Document oI The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 22471 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-42200) ON A LOAN/CREDIT/GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 50 MILLION TO THE ARGENTINA FOR A PROVINCIAL REFORM LOAN - SAN JUAN 06/28/2001 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective) Currency Unit = Peso ARG$ 1 = US$ 1 US$ 1 = ARG$ 1 FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BOCEP Private Job Creation Bond CAS Country Assistance Strategy DGI Direcci6n General Impositiva EGB Educacion General Bcisica (General Basic Education) ERR Economic Rate of Return GDP Gross Domestic Product HQ Headquarters IBRD Intemational Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion Report IDB Inter-American Development Bank IMF International Monetary Fund LPR Letters of Provincial Reform OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OSP Provincial Medical Insurance Fund PDP I First Provincial Development Project PDP II Second Provincial Development Project PRESSAL Provincial Health Sector Development PRISE Programa de Reformas en el Sector Educaci6n (Reforrn Program on Education Sector) PRL Provincial Reform Loan PRL II Second Provincial Reform Loan PRODYMES I Secondary Education Reform I QAG Quality Assurance Group SESP Secretary for Public Health TM Task Manager Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Manager/Director: Myrna Alexander Sector Manager/Director: Ernesto May Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Mark Hagerstrom FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ARGENTINA PROVINCIAL REFORM - SAN JUAN CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data I 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 1 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 2 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 13 6. Sustainability 15 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 16 8. Lessons Learned 18 9. Partner Comments 21 10. Additional Information 21 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 34 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 36 Annex 3. Economnic Costs and Benefits 38 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 39 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 40 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 41 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 42 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Project ID: P051694 Project Name: P.RFM(S.JUAN) Team Leader: Mark V. Hagerstrom TL Unit: LCC7C ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 28, 2001 1. Project Data Name: P.RFM(S.JUAN) L/C/TF Number: SCL-42200 CountryIDepartment: ARGENTINA Region: Latin America and Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: BB - Public Sector Management Adjustment KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 09/25/96 Effective: 12/31/97 04/24/97 Appraisal: 04/07/97 MTR: Approval: 08/26/97 Closing: 12/31/99 06/30/2000 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/MIN. OF ECONOMY Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid Javed Burki Country Manager: Myma L. Alexander Gobind Nankani Sector Manager: Emesto May Paul Meo Team Leader at ICR: Mark V. Hagerstrom Maria Emilia Freire ICR Primary Author: Mark V. Hagerstrom 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: U Sustainability: TiN Institutional Development Impact: N Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: U QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: 1. Designed to help the province of San Juan to reform its public sector so as to ensure an efficient and responsive delivery of public services (notably social services) within fiscally sound policies. The objectives are the following: A. Fiscal and public finance: Improve tax collection and administration to promote higher reliance on own-source revenues; Civil service reform and reduction of personnel expenditure as percentage of net revenues; Rationalization of public expenditures and prioritization of government spending, maintaining 1996 spending levels as a floor for social spending. B. Improve efficiency in the education and health sectors: B1. Education reform will ensure the extension of mandatory education and access to the poor within current budget constraints. Priority actions include: (a) increasing the student/teacher ratio and the ratio of staff actively teaching to total staff; (b) reduce the disproportionate use of temporary and substitute education personnel; (c) improve incentives for quality achievement; (d) increase participation of the private sector; and (e) reduce administrative costs. B2. Health reforms will improve efficiency and equity in the health sector, by: (a) separating the provision and financing of public health services, (b) increasing cost recovery, (c) consolidating hospital facilities, (d) reducing excessive staff and reallocating resources to non-personnel expenditures, (e) improving targeting to the poor and (f) increasing health insurance coverage (within the health budget constraints). 3.2 Revised Objective: 2. n.a. 3.3 Original Components: 3. Component; Cost; Rating FIRST TRANCHE RELEASE; $10,000,000.00; S SECOND TRANCHE RELEASE; $25,000,000.00; S THIRD TRANCHE RELEASE; $15,000,000.00; U 3.4 Revised Components: 4. n.a. 3.5 Quality at Entry: 5. Not rated by QAG. ICR rating discussed under Bank Performance, Section 7. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: Background 6. In Argentina, provincial governments have long played an important role in overall fiscal performance and macroeconomic stability. Argentina's public sector is highly decentralized, with provinces and municipalities accounting for about half of total public spending. In particular, they have increasingly become the key public sector level for providing public services, with responsibility for over 90 percent of public spending in health and basic education. Thus, provincial reform becomes a central element in the efforts of Argentina to reduce its macroeconomic vulnerability through improved fiscal performance and to increase competitiveness and enhance equity through human resource development. -.2- 7. During the 1980s, high inflation rates, lack of budgetary discipline, easy access to borrowing and reliance on the Federal Government for transfers and bailouts all contributed to persistent fiscal deficits. The situation improved in 1992, due to the reforms that the Federal Government had initiated under the Convertibility Plan, and a major national tax effort resulting in windfall revenues for the provinces. The financial crisis of 1995 aggravated the fiscal situation of the provinces once again when the pool of total public revenues fell dramatically. Provincial revenues dropped 5 percent in real terms, provincial expenditures failed to adjust, and the provincial deficit reached a record high of $3.5 billion or 1.4 percent of GDP, about half of the consolidated public sector. In 1995-96, out of 24 provinces, only four had balanced fiscal accounts. Most of the others faced important liquidity shortages, increased borrowing, and accumulated arrears. 8. Recognizing the importance of provincial finances to macro-stability, provincial reform has been a priority for the Federal Government since the early 1 990s. During 1992 and 1993, it negotiated two agreements with the provinces to promote structural reforms. The provinces agreed to improve own-source mobilization, restructure provincial taxes and eliminate distortionary taxes, privatize public enterprises, including the provincial banks and utilities, deregulate the provincial economy, and transfer the provincial pension funds to the national system. In exchange, the Federal Government guaranteed a shared-revenue floor to each province, sheltering them from downfalls in revenue. It also provided a Transformation Fund, which helped finance those reforms and provide technical assistance and advisory services. While some provinces began implementing a program of reforms during 1993-94, it was not until the financial crisis of 1995 that a large number of provinces began to reform in earnest. 9. The Bank has been a major partner of the Government since the early 1990's in supporting provincial reforms and institutional strengthening. The first generation of IBRD operations developed during the late 1980s that targeted sub-national governments were the First Provincial Development Project (Ln. 3280-AR) and Municipal Development Project (Ln. 2920-AR) and subsequent follow-up operations-- for the provinces (Ln. 3877-AR) and municipalities (Ln. 3860-AR). These loans were multi-sector operations covering all provinces to provide, at a minimum, support for institutional strengthening and, for those satisfying creditworthiness criteria, financing for investments linked to sector reforms and improved fiscal performance. In time, these loans were complemented by a series of sector investment operations aimed at improving the efficiency of delivering secondary education, public health, provincial roads, water supply, and agricultural services and infrastructure. In terms of reform, the multi-sector operations had been successful in strengthening the weak technical capacity of provincial and municipal governments and introducing the concept of rewarding good fiscal performance. However, they were not adequate for providing the necessary financial support to those provinces willing and able to implement major structural reforms. The First Provincial Reform Loan (PRL-1 Ln. 3826-AR) was designed to fill in this gap. 10. Targeted at a group of reform-minded provinces, the PRL-I was aimed at deepening the fiscal reforms underlying macroeconomic stability and enhancing the capacity of the provincial governments to fulfill their increasingly-important role as providers of public goods and services. - 3 - To accomplish these objectives, the operation was designed as a quick-disbursing adjustment loan with conditionalities both at the federal and at the provincial levels. The loan proceeds were used to capitalize the Transformation Fund, established by the national government in April 1993 to promote structural adjustment in the provinces. The national government established individual agreements with the participating provinces, determining in each case the measures to be taken by the provincial governments, their needs for technical and financial support, and the terms for repayment. The national government, in turn, was responsible for maintaining a supportive incentive framework. The PRL-1 operation in concert with the complementary Provincial Bank Privatization (Ln. 3878-AR) and the Provincial Pension Reform (Ln. 4116-AR) loans were highly successful in deepening public sector reform among participating provinces. Some of their specific accomplishments include the reduction of 55,000 provincial agents, the privatization or concessioning of 48 provincial enterprises, the privatization of thirteen provincial banks, and the transfer of eight provincial pension funds to the national social security system. 11. In 1996, the Federal Government recognized the need for a second phase of provincial reforms. After undertaking some of the basic structural reforms, including privatization, which provided a better balance in the role of the state and its fiscal means and a more stable, immediate fiscal situation, it was clear that the provinces needed to address issues of the quality and equity of core public services, especially in health and education, which had been decentralized. The Second Provincial Reform Loan (PRL-2) came as the next step in the progression towards more direct interaction with selected, reform-minded provinces. Targeted directly to individual provinces that had demonstrated their willingness and ability to implement reforms, the PRL-2 was conceived as a more agile lending tool tailored to fit the reform programs of individual provinces, thus avoiding the administrative bureaucracy of programs administered at the central level and increasing borrower ownership. 12. The PRL-2's specific objective, as stated in the Report and Recommendation of the President (Report No. P-7136-AR, July 30, 1997) was to support the provinces in reforming and restructuring so as to ensure an efficient and responsive delivery of public services, particularly in health and education, within fiscally sound policies. To accomplish these objectives, the PRL-2 was structured as quick-disbursing adjustment loans to the individual provinces to support fiscal adjustment combined with structural reforms in the social sectors. The operation was to finance the adjustment cost of the provincial programs and to provide technical assistance and analytical support to the provinces. The PRL-2 was fully consistent with the 1997 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which defined a strategy towards the provinces that focused on reform and sector investment operations aimed at deepening reforms in selected provinces by improving the efficiency of social expenditures. While the nature of the problems varied across provinces and the reform programs are tailor-made to each, the pillars of the reform program were common and include three basic components: public finance, education, and health. 13. Reforms in public finance focused on achieving a sustainable fiscal situation based mainly on strengthening ongoing reforms in the participating provinces, particularly in increasing current savings to lower the debt burden. Local resource mobilization was emphasized not only to increase revenues, but to enhance accountability and to attenuate the pro-cyclical impact of federal transfers. Civil service reform was to be promoted to enhance the productivity of public - 4 - and to increase resources available for investment by reducing the wage bill. Increased local revenues, changes in the structure of expenditures, and lowering debt were required to provide for greater flexibility in the face of economic downturns, such as the Tequila crisis and more recently the external shocks from Asia, Russia and Brazil. Technical assistance and financing for institutional development was to be provided through ongoing Bank operations, in particular the Second Provincial Development Project. The basic elements of the program included: * improvement in tax collection and administration to promote higher reliance on own-source revenues and increased accountability; * civil service reform including reduction of the wage bill and redundant personnel; improved training and compensation; control to lower absenteeism and overpayments; and, * rationalization of public expenditures and prioritization of government spending, with emphasis on privatization and outsourcing to improve reliability and quality of public services and lower the fiscal burden. 