Peru - Judicial Reform Project

Document of The World Bank Report No. 17137-PE STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT PERU JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT October 27, 1997 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Country Management Unit 6 Latin America and the Caribbean Region  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit: Nuevo Sol (IS) US$1 =/S 2.65050003 (August 5, 1997) /S 1 = US$ 0.3772873 (August 5, 1997) FISCAL YEAR Jawuary 1 - December 31 Abbreviations ADR - Alternative Dispute Resolution AM - Academia de la Magistratura CCJ - Consejo de Coordinacion Judicial (Judicial Coordination Council) CNM - Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura DP - Defensoria del Pueblo (Ombudsman) JP - Juez de Paz (Justice of Peace) 1DB - InterAmerican Development Bank IFC - International Finance Corporation INEI - Instituto Nacional de Estadistica LOPJ - Ley Organica del Poder Judicial NGOs - Non-Governmental Organizations OCMA - Oficina de Control de los Magistrados PCU - Project Coordination Unit PPU - Project Preparation Unit UNDP - United Nations Development Program USAID - United States Agency for International Development Vice President: Shahid Javed Burld Director, Country Management Unit: Isabel Guerrero Director, Sector Management Unit: Guillermo Perry Task Manager Izumi Ohno / Roberto Laver  PERU JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT Loan and Project Summary Borrower: Republic of Peru Implementing Agencies: The Judiciary (through its Executive Commission and Oficina de Control de los Magistrados), Academia de la Magistratura, Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, and Defensoria del Pueblo Beneficiaries: The Judiciary; Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, Defensoria del Pueblo, judges and judicial personnel, general public Poverty: Not Applicable Loan Amount: US$22.5 million equivalent Terms: Repayable in 17 years, on annuity payments, including a four-year grace period, at standard variable interest rate for LIBOR-based US dollars single currency loans. Commitment Fee: 0.75% on undisbursed loan balances, beginning 60 days after signing, less any waiver. Onlending Terms: Grant to implementing agencies Net Present Value: Not Applicable Staff Appraisal Report: P-17137-PE Map: IBRD 26572R Project Identification Number: PE-PA40107   PERU PROPOSED JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT Table of Contents Page No. LOAN AND PROJECT SUMMARY I. THE JUDICIAL SECTOR .......................................... 1 A. Background ........................................1 B. Structure of the Judicial Sector .......................................2 C. Issues ........................................3 Independence and Accountability .......................................4 Efficiency .......................................6 Access ........................................9 Professional Competence and Integrity ....................................... 11 D. Judicial Reform Program and Recent Initiatives ............ ........................... 16 E. Rationale for Bank Involvement ....................................... 16 F. Lessons Learned from Previous Bank Experience ............. .......................... 17 II. THE PROJECT ......... 18 A. Project Objectives ....................................... 18 B. Project Description ....................................... 18 Component 1: Judicial Administration ....................................... 19 Component 2: Judicial Selection, Evaluation and Training ....................................... 21 Component 3: Access to Justice ....................................... 22 C. Project Costs and Financing ....................................... 23 HI. PROJECT ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ........................ ................. 25 A. Status of Preparation ......................... 25 B. InstitutionalArangements ......................... 25 C. Procurement ......................... 26 D. Disbursements and Financing ......................... 28 E. Accounts and Audits ......................... 30 F. Monitoring Performance and Reporting ......................... 30 IV ENVIRONMENTAL REOUIREMENTS .................................. 31 V. PROJECT BENEFITS AND RISKS .................................. 31 A. Benefits .................................. 31 B. Project Risks and Safeguards .................................. 33 C. Participatory Approach and Sustainability .................................. 34 VI. AGREED ACTIONS AND LOAN CONDITIONS .................................. 36  Tables and Charts Table 1 Costs of Selected Civil Judicial Procedures in Peru Table 2 Monthly Salaries in the Judicial Sector Table 3 Estimated Project Cost Table 4 Procurement Arrangement Table 5 Procurement Prior Review and SOE Thresholds Table 6 Disbursement Arrangements Table 7 Projected Disbursement by Fiscal Year Table 8 Participatory Approach Table 9 Number of Chambers and Courts, and Judges 1995 Table 10 Caseloads Distribution by District 1995 (nationwide) Chart 1 Caseloads Distribution by District 1995 (selected districts) Chart 2 Public Trust on the Judiciary Chart 3 Judicial Process Time Annexes Annex 1 Statement of Policy and Objectives of the Reform Annex 2 Key Monitonng Indicators Annex 3 Judicial Performance Indicators Annex 4 Organization of the Judiciary Annex 5 Academia de la Magistratura Annex 6 Consojo Nacional de la Magistratura Annex 7 Defensoria del Pueblo Annex 8 Pilot Program for New Court Organuzation Annex 9 Project Cost Summary Documents in Proiect Files 1. Peru: Judicial Sector Assessment (Green Cover), November 30, 1994, LA3PS, World Bank. 2. BTORs: Preparation, Pre-Appraisal, and Appraisal missions, World Bank 3. Project Implementation Plan, Proyecto sobre Administracion de Justicia a ser Presentado al Banco Mundial, OTPCI, Peru, 1997. 4. Manual de Operaciones, OTPCI, Peru, 1997. 5. Access Fund Operational Guidelines (final draft) 6. Proceedings of Workshops: Reforma Judicial, Accesso a la Justicia, OTPCI, Peru, 1996 7. Plan Estrategico de laModemizacion y Reforma, Comision Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial, May 1997 8. Reform andModernization of the Judiciary in Peru, Comision Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial, June 1997 9. Plan Operativo-GerenciaEjecutiva de Proyectos, Poder Judicial, June 1997 10. Evaluacion Economica de laReforma Judicial en laRepublica de Peru, INVERTEC IGT, July 1996. 11. Plan de Reforma del Poder Judicial, INVERTEC IGT, July and October, 1996 12. Inforrme de Consultoria Proyecto Administracion de Justicia en elPeru, March 1996, CDJ/CPU This report: i based on the fin.in..gs oWo:Ban p a. = ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.... . .. .. 7...EJ"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. -:S .......it .1 16 -le. misions, cositef Izumi01mm ta .aa..).R.et...e (cNs aner.. RbroaLa P ....dn re in. Peru) prordd contfinuedsuppot g eac iso e . ..... . .......... ...... .: .:X. :V - ... ..........M.iri Ezabeth Mieat, umaro' .... Arqupeo,Alero apaA iaaa~ an Laren deAs`6oino  Staff Appraisal Report PERU JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT L THE JUDICUIL SECTOR A. Background 1. 1 Peru in the past seven years has seen dramatic reforms in economic policy for growth and social development, and changes in the definition of the role of the State required to increase government's capacity to govern. Since President Fujimori first took office in July 1990, the Government of Peruj has pursued a program of economic reform that is remarkable for both its depth and its speed, at the same time that it has created an atmosphere of domestic tranquillity. This economic program has included trade liberalization, a shift in the ownership of state-owned enterprises, financial sector adjustment, labor market deregulation, and incipient rationalization of central public administration. 1.2 Economic reform and recovery are all the more remarkable given the consequences of a decade of decline and macroeconomic mismanagement in the 1980s. These consequences are evident in the decline of public spending, relative to GDP; in the inefficiency of public expenditure allocation, and particularly in the disinvestments in health and education; in the decay of infrastructure and the poor quality of its maintenance; in the proliferation of public sector agencies with overlapping responsibilities and limited financial accountability; and in increasing public debt and pension liabilities. 1.3 The reforms and economic recovery of the past five years have occurred within the context of a redefinition of the role of the State, codified in the new Constitution adopted in 1993 which narrows the state's mandate away from productive activities and reorients government's role in the delivery of key public services. To date, institutional reform and restructuring have taken particular aim at the redefinition of the regulatory framework, the alleviation of poverty, and the improvement of conditions for private sector participation in economic growth. However, Peru's public institutions remain fragile and the issue of institutional sustainability is of paramount importance. 1.4 In recognition of this fragility, the government has committed itself to a program of public sector modernization. With the re-election of President Fujimori, it has become clear that part of the agenda for his second term is the institutional consolidation of economic reforms to assure that progress made to date is sustained. In this context, and as was stressed by the President himself on various occasions, the need for public sector reform and reform of the "rules of the game" for private sector development, including judicial reform, are imperatives. 1.5 A modem State requires an effective rule of law, including modem laws and an adequate justice system. These are indispensable conditions to create a favorable investment climate, alleviate poverty, and incorporate all social sectors into the productive process. This will not only ensure the efficiency and stability of economic transactions but also the promotion of employment, income and standard of living of the poorest people.  2 1.6 Substantial updating of laws and regulations governing economic transactions has occurred in Peru in recent years. However, as pointed out in the Bank's private sector assessment, serious shortcomings exist in the application and interpretation of laws by the courts'. The judicial sector largely fails to apply and interpret laws in an equitable, effective and efficient manner. Surveys and reports confirm the reality of a judiciary with unpredictable and low quality outcomes, unreasonable times to disposition, low levels of accessibility and extensive politicization and corruption. 1.7 Thus, the Peruvian judiciary is behind the times. Profound reforms are required in the justice system in order to facilitate the consolidation of economic reforms, encourage the productivity of enterprises and foster the integration of the poorest people into the productive process. Without a solid and respected justice system capable of guaranteeing in practice security of person and property, the aspirations of people, especially the poor, to participate in the benefits of economic and social opportunity cannot be fulfilled and private sector development is discouraged. In fact, in a private sector assessment carried out by IFC in February 1993, the judiciary and security concerns were singled out as the two most important political and institutional constraints for the development of the private sector in the country.3 B. Structure of the Judicial Sector 1.8 Peru follows a traditional tripartite model of government with three autonomous branches of government (Executive, Legislative and Judicial). Like most other Latin American countries, however, this constitutional equality is not realized in practice and the government is characterized by a strong Executive Branch and a weak Judicial Branch. The judicial sector in Peru comprises the following: the Judiciary, formed by the Supreme Court and other inferior courts; the Ministry of Justice; the Public Ministry, the National Council of the Magistracy; the Academy of the Magistracy; the Office of the Public Defender; and the Constitutional Tribunal Follows a brief summary of each institution. 1.9 The Judiciary comprises the following: the Supreme Court, Superior Courts or Courts of Appeal, Specialized Courts or Courts (or Juzgados) of First Instance, and Justices of the Peace (both professional and lay judges). The court system is distributed loosely according to the defined political jurisdictions of the country. There are 24 departments (political jurisdictions) and 24 judicial districts, roughly correspondent, and two additional districts in preparation (Cono Sur and Chosica). The Supreme Court serves the whole nation, while there is a Superior Court in each judicial district. Under the Superior Courts there are first instance courts and a small number of "professional" Justices of the Peace. Currently there are about 1,500 World Bank (1994) Peru: A Private Sector Assessment, Grey Cover Report Latin America and the Canbbean Region, Country Department L Country Operations Division. 2 World Bank (1994) Peru: Judicial Sector Assessment, Green Cover Report; Latin America and the Canbbean Region, Country Department m, Public Secctor Moderniation and Private Sector Development Division. Also, during 1992, with the financal assistance of UNDP, the government established a Commission on the Integral Restuctrng of the Judiciary and undertook a number of diagnostic studies and prepared reform proporsals. 3 International Financial Corporation (1993), A Private Sector Assessment-The Constraints to Private Sector Development in Peru: An IFC Perspective  3 professional judges throughout the country. "Lay" justices of peace amount to about 4,300. They serve as a real conciliatory justice for small claims. (see Annex 4) 1.10 The Academy of the Magistracy (Academia de la Magistratura, or AM) is a separate unit within the Judiciary charged with the education and training of judges and prosecutors at all levels. Its Charter specifies three distinct purposes of training: (i) prepare aspiring judges and prosecutors for judicial duties; (ii) upgrade skills and knowledge of existing judges eligible for and seeking promotion; and (iii) provide continuing legal education for all judges. (See Annex 5) 1.11 The National Council of the Magistracy (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, or CNM) is a separate institution emanated from the 1993 Constitution. Its mandate is to select, appoint, ratify and remove judges and prosecutors at all levels. With clear autonomy in the namning of judges, the CNM is a key element in assuring the independence of the Judiciary. The CNM directly appoints all judges, without any presidential or congressional intervention. Also, the CNM is responsible for ratifying judges every seven years and is endowed with the capacity to remove Supreme Court judges. (See Annex 6) 1.12 The Office of the Public Defender (Defensoria del Pueblo, or DP) is a constitutional level ombudsman charged with the defense of the fundamental rights of citizens and the supervision of compliance of the public sector with its legally defined responsibilities. An autonomous body, elected for a five-year term by Congress, the DP is required to submit an annual report to Congress. The first DP was appointed by Congress in April 1996, and initiated its activity in September 1996. (See Annex 7) 1.13 The Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (TCG) adjudicates constitutional issues. It also has jurisdiction over legal actions invoking constitutionally-guaranteed actions whereby a citizen may allege the violation of a constitutional right by the authorities or by another private citizen. After some delays, all the seven positions were appointed by Congress in June 1996, and the TCG started its activity in October 1996. 1.14 The Ministry of Justice provides the link between the Executive and other branches of Government on all matters related to the judicial sector. As such, it is the Executive's arm for interacting with the Judiciary. The Public Ministry represents judicial processes ofthe society. Criminal prosecution involves the bulk of the cases involving the Public Ministry. C. Issues 1.15 The judicial system in Peru largely shows an inadequate performance when measured against basic standards and principles of independence and accountability, access, efficiency and professional competence and integrity. This results in a system with very low public trust and confidence. This has not always been the case. It is more accurately a declining trend particularly in the last thirty years. Follows an overview of the main elements of the judicial system and their performance. The comments below focus on the civil and commercial side of the justice sector, but many of them may apply to other parts of the sector.  4 Independence and Accountability 1.16 Judicial Ampointment, Compensation and Evaluation. Peru's basic laws on the Judiciary (the Constitution of Peru and the Organic Law of the Judiciary) provide that the Judiciary is an autonomous power of the State, independent of the Executive and the Legislature. Further, the Constitution itself provides safeguards for judicial independence such as the prohibition of interference by other branches of the government in judicial proceedings or from exercising judicial functions, prohibition of involuntary transfers, specified tenure and an adequate salary. Despite such structural independence, like many other Latin American countries, Peru has not enjoyed a tradition of judicial independence as reflected, in the pervasive politicization of the appointment and removal of its judges as well as the constant low budgets and salaries assigned to the judicial sector. 1.17 Many judges today are without tenure. Judicial tenure has been more the exception than the rule in Peru where three purges of the Judiciary have occurred within the last thirty years. The last purge came with the autogolpe of April 1992, when virtually all judges and prosecutors were dismissed. A process to restore judicial tenure commenced in 1993 with the appointment by the Constitutional Congress of Democracy. First an interim Jury of Honor, comprised of five well known and respected jurists. The Jury of Honor functioned for two years, until the CNM became operational, and in such period appointed the Supreme Court members and the appellate and first instance judges and prosecutors in the judicial district of Lima. 1.18 The CNM has represented an important step towards a fully transparent and merit-based appointment system. In October of 1995, it established guidelines of public competition for the selection of the superior judges and prosecutors. By March 1996, it had completed the appointments of superior judges and prosecutors nationwide. It has now to complete the appointment of vacancies at the trial level. There is a general recognition that the CNM has acted with objectivity in the recent appointments. Mechanisms have been provided for transparency and participation of the public. At the same time, however, there is agreement among members of the CNM, judges and experts that the system of selection, including public examinations, needs to be improved to better ensure that the most qualified lawyers are appointed to the bench at all levels. 1.19 Because of efforts by the interim Jury of Honor and the CNM, about half of the vacancies have been filled during the past two years. Nevertheless, the CNM faces the task of appointing at least 500 judges of first instance. It expects to carry out the appointment process in stages in close coordination with the AM. Besides this emergency task, the CNM will need to fill the vacancies that occur as natural course (about 30 judges and 30 prosecutors per year) and also establish a system of periodic evaluation to be linked to the ratification process. To assist the CNM in fulfilling the emergency task, Congress recently approved changes to the Organic Law of the CNM, implementing the constitutional mandate that candidates be trained by the AM as prerequisite to judicial selection and appointment. This is certainly a positive step toward enhancing the functional coordination between the CNM and the AM in the area of judicial selection; at the same time, it has become urgently necessary for the AM to develop training programs for aspiring judges, based on technical criteria compatible with CNM's selection criteria.  5 1.20 Not only tenure is elusive, but judicial salaries are also extremely low in absolute and relative terms. They are about one-third to one- half of the equivalent salaries in the private sector. In addition, they are not in line with the legal standards. Indeed, the Organic Law of the Judiciary provides that a superior judge must earn 80% of the salary of a Supreme Court judge and that a first instance judge must earn 70% of the same salary. Currently a Supreme Court judge earns approximately US$4,500 while a superior court judge earns approximately US$1,800 (including bonus) and a first instance judge earns approximately US$1,300 (including bonus) Administrative personnel in the Judiciary also receive very low salaries. Competitive salaries are a critical element of ensuring judicial independence. Although this issue cannot be discussed separately from the generic problem facing public sector salaries, it is true that the present salary level is a disincentive to attract more qualified personnel and to ensure judicial independence. It is important to increase judicial salaries as a sign of the government's commitment to judicial reform. During 1996, the Judiciary has made its own efforts to improve economic incentives of judges. In January 1996 a scheme of productivity bonus was introduced by using the Judiciary's own income, as a part of administrative modernization initiatives (para. 1.33). Also, to strengthen its financial base, measures have been taken to improve the current fee collection system and rationalize administrative and auxiliary court personnel. As the result, the level of productivity bonus was doubled during the recent six months (see Table 2). The Judiciary authorities are currently investigating the feasibility and ways to further increase economic incentives for judicial personnel. 