Niger - Agricultural Services Support Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 18933 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER AGRICULTURAL SERVICES SUPPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 2355 NIR) February 10, 1999 Rural Development II Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENTS UNITS Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) EXCHANGE RATE 1988 US$1 = CFAF 298 1990 US$1 = CFAF 272 1992 US$1 = CFAF 265 1994 US$1 = CFAF 555 1996 US$1 = CFAF 512 1998 US$1 =CFAF 550 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVLATIONS AND ACRONYMS AMRT Atelier Mensuel de Revue de Technologie (Monthly Technology Review Meeting) CORRA Comites R6gionaux de la Recherche Agronomique (Regional Agricultural Research Committees) EDA Equipe de Diagnostic d 'Arrondissement (District Diagnostic Team) GDP Gross Domestic Product INRAN Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (National Agricultural Research Institute) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOAL Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock MOU Memorandum Of Understanding QAG Quality Assurance Group SAR Staff Appraisal Report SMS Subject Matter Specialist T&V Training and Visit UTNDP United Nations Development Program VEW Village Extension Worker Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director: Theodore 0. Ahlers Sector Manager: Joseph Baah-Dwomoh Task Team Leaders: Madicke Niang (Jan 93 - June 95); Djibril Aw (June 95 - Feb 97) Turto Turtiainen (March 97 - Aug 97) Yves-Coffi Prudencio(Sept97-June98)  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER AGRICULTURAL SERVICES SUPPORT PROJECT (Credit 2355 NIR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface Evaluation Summary ........................................ i PART 1. Project Implementation Assessment .................1....................... A. Introduction. I B. Project Objectives .I B 1. Description of Objectives .1 B2. Evaluation of Objectives and Risks. 2 C. Achievement of Objectives. 2 D. Project Cost and Financing. 9 E. Major Factors Affecting the Project. 9 F. Project Sustainability. 9 G. Bank Peiformance .10 H. Borrower Performance .11 1. Implementation Agency .11 J. Assessment of Outcome .11 K. Future Operations .12 L Key Lessons Leaned .12 PART II. Statistical Tables ........................................ 13 Table 1. Summary of Assessments ........................................ 13 Table 2. Related Bank Loans/Credits .............. .......................... 14 Table 3. Project Timetable ........................................ 15 Table 4. Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ............................... 16 Table 5. Key Indicators for Project Implementation ......................................17 Table 6. Key Indicators for Project Operation .................... ............... 18 Table 7. Studies Included in the Project ................................... 18 Table 8A. Project Costs ............... .................... 19 Table 8B. Project Financing ........... ........................ 19 Table 9. Economic Costs and Benefits ................................... 19  Table of Contents, (continued) Page Table 10. Status of Legal Covenants ........................... 20 Table 11. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................... 23 Table 12. Bank Resources: Missions .......................... , . , .,. 24 Appendix Map: 3IBRD 23273  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER AGRICULTURAL SERVICES SUPPORT PROJECT (Credit 2355 NIR) Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Agricultural Services Support Project (PRSAA) for which Credit 2355-NIR in the amount of SDR 12.9 million (equivalent to US$18 million) was approved on June 12, 1992 and made effective on January 25, 1993. The credit was closed on June 30, 1998. The last disbursement took place on October 14, 1998. About 99 percent of the credit was disbursed, and the undisbursed balance of SDR 89,495 was canceled on January 10, 1999. The completion report was prepared by Yves-Coffi Prudencio, AFTR3, with assistance of Daniel Sellen and Soulemane Fofanal, AFTR2, and was reviewed by Joseph Baah-Dwomoh, Sector Manager, AFTR2, and by Theodore 0. Ahlers, Country Director for Niger. Preparation of this report began during a mission to Niger in September 1998. The implementation report is based on the project documents, correspondence, supervision reports, appraisal report, and Credit Agreement. The Borrower accepted the Bank's ICR and made no comments (letter attached as Appendix). The Borrower's twenty-five page report, "Rapport d'Achevemenft, is available upon request. Points discussed in the ICR are the same as those discussed in the ICR mission's Aide Memoire, which is also available on request. 1Michel Aklamavo, Amadou Alassane and Salifou Mahaman of the World Bank participated in the ICR mission along with govermnent and project representatives.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (Cr. 2355-NIR) Evaluation Summary A. Introduction 1. This Implementation Completion Report evaluates the Agricultural Services Project in Niger, which was executed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. B. Project Objectives and Activities 2. The principal objective of the project was to strengthen agricultural, livestock and environment protection extension to farmers with a view to increase agricultural production and sustain growth of farmers' incomes. 3. The activities planned and undertaken to meet the objective included: (a) reorganization of extension services, supported with adequate human and physical resources; (b) regular training of responsible officials at every level; (c) strengthening the linkage between extension and national and regional agricultural research; (d) strengthening of institutional relationships between crop, livestock and environmental services; and (e) functional literacy and numeracy training. C. Achievement of Objectives 4. The project contributed substantially institution-building activities, especially to helping reorganize extension services, strengthening relationships between crop, livestock, and environmental services, and improving functional literacy. However, it had serious management problems and failed to demonstrate a substantial achievement in providing benefits to farmers through technology adoption. Thus, because the principal development objective of increasing agricultural production and incomes for farmers through improved extension was not achieved, the project outcome has been rated globally unsatisfactory. 5. The project substantially achieved the reorganization of extension services by providing human and physical resources at the farm, regional and national levels, and surpassed several of the goals set at appraisal in terms of geographical coverage and provision of human resources. Improved efficiency of the extension system was partly achieved by implementing the previously tested training and visits (T&V) system.  - ii - 6. Training objectives were partly achieved. Regular training of field extension agents has been substantially carried out and has led to successful multidisciplinary training of village extension workers (VEW) and their supervisors. However, there have been severe shortcomings in the training of farmers with only one third of planned fortnightly sessions carried out. There have also been deficiencies in the training of management and support staff, particularly in the areas of monitoring and evaluation, accounting, and financial management. Most training planned to take place outside the country for responsible officials did not take place due to poor management. 7. The objective of strengthening the research-extension linkages was partially achieved. The project was able to get research and extension staff to collaborate and institutionalize this relationship through memoranda of understanding which assured cooperation. However the achievements of the research-extension activities, such as on- farm trials, were often poor in terms of findings and impact. 