14. On the social sector side, the emphasis was to increase the efficiency and quality of the education and health sectors, focusing on demand and poverty reduction aspects, while promoting increased involvement by the private sector. The large majority of provinces devoted sufficient resources to public health and education, most at levels higher than OECD countries relative to per capita incomes; however, the efficiency and quality of this spending was poor. The basic strategy was to protect current levels of spending, while at the same time changing the structure of expenditures to increase investment and providing incentives for improvements in efficiency, quality and equity 15. In education, despite attractive returns to higher education, dropout rates from secondary school among the poor are high. In Argentina only 24 percent of students in the lowest quintile complete secondary school, compared to 76 percent for the upper quintile. Proposed education reforms sought to ensure the extension of obligatory education (from six to nine years) as mandated the National Education Law, while improving efficiency and quality. Given the low productivity in most provinces, with student/teacher ratios in some cases double those of comparators, and high levels of teacher absenteeism (sometimes four times as high as comparators), much of this was to be financed within the current budget, with some short-term increases to cover investment in classrooms, materials and teacher training. In addition, most provinces also needed to undergo important reforms to provide incentives to improve quality, including changing seniority-based teacher remuneration systems into merit-based systems, and decentralizing greater control to the school level. Technical assistance and financing for institutional development was to be provided through the ongoing Bank operations, First and Second Secondary Education Projects (Lns. 3794 and 3971) as well as through IDB sector operations. Priority actions included: * Increasing low student/teacher ratios and the participation of staff actively teaching as a share of total staff; * Reducing disproportionate use of temporary and substitute education personnel; - 5 - * Improving the incentives for quality improvement; * Increasing the participation of the private sector; and, * Reducing administrative costs. 16. In health, despite the availability of health care, generally through public hospitals, care is of poorer quality for poorer people. For example, 25 percent of women in the lowest income levels are delivered by non-doctors, while none at the upper level; over 30 percent of women in the lowest quintile have no post delivery follow-up, compared to only 2 percent of those in the upper quintile; 74 percent from lowest have to wait more than 24 hours for a consultation, as compared to only 45 percent of those in the upper quintile. Proposed health reforms sought to increase overall investment largely within the current budget envelope and to induce improvements in efficiency, quality and equity by separating the supply of services from the financing, promoting cost-recovery for care provided by public hospital to insured patients, promoting hospital accreditation and quality assurance systems, and providing the indigent population with health insurance. A fundamental element of this strategy, self-administered public hospitals, was pioneered in Argentina under the ongoing Provincial Health Development Project (PRESSAL, Ln. 3931-AR). On the financing side, the Bank supported reforms in the national health insurance system (Health Insurance Reform Loan Ln. 4002/3AR and Health Insurance Technical Assistance Project Ln 4004-AR) to enhance efficiency and promote competition. The PRL-2 program combined these two reform elements in participating provinces and promotes the incorporation of the uninsured poor into the system to help ensure equity in access to services. The main actions to be undertaken cover reformns in the area of personal health care delivery, public health finance and public health administration and included: * Extending the Provincial Health Insurance to the uninsured poor * Restructuring the Provincial Health Insurance carrier (Obra Social Provincial); * Reducing staff and reallocating resources to non-personnel expenditures; * Reallocating resources from personal health care to essential public health services, including health promotion, reproductive health and injury control; and * Promoting public hospital autonomy; 17. According to the eligibility criteria and the focus of the program agreed between the national government and the Bank, the PRL-2 loans were to be made available to provinces that had: (i) introduced significant structural reforms in terms of the size of the provincial government and the privatization of major public enterprises; (ii) accepted the transfer of the provincial pension funds to the national system; and (iii) demonstrated ability and political comrnitment to further reforms. On the basis of these criteria, four provinces were selected for piloting this approach: Rio Negro, Salta, San Juan, and Tucuman. These provinces represented a diverse pool in terms of their main demographic and socio-economic indicators, economic base, and the political affiliation of the provincial admninistrations. Together, they account for 6 percent of Argentina's GDP and 10 percent of the country's population. 18. The borrower of the four adjustment loans was the Argentine Republic, which in turn was to onlend funds equivalent to the loan amounts to each province. The amount of each loan was determined as a function of the population of each province, its adjustrnent needs, and the depth - 6 - of each program. Tranche conditionality was also tailored to match the depth and pace of reforms in each participating province. Disbursements for each loan were conditioned on Board approval (i.e., loan effectiveness) and subsequent positive evaluations on the compliance of the loan conditionality agreed with each province. While the formal tranche-release actions were limited to key measures, the operations supported an ambitious reform program in each of the participating provinces that were detailed in the Letters of Provincial Reform (LPR) drafted by each province. San Juan 19. The province of San Juan is a relatively poor province in the Northern region of Cuyo in Argentina. Its per capita income was about $4,200 in 1995, about half Argentina's average, with 32% of families not meeting their basic needs. Although San Juan is well endowed with agricultural and mining resources and has attracted private investment in the last few years, by the mid-I 990s the province had yet to begin the process of modernizing the public sector to facilitate these investments and to ensure that the benefits of increased growth are more broadly shared. Performance in the social sectors was poor, despite the high share of public resources these sectors absorb. Weak public administration led a to rapid growth in current expenditures and serious fiscal imbalances, marked by excessive public employment. In 1995, the provincial deficit reached 44% of current revenues, the wage bill absorbed 123% of the provincial net current revenues and the debt stock/revenue ratio was above 101%. Due to lack of resources, capital expenditures were financed only from earmarked transfers from the central government and commercial debt guaranteed by revenue sharing. San Juan Achievement of Objectives 20. The objective of helping the province of San Juan to reform its public sector so as to ensure an efficient and responsive delivery of public services in education and health within fiscally sound policies was not met. Moreover, modest achievements are unlikely to be sustainable. Although the province met second tranche targets in the fiscal, education and health components by mid-1999, subsequently implementation deteriorated, particularly on the fiscal side, and the new provincial administration began dismantling some of the reforms starting in December 1999. Discussion with the new administration, during two three-month extensions, failed to reach agreement on a revised program to meet the third tranche targets within a reasonable time frame (12 to 18 months). The third tranche was canceled and the loan was closed on June 30, 2000. 21. While the current fiscal situation represents an improvement from the situation in 1996, there is little willingness by the province to take the required measures to put it back on a sustainable path and the negligible institutional development appears insufficient to support such an improvement. Indeed, the new administration, which took office in December 1999, inherited a rather chaotic situation largely because the previous administration had not taken timely measures, particularly on the fiscal side, during the long transition after its defeat in the May 1999 gubernatorial elections. There were some achievements in education and health, but they are far from beginning the important transformation envisaged at the time of appraisal and their - 7 - sustainability is uncertain. These incipient efforts, which had yet begun to generate important benefits, were largely dismantled by a new provincial administration that did not share the basic assumptions underlying the reforms. While the economic downturn in Argentina had a negative affect on program implementation during 1999, it was within ability of the then provincial government to adjust to the less favorable environment. A detailed assessment of the three main components, fiscal and public finance, education, and health, are detailed below: 4.2 Outputs by components: A. Fiscal and Public Finance 22. In 1996, the Provincial Government took the first steps aimed at restoring fiscal balance and reducing the size of government. These measures included: reducing the wage bill by 30%, transferring the Provincial Pension Fund to the National government, and privatizing the provincial bank, the electricity utility and the water utility. As a result, the fiscal situation improved: relative to current revenues, the current deficit fell from 53% in 1995, to 4% in 1996; the wage bill declined from 123% to 76%; and the debt stock was brought down to 84% from a peak of 101%. 23. Under the program, the provincial government sought to reach and maintain a current surplus, reduce the wage bill to 60% of current revenues, and to reduce debt stocks to less than 60% of current revenues, while keeping investment at an adequate level. The province was able to attain intermediate targets to meet these objectives during the first two years of the program. However, the seeds of future fiscal problems were planted in 1998 when the province adjusted teacher salaries back toward their 1995 levels. Subsequently, with a downturn in revenues, the need for corrective fiscal measures during the second semester of 1999 coincided with the electoral defeat of the Governor a long transition between administrations (May to December). Far from an adjustment, the outgoing government accelerated spending. The current deficit reached about $32 million by the end of the year, as compared to a surplus of $24 million in 1998. On the debt side, the stock had been reduced from $424 million at end December 1996 to around $400 by mid-June, or about 68% of current revenues. By the end of the year, the need to finance the current deficit increased the debt stock again, but more importantly, the outgoing government took on over $200 million more in debt to finance the construction of hydroelectric works to be constructed over a five-year period. Thus, at the end of the year the stock had reached $643 million, or about 110% of current revenues. The new administration, citing its desire to protect public employment and wages in the face of the economic downturn and increased unemployment, has yet to implement the needed fiscal adjustment and continue financing the resulting current deficit. Its program for the year 2000, based on overly optimistic revenue assumptions, projected a current surplus of $29 million (as opposed to the program target of $55 million), personnel spending equivalent to 74% of current revenues (with a program target of 60%), and debt stock to current revenues of 101% (compared to a target of 60%). More recent projections indicate that the revenue expectations were not realized and the actual performance during the year 2000 is likely to be substantially worse that what the government proposed. The performance of the province under the program as regards specific sector objectives is detailed below: -8 - (i). Increase tax collection and administration to promote higher reliance on own-source revenues. The effort to improve tax administration and collection was effectively pursued during most of the 1997-99 period. Building on technical assistance and equipment financed under the First and Second Provincial Development Projects, the Bank sought to promote improved tax collection, with programs to identify and monitor the largest taxpayers in association with the federal government, which contributed to the early gains in collections, and a project to improve property collections by updating and modernizing the cadaster. The province also enacted a realignment of tax rates for property, turnover, stamp and automobile taxes. It, however, was slow in implementing an integrated reform and modernization of the local tax office to enhance the efficiency of collection and integrate the cadaster work to reduce evasion. Despite a downturn in late 1999, overall own-source revenues increased by 14% over the 1996-99 period (26% by 1998). Still, even at the highest level, the province only generates about 15% of its revenues from own-sources. The overall program target was about 20% higher than the level reached by 1998. (ii). Civil service reform and reduction of personnel expenditure as a share of current spending. Reform efforts included controls aimed at lowering absenteeism and overpayments and progressive decentralization and concession of public works and services, with the possible privatization of central government departments. Under the program, the province reduced public sector employment by almost 5% between 1997 and mid-1999, and was within reach of the third tranche target of 6%. This downsizing was associated with an effort to readjust salary levels from the emergency cuts implemented in 1995-96. As a result, the wage bill actually grew under the program by more than 20% between 1996 and 1998, but in conjunction with increased revenues the province was able to almost met the third tranche target of personnel expenditures equivalent to 60% of total spending. However, continued increases in personnel spending during 1999 put the province at risk in not meeting the target. The new administration was unwilling to implement further adjustment measures, including further downsizing of about 600 public employees required for the third tranche, and the projected share for personnel spending was above 70% for the year 2000. (iii) Rationalizing and prioritizing spending, including maintaining levels of spending in health and education. The three year expenditure plan for the province highlighted its priorities of in the social sectors. Second tranche conditions were met as regards ensuring the maintenance of floor levels of budgeting in health and education. In September 1999, the province decided to go ahead with a major investment in hydroelectric works costing more than $200 million over a construction period of about five years. While the investment benefited from economic analysis, further measures need to be undertaken to ensure fiscal space. B.1 Education 24. Studies undertaken at during preparation found that education in San Juan was characterized by high costs and poor outcomes. Student achievement were among the lowest in the country in many areas, despite the significant shares of its budget devoted to education, with public sector spending/per capita income at almost double the level of OECD countries. The province was also facing equity issues, with a widening gap between secondary school net enrollment rates between the children of the highest and lowest 20% in terms of household -9- incomes. The problems plaguing San Juan were typical of many other provinces. Personnel expenditures dominated the education budget, leaving little room to finance non-personnel inputs and investment. The average costs per student was high due to low student/teacher ratios the and disproportionate use of temporary and substitute teachers. Teachers often abused the leave system and their pay is unrelated to teaching quality or effective classroom hours. These problems were exacerbated because of expectations for an increase in educational demand due to the extension in compulsory education from six to nine years, as mandated by the Federal Education Law. 25. During 1996, the province undertook a deep adjustmnent in educational spending and took several decisions to face this situation. From 1995 to 1996, the budget allocated to education was cut by 29%, mainly by reducing teacher salaries. Under the program, San Juan sought to face the challenge of extending compulsory education and improving efficiency, quality and equity, within the context of important fiscal constraints and the desire to readjust teacher wages upward following the drastic cuts in 1995. Savings to finance this effort were to come from improved human resource administration, increasing student/teacher ratios, and reducing the unwarranted use of substitute teachers. Other measures included enhancing quality and equity through incentives, piloting of school decentralization, improving the allocation of subsidies to privately managed schools, and enhancing the efficiency and quality of teacher training. 