1.21 Discitlinarv System. The disciplinary system for judges has been largely ineffective. There are a number of sanction levels for judges including warning, fine, suspension, separation and removal from office. The CNM has the power to remove judges while the Office for the Supervision of the Magistracy (Oficina de Control de la Magistratura, or OCMA) of the Judiciary imposes the other sanctions. However, to date, there is no systematic system for monitoring and evaluating judges' performance, except that the OCMA has been functioning to receive and analyze public complaints of judicial decisions and/or processes. Recently, district-level disciplinary commissions were established to strengthen the OCMA's supervision capacity through decentralized management. District disciplinary commissions are headed by respective Superior Court Presidents and with the participation of various levels ofjudges (as fixed-term assignment for OCMA) in the districts. 1.22 Budeetary Resources. The political environment in Peru has traditionally neglected the financial support of the Judiciary. The previous 1979 Constitution established that the Judiciary should receive a minimum of 2 percent of the national budget. In spite of such constitutional provision, this share of funding was not received during the first 11 years after the enactment such Constitution. The situation improved during 1990-93, when the average allocation of the national budget exceeded 2% (peaking in 1990 at 2.45%). However, this ratio declined again in 1994-95. The actual Constitution does not set a minimum share of the national budget to be assigned to the Judiciary. 1.23 The 1996 budget initially allocated to the Judiciary was 288 million soles (including 19 million soles of the Judiciary's proper income), only 1.3% of the national budget. However, the Government later authorized a 50% budgetary increase (by 144 million soles or approximately US$60 million) to specifically finance the emergency program for administrative modernization that was initiated by the Comision Ejecutiva in November 1995. For 1997, the budget allocated to the judiciary amounts to 315 million soles (including 22.5 million soles of proper income), 1.4% of the national budget.  6 Efficiency 1.24 An imperative area for reform is the modernization of the operational and functional aspects of the Judiciary. It is urgent to improve the efficiency in the sector administration, from the viewpoint of the management of the overall judicial branch as well as case administration. 1.25 Administration of the Courts. Since 1991, some efforts have been made to improve the overall administration of the courts, including administrative decentralization on a pilot basis, improved planning, and the development of operational manuals covering budget, accounting, treasury, personnel administration, and procurement etc. Although progress has been made, these measures were not sufficient to achieve substantial improvements in the supply of court services. 1.26 An important step taken to improve the administration of courts was the separation of the administrative functions from the judicial functions at the Supreme Court level. In 1992, the Organic Law of the Judiciary was modified to provide for a Board (Consejo Ejecutivo) with responsibility for the overall admninistration of the court system, and a judicial management office (Gerencia General de Administracion) with professionals in the diverse areas of administration. Previously, the responsibility to administer the Judiciary and its revenues had fallen to the Supreme Court justices who had neither time, the training nor the inclination to properly manage the organization or the finances of the system. This confusion of management and judicial duties resulted in very inefficient administration of the courts. 1.27 The Board or Consejo Ejecutivo originally comprised five members: the President of the Supreme Court, a Supreme Court justice selected by the plenary, the Chief of the Office of Supervision of the Magistracy, a Superior Court judge elected by the Presidents of the Superior Courts and a representative of the Bar Associations. This Board, now termed Comision Ejecutiva, has been temporarily reduced to three Supreme Court members (the Presidents of three chambers of the Supreme Court) and a general manager (Secretario Ejecutivo) by laws 26546 and 26623.4 The Secretario Ejecutivo is the technical and administrative arm of the Judiciary. Before November 1995, this office carried no voting power in the Board, but since then, it not only has such power but also retains authority to decide budgetary allocations and expenditures. It was officially explained that this move toward the limited membership of the policy-making body and the appointment of a manager with full delegation of administrative authority is an attempt to improve administrative efficiency and implement modernization of the Judiciary during the emergency reform period (1996-98). Upon assuming the responsibility, the Comision Ejecutiva and the Secretario Ejecutivo adopted a series of measures to address deep-seated problems in the sector, e.g., in the areas of the management of human and financial resources, statistics and management information system, court automation, judicial process, courtroom organization and infrastructure (paras. 1.32-1.33). 4 Law 26546 (November 1995) suspended the Consejo Ejecutivo and other administrative units and established a temporary governing body with a one-year reform mandate-i.e.,the Comision Ejecutiva as a policy-making organ and an Secretario Ejecutivo vwith full delegation of adminisve authority. In June 1996, such mandate was extended until end-1998 (law 26623).  7 1.28 Financial Management. As previously noted, the Judiciary has been assigned a low priority in the government's budget. Apart from the need for higher budget allocations, the Judiciary also must make its own efforts to strengthen the financial base by improving budget planning and execution, establishing a financial control system, and reinforcing its resource generating capacity. There is limited use in the Judiciary of mechanisms to raise separate resources (from the charging of fees) and a reluctance to implement such charges. In 1996, virtually all resources come directly from the treasury, equal to approximately 93% of the total Judiciary budget (288 million soles of initial allocation). At present, user fees are only charged on civil cases above 2,200 soles, while other claims and suits (such as criminal, labor, agriculture, family and mixed) are free of charges. (Civil cases account for about 51% of the total cases; and those cases below 2,200 soles account for about 10% of the total civil cases.)5 This system translates into real inequities as regards the treasury and public spending. The Judiciary is a costly service for the state and thus private parties should contribute to its maintenance unless there is a clear hindrance to access to justice. To achieve economic independence, the Judiciary needs to strengthen its capacity to seek the resources required for meeting its judicial responsibilities, use those resources prudently, and account for their use. 1.29 Case Administration. Regarding the processing of cases, substantial case delays and backlogs are reported to exist in the courts in Peru. On average, a case under ordinary proceedings takes 3 years (compared to a maximum of 300 days established in the code of civil procedure), and a case under summary proceedings in the first instance takes 270 days (compared to 60 days prescribed in the code)6. Fewer cases are resolved in a year than the total number of cases that enter the system in that year. According to the most recent survey conducted by the Judiciary with the support of INEI, in 1995, 749,216 cases were filed while only 592,589 cases were resolved in the whole judicial system (except for the Supreme Court); and at end-1995, there were 457,749 cases backlogged. In the Lima district where one-third of the total cases are concentrated, 141,864 cases were backlogged at end-1995 (see Chart 1). 1.30 The above situation results, on the supply side, in large measure from an inefficient administrative system for handling cases with the following main characteristics. First, the judicial process is based on a judge-specific administrative system; every court has its own administrative office, staffed by legal and administrative clerks. There is no centralized caseload management system in the court system. Second, there is confusion of judicial and managerial duties. Judges must play a dual role in their daily duties as dispensers of justice and administrators of their own courts. Judges are involved in personnel management, the management of financial resources, the management of judicial deposits and coordination of process servers and clerks. This duality is a major cause of court backlogs. Third, there exists no standard guidelines on critical issues such as the numbering of case files, the determination of the number and location of registries on court actions, methods for handling exhibits and records security. Lastly, there is no reliable information system on which to base decisions related to both the administration of the system and the management of the flow of cases (e.g., financial and personnel statistics, jurisprudence and case statistics, access to case management information). 5 StUdyby GERPRO S.A., for the Judiciary, 1996. 6 ditto.  8 1.31 Physical Infrastructure. Over the past years, the quality of the physical infrastructure within the Judiciary has deteriorated and failed to keep pace with the expansion of the population and the judicial system. The preliminary assessment at selected judicial districts suggests that regarding central buildings where appellate courts, part of the first instance courts (most of the specialized courts and a small number of Juzgados de Paz Letrados), and administrative offices are located, the main problems are: (i) the inefficient utilization of facilities due to lack of overall planning of functions and available space, and (ii) outdated facilities. There is a lack of modem office technology, information and communications, modem archives, and security safeguards. Increased caseloads, security issues, modem court technology and court organization, the movement toward oral hearings, and the decentralization of administrative functions are creating a series of design problems that must be addressed. Furthermore, in the case of courts for Jueces de Paz Letrados, the centralization of court facilities is a serious problem, and there is a need to decentralize these courts in order to improve access for a large segment of the population. 1.32 Recent Reforms. The Judiciary has recently undertaken initiatives to remedy this dismal picture. Immediately assuming the responsibility in end-November 1995, the Comision Ejecutiva, and their team elaborated a strategic action plan for 1996 and initiated a series of new and bold initiatives in the areas of human resource management, financial management, modernization of court organization and process optiiization, statistical updates, backlog reduction, improvement in institutional image, and infrastructure improvement. The reform objectives spelled out in the strategic action plan are: to lay the grounds for a irreversible modernization and optimization of the administrative support system of the Judiciary to achieve effective, timely, and fair justice administration; to introduce efficient administrative and judicial processes, which should be implemented by qualified and disciplined personnel, with the support of infonnation and technology; and to improve the image and the political and economic autonomy of the Judiciary. 1.33 The major actions taken by the Judiciary authorities to date include the following: * Human resource management: (i) modifying the existing employment practices to increase transparency, e.g., by terminating judges' family members occupying clerical positions and prohibiting the employment of non-salaried clerical staff, (ii) introducing a scheme of productivity bonus by using the Judiciary's own income; (iii) defining the number of administrative positions required and developing job descriptions, reducing the redundancy of administrative personnel through a voluntary retirement program, and recruiting new personnel through competitive examinations; (iv) advancing administrative decentralization by nominating General Managers at each district, selected through competitive examination; (v) introducing the private sector labor regime for administrative and auxiliary personnel to increase the flexibility in labor contracts; and (vi) reinforcing a disciplinary system by strengthening the Oficina de Control de los Magistrados of the Judiciary and establishing district-level disciplinary commissions chaired by respective Superior Court Presidents. * Financial management: (i) reviewing the existing fee structures and examining options for strengthening the Judiciary's income base; and (ii) analyzing the feasibility of contracting out selected administrative and judicial services (e.g., cleaning, security, logistics, notification) to increase the efficiency and quality of these services. The authorities plan to create a superintendency of legal services to supervise the implementation; the superintendency would be also responsible for fee collection.  9 * Reorganization and process optimization: (i) introducing standard formats regarding court administration and developing operational manuals; (ii) developing a new model of court organization (e.g., 'sistema corporativo' or the creation of a centralzed unit for registry and document processing) to change the current judge-specific administrative system into a more impersonal one; (iii) designing and installing, on a pilot basis, a computerized document registry system, and initiating the design of a case management system; and (iv) conducting a comprehensive statistical update of the entire districts in collaboration with INEI (National Statistical Institute) and compiling the Judicial Statistics for 1995. The computerized document registry system and new court organization were tested in a few criminal courts in Lima from August, and then introduced in civil courts in Chiclayo (the Lambayeque district) in November 1996. The Judiciary authorities plan to implement such court automation in the other districts in a phased manner, aiming at the completion of the nation-wide installation by end- 1998. * Backlog reduction: creating transitory courts to eliminate cases pending as of end-1995 (to be completed by end-1996), including 2 supreme transitory crimiinal courts, 14 superior transitory courts (criminal, labor and mixed), and 80 first-instance courts (criminal, civil, labor, and basic justice). According to the Judiciary's statistics, in less than a year, in Lima, all backlogs as of end-1995 (137,000 cases) were resolved. O Improving the image of the Judiciary: (i) improving public attention; (ii) taking measures to strengthen the security of the existing court facilities; and (iii) conducting public opinion surveys as instrument to obtain feedback to the recently initiated reforms and identify areas where further efforts are required. * Infrastructure modernization: (i) designing a model courtroom, taking account of the proposed new court organization, security and technology aspects; and (ii) undertaking the civil work identified as priority in 1996, such as the remodeling of the central building (Palacio de Justicia) and civil, labor, and criminal courthouses in Lima and the design study for the construction of central buildings in the Cono Norte and Tacna districts--in both cases, adopting the new model of courtroom. Access 1.34 General. Access to justice is severely limited for a large segment of Peruvians. Principal barriers include physical access, high economic costs, lengthy and inefficient court procedures and cultural barriers. First, the geographical coverage of the judicial system is very irregular. This has been recognized by the President of the Supreme Court in his inaugural address of 1996 as the main barrier of access to justice. The ratio of judges per inhabitant varies widely across judicial districts with no relation at all to economic base or level of cases. High direct and indirect costs increase the difficulties of access for the poor to the judicial system. Also, Peru is a very heterogeneous country with 5.1 million of indigenous population (such as quechas, aimaras, and amazonicos) or 22% of the total population. These people may be intimidated not only by the unfamiliarity of the court system, but also by the language barrier. 1.35 Efforts have been made in recent times to improve access of justice in particular regarding decentralization of courts, modernization of the legislation for civil procedures, strengthening the public  10 defenders office and legal aid clinics and increased support for the justices of peace. The Judiciary has embarked on a plan to decentralize court services by opening new courts closer to low-income populations. 1.36 Judicial Process. A new civil procedural code replacing the Civil Proceedings Code of 1912 went into effect on July 28, 1993. This new code is designed to facilitate access to justice through its endorsement of the guiding principles of judicial management of trial, immediacy, concentration and procedural economy. In application of these principles, the judge is afforded increased authority over the conduct of the proceedings, parties will have a more direct contact with the judges, procedural acts are simplified and superfluous formalities are eliminated. While the previous code contained more than 100 different procedures, the new code reduces the number to six. Another significant change has been to assign the Supreme Court the role of a court of cassation and thus reduce the number of appeals to the highest court. Though the new code intends to facilitate the adjudication of disputes, in practice this has proven very difficult as a result of the insufficient number of judges, the inefficient administration of the courts, and the lack of proper training of judges and other judicial personnel. 1.37 Alternative Disvute Resolution. Some alternative dispute resolution methods have become more available in recent times. This has increased the "supply" of services to satisfy the need of society for prompt, effective and suitable means of conflict settlement. A new arbitration law was enacted in 1992, and modified in 1995, and there exists about eight arbitrage centers. The new civil procedural code requires the judge to seek, at the outset of a lawsuit, a conciliation between the parties by proposing formulas for reconciling their differences and arriving at an amicable solution to their conflict. However, the problems mentioned in the previous paragraph prevent the full benefit of this new feature in civil proceedings. Dejudicialization measures have been taken recently, including the assumption by notaries of several non-contentious matters which were previously handled by civil judges. In the area of consumer protection and intellectual property, INDECOPI has a very successful record in its conciliatory mechanisms for dispute settlement. Also, there is some NGO activity in the area of mediation and conciliation. While alternative dispute resolution mechanisms outside the formal system are legally available in Peru, these mechanisms are not widely used by the public thus forcing the parties into the formal system to resolve disputes. Strengthening ADR is expected to promote access to justice and result in decongestion of the formal court system. 1.38 An important institution to promote access to justice is the Ombudsman or Defensoria del Pueblo. Ombudsmen have been recently appointed in many countries responding to the increased * complexity in the relations between the State and private parties and the inability of the public sector to satisfy the growing demands for protection of the rights of citizens. As previously stated, the Defensoria del Pueblo in Peru is charged with the investigation of claims by citizens against the public administration, to solve disputes in government matters and help establish accountability by the government for its actions. The Defensor del Pueblo was appointed in April 1996, and the office became operational in September 1996. 1.39 Basic Justice. A most outstanding institution in Peru are the justices of peace. They constitute a first instance of conflict resolution for the average Peruvian citizen especially in the rural areas. The number and location of the justices of peace is determined by the Superior Courts in each judicial district. There are two types of justices of peace: Jueces de Paz Letrados (legally trained justices of  11 peace) and Jueces de Paz (lay justices of peace). Jueces de Paz Letrados act as small claims courts with competence over both civil and some minor criminal matters. As of end-1996, there are approximately 337 Jueces de Paz Letrados, and it is expected that this number will increase in the next year. Many of the Jueces de Paz Letrados who are appointed have never been in the judicial system and have little experience both in substantive legal matters as well as in conciliation techniques. In fact, currently there is no consistency in how these Jueces de Paz Letrados conduct conciliation hearings. 1.40 Jueces de Paz (lay judges) are approximately 4,300 and account for almost 80% of justices in Peru. They are basically conciliation justices who administer justice ex aequo et bono, based on their best knowledge and understanding. They are generally persons with great respect and influence in their communities; the good neighbor. They speak the local languages and most of them have secondary education. Several studies have shown that the public has more confidence in such a system than it does in the formal justice system. (For example, the level of popular satisfaction with them is high at 60-70%, in a sharp contrast to consistent lack of faith in the formal system.) Thus, this extension of popular justice plays a critical role in access to justice in Peru particularly in regard to traditional and indigenous communities. 