8. The objective of improving institutional relationships between crop, livestock, and environmental services in the Ministry was substantially achieved through the institutionalization of working relationships between the three types of services at central, regional and district levels. In particular, the multidisciplinary training of extension agents achieved under the project is the result of such integration. 9. The functional literacy objective was substantially achieved. A total of 20,212 farmers, half of them women, were trained under the project. 10. Technology adoption by farmers of extended technologies was slow and insufficient. This was mainly a result of inadequate participatory diagnosis early in the project to identify and extend demand-driven technologies. A 1998 impact study suggests that nationwide, and within the contact group farmers, only 5 out of 32 crop production technologies (16 percent), 5 out of 19 livestock production technologies (26 percent), and 5 out of 13 environment protection technologies (38 percent) had non- negligible adoption ratios. 11. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) was insufficient. The external and internal M&E systems did not operate effectively during most of the project implementation period, as a result of inadequate training and lack of support from Government and project management. As a result, the M&E units were unable to assess project performance and to guide project management, contributing to the poor performance of the project. 12. Financial and administrative management was unsatisfactory throughout the project period. Management was highly unstable with eight changes in project coordinators over a five-year period. Bank project management was similarly unstable. Audit reports found ineligible and insufficiently justified expenses from 1995 to the end of the project, which led to the government's reimbursing about 200 million CFAF.  - iii - D. Sustainability and Future Operations 13. The extension system in Niger, is not fmancially sustainable and is not likely to be so in the near future, given its current design. However human resource development under the project, through transfer of information and knowledge, is expected to have a sustainable impact. 14. Due to the unsatisfactory performance of the project, no direct follow-up operation has been prepared. However, the government is working on a rural development strategy that could serve as a basis for more innovative and cost effective future agricultural services operations. E. Borrower and Bank Performance 15. The performance of the Borrower, including that of its implementation agency, was mixed, but is judged generally unsatisfactory, mainly as a result of poor financial and administrative management of the project. 16. The performance of the Bank was also mixed, and also rated unsatisfactory. Supervision was quantitatively fair, although insufficient, but qualitatively poor. It was close to the client and carried out on a regular basis, but was unstable (four Task managers in five years). Performance indicators with respect to development objectives were not clearly stated anywhere and were arbitrarily decided by each Task Manager. Early opportunities for taking decisive actions to improve project management at an early stage were missed. Procurement delays due to the Bank occurred. Corrective measures such as retrofitting took place too late and therefore could not sufficiently improve the performance of the project before its closing date. F. Major Lessons Learned 17. The following are the key lessons learned from the project: (a) It is essential to define and phase project objectives by stating clearly at appraisal the short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives of the project and related performance indicators. (b) It is essential to ensure, from the beginning of project implementation and during each supervision, that external and internal monitoring and evaluation systems use adequate performance indicators, are properly staffed, are allocated timely and adequate resources for operation and training, and are not adversely influenced by national project managers. (c) Stability of project management must be encouraged, by ensuring that managers are recruited more on the basis of technical and managerial competence than on the basis of political affiliation.  -lv - (d) Multidisciplinary training of extension agents is feasible and shows potential to be an effective way of reducing costs of extension services to small farmers. (e) Participatory diagnosis is a critical factor in improving the pertinence of extended technologies, and therefore the efficiency and the impact of extension services.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (Cr. 2355 NIR) PART I: Project Implementation Assessment A. Introduction 1. At the time of project preparation (1991/92) the crop sector in Niger accounted for 35 percent of GDP and for 25 percent of exports. Population growth (3.1 percent) far exceeded growth of food production (1.8 percent), which increased as a result of expanding cultivated area and not to productivity gains. Agriculture was also hindered by environmental degradation from desertification and mining of soil fertility. The livestock sector accounted in 1984-89 for 13 percent of GDP and 12 percent of exports. It was characterized by poor husbandry practices, chronically low nutritional levels, and deteriorating grazing resources. 2. The Government's development strategy aimed at achieving sustainable per capita income growth with equity. The rural development strategy strove for: (a) food security; (b) natural resource management; (c) intensification and diversification of production; and (d) promotion of participation of rural populations and of the private sector in development activities. IDA, in collaboration with other donors, supported the strategy through projects with a strong emphasis on agricultural research (Cr.2122-NIR) and small rural operations (Cr. 1 890-NIR) to promote off-season production. Support to agricultural services was undertaken initially in 1987-90 as a pilot project, after which Government decided to implement the resulting extension system nationwide. B. Project Objectives Description of Objectives 3. The project aimed at strengthening agricultural, livestock and environmental protection extension with a view to generate increased production and sustained growth of farm incomes. The project was expected to build on experience gained during the implementation of the pilot project. 4. The project included the following activities: (a) efficient organization of extension services, supported by adequate human and physical resources at the farm, regional and national levels; (b) regular and continuous training of responsible officials at each level by means of fortnightly, monthly and annual training sessions, including courses held outside Niger or conducted by external participants;  -2 - (c) strengthening of the linkage between extension and national and regional agricultural research to address farmers' problems. Technical problems such as those related to soil and water conservation, diversification of production, soil fertility, and ecologically adapted varieties were to receive priority under the adaptive research programs. (d) strengthening of linkages between crops, livestock and environmental services so as to ensure effective extension support for these programs; (e) functional literacy and numeracy training for men and women, including stepped-up promotion of participation by women to enable them to play a progressively active role in rural development and village activities and management. Evaluation of Objectives and Risks 5. In hindsight, first phase objectives of increased production and sustained growth of farmers' income were too ambitious, given the poor state of the extension system at the time of project preparation. The project, however, correctly emphasized institution- building in the first phase, but would have benefited from a clearer definition of the objectives and performance indicators at each stage. 