26. Initially there was rapid progress in implementing the required reforms and most second tranche conditions were met early in the process and personnel spending was reduced from 94% to 88% of the sector budget and the province was able to increase the coverage of the new curriculum, with much of the increase focused on poorer communities. However, the recuperation of teacher wages exceeded the level of savings and a downturn in overall revenues. A new adjustment in 1999 was not undertaken in the midst of an electoral campaign and a prolonged transition between administrations. While there were some initial achievements, including better control over absenteeism and the closing of redundant teacher institutes, their sustainability is questionable. The more comprehensive reform effort envisaged at appraisal has not occurred. For example, the effort to align teacher remuneration with merit remains as a challenge. Discussions with new authorities indicated a commitment to continue a number of sector reforms, but they too have been reluctant to make the necessary adjustment to the wage bill. Details on specific objectives are detailed below: (i) Increase the student/teacher ratio and the ratio of teaching staff to total staff. The improvement of human resource administration was expected to generate important savings, by reducing central administration, and implementing new technical requirements. By 1998, the province was able to achieve a student/teacher ratio of 17: 1, with a third tranche target of 19: 1. It was also able to reduce the share of personnel spending for education to 88%, bettering the initial target of 96%. (ii) Reduce the disproportionate use of temporary and substitute teachers. The main instrument to achieve this objective was through the creation of a new leave system, including tighter controls over sick leave. The new leave system was initiated in 1997, and resulted in a 15% decline in the use of substitute teachers, followed by an additional 10% drop in 1998. Based - 10- on this success, the program was extended throughout the public sector, with a private concession. However, more recently sick leave and the use of substitutes has been on the rise, in part because the existing private contract lacks adequate performance targets. (iii) Improve incentives for quality achievement. This was to be promoted through a change in the remuneration system for teachers to include performance and a pilot program to decentralize school management, including the creation of a fund to provide incentives for quality improvements. Unfortunately, the new system of wage scales was not implemented in conjunction with an increase in sector salary and an important opportunity was lost. Under the decentralization pilot, for equity consideration, the initial targets were to be schools in poorer areas or where the levels of repetition or drop out are especially high. While the decentralization pilot was initiated, the fund of $2 million, was not created until 1999. Moreover, an additional effort to promote regionalization only added an additional bureaucratic layer, as the most important management decisions remain centralized. (iv) To promote the development of the private sector. Privately managed schools represented about 12% of the education budget (and about 14% of enrollment) at an average cost of $700 per student. However, subsidies to these schools were allocated based on agreements that provided little incentive for efficiency, quality and equity. Under the program, the province developed a system of allocating the subsidies according to a formula that included the cost per student as well as regional factors and social indicators. With the new administration, the technical and political basis of the program is under question and implementation appears unlikely. (v) Teacher Training. Under the program, the province sought to increase the efficiency and quality of its public institutes for teacher training in support of the new curriculum. By 1996, the number of institutes had been reduced from 13 to 8 and enrollment was frozen to reduce excess supply (local demand for teachers had been equivalent to 10% of annual graduates). The target was to consolidate and reduce the number of institutes to six by the end of the program. An additional institute was closed by 1998, reducing a further 50 faculty positions, and two of the institutes were designated exclusively for training teachers in the new curriculum. B.2 Health 27. Preparation studies indicated that substantial resources in San Juan were devoted to health by the public sector, about 7% of GDP, but the quality of services provided to the poor without health insurance suffered as a consequence of poor management in the sector and the inefficient use of available resources. The health system was predominantly hospital-based, with hospitals being managed primarily by the provincial government. Public hospitals were inefficient, with low occupancy rates averaging only 57 percent (compared to a norm of 80%), low personnel productivity and low quality of care. Personnel costs absorbed most of the health budget, leaving little room for essential complementary inputs and investment. As a result, many hospitals were obsolete and lacked basic.maintenance, both in terms of equipment and physical facilities. As decision-making was highly centralized at the level of the Provincial Ministry of Health, hospitals had limited authority and incentives to achieve improvements in efficiency. 28. To promote a more efficient production of health services the program sought to support the transformation of public hospitals into decentralized hospitals, defined by the local - 11 - administration of human resources and financing associated with the volume and quality of services offered. Essentially public hospitals were to be financed by the sale of services to private and public insurance providers rather than by direct budget lines from the Ministry of Health, by charging those clients with health insurance (20-40% of services were believed to be garnered by this group) and provided the poor without coverage with health insurance. All of this was to contribute to improving the quality of the services, and make the subsidy extended to those services or activities considered public goods more transparent. 29. The provincial government began the first steps towards this transformation in 1995-96 through staff reductions and intervening the obra social for public employees to put it on a sustainable financial basis, and proceeded under the program to set up the required legal framework and to begin implementing the new systems. In early 1999, it decided to accelerated the reforms by jump starting hospital decentralization and implementing a fledgling system of health insurance for the poor. These efforts were not continued by the new administration, and in some cases were reversed. An assessment of the individual components of the program is as follows: (i) Separating the provision from the financing of public health services. This was the fundamental transformation expected under the program. Even under the most favorable environments, this objective appears to have been overly ambitious for a two-year program. Nevertheless, in early 1999, with the legislation for decentralization in place, the province decided to accelerate its strategy and begin the process of hospital decentralization with the two largest public hospitals in the capital city (it had earlier planned to start with smaller hospitals in a more incremental approach). To accelerate these changes, in early 1999 the Ministry channeled cost recovery from the provincial obra social to public hospitals based upon services actually rendered. The hospital decentralization effort was slowed by the new administration, which attributed a deterioration in health care to the reforms. (ii) Increasing cost recovery. Incipient systems for cost recovery were set up in connection with decentralized contracts with the two hospitals, which stipulated that they increase such recovery by 30% in 1999, and that they contract staff on a merit pay system. The new administration has proposed a mixed system for budget allocation and a continued role for cost recovery. (iii) Consolidating hospital facilities. No specific activities were apparently included in the program to achieve this objective, beyond that which might have been realized under a system effectively separating financing from services. With the move to decentralize the two largest hospitals, the province indicated its desire to restructure its services through a network approach including public and private facilities that would have helped to facilitate such consolidation, and allowed beneficiaries of the new health insurance system to seek services at both public and private facilities. The new administration put forth a program along similar lines, focusing on the importance of primary care. (iv) Reducing excess staff and reallocating resources to investment. Under the program, through reductions in staff and outsourcing, the province was to lower the share of the wage bill to 72%, reducing stafflevels to 3,800 employees. By the time ofthe second tranche (mid-1999), - 12- the province had reduced employment to 4,145, down from 4,490 in 1995, and the share of personnel spending from 86% to 80%. The new administration cited the lack of sufficient personnel as a cause of a deterioration in health indicators and indicated its desire to increase employment again. Fiscal considerations limited the implementation of this strategy. (v) Improve targeting to the poor. Better targeting and equity was essentially to be achieved by improved public health service (see iii) and the health insurance scheme for the poor (see vi). (vi) Increasing health insurance coverage within the current health budget constraint. The intervention of the obra social (an autonomous organization) was fundamental for supporting the transformation of the sector by ensuring the financial viability of a major user of the public hospitals and for administering the health insurance program for the poor. Although it was initially envisaged that putting the obra social on firmer financial footing would require recourse to private management contracts, the intervention itself was successful. Through 1999, the obra was running a surplus by regularizing payments and contributions and renegotiating supplier contracts. This achievement supported the decision to begin implementing health insurance for the poor through an executive decree, although the third tranche required merely presenting draft legislation. With a roster developed under an opportunistic approach, over the course of a month about 25,000 people signed up (about 10-15% of potential beneficiaries). The new administration has proposed a different approach to screen beneficiaries on a needs basis. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: 30. n.a. 4.4 Financial rate of return: 31. n.a. 4.5 Institutional development impact: 32. The impact on institutional development appears to be negligible in terms of public finances, between the achievements that were dismantled by the new administration and the slowness of the previous administration in implementing such important initiatives such as modernization of tax administration and financial management. Several initiatives that appear sustainable include the greater control of absenteeism and abuse of the leave system, if corrective measures are undertaken, and the reforms instituted at the provincial obra social. Health sector reform has been reversed in some cases, but it is clear that the traditional public hospital based system is no longer seen as viable, and proposals by the new ministry may provide a more gradual approach to achieving many of the development objectives. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: 33. Macroeconomic performance: It would be difficult to imagine a more favorable economic environment to support implementation during the initial years of the program. Economic growth was on the upswing, with real GDP growth of 5.5 percent in 1996, 8.1 percent in 1997, and 6.6 percent in the first half of 1998. However, as a result of the combined effects of - 13 - the downturn in East Asia, the devaluation of the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real, and deterioration of commodity prices, the economy began to decelerate falling to -0.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 1998, and 3.9 percent for the year as a whole. For 1999, GDP is estimated to have declined by 3.1 percent in 1999, a larger drop in output than experienced during the Tequila crisis of 1995. Unemployment, after falling to about 12 percent from the high of 18 percent reached in 1996, increased to 14 percent in late 1999. At the end of 1999, the economy began to gradually recover from the recession; however, the recovery has been slow. In the first quarter of 2000, GDP grew by a mere 0.9 percent (year-on-year). Industrial production grew by 2.7 percent and 1.7 percent (year-on-year) in the first and second quarters of the year; however, this is due to a bump up at the end of 1999, and further growth has stagnated since then. Unemployment rose somewhat from 13.7 percent in October 1999 to 15.4 percent in May, 2000. In general, access to international financial markets was limited, with a high degree of volatility in spreads. Fiscal performance deteriorated during 1999 and the fiscal program went off track in the latter part, ending the year with a deficit of about $7.4 billion, considerably higher than the target of $5 billion agreed with the IMF. The higher deficit was the result of higher interest costs, the duration of the recession, and a general weakening of fiscal discipline during the election year. Provincial governments encountered similar conditions and they ended the year with a deficit of about $4.5 billion, almost twice the deficit in 1998. In total the consolidated public sector fiscal deficit amounted to about 4.2 percent of GDP, excluding privatization receipts. As a result, the new administration took swift action in December 1999 to restore order in the fiscal accounts, including those of the provinces. 