Ghana - Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 23406 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-26950; PPFI-P8980) ONA LOAN/CREDIT/GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ MILLION TO THE GHANA FOR A VOCATIONAL SKILLS AND INFORMAL SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT 12/28/2001 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their | official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective) Cunrency Unit = Cedis I Cedis = US$ 0.000138 US$ I = 7250 Cedis FISCAL YEAR January I Decernber 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Country Manager/Director: Peter C. Harrold Sector Manager/Director: Rosemary T. Bellew Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Ferdinand Tsri Apronti  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GHANA Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support Project CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 7 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10 6. Sustainability 11 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 13 8. Lessons Learned 18 9. Partner Comments 20 10. Additional Information 29 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 31 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 33 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 35 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 36 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 38 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 39 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 40 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   Project ID: P000948 Project Name: Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support Project Team Leader: Ferdinand Tsri Apronti TL Unit: AFTQK ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 28, 2001 1. Project Data Name: Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support L/C/TF Number: IDA-26950; Project PPFI-P8980 Country/Department: GHANA Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: EV - Vocational/Technical Education & Training; SY - Other Social Protection KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 07/24/1992 Effective: 09/19/1995 09/1911995 Appraisal: 06/03/1994 MTR: 12/10/1997 04/24/1998 Approval: 03/28/1995 Closing: 06/30/2001 06/30/2001 Borrower/lmplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/Ministry Of Education Other Partners: Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Edward V. K. Jaycox Country Manager: Peter C. Harrold Olivier Lafourcarde Sector Manager: Rosemary Bellew Ian Porter Team Leader at ICR. Ferdinand Tsri Apronti Nicholas Bennett ICR Primary Author: Eliezer Orbach 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: U Sustainability: UN Institutional Development Impact: N Bank Performance: U Borrower Performance: U QAG (if available) ICR Qtuality at Entry: Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The objectives of the project were stated in several places in the SAR and in many other project documents. The statements are not identical, and the assessment here is based on the 'Project Objectives' section and Annexes 5.1 and 5.2 in the SAR. Basically, the project had two goals: "to promote the development of the informal sector" and to "provide an enabling environment for employment creation and income generation in the micro and small enterprise sector". To achieve the first goal the Government formulated four objectives: "to redirect all vocational and technical training institutions in the country towards the provision of short, focused, practical, competency-based, demand-driven training for people already in employment" and "to improve the level of technical entrepreneurial skills of mastercraftsmen and apprentices in the informal sector", "to help create new businesses and improve existing micro and small informal sector enterprises" and "to improve inforrmal sector product quality and productivity in five selected areas". To achieve the second goal, the Government formulated one objective: "to ensure that an institutional capacity is created for the Govermnent to have access to regular labor force, employment and earnings data". In its completion report, the Government is stating that the Bank did not accurately capture in the SAR the desire of the Ghanaian team (i) to switch the emphasis of regular VOTEC delivery in some 400 training institutions from technical to vocational training and (ii) to contain the unsustainable levels of public subsidies and high training costs associated with long, full-time formal training of apprentices. Responsiveness of the Objectives to Borrower Development Priorities, Their Relevance to the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and Their Realism Ghana's development priorities in the early 1990s were to reduce poverty through accelerated growth. These objectives were elucidated in a joint Government of Ghana/World Bank study published in 1993. They were also included in the Ghana CAS, discussed and approved by the Board on April 14, 1994. The project's development objectives are fully responsive to these priorities. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, around 40% of all employment in Ghana was in the informal sector, and this sector was growing at an annual rate of more than 5% and generating over 20% of GDP. Thus, supporting its development, and helping it improve its productivity was fully in line with the priority of accelerated growth. The Government's strategy to develop the informal sector and improve its productivity relied, among others, on the upgrading of skills in the sector through training. The project focused on the strengthening of institutions involved in the direction and delivery of such training. Thus, the project's objectives were in line with Government priorities. The CAS made specific mention not only of these priorities, but also of the project itself. Most objectives were realistic in a general sense. They could have been achieved, at least to some extent, with good project design and adequate implementation. The Design of the Project The assessment of project design is based on a notion that an optimal design aligns the features of the product, or service, with the needs of the client. For each need, there is a matching feature in the architecture of the product or the service. A project is, therefore, optimally designed when - 2 -  each of its key features covers a client need, and when all important client needs are covered by matching features. Nine key design features are reviewed in this report and are summarized: * Project focus - the Government, with support and advice from the Bank, chose to focus on the enhancement of skills and the provision of tools. The main goal of the project was to develop the informal sector. The masters and apprentices indeed needed help to improve their skills and to acquire tools of trade, but they needed help also in setting themselves up in business and finding employment - mostly, self-employment in the informal sector. At least three additional factors were equally important: access to credit, access to production sites, and post-training support and advice. But these were not included in the project - neither as components nor as structured links to agencies that provide them. * Project oversight - the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MESW) was the key ministry concerned with the development of the informal sector in Ghana. It was also a major trainer of apprentices, through its National Vocational Training Institutes (NVTI). The Ministry of Education (MOE) was involved in the non-formal sector, but not as its core business. The two ministries ran parallel, competing examination and certification systems for apprentices. The Government, with Bank support, chose the MOE as the lead ministry for the project. It is believed that the MESW, or an office above the two ministries, would have been a better choice. * Project implementing agency - the need was for an overall coordinating agency strong enough to implement the project efficiently - in the face of considerable difficulties, not the least of which was the obvious conflict between the two ministries involved. The Government chose NACVET, even though it did not have a legal mandate and, therefore, adequate authority. NACVET was an extremely weak organization. Its position as the key implementing agency was further weakened by placing the project manager inside the Project Management Unit (PMU) of the MOE, and dividing project management responsibilities - in a very unclear way - between NACVET and the PMU. * The target population - The need was to include not only apprentices but also master craftsmen. The traditional apprenticeship system at the time relied on very basic techniques of production and out of date technologies. Many master craftsmen had only crude tools and lacked advanced technical knowledge. Had the training been provided only to apprentices, they would have returned to their masters' workshop where there would be no opportunity to practice what they had learned. The project was designed indeed to include both apprentices and masters. * The selection of training institutions by the trainees - the need was (a) to mobilize training institutions that had adequate capacity for the delivery of the anticipated training, and (b) to provide each trainee a realistic choice of training institutions. The project was designed to meet both of these needs. It included an assessment of potential training institutions and a component aimed at helping the institutions selected to improve their capacity. It also mobilized a large number of institutions and by gave the trainees intake vouchers with which they could go to the institution of their choice and receive training there. * The choice of trade areas - the project was limited to five trades. The need was to choose areas where the demand for training was high. Furthermore, the very active role played by women in the informal sector meant that to be responsive both to demand and to the principle of gender equity, it would be good to include in the project a 'fair' number of trades followed predominantly by women. The Government selected the following five trades: Electrical Installations, Carpentry and Joinery, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning, Dress-making and - 3 -  Tailoring, Blocklaying and Concreting. From a demand point of view, the selection was right for four out of the five trades. Refrigeration and Air Conditioning was selected based on policy considerations rather than demand. From a gender equity point of view, only one out of the five trades - Dress-making and Tailoring - was indeed a female-oriented trade. * The modalities for skills' acquisition during instruction - the need was to balance the theoretical content with practical application and to deliver the training in a way that will ensure mastery. Until that time, all formal training courses for apprentices in MOE and NVTI institutions were very long and very theoretical. Their focus was not on the achievement of mastery in specific well-defined skills. The training provided in the project was designed to be short, highly practical and competency-based. This was a very good design feature of the project. * The provision of trade tools to the trainees on easy terms at the end of training - the trainees were going to be trained to use many trade tools. Most masters were not likely to have all of these tools. The need was to make sure that the trainees do not forget the skills that they had learned in the formal training once they return to their masters' workshops. This need was met by allowing them, and the masters, to acquire the tools. * The recruitment channels - the project was planned for the training of 20,400 apprentices and 4,500 masters. This meant a large recruitment operation requiring multiple channels. The trainees were to come not only from urban areas, but also from rural ones, requiring significant capacity on the ground to reach these areas. The Government, with Bank advice, selected trade associations as the only recruitment channel for trainees, even though it was possible to use additional channels. While there is no doubt that the project itself, its very idea, addressed a need and was well justified, the conclusion reached here is that only some of its features were well-designed. Key features, such as the choice of focus areas, oversight ministry and implementing agency, were not well designed. The Govermment agrees that several key features were not designed well, indeed, saying in its own completion report that "with hindsight, not all of the design hypotheses were valid". It is concluded, therefore, that the project as a whole was not well designed. 