Colombia - Bogota Urban Transport Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 24283 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (CPL-40210; SCL-4021A; SCPD-4021S) ONA LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$65 MILLION TO THE CAPITAL DISTRICT OF SANTA FE DE BOGOTA, THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA FOR THE BOGOTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 4021 CO) August 8, 2002 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective August 7, 2002) Currency Unit = Colombian Peso (COP) COP 1.00 = US$ 0.0003730 US$ 1 = COP 2680.80 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS DACD Cadaster Departnent of Bogota DAMA Enviromnental Department of Bogota DAPD Planning Department of Bogota DATT Department of Transport and Traffic of Bogota DNP National Planning Departnent FONDATT Traffic Safety Fund GOC Government of Colombia IDU Urban Development Institute of Bogota SOP Secretariat of Public Works of Bogota SHB The Finance Secretariat of Bogota STT Traffic and Transport Secretariat of Bogota UNDP United Nations Development Programme Vice President: David De Ferranti Country Manager/Director: Olivier Lafourcade Sector Manager/Director: Danny Leipziger Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Thakoor Persaud  COLOMBIA Bogota Urban Transport Project CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 12 6. Sustainability 13 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 14 8. Lessons Learned 15 9. Partner Comments 16 10. Additional Information Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 29 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 30 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 32 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 33 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 34 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 35 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 36   Project ID: P006872 Project Name: CO Urban Transport Team Leader: Thakoor Persaud TL Unit: LCSFU ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: August 13, 2002 1. Project Data Name: CO Urban Transport L/C/TF Number: CPL-40210; SCL-402 IA; SCPD-4021 S Country/Department: COLOMBIA Region: Latin America and Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: General transportation sector (54%), Roads & highways (37%), Sub-national govemment administration (9%) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 04/25/95 Effective: 10/15/96 10/16/96 Appraisal: 04/26/96 MTR: 10/15/98 09/28/98 Approval: 05/23/96 Closing: 12/31/2001 12/31/2001 Borrower/lmplementing Agency: Capital District of Santa Fe de Bogota/Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano -IDU-; Fondo de Seguridad Vial - FONDATT-; Secretaria de Hacienda de Bogota -SHB-; Other Partners: Secretaria de Obras -SOP-; Departamento Administrativo del Medio Ambiente -DAMA-; Secretaria de Hacienda de Bogota - SHB- STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid Javed Burki Country Manager: Olivier Lafourcade Paul Iseman Sector Manager: Maria Emilia Freire Eugene McCarthy Team Leader at ICR: Thakoor Persaud Thakoor Persaud ICR Primary Author: Thakoor Persaud 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: HS Sustainability: HL Institutional Development Impact: H Bank Performance: HS Borrower Performance: HS QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: No  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: As described in the Loan Agreement and the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the overall objectives of the Bogota Urban Transport Project were to: (a) improve major transport corridors by rationalizing vehicle flows and upgrading environmental conditions for users; (b) promote the use of public transport and non-motorized transport modes; (c) facilitate public transport access to areas of low income population; (d) extend the life of the road infrastructiire; and (e) to strengthen the Borrower's institutions in charge of planning, managing and maintaining transport infrastructure. These objectives were developed jointly with counterpart staff, taking account of such factors as: (a) a population of 6.5 million people who take almost 77% of their trips by public transport; (b) a city were security, employment and transport are the three most important issues cited in public surveys; (c) a newly-evolving decentralization process under which municipalities have govemments with three-year terms and assumed several new obligations with an important level of fiscal self-reliance and (d) a shift in the Bank's urban transport strategy toward a more integrated and comprehensive development framework. The overall objectives were clear and appropriate and they reflected the needs and priorities of the stakeholder. Although these objectives were clear, greater explicit emphasis upon road safety (implicit in the environmental conditions referred to in (a) above), and traffic management would have helped in highlighting these important elements. The objectives were quite realistic and at the outset, they emphasized the role of the Bank as a facilitating entity and a catalyst in line with its relatively limited loan amount (US$65 million) vis-a-vis the investment program of the District and its five-year project-implementation period. This approach has been very instrumental in allowing the Bank to work very closely with three different District administrations between 1995 and 2000, all of which supported the project objectives and were highly effective in pursuing public transport reforns and the rehabilitation of urban space. Project funds were leveraged with great success in helping to achieve both substantial institutional reforms as well as in the District's investment program. Furthermore, they allowed for many follow-up actions such as the Bogota Urban Services project which is currently under preparation. 3.2 Revised Objective: Not Applicable. The overall objective was not revised during the project implementation. 3.3 Original Components: Component A - Traffic Management and Transport Corridors. Cost: US $ 70.5 million This component included: Al. Works, equipment, and consultant services to carry out corridor subprojects, consisting of an integrated program of least-cost investments, supported by administrative measures, to improve transport flows (including dedicated lanes for buses, car traffic and non-motorized transport) in major transit corridors and their areas of influence, and A2. Equipment, training and consultant services to assist the entities to carry out their mandate. The areas of focus included: (a) a citizens education program; (b) computers, software, equipment and vehicles for the Traffic Safety Fund (FONDATT), the planning department of the Traffic and Transport Secretariat of Bogota (STT) and the busways operation unit; (c) training of the traffic police and other transport sector professionals; (d) traffic count and transport surveys; and (e) assistance in transport planning and policy studies covering bottlenecks in existing road design; non-motorized transport; public transport system, parking, traffic signals, and accident reporting and analysis. -2-  Component B- Access Roads Cost: US $ 12.8 million This component included: Bl. Infrastructure Investments comprising designs, works, and supervision to pave and upgrade roads totaling 22 km. to improve public transport access into low-income areas; and B2. Support to The Urban Development Institute of Bogota (IDU) aimed at strengthening its overall project-execution and financial-planning capabilities. Component C. Road Maintenance Cost: US $ 33.8 million This component included: Cl. Road rehabilitation works comprising designs, civil works and supervision for a program to repair or rebuild about 400 lane-km of arterials and secondary roads used by public transport, including the walkways, bikeways, and green areas along the right-of-way of these roads; and C2. Planning, management and quality control of the rehabilitation program, development and implementation of pavement information system; and development of standards and manuals for pavement design and maintenance. Component D Institutional Support Cost: US $ 7.6 million. This component included: DI. Sector Technical Assistance consisting of equipment and consulting services to assist with on-going borrower's transport sector reform to: (a) reorganize the transport authority, (b) define functional organization and participation of the private sector, (c) implement the new sector organization; and (d) train the borrower's professional staffing in connection with their activities under the new system. D2. Support to the Environmental Department of Bogota (DAMA), consisting of technical assistance and training to help develop and establish local environmental guidelines for such problems as noise pollution and disposal/recycling of used tires, batteries and waste oil, and to design and implement the required regulations. D3. Support to the Finance Secretariat of Bogota (SHB), in the form of equipment-and professional services for: (a) auditing, monitoring and coordination of the project; (b) development of an information system for investment budgeting and monitoring; and (c) upgrading of the tax collection system. The design of the four components was clearly linked to the achievement of the objectives of the project and the sub-components were within the scope and capacity of the implementing entities, including their administrative and financial capacity. The design of the components and sub-components was flexible enough to allow for the normal execution of the project works without interruptions to these occurring because of possible delays in the institutional reform that was being implemented. Because of this approach, some entities were able to complete the subprojects which were originally assigned to others, e.g., IDU's assumption of some of the maintenance activities which SOP was doing until SOP was disbanded because of the District's institutional reform program. 3.4 Revised Components: The components and sub-components were maintained throughout the life of the project. However, there were some modifications which resulted in adjustments within the components as noted below. - 3 -  Al. A-1-2 Resources from " Other project" were used for A-I-I, the Calle 80 and A-1-3 Av. Caracas works after it was determined that these funds were not sufficient to commence another trunk line and the other two lines needed additional funding because of design modifications. A2. Due to the sector reform, resources originally earmarked for such activities as citizen education programs; computers, software, equipment and vehicles for FONDATT, STT's planning department and the busways operation unit; training of the.traffic police and other transport sector professionals; traffic counts and transport surveys; were all transferred to (e) assistance in transport planning and policy studies covering bottlenecks in existing road design; non-motorized transport; public transport system, parking, traffic signals, and accident reporting and analysis. 3.5 Quality at Entry: Satisfactory. The Quality at Entry is rated satisfactory because the project was in line with the country CAS and it was conceptualized and formulated after a thorough analysis was done on urban development and transport issues in Bogota, on the institutional framework and responsibilities, the performance of the sector agencies, the sector investment plans, local finances and issues and strategy. Because of this there were: (i) a high degree of consistency between the project objectives and the priorities of both municipal administrations in Bogota; (ii) goals and objectives which took account of the existing conditions and included components which had a high poverty focus; and (iii) the project design was formulated to take account of the complex institutional, financial, legal and related framework, with a realistic assessment of the possible risks during project implementation. The project design also incorporated the flexibility needed to modify and improve the planned works without losing sight of the end results. It incorporated clear, explicit and workable provisions for resettlement and environmental activities under the project, consistent with Bank policies. Special efforts were made to incorporate economic analyses as part of the project preparation process. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: Highly Satisfactory. The project exceeded its major objectives. It was very successful in leveraging Bank funds during three different administrations to help promote key institutional reforms and restructuring. The first and second municipal admiiinistrations established much of the basic financial and operational framework, along with several creative initiatives aimed at reducing traffic congestion (pico y placa) and promoting citizen participation. This was complemented well by the third administration which demonstrated a high degree of vision and versatility in pursuing, among other activities, a bikepath program and the Transmilenio, a low-cost and very efficient bus-operated public transport system, which is regarded as a Best Practice regionally and internationally, the latest indicator of this being the Stockholm Partnership prize awarded to Bogota for this system. Within Colombia, Barranquilla, Pereira and Cali have discarded plans for expensive rail mass-transit systems in favor of the Bogota model. Similarly, there have been delegations from Chile, Peru,- Ecuador, Mexico, San Salvador, Panama, Dominican Republic and Japan which have already visited Colombia to learn from Transmilenio. While the project benefited from propitious timing, it also contributed to the enabling environment by promoting policy, institutional and investment continuity among three municipal administrations. The project output and impact indicators in terms of speed, safety, reduction in number of buses, etc. for the trunk line works exceeded planned goals years ahead of schedule. In the access roads program, the targeted number of access roads and kilometers constructed were achieved and it exceeded the percentage of strata 1-2 beneficiaries. However, as explained below, the SAR estimate of one million beneficiaries for this component was an error which was corrected in some, but not all of the annexes. Project support for promotion of the non-motorized transport component included assistance in the design of the master plan and coordination with IDU in order to construct bicycle paths on the rehabilitated roads. In road rehabilitation, the project reached 378 lane kilometers of the 394 envisaged at appraisal. Several key studies (e.g., on accidents, parking, traffic management, use of discarded tires and batteries, etc.) have yielded important information which are currently being used in modifying or strengthening sector policies. Finally, in terms of institutional impact, project-assisted initiatives had far-reaching positive impacts which include: reduction of sector administration costs from 17% in 1996 to 10% in 1998, increase in sector revenues, institutionalization of improved road rehabilitation programs, generation of greater private sector competition, adoption of Bank resettlement guidelines for non-Bank investment and restoration of the credibility - 4 -  and public confidence in sector entities. Pride and a sense of identity among residents in the city has noticeably increased and many project outputs, notably Transmilenio and the bike paths, have been very instrumental in reducing or at least blurring class barriers in utilization of the public transport system. Several of these achievements are described below. 4.2 Outputs by components: Component A - Traffic Management and Transport Corridors. The objectives of this component were: (a) improving major transport corridors by rationalizing vehicle flows and upgrading environmental conditions for users and (b) promoting the use of public transport and of non-motorized transport modes (implemented by two sub-components, (Al) transport corridors and (A2), traffic management). Sub-component Al Transport Corridors Sub-component Al was concentrated in works, equipment, and consultant services to carry out exclusive busway corridor subprojects in Calle 80 and Avenida Caracas. The scope of the works included an integrated program of least-cost investments, supported by administrative measures, to improve transport flows (including dedicated busways, mixed traffic and non-motorized transport) in major transit corridors and their areas of influence. Even though there were various modifications, both subprojects were concluded before the project completion date and are now fully operational. The Avenida Caracas component is a 16.3 km project with four exclusive lanes for buses, and 4 lanes for mixed traffic. The Calle 80 project is a 10.3 lan corridor with 4 exclusive bus lanes, 6 lanes for cars and other traffic, bridges, traffic signals, pedestrian walkways, parks and public spaces, exclusive bicycle lanes and all of the ancillary facilities necessary for the operation of Transmilenio bus system. Transmilenio operates on exclusive busways with their own platforms and terminals which are fed through smaller feeder routes, traversing both poor and non-poor areas in metropolitan Bogota. The Transmilenio system currently has 41 kilometers of busways in operation with 60 stations and 470 articulated buses, complemented by 258 feeder buses. Within the next fifteen years, plans call for full coverage of the .entire metropolitan area, with about 85% of the population being able to get to the system walking less than 500 meters. The system has the latest technology and is operated entirely by the private sector on a for-profit basis. High capacity (170 persons) and environmentally friendly buses provide a capacity of over 40,000 passengers per hour per direction, with an observed figure of 31,000 for the most heavily traveled section of the Avenida Caracas. In total, Transmilenio currently serves about 750,000 passengers per day, surpassing original estimates by a wide margin. Before this project, IDU employed various ad-hoc procedures for acquiring the right of way or land it needed for its investments. With the Bank resettlement program, this was the first time that IDU had a road project in Bogota where it had to prepare a resettlement action plan for the people affected by the project. Even though the initial phase of this exercise created a great deal of dissatisfaction within IDU because it was perceived as costly and cumbersome, there was intensive Bank-IDU dialog and in the end, IDU was very successful in working with about 470 affected individuals or families to help them improve, or at least restore, their pre-project living standards, income-eaming capacity and production levels. IDU's action plan included not only the acquisition of land at commercial prices, but also additional compensation, depending upon the characterization and degree of vulnerability of each social unit. IDU provided technical assistance in design, legal, financial and entrepreneurial aspects to help vulnerable groups. The city was so impressed with the results of this exercise that a city law (decree) was put in place for all future IDU works (irrespective of finance source) done in poor areas (strata 1,2 an 3), to employ these Bank resettlement guidelines. This sub-component is rated Highly Satisfactory. Even with the complexity of several activities under this component, (land acquisition, staff changes, new operational system), the works were finished on time, albeit at higher costs than originally estimated, primarily because IDU had to pay the commercial cost for the land it acquired and it also had to reestablish the living conditions for the vulnerable groups who were affected. For the - 5-  Calle 80, all of the original works were completed. The actual speed of buses averages 27 km per hour (versus SAR estimates of 23 km per hour and pre-project speeds of 12 km per hour). Instead of reduction of the number of buses to 450 medium-sized buses per hour on the Calle 80 as envisaged in the SAR, the actual number is 120 large, articulated buses per hour transporting over 20,000 passengers per hour. In the SAR, the number of accidents was expected to decline by 20% in the second year after project completion and by 40% in the third year. The actual figures so far show an 84% decline in accidents, a 75% decline in injuries and a 92% decline in deaths on the Calle 80 and Avenida Caracas routes after the project works. In terms of user profile, ex-post surveys show that about 53% of the users of the Transmilenio system belong to the first two lowest income strata and about 95% overall are within the lowest three income strata. The ex-post evaluation of those affected by the resettlement action plan also shows that they are satisfied with the assistance received. Both of the Calle 80 and the Avenida Caracas trunk lines are included in an overall economic corridor evaluation. Sub-component A2 Traffic Management The sub-component A2 was focused on equipment, training and consultant services to assist STT-FONDATT to carry out their mandate. The areas of focus included: (a) a citizens education program; (b) computers, software, equipment and vehicles for FONDATT, STT's planning department and the busway operation unit; (c) training of the traffic police and other transport sector professionals; (d) traffic count and transport surveys; and (e) assistance in transport planning and policy studies covering bottlenecks in existing road design; non-motorized transport; public transport system, parking, traffic signals, and accident-reporting and analysis. Since the District had, by that time, commenced its institutional reform for the sector (disbanding of a Disrict traffic police unit with functions transferred to the national police, redefinition of functions, privatization of some operations, etc.), the assistance provided by the project for this component focused on undertaking transport studies, utilizing most of the resources originally allocated for sub-components (a), (b) and (c) above. Some of the studies done, along with the output are: Traffic Signal Optimization Studv. Traditionally, the telephone company (ETB), has had responsibility for the entire system under a single contract for planning, designing, installation, programming and operation and maintenance tasks. There were two different phases of the traffic signal study; one involved a complete review of the existing traffic signal system. The other prepared recommendations for STT (the transport authority) to assume management responsibilities for the system. Within this framework, STT then unbundle the tasks into: (i) planning, design, programming and operating functions, and (ii) maintenance, equipment, and works. This recommendation is now being implemented and the competition' it has engendered has already resulted in significant savings with improved accountability and transparency. Non motorized Transport Study. The project provided assistance in preparation of the non-motorized master plan for BogotA. Project funds were used to prepare the TORs while the city financed the study with its own resources. The plan identified the origin and destinations of the users, designed the bicycle routes to be constructed, and determined the design standards and regulation manuals. The study also identified the short and medium term strategy in order to increase the use of bicycles in the city. The city has constructed the first 250 km of the bikepath network. It has launched several creative initiatives aimed at promoting the use of bicycle as a transport mode while it continues with parallel efforts aimed at discouraging use of cars through such initiatives as car-free day (the first Thursday in February of each year), fuel surtax and license-plate restrictions which take about 40% of the cars out of circulation during peak hours. Public Transport System Study. Two different studies in this area were done. The first one was the conceptual, operational, functional, physical and financial design of the Transmilenio project for the first trunk lines. The design was implemented by a new public company (Transmilenio) which had responsibility for enforcing the regulatory and operational framework of the new privately-owned and operated bus companies operating the trunk and special feeder routes, along with the ticketing and all other ancillary tasks. The first phase of the Transmilenio system is now fully implemented and operational. Transmilenio accounts for about 10% of the total public transport trips and there is a fifteen-year masterplan for the full system to be covering almost the entire city. While the immediate impact of the Transmilenio are very obvious, there are still about 90% of the system which - 6 -  continues to operate under sub-optimal conditions until full network is developed. In order to address the city's need during this transition period, a second study was financed under the project. Its aim was to seek ways of optimizing the service and operation of the more than 34,000 buses which provide transport services in the city along with the Transmilenio system. Under this study, proposals were developed to redesign the system, drastically reducing the number of routes from about 700 to about 200, thus eliminating approximately 14,000 vehicles. The study also proposed that the new routes should be assigned through operating contracts through public bidding and it developed a financial and management strategy along with the necessary bidding documents for the process. This study is currently being reviewed by STT and it could become a component of a follow-up operation being prepared for Bank financing. Parking Plan and Policy Studv. A study for parking plans and programs was financed under the project. The study identified various demand and supply factors affecting parking in the city. One of the interesting findings of this study was that a large part of the problem was not the lack of available parking spaces; rather, it was related to controls and regulations governing street parking and parking in public areas. The study proposed a parking