34. As regards San Juan, a 4% decline in total revenues in 1999, equivalent to about $28 million can be directly linked to the affects of the nationwide economic downturn. Although capital expenditures were adjusted downward, current spending accelerated, and the required adjustment was not undertaken by the provincial government. The new administration referred to the general economic downturn in justifying continued deficit spending. 35. National and Provincial Elections. The electoral campaign in 1999 at both the national and provincial level, and the subsequent change in both administrations later that year had an important affects on the program. The most obvious affect was during the campaign when the Governor hesitated to make needed adjustments in public sector wages. At the same time, however, the Governor choose accelerate health sector reforms during the height of the campaign. Subsequently, the defeat of the Governor and a long transition period between May and December had a major negative affect on the program, when the outgoing Governor did not take the required fiscal measures. The program suffered further with the new administration, which had essentially campaign on an anti-adjustment program. Not only did the new administration not take needed fiscal measures, it also began to dismantle earlier reforms in other areas that were identified with the previous Governor, most importantly the health sector reforms. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: 36. Along with specific sector-level reforms promoted by the federal government, the provincial efforts benefited from a consistent system of fiscal incentives at the national level that combined a hard budget constraint and federal resistance to providing bailouts, with proactive programs to support state reform. In Argentina, a set of critical actions was implemented during - 14 - the 1992-1996 period, including the signing of the Fiscal Pacts, the elimination of quasi-deficit financing through Central Bank rediscounts and provincial banks, and support for transferring provincial pension funds to the national government, and privatizing provincial banks and public enterprises, and institutional strengthening for financial and tax administration. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: 37. While this framework was firmly in place during the implementation of the program in San Juan, it is likely that the new provincial administration in December 1999 expected that the new Federal Government would be supportive of its decision to continue running deficits, and might even offer financial support. However, in fact, although the new Federal administration did provide a program to support provinces to service their short-term debt, other measures taken actually hardened the budget constraint by requiring federal authorization for external borrowing and linking more explicitly for two years the level of co-participation transfers to overall growth of the economy. Further, San Juan was not willing at that time to agree to the fiscal measures required to enter into the debt-relief program. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: 38. n.a. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: 39. With no major objectives achieved during the life of the loan, and little prospects for achieving them in the near term, sustainability is rated as unlikely. 40. Although there are some more recent indications that the province would like to return to the reform path, it is much too early to know if these efforts will be successful. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: 41. Despite the closing of the loan and a difficult implementation environment, a framework at the federal level for supporting the reforms of a committed provincial government remain in place, as does support for ongoing attempt to improve financial management and tax administration through the Second Provincial Development Project. The new administration now appears willing, as of late 2000, to enter into the Federal debt relief program and to discuss enacting new fiscal measures, including a Law of Fiscal Discipline, and meeting fiscal targets to achieve equilibrium over the next few years. 42. In education, discussions with the authorities indicated a willingness to continue with the reform efforts and they requested a follow-up operation for the sector (they do not participate in the ongoing First Secondary education Project). In health, after initially rejecting the reform program outright, authorities were engaged in discussions to try to make their proposed program compatible with third tranche targets. Significant headway was made during the six month loan extension, but the Minister subsequently resigned. The new Minister is even more sympathetic to the reforms and has initiated efforts to meet third tranche conditions (despite the closing of the loan), as regards hospitsal cost recovery and staff reductions. - 15 - 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: 43. Identification was on target and innovative. First, through important upfront nationwide analysis, the Bank identified the need to promote reforms in the social sectors, education and health, in a framework of fiscal soundness centering on the provincial government. These two sectors are central to the medium and long-term success of any provincial reform strategy, as they represent between 40 and 45 percent of the provincial budgets. Moreover, the services in these two sectors are key in determining the level of human capital development of the province in the medium and long term. Secondly, the program design to deal with individual provinces with integrated fiscal programs and second generation reforms was an important next step, following successful Bank operations to promote first generation reforms among groups of provinces. As regards preparation, San Juan benefited from a Bank expenditure review of health and education. Nevertheless, a social assessment and impact analysis, including beneficiary participation could have helped to identify local support for proposed reforms and anticipated needed mitagory measure, giving more confidence to both the outgoing and incoming governors as regards the benefits of the proposed reforms. 44. The need to improvement transparency was identified by the team, however, the proposed activity to require the auditing of the fiscal accounts did not provide the citizens of San Juan with the timely information. A more transparent system, together with the parameters of a Law of Fiscal Discipline, might have helped to avert the fiscal mismanagement during the last seven months of the outgoing administration. (Both these features are now basic measures on the Federal program). In addition, the matrix of conditionalities would have benefited from a explicit link between the program to readjust wages, needed savings, and the implementation of a new wage scale and performance incentives. 7.2 Supervision: 45. San Juan benefited from field-based supervision, including the TM, a Social Sector Leader who was a health specialist, and local staff in fiscal/public sector management and education, who provided day-to-day contact between HQ-based missions. Project implementation was also supported through supervision and financing of activities by the Second Provincial Development Project (financial administration, tax cadaster modernization, reform of tax administration, health sector reforms), and the Provincial Health Development Project (hospital decentralization, payment system and reform of the obra social). The IDB financed PRISE project provide support in education for improvements in human resource administration and quality incentives. 46. The most difficult issue faced immediately by the supervision team was the lack of cooperation from the Minister of Finance, who saw the program as an attempt to reduce her personal control over fiscal matters. As such she delayed needed technical assistance in financial management and tax administration. Prior to effectiveness, the Bank indicated that progress in these areas was vital to ensure institutional development and that, while they were not explicitly in the matrix. The Bank monitored these efforts to ensure that progress was made prior to the - 16- second tranche. For the second tranche, the Bank also provided intensive support for accelerating health sector reforms and in supporting the education ministry on the issue of subsidies to private schools. 47. During the long transition period, the Bank was pro-active in making contact with the newly designated authorities. These discussions were largely positive and the province indicated a desire to remain in the program. The Bank indicated that closing the current deficit should be a priority and that a strong program in this area would facilitate further discussions to resolve the issues of the debt targets that were largely out of reach because of the debt taken on for the hydroelectric works. With the change in government in December, particular attention was paid to health sector issues, and over the course of several missions and intensive dialogue a new matrix was developed. Loan closing, scheduled for December 31, 1999 was extended with two three-month extension in an attempt to reformulate a mutually agreeable program for public finances, education and health. In the end, however, the new administration was not able to agree to a new fiscal program to meet the fiscal targets within a reasonable time period. and the loan was closed on June 30, 2000 and the third tranche of $15 million equivalent was canceled. Its proposed program for the year 2000, based on overly optimistic revenue assumptions, projected a current surplus of $29 million (as opposed to the program target of $55 million), personnel spending equivalent to 74% of current revenues (with a program target of 60%), and debt stock to current revenues of 101% (compared to a target of 60%). 7.3 Overall Bankperformance: 48. Better preparation and appraisal might have reduced the risk of failure. Most critically, Bank concerns about the fiscal situation of the province going into the program should have been reinforced by requiring legislation regarding fiscal discipline and transparency. Not only might this have helped to avoid the deterioration in fiscal performance during the transition period between administrations, it also might have raised the level of understanding among politicians and the general populace over the need to maintain fiscal discipline. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: 49. Both the provincial and federal governments were fully involved in the preparation process through the work on public sector reviews in the social sectors. The federal ministries of Economy, Health, Education, and Interior all fielded teams to support the province. 7.5 Government implementation performance: 50. At the federal level, implementation benefited from a consistent system of fiscal incentives that combined a hard budget constraint and federal resistance to providing bailouts, with proactive programs to support state reform. In Argentina, a set of critical actions was implemented during the 1992-1996 period, including the signing of the Fiscal Pacts, the elimination of quasi-deficit financing through Central Bank rediscounts and provincial banks, and support for transferring provincial pension funds to the national government, and privatizing provincial banks and public enterprises, and institutional strengthening for financial and tax administration. This framework remained in place throughout the implementation of the program. At the federal level, the - 17 - coordinating unit for the PRL2 program provided important support in monitoring fiscal performance. Provincial reforms in health and education benefited from and complemented national initiatives. In education, the PRL-2 complemented the IDB-financed PRISE, which provided technical support to the province to improve the management of the education sector. In health, the PRL-2 promoted hospital decentralization, a key objective of the PRESSAL, which provided technical assistance to the province in hospital management initiating a program of health insurance for the poor, restructuring of the health ministry and in strengthening the provincial obra social. 7.6 Implementing Agency: 51. At the provincial level, during the life of the program, the Minister of Finance was largely uncooperative, particularly in supporting modernization of financial management and tax administration that might limit her traditional and personal style of management. She also pushed forward a general increase in teachers salaries despite the need to first implement a better incetive system. Both health and education sector authorities were very cooperative and energetic in implementing, particularly in the period leading up to the first and second tranche releases. As noted above, the implementation performance of the provincial government was clearly unsatisfactory on the fiscal side during the last seven months of the administration. Attempts to engage the outgoing administration and to update needed information was unsuccessful. The Governor, in particular, blamed the Bank and the policies it "forced" him to implement as the reason for his defeat for a third term. With the new administration, implementation continued to be difficult on the fiscal side, despite early indications from the new authorities regarding their desire to maintain the program. On the other hand, health authorities after initially rejecting the reforms out of hand, engaged the Bank in intense discussions in an attempt to identify differences in policy orientation and to construct a new set of targets that attempted to conform to the matrix. Education authorities were also very cooperative. The program coordinating unit was effective in providing progress reports, however, the head of the unit enjoyed only limited influence at the cabinet level, particularly with the Minster of Finance. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: 52. While the performance of the federal government was satisfactory, that of the provincial government in implementing the reforms was unsatisfactory. Given the importance of the latter the overall rating of the borrower would be unsatisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned 53. As one of four provinces participating in a pilot program for supporting reforms, the lessons learned draws upon the experiences of the provinces as a group, while highlighting those of Rio Negro. Drawing on the ongoing ICR effort, including the intensive learning ICRs carried out for Salta (Report No: 20698) and Tucuman (Report No: 20699), which included local workshops and institutional assessments, important lessons from this experience include: 54. A national framework for fiscal reform is criticaL Along with specific sector-level reforms promoted by the federal government, the provincial efforts benefited from a consistent system of fiscal incentives at the national level that combined a hard budget constraint and federal - 18 - resistance to providing bailouts, with proactive programs to support state reform. In Argentina, a set of critical actions was implemented during the 1992-1996 period, including the signing of the Fiscal Pacts, the elimination of quasi-deficit financing through Central Bank rediscounts and provincial banks, and support for transferring provincial pension funds to the national government, and privatizing provincial banks and public enterprises, and institutional strengthening for financial and tax administration. While these constraints were firmly in place during the implementation of the program in San Juan, the prospects of a change in the national administration raised expectations that there might be a general relaxing of these fiscal constraint in general, or at the least a more favorable treatment of the province in particular. This is likely to have had a negative affect on implementation of the needed fiscal measures when the new provincial administration took office in December 1999. Although the new Federal administration did provide a program to support provinces to service their short-term debt, other measures taken actually hardened the budget constraint by requiring federal authorization for external borrowing and linking more explicitly for two years the level of co-participation transfers to overall growth of the economy. 