6. Project risks identified during preparation were pertinent and properly managed during project implementation. These included (a) the lack of workable solutions to deal with farmers' problems; (b) coordination problems between the central administration and the departmental and district agricultural services; and (c) failure of Government and donors to sustain a long term commitment to achieve durable improvements. Unfortunately, several important risks were overlooked and adversely affected the project. They include: (a) instability in project management due to eight changes of project manager in five years at the national level and four changes of task managers at the Bank level; (b) economic recession, leading to delays in salary payments and to low morale among extension staff, (c) climatic and famine risks, resulting in highly mobile farmers who were difficult for extension agents to reach; (d) lack of unity in the line of command at the ministerial level, resulting in conflicting management information flows; (e) delays in the transfer of accounting documents from regional to central level; and (f) non-project use of project vehicles by government officials. C. Achievement Of Objectives 7. The Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project did not function properly and failed to address and measure project's development objectives, which were to increase agricultural production and farmers' incomes. The project did, however, substantially achieve some, but not all of its institution building objectives.  -3 - Organization of Extension Services 8. The objective of providing the extension services with adequate human and physical resources at the farm, regional and national levels was substantially achieved, but the objective of achieving an efficient organization of extension services was only partially achieved. 9. The project aimed at improving coordination and efficiency of the extension services provided to farmers by directorates from three different ministries (directorates of agriculture/livestock, of environment and of literacy). A coordination unit within the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock was in charge of implementing the successfully tested Training and Visit (T&V) extension system in the project areas. 10. The project covered, in addition to the three departments of the pilot phase (Tilaberi, Dosso and Tahoua), the urban district of Niamey and three additional departments (Zinder, Maradi, Diffa) instead of two, as originally planned at appraisal. Memoranda of understanding were signed between the project and other agricultural development projects to minimize conflicts and to achieve complementarity of interventions. 11. Staffing was higher than projected at appraisal to deal with the greater geographical area coverage of the project. By the end of the project (in June 1998) extension was being implemented by about 1000 agents, including 600 Village Extension Workers (VEW), compared to 410 VEWs projected at appraisal. In addition, there were 100 district level supervisors, compared to 66 supervisors projected at appraisal. There were 25 district level coordinators, compared to 18 projected at appraisal. In addition, there were, at the district level, 52 M&E enumerators, 22 coordinators of women activities, and 78 subject matter specialists, compared to none projected at appraisal. At the departmental level, there were 7 Coordinators and 7 Extension Leaders as planned at appraisal. Subject matter specialists (20 in SAR) were to be appointed at the departmental level but were appointed instead at the district level, as mentioned above, for greater efficiency. In addition, 14 M&E agents, 7 Coordinators of women activities and 7 training coordinators were appointed at the departmental level, compared to none planned at appraisal. At the central level there were 11 high level staff, 6 M&E staff and two training specialists as planned. In addition, there was one Chief Coordinator of women activities, not planned at appraisal. 12. Extension coverage expanded substantially during the project period. At closing, the project coverage grew from near zero to about 80 percent of small scale irrigation areas (40,000 hectares) as expected at appraisal. However, it could only cover 40 percent of the 10,000 villages in Niger rainfed cropping areas, compared to the 60 percent target at appraisal. The number of villages per VEW increased from three in 1993 to seven in 1997 with improved access to transportation. The number of contact group farmers per VEW increased from 30 in 1993 to 140 in 1997, with each VEW serving about 1,400 agricultural households in the 7 villages covered, This is below the expectation of 2,000 households at appraisal. The number of contact groups increased from 1,828 in 1993 to 8,694 in 1997 with about 2 contact groups per village and 10 farmers per contact group. The number of VEWs per supervisor increased from 3 in 1993 to 6 at the end of the  -4- project, within the range (6 to 8) expected at appraisal. With the transfer of subject matter specialists from departmental to the district levels, there were over 10 Subject Matter Specialists per department, compared with 4 Subject Matter Specialists during the pilot phase, and as projected at appraisal. 13. Farmers' participation in fortnightly working sessions was relatively satisfactory. During the last year of the project, two-thirds of contact group farmers were attending regularly and 81 percent of follow-up visits occurred as planned. There were only two demonstrations per contact group and per cropping season before 1997, the main reason being that only one third of planned fortnightly training sessions of the VEWs and supervisors by Subject Matter Specialists took place. Such sessions were to provide the demonstration themes needed and did not occur on a regular basis. Reasons included the fact that there were few themes repeated several times leading to loss of interest from VEWs, and also insufficient means of transportation. Following the retrofitting of the project in March 1997 and the implementation of its action plan, including the promotion of participatory diagnosis, the rate of completion of planned training sessions increased to 65 percent and the number of demonstrations per contact group doubled from 2 to 4 during the 1997/98 cropping season. The number of demonstration units increased from 12, 950 in 1993 to 33,832 in 1997. Training of Responsible Officials 14. This objective was partially achieved. A major achievement of the project has been its ability, through formal training and exchange of experience, to create a VEW force and its supervisors trained in several disciplines. 15. Seventy-seven percent of the planned monthly technology review meetings (AMRTs), which brought together researchers and subject matter specialists, took place during the project period. The achievement ratio increased from 50 percent in 1993 to 89 percent in 1997. 16. Fortnightly training sessions, where Subject Matter Specialists transfer the information received during the monthly technology review workshops (AMRTs) to VEWs and their supervisors, did not occur on a regular basis. On average, only one out of three planned actually took place. The completion ratio was 26 percent in 1993 and increased to 39 percent in 1997. 17. In addition to the regular training sessions, there has been specific training sessions covering various themes, including T&V methodology, planning and implementation of on-farm trials, work planning, demonstrations, and Monitoring and Evaluation. Participatory diagnostic training was also emphasized, particularly after the 1995 mid-term review and the 1997 retrofitting. A total of 204 specific training events for extension staff at all levels in different parts of the country were organized during the project period. 