3.2 Revised Objective: The objectives of the project were not formally revised. However, there was a formal revision of one of the output targets, namely, the number of apprentices to be trained. Originally, the target was to train 20,400 apprentices. This target was changed to 15,000 apprentices. Also, as the implementation of the project proceeded, the Bank's project team started viewing the project as a pilot, close in nature to a LIL. The objective of the pilot, if it were to be formally formulated, would have been to demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of short, practical, competency-based training. However, this objective is not reflected in the SAR and other preparatory documents, and the project was not designed as a demonstration project. 3.3 Original Components: The project comprised of the following basic components: (a) apprentice training; (b) training of mastercraftsmen; (c) financing of training; (d) support to apprentices and masters; (e) training program development; (f) training of instructors; (g) institutional strengthening of NACVET; (h) tracer studies; (i) labor market data base, and () support for project management and coordination. 3.4 Revised Components: -4-  N/A 3.5 Quality at Entry: To assess the project's quality at entry, it was assumed that an adequate quality at entry depends on meeting five conditions. The conditions are as follows: * The project must fall within a well-conceived policy framework * The project's goals, objectives and strategies must be consistent with such a policy framework, and/or with Government's stated priorities, as well as the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy * The project must be well designed * The preparatory work done following the design stage must be adequate * The project's implementing agencies must have at least core capacity to start implementing the project when it is launched The second and third factors have been dealt with in previous sections; the rest are discussed in this section. The Existence of a Policy Framework Bearing in mind that the goals and objectives of the project were to support the development of the informal sector in Ghana, mainly through the training of master craftsmen and apprentices, Ghana had to have a policy framework both for the development of the informal sector and for the delivery of technical and vocational training. The elements of a policy framework for the development of the private sector were in place at the time, but project documents do not include a description of these elements. As to a policy framework for the delivery of technical and vocational training in Ghana, it is clear that the Government did not have a comprehensive and agreed framework. Issues such as the division of labor between all the ministries involved in training, and particularly between the MESW and the MOE, were not resolved. No policy decisions were made yet with respect to the two competing systems of testing and certification for artisans. The role, the mandate and the legal status of NACVET, were not settled yet. Many more policy issues were awaiting decision at that time - and are still awaiting decision today. This is reflected in the facts that the Government set up a working group to develop a TVET policy framework some two years ago and that a draft framework has been produced recently. The draft has not yet been discussed by the Government. The lack of a policy framework influenced negatively both the design and the implementation of the project. From a design point of view, it was important to know what would be the division of labor among the agencies involved. This would have helped determine which agency would be responsible for what routine service and for what component in the project. It would have then helped to design a capacity building program for each agency in line with its role and responsibilities. From an implementation point of view, it was important to settle the turf conflict between the MOE and the MESW. This conflict was bound to diminish collaboration and slow - 5-  down the project - and it did. Equally, it was important to settle the status of NACVET and grant it the necessary legal mandate before the project commenced, if it were to be the key implementing agency. This would have bolstered its authority, given it access to additional resources, and facilitated project implementation. From a policy point of view, then, the project was not ready for implementation at entry. The Adequacy of Preparatory Work Despite the length of time taken to prepare the project, it was not ready for implementation at entry. Most project supervision reports state that "in the first two years, the project was in a learning curve and in the mode of setting up systems and processes for project implementation, monitoring and evaluation". Indeed, many tasks that were to be completed during preparation were eventually carried out during the first two years of implementation and even later. These included, for example, the preparation of the implementation manual, the development of curricula and training materials for the five training courses, the design and printing of the intake vouchers, the finalization of the bidding document, and the design of a system for the distribution of the tools, the collection of payments and the establishment of a revolving fuind. These, and other tasks, greatly delayed the actual implementation of project activities. The examples given above refer to tasks that the MOE and NACVET planned to carry out during the preparation period and eventually did not. One type of task that could have contributed positively to the implementation of the project, but was not contemplated, is logistical or operational planning. Many of the operations included in the project were logistically complex and could have benefited from such planning. But this was not done. Based on all of the above, it is concluded that the Government did not meet the condition requiring adequate preparation before project commencement. The Capacity of Implementing Agencies NACVET, the key implementing agency had almost no capacity at the time that the project commenced. It lacked the necessary legal status, had almost no staff, no management systems and no work systems, no office space, and no office equipment. It had no technical and managerial experience in the area of vocational training. The lack of capacity was recognized as a main risk to the project. The risk was addressed by obtaining Government assurances to transfer key management and professional staff to NACVET, and by the including a number of capacity building activities in the project. Indeed some 23 professionals, administrators and laborers were transferred to NACVET before the project commenced, but many of them were not up to a reasonable standard and have never worked together as a team. Their presence did not give NACVET the core capacity needed at entry. NACVET also lost many of them later on and is smaller today than it were when the project was launched. The Labor Department at the MESW, and the Tracer Studies Unit at the MOE, had similar problems. The Labor Department at the MESW was so short of staff, that the Bank made it a condition of disbursement to address the shortage. It took two years to bring in the necessary staff and remove the condition, and in this case too, five out of seven staff left soon thereafter. - 6 -  The PMU was the only unit that had core capacity when the project commenced, but its capacity was limited to matters of procurement and disbursement. In conclusion it appears that none of the five conditions for adequate quality at entry was met. Three conditions were reviewed in this section. The other two were reviewed earlier. The project was not based on an adequate policy framework and its strategic focus was too narrow to achieve key goals. Taken together, the conclusions reached with respect to each of the five factors that affect quality at entry lead to one overall conclusion that the project's quality at entry was low. The Government agrees with this conclusion and has rated it in its own report as unsatisfactory. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The first goal of the project was to promote the development of the informal sector. According to the SAR, three indicators were to be used to assess the achievements of this goal: "growth of the informal [sector's] contribution to national development", "improved product quality and types" and "improved entrepreneurial skills." These indicators have not been operationalized and no information was collected on them. The second goal of the project was to provide an enabling environment for employment creation and income generation. Two indicators were to be used in assessing the achievement of this goal: the "levels of govermment financial [support] for informal sector training and job creation activities", and the "overall improvement in efficiency, profitability and productivity of MSE operations". These indicators too have not been operationalized and no information was collected on them. The project had five objectives - four emanating from the first goal and one emanating from the second goal: (a) to redirect vocational training institutions in the country "towards the provision of short, focused, practical, competency-based, demand-driven training for people already in employment", (b) to improve the level of technical entrepreneurial skills of mastercraftsmen and apprentices in the informal sector, (c) to help create new businesses and improve existing micro and small informal sector enterprises, (d) to improve informal sector product quality and productivity in five selected areas, and (e) to ensure that an institutional capacity is created for the Government to have access to regular labor force, employment and earnings data. It is stated in the SAR that five indicators would be used to assess the achievement of the first four objectives, but none of them has been operationalized and little or no information was collected on them. No indicator was provided for the fifth objective. A summary of all the indicators provided in the SAR is presented in Table I Annex 1. The following assessment is based, therefore, on a general analysis of the information available in the Bank's supervision reports, the beneficiary assessment, and discussions with NACVET and MESW officials. Redirecting Vocational Training As indicated earlier, the project was not designed well enough to achieve this objective. To its credit, the project did demonstrate the feasibility and the efficacy of short, competency-based training, but there is little evidence to suggest that it also managed to convince the participating training institutions, or other institutions, to change their practices generally, or even just in the training of apprentices. The government fully concurs with this conclusion, stating that "the evidence of the efficacy of short,competency-based training has not stimulated the desired shift among training institutions..." - 7 -  Improving technical and entreprenzeurial skills Some 14,565 apprentices and 5,434 master craftsmen received technical training, and 7,666 mastercraftsmen received training for entrepreneurship. These numbers are large, demonstrating success at least in the delivery of training. Whether the training resulted in improvement in skills is not clear. No systematic, technical and independent assessment was carried out to measure the quality of training and the improvements in skills following it. What is known is that during the first half of the project many of the training institutions did not procure the consumable materials on time and that the quantities of materials procured were also inadequate. There was also a general shortage of instructors in technical training in the sector and, consequently, most of the institutions provided only one instructor for the project instead of the two instructors required. Nevertheless, the beneficiary assessment team that reviewed the project gathered a wealth of oral reports and accounts, both from trainee apprentices and from masters who did not go on training, indicating that skills were indeed substantially improved. Creating New Businesses The project was not designed well enough to create new businesses. As indicated earlier, its design focused on training and, to a much lesser extent, on tools, but omitted other factors supportive of new business creation. Thus, it could not make a visible contribution to business creation. The Government agrees with this conclusion, stating that the VSP graduates lacked access to vital start-up credits, land and other post-training support. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that all of the masters and apprentices who benefited from the training provided in this project came from the ranks of the poor. While the project as a whole did not measurably reduce the level of poverty in the country, or make a visible contribution to business creation, it may be assumed that it has at least improved the skills, and thus the productivity of the 15,000 apprentices trained. This has at least improved their chances of setting up their own businesses, once they got access to the necessary credit and space. Improved Quality and Quantity of Informal Sector Prodtucts The achievement of this objective by apprentices and masters who received training cannot be demonstrated. The objective appears in the SAR also as the indicator of the goal of improving the productivity of the informal sector, but no information was collected on it. As has already been indicated, there is some anecdotal information in the beneficiary assessment report on improvements in the quality and quantity of products produced by the persons who attended the training, but no solid, systematically collected information. The Government believes that too few persons received training so far "to make a significant dent in service quality and productivity in the sector". Instituttional Capacity to Access Labor Force, Employment and Earnings Data Regularly Finally, the objective of ensuring that the Government has access to these data was achieved partly. The MOE developed a methodology for conducting tracer studies and successfully conducted three such studies. The capacity of its Tracer Studies Unit has improved with the training of two staff and 35 institutional representatives, and the acquisition of computing equipment, office equipment and furniture. The MESW developed a methodology for conducting the labor survey and successfully conducted the survey - the first of its kind in the country. And although the survey report is in draft form, there is now base line data on the informal sector - a base line that did not exist before. However, these results do not represent all that was to be done and also do not ensure regular access to labor-related information. The capacity that was built initially to conduct the tracer studies and labor surveys has not been retained. The units involved are weaker today than they were when they did this work. - 8 -  4.2 Outputs by components: The activities included in each component, the quantitative targets for each activity and the extent to which the targets were achieved are summarized in Annex 1, Table 2. The activities may be divided into two categories: activities that prepare the ground for the production of output, such as the mobilization of staff and the rehabilitation of facilities, and activities that create the output, such as the delivery of training and the conduct of surveys. Most of the activities in the first category were accomplished, though not all on time. The mobilization of staff was accomplished initially (with a two-year delay at the Labor Department of MESW), but many of the staff left during the course of implementation and were not replaced. The upgrading of physical facilities was not accomplished for NACVET, and only 25 of 40 training institutions that were supposed to be rehabilitated, were actually rehabilitated. Four out of five activities in the second category were not accomplished fully, as planned. One was exceeded. The key activities that were meant to produce the core output of the project, were the training of apprentices and masters: 20,400 apprentices were supposed to be trained. By the end of the project, 14,565, or 71% of the target, received training. Some 4,500 masters were supposed to receive both technical training and training for entrepreneurship. By the end of the project, 5,434, or 121% were trained technically and 7,666, or 170%, received training for entrepreneurship. It is not known how many apprentices and masters purchased tools, but it is known that only tools for dressmaking and tailoring were purchased in large quantities, while tools for all other areas were purchased in small, or very small, quantities. The actual distribution of trainees by trade area was quite different from the planned distribution. The plan was to train in each of the five areas about 20% of the total number. Only refrigeration and air-conditioning was lower - at 15%, and tailoring & dress-making was higher at 23.5%. In reality, only electrical installation came close to target. Refrigeration made up only 3.7% of the trainees, while tailoring & dress-making made up 45.7%. If not for the overwhelming success of tailoring & dress-making, NACVET would have not made even the 71% achievement indicated above. The idea of giving the apprentices and masters choice with respect to training institutions did not eventually work well because 12 NVTI institutions withdrew from the program. Although other institutions were brought into the program, only Kumasi and Accra had more than one institution offering the same courses in some of the trade areas. These institutions were situated at opposite ends of the two cities. In virtually all cases, trainees chose the institutions close to where they lived, so as to save the cost of transportation. In the absence of real choice, the intake vouchers did not help much. On the contrary, there are indications that the vouchers were misused by the trade associations. NACVET states in its completion report that the operation of the voucher system adversely affected the implementation of the project, because the associations demanded to be paid for administering them - an incentive that was not contemplated in the design of the project. According to the original implementation plan, the Labor Department of MESW was to produce one complete base line survey and two updates during the life of the project. It produced only a draft of the base line survey. The Tracer Studies Unit at the Ministry of Education was to produce 6 tracer studies. It produced three. In summary, the evidence available indicates that many planned activities, particularly training activities, have been carried out to a considerable extent, though not fully. There is insufficient evidence, however, to conclude that the objectives of the project were achieved, partly because the activities did not cover all the areas required to meet these objectives. It may be argued that the project was not really designed well to achieve these objectives. Different design was required. Therefore, it was quite an achievement to have -9-  conducted and completed even just the large-scale training activities that were conducted. But, in assessing the project, one cannot exclude project design from the equation and ignore stated objectives. Thus, the overall rating of achievement remains unsatisfactory. The same applies to outcomes. Outcomes are typically related to goals, rather than objectives. The stated goals of this project were to develop the informal sector and create an enabling environment for employment creation. Even if the goals are re-stated as 'to achieve a change in the orientation of (at least) apprenticeship training', and 'to establish an operational data bank for labor, employment and income statistics', there is no evidence that these goals have been achieved. Therefore, outcomes remain unsatisfactory. The Government has rated the outcomes of this project as satisfactory, based mainly on its success in meeting the targets for technical training and exceeding the targets for entrepreneurial training. The targets for technical training that were met were not the original targets, however. These had been revised significantly downwards during the mid-term review. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: N/A 4.4 Financial rate of return: N/A 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project aimed at creating stronger institutions: a strong NACVET that would be able to carry out the policy-related, coordination and implementation tasks envisaged for it by the MOE, a strong Labor Department that would be able to produce regularly employment and earnings data in the labor force, and a strong Tracer Studies Unit that would be able to produce regularly a host of tracer studies. This was not achieved. NACVET's role in the vocational and technical education and training area, and its legal status, are still not settled. It has less technical and administrative staff today than it had when the project started. Its management is weak and both the mix and level of skill available to it are inadequate. The Labor Department and the Tracer Studies Units too are not stronger today, simply because most of the staff that were brought on board, and received some training when the project started have left, and because no budget provisions have been made for them to continue with their activities. It is concluded, therefore, that the institutional development impact of this project has not been satisfactory. The Government agrees with the facts cited above, but does not agree with the conclusion, suggesting that the institutional development impact of the project is satisfactory. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5. 1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: N/A 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Four major factors have affected the implementation and outcome of this project: (a) incomplete alignment of goals, objectives and target, (b) sub-optimal design, (c) poor preparatory work and (d) inadequate capacity. All were within the control of the Government, though some may be said to be also in the control of the implementing agencies. All, except the first one were discussed earlier in the section on quality at entry. They will therefore be recapitulated here very briefly: Alignment of Goals, Objectives and Targets - Key objectives of this project were not fully aligned with its goals, and key activities covered by the project were not fully aligned with these objectives. Re-orienting vocational training was only one measure to attain the goals of growth and productivity in the informal sector. Yet, it became the main objective. The training of apprentices and masters was only one measure to - 10-  attain the objective of re-orienting vocational training, yet it became the main activity. This incomplete alignment greatly affected the probability that the project will achieve the intended higher-level outcomes of growth, employment and productivity in the informal sector. Moreover, even the narrower objective was not well articulated, and the institutions whose training practices were to be re-oriented did not know that this was the objective. The government concurs with this conclusion. Sub-Optimal Design With training at the core, the design of the project was aimed predominantly at mobilizing and arranging all the 'factors of production' - the resources necessary to carry out the training, including the instructors and the trainees. The design was inadequate particularly in terms of the choice of an overseeing ministry and an implementing agency. The choice of the MOE to oversee the project, and the choice of NACVET to implement it, greatly diminished collaboration between the MOE and the MESW and was responsible for many of the difficulties encountered in implementation. As indicated earlier, the Government agrees that the design was not adequate, though it stresses factors other than the choice of overseeing ministry and implementing agency. Poor Preparatory Work and Inadequate Capacity There is nothing to add to the points made in the section on quality at entry about the inadequate preparation for the project and the poor capacity of the implementing agencies. These greatly affected the implementation of the project and its outcomes. The Government agrees with these points as well. Finally, the Government lists in its completion report a few more factors that affected implementation and outcomes. These include: (a) limited consultation with stakeholders during design, (b) high turnover of ministers, deputies, managers at NACVET and the FPMU, as well as in the Bank, (c) weak communication, (d) inconsistent policy on incentives, and (e) inflation. 