1.41 Jueces de Paz neither obtain compensation for their services nor receive any state support for administrative expenses in support of such services. Training opportunities are also limited; during the 1980s, these judges received some training, but this has been discontinued. Many of the Jueces de Paz have little or no experience upon taking the office. Though the 1993 Constitution requires that the Justices of Peace be elected by the communities, such selection system has not yet been implemented and they continue to be appointed by the Superior Courts. Professional Competence and Integrity 1.42 Peruvian judges are generally poorly educated and trained as reflected in the generally poor quality, unpredictability and uncertainty of their rulings; lack of appropriate aptitudes and skills; and an overall misguided concept of their role and mission as magistrates. 1.43 Decisions rendered by judges reflect a very formalistic judicial reasoning. Judges tend in general to apply a very narrow and literal interpretation of the laws with disregard to the economic and social impact of their judgments. A recent research study on more than 200 cases in the civil courts in Lima confirms this reality when deciding cases involving extra-contractual liability (torts). Outcomes are also uncertain with almost no development of guiding case law. Further, judges are unfamiliar with legal developments in the business field such as competition law, banking and insurance law and securities legislation. 1.44 Though uncertainty and unpredictability are not easily measurable, as Chart 2 shows, people have little trust in the system--particularly those who participated in the judicial process. Moreover, it has translated into a private sector largely mistrustful of the Judiciary. In a survey carried out in 1993 among 108 businessmen from companies with gross income equal or over US$1 million, 90%/O of those interviewed said they would not utilize the judicial system for the resolution oftheir legal disputes. Also, 32% ofthem 7 These companies were involved in commerce acivities (39%), manufacture (39%), non-financial services (17%), and other activities (39%). The most frequent conflicts companies face are collection of bills, disputes over conratual interpretation,  12 responded that they are not interested in purchasing from new suppliers--even if they are offered much lower prices (compared to their traditional suppliers)--because of the lack of reliable contract enforcement mechanisms. 1.45 Judges also show a poor preparation in judicial and practical skills. These include those related to the procedure itself such as evaluation of evidence as well as other general matters as case flow management, informatics, administration, etc. Most importantly, judges fail to view their role as a public service to the people. There is a want of a "culture of service". 1.46 In the past, the Judiciary has undertaken training programs. In the 1970's, the then Comision de Reforma Judicial embarked on an active and aggressive training effort aimed at instilling a more creative mentality in the judges. In the 1980's important training activities were conducted for the justices of peace.8 Recently, the predecessor of the Academia de la Magistratura also engaged in training efforts to update the knowledge of judges in new legislative developments. However, the impact of those past efforts has been adversely affected by the high turnover in the Judiciary in the last two decades for political factors. 1.47 The training needs are profound and the new Academia de la Magistratura is well aware of the challenge. It has become operational earlier this year and conducted several seminars with the newly appointed superior judges and prosecutors, as well as a series of self-training programs ("auto- capacitacion) for the existing judges in Lima, northern, and southern parts of the country. In the auto- capacitacion programs, opinions were sought from judges on the ongoing reform process, and the need to improve the existing court organization and process was discussed. The Academia has also completed, with the funding of the Japanese PHRD grant, an initial needs assessment of the civil judges in the Lima district. There are, however, much work and assistance required ahead for the Academia to develop into a sustainable resource center for the improvement of the justice system. This will include upgrading curriculum development, teaching methodologies and styles, development of personal teaching tools and evaluation of training programs. Furthermore, with the recent modification to the Organic Law of the CNM, the AM is now requested to provide effective assistance to the CNM in the emergency, mass judicial selection, by offering training programs for aspiring judges (para. 1.19). 1.48 Ethics standards in the Judiciary requires a special consideration. There is a widespread perception in the public of pervasive corruption in the judiciary. Ethics was a point emphasized by the President of the Supreme Court in his inaugural address in 1996 and a recommendation was made to adopt a Code of Judicial Ethics. In the workshops with judges and the training needs assessments carried out by the Academia de la Magistratura, ethics was identified as a learning need. 1.49 Unethical behavior is much a cause as a result of the many problems in the Judiciary. There is a need to develop clear ethical guidelines, provide training and ensure appropriate enforcement labor related conflicts, and finally, civil and mercantile conficts. APOYO S.A. (1993), Actitudes Empresariales ante el Poder Judicial. 8 Indeed, the Centro Judicial de Investigaciones (a research unit of the Judiciary),with the assistance of the Naumnman Foundation, carried out more than 250 seminars.  13 mechanisms. At the same time, it must be recognized that a system with no tenure, low salaries and great political interference encourages such behavior. 1.50. Recently, efforts have been made to correct unethical behavior. The most symbolic action was the modification of the prevailing employment practices to increase transparency, e.g., by terminating judges' family members occupying clerical positions and prohibiting the employment of non-salaried clerical staff (para.1.33). The function of the OCMA has been also strengthened. Without strengthening the values of ethics in the justice system, reform efforts will become futile and not sustainable. Chart 1: Caseload Distribution by District (1995) Piura Cuzco 0 Pending at end-95 Arequipa * Resolved Callao U Filed Cono Norte Lima 0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 Source: the Judiciary, Estadistica Resolucion 002-95-TP/J, PUCP  14 Chart 2: Public Trust on the Judiciary Not turstworthy at all Little trustworty 32% 40% No comment Trustworthy trustworthy 9% 5% 14% Source: Apoyo 1993, Evaluacion del Sistema Judicial, Opinion Publica Sample of 502 persons in Linia, with age 18 years and above. Chart 3: Judicial Process Time No comment Short Lon 4% 4% Long _ -------- r . - ---- - _ Acceptable 6% 62% Source: Apoyo 1993, Evaluacion del Sistema Judicial, AgraOiados Sample of 180 businessmen inLim a.  15 Table 1: Costs of Selected Civil Judicial Procedures in Peru .- i : ..... ";.""'''' ' ' ''' ' ....~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.........._ ... .... .... ._ . _ _ _ _ _ _....__ _.....). Ordinary Breach of contract 200,000 4 years 27,111.61 Executive Collection of debt in US$ 60,000 1 year, 9 mos. 12,196.58 Summary Damages 20,000 3 years 7,134.01 Summary Damages 4,000 3 years 1,110.50 Executive Collection of debt in Soles 1,500 1 year, 9 mos. 549.06 Setting and 250 2 years 321,07 collecting alimony I I I I Sources: APOYO, 1993, El Cost de los Procedimientos Civiles en el Poder Judicial. Table 2. Monthly Salaries in the Judicial Sector .;. S y '9, S '''':"'""-"'" ,' . ..'' '".........7..s..a....... ., , < * D_ 3!1 i- : : ,,.,..., :.:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . . . . Supreme Court Judges 2,300(1,150) 6,695 (2,678) 11,995 (4,526) 790/0 President $6-10,000 Board Supreior Court 3,005 (1,202) 5,765 (2,175) 92% Pesident Superior Court Judges 1,840 (920) 3,005 (1,202) 4,730 (1,785) 57% General $4-8,000 Manager Specialized Judges 1,265 (622) 2,005 (1,002) 3,500 (1,320) 75% Deputy $2-5,000 Manager Juecez de Paz 920 (460) 1,405 (562) 2,555 (963) 82% Source: Judicial Sector Ass em, LA3PS, World Bank, 1994 (for 1993 data); Judiciary Gerencia General (for 1995-97 data) The 1997 salaries include rmmuneration + bonus for jurisdictional functions + gasoline allowance (for supreme court judges).  16 D. Judicial Reform Program and Recent Initiatives 1.51 As stated before, administrative modernization and reorganization of the Judiciary have gained new dynamics with the passage of law 26546 in November 1995 (para. 1.27). Although this law initially gave the Comision Ejecutiva only one-year to carry out reform in the administrative areas, last June such mandate was extended until end-1998 and its scope was expanded to include jurisdictional reforms (law 26623).9 Since January 1997, the Comision Ejecutiva has been presided by the President of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, law 26623 provides for: (i) the creation of a Consejo de Coordinacion Judicial (CCJ), with a broad representation of various interest groups, charged with strategic planning and policy coordination of the justice sector; and (ii) the reorganization and modernization of the Public Ministry, thus extending the reform to the criminal justice system. During the three-year reform period, the membership of the CCJ will be restricted to three organizations, i.e., the Judiciary, the CNM, and the Public Ministry. Also, an office was created within the CCJ to coordinate technical and financial cooperation with national and international agencies. 1.52 The stated objectives of the CCJ are: to coordinate the general policy directions on the development and organization of the institutions involved in the justice sector; to define strategies for permanent collaboration and concerted efforts in the areas of modernization and efficiency improvement in judicial services; to elaborate integral programs to modernize and reorganize procedures and administrative systems for the institutions directly related and/or associated with the service of justice administration; and to support efforts to improve the justice system in coordination with the related institutions such as Ministry of Justice, Police, Defensoria del Pueblo, universities, private business, legal community, and international agencies. 1.53 Upon assuming the responsibility in last November, the Judiciary authorities launched wide-ranging reform initiatives, primarily in the administrative areas (paras. 1.32-1.33). In August 1996, the Comision Ejecutiva elaborated a document that outlines a strategic plan and the proposed reform program for 1996-98. The document establishes three key objectives of the reform program: (i) to implement an efficient administrative organization (e.g., by strengthening general administration, disciplinary function, and other support services); (ii) to establish a modem court organization (e.g., through the implementation of backlog reduction, new court organization, and alternative dispute resolution mechanism); and (iii) to optimize the profile of judges (e.g., through the development of a judicial career system, improvement in incentive systems, judicial training with increased emphasis on quality and efficiency). Under each objective, specific time-bound work programs have been defined. Furthermore, during the recent months, there have been a collaborative effort among the Judiciary, the AMK the CNM, and the DP to develop a vision and strategy of the sector reform and clarify the responsibilities of respective institutions for achieving the shared vision (see Annex 1 for the policy letter). E. Rationale for Bank Involvement 1.54 The project is consistent with the latest Country Assistance Strategy, presented to the Board in July 1997 (Report No. 16796-PE) and policy dialogue held with the Government at the time of the Bank programming missions in the recent years. In particular, the project would assist in the process of modernization of the state, improve public sector management in support of growth, assist in poverty 9 In December 1996, the Organic Law of the Judiciary was modified to accomodate these changes (law 26695). Law 26695 has established that from 1997, the Coniision Ejecutiva would be presided by the President of the Supreme Court.  17 alleviation and provide better conflict resolution mechanisms for the private sector. The absence of a credible and efficient judiciary and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms negatively affects the enabling environment for private sector development, contributes to inequities in access to justice by the poor, and potentially could contribute to political instability. Moreover, a stronger judiciary will serve better to counteract corrupt and fraudulent practices in the public and private sectors. Bank support of the Government's economic program in the areas of private sector development and the social sectors is hampered by the lack of attention to problems in the judicial sector. While Peru has adopted a number of necessary legal reforms, its capacity to implement those reforms remains inadequate. The Bank's expertise in administrative strengthenng, its perceived objectivity in a sensitive area, and its support for the Government's economic reform program provide the rationale for Bank involvement. Moreover, the Bank could play an important role in helping the authorities: (i) elaborate and implement a medium-term reform program; (ii) attain a smooth transition from the emergency situation and sustain the ongoing reform initiatives; and (iii) ensure the integrity and consistency of recent reform initiatives by involving other key players (such as the AM and the CNM) in the project. During the discussions of the sector report in March 1995, the Government agreed with many of the principal recommendations and the reform strategy outlined in the report, and in separate discussions with the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economy and Finance, and then new President of the Supreme Court, strong positive feedback was provided for Bank assistance. This was reiterated by the new team of the Judiciary, which considers Bank involvement in the sector at this juncture critical to achieve smooth transition from current emergency efforts to longer-term, sustainable, comprehensive reform. The existence of a new constitutional framework and improved legislation for the sector including the administrative organization of the Judiciary, new legislation on civil procedure and arbitration-together with increased recognition within the civil society on the need for judicial reform-- present a unique opportunity for accomplishing significant advances in the judicial sector. F. Lessons Learned from Previous Bank Experience 1.55 Since this project would represent the Bank's first operation in support of judicial reform in Peru, no lessons of sectoral experience are available. Moreover, given the relative recent history of Bank involvement in the judicial sector, there has not been much experience in the area from which to draw lessons, except for Venezuela and Bolivia (under implementation) and Ecuador (recently approved by the Board). Experience with the Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project suggests the desirability of prior strengthening of the implementing agency and unit, especially given the limited experience in the judicial sector with project planning and implementation; the establishment of a broad-based advisory commission to ensure communication among agencies that affect and are affected by the project; and constant reinforcement of the commitment and ownership of the project by the Government and the judicial sector. Recent Bank efforts in Bolivia and in the preparation of the Ecuador Judicial Reform Project reinforce the need for these three elements: (i) professional and functioning coordination units; (ii) the establishment of clear coordination responsibilities across branches of Government; and (iii) commitment and understanding of changes by the Judiciary.  18 IL THE PROJECT A. Proiect Obiectives 2.1 The overall objective of the project is to assist the Borrower in improving the performance of its justice system by enhancing, under the framework and terms of its sector strategy in the policy letter, its access, quality, independence, efficiency and integrity. Specific objectives are to: (i) modernize the administrative structure and operation of the Judiciary; (ii) improve the overall performance in civil and labor courts in the selected districts; (iii) strengthen the CNM and consolidate and improve its merit-based system of appointment, advancement and removal of magistrates; (iv) strengthen the AM and enhance the professional competence of civil and labor judges in the selected districts; (v) strengthen OCMA's disciplinary system to enhance accountability and integrity of judges; (vi) develop and strengthen alternative dispute resolution methods; (vii) support the institutional development of the newly established Office of Public Defender; and (viii) strengthen the capacity of civil society to analyze, monitor and demand judicial performance. The achievement of these objectives would increase public trust and confidence in the justice system, and thus improve the competitive environment for conflict resolution. B. Proiect Descrigtion 2.2 To achieve the above objectives, the project would support key initiatives in the first stage of a comprehensive and long-term reform program of the justice system. These key initiatives would improve the "supply" of judicial services as well as strengthen "demand" for better judicial services--both within and without the formal system. On the "supply" side, the project would strengthen basic institutions in the judicial sector and support a set of focused, specific activities aimed at improving judicial performance at five selected districts: Lima (including Cono Norte and Callao), Arequipa, Cusco, Lambayeque, and Piura. In this respect, the project aims to create five "centers of excellence" showing short-term, tangible and measurable results with demonstration effects to the rest of the judicial districts. In November 1996, the first, district-wide pilot program for new court organization and procedures (backed by court automation) was inaugurated in the civil courts in Chiclayo, capital city of the Lambayeque judicial district. A phased, pilot approach would be taken, and the experience of the Lambayeque pilot (medium-size) would be evaluated and disseminated before the pilot is replicated in the other selected judicial districts. On the "demand" side, the project would support greater public demand and accessibility to judicial services through the strengthening of the Justice of Peace and the ombudsman's office (Defensor del Pueblo) and a demand-driven "Access Fund" to promote ADR initiatives and other innovative activities to develop the capacity of the civil society for analyzing, demanding and monitoring judicial performance. 2.3 The project would finance consulting services and studies, training and seminars, goods and equipment, and physical infrastructure of the following three integrated components: (i) administration of justice (US$18.1 million or 62% of total base costs); (ii) judicial selection, evaluation and training (US$3.7 million or 13% of total base costs), and (iii) access to justice (US$5.0 million or 17% of total base costs). Total project costs are estimated to be US$31.6 million, including price and physical contingencies (total base costs $29.2 million; see summary cost tables, Annex 10). Specific component activities are summarized below. (The detailed description of the component activities are provided in the Project Implementation Plan.)  19 Component I: Adminis*ation of Justice 2.4 The objectives of this component are to assist in: (i) modernizing the administrative apparatus of the Judiciary and make it more effective and self-sustainable; and (ii) improving judicial performance in selected districts through key activities related to its efficiency, equity and predictability. Subcomponent 1: Modernization of the Administrative Apparatus of the Judiciary. This subcomponent would assist in deepening the ongoing reforms by the Judiciary authorities in the following three areas: Admnistrative strengthening of district offices: (i) providing training to administrative personnel of the General Administration Offices (at 25 judicial districts nationwide), who have been recently recruited through competitive examination, to upgrade their skills in such areas as: planning and management, operational procedures, statistics and information, computer skills etc.; (ii) conducting a study to review and refine the recently established administrative system and developing operational manuals; (iii) supporting the development and implementation of management information systems for the General Administration Offices in the areas of human resource, finance and procurement and the provision of informatic equipment to support general and court administration (nationwide); and (iv) conducting workshops for administrative personnel at the General Administration Offices and courts to discuss bottlenecks and improvement plans for administrative modernization. * Financial management: (i) conducting studies on feasibility and alternative ways to strengthen economic autonomy of the Judiciary, including new forns of resource generation, costs of judicial services, and improved judicial fee systems; (ii) strengthening the capacity of the General Administration Office for the elaboration and execution of program-based budget; and (iii) designing and implementing a preferential fee scheme for low-income groups. * Institutional image of the Judiciary: (i) supporting the dissenination of the Judiciary's reforms through public campaign (e.g., through radio and television spots); and (ii) conducting a series of evaluation studies on the administrative reforms being carried out (e.g., opinion surveys of litigants, lawyers, judges and court personnel). Subcomoponent 2: Court Performance Improvement Pilots. This subcomponent is designed to improve the quality, predictability and timeliness of judicial decision-making in the selected districts through the implementation of key activities in a participatory manner. These activities focus on improving the predictability of decisions of judges, court procedures and organization ('sistema corporativo'), court automation and infrastructure remodeling (see below). In addition judicial training activities (component 2) will also focus on these selected districts. Specific