55. Sequencing is important, and the PRL-2 approach is more successful and sustainable for provinces that have already achieved a level of control in their fiscal and debt situations. There can be important tensions between fiscal and sector reform objectives that are exacerbated when fiscal adjustments are not taken upfront and need to be undertaken in the middle of the reform process. Although the programs provided for protecting overall spending in health and education, politically, sector reforms often become associated with fiscal adjustment resulting in unwarranted resistance. Moreover, urgent needs to downsize staffing may result in losing better qualified staff before adequate human resource management systems for the social sectors can be put into place to provide incentives for better performance. Finally, under fiscal duress, cost-cutting or income generating activities receive priority over other reforms. For example, in health cost recovery was actively pursued, whereas the creation of health insurance for the poor was delayed. Fears of losing control over spending also undermined the efforts to promote school decentralization. 56. Length of Engagement and Political Cycles: The loans were designed to fully disburse within 12-18 months of effectiveness; however, the social sector reforms in particular took longer than anticipated to put into place and even longer to begin showing results. Conditionality went beyond merely the enacting of legislation and decrees, and required that new systems be effectively up and running. Depending upon the institutional capacity and commitment of a province, the time frame for implementation could easily be double the length originally contemplated. Given the negative impact of elections and changes in provincial administration, the preferred approach would be to have programs that cover the entire four-year period of a provincial administration. With such a time frame, given that the programs combined policy actions with longer institutional development activities a more flexible instrument, other than a traditional adjustment operation, might be more appropriate. 57. Projectpreparation should be informed by social and institutional assessments. Social impact analysis and assessments can provide provincial leadership with greater confidence in the measures to be undertaken and provide a tool for program design and garnering public support - 19- for the reforms, and would have been particularly useful for San Juan in trying to sustain reform efforts across two administrations. The reforms also introduced institutional arrangements that affect incentives governing policymaking and service delivery. Institutional assessments in support of expenditure reviews undertaken jointly with the province could help to identify complementary accountability and transparency mechanisms to support improved implementation and greater sustainability. In the more successful instances they combined mechanisms of voice, competition and hierarchy into service delivery reforms. In other cases, however, there were no clear signals within the public administration to ensure allegiance to these reforms. Perhaps the most clear example is on the fiscal side, where both Salta and Tucuman passed legislation binding the province to parameters of fiscal behavior. In the latter, despite a change in administration, the objective of fiscal discipline remains as a standard for performance. Such was not the case of San Juan. 58. Participatory approaches can facilitate implementation and support sustainability. The legitimacy of the reforms were enhanced in those cases were a participatory process was followed involving stakeholders such as teachers, medical staff, and parents and where an effort was made to inform the general public on the nature of the reforms. This was the case, for example, with the implementation of the new subsidy formula to private schools in Salta. The participatory approach facilitated the resolution of the constraints that appeared during its implementation and provided options to resolve the potential conflicts. Also, this approach guaranteed the legitimacy of the new formula. Tucuman demonstrates that participatory approaches in the health sector supported sustainability even with a change in local administration. In contrast, in the case of San Juan, the acceleration in measures for health reform prior to the second tranche was essentially through a top down approach, which might have been successful if the governor had been reelected and the effort sustained until the benefits became apparent and accepted. However, the reforms became identified with the outgoing governor and had little support within the bureaucracy to sustain them, so when the administration was changed the reforms were easily reversed. On the other hand, such approaches are not a panacea. For example, in Rio Negro the outsourcing effort were largely unsuccessful, in part because the government failed to give priority to the fiscal situation and the urgent need to bring these negotiations to a conclusion. In general, the was clearly a better performance among the provinces where reform measures were openly debated and implemented. 59. The Experience of the PRL2 Pilot. Emerging lessons from the ongoing experience suggests that the loan design for a direct relation between the Bank and the participating province is important in enabling the Bank to bring to bear its international experience and in facilitating relations between federal and provincial stakeholders. Project design also puts local governors at the forefront of implementation and dialogue has helped to improve performance under other investment operations in which the provinces participate. In addition, the provincial approach to promoting needed sector reforms in health and education appears to be a fundamental complement to the Bank's efforts in these areas at the national level. 60. In the case of Argentina, the link between fiscal balance and macroeconomic stability is a particularly important one due to the strict restrictions on currency emission established by the Convertibility Law. By putting pressure on the balance of payment, persistent fiscal deficits at the - 20 - provincial level can be a source of strain on the money supply and the financial system, thus reducing the credibility of the government's long-run ability to maintain the Convertibility Plan. Clearly, as a pilot involving only four provinces representing 10 percent of Argentina's population, PRL- 2 in and of itself was not expected to have a major direct impact on the country's fiscal situation, but it did demonstrate that the provinces can make an important contribution to the further consolidation of Argentina's macroeconomic stability. Despite the delays experienced in Rio Negro, at the late reversal in San Juan, in the four participating provinces large deficits in current spending, which totaled -$310 million on average annually during the 1995-96 period were reduced to only -$17 million for the 1998-99 period. This perfornance compares well to the overall consolidated accounts of the provinces, where the current balance declined for $75 million in 1995-96 to -$690 million in 1998-99. The PRL-2-provinces as a group, as compared to non-PRL-2 provinces during the 1996-99 period improved their own-source revenues by 18 percent between 1996 and 1999, compared to 9 percent for non-PRL-2 provinces. Similarly, PRL-2 provinces showed an average increase in personnel expenditures of only 8 percent between 1996 and 1999, compared to 17 percent for the remaining provinces. Finally, the performance of PRL-2 provinces was also superior with respect to the provincial debt, with PRL-2 provinces increasing their stock of provincial debt by an average of only 3.6 percent during the 1996 to mid-99 period, compared to 30 percent for the remaining provinces. Since completion of the PRL2 loans in 1999, the performance of these provinces continues to compare favorably with that of other provinces. For 2000, as a group, own-source revenues increased by 2.3% in PRL2 provinces, compared to a decline of almost 1% in other provinces; and, as a group PRL2 provinces were able to freeze personnel expenditures in 2000 relative to 1999, while other provinces increased spending in this area by almost 4%. 61. Assessing the impact on social service delivery of the PRL2 provinces with those not participating is far more difficult at this point, due to the longer gestation period needed to realize benefits and to the lack of readily available comparative data. However, preliminary results are encouraging in Salta and Tucuman, which completed the reform program. Indicators suggest improvements in both health service efficiency and quality in the self-administered hospitals. In education and the implementation of the federal reform, Salta in particular has been able to increase enrollments in secondary schools, reduce costs per student and realize improvements in student achievement over the 1992-1999 period. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: Comments regarding the Provincial Reform Program in general were received form the Undersecretary for Provincial Relations of the Federal Ministry Of Economy on behalf of the Borrower. In summarizing the overall experience of the PRLII, they note: Although it proved impossible to complete the third tranches of the operations for San Juan and Rio Negro, the design of the PRI program, as direct operations with the provinces with untied funding and not requiring the creation of large bureaucracies to disburse, along with advantages financing terms, are extremely attractive for the provinces in Argentina. To the extent that the provinces are able to comply adequately with the conditions established by the Loan Agreement, the PRL constitutes an appropriate instrument to introduce and implement reforms of a fiscal - 21 - nature, as well as in reforning public health and education. As untied financing they were able to both help finance the needed social sector reforms, as well as help in restructuring burdensome provincial debt. The creation of a Coordinating Unit at the National level concemed with monitoring compliance with agreements and in ensuring the transfer of disbursements to the provinces facilitated implementation and did not require an expensive bureaucracy. As regards difficulties encountered during implementation, some might have been easier to resolve with better coordination between the Bank, the Coordinating Unit and the participating Provinces. While coordination was generally satisfactory, it could have been improved in the sequencing of negotiations regarding fiscal targets. Each party should have a better idea of their roles upfront, as well as in respect to the presentation and content of the provincial reports so that they might be timely and with adequate information. In addition, other problems might have been avoided if the provinces during negotiations had a better appreciation of the importance that the Bank attaches to fuall compliance with the conditionalities, as well as in the importance of the Letter of Provincial Reform and the program of expenditures, which the Bank use as an exhaustive monitoring tool during supervision. Another area that the provinces need to pay attention to is in ensuring uniform reporting across all sectors, fiscal, health and education to facilitate meeting condtionalities. In sum, it is important that the provinces keep their promises and show a willingness to fully implement the actions to which they agree. The new provincial administration did not provide comments. (b) Cofinanciers: n.a. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): n.a. 10. Additional Information LETTER OF PROVINCIAL REFORM Translation June 30, 1997 Dear Mr. Wolfensohn 1. This letter describes the main objectives of the reforn program of the Province of San Juan as well as the actions to be taken in the areas of public finance, education and public health. To implement this reform, the Provincial government requests the fiscal and technical assistance of the World Bank. Below are the main components of the program. - 22 - 1. Background 2. The province of San Juan is a relatively poor province in the Northern region of Cuyo in Argentina. Its per capita income was about $4,200 in 1995, about half Argentina's average. Weak public administration led a to rapid growth in current expenditures and serious fiscal imbalances, marked by excessive public employment. In 1995, the provincial deficit reached 44% of current revenues, the wage bill absorbed 123% of the provincial net current revenues and the debt stock/revenue ratio was above 901%. 3. Due to lack of resources, capital expenditures were financed only from earmarked transfers from the central government and commercial. debt guaranteed by shared revenues. In the social sectors, the province faces serious poverty -- 19% of the families have non-satisfied basic needs. Performance in the social sectors is poor despite the high share of resources these sectors absorb. 2. Recent Development and Initial Adjustment 4. San Juan is well endowed with agricultural and mining resources and has attracted private investments in the last few years. However, it needs an efficient provincial economy in order to compete within an open trade framework. The provincial government is committed to create the favorable conditions of development within budgetary limits, favoring private imitative and social justice. The support of a favorable Parliament has been fundamental to speedily implement the proposed reforms since the provincial government was sworn in October 1995. 5. In 1996, the Provincial Government took the first steps aimed at restoring fiscal balance and reducing the size of government. These measures included: (a) reduction of the wage bill by 30%; (b) transference of the Provincial Pension Fund to the National government; (c) privatization of the provincial Bank and the electricity utility; (d) an ongoing privatization of the Water utility; (e) enactment of laws which allow flexibility and reduction of public employment (Ley de Licencia y Ley de Emergencia del Personal de Salud); (f) progressive decentralization and concession of public works and (g) beginning of 'Decentralization of Peripheral services" which will allow the privatization of central government departments. 