China - Yangtze Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project

Document of The World Bank Report No: 24876 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-31690; TF-21759; SCL-44380) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 28.9 MILLION AND A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF USS 40 MILLION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR A YANGTZE FLOOD EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT October 31, 2002 Rural Development and Natural Resources Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective September 1, 2002) Currency Unit = Yuan Y1 = US$ 0.12 US$ 1 = Y 8.3 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy DCA Development Credit Agreement ERL Emergency Recovery Lending ERR Economic Rate of Return ICR Implementation Completion Report MTR Mid-Term Review PLG Project Leading Group PMO Project Management Office QAG Quality Assessment Group Vice President: Mr. Jemal-ud-din Kassum, EAPVP Country Manager/Director: Mr. Yukon Huang, EACCF Sector Manager/Director: Mr. Mark D. Wilson, EASRD Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Mr. Xiaokai Li, EASRD  CHINA YANGTZE FLOOD EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5 6. Sustainability 8 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 9 8. Lessons Learned 13 9. Partner Comments 14 10. Additional Information 15 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 16 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 18 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 20 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 22 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 23 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 24 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 25 Annex 8. Borrower's ICR Summary 26 Map IBRD 30036   Project ID: P063 123 Project Name: YANGTZE FLOOD EMERGENCY REHABILITATION Team Leader: Xiaokai Li TL Unit: EASRD ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: October 30, 2002 1. Project Data Name. YANGTZE FLOOD EMERGENCY L/C/TF)Number: IDA-31690; TF-21759; REHABILITATION SCL-44380 Country/Department. CHINA Region: East Asia and Pacific Region Sector/subsector: Irrigation & drainage (2%); General education sector (19%); Health (17%); Roads & highways (5 1%); Water supply (I l%) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 10/15/1998 Effective: 06/09/1999 07/09/1999 Appraisal: 11/11/1998 MTR: 01/15/2000 01/15/2000 Approval: 02/09/1999 Closing: 06/30/2002 06/30/2002 BorrowerlImplementing.Agency: PRC/HUBEI; HUNAN & JIANGXI PROV. GOV. Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Jean Michel Sevenno Country Manager: Yukon Huang Yukon Huang Sector Manager. Mark D. Wilson Geoffrey Fox Team Leader at ICR: Xiaokai Li Lang Seng Tay ICR Primary Author: Lang Seng Tay; Xiaokai Li 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unhkely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: HL Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: S Borrower Pe-formance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at 1isk at Any Time: No  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: Background. Widespread unprecedented rainstorms occurred during June and July 1998 in the Yangtze's middle reach, causing severe flooding especially in the provinces of Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. Rivers and lakes were rapidly filled. Torrential floods in the hilly regions, coupled with mudslides, caused devastating damages to villages along the rivers and killed many people. Flooding of lake and poldered areas was further aggravated by the upstream floodwater that arrived during August and early September. Consequently, vast areas behind the Yangtze River dikes were inundated for almost three months due to back flow of the Yangtze flood. The 1998-floodwater levels recorded in the Yangtze exceeded the 1954 levels, the highest recorded in the 20th century. In the three provinces, the flood affected some 79.6 million people, of whom 10.2 million were evacuated to safety, and 1,384 people lost their lives. At project identification, some 21.1 million people were still homeless and staying in temporary shelters. Total direct economic losses estimated for Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi were about $6.6, $4.0 and $4.6 billion respectively, not including the enormous cost of flood evacuation, flood fighting and relief. The areas affected by the 1998 flood in Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi are shown in Map IBRD 30036. Following the flood, the government immediately undertook massive evacuation of flood victims. Relief and health services were provided and maintained during and after the flood.The various international organizations and communities also provided relief and aid. Responding to a request for assistance from China, the Bank Group mounted an emergency recovery operation to assist in the restoration and reconstruction of infrastructure and social service facilities damaged by the flood so as to restore economic production and social services, thereby provide more long-term and permanent benefits than the temporary relief and aid provided by other international agencies. Project Objectives. The primary objective was to assist in the restoration of social and economic infrastructure damaged by the devastating flood in Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, thereby, rapidly restoring economic production and social services. Priorities were given to restoration and reconstruction of water supply and health facilities to prevent spread of diseases after the floods, primary and secondary schools for students to continue their studies and roads to restore key access to flooded areas so as to resume economic activities. Evaluation of Objectives: The project objectives were very relevant and well-targeted in meeting the urgent needs of a large number of flood victims after the flood. The Bank Group involvement in the project has accelerated the restoration of economic and social activities through the rebuilding of water supply systems, roads, schools, health centers and irrigation works. The project was consistent with the Bank Group's CAS for China (Report No.1632) focusing on poverty alleviation and the reconstruction of essential infrastructure. Without the Bank Group assistance, many of the flood-affected counties and townships would have faced many and prolonged difficulties in the after-flood rehabilitation. Large number of flood victims would be deprived of their social services and economic production means for quite a while. 3.2 Revised Objective: There was no revision of the project objectives throughout the project implementation period. 3.3 Original Components: The Yangtze Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project supported emergency reconstruction, repair and rehabilitation programs to be carried out in Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces. The components and -2 -  costs were as follows: a) Roads: Restoration and reconstruction of 84 county and rural roads totaling 945 km ($49.4 million); b) Water Supply: Restoration and reconstruction of 55 damaged county and township water supply systems, serving a total population of about 2.5 million people ($30.2 million); c) Schools: Restoration and reconstruction of 199 county and township secondary and primary schools serving a total student population of about 222,540 ($18.8 million); d) Hospitals and Clinics: Reconstruction and restoration of 143 county and township hospitals, health centers and clinics, serving a total population of about 4.0 million people ($16.1 million); e) Irrigation: Restoring 18 irrigation areas covering a total of about 44,200 hectares ($7.5 million); and f) Studies and Technical Assistance: Provision for each province to upgrade existing or develop flood forecasting, simulation and dispatch systems, taking into account the recent flood experiences ($1.3 million). Assessment of Design: The scope and components were carefully studied and selected by the government and the Bank Group as the most deserving in view of the great demands for assistance from so many sectors and sub-sectors. The components of the project were appropriate to meet the objectives of the project, and were clear