Turkey - Second Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 19178-TU IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT Loan No. 3177-TU April 30, 1999 Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit Europe and Central Asia Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of March 26, 1999) Currency Unit = Turkish Lira (TL) I TL = US$0 US$1 = TL 365,579 AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES Jan 1990 Jan 1991 Jan 1992 Jan 1993 Jan 1994 Jan 1995 Jan 1996 Jan 1997 Jan 1998 Jan 1999 Mar 1999 2,328 2,988 5,307 8,694 15,164 40,157 60,291 111,652 211,141 357,859 365,579 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA - International Development Association PIU - Project Implementation Unit SOE - Statement of Expenditures MOF - Ministry of Finance ECS - Export Company Survey ERC - Eskisehir Research Center FS - Farmer Survey FTE - Farmer Training and Extension FTES - Farmer Training and Extension Survey GDAPD - General Directorate of Agricultural Production and Development GDAR - General Directorate of Agricultural Research GDOS - General Directorate of Organization and Support. GDP - General Directorate of Personnel GEF - Global Environment Facility ICB - International Competitive Bidding ICR - Implementation Completion Report IES - Impact Evaluation Study M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation MIS - Management Information System NCB - National Competitive Bidding PDA - Provincial Directorate of Agriculture SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SMS - Subject Matter Specialist SMSS - Subject Matter Specialist Survey T&V - Training and Visit VGT - Village Group Technician VGTC - Village Group Technician Center TURKEY FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 Vice President: Johannes F. Linn, ECAVP Country Director: Ajay Chhibber, ECCO6 Team Leader: Nedret Durutan, ECCTR Sector Leader: John A. Hayward, ECSSD  FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY TURKEY SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT Loan No. 3177-TU Contents Preface .............................. i Evaluation Summary ............................. ii Part I. Project Implementation Assessment ..............................I A. Project Origin and Objectives .1 B. Achievement of Project Objectives .1 C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project . 6 D. Project Sustainability .9 E. Bank's Perforance .9 F. Borrower's Performance .10 G. Assessment of the Outcome .11 H. Future Operations .1 I. Key Lessons Leamed .11 Part II. Statistical Tables Table 1: Summary Of Assessments .13 Table 2: Related Loans/Credits .15 Table 3: Project Timetable .16 Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated And Actual .16 Table 5: Key Indicators For Project Implementation .16 Table 6: Key Indicators For Project Operation .16 Table 7: Studies Included In The Project .17 Table 8a: Project Costs ........................................... 17 Table 8b: Project Financing ........................................... 18 Table 9: Economic Costs And Benefits ........................................... 18 Table 10: Status Of Legal Covenants ........................................... 19 Table 11: Compliance With Operational Manual Statements .................................... 21 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................................... 21 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions ........................................... 22 Appendices: A. Mission's Aide-Memoire. B. Borrower's Contribution to the ICR. C. Map: IBRD22041. his document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  -i- IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT Loan No. 3177-TU Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Second Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project in Turkey, for which Loan 3177-TU in the arnount of US$63.0 million equivalent was approved on March 13, 1990 and made effective on June 28,1990. The Loan was closed on June 30, 1998, compared with the original closing date of June 30, 1997. US$12 million of the Loan amount was cancelled on June 3, 1997. The disbursed amount was US$47,482,371.1 and US$3,517,628.9 was cancelled on February, 1999. The ICR was prepared by Nedret Durutan, task team leader at Turkey Country Office, and reviewed by Gottfried Ablasser, Principal Agricultural Economist (ECSSD), Willem Zijp, Principal Agricultural Services Specialist (RDV), and Marie-Helene Bricknell, Country Officer (ECCA4). For the preparation of the ICR, eight surveys were conducted solely or jointly with MARA in 1998 in which 3979 persons from different stakeholder groups were questioned. The preparation of this ICR is based on these surveys, material in the project files, and discussions with officials of the line agencies. The GDAPD, GDOS and GDAR contributed to the preparation of ICR by conducting surveys, providing summary data and submitted comments contained in Appendix A to the ICR.  - ii - IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT Loan No. 3177-TU Evaluation Summary Introduction 1. The Project which started in 1990 was the second phase of the Government's program for upgrading provincial extension services which was introduced to 18 provinces under Loan 2405- TU in 1984. This was consistent with the Bank's and the Borrower's strategy of improving agricultural productivity and increasing exports to contribute to economic development and poverty alleviation. The Second Project which also concentrated on state-financed extension included 23 (out of the 80) provinces. Project Objectives and Components 2. The objectives were to: (i) foster increased productivity and agricultural incomes through improving information flow from farmers to MARA's extension and research services, and the transmission of appropriate technology, (ii) contribute to institution building and strengthening of extension and research services, including program for women farmers, and (iii) improve animal health services. The efforts would translate into increased farm production, improved quality of agricultural commodities, expanded exports and higher farm income. The Project would also help to renew and preserve agricultural resource base, and reduce pollution. Implementation Experience and Results 3. The project was implemented in a difficult political and macroeconomic environment. After several years of large and growing fiscal deficits, Turkey suffered a severe currency crisis in early 1994 and the Government launched a reform program which focused on fiscal adjustment, with large cuts in investment and personnel expenditures. This coupled with frequent staff changes in the line agencies contributed to the difficult implementation environment. The objective of the Project should be to develop an extension service which was cost-effective and which could be politically and fiscally supported in the future. However, adoption of a uniform system for regions with a wide range of socio-economic and production circumstances which also had high recurrent-cost implications was unlikely to be the most cost-effective use of public extension investment. Therefore, the original format was modified and a loose formn of T&V system was implemented. 4. The original Loan allocation included US$19.5 million (revised as US$14.4 million) for Civil Works. At project closing, US$14,541,508.01 had been disbursed from this Category. Despite construction of several VGTCs, MARA reviewed the appropriateness of recruiting VGTs at village level and decided not to initiate further construction except those which had prospects for becoming a county. However, the austerity program hindered the whole construction program, excluding a modern research complex located in Eskisehir. US$13.6 million (revised as US$16.2 million) was allocated for the procurement of vehicles, equipment, and scientific books and periodicals. At project closing, US$15,875,725.36 had been disbursed. The Loan allocation  - iii - also included US$14.5 million (revised as US$10,510,000) for overseas training andconsultancy. At project closing US$8,941,210.61 had been disbursed of which 88 percent was used for training and 12 percent for technical assistance. 5. In the Farmer Survey conducted for ICR, around half of the surveyed fanners reported that in recent years, MIARA improved its extension service. The FTE directors described the change in the extension service as; increased farmers' demand for extension service, increased effectiveness in the service, and faster adoption of new technologies. Although the provincial extension service were strengthened in terms of training, equipment and vehicles, there were wide disparities in performance which stemmed from the approach/style of the provincial managers. Therefore, while a viable extension system was established in some provinces, in others the system was not dynamic. As it is expected, the most common source of information for the farmers was the friends/relatives (reported by 95 percent) and then the extension workers (reported by 36 percent) and private companies (reported by 25 percent). 6. During Project, there were changes in various aspects of agricultural production; more farmers reported increases in yield, quality, and marketability and decreases in chemical spraying, production cost and labor requirement (IES, FS, FTES and SMSS). Data indicated less progress in livestock production. 7. The efforts of the extension workers for improved quality in crop production reflected in expanded exports. The majority (54 percent) of the surveyed export companies emphasized increased awareness in quality on the producer side. Farmers, particularly medium and large scale ones reported yield increases ranging from 1 percent to 61 percent (FS and IES) and 66 percent of the farmers attributed the increase to genetic material, 62 percent to pesticide, 59 percent to fertilizer, 39 percent to irrigation, and 13 percent to mechanization. Changes occurred in production practices; mostly in the following areas; i) improved livestock feeding/forage production, ii) new crop varieties, iii) fertilizer use based on soil analysis, iv) promotion of mechanization, and v) economically and environmentally sustainable chemical use. 8. There was some improvement in the livestock production such as; upgrading of the genetic material, increased milk yields and better hygiene and health. The majority of the cattle owners (84 percent) reported upgraded genetic material and 40 percent of those reported increased milk production with purebred and hybrid cows. It appears that once production per animal increases, farmers tend not to increase the number of animal he owns (IES and FS). There was a strong emphasis in the extension programs on the improved livestock feeding (SMSS and VGTS); significant increases occurred in area sown forage crops (FS and IES). The progress regarding silage making was less pronounced; 41 percent of the farmers reported that they heard of silage and 33 percent of these reported extension worker as the source of information. However, very few reported practice mainly due to few animals, and limited land and water resources. Research and extension efforts resulted in increased farm incomes. IES gave some clue in the use of increased income; there was a significant increase in purchasing machinery and equipment by the farmers e.g. milking machine was reported by 78 percent of the surveyed farmers, subsoiler by 49 percent, harrow and seeding drill by 31 percent. 9. Project conditionality was met satisfactorily. There were only two problems; i) central and regional coordination committees not able to work efficiently due to frequent staff changes, and ii) limited counterpart funding, moratorium on staff hiring, restrictions on procurement. In some cases, there were debates with the Bank regarding procurement which were ultimately worked out consistent with the Bank procedures but with some delays. Progress reports were  - lv - submitted on time and were in good order. There were some delays associated with the audit reports. Excellent records and accounts maintained. 10. The Bank very positively and quickly responded to the client's request for a second project. However, the agreement on; i) concentrating only on the public-financed extension, and ii) expanding a system (T&V) with high investment and recurrent cost implications for the regions with very diverse characteristics, was not appropriate. The implications of the costs on the state budget was not analyzed and potential fiscal constraints were not even identified as a risk in the SAR. While the Bank's supervision performance has been satisfactory, deficiency at the time of preparation and appraisal may be noted. Despite staff changes at the Bank, there was overlap among team leaders and members. The transfer of task management responsibility to the field provided; i) proximity to client which enhanced client responsiveness as well as cost savings, ii) continuous rather than episodic supervision. The working relationships with Treasury, and MARA were very good. The Bank responded positively to the Borrower's requests for; i) increasing the disbursement percentages temporarily during the Gulf Crisis in 1991, and ii) extension of Closing Date. The Loan Closing Date was extended solely for training/technical assistance. Another important expectation was the "Extension Strategy Workshop". However, the extended period was mainly utilized for financing the ongoing overseas MSc training with some support to farmers study tours. 11. During implementation, the Bank was more responsive to the changes in the sector and the country. The mid-term review and following supervision missions recommended review of the state's role in extension and formulation of a strategy for the transition to a more pluralistic system of advisory services. Although there was an initial ownership, it was not maintained long enough to make some changes due to disrupted the commitment and ownership, bureaucratic caution and procedural. 12. During the project preparation, MARA like the Bank, overlooked changes in the sector and country. During implementation, the Borrower's performance has been adversely affected by several factors beyond the control of the agencies; such as; weak public finances, unstable political environment, frequent changes at the ministerial level resulted in varying levels of commitment, delays in implementation, and high turnover of staff. However, MARA could have performed better in; i) providing effective coordination between agencies, ii) appointing more competent field managers based on the "staff profiles", and iii) supervising the implementation more frequently. 13. During implementation, the GDAPD made two important decisions which prevented unsustainable use of funds and setting wrong examples for the future by canceling; i) construction of approximately 800 VGTCs by applying the lessons learned from the First Project, ii) study tours due to inappropriate selection of participants. In the provinces, thePDAs raised some funds by recovering part of the cost of providing extension services to provide better cooperation with farmers, and more funds for procurement, and prizes for farmers' competitions. This could be considered as the first steps towards commercialization of extension activities. Increased cooperation with the private sector was another positive development. 14. The overall rating of the Project is marginally satisfactory with regard to implementation performance. Despite the unfavorable implementation environment, the GDAPD and provincial extension services made numerous achievements; such as skill development in diagnostic survey and M&E, technical training of SMSs, training of managers in management skills, systematizing monthly workshops at FTE directorates, establishment of M&E and MIS systems, production and use of mass-media, women farmers' extension program, farmer study tours and construction of an  excellent research complex. Surveys with around 3000 farmers indicated improvements in state extension service, improved productivity and increased awareness about the environment. 15. The MARA's plan for future operations includes i) continuing service provision to the villages from the county centers instead of initiating more village based services, ii) continuing the systematized training for extension staff at all levels, iii) re-activating bi-monthly training workshops and applied research activities, iv) improving women farmers extension program, v) conducting Impact Assessment Studies regularly, vi) producing for and using more mass-media and vii) focusing more on natural resource conservation. The decision regarding new approaches that shift some of the financial burden from extension to beneficiaries while increasing the effectiveness of the service is a political on and depends on the approach of the new government. 16. The lessons learned include: i) in designing projects, the implementation environment (including macro-economic, political, sectoral factors) in a country for the Bank assistance projects needs to be carefully reviewed, ii) in designing projects, diversity of circumstances among beneficiaries and regions must be considered; blanket prescriptions do not work, iii) in introducing a system, its implications on the state investment and recurrent cost budget needs to be analyzed, iv) initiation of a second phase must depend on thorough review of the implementation of the ongoing project, v) solid monitoring data must be available to be able to make modifications during implementation, therefore, a simple but effectiveM&E system needs to be established earlier on, iv) strengthening of the beneficiaries position to formulate demand is needed to improve the performance of the organization.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT Loan No. 3177-TIJ Part I. Project Implementation Assessment A. Project Origin and Objectives 1. The Project which started in 1990 is the second phase of the Government's program for upgrading provincial extension services which was introduced to 18 provinces under Loan 2405- TU in 1984. This was consistent with the Bank's and the Borrower's strategy of improving agricultural productivity and increasing exports to contribute to economic development and poverty alleviation. The First Project reflected the socio-economic realities in Turkey during latel97Os/early 1980's and concentrated on state-financed extension. While it was being implemented in some provinces, the remaining provinces were still operating ineffective extension services. Therefore, the Government prepared a feasibility report for a second project with technical assistance provided by the First Project and the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program. It included 23 (out of the 80) provinces, appraised in 1989 and implemented by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA). 2. The Project objectives were to: (i) foster increased productivity and agricultural incomes through improving the flow of information concerning their needs and problems from farmers to MARA's extension and research services, and the transmission of appropriate technology, (ii) contribute to institution building and strengthening of MARA's extension and research services, including program for women farmers, and (iii) a pilot program to improve animal health services. These efforts would translate into increased farm production, improved quality of agricultural commodities and animal health, expanded exports and higher farm income. The Project would also help to renew and preserve agricultural resource base, and reduce pollution. B. Achievement of Project Objectives 3. In spite of prevailing difficult macro-economic and political circumstances, the objectives of the Project were achieved, but partly. The objectives are discussed below. Foster Increased Productivity and Agricultural Incomes 4. During the Project, there were changes in various aspects of agricultural production as a result of adoption of recommendations provided by the extension workers. The Impact Evaluation Study (IES) and the Farmer Survey (FS) indicated that more farmers reported increases in yield, quality, and marketability and decreases in chemical spraying, production cost and labor requirement. This outcome was consistent with other survey data (Farmer Training and Extension Director Survey-FTES and Subject Matter Specialist Survey-SMS S). The positive changes were more in crop production compared to livestock production. 5. The efforts of the extension workers towards improved quality was reflected in expanded exports as indicated by the Export Company Survey (ECS). The majority (54 percent) of the surveyed companies emphasized increased awareness on the producer's side for quality. There were also 1 percent to 61 percent (FS and IES) improvements in yields experienced by medium  and large scale farmers: 66 percent of these farmers attributed the increases to genetic material, 62 percent to pesticide, 59 percent to fertilizer, 39 percent to irrigation, and 13 percent to mechanization. Changes occurred in production practices; mostly in the following areas (SMSS); i) improved livestock feeding/forage production, ii) new crop varieties, iii) fertilizer use based on soil analysis, iv) introduction/promotion of mechanization, and v) early warning/ economically and environmentally sustainable chemical use. The VGT Survey (VGTS) results mostly overlapped with the above. The changes in these areas are elaborated in the paragraphs below. 6. New crop variety was an attractive input for both extension staff and farmers (FS, SMSS). As the farmers' resources got richer, they tended to get more interested in new genetic material, while the resource poor ones were focusing on pesticide and fertilizer use (FS). The FS indicated that 96 percent of the surveyed farmers heard of soil analysis, 59 percent of these reported extension worker as the source of information. Thirty six percent of those who heard about soil analysis had their soils analyzed and 65 percent changed practices; 87 percent changed the fertilizer type, 48 percent reduced the rate, 11 percent increased the rate. In pesticide use, there was a clear tendency to reduce the frequency (VGT Survey and FS). Early warning systems helped to achieve this in horticulture; 39 percent of the farmers indicated that they heard of such a system and 89 percent reported extension worker as the source of information. As a results of these efforts, 69 percent of the surveyed farmers reduced the frequency of spraying mostly for apple, apricot, and grapes (FS). Growing awareness in pesticide use resulted in less problems in export (ECS). Since irrigated agriculture expanded in the project provinces, the extension programs included efficient irrigation methods (VGT Survey). In potato production where excessive irrigation is a problem, 40 percent of the producers were informed that they were over irrigating and 67 percent of these reported the extension worker as the source of information. Based on the recommendations, around half of the farmers reduced irrigation (FS). 7. There were also some improvements in the livestock production; such as upgrading of the genetic material, increased milk yields and growing awareness about hygiene and health issues. The majority of the cattle owners (84 percent) reported upgraded genetic material and 40 percent of those reported increased milk production. Generally milk yield increases reported from all regions. It appears that once production per animal increases, farmers tend not to increase the number of animal he owns (IES and FS). There was a strong emphasis in the extension programs on the improved livestock feeding (SMSS and VGTS); significant increases occurred in area sown forage crops (FS and IES). The progress regarding silage making was less pronounced; 41 percent of the farmers reported that they heard of silage and 33 percent of these reported extension worker as the source of information. 8. Environmental protection and natural resource conservation were new concepts for farmers. However, in 1998, only 16 percent reported their efforts by describing as "practices to conserve natural resources"; land leveling in irrigated areas (3 8 percent), constructing terraces on slopes (36 percent), plowing on contours on steep land (31 percent), drainage (25 percent) and by controlled grazing on communal rangelands (3 percent) (FS). 9. During the last two years of the project, 47 study tours were organized for 800 farmers. Visiting modem commercial farms and observing new innovations helped them to develop a vision. Research and extension efforts in increasing yield and decreasing production costs resulted in increased farm incomes. IES gave some clue in the use of increased income; in the last three years of the Project, there was a significant increase in purchasing machinery and equipment by the farmers e.g. milking machine was reported by 78 percent of the surveyed farmers, subsoiler by 49 percent, harrow and seeding drill by 31 percent.  -3 - Contribute to Institution Building and Strengthening of M4RA 's Extension and Research Services 10. The objective of the Project should be to develop an extension service which was cost- effective and which could be politically and fiscally supported in the future. However, adoption of a unifonn system in some regions with a wide range of socio-economic and production circumstances which also had high recurrent-cost implicatie:s was unlikely to be the most cost- effective use of public extension investment. Therefore, the original format was gradually modified based on circumstances on the ground and a loose form of T&V system was implemented. 11. Around half of the farmers reported that in recent years, the MARA has improved its extension service (FS). Change in the extension service was described by the FTE directors as; increased farmers' demand for extension service, increased effectiveness in the services, and faster adoption of new technologies. The SMSS and Research Coordinator Survey (RCS) also indicated positive changes in the system. 12. As it is expected, the most common source of information for the farmers was the friends/relatives (reported by 95 percent) and then the extension worker (reported by 36 percent) and private companies (reported by 25 percent). Companies were more active in the Mediterranean Region reaching to 40 percent of the farming community (VGTS). It is clear that more open and liberalized agricultural markets are gradually bringing the knowledge of private sector to farmers. It is also observed that public sector withdrew from being conservative and more tended to collaborate with private sector. They invited the companies to contribute to the training workshop held for extension workers (FS, SMSS, VGTS). 13. The provincial extension service was strengthened in terms of training, equipment and vehicles. However, there were wide disparities in performance which stemmed from the approach/style of the provincial managers. Some did not understand that they were accountable to the client rather than to the public sector bureaucracy. Therefore, while a viable extension system was established in some provinces, in others the system was not dynamic. Although the system did not allow provincial managers to manage their own staff, based on agreed and transparent criteria, it was still partly dependent on the ability of them to secure, retain and motivate good technical staff. However, reassignment of staff, often after short interval at post made it difficult to develop the necessary rapport with farmers and, for farmers to develop a trust in extension personnel. 14. Although some characteristics of the T&V system were modified, the principle of precise task definition was mostly retained; the majority of the extension staff were freed from bureaucratic tasks. The "single line of command" principle was also maintained and put all VGTs under one system providing some degree of supervision at all levels. Supervision was limited for a period mainly due to the delayed delivery of the new vehicles. In some provinces, the supervision task did not necessarily get the highest priority while in others, in spite of the fiscal situation limiting its frequency, it was satisfactory. Some FTE directors articulated the need for more supervision. VGTs and the SMSs were supervised both by the county and FTE director. In many cases, supervision of VGTs were delegated to SMSs. Systematic VGT training by SMSs and to a certain extent by researchers continued either fortnightly or monthly. 15. In the beginning, VGTs were recruited at 64 village group technician centers (VGTCs) constructed by the Project. Later, MARA reviewed the appropriateness of recruiting VGTs at village level and decided not to initiate firther construction except those which had prospects for becoming a county; however, the austerity program hindered the construction. Subsequently,  - 4 - MARA made arrangements to provide extension service to the villages by VGTs and SMSs stationed at County Directorates. Only 3 percent of the FTE directors attributed the positive changes in the extension system to the recruitment of VGTs in the villages. Even if the envisaged number of VGTCs had been constructed, most of VGTs would be reluctant to leave town centers and live in villages anyway, because shortcomings of rural infrastructure. As a matter of fact, more commercially advanced fa.ning systems required comprehensive and up-to date information to select the best opportunities for resource use. Therefore, the rationale for posting VGTs at the frontline was gradually vanishing in some regions where more competent frontline extension staff (SMSs) had to deal with such farmers. During 1996-98 period, VGTs had 30 percent less clients and less appreciation for their services (IES). 16. When arrived in their responsibility area, VGTs conducted a situation analysis however, most need updating. Around half of the VGTs used motorcycles provided by the Project to carry out their extension program. The rest used other means including farmers' private vehicle (27 percent) which could be considered as a step towards cost-sharing or commercialization of extension activities. 17. The extension staff worked both with farmer groups and individuals. The groups were not necessarily formed on the basis of readiness to change and progressiveness but willingness to work with the extension staff. The individuals were usually selected based on literacy, progressiveness and wealth. Since these had enough resources which allowed them to take risks in testing new technology, the ones with limited resources benefited from innovations by observing the results and without taking risks. The accelerated adoption resulted from farmer-to- farmer contact, at no public cost. The FS indicated that in 1998, 58 percent of the farmers, particularly the resource poor ones had direct contact with extension workers. Although in the initial years, the visits were carried out based on a rigid schedule, later a loose form of T&V system was implemented. In the FS, 16 percent of the answers indicated a monitorable visit schedule. 18. As the fiscal constraints limited the frequency of visits, mass media was used to complement the face-to-face services. Many FTEs in 23 provinces produced excellent video tapes (3160), prepared radio and TV programs. FTEs were particularly successful in broadcasting for early warning system and environmentally friendly pest control. The national agricultural TV school (YAYCEP), was also used to complement and reduce the staff intensive services. In 1998, around 40 percent more farmers attended farmers meetings, study tours, and training courses which became more popular than other extension activities (IES). During 1991- 98, about 99,000 farmers' meetings and 33,000 demonstrations were conducted and around 1.5 million printed were distributed. 19. Based on the size of the province several SMS teams were established in each province. However, certain fields of expertise (such as agricultural economics, marketing) were under represented in skill mixes. To upgrade the professional competence, around 20 percent of the SMSs received computer and 10 percent language training, 19 percent had the opportunity to attend overseas and 43 percent in-country training courses, and 7 percent to study tours. There was significant SMS turnover in the project provinces; only 24 percent spent more than 6 years in the same province. GDAPD partially dealt with this problem by organizing training programs to cater the newcomers, in addition to the refresher training courses. Excellent bimonthly workshops organized by research institutes to train SMSs in earlier years of the project, but the momentum was eventually lost. The majority of the SMSs found the information given to them rather useful, but 42 percent them assessed the practical training as insufficient. However, 40 percent of the research coordinators felt that their task in SMS training was achieved (RCS).  Since research mostly withdrew from playing an important role for bimonthly workshops, the FTE started to involve private companies in training sessions which was well accepted by majority of the SMSs. 20. The GDAPD formed a good core team for the diagnostic survey which aimed to develop a basis for extension planning and research. The teams were trained with the assistance of consultants and field manuals were prepared; surveys were conducted annually. Nearly half of the researchers and extension staff were trained on-the-job (FTES ) and the topics identified during the surveys were included in research programs. 21. GDAR research institutes were supported significantly by the Project in terms of overseas academic training, and physical infrastructure. In the initial years, the bimonthly workshops for SMSs were the most effective linkage with research but later, there was less commitment from GDAR side; it did not fully mobilize its resources and the linkage was somewhat improved (RS and SMS Survey). The FTE directors (73 percent) reported some change in the linkage as; increased responsibility in research for identifying and solving farmers' problems (42 percent), quicker response from research institutes (38 percent), more problem awareness at the extension service side (12 percent), and extension service being more informed about new technologies (8 percent). 22. The Project significantly strengthened the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity of GDAPD. A good system was designed with technical assistance by making use of situation analysis and diagnostic survey. It was standardized and introduced to the First and Second Project provinces in May 1996 and several workshops were organized for provincial extension managers to emphasize the system's function of helping management decision making. This still needs improvement. A manual was prepared, a good core group was who further developed and operated the system at central and provincial level and initiated the "Impact Evaluation Studies". 23. The Project envisaged a pilot women farmer extension program in 3 provinces. GDOS, having the overall responsibility trained 1004 home economists who regarded the program as highly satisfactory despite insufficient practical training. In 242 selected villages, the service reached 4312 women farmers. Since the experience was positive, the component was gradually expanded to 16 new provinces where success was dependent on the commitment of the managers. There were two issues; i) cost-effectiveness of the extension services in terms of number, and ii) insufficiency of the overall supervision. Establishment of the Department of Women in Rural Development at GDOS was a promising development for the future of this program. Trained farmers wanted to take the advantage of the newly gained knowledge and were keen to expand their activities and undertake new small business. However, they were unable to do so as they lacked access to small credit. The Bank's recommendation to utilize some of the project funds to set up a micro-credit scheme was met with concern by Treasury and MARA due to potential implementation problems. 24. The Project established a Management Information System (MIS) where the First and Second Project provinces, major research institutes and central units of MARA were linked to the center. The system was also linked to the internet. It was made compatible with theMIS and GIS systems which were set up under two other projects; ongoing Agricultural Research and the newly completed In-situ Conservation of Genetic Diversity (GEF Grant No: 28632-TU).  -6 - Improving Animal Health Services 25. Five mobile animal health units were initially located in Erzincan, Kahramanmaras, Nigde, Tokat and Aksaray since east-west movements of cattle are controlled at these points. Intensive programs were carried out to reduce Mastitis and Brucellosis in dairy animals. At project completion, the units were being used jointly with Veterinary Research Institutes mainly for disease diagnosis in Erzurum, Elazig, Adana, Ankara, and Izmir. There was an awareness about hygiene and health issues; 43 percent of the surveyed farmers reported measures taken against Mastitis, 53 percent against parasites, and 87 percent some kind of renovation in their traditional barns to provide better hygiene. 26. Farmers seemed to be less satisfied with the quality of information they receive from extension workers on animal health compared to crops (IES) compared to veterinarians. This resulted in limited demand for information regarding animal feeding/nutrition and animal health. C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project 27. The Project was implemented in a difficult political and macroeconomic environment. After several years of large and growing fiscal deficits, Turkey suffered a severe currency crisis in early 1994 and the Government launched a reform program which focused on fiscal adjustment, with large cuts in investment and personnel expenditures. Moratorium on staff hiring, restrictions on procurement coupled with frequent changes of staff in the implementing agencies and appointments which were subject to political interference contributed to the difficult implementation environment. 28. Under these circumstances, the allocations made by SPO to the sectors and agencies were significantly reduced and new approval procedures were set. The patterns of budget release by the Ministry of Finance irrespective of project needs also caused delays in project implementation. Although the externally financed projects were treated comparatively better, still there has been a severe competition for the limited funds between and within the government agencies. 29. The 1993 mid-term review, emphasized the more cost-effective approaches to extension and suggested that issues of financial sustainability of extension programs, farmer participation in extension management and possible cost sharing arrangements with farmers need to be examined. In 1994, GADPD organized successful workshops on extension policy and future strategies which were well attended by various stakeholders. There was a consensus about more farmer involvement in decision making and cost-sharing. In 1996, the Bank's recommendation regarding some modest pilot programs which would support farmers and private sector initiatives in extension was agreed by the Government. However, no steps were taken by the concerned general directorates towards formulating a strategy for the transition to a more pluralistic system of advisory services mainly due to bureaucratic caution and concerns and disrupted ownership. 30. For the implementation of the extension component, GADPD and GDOS were the major agencies as it was the case for the First Project, and GDAR was responsible for the applied research activities. The First Project suffered from a lack of clearly defined task boundaries between GADPD and GDOS which did not change for this Project. The central and regional coordination committees did not work efficiently due to frequent staff changes. Administrative authority over extension staff belonged to the centrally located General Directorate of Personnel (GDP) of MARA. The staff profiles prepared by TA for each job level to assist management in staff appointment were not always taken into consideration and in some cases the GDP failed to  - 7 - appoint PDA or FTE directors who had leadership qualities and a reasonable level of management capability. As the infrastructure and resources provided by the Project were the same for all project provinces, only management and organization were the determining factors for success. In order to improve the situation, GADPD organized excellent courses (23) to train 165 extension managers and 425 extension staff in management skills. 31. In 1991, research was organized under GDAR. Except initial years of the Project, its management did not regard itself as a full partner in the operation and did not fully mobilize its resources to improve the extension-research linkage. Higher management was not able to secure its commitment. Relevant recommendations formulated by the researchers were adopted by the farmers, but irrelevant messages not only wasted extension efforts but also caused frustration on the farmers' side. In the FS, around half of those who were not following the recommendations of the extension service (17 percent of the surveyed farmers) reported that the recommendations were risky, and 16 percent of those complained about the high cost. Lack of farmer organizations to articulate small farmers' needs affected the responsiveness of the services to their needs and circumstances. However, educated, resource-rich and politically influential farmers managed to give feedback to research and extension. The Bank supported Agricultural Research Project (Loan 3472-TU) aimed to improve research programming and priorities and linkages with extension. However, it had implementation problems until 1998 and provided limited benefit to the extension. Civil Works 32. The original Loan allocation included US$19.5 million (revised as US$14.4 million) for Civil Works to finance construction of VGTCs, staff houses, training halls and some minor renovation for research institutes. The First Project attempted to construct a complex for Eskisehir Research Institute (ERC) but the work was re-tendered and, a contract for US$5.7 was signed on December 2, 1993. The Bank agreed to finance 75 percent of the cost of the construction out of the Second Loan. The design company supervised the construction with a cost of US$370, 818 of which 100 percent was financed from the Loan. 33. To help compensate for costs Turkey incurred as a result of the Gulf crisis, for FY91, disbursement percentages of total project costs were increased (80 percent for civil works) in April 1991 and later extended to February 1993 and was reset as 60 percent for the civil works with the exception of the ERC for which 75 percent as was previously agreed. The construction of the ECR started in December 1993 and was completed in January 1998. 34. The SAR envisaged the construction of 860 (revised as 883) VGT offices/houses in 19 provinces. On December 27, 1993 the Bank agreed to finance the construction of 57VGTCs and 11 County Centers (CCs) where contracts were awarded under the First Project. By the end of 1994, 64 VGTCs were constructed. MARA reviewed the need for further construction and in May 1995, GADPD submitted a two year plan to construct 71 more VGTCs which also be used as "County Offices". However, either these or envisaged training halls (16) in counties and at research institutes, and government housing facilities (234) were not built due to the austerity measures. At project closing, US$14,541,508.01 of the Loan had been disbursed from the Civil Works Category. Goods 35. US$13.6 million (revised as US$16,2 million) was allocated for the procurement of vehicles, equipment, and scientific books and periodicals. At project closing, US$15,875,725.36  -8 - had been disbursed. The original allocation included procurement of 261 station wagons, 233 pick-ups, 950 motorcycles, 5 mini-buses, 29 midi-buses, 24 trucks, 4 trailers and 4 mobile veterinary clinics. US$10,622,283.71 had been spent to procure 672 vehicles and 1073 motorcycles through ICB at the end of 1991. The research institutes received 6 percent of the vehicles, 93 percent were given to provincial extension offices and 1 percent to the ministry headquarters at the beginning of 1994. Delays were experienced due to lack of funds to pay the import duties. However, in some provinces, the governors allowed the use of vehicles with temporary plates although the duty had not been paid. 36. In total, US$.5,253,441.65 was spent for equipment, 80 percent of which was being allocated to the research institutes. Once the Research Master Plans (RMPs) under the ongoing Agricultural Research Project were effective, procurement of remaining equipment was financed from that Loan. The contracts for the MIS system were signed during the First Project but it was mostly financed (about US$ lmillion) by the Second Project. The system linked 39 provinces, 15 research institutes and 9 central units of MARA and became operational in 1996. Almost 1000 staff was trained in using the system. Training and Technical Assistance 37. The Loan allocation included US$14.5 million (revised as US$10,510,000) for overseas training and consultancy services. At project closing US$8,941,210.61 had been disbursed of which 12 percent was used for technical assistance and 88 percent for training. Technical assistance packages were prepared for: i) skill gap analysis, ii) training master plan, iii) situation analysis, iv) diagnostic survey, v) pilot women farmers extension and vi) M&E. Lack of qualified full-time counterparts, delays in translation of technical documents and receiving comments from management resulted in the delayed operationalization of recommendations. 38. Eighty percent of the training funds were used for extension and 20 percent for research. Around 600 staff benefited from the English courses. The overseas study tours were planned as 450 person months (89 percent for provincial staff, 11 percent for research). In May 1995, the short term training component has been substantially reduced (250 person months) by canceling the study tour program mainly due to the inappropriate selection of some participants. Totally, 372 persons (93 percent from extension and 7 percent research) benefited from study tours mainly to the UK and USA. Short term training was limited only to specific individuals taking courses of 2-4 months and/or attending international meetings. Around 50 staff (78 percent from extension and 22 percent from research institutes) benefited from this program. The MSc program provided degrees for 75 person (41 percent from research). 39. A very good in-service training program was conducted for all levels. County directors, section chiefs of PDAs, project related staff from GDAPD and GDOS received courses on public and project management, and agricultural extension. Training on new topics such as modern irrigation techniques, fertilization techniques, covered vegetable production, IPM, organic farming and impact evaluation were conducted for SMSs. Training also provided for the staff of some Water User's Organizations and Livestock Breeders' Associations. 40. Project conditionality was met satisfactorily. In some cases, there were debates with the Bank regarding procurement which were ultimately worked out consistent with World Bank procedures but with some delays. Progress reports were submitted on time and were in good order. There were some delays associated with the audit reports. Excellent records and accounts maintained to reflect operations. There were only two serious problems; i) central and regional  -9 - coordination committees did not work effectively due to frequent staff changes, and ii) limited counterpart funding, moratorium on staff hiring, restrictions on procurement. D. Project Sustainability 41. The project intended to establish a labor and mobility intensive extension method requiring high recurrent budget. However, under the high inflation and fiscal deficit circumstances in Turkey, governments, within the fundamental reform program of the public sector, will continue to make reductions in the costly state interventions in investment, production and marketing. This requires questioning of the intended system in agricultural services sector in terms of financial, political and institutional sustainability. 42. Since the beginning of the First Project, recruiting technicians at the village level has not been sustainable due to the; i) reluctance of them to live in the villages, and ii) farmers' increased demand for more specialized and sophisticated information which can be fulfilled by specialists. Therefore, MARA decided; i) to provide services to the villages from the county and provincial centers through SMSs and VGTs, and ii) not to initiate further VGTC construction at the villages which also requires funds for maintenance. Providing village or county-based extension services, both calls for sustainability of infrastructure and human resources which need to be secured by MARA. 43. In view of the regional differences, MARA should make a careful assessment of the need for providing extension services from the villages and find situation-specific solutions. The circumstances may necessitate a departure from the current approach for some categories of farmers, regions and information areas. Resource rich farmers who have sufficient cash resources and are willing to pay for high quality services for tailor-made recommendations can receive services from the private sector. This can reduce public cost, and bring professionalism into the sector. This would allow public extension to concentrate its limited resources (particularly financial) on the provision of services to the most needy; and, the less developed regions, and on selected areas like natural resource conservation which has a public good nature. This could increased the financial sustainability. Financial sustainability could be further enhanced by increasing complementary use of mass-media. 44. Institutional sustainability for public extension and research will be at risk as long as;i) administrative authority for staff transfers, discipline and promotion stays at the General Directorate of Personnel (GDP) instead of line agencies, and ii) the staff for specific positions are not recruited based on the characteristics required for efficient performance including operationalization of staff profiles and skill gap analysis. On the other hand, unless the extension service continues to demonstrate and document benefits to the client group, the political sustainability will be in question. E. Bank's Performance 45. The Bank's decision to complement the Government's commitment in further strengthening its provincial agricultural services and to accelerate Turkey's agricultural development was appropriate. It very responded positively and quickly to the client's request for lending for a second agricultural extension project. A correct decision was made in giving the priority to provinces which were included in the Project. However, the Bank's agreement on; i) concentrating only on the public-financed extension, and ii) expanding a system (T&V) with high recurrent and investrnent cost implication for the regions with very diverse characteristics was not  - 10- appropriate. The implications of the costs on the state investment and recurrent budget were not analyzed and potential fiscal constraints were not even identified as a risk. 46. Later, the Bank was more responsive to the changes in the sector and the country and following a good mid-term review, the supervision missions of 1994 and 95 emphasized the need for a review concerning how the extension needs to be evolved in the context of country's rapidly modernizing agriculture, and the demographic changes in rural Turkey. The Bank also recommended formulation of a strategy for the transition to a more pluralistic system of advisory services and proposed several modest pilot projects that support farmers and private sector initiatives in extension. 47. While Bank supervision performance has been satisfactory, deficiencies at the time of preparation and appraisal may be noted. Bank supervision missions provided useful guidance on technical issues, project management and institutional strengthening. Despite staff changes at the Bank, the project did not suffer from discontinuity due to overlap among team leaders and members. The transfer of task management responsibility to the field provided; i) proximity to client which enhanced client responsiveness and efficiency as well as cost savings, ii) continuous rather than episodic supervision. The working relationships with Treasury, and MARA were very good. The Bank positively responded to the Borrower's request for; i) increasing the disbursement percentages temporarily during the Gulf Crisis in 1991, and ii) extension of Closing Date. F. Borrower's Performance 48. During the project preparation, MARA, like the Bank, overlooked some facts; i) the signals of rapid demographic, market, economic and structural changes that began to emerge in rural Turkey in early 90's, ii) high recurrent cost implications of the intended system and its heavy reliance on state intervention. Later, while the public system was suffering more from insufficient funding and many private sector and farmer initiatives in extension had been developed, the Bank's recommendation to re-fornulate the role of government in extension was not put into action. The initial ownership was not maintained long enough to make changes due to disrupted commitment and ownership, bureaucratic caution and procedural concerns. MARA could have been assertive to take a lead in developing new approaches that shift some of the financial burden from extension to the beneficiaries while increasing the effectiveness of the service. 49. During implementation, the Borrower's performance was been adversely affected by several factors beyond the control of the implementing agency. In particular weak public finance, unstable political environment, frequent changes at the ministerial level (8 ministers and 5 undersecretaries) has in turn caused varying levels of commitment, delays in implementation particularly in procurement, high turnover of senior staff (5 general directors, 5 department heads) and staff at the operating level. However, MARA could have performed better in; i) providing effective coordination between GDAPD, GDOS, and GDAR, ii) appointing more competent field managers based on the "staff profiles" and iii) supervising the implementation in the field more frequently. 50. The GDAPD made two important decisions which prevented unsustainable use of funds and establishing inappropriate precedent by canceling; i) the construction of approximately 800 VGTCs by applying the lessons learned from the First Project, ii) the study tours due to inappropriate selection of participants and increasing the allocations for the short-term technical courses. At the field level, there were also positive initiatives. In the provinces there were some  solid steps towards commercialization of extension service to reduce public cost. The PDAs established "Association for Services for Agricultural Support" where funds were raised by recovering part of the cost of providing extension services to provide; i) better cooperation with farmers, and ii) more funds for procurement of equipment, minor civil works, and prizes for farmers' competitions. Increased cooperation with the private sector was another positive development. 51. An extension of the Loan Closing date was requested solely for training/technical assistance including ongoing overseas MSc training, in-service training for extension staff and farmer study tours. Another important expectation was the "Extension Strategy Workshop". However, the extended period was mainly utilized for financing the ongoing overseas MSc training with some support to farmners study tours. G. Assessment of the Outcome 52. The overall rating of the Project is marginally satisfactory with regard to implementation performance. Despite the unfavorable implementation environment, the GDAPD and provincial extension services made numerous achievements; such as skill development in diagnostic survey and M&E, technical training of SMSs, training of managers in management skills, systematizing monthly workshops at FTE directorates, establishment of M&E andMIS systems, productions for and use of mass-media, women farmers' extension program, farmer study tours and construction of an excellent research complex for Eskisehir Research Institute. The implementation took longer than planned, mainly due to the overseas training component which was completed during the extended period. The ultimate result of the efforts were clearly observed in the field, surveys with around 3000 farmers indicated improvements in MARA's extension service, increased productivity and increased awareness about the environment. H. Future Operations 53. The MARA's plan for future operations includes i) continuing service provision to the villages from the county centers instead of initiating more village based services, ii) continuing the systematized training for extension staff at all levels, iii) re-activating bi-monthly training workshops and applied research activities to strengthen the research and extension linkage, iv) improving women farmers extension program through the Department of Women in Rural Development of GDOS, v) conducting Impact Assessment Studies regularly, vi) producing and using more mass-media and vii) focusing more on natural resource conservation in extension programs. The decision regarding new approaches that shift some of the financial burden from extension to beneficiaries while increasing the effectiveness of the service is a political on and depends on government policies in the future. I. Key Lessons Learned 54. There are several lessons to be learned: i) in designing projects, the implementation environment (including macro-economic, political, sectoral factors) in a country for the Bank assistance needs to be carefully reviewed as a whole to apply lessons learned, ii), before introduction of a system, implications of the its costs on the state investment and recurrent cost budget needs to be analyzed, iii) diversity of circumstances among beneficiaries and regions must be considered in the design; blanket prescriptions do not work, iv) initiation of any second phase must depend on a thorough review of the ongoing project regarding implementation problems at the central and field level, v) solid monitoring data must be available to be able to make modifications during implementation, therefore, a simple but effectiveM&E system needs to be  - 12 - established earlier in the project, iv) strengthening of the beneficiaries position (farmers' organization) to formulate demand is needed to improve the performance of the organization.  - 13 - Part II. Statistical Tables Table 1: Summary of Assessments Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable A. Achievement of objectives (X) (X) (X) (X) Macro policies E l E 0 Sector policies El 0 E El Financial objectives O 0 0 0 Institutional development El 0 El 0 Physical objectives 0 El El Poverty reduction 0 0 El El Gender issues 0 o El Other social objectives El El E 0 Environmental objectives 0 0 E E Public sector management E El El 0 Private sector development E E E 0 Other (specify) E E E 0  - 14 - B. Project sustainabiliy Likely Unlikely Uncertain (X) (X) (X) O D ED Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient C. Bank performance (X) (X) (X) Identification 0 El Preparation assistance E a 0 Appraisal 0 0 0 Supervision E 0 HWy Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient D. Borrower performance (X) (X) (X) Preparation a El 0 'Implementation El 0 El Covenant compliance 0 0 El Operation (if applicable) E E E Highly Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory E. Assessment of outcome (X) (X) (X) (X) El 0 O El  - 15 - Table 2: Related Loans /Credits Loan/Credit Purpose Year of Status Approval Increase production, institutional Seyhan Irrigation I development, upgrade and (Credit 38) strengthen agricultural extension, FY 63 Complete improve irrigation Seyhan Irrigation II (Loan 587) Same FY69 Complete Seyhan Irrigation II (Credit 143) Same FY69 Complete Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Same FY71 Complete (Loan 762) Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Export Same FY71 Complete (Credit 257) Irrigation Rehabilitation Completion Same FY72 Complete (Credit 281) Ceyhan/Aslantas Multipurpose Same FY73 Complete (Loan 883) Ceyhan/Aslantas Multipurpose Same FY73 Complete (Credit 360) Corum/Cankiri Rural Development Same FY75 Complete (Loan 1130) Same FY75 Complet Second Fruit and Vegetables Same FY81 Complete (Loan 1967) Erzurum Rural Development Same + strengthen agricultural FY82 Complete (Loan 2094) research system Agricultural Extension and Applied Same + strengthen agricultural FY84 Complete Research (Loan 2405) research system Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan Improved capacity for sectoral FY85 Complete (Loan 2585) planning and analysis Agricultural Research (Loan 3472) Strengthen agricultural research FY 92 Ongoing Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual Latest estimate Identification June-July 1987 Preparation - October 1988 Appraisal April-May 1989 May-June 1989 Negotiations December 1989 01/20/1990 Board Presentation 03/13/1990 03/13/1990 Signing 03/30/1990 03/30/1990 Effectiveness June 1990 06/28/1990 Midterm Review 12/31/1993 10/13/1993 Project Completion 12/31/1996 12/31/1997 Loan Closing 06/30/1997 06/30/1998  - 16 - Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual .______________ FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 Appraisal estimate 4 6 12 22 36 49 57.5 63 51* Actual 10.053 15.180 22.315 31.221 38.034 42.760 46.700 47.400 Actualas percentof 0 167 127 101 87 78 74 74 93 estimnate____ Date of final 10/28/98 disbursement 1 The total was revised as US$5 lmillion due to cancellation of US$12million in June 1997. Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation |Key implementation indicators in SAR/President's Report I Estimated I Actual Key implementation indicators were not used for this project Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation ey implementation indicators in SAR I Estimated I Actual Key implementation indicators were not used for this project Table 7: Studies Included in Project 7 Study Piurpose as defined Status Impact of study at appraisal/redefined Training programs were prepared partly based on this analysis, the majority of the Skill Gap AnalysiTechnical assistance to Partially extension workers were appointed in Skill Gap Analysis MARA implemented accordance with the staff profiles, however, for managerial positions these were not applied. M&E capacity of MARA was Monitoring and Technical assistance to strengthened, a competent monitoring Evaluation MARA Implemented team was established, system became operational needs improvement in the use of the system for management purposes . . Technical assistance to Extension programs were prepared based Diagnostic Survey MARA Implemented on these surveys, farmers feedback to research was partially improved Pilot Women Technical assistance to Women farmers were recognized as a Farmers Extension MARA Implemented client, home economists were utilized Farmers Extension MARiA more efficiently at the provincial level  - 17 - Table 8A: Project Costs Appraisal estimate (US$M) Actual/latest estimate (US$M) Item Local Foeg cosctas Foesitgsn Total Local costs Foreign costs Total Civil Works 65,6 21,9 87,5 5,5 14,5 20 Vehicles 1 9,5 10,5 2 10,6 12,6 Machinery, equipment and 0,8 5,3 6,1 0,5 5,3 5,8 books Furniture 1,2 0 1,2 2 0 2 Overseas training 0 14,5 14,5 0 7,9 7,9 Local training 0,8 0 0,8 1 0 1 Technical 0 1,3 1,3 0 1 1 Assistance Incremental Salaries and 3,9 4 7,9 1 1,3 2,3 Allowance Incremental C 9,1 6,5 15,6 10 6,8 16,8 Grand Total 82,4 63 145,4 22 47,4 69,4 Table 8B: Project Financing l___________ Appraisal estimate (US$M) Actual/latest estimate(US$M) Source Local costs Foreign costs Total Local costs Foreign costs Total IBRD/IDA -- 63 63 -- 47.4 47.4 Domestic contribution 70.3 12,1 82.4 18.8 3.2 22 TOTAL 70.3 75.1 145.4 18.8 50.6 69.4 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits These are inapplicable to this Project.  - 18 - Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Second Agricultural Extension and Applied Research Project Covenant Present Original Agreement Section Type Status Fulfillment Description of Covenant Comments Date Loan No.3177 3.01(a) 02 CP Carry out project with due diligence None efficiency and provide promptly the required funds, facilities, services and other resources. 3.01(b) 10 CP Carry out the project in accordance None with the implementation program (Schedule 5; see below). 3.02 03 CD Carry out procurement of goods, None works and consultants according to the provisions of Schedule 4. 4.01(a) 01 C Maintain records and accounts None reflecting operations, resources and expenditures of the departments 4.01(b) 01 C (i) Have records and accounts None independently audited each fiscal year. (ii) Furnish audit reports to the Bank not later 9 months after the end of FY. (iii) Fumish other information conceming records, accounts and audits. 4.01(c) 01 C For all expenditures for which None withdrawals from the loan account were made: (i) maintain records and accounts reflecting expenditures; (ii) retain all records at least one year after last withdrawal from the loan account was made; and (iii) enable the Bank representative to examine such records. 4.01(d) 01 C Fumish the Bank within 2 months after end of None each semester with an expenditure statement. 5.A1 05 CP At central level, MARA shall carry out the None project through GDPI except for: (a) construction of VGTCs, VGT training facilities, and housing for AESs and SMSs which shall be carried out by GDRS and MPWR and acting in collaboration with GDPI; (b) establishment of mobile animal health units, 5.Al(con't) 05 C c) strengthening of veterinary and plant No comment protection and soil and water research institutes; and 5.AI(con't) 05 CD (d) training of extension staff which shall be None jointly coordinated through GDPI and GDOS.  - 19 - Covenant Present Original Agreement Section Type Status Fulfillment Description of Covenant Comments Date Loan 5.Al(con't) 05 CD GDPI responsible for: coordinating input of None No.3 177 GDPC, GDRS and GDOS and other Departments and agencies of MARA to the project for procuring vehicles and equipment; for overseeing management and implementation of the project at provincial level; for monitoring and evaluation of all project activities. 5.A2 05 NC At central level MARA to coordinate all CCC remains project activities through CCC. inactive 5.A3 05 CP Designated Research Institutes to regularly the training conduct training, coordinate on-farm programs, and research, conduct diagnostic surveys. diagnostic SMS to train VGT which in tum have surveys are not direct contact with farmers conducted regularly. Large variation among regions and in the approach of the research institutes. 5.A4(con't) 05 NC At the provincial level MARA shall RCC remains coordinate all Project activities inactive through the RCCs to be established in each region no later than October 1990. Each RCC (chaired by GD of GDPI) to meet at least once a year 5.B5 05 CP GDRS shall: (a) appoint no later than None October 31, 1990 a full-time architect- Engineer to review progress and ensure Quality control; (b) arrange visits by its staff to supervise project sites and prepare reports. S.C6 09 CP GDPI in consultation with the Bank None shall carry out: (a) an annual review no later than June 30 in 1991 and 1992; and 5.C6(con't) 09 C (b) a mid-term review not later than None December 31, 1993. 5.D7 09 CD GDPI to provide progress reports for None each semester not later than 60 days after each semester. Present Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay NC - Not Complied with SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Complied with Partially NYD - Not Yet Due  - 20 - Covenant types: I Accounts/audit 2 Financial performance/generate revenue from beneficiaries 3 Flow and utilization of Project funds 4 Counterpart funding 5 Management aspects of the Project or of its executing agency 6 Environmental covenants 7 Involuntary resettlement 8 Indigenous people 9 Monitoring, review and reporting 10 Implementation 11 Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation 12 Sectoral or cross-sectoral regulatory/institutional action 13 Other Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Statement number and title | Describe and comment on lack of compliance Operational Manual Statements have been complied with. Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Planned Revised Actual Stage of project cycle Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Preparation to Appraisal 35.2 72.8 Appraisal 36.3 109.5 Negotiations through Board 5.7 17.0 approval Supervision 119.1 205.1 Completion 9.4 15.5 Total 205.7 419.9  -21 - Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Perfonnance Rating' Types of Stage of project cycle Month/ No. of Days in Specialization' Implem. Developm. problems3 Year Persons Field status objectives Problems Through Appraisal 3/86 3 26 Ad, ES (FAO) 3/89 1 2 ES 5/89 6 15 A, AE, E, ES, E 9/89 1 2 E Appraisal through Board approval Supervision 6/90 5 17 AE, Ad, ES, A, A 1 1 6/91 2 7 A, P 2 2 A, M 1/92 3 15 ES, E, A 2 2 A, CF, M 11/92 3 10 E, A, AE 2 2 M, PC, CF 4/93 2 5 A, A 2 2 M, PC, CF 10/93 3 12 A, A, A 2 2 A, M,CF, P 6/94 2 25 A, A S S P, A, M, CF 12/94 2 5 A, A S S M, A, C, CF 9/95 2 17 ES, A S S CF, M,PA, 9/96 2 10 A, O S S M, C,CF, P 3/97 2 15 A, PS S S A, M, PC, C 9/97 1 7 A S S A, M, PC, C Completion Total 1-Key to Specialized staffskills: 2- Key to Performance Ratings: 3- Key to Types of Problems: A- Agronomist 1. Highly Satisfactory A-Administrative AE-Agr. Economist 2. Satisfactory M-Management PS-Private Sector HS-Highly Satisfactory PC-Project component E-Economist S- Satisfactory C-Commitment ES-Extension Specialist U- Unsatisfactory P-Procurement 0-Operations (disb.) CF-Counterpart funds Ad-Administration World Bank User C:\TEMP\tricrrep.doc 05/10/99 10:52 AM  - 22 - Appendix A SIE(<7M3 AGRICUTIURAL EXTENSION and API LIED RESEACH PROJECT (Loan 3177-TU) Supervision Mission (September 19-25, 1997) AIE-MMOM J -- FoTrd B,- ak Mission co-isisting of Ms. Nedret Duritan (Task Manager, ECI TU) A . T, xaEt ensi and Appied Rseach Project (AEARP I) du-ri ny19b 25, 1997. The mission's findings and recommendations are based on the dts c'urKv?t tt D)ep t Undersecretary, Mr. . Bilgin, General Directorate of DealDop' O H l Production (TUGEM, General Directorate of Organization and Su,ppnrt ,, CC A) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Ser6ces (MARA) and the Treasui. i ;e n ssi!on mshes to thank the Government of Turkey for the cooperation and countesRes e, ' Thus A