master plan for the city (on and off-street parking, institutional framework, administrative arrangements, etc.). In the short-term, it proposed a system of on-street parking districts, as a traffic management tool and an important source of revenue for the city. The study provided the STT with details for defining the districts, and prepared the bidding documents required for operating them through private-sector participation. This plan is scheduled to be implemented by January 2003. Traffic Accident Re'orting and Analysis System. The objective of this study was to improve traffic accident reports and data analysis procedures in order to develop a responsive traffic safety program. The consultants reviewed various aspects of the current system in Bogota and, along with STT, prepared and implemented an accident reporting an analysis system (MAAP), trained STT staff and others to use the program and structured a five-year road safety action plan for the city. While several elements of the action plan have not been fully implemented, STT is currently strengthening its Traffic Safety unit in order to address problems in a more comprehensive way. Desien and Planning Manual. This manual was prepared as a reference source aimed at assisting sector practitioners in improving and standardizing basic designs. It was completed and is being used; however, for various reasons (staffing, resource), its use has not been as widespread as anticipated and the current administration is interested in its wider dissemination. Overall, the A2 sub-component is rated Satisfactory. The issues were complex and required a great deal of inter-jurisdictional cooperation and coordination, which, in many cases, involved legal issues such as privacy of accident data. While there is great awareness and demand for improved traffic-safety measures in the city, it took some time before the necessary degree of cooperation was reached and for the results to be seen. Most of the needed studies were done on time and proved to be very useful in several traffic management and public transport initiatives in the city; however, many of the findings and recommendations are still in the process of being implemented. Component B- Access Roads The main purpose of this component was to facilitate public transport access to areas with low income population. Sub-component B1. Access Roads. This component included Infrastructure Investments consisting of designs, works, and supervision to pave and upgrade roads totaling 22 km to improve public transport access in low-income areas. Accompanying such upgrading works were renovation and legalization of public services, public areas and sidewalks. This was done as a package to prevent later excavation which would damage the access roads and it was also done to help consolidate the neighborhoods. The first roads built under the project were more focused on motorized transport. Because of lack of experience with such works, some of these early access roads were over-designed (in width, sidewalks, material, etc.) when considered in light of the available vehicle demands and the population density of -7 -  the areas. After reviewing the initial results, greater emphasis was placed upon making these access roads more site specific in terms of configuration and other design elements and more emphasis was placed non-motorized transport, pedestrian facilities and public spaces. The later works have been more appropriately designed but there is still room for improvement. The proposed Bank follow-up project is expected to assist in this. This sub-component is rated Satisfactory. The project constructed 22.3 km of access roads (compared to 22 km envisaged at appraisal). It reached about 98% of beneficiaries with income classification in strata 1-2 (vis-a-vis a SAR goal of 90%). The actual number of access roads constructed was the same as stated in the SAR (19). In the SAR, it appears that while the main text estimated a gross population of about 630,000, the indicator in one of the annexes was over one million. The actual figure of residents who received both direct and indirect benefits from this component is about 450,000. With the access roads program, several of the utilities and other public social entities have entered these marginal areas and improved their coordination. Sub-component B2. Support to IDU This sub-component was aimed at strengthening IDU in its overall project execution capabilities and financial planning. The efforts were primarily concentrated upon information systems for IDU and under it, financial, legal (software for procurement and contract management), human and physical resource systems were reviewed and strengthened. IDU used its own resources to embark upon several other complementary physical and institutional improvements, including programs with Transparency Intemational which were aimed at improving its image. These efforts resulted in a transformation of the institution into a very professional entity which enjoys a high level of public confidence. This sub-component is rated as Highly Satisfactory. Component C. Road Maintenance The main objective of this component.was to help extend the life of the road infrastructure, primarily through a well-designed and efficient maintenance system. To provide hands-on experience, 394 km-lane of roads (used primarily for public transport services) were selected with the aim of developing norms and standards, manuals, rehabilitation programs, and related information systems. Sub- component Cl. Road rehabilitation works This included a complete rehabilitation program comprising designs, civil works and supervision to repair or rebuild principal public transport roads. It was commenced under the public works agency (SOP) but transferred to IDU after SOP was disbanded as part of the District's institutional reform process. The principal roads selected were: Autopista Sur ( 65 lane-km), Avenida el Dorado (79 lane-km), Via la Calera (14 lane-km), Avenida 68 (117 lane-km); Avenida Boyaca (85 lane-km) and Calle 127 ( 20 lane km). These are important corridors along which about 1.5 million persons live and approximately 800,000 use them to get to work and other destinations daily. The works done included road rehabilitation, changes in geometric design, walkways and green areas along the right-of-way. Although bikeways were not part of the project component, there was coordination with IDU, which constructed bikeways with its own resources in Avenida Boyaca, Avenida 68, Calle 127. In the process of implementing this component, several obstacles had to be overcome. IDU's initial unfamiliarity with several elements resulted in a long design period of about one year. Once works began, it became clear that since these were key traffic corridors, they could not be fully closed while works were in progress. This led to adoption of several creative ways to manage traffic flows, traffic safety measures, modified work schedules to take advantage of off-peak periods and this experience was successfully incorporated in the preparation of later bidding documents, under which, among other things, IDU now requires a complete traffic management program as part of the package. This sub-component is rated Highly Satisfactory. Ninety-five percent of the original target (of 394 lane km) was -8-  achieved and all the roads under this component have been improved and are in operation. Although there were some start-up and design problems and some initial difficulty managing traffic during construction, the goals of this component have been achieved with only a 6% cost overrun. Furthermore, IDU adapted very well to the mid-course change, when it had to assume responsibility for this task after SOP was stripped of its functions. It is estimated that most of the population of this area are in stratum 3 and so the benefits of these works accrue largely to low-income groups. Sub- component C2. Support to SOP (moved to IDU after reform). This sub-component was aimed at developing and implementing a planning, management and quality control system for the rehabilitation program along with development and implementation of a road quality information system; and development of standards and manuals for pavement design and maintenance. After a first road inventory was done by SOP with the support of project TA and funding, the functions of SOP were transferred to IDU which took over the task of developing a road management information system. Project TA and funding assisted in the review, categorization and inventory of the entire road network of Bogota. The database is complete and the information system (Pavement Plus) is fully operational, using a Geographical Information System (GIS). This sub-component is rated Highly Satisfactory. Even with the disruptions caused by the institutional changes, IDU has now fully integrated the system in its operation and it has been very useful in IDU's long-term rehabilitation planning program, facilitating the formulation of new projects, preparing details required for multilateral loans and providing technical inputs in support of new taxes (tolls). It is routinely being used for estimating costs and prioritizing investments among such activities as the rehabilitation of Transmilenio feeder bus roads. While the importance of this system is clear and widely recognized by the District authorities, its sustainability, in terms of obtaining the needed professional staff and annual resource allocation to efficiently operate and maintain the system, needs to be assured. The current country economic situation tends to emphasize other areas; however, the District authorities are trying to find the needed resources for this system. Component D Institutional Support The main purpose of this component was to (i) facilitate various transport sector reform initiatives, (ii) provide technical assistance to DAMA for sector-related problems (noise control and alternative uses for discarded tires, battery and waste oil), (iii) support SHB in the upgrading of the tax-collection and budgeting systems and (iv), to support SHB in project coordination (via the Project Coordination Unit). Sub-component Dl. Technical Assistance in the Sector These activities were carried out mainly through consultant services aimed at assisting the District's then on-going transport sector reform to: (a) reorganize transport sector entities into a Transport Authority, (b) define various organizational functions and participation of the private sector, (c) implement the new sector reforms and (d) help train the Borrower's professional staff. Consultants were hired to help design the proposed sector reforms. A new sector agency was proposed for addressing traffic management and policy formulation, road and public space construction and maintenance activities. This proposal called for the transformation of IDU, SOP and STT into a unique sector agency which needed the approval of the City Council. For various reasons (layoff implications, lack of understanding of the proposed system, entrenched vested interest groups), the Council did not approve the proposed reform project in 1997. The authorities consequently adopted a different approach under which various institutional, functional and related changes were made on a more modest scale. The demise of SOP (with layoff of 2,860 staff) was one consequence of this altemative plan. STT was also reduced in size (by 1680 staff) as a result of the transfer of traffic police -9-  functions from a District entity to the national police. There were other modifications such as the cut in about 200 administrative staff of STT after the management of the vehicle registration activities was privatized. IDU also reduced its staff size by 325 persons; however, since it assumed new responsibilities for construction and maintenance activities, it had to be strengthened and technically improved for these tasks. The strengthening of IDU was done with the help of an intemational firm, which focused upon such areas as a) a strategic plan; b) asset management; c) administration and organizational performance; d) management of public space; e) the creation of the road-maintenance unit; f) contracting and g) land acquisition. As part of the process, there were parallel studies and technical assistance, mainly in the legal, human resources, private participation and institutional memory areas. -These include: Asset study. This study included a survey, assessment and categorization of the assets of STT, IDU and SOP and it was used as an input in the plan to reorganize sector institutions. Privatization of Vehicle & Driver Registration Systems. This study prepared the groundwork for privatizing several functions which STT formerly did. Labor and Human Resource Assistance and Follow up Study. Under this study, plans were developed to provide a wide range of assistance to help laid-off workers to cope with the problems of seeking to reestablish their livelihood. Institutional Memory Study. The focus of this study was upon the creation of uniform procedures for storing information and for the integration of the archives of dismantled entities