and in line with other Bank Group emergency operations and in China and similar projects in other countries. As this was the Bank Group first flood emergency rehabilitation project in China, the project design could only take into account lessons learned from other emergency earthquake relief interventions in China such as: (a) sub-projects should be simple and suitable for rapid implementation; (b) the need for local govemment support and participation in project implementation; and (c) the benefits of using "fast track" project processing by the Bank Group. As flooding was most severe around the Dongting Lake in Hunan and the Poyang Lake in Jiangxi, both the provinces targeted the badly affected counties in both the lake areas. Hubei had more widespread flooding and the project counties were scattered over the province. Due to limitation of Bank Loan and Credit and inexperience of many counties in Bank-supported project implementation, the number of project counties and sub-projects in each province was limited to a manageable size with priority given to those which fit best in the selection criteria agreed with the Borrower - urgency of needs, large number of beneficiaries served, optimum costs and capable of being implemented promptly (See Project Agreement: Schedule 2 Section 3 (a) (i)). 3.4 Revised Components: There was no revision of the project components except for the Studies and Technical Assistance component which was deleted during the Mid-Term Review (MTR). The provision for the studies in each province was too limited for any meaningful studies to be carried out for the flood forecasting, simulation and dispatch systems. The funds were reallocated to the other components that have more pressing demands for sub-projects. However, Jiangxi and Hunan did carry out the two flood management studies using the funds from the UK Grant (TF021759) during the project implementation. -3 -  3.5 Quality at Entry: There was no Quality at Entry assessment or QAG analysis during the course of the project implementation. However, the entry quality was considered to be adequate and satisfactory as all sub-projects proposed were screened and reviewed by the PMOs at each level (county, prefecture/city and province) according to a set of criteria agreed between the Bank Group and the government. To ensure quality at entry the Bank Group also reviewed samples of the representative sub-project proposals in each province and agreed on the format and key contents of proposals as well as approval procedures. In addition, qualified design offices and institutions at the city, provincial and national levels, depending on the value and complexity of the works and building, undertook engineering designs for works and building. Buildings for schools and health facilities were made more resilient to flooding by relocating to higher grounds and designed to higher construction standards. New schools were built according to the Education Commission's plan for the locality and approved by the County Education Commission. Roads were made more flood-tolerant and all-weather with either concrete or macadam tarred surface. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The project achieved its objectives and reached or exceeded its expected outcome. Therefore, the project is rated satisfactory. The project's main objective of restoring essential facilities and services and economic production was achieved in a rapid and consistent manner. Out of the total 521 sub-projects, 448 sub-projects (85%) were completed within the first two years and 160 sub-projects (31%) within the first year of implementation. The completed sub-projects restored the social services and economic production within the shortest possible time after the flood. The new facilities were made more flood resilient and also designed to meet the near-term expansion needs (e.g. schools and water supply systems). The project benefited a total of 9.1 million people and was fully appreciated and highly valued by the local governments and the general public in the project area. 4.2 Outputs by components: Roads: The road component has fully achieved its targets with good performance. A total of 835 km of provincial and county roads were completed under 101 sub-projects compared to 946 km under 84 sub-projects at appraisal. The number of sub-projects and road length were reviewed and adjusted during the mid-term review, taking into consideration the actual needs and justifications. The number of road sub-projects was reduced by 2 in Hubei and 5 in Hunan, and increased by 24 in Jiangxi, resulting in a net reduction of about 110 km in length. Two major bridges were also added for Hunan. One of the two major bridges, Maojiacha Bridge in Hunan, is being delayed due to funding constraint and unexpected high water level conditions encountered during construction. Completion is expected by the end of 2002. Assurance has been obtained from Hunan government to complete the bridge as designed. These completed roads cater to traffic volume of some 69,250 vehicles/day and provide flood-proof and all weather access to flood-prone areas for evacuation and flood relief of flood victims. The improved road access and traffic capacity also facilitate transportation of inputs and outputs of runal and agricultural produce, thereby contributing to a more efficient rural economy. Water Supply: A total of 42 sub-projects have been completed on time, out of the original planned 55 sub-projects (44 sub-projects under Mid-Term Review). Twelve small plants were deleted in Jiangxi as they were completed with other sources of funding. The major water supply plant at ShiShou City of Hubei Province was completed late due to lack of counterpart funding and technical problems -4 -  encountered in the construction of the twin pipe intake located on the southern bank of the Yangtze River. The completed sub-projects serve a total of 2.54 million people in 35 counties and 73 townships with clean drinking water. Schools: The education component is highly successful and fully appreciated by the local people. A total of 215 secondary and primary schools were built compared to 199 proposed at appraisal, with the biggest share of 145 in Jiangxi province. The total built-up area was 307,000 m2 compared to 293,000 m2 estimated at appraisal, serving about 213,000 students (222,540 estimated at appraisal). The school buildings were designed and constructed according to the Education Commission plan and standards, and made more flood resilient by locating buildings on sites less prone to flooding. Most of the schools also included provision for near-term capacity expansion. These newly constructed schools have largely solved the urgent problems of over-crowding at schools accommodating students from flooded areas as well as students attending classes under temporary tents and shelters. The new schools, complete with ancillary facilities, provide better teaching and studying environment for higher standards of education for the local areas concerned. Many of these new schools also received student desk-chair sets and other educational materials donated by the United Kingdom (TF-021759) and other domestic and overseas donors. Health; This component, comprising county and township hospitals and health clinics, is also satisfactorily completed. A total of 142 sub-projects were completed with adjustments made at Mid-term review in contrast to the 143 planned at appraisal. The completed health facilities serve a total population of about 5.9 million people compared to 4.1 million estimated at appraisal. These new facilities replacing the old ones damaged or destroyed by the flood, and those rehabilitated provide better health services to a larger rural population. Some of these facilities completed in poor counties also received health equipment donated by the United Kingdom (TF-021759). Irrigation: This sole component in Hubei Province covers 21 sub-projects in 18 irrigation areas for irrigation and drainage facility rehabilitation. It was fully completed and achieved its designed targets. Irrigation and drainage facilities were restored or rehabilitated to command some 44,000 ha of irrigated farmland benefiting some 442,000 farmers. Production was resumed as soon as each sub-project was completed, thereby ensuring the economic well being of the people affected. Overall Project: Under the project a total of 521 sub-projects were completed successfully in comparison with the 497 planned at appraisal. The overall performance is rated as satisfactory, judging by the reaction and appreciation of the targeted beneficiaries as well as the key performance indicators. Annex I shows the outcome and output for each component. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: As an emergency recovery operation there was no economic rate of return (ERR) determined at appraisal and project completion. However, the project has a significant positive impact on beneficiaries deriving from the recovery and rehabilitation works completed. The project is estimnated to have directly benefited some 9.1 million people in the three provinces. (See Annex 3 for more details). 4.4 Financial rate of return: This is not required for an emergency recovery operation. 4.5 Institutional development impact: Although institutional development was not included as an objective in this emergency operation, there was considerable institutional impact spin-off. Exposure and participation of project counties with no - 5 -  prior experience of Bank-supported projects were provided with opportunity of acquiring valuable project implementation and management skills, and capability building. Project staff at all levels benefited from training in various aspects of project management - planning, supervision, monitoring and evaluation, procurement, financial management, and computer applications, etc. The training received by the project staff amounts to a total of 38,097 man-days in the three provinces. Project staff from the three provinces also visited the project management offices of Yunnan Earthquake Rehabilitation Project and Hebei Earthquake Rehabilitation Project to exchange experiences in project implementation. Due to the experiences and skills acquired, quite a number of these county project staff have now been promoted to higher positions with greater responsibilities. Through interactions with the Bank Group staff and consultants, county agencies were able to acquire many new technologies for designing and operating their facilities constructed under the project, especially for the water supply systems and roads. The Studies and Technical Assistance component to upgrade/develop a flood forecasting, simulation and dispatching system in each province had to be omitted due to the fact that the very limited funds allocated at appraisal were not adequate for any meaningful studies to be carried out. Otherwise, the technical capacity in flood management of each province would have been strengthened to a larger extent. Overall, the institutional development impact is rated as moderate. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: There are essentially no major factors outside the control of government or implementing agency that affected implementation. Macro-economic factors (inflation, foreign exchange fluctuation, etc) have hardly affected the project as the implementation period was relatively short at three years and the project required very little imported equipment and materials. Weather was also quite favorable for project implementation except for some flooding encountered in 1999 and 2002 in Hunan Province. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: One of the most positive factors contributing to the project success was the firm commnitment to the project by the governments at all levels and the end-users reflected by the efforts they made in raising the required counterpart funds for the project. The Project Leading Groups (PLGs) and Project Management Offices (PMOs) at all levels were rapidly established with good coordination and functioned effectively. Active participation by local government leadership with good knowledge of the local priority needs has greatly facilitated quick sub-projects selection and their smooth implementation. This was important because the demand for assistance far exceeded the Bank funds available. Project counties were required to bear the project overhead costs of supervision and management, which posed extra financial burden on the counties already impoverished by the flood damages. Ideally, the provincial government should have provided some financial assistance to those counties concerned. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The project was fortunate to have a Provincial PMO in each province that has prior experience with implementation of Bank-supported projects. After the project identification, the Provincial PMOs promptly organized PMOs at the city/prefecture and county levels for project preparation and implementation. Many of the city/prefecture and county PMOs were new to Bank-supported projects and the Provincial PMOs organized a series of training sessions for them in procurement, disbursement, project supervision and financial management. Written manuals were also issued to project staff to guide their operations. After an initial setback on procurement and disbursement, all PMOs were able to operate effectively with further training on procurement and disbursement. Project supervision and management at the county level was progressively improved to achieve the desired results. Furthermore, the project was managed by the World Bank Office in Beijing instead of the -6 -  Washington Head Office. The PMOs were thus able to keep frequent contact with the Task Manager in Beijing Office. The close coordination and continuous dialogue had a positive impact on the project, as they helped in solving quickly project implementation problems faced by the Provincial PMOs and also enabled the Bank to monitor closely the project progress. Project expenditures were rapidly processed by each Provincial PMO and submitted to World Bank Beijing Office for timely disbursement. The timely disbursement of project funds aided fast flow of funds to the project counties that had made advance payments for the works completed. A Mid-term Review of the sub-projects was carried out in January 2000 in the three provinces. Consequently some sub-projects were deleted either because they had been completed with other funds, or because they were found to be less viable, or the timing of implementing some sub-projects could not fit with the Bank procurement process, or project owners were unable to raise the required counterpart funds. Those deleted sub-projects were substituted with other new sub-projects, including some major roads and bridges, especially in Hunan and Hubei Provinces. At hindsight, these larger sub-projects, though equally essential and pressing, should have been funded through other appropriate sources. They were more complex and time-consuming in preparation, design, procurement and construction. The funds provided for these larger sub-projects would have better served smaller sub-projects, producing benefits to the local people more rapidly. Another factor which once affected adversely project implementation was awarding contracts, in several cases, at unduly low bid prices, which ultimately led to some contractors' poor performance and implementation delay. Unexpected site conditions encountered and consequent changes of design by the owner without due compensation to contractors also delayed project when contracts were terminated. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: The total project costs were estimated at US$132.5 million at appraisal, US$137.8 million at the mid-term review and US$140.8 million at project completion. The increase/decrease in cost in each province was mainly for the local cost component. The table below summarizes the total costs (unit: US$ million) in each province at appraisal, mid-term review and completion. The total project costs by components are shown in Annex 2. Comp. At Appraisal Mid-term Review At Completion %Aof _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A p p r Local W. Bank Total Local W. Bank| Total Local W. Bank Total Roads 17.02 32.42 49.44 21.08 31.95 53.03 22.40 32.41 54.81 111 Water 11.99 18.27 30.27 11.80 17.50 29.30 11.91 17.56 29.47 97 supply__ _ ___ _ _ __ _ _ School 6.36 12.32 18.68 7.78 13.27 21.04 7.74 13.03 20.77 111 Health 5.30 10.78 16.08 7.38 11.86 19.24 7.76 11.83 19.59 122 Irrigation 2.45 5.02 7.47 2.81 4.87 7.68 2.90 4.87 7.76 104 TA 0.50 0.80 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 Others 8.84 0.00 8.84 0.00 7.25 7.25 8.15 0.00 8.15 92 1% Fee 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.40 100 Total 52.48 80.00 132.48 58.09 79.71 137.80 60.68 79.96 140.82 106 -7-  Financing of the project at appraisal and completion is summarized below: Source of Financing At Appraisal At Completion Amount ($million) Percent of Total Amount ($million) Percent of Total Hubei Province 18.80 14.40 20.05 14.20 Hunan Province 18.60 14.40 26.38 18.70 Jiangxi Province 15.10 11.30 14.44 10.30 Sub-total 52.50 39.70 60.87 43.20 Bank/IDA 80.00 60.40 79.97 56.80 Total 132.50 100.00 140.84 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Sustainability of the project is rated as highly likely. The rationale is as follows: (a) The project components have been completed with sound designs and good quality of construction. Both the design and construction standards are generally higher than the original works or facilities. This would assure long-lasting durability of the project works and their sustainable use by the end-users. (b) The sub-projects built under the project are mostly to replace those facilities destroyed or damaged by the 1998 flood and provisions for their operation and maintenance already exist including financial and human resources. Because the works and facilities were needed urgently, the end-users have taken them over for operation and maintenance as soon as they were completed. Their continued operation and maintenance is assured institutionally, as the end-users are either existing local government entities or public service agencies providing the basic services to the local people. Reasonable service fees are levied by the end-users to meet operation and maintenance costs. For those non-profit making facilities such as school buildings, the city/county governments concerned will include the funds needed for operating and maintaining those facilities in their annual budgets. The Bank supervision and ICR missions visited many of those completed sub-projects and found their 0 & M had been satisfactory. (c) Moreover, both the central and the provincial governments have committed to very firm policy supports and strategies for flood protection of these three provinces. Massive investment in strengthening the Yangtze River dikes in the three provinces is currently underway, using the state bonds and the World Bank loan of US$210 million under the Yangtze River Dikes Strengthening Project (Loan No. 4570-CHA). Works and facilities completed under this emergency operation will be protected and secured for long-term operation. (d) Although the project has been completed and the loan/credit closed, the respective Provincial PMOs will be maintained for a certain period, at least with some core staff, to monitor the post-project operation and performance of the completed works and facilities. The Provincial PMOs would address any post-operation problems and/or sustainability issues accordingly. 62 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The buildings reconstructed or rehabilitated under the schools and health components were immediately handed over to the local agencies that were previously operating them. The Bank Group supervision and ICR missions had visited some of these completed buildings and were satisfied with their operation -8-  and maintenance. Reasonable service fees were levied by the end-users to meet operation and maintenance costs for most project facilities. Some of the schools and health facilities also benefited from the materials and equipment donated by the United Kingdom through the U.K. Grant (TF-021759) and other in-country and overseas donors. Similarly, roads, water supply and irrigation systems were construction-managed by the existing operating local agencies and taken over for operation and maintenance after official acceptance. Therefore, there was no need for transitional arrangements to be made for regular operation. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank performance in identification is rated satisfactory. In respose to the Government request for assistance following the 1998 catastraphic flood, the Bank Group mounted an identification/preparation mission from the Beijing Office to prepare a project under emergency recovery lending (ERL). The Bank mission visited the three provinces and explained to each province the objectives, features and provisions of an ERL. The Bank mission also visited some of the flooded counties to assess the needs. Proposals from each province varied considerably with respect to project scale, components and sectors. Following the Bank policy and procedures for preparing ERL, the Bank mission reached agreement with each province on four or five components (roads, water supply, schools, health facilities and irrigation) with the prime objectives of restoring social services and economic production. Relief, aid aind housing assistance to flood victims were excluded as domestic funds were available and were more suitable for such purposes. The project counties were also limited to the most deserving ones, with focus on those in the Dongting Lake (Hunan) and the Poyang Lake (Jiangxi) areas. As flooding in Hubei Province was more widespread, the counties targeted were more spreadout. The Bank Group ERL of US$80 million (50% IBRD Loan and 50% IDA Credit) was more or less equally shared among the three provinces. To ease counterpart funding of the project counties, Bank funded about 60% of the total cost, mostly to finance the civil works. To ensure early start of the project the Bank mission agreed to, after assessment, provide retroactive financing of civil works up to $16 million (20% of the loan/credit amount) for eligible expenditures incurred from the date of the identification mission to signing of the Loan/Credit. The final ERL package was consistent with both the Bank CAS for China and the government priorities of starting restoration of basic services and infrastructure before the following winter. Bank Group performance in preparation and appraisal is also rated satisfactory. The Bank Group attached great importance and urgency to this emergency operation. A preparation mission was sent to the field within one month after the identification mission. Guidelines and tables were provided by the preparation mission to each province to facilitate their project preparation. Before the appraisal mission in mid-November 1998 each province was invited to Beijing Office for discussion of their draft project proposals. This facilitated the smooth and quick appraisal held in November. The appraisal mission included, in addition to the Bank staff from the Beijing Office, local consultant specialists in roads, water supply, education and health services. Detailed consultation with the stakeholders was carried out throughout project preparation and appraisal to address the urgent needs and priorities of the govermnent in the light of the Bank CAS objectives. To speed up project processing, project negotiations with the government were held in Beijing Office in early December 1998. The ERL package was prepared and delivered within the required time frame of three months. Of particular importance was the flexible approach adopted by the Bank in fulfilling its procurement requirements in view of the emergency nature of the project, and small and scattered numerous -9-  sub-projects to be implemented within a 3-year period. Most of the small civil works were procured through national shopping with the upper ceiling raised to US$1.0 million prior to September 1, 1999 (US$300,000 thereafter). Larger civil works were procured through national competitive bidding with ceiling raised to US$5.0 million. The national shopping method with relaxed ceiling enabled large number of qualified local contractors to take part in the bidding. These concessions have led to rapid implementation of sub-projects as reflected in completion of 160 sub-projects (31%) by the end of 1999 and 448 sub-projects (85%) by the end of 2000. Appropriate legal covenants had also facilitated project implementation. The appraisal mission had also considered the applicability of Bank safeguard policies and found that these policies were not applicable to this emergency recovery operation, except for the policy on resettlement. As the project works and facilities were mostly replacing the existing ones damaged or destroyed by the flood, the resettlement was considered insignificant. Nevertheless, agreement was reached with the government to include a policy framework for land acquisition and resettlement. This policy framework was reviewed and approved by the Bank Group and was followed in screening the sub-projects proposed by different project counties. 