5.3 Factors generally subject to imiplementing agency control: Weak management, both at NACVET and at the PMU, contributed greatly to the inadequate implementation of the project. Both lacked management skills as well as management systems to manage the project well. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: Matters of cost and financing influenced the implementation of the project, though it is not clear to what extent. In sending apprentices for training, master craftsmen incurred the opportunity cost of lost production. This may have created some resistence to the training and made it more difficult for the training institutions to fill all the training places available. Indeed, the utilization of training places in the various trade areas, throughout the duration of the project, was full only in the area of tailoring and dress-making. In all other areas, capacity utilization was not full. Also, arrangements for counterpart funding did not work well. The appraisal estimate was that the Government will provide 22.6% of the funding for this project. The Government failed to provide the funds in full and on time, and in the end contributed only 8% (See Annex 2 Project Costs and Financing, p.2). This failure added to the inability of the implementing agencies to achieve fully the project's objectives. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: The key operations that were supported by the project are: (a) in-service training of apprentices and masters, (b) collection, collation and analysis of labor statistics, including statistics on the  informal sector, and (c) the conduct of tracer studies also in the informal sector. The criteria used here to determine the sustainability of these operations are: * The strength of demand for in-service training from apprentices and master craftsmen, and the strength of demand from policy-makers for the labor statistics and tracer studies * Commitment of the Government to continue with the training activities and the labor market activities - demonstrated by financing these training operations and statistical services * The technical quality of the competency-based training model, the labor survey and the tracer studies developed during implementation, and * The capacity of NACVET, the Labor Statistics Unit and the Tracer Studies Unit to continue the operations funded by this project after it closed down. Strength of Demand According to the beneficiary assessment, the demand for VSP training has varied from trade to trade, as is borne out by enrollment figures. It is high for dress-making and tailoring and low for refrigeration and air-conditioning. Generally, the demand responds well to advertizing, and is influenced by considerations of cost and benefits. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the perceptions of benefits were greatly influenced by the 'model' of training, including its short, practical, competency-based nature. Also, there are initial indications that some private training institutions would like to provide some training along the lines developed in this project. There is also strong evidence that the demand for entrepreneurial training from master craftsmen is high, since the number of trainees in this area has far exceeded the training targets. This augers well for sustainability in trade areas where employment opportunities exist. As far as access to regular labor force, employment and earnings data for the informal sector is concerned, there are no strong indications yet of effective demand for such data. This may change with the new Government's introduction of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy. Commitment and Financing The test of commitment is action and resource allocation. Almost no preparations were made by the Government to continue the training activities funded by the project and no significant action has been taken yet to ensure the mainstreaming and continuation of the data collection activities. The Government is yet to identify internal or external sources of funding. In fact, it says that sufficient funding may not be available to train a large number of apprentices and that it may be necessary to focus on master craftsmen only. The only source available at this time is the toolkit revolving fund which has not been used until now. However, no system is yet in place to manage and disburse the money received by this Fund. It is not clear how much more training can be paid for from it. The ministries involved and NACVET also do not have sufficient staff for the continuation of project activities. The Government says that it now has "a pro-poor stance" and that it is going to re-emphasize the development of the private sector now. It adds that the inclusion of two VSP objectives in the GPRS is a sign of commitment. The two objectives are "to improve productivity in the micro-industrial/service sector" and "to strengthen the labour market - 12 -  information system". These statements relate directly only to one of the two activity areas and need to be backed by action and by resource allocation. Technical Quality of the Training, the Labor Force Data Base and the Tracer Studies Based on the demand for VSP training, it may be deduced that the training model followed in this project - the provision of formally structured, competency-based instruction to informal sector apprentices in the midst of their informal training - worked well. The technical quality of the training is said to be high, but currently the training model does not include an objective mastery test at the end of training. The testing is done jointly by the instructor and the trainee, and may therefore be subjective. Nevertheless, from a technical design point of view, the training component of the project could be sustainable, if the testing of mastery is addressed. The technical quality of the data base and the tracer studies too is adequate for the purpose of sustainability. Capacity of Implementing Organizations As discussed earlier, the three organizational entities involved in this operation do not have capacity to continue the operations initiated in this project. In summary, the picture is mixed. There seems to be some demand for the technical training, and considerable demand for the courses on entrepreneurship. The technical quality of the courses seems to be good. But the Government has not allocated the necessary budget, and the organizations involved do not have adequate staff and capacity, to efficiently continue the training operations. As far as the labor force data bank is concerned, the systems developed are technically sound, but there does not seem to be strong demand for the information yet, there is no budget, and capacity is limited. It is believed that the training model and approach deserve further attention and that they may be further developed and sustained through linking with other activities that the Government is currently conducting through specialized agencies for the promotion of small business and entrepreneurship. It is believed also that the labor data component can be sustained through linking with the Ghana Statistical Services. However, although this can still be done, it has not been done as of today. Therefore, the sustainability of activities initiated by the project cannot be rated as likely. The Government believes that the activities will continue and that the first indications of sustainability may be seen in the inputs of the Ministry of Manpower Development & Employment into the GPRS. It has therefore rated sustainability as highly likely. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations. As indicated above, no transition arrangements were made to move into regular operations. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: The design of the project was not adequate and the Bank must take considerable responsibility for it, since it was highly involved in its development. There is no evidence on file that Bank staff, and consultants working in the area of private sector development, participated in the design. Equally, none of the three peer reviewers was a specialist in private sector development. The Bank also did not insist on adequate participation and involvement of the MESW on the Ghanaian side. The MESW's mandate and business were the closest to private sector development and to training in - 13-  the informal sector. This failure to ensure the input of specialists in private sector development and to fully mobilize a key ministry, limited the analysis done at preparation and influenced the objectives and the design of the project. The project was not ready for implementation when it was submitted to the Board for approval. The SAR played down a number of readiness issues. Key among these were the conflict over division of labor between the MOE and the MESW, the lack of legal status for NACVET, and NACVET's very weak capacity. If the statements made in many supervision reports during the first two years of implementation about the need to set up systems and processes are correct, then the Bank failed in its appraisal of the project. There is no reason to doubt these statements. A review of all the items discussed with the MOE and listed in the Bank's aide memoires during the first two years shows that most items were indeed related to activities that should have been completed during preparation (a summary of this review is on file). During the preparation and appraisal of the project, the team received comments and recommendations on key issues from peer reviewers and other staff who participated in review meetings. Some of these were not accepted or followed. The team may have had good reasons to do so, but it is not clear if the comments and recommendations were considered, since there is no reference to them in the SAR or in correspondence on file. The conclusion reached on the basis of these factors is that the performance of the Bank during the identification, preparation and appraisal of this project was unsatisfactory. 7.2 Supervision: The assessment of the Bank's performance on supervision was based on a review of three factors: the extent to which the Bank attended to the 'big picture', the extent to which it was proactive in dealing with implementation problems, and the satisfaction of the Government with its performance. Attending to the Big Picture The assessment here is based on two notions: (a) that the Bank must continue to pursue with the client during implementation any key issue that was raised but was not resolved during preparation - especially, but not only, if the Bank's preparation team indicated at that time that the issue was resolved, or is about to be resolved; and (b) that throughout the implementation period, the Bank must continue the dialogue on the big picture with the client, that it must continually review with the client the progress towards achieving the higher-level objectives and goals, and not confine its dialogue to the lower-level objectives, outputs, and activities. A number of big issues were not dealt with adequately, or resolved, during the preparation of the project. These included (a) the lack of a policy framework for vocational and technical training and, within it, the lack of a policy on the training and certification of artisans, (b) the conflict between the MOE and the MESW regarding the question of who should be in charge of what in vocational and technical education, and (c) the role and legal status of NACVET. The review of all the issues raised in the project's aide memoires shows that issues 'b' and 'c' were not discussed. - 14 -  One issue - the lack of a policy framework - was discussed, but only beginning in mid- 1 999, when it was decided to set up a working group that would formulate a TVET policy for Government's consideration. The review shows that 39 different issues were discussed with the Government at the highest level. All, except for one, related to the implementation of specific activities and the achievement of lower-level objectives. The aide memoires reflect little or no discussion on progress towards achieving the goals and higher-level objectives. The development of the informal sector, the productivity of artisans in this sector, the creation of employment in it and the re-orientation of vocational and technical training, were not discussed. Clearly, the dialogue between the Bank and the Government was overtaken by the pressing operational problems that accompanied implementation. The level of Proactivitv The performance of the Bank on this score during implementation was mixed. The Bank supervised the project