with those of their successors. Human Resources Study. This study provided technical assistance to SOP, SIT and IDU in quantifying the legal aspects and costs to be paid for the 5,065 persons who were laid off through sector reform measures. The sub-component is rated Satisfactory. While the original sector reform package was not accepted by the city council, the above studies helped in preparing back-up reforms which have shown some positive results. Overall, the ratio of income to expenses among sector institutions grew from 61% to 74% in the period 96-98. Administrative costs over the period were reduced from 17% to 10%. Collection of traffic fines increased fourfold and has become an important source of income. Vehicles transactions processed by the private sector entity also increased from 467,000 in 1999 to 607,000 in 2000, an indicator of improved efficiency. After the reform, the cost of road maintenance dropped by 77% even while the area maintained grew almost sevenfold between 1996 and 1999. Sub-component D2. Support to DAMA DAMA contracted consultants to provide technical assistance and training to develop and establish local environmental guidelines and to design and implement the regulations to address such problems as noise pollution, two million discarded tires, 600,000 batteries and waste oil. For the discarded tires and batteries, the studies dimensioned the problems and prepared proposals for addressing them. For the noise pollution problem, both the diagnosis and acquisition of monitoring and enforcement equipments were financed. The system is operational and it is expected to have a positive impact on residents in the city. This sub-component is rated Satisfactory; however, there are still several actions to be taken to fully implement the remedial measures proposed under all of the studies in this component. Some of these are expected to be done under the second Bank project which is currently under preparation. Sub-component D3 Support to SHB and project coordinating unit. - 10 -  The Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) has assisted in project coordination. It is attached to SHB and was well-staffed throughout the project-implementation period. The PCU played an important role in project implementation. It assisted very much in keeping the project on track, ensuring compliance with Bank guidelines and procedures and in keeping the lines of communication open among the different participants. Its performance is rated Highly Satisfactory. Apart from the activities mentioned above, the PCU also assisted in maintaining continuity during both the three changes in municipal administrations which occurred during the project implementation and the staff showed great commitment to and understanding of project goals. This sub-component also provided assistance to SHB, for acquisition of equipment and professional services to develop an information system for investment budgeting and monitoring and to upgrade the District's tax-collection system. It is rated Satisfactory. SHB was first provided with an integrated system network (hardware and software) with all the necessary staff (78% of the total), having access to the system. TA (through consultants) was provided to design and implement the information systems for budgeting and monitoring, human resources and internal communications. The project also partially financed design of the Tax and Treasury information systems, which are now in the final stage of implementation. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The cost and benefits of the major components ( excluding component D) of the projects were evaluated in the SAR. For the Corridor lines, a net present value (NPV) of US $ 28 M and IRR of 20% were estimated. The SAR evaluation only included the works of Calle 80; it did not include Caracas component because these were originally going to be upgrading works. Also, land acquisition costs were not included because these were thought to be minimal. For the actual economic evaluation, the consultant who did the ex-post study included not only the Calle 80 and Caracas project costs, but also the additional works done for Transmilenio which were not financed by the project (e.g., terminals, bus stops, pedestrian bridges). The results are as follows: SAR Ex-Post Evaluation Al Ex-Post Evaluation Bz Net Present Value (US$M) 28 289 312 Intern. Econ. Rate of Return (IERR) 20% 34% .39% Benefit-Cost Ratio 2.0 2.9 3.4 Includes Calle 80, Av. Caracas, total costs with land acquisition and total Transmilenio infrastructure. 2 Includes Calle 80, Av. Caracas, total costs without land acquisition and total Transmilenio infrastructure. Even with the additional costs, the results are still higher than initial estimates. This is primarily because of the increased time savings (speeds increased from 12 km to 27 km per hour), lower operating and maintenance costs and higher than estimated load factors. The methodology used was similar to the SAR, with a discount rate of 12% (10% in SAR) and a 10 year horizon. Even though there has been a significant increase in land values attributable to the project, this was not considered in calculating the economic benefits. Access Roads.  The access road evaluation includes the benefits 'from operating-costs and travel-time savings from public transport only. The methodology used in estimating the original IERR was based6ri savings in vehicle operating cost and time saved by users. Because of the relatively short lengths of street improved,.their previous low level of utilization and the low-income profile of the beneficiaries, the re-estimated IERR was about 4% compared to a pre-appraisal estimate of 12%. While it is difficult to estimate increased property values in these marginal areas, sample checks on the rate and degree of lot and building improvements indicate that the IERR would be much closer to the original estimates if such improved property values were also taken into account. This sub-component has had a'very important positive poverty impact in the beneficiary communities. It is estimated that'about 93% of the beneficiaries fall in the first two strata of household income distribution. Prior to the project, access to homes in the area was very limited and these residents had to walk through mud paths, wash, and sometimes even change clothing before boarding buses. With the improved roads, there has been a significant transformation of these areas. Street Maintenance. At appraisal, the IERR of this component was estimated at over 50%. The re-evaluated IERR ranges between 47% (Avenida Boyaca) and 225% (Autopista Sur). It is estimated that about 24% of the workforce in Bogota has benefited from these works. The majority of the beneficiaries belong to the first three strata in terms of household income distribution. 4.4 Financial rate of return: No financial analysis was done for the components or activities carried out under the program. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project had a Satisfactory impact on the sector as a whole, as well as upon the participating agencies individually. Sector institutions are now leaner and more- technically, administratively and financially able to address Bogota's transport sector needs in partnership with the private sector and beneficiaries. Confidence in these institutions has increased and several surveys and opinion polls show that the Transmilenio system has instilled a level of civic pride which has transcended the direct benefits of the system. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control ofgovernment or implementing agency: Rejection of the comprehensive sector reform package by the City Council was a setback which disrupted the original project plan. However, the Mayor had a back-up plan for more modest reforms and this helped in achieving most of the results sought in the more comprehensive reforms. Still there are several areas where the results are not as complete as desired. For example, even though the SOP has had all of its main functions transferred to other entities, the Council still has not approved a final dissolution of SOP. The civil conflict and internal security had some negative impact, especially with respect to supervision activities. However, they did not greatly affect the pace of project implementation, schedule or costs. In this, the city authorities did a good job of minimizing such impacts. The three-year term of city administrations tends to favor rather short-term actions. This period will be extended to four years for future mayors. While the situation is ameliorated somewhat by the possibility of serving an additional term, since these terms are not consecutive, it still creates disincentives. - 12 -  5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Budget constraints appeared during some stages on the project; however, these were managed efficiently by SHB through such devices as straddling the works over two different fiscal years. Colombian Law goyerning land acquisition for public works was not fully compatible with Bank requirements. This slowed the land-acquisition process. However, both sides were willing to review the issues and find workable solutions. This process took some time but the delays were not a significant factor. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Sustaining interest in the maintenance needs in the sector is an important task. However, under the current difficult national economic situation, the authorities tend to sacrifice such tasks in favor of what they perceive as more pressing immediate issues. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: At appraisal, the project cost was estimated at US$ 141.27 M. The actual cost was US$ 183.88 M, about 30% more than the original estimate. Among the reasons for this higher cost are: * Land acquisition cost for the Calle 80 which was originally estimated at US $ 3.7 M versus an actual cost of US $26.7 M. This cost difference is due to an increase in the number of properties affected (from 175 estimated in 1995 to 235 in 1999) and to Bank guidelines for payment of commercial, as opposed to owner-declared value for taxes, which the City had been using. * Higher costs in Calle 80 to accommodate a 10.3 km bikepath and the need to hire a contractor to complete the work initiated by another one who left the work after an initial dispute with the city regarding another (non-project) contract. The decision to build an integrated Transmilenio system resulted in modifications in both the Avenida Caracas and the Calle 80 facilities. All of these modifications resulted in additional costs of about US $ 19 M in the corridor component * Higher cost of US $ 4 M in the access roads program due to the need to update designs and to construct, with project funds, some sewerage and related works before building the access roads. COMPONENTS APPRAISAL ESTIMATED IMPLEMENTED COST (US $ million) (US $ million) COMPONENT A 70,45 112,00 COMPONENT B 12,82 16,93 COMPONENT C 33,77 36,37 COMPONENT D 7,58 8,22 TAXES 16,65 10,36 TOTAL COSTS 141,27 183.88 Taking in consideration the size, complexity and change of scope in the corridors and acquisition of land sub-components, the final US dollar costs are very close to the SAR projected figure. The detailed costs are in Annex 2. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: The project sustainability is rated Highly Likely. Overall the transport sector entities in the District have been -retooled to address the future needs. In policies, institutional arrangements, finances and other such areas, the authorities have made great advances and they have a ten-year development plan (POT) and shorter-term plans which they are following. Financing sources for one of the main components of the District's plan, the - 13-  Transmilenio system, is assured through a fuel surtax and Govemment commitments. The private sector is responding to many sector needs and is becoming a key player. The District is working with several donors and lenders to consolidate and build upon its achievements so far and to continue with the implementation of several of the initiatives (road maintenance, traffic management, environmental and institutional building capacity) which commenced with this project. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: No explicit transition arrangements are required because the project activities were always part of the institutional goals of each agency. As the works were completed they became part of the regular assets and operations of the respective entities. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: The Bank worked intensively with counterpart staff during the identification, preparation and appraisal process. There were several obstacles and the process took several years; however, Bank persistence resulted in a project which was well designed and which has become a model regionally as well as internationally. 