7.2 Supervision: The Bank Group performance in supervision is rated satisfactory. The project was supervised at roughly 6-month intervals and seven times in all over the 3-year period. Each mission lasted 4 to 5 days in each province and paid site visits to selected project counties in turn. Due to the large number of counties and sub-projects, it was physically impossible for the supervision missions to visit every county every time in the three provinces. Whenever possible, the mission invited all the county PMOs to meet and brief the mission and discuss any existing issues, thereby was always well-informed of the implementation status of all sub-projects. At the end of each mission, the supervision mission left an aide memoir for the Provincial PMO to follow up on the issues identified with the mission's recommendations. The mnission aide memoirs were translated by Provincial PMOs and quickly disseminated to PMOs at the lower levels. All PMOs appreciated very much the supervision mission aide memoirs and paid much attention to the issues and recommendations contained therein. These written aide memoirs also served as important supporting documents for the Provincial PMOs to request advice/decision from their respective government authorities. In order to track implementation progress, each Provincial PMO was required to prepare and submit to the Bank half-yearly physical and financial progress reports together with the performance indicators based on the formats designed by the Task Team. These reports were reviewed prior to and during the supervision missions. To monitor completion of each individual sub-projects, the supervision mission designed and provided to the PMOs a special sub-project completion sheet for completion acceptance. These simple completion reports were reviewed by City and Provincial PMOs before submitting to the Bank Group. The Bank supervision missions and ICR mission had sample-reviewed the sub-project completion reports and found them generally satisfactory and consistent with the physical outcomes. The project was managed from Beijing Office. This led to very effective and close communications between the three Provincial PMOs and the Bank task team. Many implementation problems were quickly and effectively resolved, sometimes just through telephone and facsimile communications. Provincial PMOs were also encouraged to meet the Task Manager in person for complicated issues. Supervision documents such as post-mission letters, aide memoirs, and project status reports, were adequately prepared and maintained. Project status reports gave realistic and consistent performance ratings throughout implementation. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The Bank Group overall performance is rated satisfactory. The Bank Group responded promptly to - 10 -  the Borrower's request, adequately prepared and timely appraised the project under ERL, and obtained Board approval within the set timeframe. It undertook effective supervision and maintained close interaction with the client, which contributed to smooth and successful project implementation. The three Provincial PMOs have commended the highly satisfactory overall performance by the Bank. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrower performance in project preparation is rated satisfactory. As soon as the Government had a clear picture of the extent of damage and the recovery and rehabilitation required, following several months of extremely challenging flood-fighting, it promptly requested the Bank Group for assistance. The Central Government through the State Development & Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance provided guidelines on project objectives and scope for the three provinces to follow in drawing up project proposals for the Bank identification mission. As the project was the first ERL for each province, initial proposals and scope of project varied considerably among the three provinces. However, the three provincial governments were receptive to the Bank identification mission views and suggestions, and soon reached a consensus on project scope and contents. Based on the agreed project objectives and scope, each provincial government mobilized resources at the provincial, city/prefecture and county levels to identify and screen sub-projects for Bank financing. That was not an easy task as flood damages were so extensive that there was a fierce competition for funding. The first set of draft sub-project proposals together with the cost estimates from each province were submitted to the Bank within one month after the initial project identification. After review by the Bank Group, each provincial government revised the draft proposals and submitted them for appraisal by the Bank Group in November. Considering the time constraint and urgency of the project, the government had performed very well in preparing the project. 7.5 Government implementation performance: The Government performance in implementation is rated as satisfactory. Following project appraisal, each province established project leading groups (PLGs) at the provincial, prefecture/city and county levels. The Provincial PLG was headed by the Vice Governor in-charge of planning and finance. Project implementation management responsibility was assigned to the Provincial Planning Commission in Hubei and Jiangxi, and to the Finance\Bureau in Hunan. The key role played by the provincial governments was policy guidance to the implementing agencies, effective inter-agency coordination, adequate and timely counterpart fund allocation, and prompt approval of staffing for the PMOs. The only area where Government performance could have been better was with respect to on-lending agreements between the central government and the three provincial govemments. Protracted signing of the on-lending agreements led to delay in Loan/Credit effectiveness by almost a month beyond the normal norm of 90 days after project approval. However, the delay did not significantly affect the project physical implementation but affected disbursement. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The performance of the implementing agency in each of the three provinces is rated satisfactory. The three provincial PMOs, with prior experiences of World Bank projects, played a critic'al role in ensuring successful completion of the project within the three-year period. They provided guidance to the PMOs at prefecture/city and county levels, organized training of project staff and monitored implementation of the sub-projects in accordance with the legal agreements. The PMOs at all the levels collaborated very well in project implementation. This was reflected by the completion of 160 - 1 1 -  sub-projects in 1999, 288 in 2000 well ahead of the planned schedule. The provincial PMOs kept close and regular contact with the Task Manager in Beijing Office. Physical and financial progress reports of good quality were prepared and submitted to the Bank regularly and on time. Excellent arrangements were made for the Bank Group supervision missions to visit as many project counties as possible. The management letters and supervision mission aide memoirs from the Bank were taken seriously and disseminated to all the PMOs for necessary follow-up actions. This has helped in keeping implementation issues and problems to the minimum. The provincial PMOs set strict rules on the procurement of works and goods by the city/prefecture and county PMOs. Procurement of small civil works was mainly through national shopping with at least three price quotations. Procurement was done generally in accordance with the Bank procurement guidelines. However, there were initially a few cases where some county PMOs used the local