6. As a result, the fiscal situation has improved: the current deficit fell from 53% of current revenues in 1995, to 4% in 1996, and the wage bill declined from 123% of net revenues to 76%. The debt stock is still high (84% of the current revenue) and there is a need for strict control in order to enable the province to reach a sustainable fiscal balance in two years and develop a future program of investment in the future, especially in the social sectors where we need priority investments oriented to our poor. 3. The Reform Program of the Province of San Juan 7. The strategy of the Provincial Government is to reduce the role of the public sector in the regional economy, promote participation of the private sector, restructure the provincial - 23 - government and ensure an efficient and responsive delivery of public services. For the period 1997-99, the program unfolds into the following components. 8. On the public finance front, the program calls for * Improvement in tax collection and administration to promote higher reliance on own-source revenues; * Civil service reform through personnel reform in selected areas, including privatization of public services; controls aimed at lowering absenteeism and overpayments, and measures to increase the quality and professionalism of public employment; * Rationalization of public expenditures and prioritization of government social spending, maintaining current spending levels for the social sectors. 9. In the social sectors, the government objective is to improve efficiency in the education and health sectors, focusing on demand and poverty-reduction aspects, while promoting major involvement by the private sector. * Education reform will ensure the extension of mandatory education (EGBII) and implementation of the "polimodal" as well as guarantee access to the poor within current budget constraints. Priority actions include: (a) increasing the student/teacher ratio and the ratio of teachers to total staff, (b) reduce the disproportionate use of temporary and substitute education personnel; (c) improve the incentives for quality achievement; (d) increase participation of the private sector; and (e) reduce administrative costs. * Health reforms will improve efficiency and equity m the health sector, notably by separating the provision and financing of public health services, implementing the law on hospital autonomy, increased cost recovery, consolidation hospital facilities, reducing excessive staff and reallocating resources to non-personnel expenditures, improving targeting to the poor, and increasing health insurance coverage (within current health budget constraints). 3.1 Public Finance 10. The provincial government is committed to obtain a sustained fiscal balance by the end of 1998, and to abide by strict creditworthiness rules. In particular, it intends to (a) obtain a current surplus every year, (b) reduce personnel expenditures to 60% of net current revenues; (c) assure fiscal surpluses large enough to reduce the debt stock to a sustainable level (less than 60% of recurrent revenues) while keeping investment levels an adequate level): (d) maintain the debt service at less than 15% of net revenues, even if this will be possible only after the debt stock is completely refinanced and restructured. 11. The fiscal objectives and benchmarks are shown in the Annex to this Letter. We estimate that is possible to increase current revenues and cut expenditures in personnel in a stable manner. - 24 - The instruments to be used to this end are the following: (a) Improved Tax Collection and Administration. 12. During 1996, the province's own-source tax revenues registered a substantial increase in relation to 1995, about 32%. If we include the increased taxes coming from special programs to encourage tax payment, that increase was 36%. This experience indicates that the province win be able to recover the drastic decline in own-source revenue that happened in 1995, and surpass the 1992-94 level by about 17%. 13. The provincial government. is committed to improve its tax management and administration. The revenue increases will be used to offset the likely decline after 1997, of extraordinary revenues associated with the tax amnesty, application of the CREFI to the payment of delinquent debts, compensated by the increase in revenues generated by the province itself. 14. To this aim, the province is finishing the Cadaster Project (urban and rural) which will lead to a major revaluation of the base of the property tax, with full impact in 1998. 15. The other component of the strengthening of own resource taxes is the Proyecto Integral de Rentas currently financed by Bank-supported projects (Provinces I and II). Given the time required to finish these projects and the urgency of improving the own-resources collection, the province has prepared a short action plan which will begin in the second half of 1997, and will allow estimates of the level of tax evasion which will guide auditing and lead to increases in the effective tax collection levels. Moreover, the identification of the determinants of the provincial tax collection will lead to the preparation of better projections in line with the tax resources. The province expects to have the first results of this short-run program in the first quarter of 1998. 16. Other programs, equally important, are being undertaken by the Tax Department with an important expected impact on tax collection levels: (a) strengthening of the System to control the large taxpayers (System 2,000); (b) cleaning of the Taxpayer Census; (c) implementation of the agreement to complement information with the DGI; (d) use of information produced by SICOM m relation with tax evasion or underpayment of the large tax payers. 17. Our preliminary estimates indicate that it will be feasible for the province to maintain the level of tax collection around $80 million during 1997 (despite the decline of revenues associated with the tax amnesty and the decline in fiscal credit bonds), and reach $83.5 million in 1998 and $91.2 million in 1999. (b) Civil Service Reform. 18. Personnel expenditures in San Juan represented 84% of net revenues in 1995, and 76% in 1996. The control of personnel costs is critical to the fiscal recovery of the province. In this context, the government has implemented a severe cut in the wages of the provincial staff which - 25 - reduced the wage bill substantially. In addition, there is a program to reduce public sector employment financed by BOCEP (Bonos para la Creacion de Empleo Privado), financed by the central government, that has led to separation packages of 692 people with a medium compensation of $14,000. 19. The government has considered a wide program of privatization of peripheral services to encourage the outsourcing of public services in the form of enterprises formed by public workers. The first experience was with several Mining Shops with very important and encouraging results. The government is preparing a program of civil service transformation aimed at (i) reducing the size of the work force; (ii) support and facilitate the insertion of ex-public workers into the private sector, (iii) improve the work conditions of those who remain in the public sector. 20. To this aim, the province is developing training programs, for the workers that remain in the public sector and for those that will enter the private sector through early retirement. In this last case, the program will be implemented taking advantage of the infrastructure and experience in the private sector through the offer of "vouchers" which will allow the beneficiaries to use them the best way in line with the market signs and their personnel preferences. The direct costs of the program will be financed with 2% of the amount of the retirement which will be financed in equal parts by the beneficiary and by the government. 21. Due to the drastic wage cut in 1996, the wage in many categories is very low, with very small wage differentials between categories and levels of responsibility. Large number of levels have wages that do not correspond to the responsibility and skills required for the job. The government will proceed in the reform of the wage scale, with the identification of critical positions, which will be able to become a professional public service and the restructuring of the wage scale for the whole public sector and the wage restructuring including criteria of productivity in the remuneration. 22. To be able to proceed with the objectives of its policy of human resource development, the provincial government will use other instruments such as voluntary retirement, transference of public workers employed in the provincial hotels. Water utility (Obras Sanitarias), casino, and the Bus Terminal -- all of which are being privatized -- as well as the design and execution of the early retirement program financed by own resources with attractive conditions for public sector workers. (c) Rationalizing Public Expenditure. 23. Together with the reduction in wage costs and improvement of tax collection, the government will continue the policy of no subsidies to public enterprises (now mostly privatized) and will ensure that public spending will be oriented to priority sectors having in line strict criteria of economic and financial justification. 24. Capital expenditures will increase from $56 million (9% of total expenditures) in 1996 to $76 million in 1998. Half will be financed by provincial public savings. The remaining will be financed by earmarked transfers from the center. The planned level of investment expenditures - 26 - would be reduced to the extent that the anticipated financing sources do not materialize. 25. The stock of debt will decline from US$401 million in 1996, to'US$288 million in 1999. New borrowing will be exclusively allowed to refinance old debt or finance amortization or well justified projects. 26. The Three year Public Expenditure Plan mirrors the priorities of the government, e.g. social sectors, poverty alleviation, including education, health, potable water and environment. All investment projects will have adequate justification, with an ERR of at least 10%. New public work projects should be submitted in line with the new Law of Purchases and Procurement to make them more open and to encourage private sector development. 27. To ensure the continuity of the process of transparency and budgetary accountability, the government will propose and pass in the Legislature a law of financial discipline based on four principles of financial management: (i) balanced annual budgets with current surplus -- no borrowing will be permitted to finance current expenditures; (ii) annual external auditing by independent auditors; (iii) limits in the debt stock below 65% of recurrent revenues and personal costs below 65% of net current revenues; (iv) public works will be procured in line with the new law of procurement of the province as it would be conducive to increased participation of the private sector. 3.2 Education 28. Framework: Education in the province of San Juan faces the challenge of extending compulsory education in line with the Federal Law on Education and improving efficiency and educational quality. In San Juan's education budget, the wage bill represents 99% of the total budget. The investment comes totally through National programs for a total of $11 million in 1996 (PRODYMES $1.7 million; PRISE $0.3 millions; BID $2.4 million; Plano Social Educativo, $4.6 million; Pacto Federal, $1.2 million and MCEN $0.9 million). The policy of the province is to be able to generate savings to be able to extend the third part of the basic education, within the current budgetary constraints, while recovering the wages of the teachers in line with the educational quality. 29. During 1996, the province undertook a deep adjustment in educational spending and took several decisions to face this situation. From 1995 to 1996, the budget allocated to education was cut by 29 %, that is, from $188.2 million to $134.8 million. The reduction came mainly from the cuts in wages in 1995 (Decree Agreement No 006/95) and the reorganization of the planta-funcional of the schools which allowed an increase in the student/teacher ratio from 13.8 to 16.7 in the public system between 1994/96. In terms of relevant laws, the province enacted (i) the law on leave for teachers (Ley sobre el nuevo sistema de Licencias y Franquicias); (ii) Emergency Education Law; (iii) the Provincial Education law; and (iv) the Law ratifying the Federal Pacto Educativo. 30. In the next years, the government will deepen the transformation of the educational sector - 27 - according to the following guidelines: (i) gradual expansion of the compulsory education; (ii) implementation of new curriculum together with teacher training; (iii) reform of the central administration of the Ministry of education and the decentralization of the financial administration m regions and towards the schools: (iv) the reorganization of the plantas-funcionales and (v) the restructuring the non-university Higher Education. 31. The govermnent wants to deepen the process of improving the administration of the educational sector to lower the wage bill to 94% of the total budget and generate a capacity of $5 million in two years. This level of investment (including training, incentives, equipment and maintenance, and infrastructure) will allow to increase quality, generate new school capacities and promote incentives in teachers. The reforms to reach this objective are the following: (i) improve the administration of the human resources; (h) improving the efficiency of the sector; (iii) promote decentralization of the sector, (iv) extend incentives to the private-, sector and (v) restructure the Teacher Training institutes. a) The improvement of the human resource administration will generate substantial savings. The administrative staff of the Ministry at the central level includes 373 people and could be reduced to 60 people. This will generate savings of about $0.6 year. The implementation of the new leave system and control of absenteeism (already full implemented) would generate another $0.1 million in 1998. Next year the government will create a wage system which will include a system of incentives and quality premia. b) To improve educational efficiency, the govermment will promote a better utilization of- the school structures. In the primary education, the Ministry of Education did a major re-arranging of people and infrastructure. The objective is to increase the student/teacher ratio to 19:1 in 1998. In the secondary education, it is, expected that savings will reach $2.8 millions by the reduction of 4,490 teaching hours. In 1997 and 1998, the potential savings is $0.3 millions pay the reordering of the classes size and the reduction of 125 teaching positions. c) The province is coimmitted to promote the decentralization of educational management and the optimization of the educational spending, promote the quality in the school to answer the needs in the poorest zones or where the levels of repetition or drop out are special high. The province is committed to develop a management model and create in 1997 an $2 million Incentive Fund to finance decentralized initiatives to improve quality and finance a program pilot schools. d) To promote the development of the private sector, the government aims at reducing the substantial dispersion in the per-student subsidy . The 1997 budget has allocated $16.3 million to 85 schools (out of 92) representing an average of $700 per student. A more equitable allocation would allow the promote new capacities and to improve the educational quality. This way of allocation by teachers is not equitable and does not provide incentives to the private sector which accounts for 14% of the enrolments. In 1997, the government will diagnosis the situation of the financing of the private sector and will prepare an action plan which will design alternatives of financing. In 1998, the province will adopt a system of subsidies according to a formula that will include the cost per student as well as regional factors and social indicators. - 28 - e) The Teacher Training institutes have been reformed since 1995. During 1996 and 1997, the number of teacher training institutes has declined to eight and four were converted into Technical schools. The government will continue reducing the enrollment to limit the institutes to six and reconvert six into technical schools. The further reduction in enrollments will lead to a decline in teaching hours (around 700) or I 1% budgetary savings. The annual budget for the teacher training institutes is actually $6.8 million. 