18. Training of staff outside the country, as suggested in the SAR, did not take place until 1997 due to inadequate planning. There has been no overseas training of key project staff in the monitoring and evaluation, rural extension, information support, and other  -5 - important fields. However, in implementing the action plan of the 1997 retrofitting, four project staff were finally sent abroad in 1997 for training in farmers organizations, and one was sent for management training. Linkage with Research 19. The research-extension linkage objectives were partially achieved. The project was able to establish adequate research-extension mechanisms and to get research and extension staff to work together and to institutionalize their relationship through memoranda of understanding. However the findings and impact of the research-extension activities, such as on-farm trials, were globally weak compared with the stated objectives of the component (paragraph 4-c). 20. The linkage was governed by a memorandum of understanding between the National Agricultural Research Institute (INRAN) and the project. Mechanisms for ensuring the linkage were (a) the regional agricultural research committees or Comit6s Regionaux de la Recherche Agronomique (CORRA); (b) monthly technology review workshops (AMRTs); (c) on-farm trials; and (d) multidisciplinary research-extension teams. 21. The regional agricultural research committees (CORRAS), which were not mentioned in the SAR, existed prior to the project (PRSAA) but were initiated under the research project (PNRA) which became effective in 1991. The CORRA was a forum for farmers, administrators, research and extension specialists to meet at the regional level to discuss rural development problems and propose solutions. Three CORRA meetings took place, at Tillaberi in 1992, at Dosso in June 1993, and at Tahoua in December 1993. The CORRAS were suspended when the research project stopped funding them, because their performance was unsatisfactory from the point of view of the research project. They were controlled by the political administration which was using them more for its own purpose than for providing answers to pressing research and extension questions. 22. Most of the planned monthly technology review workshops AMRTs took place each year during the project period. There were 36 out of 72 planned (50 percent) in 1993; 42 out of 72 planned (58 percent) in 1994; 38 out of 95 planned (45 percent) in 1995; 61 out of 84 planned (72 percent) in 1996, and 75 out of 84 planned (89 percent) in 1997. Reasons for the shortfalls were transportation problems faced by the SMSs, and the repetitive nature of discussion themes in the early years of the project, resulting in lack of interest from the SMSs. This was a result of the neglecting to undertake a participatory diagnosis to identify pertinent and demand-driven themes. 23. On-farm trials of technologies were carried out by the extension services, but in relatively small numbers in the early years of the project. There were 201 tests out of 309 planned (65 percent) in 1993. There were no tests in 1994 due to a lack of communication between research and extension staff during that year. There were 329 tests out of 369 planned (92 percent) in 1995; 532 tests out of 577 planned (92 percent) in 1996, and 1,856 tests and researcher managed trials (including 1200 extension tests) out of 2,204 planned in 1997. The number of tests was generally greater than the target of 250 tests per year set at appraisal. The increase in the last year was due mainly to the  -6- requirements of the 1997 post (retrofitting action plans. However, the quality -of the on- farm tests was often poor and led to few significant findings and minor impacts. 24. Two research-extension multidisciplinary teams were set up in 1996 in the departments of Dosso and Maradi. The team included in each province six researchers and three extension staff and worked with extension staff at the district level. Two districts were covered by each team in each province in 1996 and 1997. Activities carried out by the team included participatory diagnostics and planning, and on-farm testing and demonstrations of technologies. Following a positive evaluation in 1997 of the results achieved by the two teams, the national research and extension institutions decided to further decentralize the multidisciplinary team approach and establish a permanent diagnostic team in each district (Equipe de Diagnostic d'Arrondissement). Relations between Crop, Livestock, and Environment Services 25. This objective was substantially achieved. The strengthening of relationships between crops, livestock and environmental services was achieved through the institutionalization of working relationships between the three types of services at central, regional and district level. In particular the multidisciplinary training of extension agents achieved under the project is the result of such strengthening of relations. Gender and Audio-visual 26. These components were articulated in action plans following the project's retrofitting in 1997 and were substantially completed. The Gender component was designed to improve women's access to agricultural services. As a result of the implementation of related plans, about 30 extension staff in charge of women's activities have been appointed at the national, regional and sub-regional levels. Extension themes of particular interest to women have been introduced into the training schedule. A total of 64 women VEWs have been appointed and the number of women contact groups increased from 1,004 in 1997 to 3,757 in 1998. Women farmers' associations and women's savings and credit schemes also emerged as a result of the implementation of the plans. 27. The use of audio-visual instruments, such as radio and television extension programs was enhanced following the retrofitting, so as to lower the cost of extension and increase its impact. A survey in May 1998 to assess the impact of such programs indicated that over 60 percent of farmers listened to the radio programs and over 40 percent watched the television programs. Over 80 percent of the viewers or listeners found the demonstrated technologies relevant to their needs and applied partly or fully at least one of them. Technology Adoption 28. According to the M&E results, about ten out of more than fifty technologies had significant adoption ratios between 1994 and 1996. The most adopted technologies (about 50 to 60 percent of farmers partially adopting within the contact groups) were soil water conservation techniques (the zai in particular) and planting density. Technologies  -7 - with moderate adoption rates (20 to 40 percent) included composting, mineral fertilizers, improved wood stoves, thinning, elimination of livestock internal parasites, livestock feeding crates, urea block and urea treatment of hay for livestock feeding. However, a more independent impact study carried out in Febmary 1998 by a consultant with a sample of over 3,000 farmers (half of whom were contact farmers) suggested much lower adoption rates. This study indicated that, out of 32 crop production technologies, only five (16 percent) had significant nationwide adoption rates between 8 and 17 percent of the contact group farmers. These are, in a declining order of adoption, thinning, compost production, plant density, seeds treatment with fungicides, and use of organic manure. Among the livestock production technologies, only five out of nineteen (26 percent) had a significant adoption ratio between 8 and 30 percent of contact group farmers. These include in declining order of adoption, urea block (licks) for livestock feed supplementation, forage cutting and storage, stomach parasite treatments, construction of feeding crates, and hay treatment with urea. Among the environment protection technologies, five out of thirteen (38 percent) had a significant adoption ratio between 8 and 25 percent of contact farmers. These are, in a declining order of adoption, the improved wood stove, the zai land recuperation technique, improved land clearing, natural tree regeneration protection, and pruning techniques. Technology adoption in the non-contact groups were much smaller and dispersion rate was estimated to be on average one contact farmer to four non-contact farmers, instead of 10 as expected at appraisal. A third independent impact study carried out with the help of a consultant after project completion, on a smaller but widely spread sample (120 households) focused on the six most popular technologies identified in the previous study and found that their adoption rates were about 33 percent in the contact groups as well as in the non-contact groups. Functional Literacy 29. This objective was substantially achieved. The literacy component, handled by the Direction de l'Alphab6tisation et de la Formation des Adultes of the Ministry of Education, was introduced in the project in 1994 as a pilot program, covering 5 villages in the Dosso district and 5 villages in the Konni district (Tahoua province). Five hundred farmers benefited from the pilot program. 