procedures of bracketing for contract awarding. The Bank supervision mission spotted themj and had the PMOs concerned abandon this practice through further further procurement training. Disbursement for a few sub-projects was rejected for not fully complying with the Bank requirements. Initially, there were complaints of slow disbursement from the city and county PMOs. This was mainly due to the lack of experience with disbursement procedures by the county PMOs, incomplete supporting documents, strict processing of disbursement applications by the provincial PMOs, and lack of staff to process large number of disbursement applications accumulated prior to effectiveness of the loan/credit. Disbursement was also withheld until the project counties had signed the on-lending agreements with the provincial PMOs. This has caused cash flow constraint to some project counties and slowed down their project implementation. The situation was progressively improved from the later part of 1999 onwards after further training of county project staff on the disbursement processes. The actual versus planned cumulative disbursement is summarized below: Cumulative Disbursement: Planned Vs. Actual ( unit: $ million) Calender Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 Planned in SAR 44.40 71.20 80.00 80.00 Actual 28.34 60.61 77.87 80.00 Actual/Planned (%) 64 85 97 100 Construction quality was generally good though it varied among different counties. There were no major structural defects other than some building finishing works, which were remedied before the works were accepted by the entities. Due to some recent engineering work failures in the country from defective designs and materials used and poor supervision, the government had imposed strict quality control and introduced a system of life-long accountability upon those responsible for the works. Conscious of the accountability system, county PMOs have their sub-projects designed by qualified design offices or institutions, construction materials at site checked by the County Material Quality Checking Station, and construction supervised by qualified independent supervising engineers. This ensured that all sub-projects were constructed to the design standard and quality. Project management under the guidance of the provincial PMOs was generally adequate and effective. Project staff at all levels was, in general, dedicated, competent and adequately maintained. Changes of -12-  staff were minimum and so continuity was maintained throughout the implementation period. Progress reporting, including the monitoring and evaluation of performance and impact, by the three provincial PMOs was of good quality and timely. This reflects the effectiveness and competence of the provincial PMOs in project management. Financial control and management were in accordance with the intemal control procedures laid down by the Ministry of Finance. The State Audit Bureau audited project accounts in each province annually. Unqualified audit reports were submitted on time to the Bank Group with minor observations on financial administration. Legal covenants in the Development Credit Agreement were fully complied with or complied without any significant deviations. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Based on the above the Borrower overall performance is rated as satisfactory. Both the governments and PMOs at all levels were fully committed to achieving the project objectives during project implementation. Despite some initial setback at the project startup, the project has been successfully completed within the three-year period. 8. Lessons Learned Key lessons leamed from the project preparation and implementation of the project include: Replicability of Experiences: The project was successfully completed, having achieved the designed objectives, physical targets and benefits. The project scope, components and sub-projects chosen were appropriate and benefited a large number of flood victims in the post-flood recovery and rehabilitation. Valuable experiences and lessons were learned in the project preparation and supervision. Processing and implementing the project under an emergency recovery lending following a "fast track" within three to four years, proved to be realistic and achievable. The practice of this project could be replicated for similar projects in future, if needed, in China and elsewhere. Appropriate Sizing of Sub-projects: In selecting sub-projects from hundreds proposed, more attention should be paid to the size of each sub-project. A few of the sub-projects included in the mid-term review (roads, bridges, water supply systems) were comparatively large and their implementation was less satisfactory due to work complexity and longer time required in project preparation, design, procurement and construction. These larger sub-projects also faced counterpart-finding constraints when there was a cost overrun. On the other hand, too small a sub-project required similar amounts of time and effort in preparation, thereby increased the workload of PMOs in their supervision and management. A large sub-project should not exceed US$2.0 million in cost and be capable of being completed within 12 to 18 months. This would ensure that benefit targets be achieved within the shortest possible period. In particular, education sub-projects should be reviewed in the light of the development plans of the local government authorities to avoid excessive capacity expansion, leading to under-utilization and waste. Procurement Requirements Relaxed: As an emergency recovery operation, normal Bank procurement requirements have been somewhat relaxed to speed up the procurement process. As most of sub-projects consisted of small and simple civil works, national shopping method was widely used with raised upper ceiling (US$ 1.0 million prior to September 1, 1999 and US$300,000 thereafter). For the few larger sub-projects, national competitive bidding was used for contracts of values up to US$5.0 million, using the Chinese Model Bidding Document for Procurement of Works developed by the Ministry of Finance for Bank-financed projects in China. The flexible approach adopted in handling procurement, together with a sizeable amount of retroactively financed works started after the Bank identification mission, had facilitated the project to be carried out effectively and quickly. This is an - 13-  important lesson learned and could be extended to other emergency projects. Adequate and Timely Provision of Counterpart Fund Critical: Adequate and timely allocation of counterpart funds is critical for smooth project implementation. Promise and assurance of counterpart fund availability are not good enough. Required funds should be included in the annual budgets of the responsible agencies and tirnely allocated in adequate amount. Counterpart funding constraints had led to project counties dropping some sub-projects selected for implementation. A point in case was the Poyang County in Jiangxi Province where several sub-projects had to be cancelled and the corresponding Bank funds reallocated to some other sub-projects. This was because under the principle of "the beneficiary pays" the provincial governments were reluctant to assist those counties which were unable to raise the required counterpart funds and to service the Bank loan/credit. More IDA Credit and Optimum Use: The project lending was a blend of 50% IBRD Loan and 50% IDA Credit. Many of the project counties were impoverished by the floods and faced serious financial constraints in undertaking the recovery and rehabilitation. A larger percentage of the concessionary IDA Credit would be of great help to those poor counties. Moreover, IDA Credit should preferably be used for non-revenue generating sub-projects like flood protection works, schools and health services. IBRD loan should be used for roads and water supply works for which fees can be collected for loan servicing. Active Participation and Effective Coordination: The project contained many sub-projects under different sectors and spread over a great number of counties in each province. Without the active participation of the local governments and the end-users and effective inter-agency coordination, the project would not have been implemented as smoothly. Guidance and leadership provided by the experienced Provincial PMOs had also greatly facilitated the project implementation despite that many project counties and cities have no prior experience with World Bank projects. Active participation by local governrments and end-users, and effective project management organization are therefore one of the key lessons learned from this project. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: 1. Comments The following comments on the Bank draft ICR were received via a letter dated September 17, 2002 signed by Mr. Liu Zhaolin, PPMO Director, Hubei Province on behalf of the three provincial PMOs. We acknowledge the receipt of the draft ICR prepared by the World Bank task team dated June 20,2002. We have carefully reviewed the draft in relation to the project appraisal documents and have the following comments: * The Bank draft ICR fully reflects the true history of the project; * It provides an objective andfair evaluation of the achievements and benefits of the project, as well as the experiences and lessons learntfrom the project; * With the joint efforts of the government and implementing agencies and the World Bank task team, all the project activities under different components have been completed successfully, with profound impact on the local social and economic development, and played an important role in - 14-  reducing the vulnerability to floods of the local people in the beneficiary areas; * We would like to express our appreciation of helpfrom the World Bank and the task team in the project preparation and implementation, and would definitely incorporate the experiences and lessons learnt into future project operations. I hereby confirm that the above are the collective comments of all three project provinces. Yours sincerely, Liu Zhaolin PPMO Director, Hubei Province On behalfof Hunan Provincial PMO Jiangxi Provincial PMO Hubei Provincial PMO 2. Suggestions: It is recommended that World Bank provide different types of funding for emergency projects in accordance with different projects. For projects that have repayment capabilities such as roads and water supply plants, IBRD loans are more appropriate. These revenue-earning sub-projects can pay for operation and maintenance and service loans through service fee collection. For sub-projects that do not generate revenues, such as middle or primary schools, which come under the national compulsory education system, the schools cannot collect high fees from students and are unable to service any loan. In fact, the loan would be repaid by government finance. Therefore, it is recommended that the World Bank provide soft loan (credit) for education sub-projects or that the repayment be handled at the central level. For county and township hospitals and health clinics, fees can be collected from patients, but rural economy lags behind the urban areas at present. Farmers' income is still low and cannot afford paying high costs of healthcare. Therefore, funding for rural healthcare sub-projects should be an appropriate blend of hard loan and credit. Using this kind of funding arrangements for different nature of sub-projects, it can not only help the Borrower to build infrastructures, but also guarantee repayment of the World Bank loan and credit. It is further recommended that World Bank provide grants for project preparation. Following the flood disaster, the governments have to bear huge financial burden for flood relief and recovery of the flood victims. If the World Bank could provide some grant for project preparation, it would help reduce the government financial burden and accelerate project preparation work. (b) Cofinanciers: None (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): None 10. Additional Information - 15 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: -. Indicator/Matrix .1 . Pr oe t d'lnhl;pAsSRA&A{ _____'____________l_____ n___ Roads: 1 No & total length of roads 84 roads/945 6 km 101 roads/836.2 km 2. Traffic volume catered 88,000 vehicles/day 69,250 vehicles/day Water Supply: 1. No of water supply plants 55 42 2. Daily water supply production 1,130,000 tons/day 1,031,000 tons/day 3. No. of counties served 29 35 4. No of townships served 62 73 5. No. of households served 686,000 662,000 6 Total population served 2.47 million people 2.54 million people Schools: 1. No of pfimary schools 118 119 2 No of secondary schools 81 96 3. Total student population served 222,540 213,000 Health 1. No. of sub-projects completed 143 142 2. Total populaton served 4,079,000 people 5,899,000 people lmgation. 1. No. of sub-projects completed 18 21 2. Total irrigation area served 44,200 ha 44,200 ha 3. Total drainage area served 38,000 ha 38,000 ha 4. Total no. of farmers served 442,000 farmers 442,000 farmers Note: Column 2 refers to indicators at appraisal, Column 3 includes changes made under mid-term review m January 2000 Output Indicators: Indicator/Matr,x-i Prodectd in last P ' ; '; ' ,A l; . ctualI U-t1EWMinttea Road: 1 Total investment 426.7 million yuan 503.6 million yuan 2 Total length reconstructed 945 km 834.7 km 3. Bridges constructed 55 27 4. Road culverts constructed 915 1,149 Water Supply. 1. Total investment 262.3 million yuan 253.4 million yuan 2. No. of water supply plants 55 42 3 Total daily water production 1,130,000 tons/day 1,031,000 tons/day Schools. 1. Total Investment 160 9 million yuan 178.8 million yuan 2 No. of secondary schools 81 96 3. Total built-up floor area 149,000 sq. m. 176,000 sq. m. 4. No of primary schools 118 119 5 Total built-up floorarea 143,500 sq m 128,800 sq. m. Health. 1. Total Investment 141.1 million yuan 167.6 million yuan 2. Hospitals reconstructed 19 33 3. No. of health centers constr. 29 26 4. No. of health clinics constr. 96 83 5 Total built-up floor area 220,400 sq. m. 212,300 sq. m. Irrigation 1 Total investment 403.9 million yuan 501.8 million yuan 2 Total Irrigated areas reconstructed 44,200 ha 44,200 ha - 16 -  End of project Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements A. At Appraisal (Estimates: US$ million) Project Components Procurement Methods\a N.C.B. Other\b N.B.F. Total Cost 1. Works/Buildings 32.5 81.5 0 114.0 (20.5) (51.6) (0) (72.1) 2. Goods 4.2 3.8 0 8.0 (4.2) (2.5) (0) (6.7) 3. Studies&TA 0 0.8 0.5 1.30 (0) (0.8) (0) (0.8) 4. Others 0 0 8.8 8.8 (0) (0) (0) (0) 5. 1% Front-end Fee 0 0.40 0 0.4 (0) (0) (0) (0.4) Total 36.7 86.5 9.3 132.5 (24.7) (55.3) (0) (80.0) la: FiguresinparenthesisaretheamountstobefinancedbytheBankLoan. Allcostsincludecontingencies. Ib: Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, training, technical assistance services B. At Completion (Actual/Latest Estimates: US$ million) Project Components Procurement Methods\a N.C.B. Other\b N.B.F. Total Cost 1. Works/Buildings 39.91 93.07 0 132.98 (25.69) (48.74) (0) (74.43) 2. Goods 1.49 5.96 0 7.45 ((0.97) (4.20) (0) (5.17) 3. Studies& TA 0 0 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) 4. Others 0 0 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) 5. 1% Upfront Fee 0 0 0 0.40 (0) (0) (0) (0.40) Total 41.4 99.42 0 140.83 (26.66) (53.34) (0) (80.00) la: Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. Ib: Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, training, technical assistance services - 17 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 2A. Project Costs by Components Project Cost by Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Percentage of Component $ million Estimate $ million Appraisal (%) Roads Hubei 8.7 7.33 84 Hunan 20.7 25.65 124 Jiangxi 20.0 21.77 108 Sub-total 49.4 54.75 111 WaterSupply Hubei 15.2 16.03 105 Hunan 9.3 8.65 93 Jiangxi 5.7 4.71 82 Sub-total 30.2 29.39 97 Schools Hubei 4.2 5.18 122 Hunan 6.6 6.44 100 Jiangxi 8.0 9.15 114 Sub-total 18.8 20.77 111 Health Hubei 7.2 10.60 145 Hunan 4.0 3.80 94 Jiangxi 4.9 5.19 107 Sub-total 16.1 19.59 122 Irrigation Hubei 7.5 7.76 103 Hunan 0.0 0.00 0 Jiangxi 0.0 0.00 0 Sub-total 7.5 7.76 103 Studies/TA Hubei 0.4 0.00 0 Hunan 0.5 0.00 0 Jiangxi 0.4 0.00 0 Sub-total 1.3 0.00 0 Other\a Hubei 2.5 0.00 0. Hunan 4.1 8.15 200 Jiangxi 2.2 0.00 0 Sub-total 8.8 8.15 92 1% Loan Fee 0.4 0.4 100 -18 -  Total Project 132.5 140.82 106 Cost Total Financing 132.5 140.82 106 Required la: include land acquisition and compensation, engineering, design andproject management costs. 