32. The government of San Juan is committed to increase the educational budget so as to reach $146.7 million in 1998 so as to be able to maintain the wage bill, increase some the lowest wages and guarantee that the savings obtained by the proposed actions are used and invested within the sector to enable a better quality system. 33. Monitoring system. To be able to follow the evolution of the quality of the services rendered to the community, the government of San Juan will use the system of indicators (Table F5 in Annex) which will allow the government to monitor the way how the reform unfolds and the long-run impact in the education quality and school coverage. In primary school, the subsidies ranges between $135 and $469 for an average $265 and in die urban schools from 47 to 307; in the urban secondary schools the subsidy ranges from 147 to 950. In the institutions of teacher training the cost per student if $2,714 with a range of $731 and $4,550. The cost by graduate varies between $1,711 and $12,303 3.3 Health 34. The provincial government has given the first steps to reform the sector of public health especially in terms of paying the debts of the Obra Social Provincial, the reform of the purchasing contracts of the Obra Social Provincial and of Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica (SESP) , and the reductions in the staff which started in 1995-96. The government has planned larger reductions in personnel, taking into account (a) that the administrative positions will not exceed more dm 30% of the personnel; (b) the reductions i the personnel costs could contribute to change the structure of expenditures in favor of goods and services, non-personnel costs and investments. 35. These policies are based on strategic guidelines aiming at improve the efficiency of the expenditures in the sector, favoring the poor segments of the population and those without public health insurance. In this context the government has decided that (i) there will be no reductions in the health budget; (b) the revenues that accrue to the autonomous hospitals and other savings will be administered by the SESP and by the directors of the hospitals autonomous; (c) the savings obtained by the reduction in personnel costs will be allocated to increase inputs and non-personnel spending; (d) the government will develop a new model of management for hospital personnel, reform the payment system in the context of the SESP and the Obra Social Provincial, and there will be incentives to personnel based on productivity, efficiency and efficacy, financed by a percentage of the cost recovery. 36. To make these measures sustainable, the government reform program includes changes in - 29 - the following areas: * Public providers: to improve the efficiency of procurement and contracting, the legal framework will be reformed, including the direct management of the autonomous hospitals. * Financing: the restructuring and strengthening of the OSP, the development of laws and norms, management and information system to improve the billing and collection of the service payments that the hospitals made to the beneficiaries of the health insurance (public, private and mixed); the creation of a Provincial Health Insurance (Seguro Provincial ale Salud) which will include the resources of the OSP and the budget funds of the Secretary of Public Health. This Seguro Provincial de Salud will aim at improve the parameters of equity in the system, reaching the target population (poor and without insurance coverage) and to reach important savings by improvement of the efficiency in the allocation of funds. * In the Secretary of Public Health, the government will reform the institution, strengthen its capacity as controlling (financing and medical quality) and regulatory agency (notable by managing the health contracts with the autonomous hospitals). 37. The areas of intervention and the objectives are the following: * Personnel: the staff in the health public sector will decline to reach 3,800 employees; the costs in personnel will not exceed 70% of the sector budget * Autonomous Hospitals: Five hospitals will become autonomous (including the Hospital Quiroga) and the development plan to made Hospital Rawson autonomous will be prepared. These hospitals will be financed by the sale of their services within the budgetary limits. * Payment Systems: the government will develop a new payment system based on parameters that promote efficiency, productivity, and transparency of transactions. * Provincial Health System: the government will prepare and introduce in the legislature a draft law to create the new system. Moreover, the govermnent will obtain $1.8 million in cost recovery * Obra Social Provincial: the government will develop and implement the restructuring of the management of OSP and will complete its financial recovery * Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica: the SESP will be strengthened as agent of control and regulatory body of the public health system in the province 38. Monitoring System: To be able to follow up on the evolution of the quality of the services rendered to the community the provincial government will use the system of indicators in Table F6. 39. The provincial government is aware that the reform process will require the strengthening - 30 - of the SESP so it can undertake the financial, legal and management efforts needed to implement the reform. Technical assistance will be needed in the following areas: * redefinition of the legal framework and development of the administration model and management; * design of the new payment systems and implementation; * design of the legal framework for the Provincial Health Insurance; * institutional diagnosis of the OSP, restructuring plan and proposal of implementation; * design of the new structure of the SESP. 40. This program will be financed by PRESSAL (Ministry of Health), Provinces I e 11 (Ministerio de Interior), resources for the proposed loan and the funds of the province. 41. Financial Needs: Table H3 in Annex includes the 3 -year program which is compatible with the above program. 4. Impact of the Reform Program in Environment 42. Given the nature of the reform program, its implementation should have no negative impact on the environment. To this end, the government will undertake an environmental audit of the hospitals mentioned above financed by the technical assistance of PRESSAI, and before the transformation of the hospitals into autonomous hospitals. The terms of reference, the proposed consultant's CV, and the resulting report will be satisfactory to the Bank. The recommendations of the audits will be implemented by the Autonomous Public Hospital. The government is committed to review the legal and institutional framework -- which includes the organ of environment supervision -- regulating the management of the hospital pathologic waste. The government is also committed to implement the improvement in the legal framework which will be necessary, in line with the normal rules and standards, accepted by the Argentine Republic, to ensure the collection, transport treatment and final deposition of pathological wastes. 5. Letter of Provincial Reform of San Juan 43. In line with the above, the provincial government agrees that the National Government should include, in the Loan Agreement to be signed with the World Bank, one Annex with the details on the objectives considered in the Provincial Development Letter and referred to in the Policy Matrix attached. 6. Justification for the Request of World Bank Assistance 44. Mr. Wolfensohn, I would like to insist on the importance given by this province to the support of the Bank to our Provincial Reform Program. First, I would like to mention the importance of the financial support which will allow the financing of the adjustment costs and priority outlays. Second, I would mention the technical and professional support receive from your staff with whom we have worked. Third, the fact that the flank is supporting our program of reform gives us the confidence on the quality of our own program and will help us to attract the - 31 - private investors. Sincerely, Dr. Jorge A. Escobar - 32 - Policy Matrix Activity Accomplished Second Tranche Third Tranche General Condition Legal opinion confirming the constitutionality of the reforms included in the program and conditions of tranche disbursement PUBLIC FINANCE Fiscal Balance Agreement on targets for the Three - month current account Three month current account program surplus of at least US$2.5million surplus of at least $ 5 million equivalent equivalent ($20 million annualized Cut in personnel Identification of components Number of provincial public sector Personnel Cost equal to no more Cost and Conversion of Public staff is 1.140 lower than the than 65% of net current revenues Employment number of position budgeted in 1997 Provincial public sector staff is reduced by additional 617 position (excluding autonomous hospitals) Stock of Debt Debt has been restructured and Debt stock equal to or less than short -term debt has been replaced 60% of current revenues by longer term debt Enactment of Law of Financial Discipline as mentioned in the LPR Tax Reform Structure of vehicle tax has been Provincial tax structure has been simplified. Infrastructure to substantially simplified, notably connect data basis between with respect to the urban and rural Direction General de Rentas and property taxes. cadaster has been substantially installed . Prepared to fiither simplify taxes Public Expenditure Program Agreement on a 3 year PEP which Positive Review by the Bank Positive Review by the Bank, (until 1999) is consistent with the objective of Extemal Auditing of the Provincial Extemal Auditing of the Provincial the Program and is included in the Public Accounts; public disclosure Public Accounts; public disclosure Letter of Provincial Reform of audit reports. of audit reports - 33 - EDUCATIONAL POLICY REFORM Improve Administration of Human Prepared new leave system Implemented new program to Resources Invitation for bids for award of the control sick leave and absenteeism. contract to control public school Creation of Incentive Fund to sick leave and absenteeism provide support to secondary and polimodal schools Increase Educational Efficiency First consolidation at primary level Consolidation in primary public Student: teacher ratio is maintained education to increase the student: at no less than 19:1 in primary New stnicturesplantas teacher ratio to 17:1 public schools organico-funcionales (POF) approved and implemented at the middle level Activity Accomplished Second Tranche Third Tranche Teacher Training Institutes Reduce the number of enrollments Limit the teacher training institute Limit the teacher training institute to seven and Tecnicaturas to six; to no more than six Transform or closed excessive savings will be 700 teaching hours public teacber training institute ( 11%) per 50faculty positions Sector Management Agreement on Budget and public Sought legislative authorization to Sought legislative authorization for expenditure program. make available an amount education budget equal to that for equivalent in real terms to at least 1996 or at least $150 million the annual amount budgeted for equivalent whichever is higher; 1996 or equivalent to at least $146 percentage spent in wages is equal million to no more than 94% of education sector expenditures Wage bill is equal to no more than 96.5% of the sector budget Sought legislative authorization to Sought legislative authorization so have savings in the personnel stay in that budget amount will be the sector and finance non-personnel maintained and will not be costs transferred to other sectors and that saving in personnel will be used to finance invests and bonus costs Sought legislative authorization to Sought legislative authorization to have safeguards in place to maintain have safeguards in place to education budget maintain education budget Private Sector Incentives Prepared TOR an ensured the Formula of public schools subsidies financing of technical assistance to implemented in private schools prepare basic formula for private school subsidies - 34 - HEALTH SECTOR REFORM Sector Budget Plan of Expenditures discussed; Sought legislative authorization to Sought legislative authorization so 1997 health budget maintains at use savings from reductions in staff that (i) budget at least at the 1996 least the 1996 level in real prices to provide performance incentives level in real prices ;(ii) budget (presented to legislature for or finance investments or inputs, to amounts will be maintained and will approval) maintain sector budget at no less not be transferred to other sector than real 1996 budget levels, and to and (iii) savings in personnel will be actually allow full use of budget. used to finance invests and bonus costs Personnel Agreement in targets and the Staff reduced to 4.150 by Personnel cost represents at most mechanics to reduce personnel outsourcing and other separation 72% of health budget mechanism Staff of Health Secretary reduced to 3,800 total permanent and temporary Autonomous Hospitals Agreement on strategy to separate At least five hospitals have become At least five hospitals have become provision from financing of public autonomous. autonomous. health services. New payment system is New payment system is Completion of terms of reference for implemented in decentralized implemented in decentralized design of new payment system hospitals hospitals Activity Accomplished Second Tranche Third Tranche Provincial Health Insurance Agreement to create a Provincial Completion of Roster with potential Presenting to Legislature Law to Health Insurance to province health beneficiaries of the new insurance create a new Provincial Health insurance to those not covered by system (poor) Insurance any other system. Completion of terms of reference for Definition of the Medical Program design of new health benefits applicable to the poor and OSP package Roster with beneficiaries of the new insurance system (obra social) Obras Sociales Provinciales Plan to improve structure with new Implementation of the new organization management structure Restructuring of the of the Agreement to change the Secretariat New structure in place Secretariat of Health of Health into a regulator agency - 35 - Change in Own-Source Revenues by Province 1996-2000 (US$ 000) PRL-2 Provinces 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Growth .