30. The program was subsequently extended nationwide to cover 23 districts. A total of 365 villages were covered under the program, surpassing the target of 350 villages at appraisal. The population reached was 20,212 farmers of whom 50.33 percent were women. The final test was taken by 14,168, of which 5,175 men and 3,864 women passed and became certified literates, while the remaining were considered to be semi-literates. These results reflect an acceptable 30 percent drop-out ratio. 31. According to UNDP statistics, the literacy ratio for adults in Niger increased from 14 percent in 1988 to 17 percent in 1998, partly due to the effects of the project. In 1998, out of a total of 1,035 literacy training centers, 58 percent were under the project during the second half of the decade, thereby suggesting a significant contribution of the project to the observed increase in the adult literacy rate in the country.  -8 - Monitoring and Evaluation 32. An external M&E unit was established in 1993 under the Direction des Etudes et de la Planification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. In practice, however, it has rarely been operational. A M&E report produced by the unit in 1994 was not considered useful by the extension services since the authors lacked adequate training. Furthermore, it is the general feeling of the M&E unit staff that the project managers, fearing negative evaluations, never made available on time the necessary resources for them to carry out their duties properly. Only two M&E surveys were carried out by the unit over the five years of the project while one was planned for each year. The unit was instead used to compile and analyze routine extension management information contained in monthly reports from the field. This was inadequate to acquire sufficient information to guide the project management. One external adoption study was finally carried out by the end of the project to comply with the requirements of the 1997 post- retrofitting action plans. 33. The failure of the M&E unit to demonstrate any significant impact of the project, in terms of technology adoption and benefits to farmers, was the main cause for the project being rated unsatisfactory with respect to its development objectives from 1995 until the end of the project. Major M&E achievements, such as the early 1998 impact study which documented action plans resulting from retrofitting, were similarly insufficient and occurred too late to guide project implementation. Civil Works, Vehicles and Equipment. 34. Acquisition of program inputs in terms of buildings and equipment progressed faster than program outputs. A total of 26 training centers, one in each district, were built and equipped. One hundred and three vehicles (compared with 60 planned at appraisal) and 871 motorcycles were acquired, as well as office equipment, including computers. The few performance indicators defined at appraisal emphasized mostly the achievement of such project input goals. Financial and Administrative Management 35. The project fmancial and administrative management was unsatisfactory throughout the project implementation period. Management was unstable with eight different project coordinators over a five year period. Audits reported ineligible and insufficiently justified expenses from 1995 to the end of the project, which led to the government's reimbursing about CFAF 200 million. Up to 1995, the project had a centralized financial management system; it was subsequently decentralized to some extent but never functioned efficiently because of inadequate training of management staff, particularly the financial controller and the accountants. Other problems included a lack of transparency on the side of the project coordinator and resistance to allow the internal control mechanism (procedures manual, co-signatures) to function as planned.  -9 - D. Project Cost And Financing 36. The total project cost was over US$20.5 million. US$18.0 million were funded by the IDA credit with the balance funded by the government and beneficiaries, mainly to cover salaries of the extension staff, and also for land and other items offered by rural communities for the housing of the village extension workers. E. Major Factors Affecting The Project 37. Management Instability. The frequent changes in project management that coincided with almost every change in Minister of Agriculture was a major contributor to the poor performance of the project. It led to lack of continuity in implementation strategy, frequent changes in priorities, and disruptive interventions of some government officials in project implementation, particularly in the allocation and use of project resources (e.g., vehicles, oil). 38. Deficient Monitoring and Evaluation System. The absence of adequate performance indicators and M&E data, both from internal and external sources, to guide project management, significantly contributed to the poor performance of the project. 39. Midterm review. The midterm review carried out in February 1995 was instrumental in identifying several weaknesses in project implementation, particularly in the areas of extension management and financial management, and in making recommendations for corrections at an early stage. Corrective action included restructuring of staff at the field level, with elimination of overlapping in areas of intervention of staff, and rationalization of the organization chart. It significantly contributed to the institution building (T&V) achievements of the project. 40. Retrofitting. The action plans put in place following the March 1997 retrofitting of the project significantly contributed to improvement of the project performance during its last year. The plans enabled the project to shift emphasis slightly from level of efforts (or project inputs) to impact in terms of expected results and to introduce or emphasize needed specific components. As demonstrated by the evolution of the previously discussed extension parameters, significant positive changes in such parameters were observed during that period. In particular the introduction and successful implementation of the gender and audio-visual action plans significantly upgraded the performance of the project. F. Project Sustainability 41. The extension system in Niger is not financially sustainable and is likely to remain so in the near future, given its current design and the low capacity of Government to finance its recurrent costs. The government does not currently have the capability to sustain the recurrent costs of the project, and extension services are rapidly diminishing due to an absence of external funds. 42. The human resource development elements of the project (fanner's training in new technologies, literacy) are expected to have a sustainable impact. It is even  -10- expected, given the high rural demand for functional literacy, that with reduced or no funding, several village communities, are likely to maintain or create and pay for their functional literacy programs. Furthermore, some of the low resource technologies that have been transferred to farmers, particularly in the area of soil fertility maintenance (e.g., zai, half moon) are expected to also have long lasting effects in environmental protection. G. Bank Performance 43. Project Preparation. The Bank's performance during preparation was unsatisfactory. A two-year pilot project was carried out in preparation for the project, but glossed over a number of risks that in hindsight affected performance and sustainability, including the lack of continuity in national and Bank project managers, poor morale from delays in salary payments, lack of unity in the line of command at the ministerial level, and delays in the transfer of accounting documents from regional to central level. There were deficiencies in some areas, such as the lack of a logical framework and performance indicators, insufficient risk control/mitigation mechanisms. However, the design of the project, given the complexity of the Nigerien extension system, had some merits, particularly regarding the nation-wide institutionalization of the T&V approach, and inter-institution linkages and coordination mechanisms. 44. Project Supervision. The Bank's performance during project supervision was overall unsatisfactory. The project task manager was initially based in the field during the first two years of the project for close supervision and was assisted by specialists from headquarters. Close supervision was maintained afterward with two local staff and with headquarters-based task managers. Although formal supervision took place regularly twice a year, the supervision teams included mainly extension specialists and fimancial analysts, but lacked monitoring and evaluation specialists. The midterm review took place as planned two and a half years after project effectiveness. It identified several deficiencies and made adequate recommendations to correct some but not all of them, without any fundamental change in project design. The Bank changed the project task manager four times during the five years of project implementation, thereby creating instability and lack of continuity in project management approach on the Bank's side. This was exacerbated by the fact that, due to the absence of adequate development outcome indicators, the project performance was arbitrarily rated by each task manager on the basis of subjective opinions. Decisive actions were not taken to limit the frequent change of project coordinators by the Government, to correct the financial management of the project or to suspend the project in view of its numerous qualified audits and ineligible expenses. The project was declared "at risk" and was retrofitted as needed, but this was done fourteen months before the end of the project, with insufficient time to change project performance from unsatisfactory to satisfactory. 45. Procurement, Disbursement and Audits. The Bank's performance with respect to procurement was marginally satisfactory, even with a field-based Task Manager, as a result of long delays for acquiring non-objections. Performance with respect to disbursement and audit were more satisfactory, as they resulted in the project disbursing almost all the credit as planned, and allowed timely detection of ineligible expenses and other financial management constraints.  H. Borrower Performance 46. The performance of the Borrower was satisfactory during preparation, but unsatisfactory during implementation. Government failed to establish an effective external monitoring and evaluation system. The frequent change (eight times in five years) of project coordinator was for political reasons rather than for technical performance reasons. Project resources were often abused by Government officials, such as the requisition of project vehicles by Prefets and sous-Prefets. The Government did attempt to resolve problems by moving the project from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MOAL) to the Ministry of Economic Planning in April 1998, reflecting the Government's weaknesses in tackling fundamental problems within MOAL. This was done too late and was not necessarily the best solution. The Government satisfactorily complied with most legal convenants and supported action plans proposed by supervision missions to improve the performance of the project. I. Implementation Agency 47. The performance of the project coordination unit was unsatisfactory, mainly as a result of financial management problems that resulted in several qualified audits and ineligible expenses reimbursed by the Government from 1995 to 1998. Project coordinators' reluctance to provide adequate and timely resources to the M&E component contributed to the poor performance of the internal monitoring and evaluation system, and thereby to the poor performance of the implementation agency. However, following the 1997 retrofitting, the performance of the project coordination office improved significantly and resulted in successful completion of most actions proposed in the post-retrofitting action plans. J. Assessment Of Outcome 48. Supervision missions often rated the project satisfactory with respect to its implementation progress but generally unsatisfactory with respect to attaining its development objectives. In retrospect, however, implementation progress was in fact barely satisfactory, if not unsatisfactory. This was a result of administrative and financial management problems and problems stemming from not having an adequate monitoring and evaluation system. In providing satisfactory rating for implementation progress, supervision missions focused achievement of action plans proposed during previous missions. Most of such plans turned attention to technical T&V implementation issues rather than project management and M&E issues. The project was most successful in capacity building. Four of its seven major capacity building objectives were substantially achieved (organization of extension services; improvement of the linkage between crop, livestock and environment services; functional literacy; civil works and equipment). Other capacity building objectives, particularly regarding training and management were not achieved. Although there are, as suggested by the early 1998 impact study, a few cases where the project successfully transferred technologies, the achievement remains insufficient (although no standards were originally agreed upon) with no knowledge of its impact on the livelihood of farmers. It may be premature to expect much impact from a five-year project, but given the rather successful organization of the extension services during the first two years of the project, better results in terms of extension of pertinent  -12- technologies and in terms of adoption might have been achieved during the other three years if the M&E and management components had functioned properly. Seen in this broader context, the project outcome is rated globally unsatisfactory. K Future Operations 49. Due to the unsatisfactory performance of the project and the fact that supervision efforts were aimed primarily at correcting short-term problems, no preparation for a follow-up operation was made during the life of the project. Since the end of the project, the extension system has been surviving on Government funds and on a revolving fund created for the maintenance of the motorcycles of the extension staff. A rural development strategy is however being drafted by the Borrower and several strategic studies and workshops have been carried out under the project. Their results may serve as a basis for the identification of future operations to provide more cost-effective agricultural services to Nigerien farmers. L. Key Lessons Learned 50. The following are the key lessons learned from the project a) It is essential to define and phase project objectives by stating clearly at appraisal the short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives of the project and related performance indicators. b) It is essential to ensure, from the beginning of project implementation and during each supervision, that external and internal monitoring and evaluation systems use adequate performance indicators, are properly staffed, are allocated timely and adequate resources for operation and training, and are not adversely influenced by national project managers/coordinators. c) Stability of project management must be encouraged, by ensuring that managers are recruited more on the basis of technical and managerial competence than on the basis of political affiliation. d) Multidisciplinary training of extension agents is feasible and shows potential to be an effective way of reducing costs of extension services to small farmers. e) Participatory diagnosis is a critical factor in improving the pertinence of extended technologies, and therefore the efficiency and the impact of extension services.  - 13- IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NIGER AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (Cr.2355-NIR) PART II: Statistical Tables Table 1: Summary of Assessments Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable A. Achievement of objectives (X) (X) (X) (X) Macroeconomic policies X Sector policies ___ X Financial objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives X l Poverty reduction X Gender issues X Other social objectives x Environmental objectives _ X Public sector management X Private sector development X X Other (specify) X 1 Likely Unlikely Uncertain B. Project sustainability (X) (X) (X) Highly satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient C. Bank performance (X) (X) (X) Identification x Preparation assistance x Appraisal X Supervision X  - 14- Highly satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient D. Borrower performance (X) (X) (X) Preparation 1X Implementation X Covenant compliance X Operation (if applicable) X Highly Highly E. Assessment of satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory outcome (X) (X) (X) (X) x Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/Credit title Purpose Year of Status approval Preceding operation Dosso RDP The project was aimed to increase 1979 Completed (Cr. 0967) agricultural production and reinforce capacity building at a local level. The project Completion report concluded that the impact of Dosso project on production increase was marginal and that the adoption of insufficiently proven technical messages by farmers was limited. The project closed in June 1985 with only 16 percent of fund disbursed out of the total credit of US$20 million Maradi RDP II The project aimed to: (a) encourage 1980 Completed (Cr. 1026) farmer's initiative and participation and to make them more responsible for development activities; (b) develop village-based extension system; and (c) gradually reduce technical assistance and cut operating cost. The project was confronted with implementation problems and failed to achieve the expected increase in crop production and a real participation of farmers in development activities. Small Rural The project aimed at helping the 1988 Completed Operations Government to develop institutional (Cr. 1890) capability in preparation and execution of small rural operations by (i) providing support to provincial and district technical  - 15 - services, (ii) improving extension services, and (iii) training beneficiary groups in literacy and management. In addition, the project financed investments in grant form for (a) bottomland improvements, (b) development of small- irrigated perimeters, (c) establishment of fruit tree nurseries, and (d) various operations in natural resource management. AG. Research The project aims to strengthen national 1990 Active Project planning and implementation capacity in (Cr. 2122 Nir) agricultural research. In particular, the project emphasizes the development of research capacity in order to respond to the needs and constraints of agriculture as practiced in Niger. Following operations Pilot Private The project assesses and applies irrigation 1995 Active Irrigation technologies adapted to small-scale (Cr. 2707 Nir) agriculture as practiced by individual farmers. Natural Resources The project is intended to slow and arrest 1995 Active Mgt. environmental deterioration, and (Cr. 2796 Nir) eventually improve environmental conditions. It is the first part of a long- term project aimed at improving agricultural productivity. Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date Actual/ Latest Estimate Identification October 1987 October 1987 Preparation October 1988 October 1988 Appraisal May 1991 May 1991 Negotiations January 1992 February 1992 Board Presentation March 1992 April 1992 Signing - June 1992 Effectiveness January 1993 Mid-term review July 1994 February 1995 Project Completion December 1997 December 1997 Credit Closing June 1998 June 1998  - 16- Table 4: Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ million) | FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 Appraisal Estimate 4.5 7.5 10.5 14.1 17.3 18.0 - Actual 2.1 4.0 6.5 9.4 12.9 16.1 18.1 Actual as % of Estimate 46.7 53.3 62 66.7 74.6 89.4 - Date of Final Disbursement October 14, 1998  - 17- Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Activity/objective At Project Expected at Project Situation During ICR Stait Completion Mission Program Inputs Fielding of Extension Staff: - VEW (field extension staff) 315 419 600 - Supervisors 60 66 100 - SMS/TS 12 20 78 Vehicles 2 20 103 Motorcycles 5 66 871 Mopeds 35 410 0 Actual recurrent expenditures per VEW per year for mobility and training N.A. 630,000 Program Delivery In service training of - VEW inadequate - SMS inadequate (periodicity & regularity) Extension trial plots 30 250 201 to 1,200 No. of contact farmers/groups 2,200 8,000 8,694 No. of farmers in contact groups (men, women) 30,000 120,000 84,000 Periodicity of farm visits - VEW inadequate fortnightly about 30 percent of - Supervisors cc planned - SMS visits carried out Program Impact No. of farmers testing 0 to 25,000 improved technologies on depending on micro-plots (men/women) 2,200 16,000 technology (see paragraph # 28 Development of new extension messages per season 2-4 0-10 Surveys by Monitoring Unit on adoption and diffusion - 1 per year 2 in 5 years Geographic Coverage 768 6,100 4,000 villages  - 18- Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Key Indicators Estimated Actual Staffing Ratio Farmer households per extension agents 2000 1,448 Supervisor per extension agents 1/8 1/6 Training Schedule BI-weekly 7,213 2,225 Monthly 396 252 Number of contact groups 8,694 (in 1997) Total Number of contact groups (in 5 years) 41,012 Table 7: Studies Included in Project Studies Status Impact of the Study 1. Participatory Method Fulfilled Production of a document on Programming participatory method and training of all the staff 2. Detailed plan of ag. Extension Fulfilled This study helped readjust the extension in peri-urban areas in peri-urban areas 3. Study to set-up a sustainable Fulfilled This study helped set-up a sustainable extension strategy national extension strategy 4. Study on farmers' Fulfilled Identification and recording of farmers' organizations organizations 5. Study on institutional aspects Fulfilled This study helped put in limelight the of the project causes for project's problems and the solutions to solve them 6. Study on the supply of Fulfilled This study helped analyze the market, agriculture Inputs identify the problems and find the solutions to solve them 7. Study of the market of Fulfilled This study helped ensure a better chemical agriculture inputs in knowledge of chemical agriculture Niger inputs in Niger 8. Diagnosis and identification of Fulfilled This study helped identify women's women's specific needs specific needs in order to better integrate them in extension activities 9. Studies on the adoption of Fulfilled his study helped the project know the technologies technologies effectively mastered 10. Study on the improvement of Fulfilled This study helped the unit in charge of the monitoring and evaluation monitoring and evaluation set-up system pertinent monitoring and evaluation indicators and also create a monitoring and evaluation system at sub-regional _ level 11. Study to set-up an internal Fulfilled Conception of the internal control control system system  - 19- TABLE 8A: Project Costs (in US$M) Project Components Appraisal Estimate Actual Civil Works 0.8 0.6 Vehicles, Equipment, Materials and 4.3 4.5 Furniture Consultant Services 0.3 0.4 Training 0.9 1.5 Operating costs 8.5 10.0 Refunding of Project Preparation 1.5 1.1 Advance Unallocated 1.7 0.0 Total 18.0 18.1 Table 8B: Project Financing Source Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate (US$M) (US$M) Government and 1.8 2.5 Beneficiaries IDA 18.0 18.1 TOTAL 19.8 20.6 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Not Applicable  Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Credit Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Agreement Type Status Fulfillment Fulfillment Section Date Date 3.01(a) 10,05 C The Borrower declares its commitment to the objectives of Complied with, the Project as set forth in Schedule 2, and shall carry out consistently. Part A of the Project through MAG/EL and MH/E, Parts B and C through MAG/EL, MH/E and MEN/R, and Part D through MEN/R, with due diligence and efficiency and in conformity with appropriate administration, financial and technical practices, and shall provide promptly funds, facilities, services required for the Project. 3.01(b) 10 CD Without limitation upon the provisions of para (a) of this No comments. Section, and expect as the Borrower and the Association shaU otherwise agree, the Borrower shall carry out the Project in accordance with the Implementation Program set forth in Schedule 4 to this Agreement. 3.02 03 C Except as the association shall otherwise agree, Complied with, procurement of the goods, works and consultants' services consistently. required for the Project and to be financed out of the proceeds of the Credit shall be governed by the provisions of Schedule 3 to this Agreement 3.03 13 NC The Borrower shall ensure that aUl motorcycles and This covenant is being mopeds purchased under the Project for use by revised. supervisors, VEWs and Monitoring & Evaluation agents shall be assigned to the appropriate local government, which shall thereafter be required to assume responsibility for the maintenance of such vehicles and for their insurance. 3.04 05,09 C The Borrower shall establish a coordinating committee, Satisfactory. consisting of the Project Coordinator and representatives of each Directorate, and of INRAN, to be responsible for the coordination and supervision of the Projects: MAE/EL-Agrc, Plant Protection, Livestock, Studies and Programming; MH/E-Environment, MEF-Programs and Plan, Pub. Debt; MEN/R-Functional Literacy; MAE/C- I________ International Organization and Conference.  4.01(a) 01 C The Borrower shall maintain or cause to be maintained Satisfactory. records and accounts adequate to reflect in accordance with sound accounting practices the operations, resources and expenditures in respect of the Project of the departments or agencies of the Borrower responsible for canying out the Project or any part thereof. 4.01(b)(i) 01 C The Borrower shall: have the records and accounts Satisfactory. referred to in para (a) of tNis Section including those for the Special Account for each FY audited, in accordance with appropriate auditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable to the Association. 4.01(b)(ii) 01 NC The Borrower shall funish to the Association, as soon as Audit report for the 1994 available, but not later than 6 months after the end of each accounts was received. year, a cerfified copy of the report of such audit by said However it was not auditors, of such scope and in such detail as the acceptable. Its revision Association shall have reasonably requested. would be done together with I________ ________ __________ ________________________________________________ the audit of 1995 accounts. 4.01(b)(iii) 01 C The Borrower shall furnish to the Association such other Satisfactory. information concerning said records, accounts and the audit thereof as the Association shall from time to time reasonably request 4.01(c)(i) 01 For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of statements of expenditure, the Borrower shall: maintain or cause to be maintained, in accordance with para. (a) of this Section, records and accounts reflecting such expenditures.  4.01(c)(ii) 01 For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of SOE, the Borrower shall: retain, until at least 1 year after IDA has received the audit report for the FY in which the last withdrawal from the Credit Account or Special Account was made, all records (contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other documents) evidencing such expenditures. 4.01(c)(iii) 01 For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of SOE, the Borrower shall enable the Association's representatives to examine such records. 4.01(c)(iv) 01 Pertaining to the SOE, the Borrower shall ensure that said accounts and records shall be audited on a semi-annual basis with audit reports furnished to IDA not later than 3 months after the end of the audit period, with an opinion as to whether the SOE submitted during such period, can be l___________________ ________ relied upon to support the related withdrawals. Status: Covenant Class: C: Complied with 1: Accounts/audit 7: Involuntary resettlement CD: Complied after delay 2: Financial performance/generate 8: Indigenous people NC: Not Complied with revenue from beneficiaries 9: Monitoring, review and reporting Soon: Compliance expected 3: Flow and utilization of Project fimds 10: Implementation in Reasonably Short Time 4: Counterpart funding 11: Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation CP: Complied with Partially 5: Management aspects of the Project 12: Sectoral or cross-sectoral regulatory/institutional action NYD: Not Yet Due or of its executing agency 13: Other 6: Environmental covenants  Table 11: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Actual Project Cycle Weeks US$ .___________________ ($000) Through Appraisal 147.7 405.3 Negotiation-Board 21.7 68.8 Supervision 275.1 669.7 Completion 12.0 22.5 TOTAL 456.5 1,166.3 l-h  Table 12: Bank Resources: Missions Performance Rating Project phase Month/Year Number Days Specialized Implementation Development Types of of in Staff Skills Status Objectives problems Persons Field Represented Identification Oct. 1987 - - Preparation Oct. 1988 4 12 AS, AS, AE, TR Appraisal May 1991 EX, FA, OA, _ _ l___ EX, ME Supervision I Dec. 1993 2 14 AS, AS S S Supervision II Aug. 1994 3 14 AS, AS, AS S S Mid Tenn Review Feb. 1995 4 15 EC, AS, AS, FA S U M, F, L Supervision IV June 1995 2 12 AS, AS S U M, F, L Supervision V Dec. 1995 4 14 AS, AS, AE, U U M, F, L 00 Supervision VI Sept. 1996 4 14 AS, AS, AE, S U FP 00 Supervision VII Oct. 1997 4 12 EX AS, AE, S U M, P, PS Supervision VIII June 1998 2 10 AS, OA S U M, PS, M&E Types of problems: Subject specdalty: D: Slow Disbursement AE: Agricuhural Economist TR: Training Specialist F: Availability of counterpart funds AS: Agricultural Services Specialist 00: Operations Officer FP: Financial problems EC: Econornist OA. Operations Analyst L: Adherence to legal clauses EX: Extension Specialist NRM: Natural Resources MgL Specialist M: Project management ME: Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist RR: Resident Representative PS: Project Staffing FA: Financial Analyst WID: WUD Specialist P: Progress with procurement LS: Livestock Specialist NGO: NGO Specialist TA: Progress with technical assistance PS: Procurement Specialist TR: Training SE: Social Economist M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation RF: Rural Finance Specialist MS: Management Specialist  APPENDIX UPUBIIOUX DU NIOUl Nay, Du KZ!TXR D PUNM DXgCTZON DES PROR0g&b=S IT DU PLAN _"______/HP/D./BDR v 7- L1 UICRZTAXRl M GIRAL Monsieur le Repr6sent.nt Rhaident de la Banque Nondiale t Proj et de Reforcement des gervicas d'appui A iLAgriculture (CR 2355 - OMIR rapport d'adh&vement Ut= : 31R/liO/9 9/AgT Monsieur le Repr6sentant Resident, Suite & votre lettre ci-dessus rdf6renc6e, jiai l'honneur de vous informer que mon d6partement minist6riel n'a aucune observation quant au contenu de ce rapport d'achAvement. Aussi noug vous saurions gr6 des dispositions qua vous voudriez blen prendre pour prxsenter ce document au Conseil d'Adminietration de la Banque. Veuillez agrier, Monsieur le Repr6sentant R