regularly, and the skills mix of its supervision teams was well aligned with what the government was implementing. The Bank was very proactive in addressing some of the problems that arose during implementation, but was less proactive on others. The absence of a more proactive approach in some cases may be attributed to a generally high level of optimism. It may also be the result of a desire to avoid declaring a project unsatisfactory - or to keep it in an unsatisfactory status for too long - because this may lead to cancellation. This may perhaps explain why the project was rated satisfactory during most of its life, while it is being rated as unsatisfactory upon completion. Following are a few examples of both proactivity and the lack thereof: (a) The biggest problems that arose immediately after the project had become effective had to do with the lack of readiness for implementation. The Bank's project team was quick to identify these problems and to address them. The focus of all supervision missions during the first two years of implementation was placed almost completely on completing the preparatory work that had not been done earlier on, and on helping NACVET and the Project Management Unit (PMU) at the MOE develop capacity to implement the project. As is evidenced by the aide memoires, supervision missions worked with NACVET meticulously on all the components, sub-components and operations included in the project, and provided detailed advice on how to make progress. This point is evidenced also by the conduct of the Mid-Term Review. The review was very thorough. It brought to the surface many of the implementation problems that held up the project and it put in place an action plan to address them. Performance did indeed improve substantially following the review. (b) The Bank was not proactive enough with respect to the toolkit and revolving fund component of the project. The implementation of this component presented serious problems in all of its activities, from the specifications of tools to be included in the kits, to the setting up of a system for the storage, distribution and sale of the tool kits, and to the collection of revenue from the training institutions and its deposit in the revolving fund. This is reflected very well in the review of issues reported in aide memoires, where it can be seen that the toolkit issue was mentioned at every single wrap up meeting. It is clear that the Bank did attend to this issue, but proactivity calls for more than mere attention. In this case serious action was necessary from very early on to - 15 -  prevent what had eventually happened: the very slow sale of tools, the loss of a "material" number of toolkits and a likely loss of revenues from the sale of toolkits. This was a major component of the project, estimated at 51% of the project's financing at appraisal and reaching 47.7% during implementation. The Bank needed to ensure from the start that adequate practices are followed in the storage, distribution, and sale of toolkits and the collection of revenues from the training institutions. It needed to ensure that the right management information systems are in place to help manage this component. This was not done during the first three years of the project, nor after an audit report found a large number of poor practices in the storage, distribution and sale of the toolkits. The audit report was presented by the auditors in draft form, because NACVET and the FPMU contested its findings. Disagreements between the auditors and NACVET/FPMU were not attended to and resolved, and the Bank did not insist on a further review and the submission of a final audit report before the project closed in June 2001. A final audit was submitted at the insistence of the ICR team. But the disagreement between the auditors and NACVET/FPMU were not resolved. Other areas where the Bank was proactive include the change of 'strategy' from an instant full-scale launch of training activities to a phased and gradual expansion, the introduction of further incentives for apprentices, masters and trade associations. Other areas where the Bank was not proactive enough include the withdrawal of 19 NVTI institutions from the project, the decision of the GSS not to collect certain data on the informal sector, which would have facilitated the work of the Labor Department in its labor market survey, the lack of good indicators and the fact that the Government did not collect information to assess outcomes and, finally, the retrieval of a project vehicle from the project manager when he left Government service. Borrower Satisfaction with Bank Performance The Government's completion report indicates general satisfaction with the performance of the Bank during supervision, though it notes a number of cases where the Bank failed to take the necessary action. Chief among these were the failure to be "sufficiently firm on (the previous) Government honouring its funding obligations" and the failure to respond to the need to provide better incentives to the training institutions, the instructors and the trainees. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Bank performance was unsatisfactory during the design and preparation of the project and satisfactory during its implementation. The implementation period was characterized by a large number of problems that resulted from inadequate design and poor preparation. The Bank's role during implementation was therefore particularly difficult and its ability to push for progress was greatly handicapped by these problems. The Bank handled a number of these problems in an unsatisfactory way, but it handled many problems in a more satisfactory way and eventually helped the Government achieve at least a significant proportion of the training target. This is why on balance its performance during implementation is rated as satisfactory. But the overall performance, taking into account both design/preparation and implementation cannot be regarded as satisfactory. The Government has rated the Bank's overall performance as satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: - 16 -  As discussed earlier, the project was not well prepared and its quality at entry was low. The responsibility for this must be shared by the Bank and the Government. 7.5 Government implementation performance: The performance of the Government during implementation was unsatisfactory. Various aspects of the project were formally rated as unsatisfactory between October 1997 and May 1999. The status of the project returned to 'satisfactory' again only in May 1999. This was based mostly on the successful implementation of an 'emergency' action plan designed during the mid-term review. It was not based on progress towards the achievement of the higher-level objectives and goals, and the build up of capacity and sustainability. Generally speaking, taking into account the perfornance of Government during the entire period of implementation, the Government (a) did not adequately address the staff situation in the implementing organizations, (b) did not provide the counterpart funds in the amounts agreed and on time, and (c) did not provide leadership and direction. By the closing date, the project disbursed $8.6 million out of an appraisal estimate of $12.4 million, that is, 69.3% of the planned and available funds. The first two points were discussed in Section 3. The third is discussed briefly below. Leadership is defined here as interest and action on behalf of the agency leading the project. The MOE was selected to lead the project. The ministry did not demonstrate sufficient interest in the project and did not take action to resolve the inter-agency problems that held up implementation. It did not address weaknesses in the capacity of all implementing agencies, and did not adequately attend even to serious problems, such as the dropping off of 12 NVTI institutions from the program - a matter that significantly affected implementation. Throughout implementation, it was typically the Bank that brought problems to the attention of the highest levels in Government and that urged the Government to take action. The Government basically agrees with the conclusion that its performance was unsatisfactory, while maintaining that the task force in charge of the project "demonstrated immense commitment in carrying out its mandate". 7.6 Implementing Agency: The performance of NACVET, the PMU, the Labor Department of the MESW and the Tracer Studies Unit of the MOE was unsatisfactory due to weak capacity and weak management, particularly during the first three years of implementation. It improved modestly later on, but remained unsatisfactory. The Government agrees in its completion report that NACVET did not perform well, but suggests that the PMU's performance was satisfactory (it does not refer to the Labor Department and the TSU ). The ICR team believes that the PMU did not perform well. The project's overall manager was in the PMU during the project's first three years. Only when he left, admittedly because of poor performance, did the management pass to NACVET. In addition, the FPMU had a significant role to play in the handling of the toolkit component - equal to, if not more important than, that of NACVET. Its performance here was highly unsatisfactory. The key factors that contributed to the unsatisfactory performance include the following: poor operational planning and lack of attention to detail, poor logistics capacity and inability to complete tasks that have deadlines on time, poor communication among the implementing agencies themselves and between NACVET and the trade associations and training institutions, and inadequate working arrangements between NACVET and the PMU. - 17-  Fourteen supervision missions were conducted by the Bank during the implementation of the project. All of them were concluded with wrap up meetings, where the Government agreed to take action relating to the 39 issues referred to earlier. These actions were listed in the aide memoires and in the Bank's supervision reports. Each supervision report included information not only on agreements made during the last mission, but also on actions taken as a result of agreements made in the previous mission. An examination of this information reveals that a large number of agreements made by the Government were not met by the agreed time, either fully, or at all. In all of these cases the implementing agencies did not take the necessary action as agreed. The performance of the implementing agencies regarding the toolkit distribution and the revolving fund has been particularly unsatisfactory. The audit report lists a large number of poor practices, both technical and managerial in nature. The report also raises two matters that need to be further reviewed: missing tools and unpaid and unaccounted funds. With respect to the first matter, the report indicates that the explanations received from NACVET were not satisfactory. With respect to the second matter, the report indicates that close to 51% of the money collected by the training institutions following the sale of tools to trainees has not been paid into the revolving fund yet, and that close to 17% of the money collected is unaccounted for (see Annex 4). In addition to this, there is still a stock of tools worth $2,000,000 in VSP's warehouse. The Bank has formally requested the Government to further investigate the status of the toolkits as well as the revolving fund. It has also brought to the attention of the Ministry of Education to the need to ensure that no further losses occur with respect to the remaining toolkits. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: The project completion teamn rates the overall performance of the borrower was unsatisfactory. The Government, not contesting any of the facts reported above, has rated its own performance as satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned The following lessons may be learned from the ICR assessment of this project: * Objectives influence design. Confused thinking about objectives ends up in sub-optimal, often poor, design. It is, therefore, worthwhile to devote a lot more thinking to the objectives of projects and to state them in very specific terms, clearly distinguishing between higher-level and lower-level ones. It is also worthwhile to pay attention to the presentation of objectives in formal documents such as the PAD and supervision reports. The presentation must be consistent in content and form. * It is important to provide an operational definition for each indicator, that is, to state exactly what data will be collected for it. The data must exists, the mechanisms for its collection must be in place and the borrower must have operational capacity to carry out the collection. During implementation, there is a tendency to watch for indicators of activities, to see if the targets are being met, while overlooking indicators of outcome. It is necessary to avoid this tendency. * It is possible to apply design tests to the design of development projects. Such tests exist, as was demonstrated in Section 3 of this report. They are not complex, but they are systematic and methodical, and they help in identifying design flaws. The tests need to be applied before - 18-  proceeding into detailed preparation. * There is a trade off between the duration of a project and the required level of preparation. The shorter the duration, the better - and sometimes, the longer - must be the preparation. But, whatever the duration, there is a minimum of preparatory work that needs to be done. It is worthwhile to define very clearly this minimum requirement at the start of the preparation period and to reach agreement with the borrower not to go ahead with a project if this preparatory work has not been completed. Thinking that the borrower will catch up with such work during implementation and still be able to implement the entire program, is unrealistic. * It is worthwhile distinguishing between core capacity and extended capacity. Core capacity is what needs to be in place before implementation, so that the borrower can implement well all project components. Extended capacity is what can be built during implementation. Core capacity is needed to build extended capacity. It is wrong to move from preparation into implementation if core capacity is not in place. * It is very risky to accept an empty shell as a viable institution, even if the borrower promises to fill it up with staff, systems and equipment. It is equally risky to rely on a new institution as an implementing agency, even if it has all the necessary staff, systems and equipment. Both do not have core capacity. It is worthwhile establishing whether or not it will be necessary, nevertheless, to rely on an empty shell, or a new institution. If this is the case, the best approach would be to fill up the shell, or create the new institution, early in the preparation stage, so that it has time to build up the necessary core capacity. * It is not advisable to select an institution to become an implementing agency if its role and function in the sector is not clear, or is contested, and particularly if it lacks the legal status to do its job. It is risky to accept even the most sincere promises that 'a law will be enacted soon' to establish the role, the flmction and the legal status of a proposed implementing agency. Laws take years to pass. * Inter-agency conflicts are extremely hard to settle in a satisfactory way. Because of this, Governments often tend to avoid dealing with them altogether. Also, even when a formal settlement is reached, in most cases it is not a win-win settlement. One agency wins, while the other loses. It is not advisable to include both in one project that requires a large measure of collaboration. because the two agencies are not likely to collaborate effectively. * Schemes that set up revolving funds and expect implementing agencies to sell goods of high value and/or utility, and replenish the fund from revenues on such sales, are risky. Project components that include such schemes require a higher level of detail planning and preparation, a higher quality of management and a closer monitoring than most other components. It is better to avoid such schemes if possible. * Most Bank projects provide a relatively large number of motor vehicles and other equipment, such as computers and software to project implementation units and to other units in Government ministries. The vehicles and equipment are given to officials in management capacity and to working units for the implementation of the projects involved. In the absence of asset management systems, through which all major assets owned by a ministry are tagged and registered, some of these assets may be taken away, or lost from the units to which they belong. Experience in this project suggests that vehicles may remain in the hands of officials when they move away from the project, either at the end or before, and even when they leave the service of Government. Equipment too may disappear. It is advisable to require borrowers to introduce asset management systems, conduct periodical checks of existing - 19-  inventories, and report to the Bank. * If a future Bank-supported project, or a component within a project, in the area of vocational and technical training in Ghana is considered, it will be necessary to ensure (a) that the Government finalizes its policies and strategies in this area, (b) that it clearly and definitively determines the respective roles and functions of each ministry and agency involved, and (c) that consensus is achieved about these policies, strategies, roles and functions. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/limple nenting agency: The MOE has completed its own evaluation report and submitted it to the Bank. The report is on file. The Ministry also produced a summary which is included here: 1.0 PrindRal Performance Rat!in (HS = Highly Satisfactory, S = Satisfactory, U = Unsatisfactory, HL= Highly likely L=Likely, UN= Unlikely, HUN= Highly Unlikely, HU= Highly Unsatisfactory, H= High, SU= substantial, M= Modest, N=Negligible). Outcome: S, Sustainability: HL, Institutional Development: S, Impact: S, Bank Performance: S, Borrower Performance: S, Quality of Entry: U, Project Risk at any time: SU 2.0 Assessment of Obiectives and Design The informal sector continues to be significant in terms of its contribution to skills development, urban employment and the gross domestic product (GDP) of Ghana. Thus, the broad purpose of the project (promoting the development of the informal sector) is clearly important to Ghana's development. It is clear from the general lack of ownership and full appreciation of the project objectives, however, that the project was developed without sufficient consultation with actual beneficiaries and frontline trainers. This begs the question of whether the project was really "entirely developed by a Government task force", as daimed in para. 3.41 of the SAR. The evidence is that while the task force invested much energy in conceiving and developing the project, the eventual articulation by the Bank in the form of the SAR did not accurately capture the desire of the Ghanaian team (i) to switch the emphasis of regular VOTEC delivery in some 400 training institutions from technical to vocational training and (ii) to contain the unsustainable levels of public subsidies and high trainee costs associated with long, full-time formal - 20 -  training. A recent stakeholder evaluation workshop Identified diverse problems with the clarity of the projects intentions. On the one hand, the first objective refers to training for people already in employment. Yet, Ghanaians do not generally consider apprentices (the principal beneficiaries) as people in employment. Then also, there is uncertainty among implementers and training institutions over the interpretation of other parts of the same objective viz., is the VSP seeking to change training institutions' regular approach to training or only to encourage them to add on focused programmes for the informal sector? Or is the objective assuming instead that vocational training institutions are already providing some amount of training to people in employment? Further, the objectives defined in para. 4.1 of the SAR differ from those itemized in Annex 5-1 of the same document. Inadequate emphasis on impact also contributed to project managers devoting their attention to numbers of people trained, quantities of toolkits delivered, workshops rehabilitated/built. For a project that was largely exploratory, it was not particularly clear to stakeholders what was being trialed. However, the staged expansion -- beginning with a small number of training institutions and increasing the number as implementers gained experience was entirely reasonable. With hindsight, not all of the design hypotheses were valid. The assumption that trade associations were sufficiently organized to undertake the recruitment of trainees was based on optimism rather than fact. Again, the design assumed that a combination of training and tooling of graduates would be sufficient to generate self-employment, and that training institutions would create room for VSP training by reducing their intakes for the regular (formal) courses. The acquisition of skills by trainees has not generated an equivalent demand for their services. The adoption of uniform values for the infrastructure contracts (irrespective of significant differences in the scale of works) was questionable, Unsurprisingly, this has been a major source of concern to training institutions. The fact that training targets have been exceeded by a significant margin (see Section 4) in spite of significant shortcomings and severe slippage over the first half of the project says something of the arbitrariness of the training targets set by the SAR. As structured, the activities per se were not overly demanding for the implementers. Lapses observed in the course of implementation have less to do with complexity of design than with gaps in the appraisal of the project and non-recognition of/ insufficient attention to risks such as the absence of a widely shared national vision and the lack of requisite capacity at senior levels of NACVET at the time. This culminated in unsatisfactory ratings during the initial years, with the eventual removal of the first project manager. - 21 -  It is also worth noting that in spite of some leakage on the trainee recruitment side (i.e., some trainees with no previous experience in the trade areas managed to enroll on the VSP), there is no evidence of serious adverse outcomes. The fact that such beneficiaries were generally able to acquire marketable skills through the project questions the validity of restricting the range of eligible beneficiaries to masters and apprentices with a minimum of 18 months training. Finally, the assumption that the serious risk of contestation between NACVET-MoE and NVTI-MMDE over leadership of the VSP would be easily resolved has proved to be unjustified in retrospect. 3.0 Ouality at Enby The Performance rating for quality at entry is unsatisfactory. The following actions adversely affected the smooth take-off of project implementation: * Details of the contractual obligations were not discussed with the 40 selected institutions; so when this was done, some schools pulled out. * The inability of the public institutions to make available two permanent instructors for VSP. * The Operation of the Voucher System by the Trade Associations. * The non-payment of a modest allowance to apprentices ( ref. MOTC); * The Bank's insistence on paying nothing to instructors, heads of institutions and * Rehabilitation of 28 training institutions. (Rehabilitation works was to have been done before training begun) * No standard list for consumables was prepared. (each school generated its own list of consumables) These key inputs were to be in place for the smooth take-off of the project. Seventeen (17) instead of all forty (40) envisaged under the SAR started the programme. Following the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which found training and disbursement targets far behind schedule and project implementation wanting in most other respects, a restructuring was effected. A significant feature of this restructuring was a distinct separation of financial and training management functions between the Funds and Procurement Management Unit (FPMU) and NACVET respectively. 4.0 Project Performance and Achievement of Oblecive. It is still early days to appreciate the full impact of the project, but it is fair to say that the performance of the project has been mixed. Objective 1 (redirecting the focus of vocational training institutions towards the provision of short, - 22 -  focused, practical, competency-based, demand-driven training for people already in employment): The VSP has demonstrated convincingly the feasibility of short, competency-based vocational training. Routinely, VSP graduates are demonstrating competencies beyond those exhibited by their non-participating colleagues and their counterparts on the formal three-year programmes. Both in terms of diversity and quality, they are also out-performing those masters who declined to enroll on the programme. Evidence adduced in the Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) demonstrates, however, that the availability of training consumables is critical to the viability of competency-based training. As noted earlier, training targets have, likewise, been exceeded overall. 14,565 apprentices have been trained [against a revised target of 15,000]; 5,434 masters have received technical training [target = 5,000], and 7,663 masters have benefited from entrepreneurship training [target = 5,000]. Demand for training spaces now exceeds supply in some areas (most notably in dressmaking and tailoring). But demand for training in refrigeration and air conditioning has been low. Rather disappointingly, the evidence of the efficacy of short, competency-based training has not stimulated the desired shift among training institutions away from a long, theory-based culture towards significantly shorter, competency-based training. While many additional training institutions and District Assemblies have expressed a demand for accreditation, the evidence is that this is more a request for largesse than an indication of a sustainable change in culture. * Objective 2 (improving informal sector product quality and productivity in five selected trade areas): Exhibitions mounted at the institutions during graduation ceremonies give ample evidence of reasonable improvement of the level of skills acquisition by the Apprentices and the Mastercraftsmen. It has also been demonstrated that Mastercraftsmen could undertake the manufacture of wider variety of products. Similarly, apprentices can complete sets of competencies which hitherto they only learned by observation. In spite of the evidence that VSP trainees are indeed acquiring a wider range of competencies and able to deliver to higher standards, these gains are not yet rubbing off onto the wider informal sector. Clearly, the recipients of the enhanced training are still too few to make a significant dent in service quality and productivity in the sector. a Objective 3 (creating institutional capacity to ensure that Govemment has access to regular labour force, employment and earnings data that will enable it to make rational decisions as to the type of training that should be supported): - 23 -  The impact monitoring and labour market monitoring components have generally been pursued purposefully, though with significant delays -- largely attributable to factors outside the control of the two relevant institutions (the Tracer Studies Unit (TSU) and the Labour Market Unit (LMU)). Tracing capacity of the MoE has been strengthened through training. Significantly, tracing has not been restricted to graduates of the VSP, but extended to cover control groups from the informal sector as well as products of formal vocational training programmes. Another direct outcome of the project is the fact that the Ministry of Manpower Development and Employment's (MMDE's) Employment Market Reports now include data on the informal sector. The TSU, LMU and Public Employment Centres (PECs) also benefited from valuable equipment support to facilitate data processing and analysis. However, though staff of training institutions have been trained to support the tracing process, MoE has not undertaken the expected close monitoring of institutional tracer studies officers. This has been attributed largely to untimely resourcing and delays in obtaining the Bank's "no objections", a situation which is noted to have improved in recent times. 5.0 Factors Affectina ImDlementaton and Outcomes The most significant of these are the observed weaknesses in the consultation framework, continuity problems, poor communication, inadequate attention to fostering institutional linkages especially in areas of micro-finance support to trainees, and to pre-empting dependency among beneficiaries, inconsistent policy on incentives, inflation and deficits in technical capacity. 6.0 Performance oflTowm * Demonstration of Government commitment The GoG Task Force responsible for conceiving and leading project preparation demonstrated immense commitment in carrying out its mandate. However, the previous Government failed to match this level of commitment to the project. Assurances given in the Government's own Letter of Development Policy were not honoured, and the period was characterised by persistent delays in releasing pledged matching funds resulting, inter alia, in high demurrage charges on tool imports. * Sector policies The greater part of the project's life has been characterised by a lack of proactivity and real progress in - 24 -  articulating a coherent policy for technical and vocational education and training (TVET). Again, this situation has begun to change since the new administration took over this year. Credible efforts are already underway to achieve consensus between MoE and MMDE. Management effectiveness NACVET NACVET has proven itself able to manage accreditation of vocational training institutions and to develop and review training curricula. However, there is little evidence that NACVET has set in motion the aggressive promotional arrangements needed to ensure sustained and expanded demand among training providers for the delivery of short, competency-based vocational training. NACVET has also been criticised heavily for delays in processing of requisitions and claims. Particularly disturbing accusations relate to frequent misplacements of applications and of failure to act on decisions reached at stakeholder meetings. In particular, serious problems with toolkits (delivery, content and accounting) remain unaddressed. Other indications of effectiveness have been discussed in the Section 5. FPM, FPMU's performance of its disbursement role has generally been satisfactory, but there has been some criticism conceming the quality of some of the tools procured for sale to trainees and, prior to restructuring, supervision of the infrastructure contracts, which has been a source of serious concern to training institutions who have had to pay for shoddy, yet expensive works. 7.0 Peifrmiance of the Bank * Project Identification The project as identified was consistent with Government development objective of giving the informal sector training that will lead to productivity and market quality. X Project Preparation The Bank's staff participated actively in the development and approval of the overall national policies and the implementation strategy in a series of workshops at the preparation stages. * Appraisal Though the appraisal recognised the risk associated with the dispute over leadership of vocational - 25 -  skills training for the informal sector, its significance was underestimated in the drafting of the SAR. It is questionable whether the project should have commenced when such an important, central issue had not been resolved. Further, relevant lessons from previous Bank involvement in the education sector were not adequately factored into the design. For example, there was considerable evidence from EdSACs I (Cr. 1744-GH) and II (Cr. 2140-GH) demonstrating that GoG's failure to promote a genuinely shared national vision of the basic education reforms played a significant role in the lack of impact and ownership by frontline implementers (viz. teachers). Other areas in which the appraisal fell short (mainly in its assumptions) have been identified in Section 3. Implementation support The Bank was instrumental in the project's restructuring following the findings of the MTR. This led to acknowledged improvements in disbursements and in the achievement of the project's training targets. The Bank also made significant technical inputs to the development of the labour market survey. Devolution of supervision functions to the resident mission had a positive effect on the speed of response to requests and the timeliness of disbursement. However, the Bank did not correctly pre-empt the previous Govemment's commitment to financing and the Bank was not sufficiently firm on GoG to honour its funding obligations. The Bank does not appear to have taken sufficient advantage of her strategic position in the donor community to influence a convergence of strategy and its unwillingness to accede to certain initial demands made by the beneficiaries made the project unpopular. For example: (a) Apprentices expected they would be paid $1 per day as pertained under the MOTC programme also funded by the World Bank. (b) Instructors were not paid any allowance for what they considered to be additional work. (c) The Bank also insisted that contractors should be engaged to rehabilitate institutions workshops against the wishes of the training institutions (d) The Bank also insisted on only Trade Associations recruited apprentices even though it was evident that some trade associations were not represented in some of the districts where training was being offered. The idea of tying training with Toolkit purchase was a disaster. Many apprentices already had the basic tools. 8.0 Sustainabilitv Given the difficulty which GoG has had raising its share of the project finance, there is merit in - 26 -  exploring still lower-cost options for vocational skills training in the informal sector. An alternative training strategy which has been proposed by some masters is to make greater use of masters in the enhanced training of apprentices. This proposal, which requires a rechanneling of energies into training larger numbers of mastercraftspersons, is clearly a more economical and sustainable strategy with lower risks and opportunity costs for masters. Also crucial to the sustainability of the project is the ability to recover from the institutions monies from the purchase of tools. From projections, it is anticipated that 13,920 apprentices could benefit from funds accruing from the revolving account over the next four years. A more vigorous effort however, must however be made to dispose of the huge stockpile of tools in the other trade areas apart from Dressmaking to realize this goal. 9.0 Lessons Leamed: 9.1 The Demand Driven Concept The practice of the demand driven concept has shown clearly that it has been embrace by the informal sector because of its focused nature. Presently demand has outstripped supply. 9.2 Ownership of the Project The ownership of the project was heavily linked to the World Bank. The project was often referred to as the "VSP World Bank funded project". The impression was created that the World Bank owned the project and could either approve or disapprove of legitimate request presented by the Institutions and the beneficiaries. 9.3 Institutional Rehabilitation This issue contributed to some of the selected institutions dropping out of the project. Those who came on board however complained about shoddy works. On hindsight, it would have been prudent to give the Rehabilitation money to the institutions and charge it against their indebtedness to the project. 9.4 Trade Assodations (COPTAG) The potential of the informal sector (Trade Associations) to deliver has been unearthed as evident in their performance by offering their apprentices & masters for training and the subsequent graduation exhibitions testify to this. Greater collaboration between NACVET and the Informal Sector has fostered partnership, which is reflected in the quality of outputs witnessed. Experiences gained by participating organizations have become one of the pillars to sustain the programme beyond the project duration. Also the capacity built in the informal sector has armed - 27 -  them with the requisite skills and experiences to be more effective in broad positive transformation of the country. 9.5 District Assemblies There should be full participation of District Assemblies in the implementation of the project in order to ensure a high sense of ownership. 9.6 NACVET There is the need to ensure that NACVET and the other implementers have the resource capacity in place to provide effective and timely support so that the demand driven concept could be more meaningful to the beneficiaries. 9.7 Government - Ghana needs to reform and strengthen the traditional apprenticeship system to improve product quality, productivity and relevance. - Equip the workforce in the informal sector with skills and experiences to improve productivity and efficiency with international competitiveness and sustainable livelihoods. - Develop systems and mechanisms to facilitate co-ordination and articulation and linkages at all levels and between different sectors, ministries, departments of the economy in TVET delivery. - The process to develop a National Policy for TVET for Ghana should be carried out to its logical conclusion. 10.0. Condusion The VSP has demonstrated convincingly that short, competency-based training can produce quality skills and is viable. However, the success of such training depends to a significant degree on the timely availability of relevant consumables and equipment. Beneficiaries are generally poor, and the project is reasonable in distributional terms. However, greater attention ought to be paid to financial sustainability and cost-sharing in future. The relevance of the project also needs enhancing through greater attention to a process of national visioning (see below). Similarly, greater attention is required towards influencing traditions in the wider informal sector beyond recipients of training. It is important, in considering options for the future, to note that declining to support skill-building and productivity enhancement for the informal sector is not a sustainable option. The size of Ghana's informal sector and the fact that it continues to be responsible for training and employing the majority of the urban poor renders it too important to be ignored. Also, in the absence of appropriate household - 28 -  and establishment-based sampling frames, the LMS has been compelled to innovate a new methodology which will require further technical support to trial effectively and refine. The question then is not so much if, but how to structure support to maximise its efficacy. Critical conditions which ought to be met prior to the execution of a future phase of support to vocational skills training in Ghana include: * resolving the continuing contestation between MoE and MMDE over leadership of vocational skills training for the informal sector; this requires a spirit of compromise on both sides; * promotion of a broad-based vision around a productive, quality-providing and prosperous informal sector and fostering a unified strategy for achieving this; this will require greater openness and genuine consultation on the draft TVET policy with grassroots informal sector operatives as well as the unemployed and underemployed; * demonstration of the capacity of implementing agency staff to manage the components/ activities effectively: options include recruitment of the requisite skills and/or focused training for existing staff in skills such as policy analysis, curriculum development and proactive monitoring; * demonstration of commitment by GoG to finance operations over the year following closure of Cr. 2695-GH; * a clear framework for optimising the synergies of key potential partners such as formal (private, public) and informal sector training providers, microfinance and business start-up intermediaries identified in Section 5, above. Without real cooperation, energies will continue to be dissipated and the efficacy of interventions undermined. (b) Cofinanciers: N/A (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N/A 10. Additional Information - 29 -  - 30 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Goals and Objectives Indicators To support the development of the informal sector in "Gradual growth of the informal contribution to Ghana through training national development" Also, one of the key benefits of the project will be "an expansion in informal sector employment" "Improved product quality and types" "Improved entrepreneurial skills" To provide an enabling environment for "(Increased] level of government financial employment creation and income generation in [support] for informal sector training and job the micro and small enterprise sector creation activities" "Overall improvement in efficiency and productivity of MSE operations" To improve the capacity ofprivate and public "Existence of training programs in selected training institutions to teach practical skills and training institutions" run short, competency-based training programs "Well run and well patronized short courses in the training institutions" "Teachers attending orientation and upgrading programs organized under this project" "Improved quality of teaching of practical skills" "Increased concentration of training resources on short-term, clearly focused programs for those already employed." "more efficient transition by workers from apprenticeship to master levels" To help create new businesses and improve "Number of new businesses created by beneficiaries existing micro and small informal sector of training" enterprises "Increasing returns on investment to master craftsmen" To improve the level of technical & - 31 -  Improved product quality entrepreneurial skills of master craftsmen and apprentices through training Diversification of product types in the market - 32 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Project Cost By Component US$ million US$ million Training of Masters and Apprentices 3.40 2.92 86 Toolkits for Apprentices and Masters 6.40 4.10 64 Institutional Strengthening 2.60 1.58 61 Total Baseline Cost 12.40 8.60 Price Contingencies 1.60 Total Project Costs 14.00 8.60 Total Financing Required 14.00 8.60 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost 1. Works 0.00 1.04 0.00 0.00 1.04 (0.00) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94) 2. Goods 6.08 0.17 0.04 1.12 7.41 (6.08) (0.15) (0.04) (0.00) (6.27) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.72 (0.00) (0.00) (0.72) (0.00) (0.72) 4. Training 0.00 0.00 2.26 0.00 2.26 (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.77) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.14) 6. Incremental Recurrent 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.82 Costs (0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.74) Total 6.08 1.21 3.90 1.20 12.39 (6.08) (1.09) (2.41) (0.00) (9.58) Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt) Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.34 (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.31) 2. Goods 3.45 0.54 0.20 0.55 4.74 (3.45) (0.49) (0.16) (0.00) (4.10) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.42 0.00 1.42 (0.00) (0.00) (1.42) (0.00) (1.42) 4. Training 0.00 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.55 - 33 -  (0.00) (0.00) (1.55) (0.00) (1.55) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) 6. Incremental Recurrent 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.03 0.43 Costs (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00) (0.40) Total 3.45 0.54 4.03 0.58 8.60 (3.45) (0.49) (3.96) (0.00) (7.90) Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2' Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Training of Masters and 3.00 0.40 2.87 0.05 95.7 12.5 Apprentices Toolkits for Masters and 5.10 1.30 3.60 0.50 70.6 38.5 Apprentices Institutional Strengthening 1.50 1.10 1.44 0.14 96.0 12.7 -34 -  Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits N/A - 35 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 07/24/1992 Appraisal/Negotiation 07/94 6 Principal Planner, Project Officer, Operation Analyst, Technical Training Specialist, Labour Market Specialist, Technical Training Specialist, Supervision 10/20/95 5 Senior Implementation. Specialist, Staff Assistant, Institutional Development Specialist, Economist, Procurement Specialist 02/16/96 2 Senior Implementation Specialist Procurement Specialist 10/12/96 5 Senior Implementation Specialist, Senior Operations Officer, Project Assistant, Economist, Procurement Specialist 02/25/97 5 Senior Implementation Specialist, Senior Operations Officer, Economist, Procurement Specialist, Financial Management Specialist 07/04/97 4 Senior Implementation Specialist, Senior Operations Officer, Economist, Procurement Specialist 10/10/97 5 Senior Implementation Specialist, Senior Operations Officer, Economist, Procurement Specialist, Financial Management Specialist 05/02/98 6 Senior Implementation Specialist, Procurement Specialist, Financial Management Specialist, Senior Human Resource Economist, Senior Education Specialist, - 36 -  Economist (Consultant) 10/15/98 5 Senior Implementation Specialist, Procurement Specialist, Financial Management Specialist, Economist, Senior Human Resource Economist 04/23/99 2 Senior Implementation Specialist, Proocurement Specialist, 12/10/99 1 Procurement Specialist (TTL) 10/08/99 4 Procurement Specialist (TTL), Financial Management Specialist, Economist, Senior Human Resource Economist 11/06/00 4 Procurement Specialist (TTL), Economist, Financial Management Specialist, Senior Human Resource Economist 03/14/01 4 Procurement Specialist (TTL), Financial Management Specialist, Institutional Development Specialist, Education Cluster Leader 06/26/01 5 Procurement Specialist (TTL), Economist, Financial Management Specialist, Institutional Development Specialist, Education Cluster Leader ICR 10/01/01 3 Procurement Specialist (TTL), Institutional Development Specialist (ICR Author) Financial Management Specialist (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 191398.59 Appraisal/Negotiation Supervision 426054.87 ICR Total N/A 617525.46 - 37 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=-Substmntial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating a Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA Li Sector Policies O H OSUOM * N O NA L Physical OH *SUOM ON ONA Oi Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA O Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M * N 0 NA CL Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social El Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N O NA El Gender OH OSUOM ON ONA a Other (Please specify) O H O SU OM O N O NA L Private sector development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NA O Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N * NA El Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA - 38 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating FI Lending OHS OS *U OHU E Supervision OHS *S Ou OHU O Overall OHS OS * u O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating O Preparation OHS OS * u O HU O Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU O Implementation agency performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU O Overall OHS OS * u O HU - 39 -  Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Staff Appraisal Report GIMPA Review Report on NACVET, December 1995 Back to Office Reports, Aide Memoires, Project Status Reports Government's full Project Completion Report, September 2001 Draft Ghana Labour Market Survey Report - 2001 Tracer Study Reports Draft TVET Policy Document - 2001 Beneficiary Assessment Survey Report - 2001 Mid-term Review Report - 1998 MOE Status report on Project Restructuring - March 1999 Annual Consultative Workshops reports (1998-2001) Audit Report on Toolkits - Deloitte & Touche - 2001 Sample Training Manuals for Apprentices Sample Nomination and Admission form Ghana's Experience in Apprenticeship Training in the Informal Sector, Amankrah, March 2001 Improving Productivity in the Informal Sector in Ghana, Amankrah, December 2000 Working tables used for the preparation of the ICR: Statements of Objectives by Source List of Indicators by Goals and Objectives Targets Set by Component and Activity, and Their Achievement Choices Made in the Design of the Project Key Issues Discussed in Aide Memoires - 40 -  MAP SECTION   IBRD 26746 3- BURKINA FASO2-O GH A NA 1 v *-JWov~~~~~TuruuNvrMaog).VOCATIONALSKILLS AND `T; ~~~~~~~~~~~INFORMAL SECTOR SUPPORT 20 ~~~~~~~~2"IPROJECT UPPER ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-PRIMARY ROADS rapa bi, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0DISTRICT CAP TALS E S T ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~REGION CAPITALS adawli w IL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\ NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT BOLJNDARIES REGION BOUNDAR ES L -INTERNATIONAL 10' BOU.NDARIES 10' Gushiegu ~ ~~~Note; Red Numiber indicate aboba Locationh of Government 0. Traning nstitutios s lug T"'i~~~~) reni gNumbers Indicate LLoaions of Private/N'GO To on 0 n p Yendi ~~~* Trining Institutions .9. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~/ r b T E T 4D G 0~~~~~~.1 D~~~~~~~~~~~~~~111 I .j.- PJE .-..., -.* I'.~~~C - *1 I. I.- .~~~~~~~~~~~'er /' 1/ L' I -- 1 -' - :..-: 0 - . -l L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~j F ~~~~~~~ I~~~~~~~~~2 N - . ,~~~~~~~~~~~~ C1.I 35 33 J--t LI ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -~ Jo -~ G LILF OF- GuN FEBRUARY 1995