key activities have already commenced in civil courts of the Lambayeque district in November 1996 in the areas of the introduction of new court procedures and organization, court automation, infrastructure remodeling, and training of judges and court personnel in informatic skills and case administration. (Prior to this district-wide implementation in Lambayeque, during August-October 1996 the Judiciary team experimented the proposed new court procedures and organization, as well as the software system of the first-stage court automation in selected courts in Lima (i.e., anti-drug courts and transitory courts)). Upon satisfactory evaluation of the Lambayeque pilot, the implementation of the pilot program will expand to other selected districts in a phased manner. To this end, two teams have been recently set up within the Judiciary to plan and implement pilot programs (outside Lima) in collaboration with respective districts. The experience of the Lambayeque pilot would be evaluated and the lessons gained  20 would be incorporated into the subsequent pilots in the other districts of similar size (see Annex 8 for the description of a typical pilot program). Due to its very large size and complexity, the Lima pilot would be treated separately from those of the above medium-size districts. A team has been set up to exclusively focus on the preparation and implementation of the Lima program. * Civil and labor judgments. (i) conducting national and regional forums (plenarios) with civil and labor judges to discuss specific judgments in civil and labor matters, share experience and knowledge among the judges, and make recommendations to uniformize case law on specific legal issues; (ii) developing innovative incentive schemes for judges, i.e., the dissemination of the work of judges and researchers through the publication of journals and annual reports, research competition, and the conduct of study tours; and (iii) expansion of court libraries in the selected districts. * Court procedure and organization: (i) pilot implementation of a new court organization and simplified, standardized case processing procedures (starting from the Lambayeque district), introducing fine-tuning measures as required, and expanding the new organization and procedures to the remaining selected districts in a phased way. This exercise would include training of judges and auiliary court personnel on case administration and information skills, public campaign, evaluation (through statistical verification, workshops, and surveys on users and judges), as well as court automation and infrastructure remodeling (see the separate section below); (ii) conducting regional workshops for judges to evaluate the impact and results of the application of the new code of civil procedures, deepen the understanding of court procedures, and make recommendations for further improvements; (iii) organizing workshops and surveys with the representatives of the civil society to evaluate the progress of new court organization and the implementation of the new civil procedure code; and (iv) conducting studies on quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure performance improvements of civil and labor courts and disseminating the results at workshops with judges (on an annual basis). The studies would include the process time, the volume of cases disposed per court, costs of judicial administration, and be used as a tool to monitor improvements in judicial performance in the selected districts. * Judicial information system and statistics: (i) design of an automated caseflow management system, the pilot implementation of an integrated judicial information system in Lambayeque and its evaluation, and subsequent expansion of the system to the other selected districts in a phased way; (ii) conducting a diagnostic study of the existing judicial statistics system (including identification of key statistical indicators) and implementing improvement plans, so that key administrative and jurisdictional data, necessary for operations and decision making, can be provided timely and accurately; (iii) development of multiple data base (both legislation and cases); (iv) design and implementation of a modern archive system in the selected districts; and (v) automation of courts through the purchase of basic automation equipment-PCs, printers, basic software, and other equipment for the selected pilot districts (except for Lima where the purchase of these equipment is underway). * Infrastructure remodeling: The project would finance the remodeling of physical facilities in the selected districts (i.e., central buildings) so that infrastructure investment could go hand in hand with administrative and judicial modernization efforts. The Judiciary has already developed a concept of model courtroom (or new court organization), which takes account of improved processes, modem technology, and security considerations. The remodeling works will be implemented by the architectural unit of the Judiciary. During preappraisal, the unit costs of the proposed remodeling (per m2) were reviewed and judged satisfactory. Infrastructure remodeling would be financed entirely with local counterpart funds.  21 Component 2: Judicial Selection, Evaluation and Training 2.5 This component aims, through integrated efforts of the CNM, the AM and the Judiciary, at (i) establishing and maintaining a merit-based judicial career system; and (ii) improving judicial ethics and accountability. This should result in an improvement of professional competence, ethical standards and legitimacy of judges and other court personmel.. Subcomponent 1: Judicial Selection and Evaluation. This subcomponent would support the CNM through: (i) developing, upgrading and refining its regulations, procedures and systems for selection, removal, and ratification of judges and strengthening its organizational structure accordingly; (ii) strengthening its strategic planning and management capacity through the implementation of diagnostic studies, the development of organizational visions and action plans, and expert advice; (iii) providing the CNM members with training on management and informatics skills; (iv) conducting studies on the profile of judges, the profile of the CNM staff, and ethical standards in the Judiciary; and (v) providing informatic and other logistic support, including the development of data bases in support of the selection, removal, and ratification functions. Subcomponent 2: Judicial Training. This subcomponent would assist the AM in the initial institutional development and the implementation of comprehensive and integrated training programs for civil and labor judges in the selected districts to upgrade their judicial skills and aptitudes, strengthen their knowledge in selected areas of primarily business law matters, improve ethical standards and instill a "culture of service". An initial training needs assessment conducted in the Lima judicial district (with the Japanese PHRD grant financing) shows as priority learning needs: (a) judicial skills such as judicial reasoning, legal writing, evaluation of evidence, conciliation techniques, court administration, etc.;. (b) legal knowledge such as tax matters, capital markets, competition law, banking law, insurance law, negotiable instruments, extracontractual liability (torts) and measurement of damages; and (c) attitudes as mission and role of the judge in society, attitude or culture of service, treatment of minorities, etc. Project financing would include: (i) the design and implementation of arnual training programs for the judges appointed by the CNM (e.g., needs assessments, curriculum and module design, training materials, honorarium, training of trainers, distance training, and logistic support); (ii) evaluation studies of impact and results of the training programs; and (iii) institutional strengthening of the AM (e.g., consultancy for designing intensive training programs for aspiring judges, judicial selection by the CNM, study tours for the AM staff, and the support to publications). These activities would complement the support received by the AM from the European Union (approximately US$1 million in grant) in the areas of the Academia's library, the contracting of professors for specific training courses (including non-civil matters and with emphasis in districts other than Lima and aspiring judges and prosecutors), and the purchase of informatic and office equipment. Subcomponent 3: Disciplinary System. This subcomponent aims at strengthening the disciplinary system of the OCMA (Oficina de Control de los Magistrados; internal control unit of the Judiciary). Project financing would include: (i) the conduct of a diagnostic study of its organization, particularly in light of the OCMA's recent decentralization efforts (i.e., the creation of district-level disciplinary commissions), and support to the implementation of the study's recommendations; (ii) the refinement of the legal framework for a monitoring and control system; (iii) training of the OCMA staff, including needs assessment, workshops and annual training seminars, study tours; (iv) dissemination of OCMA's activities; and (v) informatic and other equipment support for the decentralized, district-level disciplinary commissions. Because of the  22 complementary role of the CNM and the OCMA in the evaluation and the control of judges' performance, the activity (i)-(ii) would be carried out in close coordination with the subcomponent 1. Component 3: Access to Justice 2.6 This component aims at improving access to justice in a broad sense by: (i) providing training for justices of peace (i.e., lay judges) and community authorities on conciliation and mediation techniques and refining the legal and regulatory framework for their activities; (ii) establishing and operating a demand-driven Access Fund to promote altemative means of dispute resolution and to strengthen the capacity of civil society for analyzing, demanding and monitoring judicial performance; and (iii) supporting the initial institutional development and key selected activities of the newly created Office of Public Defender (DP). The component is complementary to the proposed IDB project (estimated at up to US$20 million), which would primarily focus on training, courtroom modernization and infrastructure improvement for the Jueces de Paz Letrado (legally-trained judges). Subcomponent 1: Support to the Jueces de Paz System. This subcomponent would support: (i) the design and implementation of training programs for Jueces de Paz (lay judges, popularly elected under the new constitutional system) and community authorities, who provide an important mechanism for access to justice of the poorest people in the urban and the rural areas; (ii) the implementation of baseline studies of Jueces de Paz and user surveys (before and after training programs); and (iii) the review and refinement of the existing laws and regulations of the Jueces de Paz. The activities (i) and (ii) would focus on the selected districts. - Design and implementation of trainingprograms: (i) the development of training modules for training of trainers (about 30 local trainers, each for Jueces de Paz and local authorities) and their selection criteria, the provision of training for trainers in the skills of adult education and mediation and conciliation; (ii) the preparation of training materials; (iv) the irnplementation of training programs for conciliation in the selected districts; and (v) the evaluation of training programs (their impact, content, methodology, materials etc.) with the participation of trainers, professionals, universities, NGOs, and the AM etc. 3 Performance evaluation of Jueces de Paz: (i) initial baseline and follow-up surveys (before and after the implementation of training) in selected districts, covering types of cases, time delay, form of conflict resolution etc., and the dissemination of the survey results through workshops; and (ii) client surveys-- similarly before and after the implementation of training. The results of both baseline and client surveys would be discussed at the time of evaluation of training programs (see above (v)). * Analysis of legislafion and regulations on Jueces de Paz: (i) the review of the existing legislation and norms on Jueces de Paz by establishing working groups and make proposals for improvements; and (ii) public dissemination of the proposals through workshops to forge consensus on legal and regulatory changes. Subcomponent 2: Access Fund. This subcomponent would help improve access to justice through the creation of a demand-driven fund to finance eligible subprojects aimed at: (i) promoting ADR mechanisms (e.g., setting up mediation centers, training mediators and arbitrators, development of training materials and requirements to be a mediator or arbitrator, etc.); and (ii) strengthening the capacity of civil society for analyzing, demanding and monitoring judicial performance. The proposed subprojects would be non-profit and items eligible for financing would be technical assistance activities. The Access Fund would be administered by the PCU through a management committee (comprising of the representatives of the PJ,  23 CNM, AM and DP). The management committee, in consultation with the advisory panel, would evaluate and approve subprojects based on rules and procedures to form part of the operational manual. In order to promote the participation of the civil society in the reform process, proposals would be sought widely from NGOs, bar associations, law schools, and other private and academic groups. Successful subprojects would be evaluated upon completion to assess their replicability. It is envisaged that the Access Fund would have a national coverage to assure that the large number of organizations and groups be given a chance to participate in the reform process. In this way, the Access Fund would complement the administration of justice component which would focus on strengthening of central administrative apparatus of the Judiciary and court performance improvement activities in the selected districts. The draft operational guideline for the Access Fund was reviewed during negotiations. The adoption of the operational guidelines. acceptable to the Bank would constitute a condition of loan effectiveness. Subcomponent 3: Support to the Office of Public Defender (DP). This subcomponent would support the institutional development of the DP in the areas of: (i) its organizational structure and functions, norms and procedures (through advisory services, strategic workshops, evaluation studies, and staff training and study tours); (ii) native communities, environmental protection, and citizen rights in the market economy (through studies and workshops), as well as the organization of the forum to promote the coordination between the state and civil society; (iii) public campaign and dissemination of DP activities, including the preparation and distribution of materials in native languages and regional workshops; and (iv) other logistic and informatic support to promote the decentralization of DP offices. 2.7 In addition, the project would provide consultant services, goods and training for the implementation and supervision of the project, and canrying out of effective coordination and performance monitoring activities. D. Proiect Costs and Financin2 2.8 Total project costs are estimated at US$31.6 million equivalent, with a foreign exchange component of US$5.4 million, or 17% of project costs. Project costs include US$2.3 million for physical (US$1.3 million) and price (US$1.0 million) contingencies. The proposed loan of US$22.5 million equivalent would finance approximate 71% of total project costs, net of taxes and duties, and the balance, US$9.1 million equivalent, or 290/o of the project costs, would be financed by the Judiciary, the CNM, the AM, and the DP through their respective budgetary appropriations, as well as by the beneficiaries of the Access Fund as their local contributions. The IDB has been providing a technical assistance grant (US$1.4 million from MIF) for ADR and is also in the process of preparing a project, to be supported with a loan estimated at up to $20 million, to support the judicial sector. There has been close coordination between the Bank and the IDB during preparation, including joint missions and workshops. The IDB project would focus on the justice of peace system (Jueces de Paz Letrado) including training and courtroom modernization and infrastructure improvement in decentralized Juzgados de Paz that are not covered under the Bank project. The USAID has been involved in the judicial sector through its Administration of Justice Program; however, virtually all of its activities have been focused on the criminal justice system. Furthermore, UNDP has provided some technical assistance funding in the design and preparation of several judicial sector activities, principally in the area of informatics development. UNDP has also been providing technical support in the administration of the Japanese PHRD Grant; however, limited funding beyond design assistance is available from this source.  24 Table 3: Estimated Project Cost (US$mn equivalent) A. Admiinistration of Justice 14.2 3.9 18.1 A.1 ModemnizationoftheAdniinistrativeApparatusof 3.1 0.1 3.3 the Judiciary A.2 Court Performance Improvement 11.1 3.8 14.9 - Civil &laborjudgments 1.2 0.6 1.8 - Court procedures & organization 4.1 0.7 4.8 -Information &statistics 1.6 2.5 4.1 - Infastructure remodeling 4.1 - 4.1 B. Judicial Selection, Evaluation, and Training 3.2 0.5 3.7 B.l.Judicial.Selectionand.Evaluation 0.7 0.4 1.1 B.2 Judicial Training 1.8 0.1 1.9 B.3 Disciplinary System 0.7 0.1 0.8 C. Access to Justice 4.6 0.4 5.0 C. 1 Support to Jueces dePa_ 1 .0 -1.0 C.2 Access Fund 2.5c/ 0.1 2.5 C.3 Supportto the Office of Public Defender 1.1 0.4 1.5 D. Project Management and Adminiistration 2.1 0.2 2.4 D1. Project Coordination Unit 0.9 0.1 1.0 D2. Project Management 1.3 0.1 1.4 Total Base Costs 24.2 5.0 29.2 Physical Contingencies 1.0 0.2 1.3 Price Contingencies 0.8 0.2 1.0 a/ Pre-identified preparation activities to be funded by the Japanese Grant are not included in these figures. b/ Numbers may not add due to rounding. c/.Includes beneficiary contributions.  25 m. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Status of Preparation 3.1 Project preparation benefited greatly from a Japanese PHRD grant in an amount of 57.6 million Yen. The grant financed a series of workshops aimed at consensus building ofjudicial reform, training needs assessment of civil judges in Lima, pilot training program for new civil procedural code for judges in Lima, design and evaluation of a new court organization model, study tours for the professionals in the Judiciary, AM, and CNM. It has also supported the Project Preparation Unit within the Judiciary in the conduct of diagnostic studies and the design of component activities in collaboration with the other executing organs. B. Institutional and LeMal Arrangements 3.2 There are four implementing agencies for the project: the Judiciary (through the Executive Commission and OCMA), the AM, the CNM, and the DP. Because the project is a first major loan for the sector and in light of their unfamiliarity with Bank operations and weak institutional capacity, the Project Preparation Unit (PPU) was established within the Judiciary with the responsibility for executing the Japanese grant for the formulation of the Bank project--in collaboration with the other relevant parties--and coordinating the support from other donors.10 During the project implementation, this office will be reinforced as the Project Coordination Unit (PCU), headed by a Project Director and assisted by two project officers responsible for monitoring the execution of the PJ, AM, CNM, and DP components and a finance and accounting officer. To ensure inter-institutional coordination, a Steering Committee will be established with the participation of the representatives of the implementing agencies, and the PCU will serve as secretariat to the Committee. 3.3 The Government has decided to contract a management agency to administer the contracts and disbursements in light of the limited capacity of the implementing agencies and for reasons of transparency. The Government has proposed, and the Bank has agreed, to use UJNDP as the management agency." UNDP will administer the contracts under a "cost-sharing" arrangement and disburse directly to consultants, according to the terms of their respective contracts (signed by respective implementing agencies and authorized by the PCU). 3.4 The following legal arrangements will be executed in connection with the project. A loan agreement will be executed between the Bank and the Republic of Peru and project agreements will be executed with CNM and DP respectively. For purposes of transferring the respective portion of the Bank loan proceeds, a subsidiary agreement will be signed with each of CNM, AM and DP. Execution of such subsidiary agreements will constitute a condition of loan effectiveness. 10 Resolucion Administrativa #092-95-CD-PJ, October, 1995. Decreto Supremo #132-92-EF authonzes the UNDP office/lima to provide such suppot, on the basis of the decision made by respective sector authorities.  26 C. Procurement 3.5 In order to strengthen capacity in dealing with procurement activities, key staff in the implementing agencies and the PCU would be trained and be familiarized with Bank norms and procedures. Consultants' services to be financed by the loan will be selected and contracted by the implementing agencies in accordance with Bank Guidelines for Use of Consultants (August 1981), except for the development of selected softwares for the administration ofjustice 2, which will be financed by the Government from its own counterpart funds and contracted according to its local procedures. During negotiations, agreements were reached that standard forms of contract and model letters of invitation acceptable to the Bank would be used for hiring of consultant services and that the Bank's Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs) would be used in all applicable cases of procurement of goods and works. Such standard forms, model letters and standard bidding documents will form part of the Operational Manual. Changes needed to suit project requirements would be approved by the Bank. 3.6 Procurement of goods would be carried out in accordance with Bank Procurement Guidelines (January 1995 as revised in January and August, 1996). Infonnatic equipment (including hardware, first- three year of maintenance, and basic training needed by the judicial information system subcomponent) would be packaged into 1 or 2 contracts of US$250,000 or more and be procured under international competitive bidding (ICB) procedures. Other isolated computers, software, and office/specialized equipment would be procured using LIB among suppliers with service and maintenance facilities in Peru, for contracts valued at US$50,000 equivalent or more up to a limnit of US$700,000. Small purchases of library books and other supplies would be made using shopping procedures, requifing at least three quotations from eligible suppliers, for the individual contracts of less than US$25,000 each (national shopping) and less than US$50,000 each (international shopping), up to an aggregate of US$100,000 respectively. 