________________________ ____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 96-2000 Rio Negro 124,120.0 129,720.8 147,502.6 135,428.2 141,852.1 14.3% Salta 115,031.6 130,543.0 133,560.1 146,925.9 142,424.7 23.8% San Juan 79,313.6 91,389.0 100,168.2 90,432.4 92,161.0 16.2% Tucuman 150,007.7 166,957.0 179,318.3 179,107.9 188,125.7 25.4% Sub-Total 468,472.9 518,609.8 560,549.2 551,894.4 564,563.5 20.5% NON PRL-2 Provinces Sub-Total 9,333,461.2 10,378,610.2 11,089,894.0 10,410,055.0 10,295,941.3 10.3% TOTAL PROVINCES Total 9,801,934.1 10,897,220.0 11,650,443.2 10,961,949.4 10,860,504.8 10.8% Change in Personnel Expenditure by Province 1996-2000 PRL-2 Provinces 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Growth _____________ ____________ ______________ _______________ ______________ ______________ _____________ _ 96-2000 Rio Negro 391,865.3 383,556.0 386,949.7 377,392.7 374,218.7 -4.5% Salta 467,365.9 458,324.3 462,830 6 474,718.7 459,137.6 -1.8% San Juan 317,479.8 347,125.7 386,195.0 400,344.7 417,793.7 31.6% Tucuman 507,825.0 538,765.0 522,370.0 557,937.0 548,431.3 8.0% Sub-Total 1,684,536.0 1,727,771.0 1,758,345.3 1,810,393.1 1,799,581.3 6.8% NON PRL-2 Provinces | i r Sub-Total 13,067,621.3 13,919,037.1 15,077,395.5 16,207,831.3 16,896,438.0 29.3% TOTAL PROVINCES _ r Total 14,752,157.3 15,646,808.10 16,835,740.8 18,018,224.4 18,696,019.3 26.7% - 36- Letter to Governor Avelin: Summary of ICR 14 de junio de 2001 Dr. Alfredo Avelin Gobernador de San Juan Paula A. de Sarmiento 134 Norte (5400) San Juan Ref: Segundo Programa de Reforma Provincial (4220-AR) Estimado Sr. Gobernador: Me dirijo a usted para presentarle la sintesis del informe final sobre el Segundo Pr6stamo de Reforma Provincial (PRL II), con el fin de analizar el desarrollo del mismo, y compartir con usted algunas reflexiones acerca del programa. En primer lugar, entendemos que el programa fue inicialmente acordado con el anterior gobemador y que muchas de las fallas en terminos de objetivos alcanzados pueden atribuirse a la falta de control fiscal durante los ultimos meses de la administraci6n precedente. Al mismo tiempo, las negociaciones que mantuvimos con funcionarios de su gobierno indican que ellos comparten nuestro interes en continuar con los esfuerzos puestos en trabajar sobre el rendimiento y la eficiencia fiscal, la calidad y equidad en los gastos resaltados en el diagn6stico inicial, y en el disefio del programa subsiguiente. Efectivamente, las acciones realizadas parcialmente en la reforma del sector salud muestran un compromiso por parte de la provincia en estos temas. Como sabra, el objetivo de ayudar a la provincia de San Juan a reformar su sector publico, asi como el de asegurar una eficiente y responsable prestaci6n de servicios puiblicos en educaci6n y salud junto con politicas fiscales de relevancia no han sido alcanzados aiu. Aunque la provincia cumpli6 con los objetivos del segundo tramo en las areas fiscales y sociales de educaci6n y de salud, esos esfuerzos se vieron reducidos durante los ultimos meses de la administraci6n anterior y, posteriormente, no fueron adoptados de forma inmediata ni energica por el nuevo equipo. - 37 - En materia fiscal, se realizaron con exito las primeras medidas destinadas a encaminar el balance fiscal y reducir el tamafno del gobierno en 1996. Bajo el programa, el gobierno busc6 alcanzar y mantener un superavit, reducir el gasto en personal relativo y el stock de deuda, manteniendo, mientras tanto, las inversiones a un nivel adecuado. Con respecto al gasto, no se asociaron las medidas para aumentar los salarios, luego del principal ajuste de 1996, con los esfuerzos para mejorar el sistema del servicio civil para mejorar el rendimiento. Ademas, estos aumentos tampoco fueron sostenidos ni se realizaron ajustes en otras areas a la luz del deterioro de la economia hacia finales de 1998. La tendencia a aumentar los gastos en personal no ha sido revertida durante su administraci6n. Como resultado, este gasto creci6 el 20% a lo largo del periodo 1997-2000, comparado con el de las demas provincias del programa, donde el crecimiento fue menor al 2%. En cuanto a los ingresos, no fueron sostenidos los aumentos iniciales en la recaudaci6n de impuestos y, de hecho, se deterioraron luego de 1998, lo que contribuy6 a empobrecer el rendimiento fiscal. Para el futuro, estamos motivados por la decisi6n de la provincia de participar en el programa federal de asistencia a las deudas provinciales bajo el fondo fiduciario, y le deseamos el mejor de los 6xitos en el logro del objetivo de alcanzar el balance fiscal en el afio 2004. En materia educativa, los estudios que se Ilevaron a cabo durante la misi6n de preparaci6n encontraron que la educaci6n en la provincia de San Juan estaba caracterizada por altos costos y bajos resultados, que presentaba problemas de equidad, y que el gasto en personal dominaba el presupuesto del sector, dejando poco lugar para financiar otros insumos e inversiones. Por medio del programa, se busc6 extender la educaci6n basica, y mejorar la eficiencia, calidad y equidad, dentro de un contexto de importantes limitaciones fiscales y reajuste de salarios. Los ahorros para financiar estos cambios fueron generados a traves de las mejoras en la administraci6n de los recursos humanos, del aumento de la proporci6n entre alumnos y maestros, y de la reducci6n del uso de maestros sustitutos. Estos logros generaron, hacia 1998, la disminuci6n de los gastos en personal educativo mejorando, incluso, el objetivo inicial del programa. Auin asi, se recomienda que las refornas iniciadas deben ser continuadas y monitoreadas a fin de que no se deterioren. El nuevo sistema de retiro implementado con exito debe ser controlado, dado que los indicadores han comenzado a elevarse nuevamente. Si bien se ha mostrado un compromiso por continuar con las refornas, es necesaria una mayor voluntad para implementar el ajuste necesario en el nivel de salarios junto con la implementaci6n de un nuevo sistema de pagos basado en los meritos, asi como tambien mas medidas para descentralizar las decisiones en materia educativa. En el sector salud, los estudios preparatorios indicaron que una cantidad sustancial de recursos de la provincia de San Juan estaba destinada a este sector, pero que la equidad del servicio provisto a los sectores carenciados era muy pobre. Para promover un mejor y mas eficiente servicio de salud, el programa busc6 apoyar la transformaci6n de los hospitales publicos en hospitales descentralizados. Los primeros pasos comenzaron en 1995 y 1996 por medio de la reducci6n de personal y la intervenci6n de la obra social de los empleados piublicos, con el objeto de ponerla sobre bases financieras sostenibles. Los logros obtenidos con estas reformas apoyaron la implementaci6n de un seguro de salud para los pobres, medida que super6 las expectativas del programa. Por otro lado, el objetivo de separar la provisi6n de servicios de salud puiblica de su financiaci6n fue demasiado ambicioso para un programa de 2 afios. A comienzos de 1999, con la - 38 - legislaci6n sobre descentralizaci6n en vigencia, la provincia comenz6 con el proceso de descentralizaci6n de hospitales en dos grandes hospitales de la capital provincial, donde tambien se estableci6 un exitoso sistema de recuperaci6n de costos. A pesar de los avances logrados en este aspecto, es necesario contar con mas esfuerzos. Al mismo tiempo, continua siendo necesario que se tomen medidas tendientes a consolidar las facilidades hospitalarias y mejorar la calidad del servicio. Por otra parte, habria que mejorar el acceso de los servicios de salud a los sectores pobres y proporcionarles un sistema de seguro medico. En total, se reconocen las reformas implementadas en este sector, pero dado que algunas han sido revertidas, seria muy conveniente que se acentuen los esfuerzos a fin de reducir el exceso de personal y reasignar recursos en inversiones. A pesar de que los objetivos del tercer tramo del prestamo no se alcanzaron, creemos que la profundizaci6n de las reforTnas iniciadas, junto con el fortalecimiento institucional y una voluntad explicita por mantener los programas en ejecuci6n, pueden ayudar a avanzar en aquellas areas a donde todavia quedan reformas por llevar a cabo. Sin otro particular, me despido de usted atentamente, Myma Alexander Directora Direcci6n Subregional Argentina, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay c.c.: Cdor. Hugo Garnero, Subsecretario de Relaciones con las Provincias Dra. Gloria Rutti, Coordinadora del Proyecto - 39 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: tndicatormarix PrTjee in last PSR ActualLat Estimate PUBLIC FINANCE January-March 1999: surplus in current Current deficit projected to reach $30 million Fiscal balance: obtain a current surplus spending of $4.4 million, but deficit of 5% of for year 2000 every year; current revenues for the entire year 1999. (b) Reduce wage bill to 60% of net current Reached 81% for 1999. Estimated at 78% for 2000 revenues. (c) Reduce debt stock to less than 60% of Estimated at 110% for 1999. Estimated at 105% for 2000 recurrent revenues while keeping investment levels an adequate level. (d) Tax administration reform. Tax structure simplification for: tumover tax, Collections declined by 10% in 1999, but are stamp tax, automobile tax. Updated cadaster back up slightly in 2000. helped to double collection of property tax during during 1996-98, with overall increse of 25%. EDUCATIONAL POLICY REFORM The Incentive Fund established and Sick leaves reported to be on the rise again. (a) Administration of human resources: implemented in 1999. 25% of sick leaves implement new program to control teachers' reduced by 1998 sick leave and absenteeism; create Incentive Fund to provide support to secondary and polimodal schools. (b) Educational efficiency: consolidation of Student-teacher ratio: 17:1 achieved in More recent figures not supplied by province. primary educaton classes to increase the 1998-99 student-teacher ratio to 17:1 in the first phase and 19:1 in the second phase. (c) Teacher training institutes: limit number 7 teacher training insttutes remain. 7 teacher training institutes remain of institutes to seven; (d) Sector management: 1998 educaton Expenditure in education: $182 million in More recent figures not supplied by province. budget is at least $146 million, with wage bill 1998-99. Personnel: 88% of the budget 1998 at 96.5% of the budget; savings in the personnel stay in the sector and finance non-personnel costs. (e) Private schools: implement Public subsidies to private schools at 10% of New system not fully implemented and under formula-based subsidies for private schools. total sector spending in 1999 review by new administration. HEALTH SECTOR REFORM 1999 budget: at $85.6 million. More recent figures not supplied by province. (a) Sector budget: Savings from reductions in staff is used to finance performance incentives, investments or inputs. 1998 and 1999 budget are at least at the 1996 level in real prices. (b) Personnel; Staff reduced to 4,150 by Personnel cost: 80% of health budget in No recent figures, but new interest in outsourcing and other separaton 1997-98. Health staff reduced to 4145 in bringing down staff costs, with new mechanism. Personnel cost represents at 1999 proposals for downsizing. most 72% of 1998 health budget. Staff of Health Secretary reduced to 3,800. (c) Autonomous hospitals. In first phase, 5 The two largest hospitals in the province, Decentralizabon effort stalled, but renewed hospitals will become autonomous; new Quiroga and Rawson, have implemented the interest recently shown. payment system is implemented in reforms in 1999. They have advanced the decentralized hospitals: In the second phase Third Tranche target two additional hospitals become autonomous. -40 - (d) Provincial health insurance. Completion 25.000 people enrolled in the new program. Province is maintaining approach, but new of roster with potential beneficiaries of the 300-500 beneficaries added daily administration is proposing new needs-based new insurance system (poor); definition of methodology. the Medical Program applicable to the poor and OSP; (d) Introduction in the provincial Assembly Law to create a new the Provincial Health Insurance; (e) Obras Sociales Provinciales: Operating surplus attained in past two years. Update not supplied by province, but OSP Implementation of the new structure still under intervention. (f) Restructuring of the Secretariat of Health Output Indicators: IndicatorlMatrix Projeced in last PSR ActuaIJLatst Estmate End of project -41 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Total Baseline Cost 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 0.00 Total Financing Required 0.00 0.00 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 _________L= __________=_ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 _____________________ ={(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 == , (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 I (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -42- 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) " Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in USS million equivalent) Perentage of Appraisal Componert Appraisal Estimate AtuaVL*test Est te - - Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CF. Rank Govt CoF, -43 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits -44 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 12/96 7 TM, FM, EcF, PS, SS, ED, PS Appraisal/Negotiation 4/97 7 T, EcF, SS, ED, PS, C, C 12/97 8 TM, EcF, SS, ED, SS, PS, C, S S C 2/98 2 TM, PSM S S 4/98 1 EcF S S 5/98 5 TM, PSM, ED, Hlth, SS S S 9/98 4 TM, ED, PSM, Hlth S S 4/99 4 TM, PSM, Hlth, ED S S 6/99 3 TM, Hlth, ED, PSM S S 9/99 4 TM,Hlth, ED, PSM U S 12/99 2 TM, Hlth U S 3/00 4 TM, PSM, ED, Hlth U HU 5/00 3 TM, Hith, ED U HU ICR 9/00 1 TM U HU 10/00 2 Hlth, C U HU 11/00 2 ED, C U HU (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 20 $73,531 Appraisal/Negotiation 6 $29,482 Supervision 20 $49,700 $30. 600 (WPA) ICR 7 $43,900 (WPA) Total 53 $152,713 (direct) $74,500 (WPA) -45 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating aMacro policies O H OSUOM * N O NA I Sector Policies O H OSUOM O N O NA O Physical O H OSUOM O N * NA OI Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA O Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA OI Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social El Poverty Reduction 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA L7i Gender OH OSUOM ON *NA l Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N o NA LI Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA O Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA I Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N o NA -46 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bankperformance Rating D Lending OHS OS OU OHU O Supervision OHS OS OU OHU O Overall OHS OS O U O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating O Preparation OHS OS O U O HU D Government implementation performance OHS OS O U O HU O Implementation agency performance O HS O s 0 U 0 HU El Overall OHS OS * u O HU - 47 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Report and Recommendation of the President (Report No. P-7 1 36-AR) Intensive Learning ICR for Salta (Report No. 20698) Intensive Learning ICR for Tucuman (Report No. 20699) Release of the Second Tranche (SecM99) Project File containing Bank documents and provincial progress reports) -48 - -49 - IBRD 29348 1 71o ? r ~~~~~~~~~~61O 51so - -20
Группа Всемирного банка · Implementation Completion and Results Report
Argentina - Second Provincial Reform Loan Project - San Juan
Открыть оригинал документа
Полный текст размещён на сайте публикующей организации. lawenc.com индексирует метаданные и ведёт на официальный источник.
Полный текст
Основные сведения
Организация
Группа Всемирного банка
Тип документа
Implementation Completion and Results Report
Страна
Аргентина
Источник
Всемирный банк