7.2 Supervision: In Supervision activities, the Bank made at least two supervision missions per year. Having a key local staff in the Colombia office assisted immensely in the supervision process. A detailed operation manual, annual review programs, a mid-term review, and supervision reports were all tools which assisted in the supervision process. Additionally, the Bank facilitated access of counterpart staff to several Bank training courses in procurement and disbursement and access to several experts in specific areas (traffic management, bicycles, accidents, etc.) were made available to the Borrower. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The Bank's overall performance was Highly Satisfactory. It provided appropriate lending, supervision, and follow-up assistance and it assisted in promoting contihuity during three administrative changes. The Bank project team worked closely with counterpart staff and provided the assistance needed by the District to accomplish its goals. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The borrower's performance is rated Highly Satisfactory. There was a very close partnership between the District and the Bank. Although the institutional framework was weak before the project began, all of the sector agencies made special efforts to understand and participate in the various stages. Even when there were high costs to the affected groups (e.g. in layoffs), the spirit of cooperation was still strong. The District's decision to adopt the Bank's resettlement policies for its non-Bank investments is a very strong indication of the commitment of the District to seek and accept good-practice initiatives which it feels will benefit its citizens. The PCU's role in maintaining all parties fully informed on project activities was also a very important element. The vision of the Mayor and the staff of the SHB was very instrumental throughout the process. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Because the District was the Borrower and it took responsibility for most of the project activities, the role of the Govemment was in initial loan preparation and negotiation activities as well as in monitoring project progress. The Bank kept the Govemment informed on progress in project implementation and staff of DNP and the Finance Ministry were very active in monitoring project progress. The performance of the Government is rated as Highly Satisfactory. - 14 -  7.6 Implementing Agency: The performance of all of the implementing agencies is rated as Highly Satisfactory. All of them were very effective in managing their respective components. The quality and timeliness of their work was very good and they completed the project ahead of schedule in spite of several delays. All of the legal conditions, including the auditing and reporting requirements, were fully met and were on time. The implementing agencies were also efficient in the technical monitoring of the project; with assistance from the PCU, they were always prepared for supervision missions and they took the necessary follow-up actions needed after such missions. SHB was prompt in dealing with loan-repayment issues. At the executive level, the strong support of the mayors to transport sector reforms was one key element in successful outcome. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: The overall performance by the Borrower is considered to have been Highly Satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned On the basis of the above evaluation, as well as the assessments made in this ICR, important lessons have been learned or reinforced. These include the following: Proiect Activities have to be part of the repular operations of the agencies. Creation of special project units may help in overcoming some implementation problems to the degree that any problems in existing institutions are avoided; however, in the long run, this approach tends to create ownership and other difficulties when there are multiple entities with similar functions. Under this project, there were some initial start-up issues to resolve but once the entities understood the task and worked in preparing the project, the results were very positive. Coordinating Units (PCUs). Coordinating units must be small and located outside from the implementing agencies but within an entity where there is an appropriate level of authority and responsibility. The PCU should be given a substantial level of autonomy and it should be staffed with skilled persons who should dedicate their full time toward managing, coordinating, monitoring, accounting, reporting, auditing and disbursement activities. Bank involvement in the proiect. The Bank should be judicious in its role in projects. This role should be a varied one over the life of the project and it should be reviewed over the project cycle to ensure that the counterpart entities continue to be on board. There should be active supervision and continuity in the project. Bank staff was seen as part of the team, maintaining a policy dialogue with the authorities at different levels, helping to solve technical and procurement problems, project delays, and giving technical assistance to the implementing agencies Continuitv. Projects usually span one or more terms in office of key elected officials. In such cases, it is important to maintain intra-administration continuity so that disruptions, policy reversals and other such actions do not paralyze the project. In Bogota, there were three administrative changes. Fortunately, each of these Mayors had a similar vision and there were no serious continuity disruptions. Maintenance Programs. Maintenance is a key element for project sustainability. With so many competing demands, especially during economic downturns, the pressure to focus on other priority areas is great. Special efforts have to be made to ensure that the investments in inventory and a pavement information system are not lost. Bank procurement nrocedures. The Bank procurement procedures has been very instrumental in obtaining a high level of response, greater transparency and savings in the works done under the project. With the entrance of foreign contractors in the city, there was a notable reduction in cost and improved work quality. However, while the Bank's procurement procedures have been beneficial, there could perhaps be greater benefits if borrowers did not have to deal with variations among different lenders. Resettlement action plans in urban works. Despite the time delay for land acquisition and resettlement action plan, the final result was positive. The city has adopted this strategy for all its strata 1-3 works. Proiect flexibility. Flexibility should be encouraged in some subcomponents, procedures or new technology areas. - 15 -  This occurred in the case of the Transmilenio component where adaptations had to be made in various areas (platforms, bike paths, bridges, surfacing material, etc.), and with very satisfactory results. Community involvement in the proiect. It is important to ensure community involvement in project design and implementation. This is a key factor to be considered in addressing not only the immediate needs of the beneficiaries but also in generating support for the works over time. In this context, pride and a sense of identity among residents in the city has noticeably increased and many project outputs, notably Transmilenio and the bike paths, have been very instrunental in reducing or at least blurring class barriers in utilization of the public transport system. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: En el ahio de 1996, el Distrito Capital de Bogota-Secretarfa de Hacienda recibio un pr6stamo del Banco Mundial por valor de 65 millones de d6lares para financiar parcialmente el proyecto de Transporte Urbano de Bogot6 (PTUB). Sus objetivos principales fueron: Mejorar la eficiencia de los grandes corredores viales; promover el uso de transporte publico; facilitar el acceso de transporte pOblico a zonas de bajos ingresos; el mejoramiento y la sostenibilidad de la malla vial y el fortalecimiento de la capacidad Institucional del Distrito para planear, administrar y mantener la infraestructura de transporte. Se apunt6 principalmente a mejorar las condiciones del transporte urbano en Bogot6 mediante la inversi6n en planes fisicos y programas institucionales que comprenden asistencia tecnica, entrenamiento y estudios dentro de cuatro componentes. El PTUB promovi6, apoy6 y acompah6 la transformaci6n que ha sufrido la ciudad en materia de trdnsito, transporte y espacio publico, sector que ha dejado el Proyecto con mayor capacidad tecnica, administrativa, financiera, mds estructurada en cuanto a su funci6n de planear y optimizar las inversiones, ampliar la visi6n y panorama a largo plazo del desarrollo de la ciudad. El contrato de pr6stamo BIRF 4021A-CO se firm6 el 16 de julio de 1996 y entr6 en efectividad el 15 de Octubre del mismo. La fecha de cierre fue el pasado 31 de Diciembre de 2.001. Los resultodos m6s destacados del Proyecto fueron: * Construcci6n Troncales de la Calle 80 y Caracas (26.7 Km.) * Rehabilitaci6n vial de la Avenida Boyac6, 68, El Dorado, Autopista Sur, Via a la Calera. (380 Km.-carril) * Construcci6n de 19 accesos a barrios (22 Km. de via) * Diseiho operacional Transmilenio * Estructuraci6n y privatizaci6n del 6rea de atenci6n al usuario de la STT (SETT) y apoyo fisico durante el proceso de entrega * Apoyo al cambio funcional de agentes de tr6nsito a policias de tr6nsito * An5lisis e Inventario de recursos humanos y fisicos, memoria institucional de la SOP, la STr y el IDU * Planes de retiro, programa de capacitaci6n y reconversi6n laboral (1670 agentes, 157 funcionarios de la STT, 2.150 de la SOP, 325 del IDU) * Diseho institucional del sector. Modernizaci6n del IDU * Inventarios malla vial y apoyo al desarrollo del Sistema de Administraci6n. * Diagn6sticos ambientales sobre baterias, Ilantas usadas, mitigaci6n del ruido y apoyo al montaje y operaci6n de la red de monitoreo de ruido para la ciudad. El proyecto tuvo como entidades ejecutoras al Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano-IDU, la Secretarfa de Tr6nsito y Transporte - STT, la Secretaria de Obras P6blicas - SOP, la Secretaria de - 16 -  Hacienda (administrado parcialmente por PNUD-Alcaldia) y el Departamento Administrativo del Medio Ambiente-DAMA. El costo real del Proyecto fue superior a los 183 millones de d6lares como se muestra a continuaci6n: FUENTE MONTO (MILLONES DE MONTO (MILLONES DE PORCENTAJE DE ____________ US$) V _ US$ __ VARIACION r_____________ SVR~-7~ f,7 INVERSI6N TOTAL Banco Mundial .. ' 65'000.000 0 % Secretaria de 4 F.?.: 6'118'83.95 55 8% Hacienda 118883.951 Total __________ 141 268 257 -W- fA83!8i3951 : '30.17% El valor total del Proyecto vari6 en cerca del 30.17%, ocasionado principalmente por el mayor costo en la compra de los predios; sin considerar este Oltimo, la variaci6n solo representa el 11.22% con respecto al presupuesto inicial del SAR, lo cual no es muy significativa si se tiene en cuenta el tamafno de los proyectos de infraestructura ejecutados. Los sub-componentes que se vieron aumentados fueron: Al Troncales con un 78.78% (solo un 12% sin adquisici6n de predios), BI Accesos a Barrios con un 35.55%, el Cl Mantenimiento vial con solo un 6.25% y finalmente el Dl Reforma Institucional con el 12 % con respecto a lo estimado antes de iniciarse el PTUB. En cuanto a la facturaci6n del Proyecto, se tiene un 96.78% de lo contratado como pagado, el saldo pendiente corresponde a las retenciones de garantia de obra que se entregan una vez concluido los periodos de mantenimiento. El BIRF financi6 el 35% del total del Proyecto. Del total de la inversi6n un 67.33% se invirti6 en obras de infraestructura, 11.09% en servicios de consultorfas, 1.37% en compra de bienes y un 20% que agrupa predios e impuestos financiados con recursos locales. ALCANCE DEL OBJETIVO DEL PROYECTO Experiencia en disenio, implementaci6n y operaci6n. I) Evluocll6n del desempeino del prestatario durante la evolucl6n e implementoci6n del proyecto. Desde la reactivaci6n del proceso de preparaci6n y evaluaci6n en 1.995 El Proyecto fue evaluado por 1 er vez en Diciembre de 1.990 y por segunda vez en Agosto de 1.993 pero no fue aprobado por dificultodes entre MinHacienda y el Distrito Capital en tomo a la deuda asumida para la EDTU, cupo de endeudamiento y situaci6n financiera de la ciudod. , Ia SHD logr6 concentrar esfuerzos significativos para lograr un buen proceso de ajuste en la preparaci6n del Proyecto y su respectiva contrataci6n del credito. Se respondieron y atendieron las principales recomendaciones realizadas por el BIRF en cuanto a aspectos de indole t6cnico, redefiniendo y modificando de manera acelerada los principales actividades de impacto del proyecto, teniendo presente una programaci6n realista de las acciones para un pronto inicio del cr6dito y una ajustada ejecuci6n fisica y financiera. La entrada en efectividad del cr6dito fue relativamente acelerada observada en 3 meses (firma el 16 de Julio de 1996 al 15 de Octubre) lo cual obedeci6 al cumplimiento de las condiciones previas, que a pesar de requerir procesos complejos y dispendiosos se pudieron realizar, permitiendo un inicio temprano de los desembolsos. En cuanto a los procedimientos se propici6 un buen ambiente para el manejo y cumplimiento de las