2B. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Component Appraisal Estiamte Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Ap raisal Bank Govt. CoF Bank Govt. CoF Bank Govt. CoF Road 32.42 17.02 0.00 32.41 22.34 0.00 100 131 0.00 W. Supply 18.27 12.00 0.00 17.48 11.92 0.00 96 99 0.00 Education 12.32 6.35 0.00 13.03 7.74 0.00 106 122 0.00 Health 10.78 5.30 0.00 11.83 7.76 0.00 110 146 0.00 Irrigation 5.02 2.45 0.00 4.87 2.90 0.00 97 118 0.00 Studies 0.80 0.50 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Others 0.00 8.84 0.00 0.00 8.15 0.00 0.00 92 0.00 1% Fee 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 100 0.00 0.00 Total 80.00 52.34 0.00 80.00 60.81 0.00 100 116 0.00 Note: Govt. above means provincial governments of Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi - 19 -  Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits For this emergency recovery operation, no economic analysis was conducted at appraisal and project completion. However, the benefits are described below in terms of performance indicators as far as possible. The project was completed at a cost very close to the cost estimates at appraisal essentially with no cost overrun at the project level. The completed project as a whole had benefited directly some nine million of beneficiaries in the three project provinces. The projected economic production means and social amenities had been rapidly restored through reconstruction and new construction of some 521 sub-projects of roads, water supply, schools, health and irrigation. The major benefits and impact are summarized below: Sector/Item Benefits Results/Impacts Roads: Total no. of roads restored and 101 sub-projects The 101 roads (province, city and county constructed class), including two major bridges, were Total length restored and 835 km including 27 estored and/or constructed with higher constructed. bridges. standards. Roads were made more flood Total no. of bridges 27 (two are major) resilient through raising the height above Vehicle capacity 69,260 vehicles/day flood level, concrete or bitumen surfacing with adequate thickness of base course. Some of the roads are also linked to local road networks. The completed roads had restored the vital road access for economic roduction and ensured access for future I________________I_______flood evacuation and relief. Water Supply: Total no. of plants restored and 42 plants A total of 42 county and township water constructed supply plants had been completed, Total production capacity 1,031,000 tons/day including a major plant at the Shishou City Total no. of people served 2.54 million people damaged by the 1998 flood. These plants in 35 counties, 73 served a total population of about 2.54 townships and million people with clean water - a basic 662,000 households. need for good public health. The equipment for these plants and their distribution ipelines were either replaced or upgraded to ensure long-term operation. Schools: Total no. of schools restored and 215 primary and The 215 primary and secondary schools constructed secondary schools completed serve a total student population Total student population served 213,000 students in of about 213,000. Layout and designs of the three provinces. schools were in line with the local Education Commission requirements. The school capacity also take into account the near-term student population increase. School buildings are made more flood esilient by moving on higher grounds and being constructed with reinforced concrete frames instead of brick and mortar used in the past. These schools now have adequate educational facilities for a large number of students affected by the flood, especially in -20-  the rural areas. The new schools provide better teaching and study environments for teachers and students needed for higher standards of education. Health: Total no. health facilities restored 142 county hospitals The 142 county hospitals and township health and constructed and township health centers, built under the project, benefited a total of centers estimated 5.9 million people in the project area. The Total built-up area 212,000 sq.m. new buildings were constructed with higher Total population served 5.8 million standards to meet the increasing demand for better estimated. health services in the rural areas. The new facilities include out-patient clinics, additional in-patient beds, lanalytical laboratories and simple operation rooms. Irrigation: Total no. of irrigation works 21 subprojects in 18 The 21 irrigation works, covering some restored and rehabilitated irrigation areas 44,000 ha in 18 irrigation areas, benefited Total area restored and rehabilitated 44,000 ha directly 442,000 farmers with their Total no. of farmers benefited 442,000 farmers damaged irrigation and drainage facilities restored or rehabilitated. The project help them restore their agricultural production and ensured their economic recovery and well-being. Total no. of beneficiaries 9,094,000\a la: Beneficiariesfrom road sector not determined and included. One particular benefit worth special mentioning is the benefit derived from the two major bridges, Dahukou and Maojiacha Bridges, constructed in the Anxian and Li Counties of Hunan Province. These two bridges were included by Hunan Province during the Mid-Term Review in early 2000 after considering their importance and priority. They replaced the ferry services which could not be operated during flood, and linked up with the existing county roads. During the 1998 flood, some 111,380 people were trapped in the Guanyan Polder Area in Li County and the An Feng Polder Area in Anxian County for days without help and aid, and could not be evacuated for lack of road access. Therefore, the two bridges were regarded as "life-saving bridges" by the local communities. In addition, the two bridges together with the county roads would further promote development of local economy through better road access. The Bank-financed sub-projects provided much financial relief to the poor counties and townships. They had already suffered huge economic losses due to the flood and it would be difficult for them to finance with their own resources the post-flood recovery and rehabilitation without external assistance. At best, it would take them years to rebuild the facilities. The Bank assistance was considered timely and highly appreciated by the local governments, the beneficiary communities and the general public. -21 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation Identification: 2 TM/SIE, AE 10/98 Preparation: 3 TM/SIE; WRS, E 11/98 Appraisal/Negotiation Appraisal: 3 TM/SIE, CA, AE 11/14/98 Negotiation: 6 TM/SIE, L, ES, PS, DS, TA 12/18/98 Supervision 04/22/99 1 TM/SIE S S 09/25/99 S TM/SIE, ES, RS, HS, WSS S S 05/28/00 2 TM/SIE, SWRS S S 10/25/00 6 TM/SWRS, DS, WSS, ES, RS, S S HS 04/21/01 6 TM/SWRS, WSS, HS, RS, ES, S S FFS 11/22/01 6 TM/SWRS, E, IE, WSS, RS, FFS S S 04/30/02 S TM/SWRS, WRS, ES, HS, FFS S S ICR 09/15/02 TM/SWRS; SIE AE = Agroeconomist RS = Road Specialist CA = Cost Analyst SIE = Senior Irrigation Engineer DS = Disbursement Specialist SWRS = Senior Water Resources Specialist E = Economist TA = Task Assistant ES = Education Specialist TM = Task Manager FFS = Flood Forecasting Specialist WRS = Water Resources Specialist HS = Health Specialist WWS = Water Supply Specialist PS = Procurement Specialist (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle ActualLatest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ '000) Identification/Preparation 10.4 40.1 Appraisal/Negotiation 16.4 21.8 Supervision 56.3 190.8 ICR 10.1 14.9 Total 93.2 267.6 -22 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA Ol Sector Policies O H OSUOM O N * NA I Physical * H OSUOM O N O NA Oi Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA Li Institutional Development O H O SU * M O N 0 NA O Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social O Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NA O Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA O Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N * NA Li Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N * NA L Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA -23 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating