Morocco - Second Small and Medium Scale Irrigation Project

 Second Small & Medium Scale Irrigation Report No: ; Type: Report/Evaluation Memorandum ; Country: Morocco; Region: Middle East And North Africa; Sector: Irrigation & Drainage; Major Sector: Agriculture; ProjectID: P005425 The Morocco Second Small and Medium Scale Irrigation project, supported by Loan 2954-MOR for US$23 million, was approved in FY89. The Kreditansalt für Weideraufbau (KfW) cofinanced US$11.8 million equivalent. The loan was closed in December 1996, two years later than scheduled, and US$4.9 million was canceled. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program and completed by the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. The borrower’s comments are attached as an annex. The cofinancier’s views were taken into account during preparation of the ICR. A second phase operation, the project’s objective was to support the country’s policy to upgrade traditional small and medium scale irrigation (SMSI) through strengthening of government’s agricultural and irrigation agencies at the central and provincial levels, promotion of water user associations (WUAs) to be responsible for operation and maintenance (O&M), and cost recovery. In particular, the project aimed to (a) renovate and upgrade 120 SMSI covering 32,000 ha (including 8,000 ha of spate irrigation) and benefit 9,800 farm families; (b) equip seven irrigation maintenance and repair brigades for spate irrigated areas in the southern provinces; (c) provide vehicles and equipment; and (d) provide technical assistance for irrigation studies and training. The project was designed to be implemented in four tranches, each of 8,000 ha. The design of irrigation projects in the first tranche, agreement of criteria for the selection of projects in the remaining tranches and procedures for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were completed during appraisal. Beneficiary participation in project implementation was a major innovation of the project. Although the irrigation department had had no prior experience of spate irrigation, it was included as a pilot venture because spate irrigation was located in semi-arid areas which had the highest levels of rural poverty. The project met most of its objectives but with a delay of two years. The last three years of the project implementation was hindered by lack of counterpart funding which delayed or stopped rehabilitation. Despite this, at closure of the Bank’s loan, 80 percent of the irrigation target was achieved and it is expected that this will rise to 90 percent by the end of 1997 when the KfW loan agreement closes. The spate irrigation component proved to be uneconomic. A major cause of delay was following the unnecessarily complex scheme selection process agreed at appraisal, even though two-thirds of the potential projects were well established with negligible land tenure or water rights problems. The government’s irrigation agencies performed poorly at scheme selection and 90 percent of their workload had to be given to consultants, thus greatly increasing costs. There were significant problems with procurement and performance of contractors, and several contracts had to be relet. While the irrigation maintenance and repair brigades initially performed well, their performance deteriorated due to inadequate work programming and support services. On the positive side, the quality of rehabilitation was high and unit costs were ten percent less than appraisal. All schemes have fledgling WUAs that need more support than anticipated at appraisal. Even though extension, WUA training and O&M services are still being developed, WUAs are maintaining their systems because traditional practices continue to work. With assured water supplies and less time required for O&M, farmers are intensifying production and land under cash crops. The ICR estimated that the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) increased to 23 percent from the appraisal value of 20 percent. However, if the cost of the unsuccessful spate irrigation component is included, the ERR falls to 15 percent.  The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) agrees with the ICR on project ratings except that for institutional development which OED downgrades from substantial to modest. The project outcome is rated as satisfactory and sustainability as likely. Institutional development is downgraded because of poor performance of the O&M brigades, inadequate extension services and the belated realization that WUAs need considerable assistance to become fully effective. Bank performance is rated as satisfactory only because the quality of supervision mitigated unsatisfactory appraisal of irrigation design procedures and institutional support needs of WUAs. The most important lesson from this operation is that the project timetable must allow sufficient time for the seeds of the WUA concept to be sown in the farming community and grow, and that timely institutional support is essential if WUAs are to become fully effective during the life of the project. The ICR is satisfactory but the plan for future operation is poorly defined. No audit is planned.