normas del BIRF por parte de los funcionarios de las entidades ejecutoras asignados a cada una de las tareas derivadas de los componentes. No existieron posiciones incompatibles - 17 -  referidas a la conciliaci6n de las normas locales de contrataci6n (Ley 80) con las normas del BIRF que repercutieran directamente en el avance de los proyectos. El volumen de contrataci6n (374 contratos) se enmarc6 bajo los principios de transparencia en cada uno de los procesos de selecci6n, simplificando las actividades y balance6ndolas con los principios que el Banco propende en cuanto a calidad de los servicios contratados, economia y eficiencia. Se prepararon terminos de referencia, pliegos, informes, programas operativos anuales, entre otros para dar curso a coda proceso, por lo cual se solicit6 al Banco la no objeci6n en 485 oportunidades, recibi6ndola en 419 ocasiones (86.4%), lo cual indica la excelente preparaci6n de la documentaci6n y contextualizaci6n de la informaci6n; en especial lo referido a la preparaci6n de los terminos de referencia. Solo se objetaron 43 solicitudes (8.8%). Una aspecto que consider6 la Administraci6n prioritario fue la realizaci6n de la Reforma Institucional; impulsando una serie de acciones para mejorar los procesos y estado institucional de la SOP, STT y IDU antes de iniciar el proceso de reestructuraci6n general del sector, como se visualiza los anos 96 y 97 donde se aceler6 la contrataci6n de un numero importante de contratos. Referente a la programaci6n presupuestal necesaria para iniciar los procesos en cada una de las entidades ejecutoras, la SHD dio prioridad a la asignaci6n y apropiaci6n de los recursos presupuestales en cada vigencia, por entidad, fuente de financiaci6n (fuente de credito y aporte local), rubro de presupuestal cini6ndose a las normas estatutarias distritales que aseguraron una correcta ejecuci6n del presupuesto dentro de cada vigencia. Con relaci6n a las obligaciones derivadas por la adquisici6n de los recursos del cr6dito, el prestatato program6 el cumplimiento de los pagos por concepto de intereses y comisiones; ahora ha iniciado normalmente la amortizaci6n del mismo con lo cual se asegurara el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de deuda adquiridas. Las solicitudes y estados de desembolsos fueron adecuadamente construidos, diligenciados, soportados, autorizados y auditados, asi como tambi6n en cuanto al manejo de la cuenta especial. La seriedad y cumplimiento en la programaci6n financiera integrada a la programaci6n fisica del Proyecto se reflejaron en una acertada ejecuci6n y cumplimiento del cronograma de desembolsos (53 solicitudes de desembolsos que sumaron el total de los 65 millones de d6lares), el cual se cumpli6 en su totalidad 6 meses antes de la fecha prevista de cierre. Del total desembolsado el 72% correspondieron a gastos legalizados por obras civiles, 26% por consultorfas y el 2% por equipos, lo cual se ajusta en su mayor parte a lo asignado en el SAR (69%, 29%, 2% respectivamente) - 18 -  1~~~~~ ~~ 4r t0 'DELUIO PRDSMBLO 'LI')6t0;' X_ i -C40 1898~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 42000 ~~~~~~~~~2OOi ~ ~ ~ 0 inore de. auioi presentado > , s '01 BIRF. ,e efcuao dos enin ci cotrt de.- ^ ,,,,. -,EJECUCO DE DESEMBOLSOS i\,s, X-* 70,- ''_. 60 _f " 4 z; 40 --^ " >'30 .., .26'Xl , 1 , 1o _X13~~~~~1.9 De otra porte' se atenderoncod98a u d999 l t pn0d00a v d s raids por e El manejo de los recursos provenientes de la operacisn de credito celebrado con el BIRF fue transparente, los estados financieros y contables consolidados reflejaron razonoblemente la situaci6n del PTUB, y el cumplimiento de cada una de las condiciones contractuales del prestamo BIRF 4021A-CO se realiz6 plenamente; lo cual se evidencia en cada uno de los 6 informes de auditoria presentados al BIRF. Se efectuaron dos enmiendas al contrato de prestamo con el prop6sito de reasignar recursos en algunos subcomponentes y categorias, las cuales surtieron normalmente los procedimientos y tramites respectivos. De otra parte, se atendieron cada una de las visitas de supervisi6n realizadas por el Banco Mundial y en cuanto a las recomendaciones que hicieron parte de las ayudas de memoria, se cumplieron en su gran mayoria. Algunas referidas a instancias supra-institucionales se encuentran aun por ejecutar, como la liquidaci6n de la SOP, y otras que por aspectos de cambios recurrentes en las politicas de las entidades, en especial la STT, que no han permitido un proceso de implantaci6n completo (Plan Maestro de Parqueos, Gesti6n en Seguridad Vial, - 19-  Manual de Diseno y Planeaci6n). En cuanto a algunos procesos de reclamaci6n que han entablado algunos contratistas, las enlidades ha venido sosteniendo y defendiendo su postura en torno a aspectos puntuales de sus contratos (ICA de Mexico, TRL,...) El Proyecto logr6 acomodarse perfectamente dentro de las prioridades de los tres programas de gobierno que participaron durante el horizonte de desarrollo del mismo; de tal suerte que ayud6 puntualmente al alcance de las metas en cuanto a transporte, transito y espocio publico; lo cual dice mucho sobre el ambicioso alcance e impacto derivado de la buena estructuraci6n del PTUB. La SHD a trav6s de la Unidad Coordinadora ejerci6 una eficiente coordinaci6n del PTUB, sosteniendo los contactos cercanos y necesarios con las entidades ejecutoras y el Banco Mundial para garantizar la inercia operativa del Proyecto. Se puede afirmar que la conceptualizaci6n de esquema de administraci6n del PTUB fue acertado. Por todo lo anterior, el desempenio de la Secretaria de Hacienda Distrital como prestatario y cabeza del Proyecto fue altamente satisfactorio; la participaci6n directa de la entidad en el manejo del cr6dito fue permanente, desplegando una 6gil capacidad administrativa y operacional para ejecutarlo, contando con la fortaleza suficiente para ejecutar operaciones de cr6dito con fuentes tan apropiadas como son los recursos del BIRF. I) Evaluaci6n del desempenio del Banco durante la evolucl6n e implementaci6n del proyecto. La participaci6n del Banco en cada una de las fases que compusieron el ciclo del PTUB fue decisiva y oportuna para sostener el buen desarrollo del Proyecto y dor receptividad y continuidad a las propuestas del gesti6n en el sector trdnsito, transporte y espacio pOblico. El organismo puso a disposici6n su grupo de expertos internacionales para dar asistencia al Distrito en todas las fases del Proyecto. El PTUB fue un espacio para que el BIRF afianzar6 sus polfticos, aplicar6 y recogiera experiencias internacionales que fueron utiles a la hora de disefrar y ejecutar las propuestas de intervenci6n en el sector. Se facilit6 el cumplimiento particular de los requisitos previos para la entrada en efectividad del PTUB. La colaboraci6n, inter6s y disposici6n hacia el PTUB del Task Manager y el grupo residente en Bogot6 fue excelente; la Secretaria de Hacienda tuvo una canal de comunicaci6n permanente que permiti6 facilitar la toma de decisiones, simplificar procesos, aclaror procedimientos, programar actividades, asi como el acompaniamiento en temas criticos. La continuidad que da la presencia permanente del Banco Mundial se tuvo como ventaja inherente para hacer efeclivos los proyectos, asi como la asistencia tecnica que brind6; situaciones ambas que se vivieron a lo largo del PTUB. El Banco llam6 la atenci6n sobre las tareas criticas, actividades pendientes de implantaci6n, tareas incompletas; como se ha mencionando antes, el Banco ambient6 una buena recepci6n del proyecto durante los tres cambios de administraci6n, lo cual garantiz6 el normal desarrollo del proyecto y reconoci6 los logros obtenidos cuando se fueron alcanzado parcial y completamente las metas previstas. Durante la ejecuci6n del PTUB el Banco Mundial efectu6 9 misiones de supervisi6n, incluida una evaluaci6n de medio t6rmino para constatar el estado de implementaci6n y avances logrados del proyecto. El objeto de las misiones fue el de verificar el cumplimiento de compromisos, el avance de las actividades, visualizar hitos de inter6s en cuanto a disenios t6cnicos, actividades institucionales, sociales, ambientales, financieros y contables, y entregando sugerencias para lograr mejores resultados. El BIRF plante6 la realizaci6n de -20 -  ajustes eficaces para el desarrollo de la asistencia social y plan de acci6n durante de adquisici6n de los predios para la Troncal Calle 80. Se efectuaron visitas t6cnicas a las obras principales de cada componente. Se realizaron observaciones y recomendaciones para mejorar el desarrollo de los proyectos y se dio un apoyo a la soluci6n de inquietudes sobre aspectos de seleccion y contrataci6n, en especial sobre interpretaciones sobre clausulas de los contratos. Durante el proceso se solicitaron alrededor de 485 solicitudes de no objeci6n, de las cuales en primer envi6 el BIRF dio no objeci6n a 416 (86%) consumiendo un tiempo promedio de 14 dias, lo cual se ajust6 a la duraci6n esperado para su tr6mite. En solo 23 (4%)el Banco no dio respuesta escrita; lo cual se supli6 con decisiones tomadas durante las misiones o fueron expresas verbalmente, y algunas pocas en la cuales no hubo manifestaci6n; esto ultimo debe ajustarse a futuro pues para algunas entidades ejecutoras es necesario la respuesta escrita y oficial del Banco. La adopci6n de experiencias y practicas eficientes en otras ciudades transmitidas por el BIRF, se constituye en una transferencia de conocimientos, experiencias y tecnologia dentro del PTUB. Los funcionarios de las entidades ejecutoras tuvieron ademas un espacio para capacitaci6n y actualizaci6n en temas como seminarios de desembolsos (2), talleres de adquisiciones (2), estructura de los pr6stamos y deuda (1), asuntos ambientales y sociales (1). La labor de Banco no solo se limit6 y centro al espacio del proyecto, sino que identific6 nuevas oportunidades para ser financiados dentro de nuevas operaciones con sus recursos. El desempeno del BIRF fue altamente satisfactorio I) Evaluacl6n del desempenio del PTUB. EVALUACI6N DEL DESEMPENO EL PROYECTO DE TRANSPORTE URBANO PARA BOGOTA - PTUB t:'<.')MPt.)NFNTF A IR<.)N(:AIFS Y ADMINISTRACI()N f)FI IRAFI(;C.) Desempenio General del Componente: Altamente Satisfactorio Al -TRONCALES TRONCAL CALLE 80 El reto para la construcci6n de la Troncal Calle 80 consisti6 en la ejecuci6n de una obra de gran escala en forma integral, con procedimientos y restricciones nuevas en los cuales el IDU no tenia experiencia y se mostraba con ciertas reservas hacia algunos procesos; con actividades complejas, imprevistas y criticas, asi como tambi6n algun escepticismo sobre los planteamientos ambiciosos del disefio. El balance de ia construcci6n de la Troncal Calle 80, permite concluir que fue un proceso acertado, desde su concepci6n hasta su ejecuci6n por parte del IDU; sus prop6sitos fundamentales se cumplieron. Se entreg6 la infraestructura principal para la operaci6n de un eficiente sistema de transporte pOblico, se modific6 positivamente la cara del nor-occidente de la ciudad en terminos de embellecimiento urbano y caracteristicas de servicio de las areas transformados. La Troncal demuestra la eficiencia de concentrar inversiones de alto impacto en t6rminos de poblaci6n beneficiada, uso del transporte publico y desarrollo arm6nico y humano del espacio pOblico que la integra. El proyecto sirve de patr6n modelo para los nuevas troncales que se desarrollar6n en la segunda fase de Transmilenio. - 21 -  La intervenci6n en la Troncal Calle 80 fue destacable en t6rminos de costos si se tiene en cuenta la gran variedad de obras de gran escala que se efectuaron (86.360 millones total obra civil+adiciones+ajustes-retenci6n contrato ICA). El Proyecto no revestirfa mucho interes de no ser por los ajustes en el disenio realizados e incorporaci6n de proyectos nuevos (ciclorruta y Transmilenio), el proceso de adquisici6n de predios y asistencia social, y el abandono de un tramo de la obra por parte del contratista durante su fase final, Aun asi se ejecut6 completamente el proyecto. Entre las lecciones aprendidas podemos mencionar: 1. Garantizar que la poblaci6n desplazada no va a desmejorar su calidad de vida despu6s de las intervenciones y garantizar que la ciudad va a desarrollar normal y completamente sus proyectos son dos objetivos que pueden alcanzarse si van de la mano. El IDU crea un drea encargada de los aspectos de gesti6n social requeridos en los proyectos, denominada Oficina Asesora de Gesti6n Social. Tambien el aprendizaje adquirido en la Calle 80 sirvi6 como base para pensar en la necesidad de una polftica de intervenci6n pOblica por afectaci6n de obra civil del IDU en predios de estratos 1 y 2 exclusivamente para el pago de compensaciones; reglamentada mediante Acuerdo No 10 de 2000 del Concejo Distrital. 2. El proyecto pudo enfocar positivamente esfuerzos con otras entidades para beneficio de la troncal (parques y obras de la EAAB, IDRD, Invias, Jardin Botanico, demarcaci6n STT), lo cual puede servir como polftica generalizada en la realizaci6n de la troncales. 