3.7 Civil works would be financed entirely by the Government from its own counterpart funds and contracted according to its local procedures. 3.8 The Access Fund would finance subprojects which may include studies, training, dissemination, and ADR promotion proposed by the eligible entities--i.e., universities, research institutes, bar associations, business associations, NGOs, and other private organizations-with a maximum grant amount of $50,000 per subproject and the possibility of multiple applications up to a maximum of US$200,000. Selection of subprojects to be financed by the Fund would be carried out in accordance with eligibility criteria and operational procedures set out in the operational guidelines satisfactory to the Bank. 3.9 Bank Prior Review. The Bank will review and approve ex-ante all procurement documents and decisions for ICB and LIB contracting. For consulting firms on contracts estimated to cost less than US$100,000 equivalent, and for individual consultants on contracts estimated to cost less than US$50,000 equivalent, the Bank's prior review will cover only the tenrs of reference, single source contracting, assignmients of a critical nature as reasonably determined by the Bank and amendments revising the contract value over the agreed threshold. These prior review arrangemnents would ensure ex-ante review by the Bank of about 55% of the total value of all Bank-financed contracts. Although this prior review coverage is relatively low, it is acceptable in light of the good performance by UNDP and PPU in following Bank 12 Th=e include: the seco phase of case tang system, s cal inomkation system, manageent inifrmation ystem for geneal adminstration, and multiple data base.  27 guidelines for selection of consultants under the Japanese PHRD grant. While this prior coverage is relatively low, it is acceptable in light of the good performance of UNDP and PPU in following Bank guidelines under the Japanese grant. All procurement documentation would also be subject to selective ex-post review by the Bank and external auditors. Table 4: Procurement Arrangements (US$ millions equivalent) :Proect Eleen rouentMto Toa C ; n ~~~~~~~~. . ..---a. h-:...........-- Consultants' Service, and - 19.0 al 1.4 20.4 Training and Studies (16.4) (16.4) Goods and Equipment 3.5 0.9 - 4.3 (3.3) (0.8) b/ (4.1) Access Fund 2.4 2.4 (2.0) c/ (2.0) Civil Works 4.4 4.4 Incremental Operating - 0.1 - 0.1 Costs (0.1) d/ (0.1) TOTAL - 35 22: . 36 -: ; ---: : :(3:3) . (1':-.) (i::2.-,). Notes: Figures in parenthesis are the respective amounts financed by the Bank Numbers may not add due to rounding. t Services should be procured in accordance with World Banlc, Guidelines: Use of Consultants by World Bank Borrower and by the World Bank as Executing Agency (August 1981). Also includes the Cost-Sharing Agreement with UNDP/Lima office. /t LIB (esimated at US$0.7 rmn) and Shopping (estimated at US$0.1 rnn). cl Services should be procured in accordance vith the selection procedures described in the operational procedures of the Access Fund. f Includes offilce supplies, launch and mid-term evaluation workshops, and travel and training costs for PCU staff etc.  28 Table 5: Procurement Prior Review and SOE Thresholds (US$ thousands) .. .;..,,;..,.. ... .. ..... . . a, -, - .0 .. Consu}tant Services and Selection according Studies, Trainiing and to Consultants Seminars Guidelines. Firm >_ 100 .All < 100 < 100 * Review of TORs only. Other steps in selection process are exempted from prior reviw.*) Individual >_ 50 . All <.50 < 50 . Review of TORs only. Other steps in selection process are exempted from prior review.(*) Goods and Equipment >_ 250 ICB . All < 50 50 to 250 L1B . All < 50 Int'l Shopping and . None < 25 National Shopping (*) Exemption fiomprior review does not apply to consultants contracts below the thresholds in cases of: (i) single sousee selection of firms, assignmnents of critical nature, and amendments to contas raising oniginal contract value above the thresholds. D. Disbursement 3.10 The loan proceeds would be disbursed over a five-year period, and would finance: (i) 100% of expenditures (net of taxes) for international and local consultants' services (including studies, training, workshop activities); (ii) 100%/ of foreign expenditures and 85% of local expenditures (net of taxes and duties) for purchases of goods and equipment; (iii) 85% of expenditures (net of taxes and duties) for subprojects under the Access Fund; and (iv) 20% of expenditures for recurrent costs. The tables followed show the allocation of loan proceeds and the estimnated disbursement schedule. The closing date will be June 30, 2002.  29 Table 6: Disbursement Arrangements (US$'OOO equivalent) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..... ..... ....-. .... 1. Consultant Services, 15,780 100% Training and Studies - PJ and others 12,100 -AM 1,740 -CNM 850 -DP 1,090 2. Goods and Equipment 4,010 100% of foreign expenditure, and 85% of - PJ and others 3,470 local expenditures -CNM 170 - DP 370 3. Access Fund 800 85% of local expenditures 4. Incremental Operating 10 20% Costs 5. Unallocated 1,900 TOTALS 22,500 Table: Projected Disbursement by Fiscal Year (US$ million equivalent) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. -.... .. ... ..-. .. . . . . ............., -: - BakFY FY998 FY9 FY200 JY201 Y- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~., i.P.-.,.......... ,, :: ,,:- ., .:.. ........ ............-: Annual 3.2 5.6 7.2 4.5 2.0 Cumulative 3.2 8.8 16.0 21.5 22.5 3.11 Retroactive Financin. Retroactive financing of up to US$2 million would be provided to meet expenditures incurred between January 1, 1997 and date of loan signing (provided that this period does not exceed one year), mainly to finance: (i) court performance improvement pilots in the selected districts (e.g., public campaign and seminars on the introduction of new court procedures and organization, evaluation studies and workshops of the pilot experiences, training of court administration and basic informatics skills); (ii) studies to review the recently established administrative system and to strengthen economic autonomy of the Judiciary; (iii) baseline studies of Jueces de Paz and user surveys; (iv) consultancy for the AM in the design of training programs for aspiring judges; (v) initial institutional development of DP; and (vi) and the other areas as judged necessary. 3.12 Documentation of Expenditures. Disbursement for goods and equipments under contracts below US$50,000 equivalent and technical assistance and training under contracts below US$100,000 for firms and US$50,000 for individuals would be made against Statement of Expenditure (SOE) for which appropriate documents would be retained by the PCU. Disbursement for contracts above these limits would be made on the basis of full documentation. The required supporting documentation will be retained by the PCU for at  30 least one year after receipt by the Bank of the audit report for the year in which the last disbursement is made. This documentation will be made available for review by the auditors and by visiting Bank staff upon request. E. Accounts and Audits 3.13 The PCU would maintain a set of consolidated records and accounts for each project component and implementing agencies. All project accounts, including the special account and SOEs, would be audited annually in accordance with the Bank's "Guidelines for Financial Reporting and Auditing of Projects Financed by the World Bank". The Government will provide the Bank within six months of the end of each fiscal year (December 31), an audit report of such scope and detail as the Bank may reasonably request, including a separate opinion by an independent auditor acceptable to the Bank, on disbursernent against SOEs. The cost of this audit will be eligible for financing under the Bank loan F. Monitoring Performance and Reporting 3.14 Performance Monitorini The key monitoring indicators and benchmarks for each project component/subcomponent have been defined and are included in Annexes 2-3. In particular, the administration of justice component will be monitored in four ways: (i) changes in the volume of cases disposed; (ii) improvements in the quality ofjudicial decisions; (iii) economic analysis of reforms in judicial administration; and (iv) overall improvements in judicial services from the viewpoints of users and more broadly, of the general public. 3.15 First changes in the volume of cases disposed will be measured by using two indicators: congestion index and congestion ratio. These indicators have been adopted to monitor judicial performance in Costa Rica and Chile, and show the level of congestion and the speed of reducing the congestion. (For example, the congestion ratio is the percentage of the cases sentenced or disposed as a proportion of the number of new filings in each court in a specific year.) In April 1996, the Judiciary conducted a statistical survey with the support of the INEI (National Statistical Institute) and is currently developing baseline performance indicators. Based on the experience in other Latin American countries, it is expected that productivity would increase by 15% in the first year and by 35% in the third year, compared to the level of 1995.'3 Second, imnprovements in the quality ofjudicial decision will be evaluated annually at national and regional forums (plenarios) with judges, and further improvement plans will be discussed. With the improved case administration and training of court personnel, judges would have more time to devote to judicial decision- making. In addition, improved training ofjudges would enhance the quality of decisions based on sound legal reasoning. Third, the economic impact of reforms in judicial administration will be analyzed annually, both in terms of: (i) the costs of providing judicial services; and (ii) the income to be generated by the Judiciary's own efforts. And sly, the overall improvements in judicial services will be assessed through: (i) opinion surveys on litigants, lawyers, businessmen, and the general public; and (ii) research and monitoring of the reform process by various groups in the civil society, supported under the Access Fund. 3 Evaluacion Economico de la ReforMa Judicial en la Republica del Peru and Plan de Reforma del Poder Judicial de Peru, prepared by INVERTEC IGT, July 1996. For exampie, the Superior Court in Santiago (Chile) achieved productivity increase by 30%Yo during 1995, due to the measues to systematically reduce pending cases and cate a position of professional Administrative Coordinator to assist the President of the Superior Court in adminimv matters.  31 3.16 Reportin . The PCU will prepare semi-annual progress reports for all components of the project, based on the inputs from the four implementing agencies. These will describe: (i) progress achieved during the previous six months in the implementation and in the achievement of the objectives of the project based on the performance indicators; (ii) an assessment of the problems and issues derived from the implementation of the project; (iii) updated implementation and disbursement schedules for the following six months; and (iv) status of compliance with the legal covenants contained in the Loan Agreement. The reports will provide timely and updated information on project implementation, highlighting issues and problem areas, recommending actions and commenting on progress in executing previous recommendations. 3.17 To facilitate project implementation and gain support from stakeholders, the PCU would organize a project launch workshop with the participation of the Judiciary, CNM, AM, DP representatives, and judges from the selected districts (Lima, Arequipa, Cusco, Lambayeque, Piura). Because the first court performance improvement pilot involving new court procedures and organization, court automation and related training, remodeling recently began in the Lambayeque district, the experience of the Lambayeque pilot would be evaluated and disseminated before the pilot is expanded to the other selected districts of similar size. Moreover, in the third year of the project life, a mid-term review of the five-year program will be conducted in addition to regular monitoring and reporting. Prior to this review, the PCU will conduct a comprehensive evaluation aimed at assessing the progress in achieving the objectives of the project, as defined by the set of agreed indicators and the prospects for successful project completion. IV. ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 The proposed project aims to improve the enforceability of legal and contractual rights through improved judicial administration and judicial decision-maldng, and increased access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. As such, the project is not expected to adversely affect the environinent. In the medium term, the project could have a positive impact on the environment as it reinforces the effectiveness of legal regulation over social and economic activities. An effective legal framework is a key instrument for deterring environmentally damaging activities or seeking remedies. V. PROJECT BENEFITS AND RISKS A. Benefits 5.1 The project is expected to improve the capacity of the judiciary to build and sustain its independent role, to improve the enabling environment for private sector development, and to improve the access to and the quality of justice for the citizenry. More specific benefits include increased courtroom productivity and efficiency, thereby reducing the private and social costs of dispute resolution and improve equity in access to justice. Benefits also include reductions in the time of delay in court actions, reduced case backlogs, and improved quality of decision making by judges and justice of the peace. 5.2 First, the project would support measures to improve economic and political independence of the Judiciary. Although budget allocation is partly a function of overall resource constraints, the Judiciary must be able to seek and obtain the resources needed to meet its responsibilities, use those resources prudently, and  32 account for their use. It must be also able to raise separate resources (from user charges) to secure its financial base. The low salary level of the judicial sector that hinders attracting capable personnel, poor infiastructure etc.-these problems are partially caused by the inability of the Judiciary to manage and assign resources efficiently and effectively. The project would strengthen financial management, implement new fee structure, and provide merit-based bonus incentives for judges, administrative and court personnel. Moreover, in supporting the CNM, the project is expected to assist in building a stronger, depoliticized, and merit-based system of selection, appointment, advancement and removal of judges. Second, the project is designed to strengthen the functioning of selected. fundamental pieces of the justice system; the Judiciary, CNM, AM, and DP. To this end, discrete activities have been identified: e.g., modernization of court management, judge training, transparent and impartial selection and promotion process for judges, infiastructure improvement. With improved incentive structures, a reorganized, modem court system, and a performance monitoring system put in place, the project would contribute to strengthening the functioning of selected, key judicial institutions in an integrated manner. In particular, the strengthening of the CNM (selection and evaluation ofjudges), AM (udicial training), and DP (defense of citizens' rights) is expected to have spill-over effects in the entire judicial sector. Third, although the project will not involve criminal courts or the TGC, the resources saved by the increased efficiency in the other areas may be devoted to these aspects of the judicial system. Additionally, better civil courts would improve the overall image of the Judiciary, thus increasing popular trust in the institutions. This is closely related to the second point above. In this way, the project would bring about positive externalities to the entire justice system, including criminal justice and TGC. Fourth, the project is designed to build the social capacity for demanding and monitoring the progress in judicial reform and judicial performance by attempting'to broadly involve the civil society-- such as bar associations, NGOs, universities, the business community, and the other users--in the evaluation of reform process and outcome (e.g., in the form of opinion surveys, user surveys, workshops). Such efforts would result in greater awareness of the society in the rule of law and the role and importance of the justice systemn, a better system of checks and balances as provided in the new Constitution and eventually contribute to achieving a long-term goal ofjudicial independence, integrity and accountability in Peru. Fifth, and finally, the project, by supporting several key improvements in the justice system, is expected to assist in preventing and correcting corrupt practices, making for greater transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs. 5.3 Economic Benefits. Because this is a primarily technical assistance project, it is not as easily susceptible to cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, a simplified analysis was attempted to capture quantitatively a dimension of benefits expected from the reform associated with the proposed project. 14The evaluation of economic viability considered the Bank project as a part of the investment and technical assistance required for comprehensive judicial modernization (about US$60 million for five years, e.g., by including investments in the judicial districts other than those selected for the proposed project). A simple model was developed that takes account of the projected demand forjudicial services (assuming a 3.5% growth rate per year), court productivity (in processing and resolving cases), and increases in court productivity expected under the reform scenario. Unit costs for typical courts were calculated, and then the 14 The analysis is based on a simple model to measure benefits associated with court productivity improvement Under the "with" reform scenario, the future demand for judicial services would be satisfied and bacldogs would be eliminated through a progressive increase in court productivity and the limited creation of tmnsitowy and/or permanent courts; under the "without" reform scenario, these would be achieved primarily through the creation of the larger number of transitory and permanent courts because court productivity will remain at the 1995 level. For more detailed analysis and assumption, see Evaluacion Economica de la Reforma Judicial en la Republica de Peru, iNVERTEC IGT, July 1996.  33 costs required for satisfying the projected demand for judicial services and eliminating the accumulated backlogs were estimated for both the "with" and "without" reform scenarios. The saving to be generated under the "with" reform scenario is considered benefits to the proposed reform activities. The result of economic analysis suggests significant direct benefits, US$96.5 million of a net present value of the incremental benefits (using a 11 percent discount rate). This does not include indirect benefits, such as possible increases in foreign investment and reactivation in domestic business transactions, greater institutional autonomy of the Judiciary, potential reduction in corruption, and the other quantitative benefits described in the above para. 5.2. The other potential benefit that is not captured in this analysis includes the positive fiscal impact resulting from the Judiciary's improved income generating capacity, through the implementation of the better judicial fee structures and new forms of resource mobilization, to be supported under the proposed project. 15 B. Project Risks and Safefuards 5.4 Despite new opportunities and impetus provided by recent developments, the project, within a very sensitive sector, faces challenges and potential risks. Major risks include: (i) medium-term sustainability of the project; (ii) a lack of solid participatory approach and coordination among key entities and agencies involved in the reformn; (iii) weak institutional capacity for the implementation of the project; (iv) resistance to change from key groups, including judges, court personnel, businessmen and litigants, with vested interests in the current system; and (v) political interference and potential instability in the project environment. The project intends to deal with such risks as follows: 5.5 First, regarding the issue on medium-term sustainabilit, Bank preparation has been placing special emphasis on the engagement of key players, who would be responsible for the implementation of a project, in the reform process. Efforts are being made in identifying a core group of reform-minded judges to assume leadership in the design of the pilot programs in the selected districts. The project also supports activity to promote the participation of the civil society in monitoring progress in judicial reform to increase the chances of sustainable change. Moreover, in regard to the project, the implementing agencies have agreed, as will be reflected in the policy letter, to continue and strengthen a participatory approach in project implementation. These aspects will be evaluated in the project's annual reviews (to which representatives of stakeholders will be invited). Second, the issue of coordination is being addressed by the establishment, prior to negotiations, of an appropriate coordination mechanism at both policy and operational levels. Furthermore, throughout preparation, a number of joint meetings and workshops have been organized to discuss specific reform proposals which have bearings on various actors. Third, to address the issue on weak institutional capacity, the administration ofjustice component takes a phased, pilot approach, starting in the Lambayeque and Lima districts, where there are indications of strong leadership commnitment and a sense of reform ownership amnong judges with tenure. Before expanding the court performance improvement pilots to the other selected districts, these experiences would be evaluated and the lessons gained would be disseminated and incorporated into the subsequent pilots. Moreover, the Japanese PHRD grant has been provided to set up a functioning PCU, which lializes various agencies involved in the project and ensures the consistency of activities. Fourth, the issue of resistance to change is expected to be minimzed through the implementation of a participatory approach, with project financing, to involve affected groups in each of the selected districts. 