinced that working with farmer organizations is the best way to raise the efficiency of agricultural services . 5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies): The approach to institutional reform relied nearly exclusively on foreign technical assistance, failing to promote ownership by nationals. Certain components (e.g. support to farmer organizations ) were underdesigned. It proved difficult to coordinate activities by the nine ORMVAs . The project management unit was poorly equipped to provide technical advice and leadership on agricultural services . There was no plan for monitoring and evaluation contained in the appraisal document and no system was put in place during implementation, making it impossible to assess with any accuracy the outcome and likely impact of the project . The project was hampered by successive cutbacks in government funding. The ICR rates long-term sustainability of project activities as unlikely because, in the absence of any financial contribution by producers or their organizations, agricultural services are vulnerable to budget cutbacks by each ORMVA. 6. Ratings : ICR OED Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Satisfactory Unsatisfactory The ICR says that a rating of "marginally satisfactory" (not an option for ICRs) would be appropriate. The lack of substantial, sustainable results, and the absence of any serious attempt at monitoring and evaluation suggest that the project should be rated unsatisfactory . Institutional Dev .: Modest Modest Sustainability : Unlikely Unlikely Bank Performance : Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Bank shares responsibility for the failings noted in the Shortcomings section . ICR notes, with respect to supervision, that "Recommendations contained in the action plans and legal covenants should have been followed up more systematicallly, and when no actions were taken, the Bank should have exercised its legal remedies and suspended disbursements". Borrower Perf .: Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Borrower shares responsibility for the failings noted in the Shortcomings section. Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTE: NOTE ICR rating values flagged with ' * ' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness. 7. Lessons of Broad Applicability: (i) Management responsibilities and costs of agricultural services need to be shared with farmer organizations, not borne exclusively by state agencies . (ii) At appraisal, detailed arrangements should be made for establishing a monitoring and evaluation system, including provision for a baseline survey . (iii) When projects are based on a number of semi -autonomous, regional entities, the specific needs and capacities of each entity should be taken into account; any attempt to impose a uniform design is likely to fail . Funding to the entities should be supplied, where possible, through matching grants . (iv) In cases where (a) the Bank makes a substantial contribution to recurrent costs and (b) counterpart funding falls short, the Bank needs to ensure that its own funds are not substituting for government funds formerly applied to recurrent costs. 8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No 9. Comments on Quality of ICR: Given the absence of monitoring and evaluation, economic analysis is difficult . However, the 2000 study on "first impacts" could possibly have been used to compare the value of output increase between project start and closing, matching this against project investment cost (with appropriate caveats about the difficulty of establishing exact attribution).