3. Los conceptos principales de diseho se deben conservar hasta el final de los contratos de obra civil, en especial sobre los elementos de detalle de arquitectura y urbanismo; pues siendo 6stas las actividades finales en ejecutarse, existe la probabilidad de reducirlas para ajustarse al presupuesto asignado. 4. Se debe crear al interior de cada funcionario del IDU, cada disehador, cada constructor, cada interventor una cultura de la seguridad vial que haga razonar y validar de forma natural para eliminar las condiciones potenciales de riesgo de accidentes en cualquier fase del proyecto. En la troncal se hizo un esfuerzo interesante para lograr las mejores condiciones por medio de senalizaci6n, demarcaci6n, iluminaci6n, elementos ffsicos (reductores de velocidad, barreras) pero siempre hay trabajos susceptibles de mejorar como en la semaforizaci6n peatonal, informaci6n vial, auditorias de seguridad vial, entre otros. El IDU ha recogido una gran experiencia en la realizaci6n de proyectos. Existen algunos elementos para corregir y mejorar no solo en los procedimientos del Banco Mundial sino en la propia contrataci6n oficial en cuanto a la preparaci6n de los pliegos, la realizaci6n de los disenios, la ejecuci6n de los contratos y su liquidaci6n, compra de predios. Se recomienda iniciar una labor de retroalimentaci6n interna del instituto en estos asuntos. TRONCAL CARACAS El Proyecto se destac6 por haber rehabilitado el corredor en un tiempo de 11 meses relativamente corto; no existfa ampliaci6n vial y por lo tanto afectaci6n predial, asi como obras de redes de gran magnitud. El contrato del tramo norte registro la mayor facturaci6n mensual de obra alguna en la historia del IDU 7.403'543.463 millones de pesos, en el tramo sur la facturaci6n mdxima fue de 6.512'628.776. Se emple6 con exito la t6cnica de white-topping. Fue notoria la ejecuci6n del plan de manejo de tr6fico, informaci6n ciudadana, plan de manejo ambiental y apoyo del proyecto a otros claves para la puesta en marcha del sistema Transmilenio; lo cual se realiz6 con admirable sincronizaci6n. El Proyecto Troncal no fue tan intensivo en espacio pOblico con la Calle 80 pero en la actualidad se viene ejecutando tres controtos a lo largo de corredor para dotarlo de andenes y mobiliario urbano, semaforos peatonales y dem6s atributos para su embellecimiento. Las lecciones aprendidas son en cierta medida similares a las vislumbradas en la Calle 80. -22 -  Los recursos del componente se hicieron rendir para apoyar el mayor numero de actividades complementarias para la operaci6n de Transmilenio, por esto se financi6 la interventorfa de la autopista Norte y la correspondiente a la Estaci6n y Patios de la Calle 63 Sur (hoy Portal de Usme) Desempeno del sub-componente: Altamente Satisfactorio A2-ADMINISTRACION DEL TRAFICO Este subcomponente fue estrategico para el Proyecto pues diseiaba el esquema operacional 6ptimo para aplicar en las troncales construidas por el Proyecto, el primer objetivo del mismo. En esa direcci6n se financi6 un 1 er estudio de esquema organizacional Solobus y posteriormente se apoy6 ampliamente el diseho operacional Transmilenio, el cual se encuentra implantado casi en su totalidad como se habia previsto en la Fase I del estudio. El PTUB redireccion6 r6pidamente los proyectos a financiar y con buena visi6n desde la coordinaci6n se ejecutaron las mejores opciones que contribuyeron a la puesta en marcha del sistema; orgullo y satisfacci6n para los ciudadanos de Bogotd Referente a los proyectos especificos de accidentalidad, manual de planeaci6n, planes y politicas de parqueo, semaforizaci6n y reestructuraci6n de rutas (estos dos ultimos ejecutados a trav6s del convenio con el PNUD), todos fueron concluidos y entregados a satisfacci6n a la STT para que los implantara. Desafortunadamente por los cambios en la direcci6n de la entidad se fue desdibujando la importancia de los productos de consultoria, de tal suerte que a la fecha no se han puesto en marcha, esta administraci6n viene gradualmente retomando los procesos y algunos han servido de base para nuevas alternativas de gesti6n. Desempeno del sub-componente: Satisfactorio <',COMP()NFNIF 13 A(;:C''FSOS A BARRIOS Desempehio General del Componente: Altamente Satisfactorio BI -ACCESOS A BARRIOS Se ejecutaron 19 accesos superando la meta de 22 kil6metros de via. Los prop6sitos del subcomponente se cumplieron en su totalidad. Los beneficios para las comunidades favorecidas han sido notorios en cuanto a entorno fisico, movilizaci6n peatonal y transporte publico, mitigaci6n del deterioro de los suelos y las viviendas, mejor cobertura de los servicios, reducci6n de los tiempos de viajes. Tambien algunos de los accesos (actualmente 4) sirven para operaci6n de las rutas alimentadoras de Transmilenio y est6n previstos que 7 mas sirvan pr6ximamente al Sistema. Con lo anterior las personas de bajos ingresos de estas zonas tienen un beneficio adicional pues disminuyen sus gastos de movilizaci6n al tener que efectuar menos transbordos y gozar de libre movilizaci6n dentro de las zonas barriales que se sirven. Los planeadores de ia malla vial deben formular proyectos como los realizados en este subcomponente, mejorar la coordinaci6n con al EAAB y trabajar de la mano con Transmilenio, dar 6nfasis al espacio publico antes de desarrollar m6s infraestructura vial. Un uiltimo aspecto aprendido consiste en cambiar la tendencia de construir en concreto en estas zonas que aun no tiene su sistema de redes consolidado, tienen pendientes elevadas, minimo transito vehicular, por pavimentos asfalticos para atender necesidades sociales apremiantes en cuanto a mayor cubrimiento. Desempehio del sub-componente: Altamente Satisfactorio - 23 -  B2-FORTALECIMIENTO INSTITUCIONAL DEL IDU Se desarroll6 un sistema de software para gesti6n de los procesos administrativos de la entidad, el cual se recibi6 a satisfacci6n y se encuentre en operaci6n. El sistema para el seguimiento y control de los contratos no se esta empleando plenamente, se encuentra en litigio. Posteriormente se adquirieron equipos y licencias de software en menor escala. Dentro del Plan Estrategico de Sistemas realizado por Booz Allen & Hamilton existen 6reas de gesti6n a abarcar por porte del IDU, en temas presupuestales, contables y financieros debe proponerse un sistema lo suficientemente robusto que enlace todas las actividades del IDU en cuanto a contratos, predios, asuntos legales, licitaciones, administraci6n que pueda reducir esfuerzos y simplificar procesos que parecen no estar estandarizados al interior de la entidad por estar separados. Desempeno del sub-componente: Satisfactorio COMPONENlL C MANTfNIMIELNT10 Y RI2HA8Il.ltAC::lON UE LA MALIA VIAL Desempeno General del Componente: Altamente Satisfactorio Cl- REHABILITACI6N Y MANTENIMIENTO DE LA MALLA VIAL La meta de rehabilitar los principales corredores de transporte pOblico de la ciudad (Autopista Sur, Avenida El Dorado, Avenida Boyac6, Avenida 68-CallelOO, Via a la Calera, Calle 127) se efectu6 en un 96.4%, se rehabilitaron 380 Km.-carril contra 394 del SAR. La efectividad de las intervenciones, los esquemas de contrataci6n, los tipos de intervenci6n, diserios y tecnologia involucrados marcaron un cambio radical en cuanto al mantenimiento vial que se observaba en la ciudad; estos procesos iniciaron al tiempo con el contrato de mantenimiento de la malla vial y demostraron los beneficios en menores costos de intervenci6n, calidad, menores tiempos de ejecuci6n, mayores coberturas y garantias en cuanto a la estabilidad de los trabajos. Evaluaci6n de los beneficios e Impacto de Ia Reforma Institucional- Selfinver. Septiembre de 1999 Resumen del Proceso de Reforma Sectorial y del marco institucional del mantenimiento vial en la Ciltima d6cada. Unidad Coordinadora Proyecto de Transporte Urbano para Bogot6. Noviembre-2000 Los anteriores atributos se consideran con lecciones aprendidas; dejar a un lado labores administrativas de mantenimiento vial y facilitar la competencia de las empresas experimentadas para que por medio de adecuadas condiciones de competencia via licitaciones y contratos, permiten obtener economias de escala para la ciudad. Se debe considerar al igual que en las troncales, la garantia de seguridad vial para peatones, ciclistas y conductores, dando prioridad a los no motorizados y auditando en cada momento las decisiones tecnica y condiciones de las vias para minimizar el riesgo de accidentes. Desempenio del sub-componente: Altamente Satisfactorio C2 PLANEACION, GERENCIA Y CONTROL DE CALIDAD DEL PROGRAMA DE REHABILITACION VIAL Los esfuerzos dentro del PTUB para concebir y emplear un sistema para la planificaci6n vial, dio los frutos esperados. Inicialmente se efectu6 el inventario parcial de la malla vial en la SOP y despu6s en el IDU se le dio el apoyo decisivo para inventariar el 100 % de la malla vial de las 19 localidades de la ciudad (11.660 Km.-carril de los cuales se financiaron 3.242) posteriormente se integraron a una herramienta de software que constituye el propio "sistema de administraci6n de pavimentos". Actualmente el Instituto prioriza sus decisiones de inversi6n empleando el sistema, funci6n que realiza la Subdirecci6n T6cnica de - 24 -  Administraci6n de Pavimentos httD://www.idu.aov.co/pue%20es/oraanicrama/sdtadmonoav.htm . Ya se aprendi6 a utilizarlo, ahora debe robustecerse, esto es integrar todo los activos de la entidad a una herramienta todavfa mas poderosa (puentes peatonales, ciclorrutas, alamedas, puente vehiculores, parques, predios de la entidad, enlaces con otras entidades) Desempefho del sub-componente: Altamente Satisfoctorio (:OMPONNIXI: D FOR,)KIALI IMIE,N'l'OIN,SU'T[il(,CIONAL En busca de la racionalizaci6n administrotiva del sector trdnsito, transporte y espacio pOblico de la ciudad de Bogot6, se inici6 en el afio 1.996 un proceso de reestructuraci6n de las entidades que conforman el sector: el Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano-IDU, Secretaria de Transito y Transporte-STT y Secretaria de Obras Publicas-SOP. El diagn6stico institucional mostraba en 1.996 un sector desarticulado, no se tenfan claramente identificadas las necesidades de inversi6n para el desarrollo del sector, con baja capacidad financiera para ejecutar, poca efectividad en las intervenciones y planeaci6n de corto plazo. Actualmente se cuenta un sector m6s fuerte con mayor proyecci6n y convicci6n de su misi6n en el sector. Hoy se tiene informaci6n veraz y mecanismos dgiles de planeaci6n para priorizar las inversiones publicas, facilitando la toma de decisiones y concientizando sobre la necesidad y destinaci6n de nuevas fuentes de financiamiento que hagan mas estable y din6mico el sector. La modernizaci6n institucional en las entidades ejecutoras es contundente a excepci6n de la SOP; los procesos que ellas manejan se han mejorado. Ha aparecido una entidad encargada de gerenciar y planear el sistema de transporte publico de alta eficiencia. htto://www.transmilenio.aov.co Las entidades disponen de una mayor vocaci6n de servicio al ciudadono, lo cual ha producido un cambio de actitud del ciudadano hacia las mismas, evidenciado en una participaci6n m6s enfatica en torno al desarrollo urbano; y procurando mayor conciencia sobre su papel como motor de desorrollo por medio del cumplimento de sus obligaciones tributarias. La consolidoci6n del proceso de reforma institucional ha mejorado la productividad urbana recobrando la importancia para la ciudad de dar prioridad a los temas de planeaci6n y control del sector. La concepci6n de un proyecto que apuntara al mismo tiempo a aspectos de planeaci6n, infraestructura, operaci6n, eficiencia institucional, porticipaci6n privada, aplicaci6n de nuevas ideas y proyectos como ramas estrat6gicos del desarrollo urbano y sostenible del transporte demuestran no solo la elevada calidad de su formulaci6n sino tambi6n en su ejecuci6n e implementaci6n. La liquidaci6n de la SOP fue el unico proceso que no se ha completado aun. Desempeio General del componente: Satisfactorio I) I A r;';1TIN( IA FI.' N.A FAARA LA REFO)RMA INSTITCKI)ONAI lFI SECiOR rTRANS11O. IRANSP(2)R'IE Y 011RAS VIALiS Se realizaron trobajos detallados e intensos en an6lisis e inventarios de recursos humanos y fisicos, memoria institucional en la SOP, la STT y el IDU. Posteriormente, se efectuaron previo a los planes de retiro, programas de sensibilizaci6n al cambio, capacitaci6n y reconversi6n laboral (talleres gen6ricos, formaci6n de unidades productivas, intermediaci6n laboral, artes y oficios) para la moyorfa de las 4.302 personas que se desvincularon laboralmente de las tres entidades (1670 agentes de la STT, 157 funcionarios del area de atenci6n al usuario de la STT, 2.150 de la SOP, 325 del IDU). Se cre6 un sistema de administraci6n de activos en las tres entidades, realiz6ndose un inventario ffsico de todos los bienes de las entidades (inventario y avalOo de 1'024.606 elementos, 2.016 vehiculos, 9.209 predios en el IDU). Se efectu6 por - 25 -  primer vez un inventario completo y cierto de los registros de propiedad de los vehiculos en la ciudad (1'209.029 carpetas de vehiculos normalizadas en 688.278 registros) para ser transferidos desde la STr hacia el concesionario SETT. Se organizaron los archivos activos (70.607 volumenes) de la STr y la SOP creando politicas para administraci6n y manejo bajo