5 The preliminay study by GERPRO S.A. contracted by the Judiciary indicates a possibility of increasing the Judiciaxy's proper income from 19 million soles (about $7 million) up to 46 million soles (about $17 million), in constant 1996 prices.  34 5.6 Lasdy, the issue of political interference and potential instability in the project environment. This is a highly sensitive and complex matter. An effective Judiciary requires that it function free from political interference to ensure the impartiality and observance ofjudicial decisions. It is widely recognized that there is no strong tradition of an independent Judiciary in Peru as other LDCs, although important-but limited- developments in restoring some balance of power may be seen in the establishment and operation of the CNM and the DP. In particular, it is reported that interference continues to exist in military control ofjudicial processes and anti-terrorism legislation (outside the scope of the project). The project intends to help the "depolitization" of the Judiciary in Peru at different levels. First, the project aims at supporting the CNM to move towards a merit-based system of judicial recruitment and removals. To this end, a coordination mechanism was established between the AM and the CNM, and the principle of transparency, openness, and contestability was agreed on the AM's training program for aspiring judges and technical evaluation of tenured judges, as spelled out in the policy letter. Second, to strengthen independence in decision-making, the project would support training efforts of the AM to enhance the independent role of the judge and reaffirm a "culture" of independence. Third, the project, mainly through the Access Fund, is expected to facilitate the development of a constituency in support ofjudicial reform as a means to demand and pressure for sustainable institutional changes. Fourth, other project interventions such as improvement in the administration of the courts would indirectly strengthen independence by improving the standing of the Judiciary in the community. C. Participatory Arpnroach and Sustainability 5.7 For judicial reform, and any institutional reform in general, to be sustainable and viable over the long- run, it requires consensus and a broad participation from the legal community as well as the civil society. During preparation, a carefully-designed participatory approach has been taken to build an internal consensus leading to reform. A series of workshops and meetings were organized and continued to be planned for: (i) judges and key agencies involved in the project (seeking the cooperation and consensus on the project design, and evaluating and sharing the lessons gained from the court performance improvement pilot in Chiclayo and Lima); and (ii) more broadly the civil society, including bar associations, NGOs, the business community, and other users of the system (aimed at information sharing, consultation, and evaluation on reform progress). 5.8 The sustainability of the project will depend in part on the continued commitment of the Judiciary itself and the government to judicial reform Interest in this comprehensive reform program is shared between the Executive and Judiciary. The Executive views judicial reform as an integral component of its plan of government, supporting its economic reform objective as well as its aim to modernize state institutions.  35 Table 8: Participatory Approach .... .. .. ... - .-.-. ::.. :.... Beneficiaries: Judges - IS, CON, COL - COL (participation in - COL (continued (workshops for diagnosis project activities: collaboration to and proposals for project administration of justice sustain the reform design: administration of component) beyond the project justice component) period) Civil society (public, legal - IS - IS, COL - IS, COL & business communities) (meetings, opinion surves) (articipation in project (continued actvities: access tojustice monitoring of reform component (e.g., support to process) Juces de Paz,research & monitoring of reform under the Access Fund) Intermediaiy NGOs: NGOs - IS, COL - CON, COL - COL (workshops and meetings (participation in project (continued for information sharing and activities: access to justice monitoring the diagnosis: access to justice component (e.g., support to reform process component) Jueces de Paz, research & beyond the project monitoring of reform under period) the Access Fund) Academic institutions: Universities, research and - IS, CON - CON, COL - COL other academic institutions. (intemviews on training (participation in project (continued needs ofjudges) actvities: judicial tlaining collaboration to and access to justice sustain the reform components (e.g., support to beyond the project Jueces de Paz, research & period) monitoring under the Access Fund) Other donors: IDB, USAID, UNDO,, -IS, CON - COL It is expected that the European Union etc. (oint missions with IDB, (cofinancing expected from reform would become close consultation with IDB and European Union; self-sustainable. USAID, European Union, collaboration with the other and UNDP; plus interested donors) organization of local donors _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ m eetinO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Not . . . - ... Fom avoIvem ~ xt~ of eholera Include W brm ations ating (..);......ta.......O.....d vollaboration (COL) ~ . .. .. .  36 t . 0: ; .... ... .............. .. .. ... .. .... ...... ............-:;40;44XTt--4:CC,::;; .:t-S-4-4;;A-;.;; -:T:T-S-:- . . -. , - , , - : X.- : :-t--lQ. . . . . . . . d t t:.X-. t..: Defensor dei Neblo. N acadmcs and oter aio es d ( atR h p M . . ". - '"" ' ' ''''. . . . . donor representatives g, 1B and EupE - ..a...:... an...... .U.in.)wee ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t ,,... . ,. . . . .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. . - -<.. . .. . . . . . . . . . -. . . auk'ffthoet- oig Jtice .op .. It core .v-- TyXi .. . . . . .... ...... .... s 6 ay.) Agreem lents reache aime ngtatintonlys: rainsaigadcnuttin u loassigtedge (a)o maninetainjadgc toprefrat e co g the m topjey cori atng acnite roPeUi wihsa ffing , fuano tios ap ind hng s,adiet iftu ne acgce ptal tof pthenta leadesanguk; hem oisi lvd dcaiiy e(bceny reaind noia ilater th dcan Decmbeo 31,t1e97, coisncy antftodvalaatprocesimpatoandaresultsoo dspln ysythem judio a tro rainin and thstric e of thLAa demiaqu; chpomple.ofsuchgevalduat ionntlaerithn Mnrooarch a 1, c 998;itrnentrmnjdesR ecasrngvioers of ththhe Bafo n kpo s onac t ohi evalpurticipand ts w recdvde nommerkndagroupsfodscson and prheirpan ancpablyes tthBand, rcm e ation werpndte presete prgat the Ths tokhop resma tining a selecte dsucicss;n ofre h xsec f I togmtvto n (cm m aitm ntamong jugitn efr;( the AMaheeuigh degre fctor nsesu b ar on w the fctonprbms and q alfcations t ..e ..a cceenable ...stron the r motivation...... of. the, patcptdjde r otyt eto,adteewrsosra ndte ldt n imporance ........t..appoah urngth stag ...f. Ref Iormdsg.Tedans n rpsl rsne at the workshops have been incorporated..in the five-year....... ref .r . plnt.epotdb .h.Bnk.d..le donors.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~................. (b) rtain,not lter tan Deember31, 197, aconsutanta.. to "A evaluate the impac and7 reutso March 31, 1998; thereafter excha~~~M, Ong vies..th.heBa..ontheevluaionandit the remaining selected districts;pre (c) maintain in the AM an executive director~~~~~.... an bor with...... .ucin n qaiiain acceptable~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... ...... to the Bank,:::::: ::::: ;;, _....-..........  37 (d) provide all necessary information to enable the PCU to prepare the progress reports; (e) participate in the annual reviews. (2) CNM shall: (a) provide all necessary information to enable the Judiciary to prepare the progress reports; (b) participate in the annual reviews; (3) DP shall: (a) provide all necessary information to enable the Judiciary to prepare the progress reports; (b) participate in the annual reviews; (4) PCU shall: (a) furnish to the Bank, not later than February 28 and August 31 of each year, progress reports on the project, under terms of reference acceptable to the Bank including an implementation plan of the project for the upcoming semester (para. 3.16); (b) conduct annual reviews during the last quarter of each year to focus on: * qualitative and quantitative improvements in judicial services; * implementation of new court organization; * status ofjudicial tenure, including selection and appointment, ratification and removal of judges by CNM; * effectiveness and impact of AM's training activities; * demand, effectiveness and impact of the Access Fund; * effectiveness and impact of training activities for the Justices of Peace; . effectiveness and impact of DP activities; * effectiveness of coordination among implementing agencies; * progress in the improvement of economic and non-economic incentives for judges and other judicial personnel; * consensus building and participatory efforts and results in the implementation of the project; * the proposed annual investment program for the then upcoming year; and * any other relevant development or event which may affect the efficient execution of the project or the attainment of its objectives. The PCU shall invite to such annual reviews a group acceptable to the Bank of representatives from the judges, court personnel and other stakeholders. In the event of unsatisfactory progress in project implementation or in the achievement of progress objectives, take any necessary action as deternined by the Bank;  38 (c) maintain a consolidated set of records and separate accounts for the project resources and expenditures; (d) appoint independent auditors to audit project expenditures in accordance with terms of reference acceptable to the Bank; certified copies of such reports to be sent to the Bank, within six months after the end of the Governments' fiscal year (para. 3.13); (e) supervise procurement of goods and works and contracting of consultants' services in accordance with Bank procedures (paras. 3.5-3.9); (f) operate the Access Fund in accordance with the agreed operational guidelines. Ensure that the advisory panel are formed by experts with terms of reference, experience and qualifications acceptable to the Bank. Furnish to the Bank quarterly reports on the performance of the Access Fund; 6.3 As condition of Board presentation: (a) the statement of policy and objectives, acceptable to the Bank, would be signed and sent to the Bank, and (b) the final draft of the operational guidelines for the Access Fund, acceptable to the Bank, would be sent to the Bank. 6.4 As condition of effectiveness; (a) the operational guidelines for the Access Fund would be adopted by implementing agencies, and the Advisory Panel for the Access Fund would be appointed; (b) the Operational Manual for the project would be approved by the implementing agencies and the PCU would be established with the functions and responsibilities specified in the Operational Manual; and (c) the subsidiary agreements with CNM, AM, and DP would be executed. 6.5 As condition for disbursements, for project expenditures related to new court procedures and organization and court automation (component 1-(2)) outside the Lambayeque district, a satisfactory evaluation of the Lambayeque pilot has been carried out, and after review of such evaluation, the Bank and the Judiciary agree to expand the pilot to the remaining selected districts.  39 ANNEXES Annex 1: Statement of Policy and Objectives of the Reform Annex 2: Key Monitoring Indicators Annex 3: Judicial Performance Indicators Annex 4: Organization of the Judiciary Annex 5: Academia de la Magistratura Annex 6: Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura Annex 7: Defensoria del Pueblo Annex 8: Pilot Program for New Court Organization (Modulo Corporativo) Annex 9: Project Cost Summary  40 Annex 1 Declaracion de Politicas, Objetivos y Acciones en Relaci6n a la Reforma Judicial y el Proyecto de Inversion Financiado por el Banco Mundial  41 Declaraci6n de Politicas, Objetivos y Acciones en Relaci6n a la Reforma Judicial y el Proyecto de Inversi6n Financiado por el Banco Mundial Esta declaraci6n se compone de cuatro secciones: A. Antecedentes: visi6n y estrategia sectorial; B. Proyecto de inversi6n Banco Mundial (Proyecto BM); C. Coordinaci6n de los entes ejecutores; y D. Metodologia participativa de la reforma y ei proyecto BM. AA . Antecedentes: visi6n y estrategia sectorial. 1. Un Estado moderno requiere de una vigencia efectiva del derecho, un ordenamiento juridico actualizado y un buen servicio de justicia. Estas son condiciones indispensables para crear un entorno favorable a la inversi6n y el comercio, aliviar la pobreza e incorporar a todos los sectores sociales en el proceso productivo del pais. Lo dicho asegurara no solamente la estabilidad y eficiencia de las transacciones econ6micas sino tambien la promoci6n del empleo y la mejora de los ingresos y nivel de vida de la poblaci6n. 2. En los uitimos afios se han emprendido reformas y acciones concretas para combatir los problemas que aquejan a la administraci6n de justicia a fin de mejorar el servicio, por ello se han realizado los siguientes hechos: (a) Un nuevo marco constitucional con la creaci6n del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, el Tribunal Constitucional y la Defensoria del Pueblo. (b) Una nueva y modema estructura organica para el Poder Judicial con la separaci6n de la funci6n jurisdiccional de la administrativa. (c) La redefinici6n de la Corte Suprema como tribunal de casaci6n. (d) Reconocimiento de la justicia de paz como instancia fundamentalmente conciliadora y su designaci6n por elecci6n popular. (e) El reconocimiento de la jurisdicci6n especial de las Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas. (f) Nueva legislaci6n procesal civil concediendo a los magistrados una funci6n mas activa en la direcci6n de los procesosjudiciales y potenciando a la conciliaci6n. (g) Nueva y moderna legislacion sobre arbitraje. () Desjudicializacin a traves de la transferencia de competencia en asuntos no contenciosos a las notarias. (k) Una nueva academia de la magistratura encargada delI perfeccionamiento y actua izacion de los magi strados, asi como de la fonrmaci6n de aspirantes para la carrera p judicial ,()El diseno e implantacion de un plan de descentralizacion tanto jurisdiccional como administrativo  42 (m) Un incremento sustancial de recursos presupuestarios y mejoras salariales para magistrados. 3. Es nuestro compromiso, y venimos trabajando arduamente en ello, hacer realidad los cambios efectuados en los planos constitucional, legal y administrativo. Ello conileva un proceso de reforma que no es inmediato sino de largo aliento. Para este proceso de reforma, hemos sefialado lineamientos de politica y objetivos para la administraci6n de justicia con areas y acciones de corto, mediano y largo plazo. 4. Es nuestro objetivo general brindar un servicio de justicia eficiente, eficaz, predecible, accesible y que se desarrolle con equidad, logrando el mas alto grado de confianza de los usuarios y de respeto de los derechos ciudadanos. Para ello tenemos como politica y objetivos especificos: (a) Reestablecer una integridad y regla etica en los magistrados v funcionarios judiciales. A tal efecto: (i) llevaremos adelante acciones y medidas concretas para motivar a jueces y personal judicial a efecto que se internalice en ellos la alta misi6n que se les ha encomendado y lo indebido e ilegal de la solicitud y/o recepci6n de dadivas por realizar labores judiciales; (ii) fortaleceremos la labor de control y fiscalizaci6n del OCMA x a trav6s de ello facilitar el control y la fiscalizaci6n por parte del usuario. (b) Fortalecer la autonomia del Poder Judicial tanto en su aspecto institucional como la independencia personal de los magistrados. A tal efecto: (i) fortaleceremos y apoyaremos al Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura en su condicion de organismo aut6nomo para la selecci6n, promocion o ascenso. v correspondiente nombramiento. asi como para los procesos de destituci6n y ratificacion de magistrados. (ii) posibilitaremos que la Corte Suprema cumpla su rol fundamental de dirigir la politica jurisdiccional; (iii) apoyaremos a la Academia de la Magistratura en su misi6n de formar magistrados que internalicen su rol independiente como parte de un servicio de justicia eficaz y eficiente al usuario; (iv) respetaremos y haremos respetar las garantias de independencia personal y de permanencia en el cargo. Garantizamos un proceso de ratificaci6n con audiencia del magistrado y de protecci6n contra la remoci6n arbitraria; (v) facilitaremos el financiamiento del P.J. con recursos aut6nomos a traves de tasas judiciales con el resultado de otorgar al Poder Judicial la administraci6n autonoma de dichos recursos; y (vi) continuaremos las medidas de mejoras remunerativas de los magistrados. (c) Facilitar el acceso a la iusticia a la ciudadania. v en particular a los sectores mas marginados social. econ6mica v geoUraficamente. A tal efecto: (i) continuaremos con la descentralizaci6n tanto jurisdiccional como administrativa; (ii) impulsaremos la reducci6n de los costos directos e indirectos de la justicia; (iii) fomentaremos y apoyaremos los mecanismos alternativos de resoluci6n de U ponflictos incluyendo el desarrollo de la justicia de paz y la justicia arbitral; y (iv) favorecemos la justicia consuetudinaria dentro de una concepcion unitaria y plural del  43 Derecho Peruano conforme a lo que dispone el articulo 149 de la Constituci6n del Estado. (d) Mejorar la eficiencia del servicio de iusticia en particular buscando la reducci6n de la demora v los costos de la justicia. A tal efecto: (i) implementaremos un programa de reorganizaci6n del despacho judicial incluyendo una mayor eficiencia funcional en el uso de recursos humanos y materiales; (ii) implementaremos un programa de mejora de incentivos, incluyendo incrementos remunerativos, para magistrados y otros funcionarios judiciales: y (iii) facilitaremos la ecuada implantaci6n del nuevo codigo procesal civil, mejoras edilicias, capacitaci6n focalizada y una reorganizacion del despacho judicial. (e) Mejorar el nivel de rendimiento profesional de los magistrados. A tal efecto: (i) fortaleceremos y apoyaremos a la Academia de la Magistratura en su doble rol de preparar aspirantes y capacitar a magistrados actuales; (ii) promoveremos la realizaci6n de reuniones plenarias a fin de uniformizar jurisprudencia; (iii) promoveremos la mejora de la ensenianza legal en el pais; (iv) facilitaremos el acceso de los magistrados a informacion legal incluyendo legislaci6n y jurisprudencia; e (v) implementaremos un programa de incentivos no econ6micos para magistrados que se destaquen en su labor (becas, publicaciones, premiaciones). (f) Fomentar v apoyar la participacin v el consenso para la reforma de la justicia con los maaistrados y la sociedad civil. A tal efecto: (i) profundizaremos los procesos de dialogo, consulta y colaboraci6n con magistrados, universidades, organizaciones no gubernamentales, etc. con objeto de tener una coalici6n de apoyo y promoci6n de la reforma; y (ii) fomentaremos y apoyaremos iniciativas del sector publico y privado tendientes a crear y fortalecer en nuestra ciudadania una verdadera cultura civica de respeto a la ley y capacidad de demanda de un servicio de justicia adecuado. 5. El Anexo I de esta carta contiene una matriz de lineamientos generales de reforma a corto, mediano y largo plazo y areas y acciones de reforma que busca implementar los objetivos mencionados. B. Proyecto de Inversi6n Banco Mundial (Proyecto BM) 6. Dentro de la vision y estrategia definida para la reforma judicial, el Estado Peruano ha solicitado el apoyo financiero y tecnico del Banco Mundial en relaci6n a un conjunto integral de actividades e inversiones prioritarias tendientes a mejorar la calidad, eficiencia, integridad, independencia y acceso del servicio de justicia con enfasis en las areas civil, fcomercial y laboral. Dichas actividades e inversiones resultan de un dialogo extenso y  44 profundo entre las autoridades del Estado Peruano y el Banco Mundial, teniendo en cuenta analisis y estudios sectoriales, consultas y opiniones a sectores interesados y afectados incluyendo los magistrados, personal auxiliar, academicos, litigantes, organizaciones no gubernamentales y usuarios en general. La Corte Suprema de Justicia del Poder Judicial apoya esta asistencia del Banco Mundial. El Anexo 2 a esta carta contiene un sumario de los objetivos y las actividades e inversiones del Proyecto BM. La calidad asi como la independencia, eficiencia y eficacia del servicio de justicia se fortalecera con el apovo financiero y tecnico brindado al Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, la Academia de la Magistratura y la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura. Primeramente, reconocemos la necesidad de un sistema de selecci6n y nombramiento, evaluaci6n, ratificaci6n y promoci6n de magistrados que sea independiente, meritorio. transparente y objetivo, evitando todo tipo de influencias politicas o de otra indole. A tal efecto, la Constituci6n ha dispuesto que el Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura tenga la responsabilidad de implementar tal sistema. El Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura reconoce que es la primera vez en la historia del Peru que se opta por alejar de las influencias y presiones politico partidarias de los procesos de selecci6n, nombramiento, ratificaci6n y remoci6n . El Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura se instala el lero. de marzo de 1995 despues de promulgarse su Ley Organica - ley 26397- . Hasta la fecha ha cubierto las vacantes de Fiscalias Supremas y de Vocalias y Fiscalias Superiores de todos los distritos judiciales del pais, quedando un remanente de plazas por haberse declarado desiertas. 8. El Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura con la experiencia obtenida en los concursos ya celebrados, ha formulado autocriticas. Reconoce como consecuencia de esas reflexiones, la necesidad de afinar criterios y perfeccionar las reglas y procedimientos de selecci6n y nombramiento. A tal efecto emprenderi, con asistencia del proyecto BM, un programa de desarrollo institucional que le permitira lograr excelencia y eficiencia tecnica en el cumplimiento de su modelo constitucional. La segunda funci6n del Consejo, la destituci6n de los magistrados (Jueces y Fiscales) se ha cumplido simultaneamente a la de seleccion y nombramiento. Se ha dispuesto la apertura de proceso a 48 magistrados en base a las solicitudes de destituci6n recibidas, 29 de ellos con resoluci6n de destituci6n y estando en pleno procesamiento los 19 restantes. El Consejo no ha iniciado el proceso de ratificaci6n, que es la tercera funci6n o atribucion que le concede la Constituci6n. Las razones son claras: (a) La situaci6n de provisionalidad y suplencias de los cargosjudiciales que alcanza a mas del 80%. No puede ratificarse al magistrado nombrado provisionalmente o suplente k)N  45 (c) Debe definirse previamente el sentido de la norma constitucional relativa a la frase "...cada siete afnos" (art. 154, inc. 2). 9. Reconocemos la profunda necesidad que tienen los magistrados peruanos de una formaci6n y capacitaci6n integral. A tal efecto, se establecio la Academia de la Magistratura que se encuentra en pleno funcionamiento a partir de 1996. La AM esta comprometida en una capacitaci6n integral del magistrado, no a una mera repetici6n de la ensefianza universitaria, involucrando primariamente los aspectos de actitudes y habilidades de los magistrados. Bajo el proyecto BM, la AM implementara programas anuales de capacitaci6n de jueces civiles, laborales y mixtos, en areas y temas prioritarios mayor impacto produzcan en la mejora de la calidad del servicio. La AM se / compromete a implementar dichos programas anuales a traves de metodos costo-efectivos (contrataci6n competitiva de servicios de terceros) que mejor aprovechen la capacidad profesional existente en los distritos seleccionados. 10. El Secretario Ejecutivo de la Comisi6n Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial deleg6 las atribuciones que le transferia la Ley 26623 a una Comisi6n de Gobierno y Reorganizacion para que conduzca la Academia de la Magistratura. Una funci6n de la Academia de la Magistratura es la de capacitar a los aspiraintes a magistrados, con la finalidad de disponer de un grupo humano tecnicamente calificado para ser posteriormente elegible por el CNM. Para lograr este objetivo de una manera transparente y rigurosa desde el punto de vista acaddmico. Ia Academia de la Magistratura va a realizar exAmenes de admisio6n para seleccionar los abogados que deseen postular a los cursos de formaci6n de aspirantes. El examen de admisi6n a los cursos de aspirantes sera calificado de manera an6nima y sus f resultados serin publicados. Una vez admitidos a la Academia de la Magistratura. los aspirantes asistirin a un programa de entrenamiento consistente en diferentes m6dulos. Su ,I, desempefio seri evaluado peri6dicamente durante el curso del programa de entreniamienito - m6dulo a m6dulo por la Academia de la Magistratura. El sistema de evaluacion en todas sus etapas serA an6nimo. Aquellos que resulten aprobados serin elegibles para postular a un concurso para un nombramiento judicial. Dicho concurso seri efectuado por el Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, quien hara una selecci6n transparente. independiente. meritoria y objetiva. 11. La Academia de la Magistratura tiene ademas la responsabilidad de hacer la evaluaci6n de idoneidad tecnico - profesional, juridica, de conocimiento de los magistrados en actual ejercicio. Esta evaluaci6n tiene por finalidad contribuir a determinar las necesidades de capacitaci6n. Los magistrados provisionales o suplentes que desaprueben la evaluaci6n podran ser separados por la Comisi6n Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial. En cambio. los magistrados titulares que desaprueben la primera prueba seguiran un curso academico complementario financiado por el Estado y estaian obligados a tomar una segunda prueba escrita por la Academia. Aquellos magistrados que resulten desaprobados en la segunda prueba podrin ser separados por la Comisi6n Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial. Toda prueba de evaluaci6n tendri caricter an6nimo y su calificaci6n y revisi6n s6lo podrx ser efectuada por la Academia de la Magistratura de acuerdo a criterios t6cnicos y transparentes. Las ersonas evaluadas en la segunda prueba podrin solicitar revisi6n de los resultados de la isma a la Academia.  46 12. Reconocemos que el magistrado, ademas de ser independiente y competente, debe guardar una conducta etica intachable. Para ello consideramos que es esencial realizar acciones concretas que esten orientadas a reducir las posibilidades de corrupci6n. En atencion a ello, el Poder Judicial ha reorganizado los juzgados bajo un nuevo modelo lo cual permite un mejor control del despacho judicial; se ha racionalizado y reubicado al personal auxiliar; y, ha apoyado la tarea de la OCMA con el fin de estimular y apoyar a los jueces integros y sancionar a aquellos que incurran en conductas contrarias a la etica. Concretamente en este uiltimo affo se ha descentralizado el control a las diversas Cortes Superiores en las que viene funcionando comisiones distritales de la OCMA. 13. Para mejorar la eficiencia del servicio de justicia, el Proyecto BM apoya el fortalecimiento y desconcentraci6n de la gesti6n organica - administrativa del Poder Judicial. En este sentido se llevaran a cabo acciones dirigidas a reforzar la capacidad gerencial y modemizar la gesti6n judicial. A nivel de los juzgados. el Proyecto BM apoya la implantaci6n, de un nuevo modelo de organizaci6n funcional comenzando en los distritos judiciales de Lima y Lambayeque. Con la implantaci6n de este modelo se espera resolver el problema de la morosidad judicial, mejorando la productividad judicial; a su vez este modelo generaui procesos judiciales mas transparentes. creando con ello mayores condiciones para el control de la corrupci6n. Por otro lado, el Proyecto BM contribuirA en ia sistematizaci6n, uniformizaci6n v mejora de la calidad de la jurisprudencia. especialmente en materia civil y laboral. La Comisi6n Ejecutiva ha iniciado, y continuara. un plan de mejora de los incentivos para los magistrados incluvendo un incremento en los ingresos, a traves de los bonos jurisdiccionales. 14. En relaci6n al acceso a la justicia, el Proyecto BM fortalecera instituciones existentes asi como instituciones nuevas que facilitan la resoluci6n de conflictos particularmente de los grupos mas marginados. Primeramente. se apoyari a los jueces de paz a traves de una capacitaci6n focalizada: asistencia tecnica para implementar el marco regulatorio de la justicia de paz; y, estudios y encuestas sobre el desempeibo de los jueces de paz. En segundo lugar, se apoyari a la Defensoria del Pueblo a traves de asistencia tecnica para el fortalecimiento institucional, asi como asistencia especializada para el medio ambiente y comunidades nativas. Asimismo contribuiri con las campanias de difusi6n a nivel nacional sobre las funciones de la Defensoria y al equipamiento informatico. Por ultimo, el Proyecto incluye un fondo destinado a financiar iniciativas del sector privado tendientes a promover mecanismos altemativos de resoluci6n de conflictos y desarrollar la capacidad de la sociedad civil para demandar y monitorear el desempeno judicial. C. Coordinaci6n. < 15. El proyecto BM tiene cuatro entes ejecutores: Poder Judicial, a traves de la omisi6n Ejecutiva, la Academia de la Magistratura, el Consejo Nacional de la tMagistratura y la Defensoria del Pueblo. Sin perjuicio de su propia autonomia y  47 responsabilidad de ejecuci6n, dichos entes mencionados convinieron en establecer una unidad coordinadora con el personal y funciones descritos en el manual operativo del Proyecto BM. Asimismo, cada uno de los entes ejecutores ha nombrado un representante a los fines del Proyecto BM y a efectos de sostener reuniones mensuales para intercambiar opiniones sobre la marcha del Proyecto BM. D. Metodologia Participativa. 16. Reconocemos que el exito y sostenibilidad de la reforma y el Proyecto BM dependen, no solamente del apoyo financiero y politico, sino del grado de participaci6n por parte de los magistrados particularmente y de la sociedad civil en general. Como consecuencia de ello, cada ente ejecutor ha involucrado a jueces y otras partes interesadas en el proceso de formulaci6n y diseflo de las actividades del Proyecto BM. Reconocemos ademas que dicha metodologia participativa debe perfeccionarse y profundizarse mucho mas. A tal efecto cada ente ejecutor se compromete a implementar sus actividades propias del Proyecto BM a traves de una metodologia de participaci6n activa. Lima, 22 de agosto de 1997. Victor Ra stilo Castillo R6ger Rodriguez Iturri Presidente Ca si6n Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura Jorge San5ti an ae Noriega Franci uiguren Praeli Defenr del Pueblo Di eneral mia de la Magistratura  48 Anexo 1 MATRIZ DE LINEAMIENTOS DE LA REFORMA A CORTO, MEDIANO Y LARGO PLAZO AREAS DE CORTO PLAZO MEDIANO PLAZO LARGO PLAZO REFORMA Educaci6n Legal y Fortalecimiento Contar con un Elevar la calidad de Capacitaci6n institucional de la sistema de las resoluciones Judicial. Academia de la capacitaci6n continua judiciales. Magistratura. para magistrados a nivel nacional. Capacitaci6n de Magistrados en areas criticas de la funci6n jurisdiccional y a nivel nacional. Administracion del Racionalizacion del Reforzamiento de la Desarrollar un Sistema. personal del Poder Gerencia General y sistema nacional de Judicial. de las oficinas administraci6n del administrativas de las Poder Judicial que Modemizar la diversas Cortes del sea eficiente organizaci6n pais. administrativa del ___________________ Poder Judicial. Gesti6n a nivel de Organizar el Consolidar a nivel Elevar los niveles de juzgado. Despacho Judicial nacional un nuevo productividad bajo el nuevo modelo de judicial a standares modelo Corporativo. organizaci6n del internacionales. Despacho Judicial. Informatizar los distritos judiciales. Recursos Racionalizaci6n del Generar nuevos Lograr que el Poder presupuesto del recursos para lograr Judicial cuente con Poder Judicial. el equilibrio los recursos financiero de las necesarios a fin de Mejorar el sistema de diversas instituciones mejorar la calidad de tasasjudiciales. de la Administraci6n la prestaci6n del de Justicia. servicio de justicia y disponer de incentivos econ6micos para los magistrados.  49 Acceso a la Justicia. Fortalecer y extender Alcanzar niveles Contar con una si es necesario a nivel aceptables de Administraci6n de nacional el numero rendimiento y acceso Justicia accesible a de dependencias de las dependencias los sectores sociales jurisdiccionales y nacionales de la mayoritarios. administrativas de la Administraci6n de Administraci6n de Justicia. Justicia. ra Judicial Ofrecer signos Desarrollar un Contar con visibles de mejora sistema de carrera Magistrados s6lidos del Poder Judicial judicial para buenos en hacer respetar su con la finalidad de profesionales del funci6n y el estado atraer a buenos derecho de derecho. abogados a la judicatura. Metodos Favorecer el Difundir el uso de los Elevar la cultura de Alternativos desarrollo de la mecanismos la conciliaci6n en la conciliaci6n en el alternativos de sociedad peruana. ambito de los soluci6n de procesos judiciales. conflictos. Sistemas de Modernizar y Mejorar la estadistica Avanzaren la Informaci6n. racionalizar los judicial. interconexi6n de la sistemas de informaci6n judicial. administraci6n de la Contar con informaci6n judicial. indicadores de productividad y calidad de la Administraci6n de Justicia. Infraestructura Remodelar los Saneamiento legal de Contar con locales locales judiciales en las propiedades del judiciales modemos los que viene Poder Judicial. que brinden operando el Poder condiciones de Judicial. seguridad y una atenci6n integral al usuario. Etica Judicial Fortalecimiento de Desarrollar campanas Reducir el nivel de la las funciones de publicas para la corrupci6n judicial control del Poder revalorizaci6n del Judicial y del servicio de justicia. Consejo Nacional de __________________ la Magistratura .  50 Anexo 2 PROYECTO "REFORMA JUDICIAL" Componentes Componente I Administracion de Justicia Subcomponente 1: Mejoramiento del Aparato Administrativo del Poder Judicial. *. Des ntralizaci6n Administrativa: (i) capacitacion para el personal administrativo en areas smo: planeamiento y administraci6n, procedimientos operativos, estadistica e , inforatica. computaci6n. etc.; (ii) estudio para revisar y perfeccionar el sistema de administraci6n descentralizado y desarrollo de manuales operativos; (iii) sistema de informaci6n gerencial para las Oficinas Generales de Administraci6n en areas de recursos humanos. finanzas y adquisiciones: y (iv) talleres para el personal administrativo de las Oficinas Generales de Administracion y cortes para discutir los cuellos de botella y planes de mejoramiento para la modernizacion administrativa. *. Administraci6nfinanciera: (i) estudios sobre formas altemativas de reforzar la autonomia econ6mica del Poder Judicial, incluyendo nuevas forrnas de generaci6n de recursos, costos de los servicios judiciales y mejorando los sistemas de tasas judiciales; (ii) elaboracion y ejecucion del programa presupuestario: y (iii) disefno e implementaci6n de un esquema de tasa preferencial para grupos de bajos ingresos. /. Imagen Institucional del Poder Judicial: (i) difusi6n de las reformas del Poder Judicial a traves de campafias putblicas; y (ii) estudios de evaluacion sobre las reformas administrativas llevadas a cabo. Subcomponente 2: Mejoramiento del desempefno de las cortes piloto. S.Remodelaci6n de la infiaestructzra: El proyecto financiaria la remodelacion de las instalaciones fisicas en los distritos seleccionados (edificios centrales) asi la inversion en infraestructura podria ir de la mano con los esfuerzos de modernizaci6n administrativa y judicial. El Poder Judicial ya ha desarrollado un concepto de Despacho modelo (o nueva organizaci6n del despacho), que toma en cuenta un proceso mejorado, tecnologia modema y consideraciones de seguridad. *. Juzgados civiles y laborales: (i) plenarios nacionales y regionales con jueces civiles y laborales; (ii) difusion del trabajo de los jueces e investigadores a traves de la publicaci6n de revistas e informes anuales, concursos de investigaci6n y conducci6n de study tours; y (iii) la ampliaci6n de las bibliotecas de las cortes en los distritos seleccionados. U. Procedimiento y organizacidn de la corte: (i) la ejecucion piloto de una nueva y simplificada organizaci6n de la corte, procedimientos de procesamiento de casos estandarizados,. Este ejercicio incluiria capacitaci6n de jueces y personal auxiliar de las cortes en administraci6n de casos y habilidades inforrnaticas, campanias publicas, evaluaci6n, asi como la automatizaci6n y remodelaci6n de la infraestructura de las cortes; (ii) talleres regionales para jueces a fin de evaluar el impacto y resultados de la aplicaci6n del nuevo c6digo procesal civil, profundizando el entendimiento de los procedimientos de las cortes y haciendo recomendaciones para futuras mejoras; y (iii) estudios de reducci6n e demoras (actualizaciones de base y anuales) en las instancias judiciales excepto los penales y difundiendo los resultados en talleres con jueces.  51 *. Sistema de Informaci6n Judicial y estadisticas: (i) diseflo del sistema automatizado de administraci6n del flujo de casos, ejecuci6n piloto de un sistema de informaci6n judicial integrado en Lambayeque y su evaluaci6n, y la consiguiente extensi6n del sistema a los otros distritos seleccionados como siguiente etapa; (ii) estudio de diagn6stico del sistema de estadistica judicial existente (incluyendo la identificaci6n de indicadores estadisticos claves) e implementaci6n de planes de mejora; (iii) desarrollo de la base de datos multiple (legislaci6n y casos); (iv) disefno y ejecuci6n de un moderno sistema de archivo en los distritos seleccionados; y (v) la automatizaci6n de las cortes a traves de la compra de equipo basico - PC's, impresoras, software basico, y otro equipo para los distritos seleccionados. C onente 2: Selecci6n, Evaluaci6n y Capacitaci6n Judicial Subcomponente 1: Selecci6n v Evaluaci6n Judicial: Apoyari al CNM a traves del: (i) desarrollo, actualizaci6n y perfeccionamiento de sus regulaciones, procedimientos y sistemas para la selecci6n, remoci6n y ratificaci6n de jueces y reforzamiento de su estructura organizativa. (ii) reforzamiento de su planeamiento estrategico y capacidad de administraci6n a traves de la ejecuci6n de estudios de diagn6stico, desarrollo de visiones organizativas y planes de acci6n, y asesoramiento de expertos; (iii) provisi6n del CNM con capacitaci6n en selecci6n y evaluaci6n judicial, administraci6n y habilidades informaticas; (iv) conducci6n de estudios sobre perfil del juez, perfil del personal del CNM, y estandares eticos en el Poder Judicial; y (v) provisi6n de apoyo informatico y logistico. incluyendo el desarrollo de base de datos en apoyo al sistema de selecci6n, remoci6n y ratificaci6n. Subcomponente 2: Capacitaci6n Judicial. Asistira a la AM en: (i) el diseflo y ejecuci6n de programas de capacitaci6n anuales para jueces designados por el CNM (evaluaci6n de necesidades, curriculum y diseflo de m6dulos. materiales de capacitaci6n. honorarios. capacitaci6n de capacitadores, capacitaci6n a distancia, y apoyo logistico); (ii) estudios de evaluaci6n de impacto y resultados de los programas de capacitaci6n: y (iii) reforzamiento institucional de la AM. Subcomponente 3: Sistema Disciplinario. Reforzamiento del sistema disciplinario de los Magistrados, unidad de control interno del Poder Judicial, a traves de: (i) la conducci6n de un estudio de diagn6stico de su organizaci6n y el apoyo a la ejecuci6n de las recomendaciones del estudio; (ii) el perfeccionamiento del sistema legal hacia un sistema de monitoreo y control; (iii) capacitaci6n del personal de la OCMA incluyendo evaluaci6n de necesidades, talleres y seminarios anuales de capacitaci6n; (iv) difusi6n de las actividades de la OCMA; y (v) apoyo informatico para las comisiones disciplinarias descentralizadas. Componente 3: Acceso a la Justicia Subcomponente 1: Apoyo al Sistema de Justicia de Paz. Disen~o y ejecuci6n de progranias de capacitaci6n: (i) m6dulos de capacitaci6n para capacitaci6n de capacitadores y criterios de selecci6n, provisi6n de capacitaci6n para  52 capacitadores en tecnicas de educaci6n para adultos y mediaci6n y conciliaci6n, (ii) materiales de capacitaci6n, (iii) programas de capacitaci6n para conciliaci6n en distritos seleccionados; y (iv) evaluaci6n de programas de capacitaci6n con la participaci6n de capacitadores, profesionales, universitarios, ONGs y la AM, etc. M. Evaluaci6n del desempeno de los Jueces de Paz: (i) estudios iniciales de base y se ,gumiento (antes y despues de la ejecuci6n de la capacitaci6n) en los distritos leccionados, cubriendo tipos de casos, tiempos de demora, forma de resoluci6n de conflictos, etc. y la difusi6n de los resultados de los estudios a traves de talleres; y (ii) encuestas a clientes - similarmente antes y despues de la ejecuci6n de la capacitaci6n. E. Andlisis de la legislacion 'v regulaci6n sobre Jueces de Paz: (i) la revisi6n de la legislaci6n existente y normas sobre Jueces de Paz estableciendo grupos de trabajo y haciendo propuestas para mejoramientos; y (ii) la difusi6n publica de las propuestas a traves de talleres para forjar consenso sobre los cambios legales y regulatorios. Subcomponente 2: Fondo de Acceso. Mejorar el acceso a la justicia a traves de la creaci6n de un fondo para financiar subproyectos elegibles que aspiren a: (i) la promoci6n de MARC's y (ii) el refuerzo de la capacidad de la sociedad civil por el analisis, demanda y monitoreo de la reforma y desempeno judicial. A fin de promover la participaci6n de la sociedad civil en el proceso de reforma, las propuestas serian preparadas por ONGs, asociaciones de abogados, escuelas de leyes y otros grupos privados y academicos. Los subproyectos ganadores serian evaluados hasta su terminaci6n /1t para evaluar su replicabilidad. EstA previsto que el Fondo de Acceso tendria una cobertura nacional para asegurar que un gran numero de organizaciones y grupos tengan la oportunidad de participar en el proceso de reforma. Subcomponente 3: Apoyo a la Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo. Apoyara el desarrollo institucional inicial de la DP en las areas de: (i) su estructura y funciones organizativas, normas y procedimientos. (ii) comunidades nativas, protecci6n del medio ambiente, y derechos ciudadanos en una economia de mercado. asi como la organizaci6n de plenos para promover la coordinaci6n entre el estado y la sociedad civil; (iii) campafilas publicas y difusi6n de las actividades de la defensoria, incluyendo la preparaci6n v distribucion de materiales en idioma nativo y talleres regionales; y (iv) otro apoyo logistico e Xnformatico para promover la descentralizaci6n de las oficinas de la DP.  KEY MONITORING INDICATORS (*) L Institutional Framework for Judicial Reform , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~....... ,''"'" '''"."'" '''' ''"t'''' "'........ ... ...............,,, Strengthen the institutional * Retain consultants to assist in * Establish an operational * Improve coordination among Start: framework for planning and planning, administration, and coordination mechanism to organs involved in judicial * March 1996 (PHRD): implementation of judicial coordination ofjudicial administer and monitor the reform. PPU estsablished and reform. reform. project and coordinate with * Generate consensus on reforn became operational. * Planning & evaluation the Bank and other organs strategy, disseminate the * June 1996 (PHRD): workshops for judicial reform involved. (Project strategy and lessons gained Judicial Reform to be supported under the Preparation Unit initiated from project implementation. workshop. project. activities in March 1996; the * Efficient administration and * Judicial Coordination * Logistic support. coordination mechanism timely execution of project Council created (June under the project must be activities. 1996) by law#26623 confirmed thr. OM.) * Periodic monitoring of aimed at inter-sectoral w * Implementation Plan, progress of project activities. policy coordination. Operational Manual (by * Final IP as condition for PPU). negotiations. * Semi-annual and annual * Draft OM as condition progress reports (by PCU). for negotiations. * Launch, mid-tern review, * Signing of statement of and completion evaluation policy & objectives of workshops (by PCU). the reform by all . Annual rinancial audits. implementing agencies as conditions for Board. Finish: December, 2001 (*) Those highlighted are key monitoring indicators.  II. Administration of Justice Component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~....... ...... ..... .... --. ... .. -.' - Establish efficient, modern, Start: and self-sustainable system * Workshops & training of * Annual diagnosis & skill * Improve mgt. efficiency of * General Managers & for judicial administration. administrative personnel (25 upgrading workshops. general administration adm. staff at all districts 1) Administrative districts nationwide). * Functioning integrated mgt. offices. selected thr. competitive modernization & * Consultants for refining the information system (budget, examinations and decentralization. administrative system. accounting, personnel etc.). appointed (April-May * Informatic to support general * Develop operational manuals 1996). and court administration. for the administrative . Program-based budget system. prepared (from 1997 2) Financial management * Consultants for design & * Develop program-based * More effective use of budget budget). implementation of mgt. budget. resources and increased * Integrated mgt. information system. . Adopt improved fee income from fee collection. information system to be n * Consultants for budget structure. * Increase economic autonomy installed (by March i planning & execution. /independence of PJ. 1998). * Consultants for alternative * Improved access to judicial * Operational manuals ways for strengthening service for low-income for the administrative economic autonomy of the PJ groups. system to be developed (e.g., new forms of resource (by June 1998). generation, costs of judicial * Opinion survey to be services, and revision of conducted and results judicial fee systems). to be disseminated (by * Consultants for design & December each year) implementation of a preferential fee scheme for lower-income groups. 3) Institutional image of the * Public campaign of judicial * Dissemination through TV * Increased public recognition Judiciary reform. and radio spots. of activities of the Judiciary. * Consultants for design & * Annual opinion surveys * Obtain feedback of reform Finish: implementation of clientVuser (litigants, lawyers, judges process from client & users of December 2001 surveys. etc.) the system.  Improve efficiency, equity, Start: and predictability of judicial * National & regional (*) * Annual national & regional * Improve uniformity and * Workshops organized performance. workshops with judges to workshops with judges. rationality of judicial for Lima judges on civil 1) Civil and labor judgements diagnose the uniformity of * Design & implement decisions. procedures (July 1996) -- (*) in selected districts. judgements & discuss innovative incentive schemes . Diffusion of judgement & labor judgement (Oct. improvement plans. for judges. criteria. 1996) -- PHRD grant. * Consultants for studies of * Publication of journals & * Increase sustainability of * Implementation Manual incentives schemes for better annual reports. reform based on better of new court judicial performance. * Improve district-level incentives and participation of organization at * Publication of work by judges library. judges. respective districts & academics; annual reports; prepared (Sept.-Oct. research competition. 1996). * Study tours & fellowships. * Implementation of new * Consultants for library needs court organization assessment; literature started in Lambayeque purchase. (Nov. 1996). 2) Court organization & * Training of judges & court * Implement new court * Improve speed and efficiency * The first phase result procedures personnel in modem court organization ("sistema in case management (through. of the Lambayeque -- (*) in selected districts administration & informatic corporativo"). statistical indicators as pilot to be evaluated skills etc. (*). * Evaluate application of new measured by congestion ratio (by March 1998). * Logistic & consultant support civil procedure code. & congetion index). a Implementation of new to dissemination, supervision, * Baseline study & annual court organization in evaluation, and subsequent updates of key judicial the other selected technical follow-up of new performance indicators. districts to be court organization (*). completed (by Dec. * Regional workshops with 1999) - including judges for application of new training, judicial civil procedure code (*). information, & * Consultants for quantitative & infrastructure qualitative indicators (*). remodeling. * Workshops & surveys with civil society to evaluate the progress in procedures & organization.(*).  3) Judicial information & statistics system * Consultants for design & * Develop automated system * Improve allocation of * Design of a model court - (*) in selected districts: implementation of judicial for improved case resources to courts, efficiency house completed (May Lima (inc. Cono Norte, information system (i.e., distribution among judges of case administration, and 1996). Callao), Arequipa, Cusco, caseflow management). and case tracking. access to information. * Remodeling is to be Piura, Lambayeque. * Consultants for diagnosis & * Develop automated system * Technologically modern implemented in parallel improvements for statistic for statistical reporting. administration and court to new court system. Annual statistical reports. room. organization * Consultants for design & * Develop modem archieve implementation (see the implementation of a modem system. timing above). archieve system * Data base completed. * Consultants for design & implementation of multiple Finish: data base. December 2001 4) Infrastructure remodeling * Informatic support.(*) * Remodel courthouses in * Detailed architetural studies. * Improve public access to Callo, Cono Norte, Arequipa, * Remodeling completed. courts, judicial security, and Cuzco, Lambayeque, and minimize inappropriate a' Piura (central buildings only) contact by judges with to accomodate new court litigants. organization..  IIL Judicial Selection, Evaluation and Training ~~~~~~~~...:-.-:-. . :. ,, :.::::. .... :.-.:.:. OBJECTIVES ...* NU.. OTP SOTCmEIPA STI.N Strengthen judicial selection * Consultants for diagnosis & * Develop/improve norms and * Increase competence, Start: and evaluation system managerial strengthening for process ofjudicial selection, legimacy, honesty, * Evaluation of norms & (Consejo Nacional de la CNM (i.e., judicial selection, ratification & removal. transparency, and processes of selection, Magistratura) ratification & removal). . Biannual updating of responsibility of selection, ratification & removal * Consultants for strategic strategic plans. ratification, & removal of judges to be planning. . Internal training & study processes (merit-based completed, and * Training of CNM members & tours of CNM staff. systems). improved structure of staff in selection/ratification, . Implement various studies. * Improve administrative CNM designed (by Dec. management, & informatic * Installation of data base. efficiency of CNM. 1998). skills. * Strengthen judicial * Data base on selection, * Consultants for studies on independence. ratification & removal corruption, judges' profile, of judges to be installed and CNM staff profile etc. (by Dec. 1999). s * Consultants for design and implementation of data base to support judicial selection, Finish: ratification & removal. December 2001 * Informatic and equipment support; literature purchase etc.  Strengthen judicial training * Training of judges on civil, * 10 training course in 1st * Improve quality of judicial Start: (Academia de la commercial, labor matters, & year, increasing to 20 per decision and judges' skills in * Training needs Magistratura) conciliation etc. in selected year (on average) from 2nd free market economy. assessment on Lima -(*) in selected districts. districts (*). year onward. * Improve investigation civil judges conducted * Consultants for training needs * Develop training module per capacity of AM. in May 1996 (PHRD assessment (*). speciality. grant). . Consultants for impact * Update training needs * Preparation of detailed evaluation of training assessment. first-year training plan program (*). * Conduct biannual impact as condition for * Consultants for designing evaluation studies. negotiations. training programs for * Develop curriculum of * First series of training aspiring judges. training programs for courses on civil, labor * Training & study tours for aspiring judges. & conciliation to be AM staff. * Publication of research conducted for Lima * Support to publications. activities. judges (by June 1998). * Impact evaluation L studies to be completed X by Dec. 199 & 2001). Finish: December 2001  Strengthen a disciplinary * Consultants for diagnosis of * Evaluate decentralization * Improve judicial ethics & Start: system of judges (Oficina de organization of OCMA and experience of OCMA. discipline. July 1997 Control de los Magistrados/ implementation of the study's * Skill upgrading of OCMA the Judiciary). recommendations. staff. * First diagnostic study * Workshops on corruption. * Improve legal framework for on OCMA * Consultants for training needs system for monitoring & organization to be assessment! training of control of judicial completed (by June OCMA staff. peformance. 1998). * Study tours * Annual reports of OCMA * Informatic support. activities. . Consultants for legistlative Finish: proposal for monitoring & December 2001 control mechanism. * Dissemination _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Lf  IV. Access to Justice Component OBJE.C YES NUtS OOPT UCmE/IPCSTMN ,,l ..........~........... .. ,.l-. ,l..S.,,,,,,-- ........ .-,,X: . .TSX,,.,,. . .-: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.-..,,... .,: - A- -...... ........ Improve the quality of * Initial workshop for diagnosis * Develop curriculum and * Improve competence of JP Start: judicial services of Jueces de and training needs of Jueces training module for trainers, and community authorities, . Access to Justice Paz (lay judges) and de Paz. JP and community including conciliation workshop organized in community authorities. * Consultants for preparation of authorities. techniques. June 1996 (PHRD () in selected districts. training materials (trainers * 50 trainers selected and . Improve access to justice. grant). and JP), selection criteria and trained. * Establish legal framework for * Basic Justice workshop methodology for trainers. * Training workshops per jurisdiction of JP and rural organized with IDB in . Training of trainers selected districts and native communities. Nov. 1996. * Training of JP & community implemented. * Initial workshop to be authorities. (*) * Feedback and evaluation of conducted (by Dec. * Consultants for evaluation of training program. 1998). training program. (*) * Analysis of user survey * First training of JP to * Consultants for baseline and results. be conducted (by Dec. o follow-up surveys on * Publication of legal norms 1999). performance of JP and user on jurisdiction of JP. * Evaluation workshop surveys (before and after on the above training training). (*) to be conducted (by . Workshops for dissemination Dec. 2000). of survey results. . Second training of JP to . Consultants for preparation of be conducted (by Dec. legistlaion on JP. 2001). * Workshops to discuss * Evaluation workshop on proposed legislative the above training to be modifications. conducted (by Dec. 2001). Finish: December 2001  Increase access to alternative * Consultants for elaboration of * Operational manuals for * Faciliate access to ADR * Draft operational means of dispute resolution contract forms. Access Fund, allocation of outside formal system. manual as condition for and civil society * Public campaign of Special resources for each program, * Promote civil society negotiations. participation in judicial Fund. TOR for Fund and technical participation in judicial * Adoption of final reform. * Establish technical committee. reform process. operational manual, and 1) Creation of a demand- conunittee. * Evaluate & approve demand- appointment of driven Access Fund. * Implement Accessl Fund in driven projects. technical committee as the areas of: condition for (i) ADR; (ii) innovative effectiveness. research & monitoring of * Access Fund to become reform process. fully operational (by Jan. 1998). Fund operation : July 1998 - 2001 Strengthen the newly created * Consultants on institutional . Improve technical capacity * Develop modem & efficient Start: July 1997 Public Defender's Office development (DP's of DP & operational DP's administrative structure (ombudsman). competency, procedures etc.) decentralization. and functions. * First biannual strategic * Annual strategic planning * Action plans to improve * Establish collaborative planning workshop to be a' workshops. DP's functions and relationship with civil society organized (by * Workshops: native procedures. & public institutions. Dec.1997). communities, environmental * Diagnosis of protection of * Increased public recognition * First series of topical issues, market economy. environment, citizen rights of DP activities. workshops to be * Public campaign (production for native communities organized (by June of materials in Spanish, (selva and sierra), consumer 1998). native languages, regional rights in market economy. * Public campaign to be workshops) * Materials translated in carried out (by June * Consultants for evaluation & Spanish and native 1998). opinion surveys. languates. Materials * Information system to . DP staff training (including distributed. be installed at selected study tours). * Information system installed districts (by June Informatic support: PCs, at central and selected 1998). software, printers etc. districts. * Opinion surveys on evaluation of DP services be conducted (by Dec. 1998 & 2000). Finish: December 2001  62 Annex 3 Judicial Performance Indicators The project is expected to produce more efficient and effective results and improve the quality of services, particularly in the first instance courts. As described in paras. 3.14-3.15 of the main text, the judicial perfornance will be monitored through performance indicators to assess progress in judicial productivity and decongestion quality ofjudicial decisions, improvements in overall administration of the system, improvements in restoring judicial tenure and increased access to justice. Performance Indicatoars bv Component Component I: Judicial Administration I-(1) Administrative Modernization (a) Ratios of self-generating income relative to the budget assigned by the Treasury as measured annually. (b) Quantity and quality of support (legal, administrative, and technical) to the courts by the General Administrative Office and District Administrative Office, as measured by: (i) judge's opinions as reflected in annual anonymous surveys; and (ii) delay reduction of key administrative services. I-(2) Pilot Performance Improvement Program in the Selected Districts (a) Evaluation of court performance indicators for courts in the selected districts: (i) before and after the introduction of automated case tracking systems and (ii) changes onward, as measured in annual surveys in accordance with a methodology satisfactory to the Bank (see below for "supplementary note on court performance indicators"). (b) Percentage ofjudges by target group in the selected districts having attended a regional or national meeting of peers within the past twelve months. (c) Average quality of judicial performance as determined by selected survey groups on the basis of (i) legal knowledge; (ii) analytic technique; (iii) judicial writing; and (iv) other criteria as determined by the Bank and the Judiciary (for mid-term and final reviews). Component II Judicial Selection. Evaluation and Training (a) Success of AM training courses in effectively delivering knowledge and improving skdlls and aptitudes as nmeasured by the evaluation methodology to be developed under the Project (for mid-tern and final reviews).  63 (b) Improvement in ratio of tenured magistrates to provisional magistrates. Component HI: Access to Justice (a) Quality of support to the general public and users by the DP's office, as measured by biamual opinion surveys. (b) Success of training courses for Jueces de Paz in conciliation techniques, as measured by the evaluation methodology to be developed under the project (for mid-term and final reviews).  64 <Supplementary Notes on Court Performance Indicators> Indicators for Congestion (1) Congestion ratio (TC) is defined as the number of cases disposed (T) as a proportion of the number of cases filed (I) during a certain period of time. In the project, the disposition per year of the courts in the selected districts will be calculated as a percentage of the number of filing per year. This ratio will allow monitoring of whether judges are able to handle the volume of work or backlogs are developing. TC=T/I Experience suggests that if the congestion ratio is 1 or above, the volume of cases disposed in a particular courtroom is either equal or even exceed the number of filings. If the congestion ratio is less than 1, the caseload is higher than the capacity of a courtroom (or judges) for handling the volume of work. As Table shows, the volume of case disposed of as a proportion of filed cases is lower than one in most of the districts in Peru. (2) Congestion index (IC) is defined as the number of pending cases at the end of a particular year (CT-T) as a proportion of the number of cases brought to a courtroom in this year plus unresolved cases (or "stock") from the previous year (CT). IC = (CT-T) / CT The congestion index below 20% implies that a particular courtroom is roughly capable of satisfying the caseload imposed by the system. On the other hand, if the congestion index is above 20%, it suggests that the cumulative caseload is too heavy for a courtroom to handle the work. (3) Productivity index: Productivity can be measured as the volume of different types of cases disposed per courtroom (or one judge) or per sala (3 superior judges) in a certain period of time. Although this is an indicator for production (not productivity) in a strict sense, it roughly explains the volume of production per unit ofjudges. Therefore, by comparing the volume of cases in a year to that in the previous year, it is possible to measure annual productivity increase of a particular courtroom. In order to calculate the above indicators, the Statistics Office of the Judiciary will annually prepare the following formats for civil and labor courts as well as juzgados de paz letrados in the selected districts: Lima (including Callao and Cono Norte), Arequipa, Cuzco, Piura, and Lambayeque. Similar information will be prepared for superior courts in the selected districts and the Supreme Court. (4) Efficiency index: (a) Number of sentences and judgments (sentencias) and interlocutory appeal decisions (autos interlocutorios) divided by the number of court employees. (b) Number of final sentences and judgments divided by the number of court employees.  65 (5) Processing time for civil and special cases: (a) For cases which have not concluded, average time between case filing (ingreso del expediente) and the final judgment divided by the maximum time established by law. (b) For cases which have not concluded, average time between case filing and the current date (at which the case is reviewed by the investigator), divided by the maximum time established by law for case filing to judgment. Example: Annual Statistics of Congestion Juzgados: Civil Period: .. :.- -' . - ' . ' . ' -'-. d ':. .-. . .......... .. .,, . ... . Pe* --:-:--E: ::-:--MO - ler. J. Civil ler. J. Civil 2o. J. Civil Court: Superior Court of Liaa Period:__ ___ '''"''"""'"''"'"'... ..... ............ ,. ler__J Civil _ __ Salailra. _ _ _ _ _ _ Sala2a. J. Sala 3a. _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ T............... Total  66 Table Caseload and Indicators for Congestion at Selected Districts (1995) ~~~~~~~~. . . . . . . . . . ...................... ........ . .. . .. . .. .......... ... ..... .. . ........... .. . . ... . .. . Stcck ~.. Ingresada eula tek Idc e Tsd ...... ...~~~~~~~~.........., ., . .... ... ................... ... .......... , , .......... ......... )e y ...._ = =) . -- . _ ..g .. Arequipa 2o Inst 3,808 10,140 7,221 7,866 48.2% 0.71 ler Inst 8,262 19,517 21,547 9,852 22.40/ 1.10 JPL 6,072 13,081 9,643 7,443 49.7/o 0.74 CaUao 2o Inst 3,173 6,707 7,387 804 25.20/ 1.10 ler Inst 10,822 12,171 14,144 7,533 38.5% 1.16 JPL 5,711 13,158 8,291 11,573 56.1% 0.63 Cono Norte 2o Inst 1,007 2,351 1,146 1,277 65.90/ 0.49 ler Inst 11,293 12,685 7,776 10,321 67.6% 0.61 JPL 6,166 22,744 11,706 21,628 59.5% 0.51 Cuzco 2o Inst 7,298 5,911 6,971 (433) 47.20/ 1.18 ler InsLt 13,438 13,931 12,357 12,639 54.90/o 0.89 JPL 6,145 15,718 11,048 6,074 49.5% 0.70 Lambayeque 2o Inst 3,046 9,772 8,287 12,831 35.3% 0.85 ler Inst 11,804 17,292 16,682 90,751 42.7% 0.96 JPL 2,003 17,001 12,230 38,282 35.6% 0.72 Lima 2o hist 14,417 34,082 33,093 12,831 31.8% 0.97 ler Inst 267,152 115,282 100,969 90,751 73.6% 0.88 JPL 43,800 91,381 67,391 38,282 50.1/ 0.74 Piura 2o Inst 786 9,307 6,668 4,669 33.9% 0.72 ler Inst. 6,860 20,010 17,030 9,923 36.6% 0.85 JPL 1,936 12,847 9,272 4,589 37.3% 0.72 AI1i5tz-t 2ons 55,57J 1219 1111 5623 38 0.86 E~~~~~~~~~~~~3.V7::: i12 O' fi;2... ..... JPL 101,415 3~~03,798 200958 158,970 04/06 ....-- - .-, , ,,,_ ...Y.- .. _._.= Source: the Judiciary, Office of Statistics, and INVERTEC '