criterios estandarizados, conformando archivos centrales. Adicionalmente en la SOP se hizo un ordenamiento sobre sus archivos inactivos (250.000 items) IDU La entidad con mejor desempeno dadas las prioridades que se fijaron a lo largo del Proyecto para apoyar su fortalecimiento. Recibi6 plenamente las funciones de mantenimiento de la malla vial provenientes de la SOP, ahora dispone de un sistema para administrar y planear t6cnica y econ6micamente las inversiones. El instituto cuenta ahora con una estructura organizacional http://www.idu.aov.co/aue%20es/estructura.htm funcional, administrativa y fisica moderna y fuerte comparada con el panorama que encontr6 el Banco en el ano de 1.995. Cuenta con 6reas especializadas, recursos humanos y equipos para atender los principales proyectos desde la planeaci6n hasta la ejecucion, destac6ndose la direcci6n de construcciones, de malla vial, espocio poblico y una oficina asesora de gesti6n social; 6sta ultima nace como producto derivado de la gesti6n impulsada por el BIRF en la Calle 80. Asi mismo, maneja pr6cticas nuevas y de obligatoria realizaci6n en todos su proyectos como el manejo ambiental, las relaciones con la comunidad, el plan de manejo de tr6fico y de informaci6n ciudadana. Ahora existe una polfiica generalizada en cuanto al fomento del transporte no motorizado; la ciudad cuenta con una red de 254.6 Km. (meta del Proyecto de Transporte Urbano para Bogota) con nuevos proyectos como paseos urbanos, alamedas, parques y andenes. Desempehio de la entidad: altamente satisfactorio STT Se traslado en control y regulaci6n del transito de la ciudad a la Policia Nacional, un proceso dificil que ahora se ejecuta con eficiencia y transparencia. Se entreg6 en concesi6n el 6rea de atenci6n al usuario encargada de los tr6mites de registro de automotor y de conductores con resultados contundentes en cuanto al volumen de tramites, colidad, veracidad, economia, agilidad, transparencia y seguridad Servicios Especializados de Tr6nsito y Transporte. htto://www.sett.com.co/. Se asumi6 la planeaci6n y administraci6n de la red semaf6rica de la ciudad, y se realizaron otros avances que le han dado autonomia en sus sistemas de informaci6n (desprendimiento del SISE), facilidades en cuanto al pago de comparendos via cajeros autom6ticos y viene consolidando un proceso de reestructuraci6n de sus procesos y planta de personal y modernizaci6n de su planta fisica. Quedan por completar algunas actividades necesarias para fortalecer a la entidad y que fueron identificadas, formuladas y definidas dentro del PTUB como: i) perfeccionar el proceso de concesi6n de los trdmites sobre el registro de conductores y automotores ii) implantar un esquema de participaci6n en el manejo de semaforizaci6n iii) implantaci6n de un 6rea para el manejo integral de la accidentalidad y seguridad vial iv) fortalecimiento de las inspecciones de transito v) implantaci6n del modelo de gesti6n para la reestructuraci6n del sistema de rutas complementarias a Transmilenio. Desempen'o de la entidad: satisfactorio SOP Trasladada sus funciones de la entidad al IDU, reducida su planta de personal y su presupuesto al minimo necesario y con la demostraci6n de las bondades econ6micas del proceso Evoluaci6n de los beneficios e Impacto de la Reforma Institucionol- Selfinver. Sepffembre de 1999 Resumen del Proceso de RefoTrma Sectorial y del morco institucional del mantenimiento vial en la ultima d6cada. Unidad Coordinadora Proyecto de Transporte Urbano para Bogota. Noviembre-2000, se present6 un proyecto de acuerdo al honorable Consejo Distrital para iniciar ia liquidaci6n de la entidad, desafortunadamente no se recibi6 el visto bueno. Se ha insistido en varias ocasiones para - 26 -  retomar la alternativa de supresi6n pero los esfuerzos no han logrado el 6xito deseado. Este proceso persistente debe ser decidido nuevamente por la Administraci6n. 0)2- ASISIENCIA Al. DAMA PARA EL. PLAN DE MANEK) AMBIENTAL PARA EL SECFOR TRANSPC)RIF La propuesta de participaci6n del Proyecto se centr6 en la determinaci6n de los impactos generodos al bienestar y calidad de vida de los habitantes de la ciudad por la operaci6n del parque automotor de la ciudad. Se efectuaron dos diagn6sticos ambientales para la mitigaci6n de los efectos producidos por la disposici6n, manejo de las llantas y neumaticos y tambi6n de baterfas usadas. En ambas problem6ticas se dejaron planes de acci6n para que el DAMA ejecute; ambos se han integrado a la gesti6n de residuos de la ciudad httD://www.dama.aov.co/. En los dos diagn6sticos se entreg6 el disenio conceptual de la alternativa factible para la gesti6n de residuos (baterias y Ilantas usadas). Para la problem6tica de llantas actualmente se encuentra en ejecuci6n un contrato con la Universidad de los Andes para ensayar la incorporaci6n del residuo en la mezclas asfdlticas, se espera sustentar t6cnicamente los beneficios econ6micos de la alternativa, asi como las especificaciones t6cnicas. Posteriormente, se formularon nuevas alternativas consistentes en la determinaci6n de la problem6tica del ruido y la creaci6n de herramientas de geshi6n para el DAMA entorno al tema. Se efectu6 sun diagn6stico ambiental para evaluar la contaminaci6n por ruido en las localidades de Fontib6n y Engativ6 efectuado por la Universidad Incca. La Oltima actividad realizada dentro de componente consisti6 en la adquisici6n, montaje y operaci6n de la primera red de monitoreo de ruido para la ciudad, la cual se encuentra funcionando en el DAMA y tiene una interfase con la Aeron6utica Civil en cuanto al control y aplicaci6n de la nueva normativa para operaci6n a6rea. La financiaci6n se realiz6 de forma compartido con el Proyecto FIGAU tambien financiado con recursos del BIRF. Desempeno del sub-componente: Satisfactorio I'3 FORTAIFOIMIENr) INSfITU(iO'NAl. DE LA SECRElARiA D)E HAOIENDA En cuanto al fortalecimiento de la SHD, el proyecto se enfoc6 en la soluci6n de los problemas inform6ticos en cuanto a necesidades de sistemas inform6ticos y dotaci6n de equipos. En primera instancia se dot6 a la entidad de una red fisica y l6gica en las dos torres del Centro Administrativo Distrital; posteriormente se adquirieron 372 equipos de computo, 38 impresoras y 26 sistemas (con 500 licencias para antivirus). Una de las principales actividades consisti6 en la definici6n y desarrollo del Plan Estrat6gico de Sistemas, del cual se financi6 la implementaci6n de las fases I y 11, apoyando el desarrollo de cada uno de los sistemas inform6ticos que en su mayoria se encuentran operando La ciudodania puede consultar los principoles avances en la gesti6n de la Secretaria en la direcci6n www.shd.aov.co y sirven de apoyo a la gesti6n de otras entidades del Distrito Capital. Con relaci6n a la coordinaci6n y administraci6n del credito, la Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto cumpli6 a satisfacci6n con cada una de las funciones asignadas. Las labores de auditorfa se desarrollaron de acuerdo a las metodologfas y pautas del BIRF y durante los 6 periodos que conformaron el horizonte del proyecto las pr6cticas y procedimientos fueron aceptables; los procesos financieros, contables, de adquisiciones, t6cnicos y legales fueron convenientemente ejecutados y no se encontraron desviaciones importantes por parte de los ejecutores; las observaciones realizadas fueron atendidas oportunamente. Dado que la labor de auditoria implic6 un trabajo de verificaci6n intensivo sobre los temas de contrataci6n, asuntos legales y t6cnicos de los proyectos, no se considera necesario que - 27 -  el BIRF adelante procesos de auditaje de contrataci6n independientes pues los prop6sitos que se persiguen se pueden enfatizar dentro de los propios contratos de auditoria sin crear propensi6n y susceptibilidad a malas interpretaciones. Desempeno del sub-componente: Altamente satisfactouio (b) Cofinanciers: There were no cofinanciers (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): Not applicable 10. Additional Information -28 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ - ;- .I - ndjcatorMafrIx . - iroj i last PSR - | ActuallLatest Estimate CALLE 80: Avge. Speed - 18 kph 28 kph CALLE 80: Peak. 450 Buses 120 Buses CALLE 80: 20% Dedine in Accidents 84% Decline in Accidents ACCESS ROADS: 19 Access Roads 19 Access Roads ACCESS ROADS: Cumulative Population 435,000 Benefitting: 630,000 Output Indicators: n- lndicaio-rMatx - - | Projectd in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate End of project - 29 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) j~~!*.~~ - A praisal l ( ~ US'b)mIIIIOn .' . rfiillioff' " Component A. Traffic Mgt. & Transpt. Corridors 70.45 112.00 159 Component B. Access Roads 12.82 16.93 132 Component C. Road Maintenance 33.77 36.37 1.08 Component D. Institutional Support 7.58 8.22 1.09 Taxes 16.65 10.36 0.62 Total Baseline Cost 141.27 183.88 Total Project Costs 141.27 183.88 Total Financing Required 141.27 183.88 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) ~Expnditre1Cdteory. ~.-. .RroB.- u aeWost ~ !. - K. -t - NCB 4~i~OC 1. Works 51.40 56.70 2.00 0.00 110.10 (20.50) (22.70) (0.80) (0.00) (44.00) 2. Goods 2.10 0.00 1.40 0.00 3.50 ______________________ (1.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (1.70) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 19.30 0.00 19.30 (0.00) (0.00) (19.30) (0.00) (19.30) 4. Land Acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.20 8.20 ______________________ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00), (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 53.50 56.70 22.70 8.20 141.10 (21.50) (22.70) (20.80) (0.00) (65.00) Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1. Works 100.50 31.72 0.00 0.00 132.22 (37.41) (9.76) (0.00) (0.00) (47.17) 2. Goods 2.16 0.21 0.22 0.00 2.59 (1.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.00) (1.15) - 30 -  3. Services 0.00 0.00 22.27 0.00 22.27 (0.00) (0.00) (16.68) (0.00) (16.68) 4. Land Acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.76 26.76 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 102.66 31.93 22.49 26.79 183.87 (38.43) (9.86) (16.71) (0.00) (65.00) "Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 21Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) , 4Ar24t ,. ^ -l 1 i . Percenta ige of Appraisal | ________ . ... '1-' , LC8iCi - |- -Bank - Govt. rCoF. Bahlk' |!Goivl' CoF. A - Traffic Managment 34.39 36.06 34.44 77.56 100.1 215.1 and Transport Corridors B - Access Roads 6.80 6.02 6.17 10.77 90.7 178.9 C - Road Maintenance 17.25 16.52 18.18 18.19 105.4 110.1 D - Institutional Support 6.56 1.01 6.21 2.01 94.7 199.0 Taxes 16.65 10.36 62.2 -31-  Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Corridors. - . -. i vaI -gt1 EMM119vt r Net Present Value (US$M) 28 289 312 Intem. Econ. Rate of 20% 34% 39% Return (IERR) Benefit-Cost Ratio 2.0 2.9 3.4 Includes Calle 80, Av. Caracas, total costs with land acquisition and total Transmilenio infrastructure. Includes Calle 80, Av. Caracas, total costs without land acquisition and total Transmnilenio infrastructure. Other Components. - - 'RESULTS -:- ,S,A b,;l Internal Economic rate of return: Access Roads 12% 4% Road Maintenance Works >50% 47%-225% - 32 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty, Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS; etc.)Yl Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 7/89 2 TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); URBAN SPECIALIST (1) Appraisal/Negotiation 2/95 4 SR. ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (I); RESETTLEMENT SPECIALIST (1); ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALIST (1) Supervision 07/24/1996 4 SR. ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCE SPECIALIST (1). 04/18/1997 2 SR. ECONOMIST (1); S S TRANSPORT ENGINEER (I) 02/06/1998 3 SENIOR ECONOMIST (I); S S PRINCIPAL TRANS. SPEC. (I); CONSULTANT (1) 05/14/1999 3 SENIOR ECONOMIST (1); S S PRINCIPAL TRANS. SPEC. (1); TRANSPORT ENG. (1) 12/16/1999 3 TASK MANAGER (1); PR. S S TRNSP. SPEC. (1); TRNSP. ENGINEER (1) 03/26/2000 2 TASK MANAGER (1); S S TRANSPORT ENGINEER (1) 03/26/2000 2 ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT S S ENGINEER (1) 03/26/2000 2 TEAM LEADER (1); S S PROJECTS OFFICER (1) (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 152.1 126.2 Appraisal/Negotiation 320 274.3 Supervision 216 75.4 - 33 -  I Total | 688.3 | 565.5 - 34 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Oi Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA Z Sector Policies O H *SUOM O N O NA Z Physical * H OSUOM O N O NA 3 Financial O H OSUOM O N O NA O Institutional Development 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N 0 NA 3 Environmental O H *SUOM O N O NA Social Poverty Reduction O H *SUOM O N O NA O Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA O Private sector development 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N 0 NA Z Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM ON * NA - 35 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bankperformance Rating F Lending *OHS OS OU OHU F Supervision OHS OS OrU OHU 3 Overall *HS OS O U O HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating