Guinea - National Seeds Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 15991 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA NATIONAL SEEDS PROJECT (Credit 1864 - GUI) July 26, 1996 Agriculture Western Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Guinean Franc (GF) US$1.00 = 160 GF (at appraisal, June 1987) US$1.00 = 991 GF (at closing, June 30, 1996) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ERR Economic Rate of Return FAO/CP Food and Agricultural Organization/Cooperative Programme ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IRAG Institut de recherche agrononmique de Guinee (Agricultural Research Institute) KG Kilogram MAEF Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Forestry MDR Ministere du Developpement Rural (Ministry of Rural Development) NSC National Seed Committee NSP National Seeds Project PPF Project Preparation Facility PNVA National Agricultural Extension Service SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Special Drawing Rights SNPRV Service National de Promotion Rurale et de Vulgarisation (National Agricultural Development and Extension Service) SPC Seed Processing Center TA Technical Assistance UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA NATIONAL SEEDS PROJECT (Credit 1864-GUI) Table of Contents Preface .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evaluation Summary ........................................... ii PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ..........................................I A. Background ............................................ 1 B. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives ...........................................1I C. Achievement of Objectives ............................................3 D. Major Factors Affecting the Project .......5....................................5 E. Project Sustainability ...........................................5 F. Bank Performance ...........................................6 G. Borrower Performance ............................................7 H. Assessment of Outcome ............................................8 1. Future Operation ............................................8 J. Key Lessons Learned ...........................................9 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES........................................................................................................... Table 1: Summary of Assessments ..10 Table 2: Related Bank Credits in Guinea ..II Table 3: Project Timetable ..12 Table 4: Credit and Grant Disbursement ..12 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ..12 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation ..12 Table 7: Studies Included in Project ..13 Table 8A: Project Costs ..................... 13 Table 8B: Project Financing ..................... 13 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits ..14 A. Direct Benefits .14 B. Financial and Economic Impact .14 Table 10: Status of Legal Convenants ..14 Table I 1: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements . .17 Table 12: Bank Resources - Staff Inputs .................... 17 Table 13: Bank Resources - Missions ..18 APPENDICES A: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR ............................... 19 B: MAP IBRD - 20468 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA NATIONAL SEEDS PROJECT (Credit 1864 GUI) Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the National Seeds Project for which the IDA Credit 1864-GUI in the amount of SDR 7.1 million (US$9.0 million equivalent) was approved on December 15, 1987 and became effective on June 29, 1988. The initial closing date of June 30, 1994 was extended by one year to June 30, 1995. After lengthy, unsuccessful attempts to resolve questions concerning late submission of disbursement applications, an undisbursed balance of US$ 493,035.75 was canceled. There was no cofinancing for the Project. The ICR was prepared by Messrs. Mathurin Gbetibouo (AFTA3), Chandra Pattanayak (formerly AF5AE), with contributions from Joseph Toledano, Agricultural Specialist in recent mission in Guinea. It was reviewed by Messrs. Randolph L. P. Harris (Division Chief, formerly AF5AE) and Emmerich M. Schebeck (Project Adviser, formerly AF5). Preparation of the ICR began during the Bank's final supervision/completion mission, July 3-16, 1995, during which many Project beneficiaries and private and public participants were consulted. The ICR was completed after the mission of June 10- 14, 1996 and incorporated the comments of the Government of Guinea and material in the Project files. Staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Forestry participated fully in these missions and contributed to the ICR preparation by providing comments on the draft ICR. The Borrower prepared its own evaluation of Project implementation and outcome, which appears unedited as Appendix A to the ICR.   ii IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA NATIONAL SEEDS PROJECT (Cr. 1864-GUI) Evaluation Summary Credit Amount SDR 7.1 million (US$ 9.0 million equivalent) Beneficiary Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Forestry Credit Number Cr. 1864-GUI Date effective June 29, 1988 Date closed June 30, 1996 Introduction 1. The International Development Association (IDA) has provided substantial support to Guinea's agricultural sector since the 1980s with credits totaling nearly US$200 million. Initially this support was for projects that directly supported productive subsectors, later for integrated rural development projects, and finally, for projects to strengthen national public services that serve the agricultural sector. The design of the National Seeds Project (NSP) was based on the experience gained under the Gueckedou Agricultural Development Project, an integrated regional development project that emphasized rice production, and was expected to fill the void of the lack of a national system in existing projects, help coordinate donors' efforts, and ensure the supply of an essential input for agricultural extension messages. Project Objectives 2. The main objectives of the NSP were to: (a) supply the financing, assistance, and organization needed to establish a reliable national seed production system which could be privatized; and (b) increase agricultural productivity through the production and use of improved seeds. Following the mid-term review, these objectives were further elaborated and the following were added: the pursuit of profitability for the Seed Production Centers (SPCs), so they would be more likely to attract private operators, reduction of seed production costs, diversification of the SPCs seed-processing activities, and identification of suitable candidates to manage the SPCs. 3. Project objectives were consistent with the Borrower's overall sectoral policy, as expressed in the country's interim national recovery plan of 1987, but they were overly ambitious and unrealistic, given the general technical level of the rural population and the expectation of complete privatization of the seed industry in four years, in a country that was emerging from nearly three decades of post-colonial socialism. The objectives proved to be premature for two reasons. First, the agricultural services that were supposed to contribute to the production of foundation seeds (through the Institut de Recherche Agronomique de Guinee-- IRAG) and to increased demand for improved seeds (through what is now the National  iii Agricultural Extension Service--Service National de Promotion et de Vulgarisation--SNPRV) were not yet well-structured or functioning efficiently. Second, it was unrealistic to hope for complete privatization of the seed industry within a four-year project implementation period, in a country that had until recently been through three decades of centralized economic planning. Implementation Experience and Results 4. The Project failed to achieve its main objectives and sustainability of Project activities under current conditions is unlikely. Seed production costs were not reduced, no potential private investors were found to operate the SPCs, and the SPCs are not likely to become profitable or be privatized anytime soon. If the "mini-kit" experiment, a program to distribute complete, self-contained packages of seeds and essential complementary inputs for farmers, planned in the follow-on IDA-assisted National Agricultural Services Project is successful, then a greater distribution of improved seeds will have been accomplished at the farm level and the prospects for sustainability of NSP's limited achievements could improve. 5. Actual project costs remained within the appraisal estimates. The technical assistance (TA) cost category had an overrun because of the transitional management contracts entered into after the mid-term review. 6. A major reason for the failure of the NSP to achieve its objectives was that IDA was deficient in designing a project suited to the physical and institutional conditions in Guinea. The lack of managerial experience in the implementing agency and the irregularity or absence of counterpart funding compounded implementation problems and caused serious delays. 7. IDA's performance was unsatisfactory, except for project supervision. The project identification, preparation, and appraisal failed to assess accurately the risks associated with NSP's institutional environment. 8. Project results were unsatisfactory. An ex-post rate of return was not calculated as data were deemed unreliable, and seed production and marketing figures were so far below appraisal estimates (less than one-tenth) that a calculation was considered superfluous. 9. The conditions that led to the preparation and implementation of the NSP still exist in Guinea. NSP can point to some limited accomplishments: building the seed-processing infrastructure and training of local staff and seed growers/farmers. Continuation of NSP activities under the upcoming National Agricultural Services Project could take place in the context of its "mini-kit" program (para. 4). However, even if this program could resolve the short-term problems, it would not constitute a viable long-term policy. Discussions are still ongoing with the Guinean authorities about the proper balance between public and private interventions in seed development, processing, and marketing. The most important lessons learned from implementation of the NSP are: (i) any new large-scale activity should be preceded by and tested in a pilot operation; (ii) agricultural support services interventions should be sequenced in a logical manner; in the NSP, production and marketing activities should have been  iv undertaken only after an apparent increase in the demand for improved seeds, and in the use of complementary farm inputs; (iii) private operators should be involved from the outset in a project aimed at developing the private sector; and (iv) Borrower commitment to the project is essential for successful implementation and achievement of project objectives. In the NSP, success was compromised by Government's failure to replace NSP's weak management and to provide counterpart funds in a timely manner.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA NATIONAL SEEDS PROJECT (Cr. 1864-GUI) PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Background 1. Since the early 1980s, IDA has supported Guinea's agricultural sector through financing for subsectors involved in strategic food security for the Rice Development Project (Cr. 952-GUI approved in 1980) and the Livestock Development Project (Cr. 1063-GUI approved in 1981). In the mid-1980s, when the sectoral assistance strategy shifted to integrated regional development projects, such as the Gu6ck6dou Agricultural Project (Cr. 1635-GUI approved in 1986), support for specific subsectors continued since rice production was of strategic importance. IDA assistance strategy after the mid-1980s changed in favor of strengthening of national services that support the agricultural sector: IDA credits for the First Agricultural Services Project (Cr. 1636-GUI approved in 1986), the Livestock Services Restructuring Project (Cr. 1725-GUI, approved in 1987), and the National Agricultural Research and Extension Project (Cr. 1955-GUI approved in 1989). Table 2 lists the projects supported by IDA in the agricultural sector and for Guinea's economic recovery since 1980 and summarizes their objectives. 2. Cumulative IDA assistance for Guinea's agricultural sector since 1980 totals nearly US$200 million. Support for seed development grew out of the Gu6ckedou Agricultural Project which had heightened farmers' awareness of the benefits of using improved seeds and IDA's 1984 agricultural sectoral study. The National Seeds Project (NSP) was spurred especially by a 1985 survey indicating farmers' willingness to buy improved seeds. IDA's participation in NSP was expected to fill the void in existing projects to develop a national system and to help coordinate donors' efforts and ensure an essential input for agricultural extension messages. B. Statement/Evaluation of Project Objectives 3. The NSP's main goals were to: (a) provide the financing, assistance, and organization necessary to establish a reliable system of seed production that could be privatized, and (b) increase agricultural productivity through the production of improved seed. NSP was to support identification of suitable rice, maize, and groundnuts varieties and establish a seed production system, national in scope. The Project included the following five components: (i) Foundation Seed Production: selected research stations to identify suitable local and imported varieties and produce foundation seed; (ii) Improved Seed Production: six Seed Production Centers (SPCs) were to be established in different ecological zones of the country to condition and store improved seeds and ensure coordination of contract outgrowers production at the regional level; (iii) Quality Control: seed quality was to be controlled at the SPC level and in a central quality-control laboratory and at the farm level by monitoring field results and acceptability; (iv) Training: local staff of all services involved in the NSP were to be trained abroad and on site; and (v) Project Administration: a  2 Management unit and a consultative body were to administer the NSP and coordinate seed production at the national level. Technical assistance (TA) was to provided to the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) and consultants were to advise on quality control, selection procedures, and processing equipment, and a revolving fund was to be established for purchasing seed abroad as well as locally. 4. Project objectives were consistent with the Borrower's overall sectoral policy, as expressed in the country's interim national recovery plan of 1987. But they were overly ambitious and unrealistic, given the general technical level of the rural population and the expectation of complete privatization of the seed industry in four years in a country that was emerging out of nearly three decades of post- colonial socialism. 5. While the objective of creating a reliable national seed production system was commendable and sound, the establishment of high-capacity SPCs and the plan to privatize seed production, processing, and marketing was premature, since farmers were not ready to apply the full range of improved agricultural technologies essential to reaping the full benefits of improved seeds. Farmers' needs would have been better served by several small, mobile processing units that could have improved seed quality while educating farmers about the role of processed seeds in increasing crop yields when used in conjunction with improved management practices and other farm inputs. 6. The objective of privatizing the SPCs was unrealistic. The notion of seeds as a commercial commodity was virtually unknown among the farmers. In addition, the farmers' rate of input application, such as organic and/or inorganic fertilizers, was so low that it was difficult to demonstrate the higher yield potential of processed seeds. As a result, there was no scope for ensuring profits from seed sales. Because extension efforts were weak, the market for processed seeds of improved varieties was minuscule. Since farmers had their own seed stocks to use for several years, the expected demand for improved new seeds did not materialize. 7. The objective of increased crop productivity was also unrealistic and technically unsound in light of the low level of production technology on farms, inadequate input supply, and lack of credit. Under these conditions, increasing productivity by means of a single factor or tactic -- improved seed production and supply was unsustainable. 8. After the NSP mid-term review, the initial objectives were augmented with the addition of the following: pursuit of profitability for the SPCs so they would be more likely to attract private operators once project implementation was over; reduction of production costs; and identification of suitable candidates to take over management of the SPCs. Managers of the SPCs were also assigned the task of diversifying seed-processing activities. 9. Although the Borrower signed two-year transitional SPC management contracts with foreign firms, it was not fully committed to the privatization and diversification objectives that emerged from the mid-term review. Moreover, the Project Support Unit (PSU) did not have the means to monitor the implementation of the assigned objectives, which remained problematic in any case, since the management contracts did not include any performance guarantees, nor did they provide for any sanctions for non-performance on the part of new managers of the SPCs. C. Achievement of Objectives 10. Overall the achievement of NSP objectives was negligible. The management system in the PSU was not conducive to privatization of seed production. As part of the Ministry of Agriculture, obliged to work within the constraints of Government and IDA financial/procurement rules, the PSU had difficulty in operating as a private enterprise and in managing the NSP as a private undertaking. The PSU was  3 unable to supervise the activities of the SPCs as regularly as was necessary, since they were geographically dispersed. As a result, PSU staff had trouble carrying out their mandate. 11. The Project made substantial headway in building the seed-processing infrastructure and in increasing the capacity of local staff, but progress in privatization of seed production, processing, and marketing was negligible. Three SPCs, located at Koba, Kilissi, and Bordo became operational in 1991, two years later than planned. The staff and the seed growers/farmers were trained. Foundation seeds of several varieties of rice, maize, and groundnuts were purchased from the research institution, IRAG, multiplied on the farms of contract growers, and the resulting seeds were processed and marketed by the SPCs. Rice seed production predominated, followed by maize and groundnuts. By 1992, each SPC was processing and marketing just under 40 tons of seeds a year, compared with an annual capacity of about 1,000 tons. The PSU overhead expenses were high, as also was the cost of seed production and processing, at about 3,500 Guinean Francs (GF) per kilogram of seed versus the sale price of 250-350 GF. Thus the SPCs were unprofitable and could not meet the requirement of privatization within the time span specified in the Project agreement. 12. At the mid-term review, IDA proposed that the NSP be restructured because the SPCs were inefficient and unprofitable. Profitability of the SPCs was a prerequisite for privatization. Despite some reservations on the part of the Borrower, management of the SPCs was transferred to three foreign private firms for a two-year transition period with several clearly defined objectives to: (a) reduce the cost of seed production; (b) develop a seed market and diversify allied activities to improve the SPCs' annual turnover; (c) train SPC staff; (d) locate, by the end of the first year, a suitable private enterprise to take over management of the SPCs; (e) and study the options for transferring the SPCs to the private sector. 13. Most of these objectives were not realized. In retrospect, it was imprudent to appoint the foreign firms without enforceable conditions and guarantees in their terms of agreement. By Guinean standards, the contracts provided for very high salaries to the expatriate financial managers, as well as flexibility in financial management, but with no reciprocal guarantees to achieve the objectives or penalty clauses for not achieving them. Pressure to privatize the SPCs within the short period remaining before the project's closing date, and the lack of initial private interest in the SPCs, pushed IDA into making the contracts overly attractive. 14. Guinea is still far from achieving a reliable and sustainable system for producing and distributing improved seeds. The objective of increasing agricultural productivity was onlypartially achieved. Crop yields did increase, but the increase was geographically limited since there was little or no distribution of improved seeds to farmers beyond the immediate vicinity of the SPCs and the seed-producing villages. Furthermore, the true potential of improved seeds could not be exploited because there was little or no application of supplementary inputs. 15. The physical objectives of seed production and marketing, as well the institutional development objectives were not met. The actual production of improved rice seed during the 1988-94 period was around 600 tons, compared with the appraisal estimate of 5,300 tons. Marketing figures were even more disappointing; in 1992, each SPC managed to sell no more than 40 tons, whereas the SPCs have a processing capacity of 1,000 tons. Table 5 compares production data for rice, maize, and groundnut seeds for the 1988-94 period with Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) estimates. As for institutional development, a National Seed Commission was created (this was a condition of effectiveness), but it did not become operational. 16. The project can point to some limited accomplishments. During project preparation, once the local varieties of rice, maize, and groundnuts had been identified, inventoried, and collected, their  4 adaptability was tested to identify the best performers for massive distribution to farmers. Of the 41 rice varieties inventoried, 10 were introduced; of the 25 varieties of maize, 5 were introduced; of the 17 varieties of groundnut, 7 were introduced; and of the 14 varieties of manioc, 3 were introduced. During project implementation, training was provided to the technical outreach staff, and the beginnings of the "professionalization" of farmers was evidenced by their organization into groups and seed-producing villages now evolving into agricultural cooperatives that are increasingly interested, not only in production, but also in seed collection and marketing. Thus, the embryonic stirrings of a market for improved seeds was observed. 17. The ex ante economic rate of return (ERR) at appraisal was 32.4%. This figure was based on hypotheses about seed production that turned out to be overly optimistic. For example, it was projected that by the end of project years 4, 5, and 6, SPCs' production of improved seed by the SPCs would total 630 tons, 1,500 tons, and 3,000 tons, respectively, whereas the amounts actually produced were only 160 tons, 184 tons, and 250 tons. The expost ERR was not calculated because the data were not reliable, but it would have indeed been very low. Moreover, to the extent that activities started during the NSP will be continued under the upcoming National Agricultural Services Project, it would be difficult to distinguish between the impacts of the NSP and the upcoming project. 18. After the mid-term review and during the two-year management transition, the quantity of seeds processed and marketed increased, but the defined objectives were not achieved despite the fact that the firms had managerial autonomy and adequate financial support. The firms were unable to: (i) reduce the SPCs' production costs measurably and increase their turnover; (ii) train staff adequately; (iii) identify local private entities to take over the SPCs; and (iv) spell out a program to transfer management to the private sector. 19. The SPCs did a commendable job of maintaining seed quality standards. Much of the seed was marketed through development projects financed by bilateral donor agencies and funds from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Even so, all the processed seeds, whether marketed directly or through the aid agencies, were grown by smallholders who were satisfied with their quality. While the development of a national seed regulatory policy and the establishment of a central seed certification laboratory were not realized as planned in the SAR, some progress was made on regulatory policy with the support from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Funds originally earmarked for the construction of the laboratory were diverted to finance the two-year SPC management transition, and IDA recommended that the Government finance the laboratory from its own resources. D. Major Factors Affecting the Project Factors Subject to Government Control 20. Delays in the Government concluding construction contracts, a year after the effective Project start-up date, and in mobilizing counterpart funds led to lags in Project implementation. The planned National Seed Commission, in which the regional committees were to play an important role in helping develop seed policy, never became operational. The lack of a time interval between the creation of IRAG, which should have occurred well ahead of starting the seed program and the NSP, gave the research services not enough time to supply the SPCs with foundation seeds. Several implementation problems can be attributed to the PSU. It failed to defend its own interests; for example, two technical assistants in key positions (agronomy and administrative/financial management) were assigned, over the Director's objections, to help with two other projects, even though their entire salaries were paid by the  5 NSP. The PSU was too preoccupied with creation of the physical facilities of the central seed certification (quality control) laboratory, at the expense of important and substantive matters, such as legislation and a seed-certification system. In marketing and developing liaison with other agricultural services and projects, PSU was unable to devise a successful marketing strategy. Factors not Subject to Government Control 21. IDA failed to take full account of preconditions essential for a successful project. Guinea was just emerging from a political and economic system in which the State was the main actor in decisionmaking, even with respect to production activities; it intervened regularly through a force- account system. One of NSP's innovations was the creation of a network of contract seed growers, which was bound to take time to mature into a successful activity in a country in which civic affairs had been neglected. At appraisal, the Bank estimated the local contribution to the Project's financing plan at US$2.0 million, or 25% of the total cost. This relatively high level of contribution proved to be a recurring constraint during Project implementation that caused significant delays. Farmers' weak purchasing power limited their access to inputs. In addition, the delays caused by local contractors not completing the construction of seed storage facilities as planned, and unstable weather conditions in Koba in 1989, slowed project start-up and led to the failure in attaining production goals. E. Project Sustainability 22. Under current conditions, NSP's achievements are not likely to be sustained. Aside from paying the civil servants employed by the SPCs, Government commitment to the continuation of Project activities has not yet manifested itself in any concrete fashion (e.g., taking over the operating costs of the SPCs). The SPC at Koba had to be taken over by the second Guinea Maritime Development Project under European Union financing, and the one at Kankan was able to obtain support through another externally funded project. 23. The sustainability of the seed system was compromised because the outreach to seed growers, who do a good job and who constitute an important link in the sustainability of seed production, was not carried out under the national extension services. This outreach, from sowing to harvest, was done by PSU staff, who were too few in relation to the assigned objectives; the outreach should instead have been carried out, or at least have been supported, by the national rural and extension promotion service (SNPRV), which has better geographic coverage and is a more established entity. In addition, the production of improved seeds requires the application of fertilizers and disease and pest-control chemicals, for which no adequate distribution network exists. Finally, the incentives for contract seed growers to continue producing improved seeds for the SPCs may have been compromised by the failure to pay them under the last annual seed-purchase contracts. Due to some administrative confusion on the Guinean side, these were arranged with the SPCs after the IDA Credit disbursement deadline had passed; IDA's strict adherence to procedures did not allow the problem to be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the seed growers. A resolution is now impossible, since the beginning of the new planting season was missed, and the SPCs can no longer use the seed for which contracts had been arranged. 24. The sustainability of NSP's limited accomplishments will depend on how project objectives are pursued under the upcoming National Agricultural Services Project. F. Bank Performance 25. Overall, the Bank's performance was unsatisfactory. While project supervision was satisfactory, the Bank's specific efforts in preparation and appraisal were deficient. At the time of identification, the concept of a seeds project was valid, since the aim of boosting agricultural productivity through increased use of improved seeds was in line with the country's sectoral development policy and with the  6 conclusions of the Bank's Agricultural Sector Review in 1984. The project concept was also a logical outcome of the Gueckedou Agricultural Project, which had introduced the idea of farmers as contract seed growers (i.e., multipliers of seeds provided to them by the processing centers) and small works executors (tacherons amenagistes-small-scale rural engineers working without benefit of high technology). This was an innovative concept in that it represented a departure from force account production, which had been the favored scheme for similar public sector works, and from the usual regimen of integrated rural development projects, which tended to rely on their own structure and resources. 26. The Bank's performance in project preparation was unsatisfactory. Bank staff did not suggest that the Borrower consider a less ambitious, longer-term project package, which would have been better suited to the country's commercial and institutional realities. This failing was only partially offset during appraisal when, at the Bank's insistence, the number of SPCs was cut in half to three. Nevertheless, despite good skills mix within the appraisal team and a well-designed production/multiplication/dissemination scheme, the NSP project design was too ambitious in scope. The production capacity and equipment of the three SPCs were excessive. The Bank failed to take accurate measure of the risks of failure in achieving NSP's quantitative objectives. The sensitivity analysis indicated an ERR of over 11% for the worst case scenario (i.e., one in which a 50% drop in economic cash flow and a 50% increase in costs would be realized). The same analysis, assuming a discount rate of 10%, projected that the NSP would reach the break-even point even if economic cash flow dropped by 70% or costs increased by 220%. These hypotheses proved to be highly optimistic. 27. Bank supervision in monitoring the implementation plan and the Borrower's adherence to procedures and covenants in the credit agreement was satisfactory. Supervision missions did not have latitude to change the Project design during implementation, but the Bank could have taken the opportunity at the mid-term review to question the timetable and scale down specific objectives. Instead, the Bank opted for the costly alternative of hiring expatriate firms for the transitional management period and did not take care to negotiate contracts to ensure good performance. 28. The Project design can be criticized for its basic concept, focus on privatization, as well as its beneficiary focus. (a) NSP's basic concept was supply-driven in three ways. First, without a comprehensive analysis of the extension system, the Project could not be based on farmers' real needs. Second, it was inappropriate to create a national seed system in isolation from the extension and research functions that are basic to agricultural development. Third, the SPCs' processing capacity was based on an estimate of national seed requirements, rather than on a realistic assessment of the market for processed seeds and the prospects for growing demand. Strategic planning for market expansion was wanting. (b) Privatization requires autonomy and flexible management, but the management practices in PSU and the SPCs were typical of an inflexible public administration. Staff employment and promotion were subject to Government personnel policies rather than to individual productivity and performance assessments. Finally, private sector involvement was absent in the design phase. (c) Beneficiary focus was also weak in the NSP. Smallholders' lack of knowledge of the value of processed seeds and the low level of application of improved crop and soil management techniques, including fertilizers, were major constraints to seed market  7 expansion. Extension and research services were not able to overcome these constraints. Smallholders were scattered in areas remote from the SPCs and did not have easy access to services and inputs because of the poor state of rural transportation. G. Borrower Performance 29. Borrower's performance was deficient in the identification and preparation phases of the Project. In the absence of an effective national extension system, it was premature to give priority to a national seeds system. Since Government staff did not have sufficient capacity to conceptualize the project and prepare an operational plan, they readily agreed to appoint consultants and seek help from the Bank, The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and other donor agencies involved in various rural development projects. The result was a project that was beyond local implementation capacities. 30. During implementation, Borrower performance was mixed. The PSU did a good job of organizing construction and equipment installation at the three SPCs. It also performed satisfactorily in training staff, providing them with incentives and maintaining quality standards at the SPCs and in the field. It followed up on loan covenants. The financial difficulties encountered in 1991 and 1992 were remedied by the Borrower in the following years. The Borrower was unsuccessful, however, in fostering meaningful collaboration between the NSP and the research and extension services. It did not recognize the need to organize the PSU as a commercial enterprise and lacked commitment to achieve the objective of privatizing the seed system. As a result, the PSU did not assign high priority to cost-effectiveness and was imprudent in managing its expenditures. 31. Government's commitment to the Project was unclear. Counterpart funding was irregular during 1991 and 1992, and difficulties were also encountered with accounting and auditing. Contrary to what was envisaged in the SAR, monitoring and evaluation of NSP by the Ministry of Agriculture was nonexistent. Contractors and consultants performed satisfactorily, although TA was ineffective during 1991 and 1992; efforts at skills transfer and improved management did not produce the desired results. The PSU followed Bank policies and procedures on procurement and disbursements without significant problems. It created a difficult situation, however, by failing to adhere to the disbursement time limit after the NSP closing date of June 30, 1995. H. Assessment of Outcome 32. The overall outcome of the NSP was unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, the institutional setting of the seed enterprise, i.e., as an independent project standing apart from the extension and research services, generated more apathy than enthusiasm. Second, the priority attached to launching a national seeds system was premature; market demand for processed seeds was not strong enough to make the seed enterprise profitable. Since the SPCs were not profitable, they could not be privatized. Third, Project management was not equipped for managing a private enterprise focusing on staff productivity and cost-effectiveness. Fourth, although the potential for improving farm productivity by using processed seeds existed, the impact on grain production could not be realized in the absence of improved technology, e.g., improved soil management, crop husbandry, and greater use of fertilizers. Most of the production increase came from area expansion rather than from higher yields and productivity per- hectare. I. Future Operation 33. Two options exist for a future operation: the first would be to redesign the Project and integrate it into the on-going extension program, focusing on promoting the use of processed seeds and implementing activities on a smaller scale. The national extension program, SNPRV, is concerned with the transfer of appropriate technologies to improve crop productivity -- modern crop and soil  8 management practices and the use of organic and inorganic fertilizers. Since increased productivity also requires improved seeds, the supply of processed seeds will remain an integral part of the national extension program. Once the overall extension system is successful, stronger demand for high-quality seed can be expected, ensuring profitability of the seed enterprise. In the longer run, sustained profitability of the SPCs will create an environment conducive to their privatization. A second option would be for each SPC to introduce a profit-oriented, cost-cutting financial management system linked to a proactive strategy of diversification and market expansion. The SPCs possess excellent physical facilities and skilled staff; their managers are competent and the contract seed growers are well organized and trained. In order to ensure the efficiency of the three SPCs, their managers would need total autonomy and a Board of Directors to control and guide their work plans. 34. To expand the market, the SPCs could initiate arrangements with private retailers and cooperatives to deliver seeds to remote rural areas. SPC staff and the seed growers would need further training in maintaining quality and efficiency. Financial self-sufficiency of the SPCs would still be a challenge under this option. Alternatively, this strategy could be pursued with minimum difficulty once a certain level of success has been attained under the overall extension program. 35. The following tasks should be performed: (a) the National Seed Commission should become operational and regional committees should be created; (b) technical regulations for seed production (quality norms, for example) should be standardized; (c) an official catalog of plant species being multiplied should be drawn up; (d) the SPCs should become autonomous and their staff should be appropriately trained in anticipation of privatization; (e) an efficient monitoring and certification entity needs to be created; (f) working relationships should be cultivated with credit providers who are located in the vicinity of the SPCs; and (g) contract seed growers' groups should be strengthened. 36. The conditions that led to the launching of the NSP still exist. The Project can point to some progress made, but the needs and demand are still enormous. The continuation of the NSP activities under the upcoming National Agricultural Services Project would be done in the context of the new project's "mini-kit" program (an experimental program consisting of the distribution of a complete, self- contained farmers' package of seed and accompanying inputs). However, even if this program could resolve short-term problems, it cannot build a long-term policy. Discussions with the Guinean authorities are still ongoing as to the proper mix of public and private intervention in the seeds subsector. J. Key Lessons Learned 37. A number of important lessons emerged from NSP implementation experience. First, farmers' support services must be provided in the proper sequence. While there was a need to address the deficit in improved seeds, this should have been preceded by a more coherent and comprehensive effort to develop demand for improved agricultural technology and practices through the existing extension and research services. Instead, NSP was designed so that its success was highly dependent on synergy among all the services, a synergy that failed to materialize because other agricultural services lagged behind in performance and resources. The agronomic research centers of IRAG needed more experience in producing foundation seeds and the PNVA was inadequately staffed and funded for identifying seed- multiplication farmers and for expanding awareness of improved seeds among farmers. Some improvements have been made in the agriculture sector in recent years, and were the NSP to start now, it would stand a better chance of success than it did eight years ago. Second, private sector stakeholders should have been involved at the outset, particularly in a venture that was aimed to develop into a private industry. In the mid-1980s, in the transition after three decades of a command economy, the private sector was nascent, unprepared, and intimidated by the Government administration. The unrealistic goal of privatizing the Guinean seed industry in four years was inspired more by the prevailing philosophy in the Bank at that time rather than by an objective assessment of conditions in Guinea or experience with  9 similar seed industries elsewhere. Third, Borrower commitment to the Project objectives was lacking. It compromised the success of NSP. The Project management was weak and both the Borrower and the Bank should have acted swiftly to replace the NSP managers who were ill-suited by temperament and experience to work toward achieving NSP's objectives. 38. Difficulties in ensuring timely provision of counterpart funding for the NSP also jeopardized successful implementation. A different strategy is being applied for the follow-on National Agricultural Services Project. The Ministries of Planning and Finance have been engaged from the utset and can assure better the Government's financial contribution to the Project financing.  10 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macro policies X Sector policies X Financial objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives X Poverty reduction X Gender issues X Other social objectives X Environment objectives X Public sector management X Private sector management X Other B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain x Highly C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification X Preparation assistance X Appraisal X Supervision X Highly D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation X Implementation X Covenant compliance X Operation X Highly Highly E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactoary Unsatisfactory x  11 TABLE 2: RELATED IDA CREDITS IN GUINEA Amount Fiscal Loan/Credit Title in Purpose Year of Status US$ Approval million l Projects in the same sector/subsector and adjustment operations with related objectives - Preceding Operations: Rice Development 10.4 Improve technical expertise, agronomic 1980 Completed (Cr. 952-GUI) research and develop technical improvements in order to increase national rice output. l Livestock Development 13.3 Improve livestock production and create 1981 Canceled (Cr. 1063-GUI) incentives for herders for the sale of livestock. FY1984 Gueckedou Agricultural Devt. 6.7 Improve agricultural development with 1985 Completed (Cr. 1635-GUI) L _ particular emphasis on rice production. _ _ Pilot Extension Project 1.0 Development of field-level extension structure 1986 Completed (PPF-Financing) and training of key agronomic research staff. First Agricultural Services 7.6 Improve capacity of Ministry of Rural 1986 Completed (Cr. 1636-GUI) Development in rural sector planning, strategy and policy formulation, and project analysis. Structural Adjustment and 25.0 Support the Government's economic recovery 1986 Completed Special Africa Facility Credits 1 7.0 program and allow economic activity to expand (Cr. 1659-GUI) while implementing reforms. Livestock Sector Rehabilitation 9.8 Improve livestock productivity and increase 1987 Completed (Cr. 1725-GUI) meat and milk production. Agricultural Research & 18.4 Improve research and extension services and 1989 Completed Extension (Cr. 1955-GUI) promote supply and distribution of inputs through private sector, incentives for agricultural production, market liberalization, pricing policy, and enhance private sector role. National Rural Infrastructure 40.0 Improve rural infrastructure, policy 1978 Ongoing (Cr. 2106-GUI) formulation, rehabilitation, and maintenance .___________ capacity. Following Operations: National Agricultural Export 20.8 1993 Being Promotion restructured (Cr. 2407-GUI) l Agricultural Services 11 36.0 Strengthen Ministry ot' Agriculture services and 1996 Not yet (Cr. 2839-GUI) capacity, improve output of research and effective extension to disseminate technologies andl incrcase productivity, promote natural resourcel conservation, and improve animal production and health services.  12 TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE Item Date Planned I Revised Date Actual Date Preparation Period Identification June 1986 June/July 1986 Preparation October 1986 . October 1986 Appraisal Mission May 1987 - May 1987 Staff Appraisal Report - November 16, 1987 Credit Negotiations October 1987 - October 1987 Board Approval December 15, 1987 - December 15, 1987 Credit Signature February I, 1988 - February I, 1988 Credit Effectiveness June 29, 1988 - June 29, 1988 Implementation Period Completion May 1995 July 1995 July 1995 Credit Closing June 30, 1994 June 30, 1995 JJune 30, 1995 No. of Closing Extensions: I TABLE 4: CREDIF DISBURSEMENTS Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ Million) l FY88| FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 -FY93 FY94 | FY95 FY96 Appraisal Estimate 0.6 1.9 4.0 6.0 7.7 8.6 9.0 - - Actual 0 I .3 2.6 5.7 6.8 7.5 8.1 8.8 9.1 Actual as a % l of Estimate 0% 15% { 28% 64% 760/0 84% 90% 98% 101% Date of Final Disbursement: June 14, 1996 I/ 1/ Of the total Credit amount of SDR 7. 10 million, about SDRs 6.76 million was disbuirscd up to April 30, 1996. Howevcr, cumulative disbursements were expected to reach SD)R 0.94 million by June 15, 1996. when the final Nsithdrawal application for seed purcihases was to be reimnbursed by IDA TABLE5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PRO.JECT IMPLEMENTATION Key implementation indicators in Estimated Actual SAR/President's Report l 1. Rice Seed Production 1988 - 94 5,340 m.t. 607 m.t. 2. Maize 780 m.t. 337 mr.t. 3. Groundnut 605 m.t. 65 m.t. Note: m.t. metric ton TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION Key implementation indicators in Estimated Actual SAR/President's Reportl 1. Establishment of SPCs 6 units 3 units 2. Establishment of Laboratory I ullnit Equipmenit procured; installation outside the NSP 3. Privati'zation 'full none  13 TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT No Studies were envisaged at appraisal and none was undertaken during Project implementation. TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS (US$ Million)'/ Project Component Appraisal Actual _____________________________________________________ E stim ate 1. Civil Works 1.8 1.8 2. Vehicles and Equipment 2.4 1.9 3. Agricultural Inputs 0.6 0.5 4. Consultants' Services and Training 2.5 4.1 5. Operating Costs 2.0" 1.911 6. Project Preparation Facility and Unallocated 1.3 0.3 Total Project Cost 10.6 10.5 1/ Includes Government contribution of US$1.2 million; appraisal estimate was US $1.6 million. TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING (US$ Million) Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Source Local Costs Foreign Total Costs Local Costs Foreign Total Costs Costs Costs Government 1.6 - 1.6 1.2 - 1.2 IDA 0.4 8.6 9.0 1 .8- 7.5 ' 9.3 TOTAL 2.0 8.6 10.6 3.0 7.5 10.5 Note: The difference between estimated and actual financing is related to currency fluctuations. 1/ Partly estimated.  14 TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS A. DIRECT BENEFITS APPRAISAI| INDICATORS ESTIMATE J ICR ESTIMATE Appraisal economic rate of return (ERR) 30% l If the Project were to continue at its present performance, the ERR would be: negative If the project were redesigned as suggested in paras. 33-34, the ERR would be: 7.5% B. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT L=LThe:Project has as yet had no significant and durable financial and economic impact. TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL CONVENANTS rTEXT wOVENANT | STATUS DESCRIPTION OF COVENANT REFERENCE CLASS(ES) l _ 3.01 (a) Implementation C Borrower declares commitment to objectives of the Project as set forth in Schedule 2 to this Agreement and, to this end, shall carry out the Project through its Ministry of Rural Development with due diligence and efficiency and in conformity with appropriate admin., financial and agricultural practices, and provide, promptly as needed, resources required for the Project. 3.01 (b) Accounts/audit C Without limitation to the generality of para. 3.01 (a), Borrower shall establish and maintain in a commercial bank a revolving account exclusively for the purposes of the Project and shall, after an initial deposit therein as described in para. 5.01 (c) of this Agreement, replenish said account as and when required to ensure that on the first day of each calendar quarter an amount equal to at least the initial deposit, shall be available to finance the Borrowers contribution to the estimate cost of the Project for Th. said quarter and the following ___________ _ quarter. TEXT COVENANT STATUS DESCRIPTION OF COVENANT Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay NC - Not Complied With SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Compliance with Partiality NYD - Not Yet Due  15 REFERENCE CLASS(ES) 3.02 Flow and C Except as the Association shall otherwise agree, procurement of the utilization of goods, works and consultants' services required for the Project and to be project funds financed out of the proceeds of the Credit shall be governed by the l ___________ ________________ _________ provisions of Schedule 3 to this Agreement. 3.03 (a) Implementation NC Borrower shall: (i) establish a National Seeds Committee comprising, inter alia, representatives of MDR, farmers and representatives of rural development projects; and (ii) cause said committee to hold its initial meeting not later that Sept. 30, 1988, and thereafter meet at least once a year. 3.03 (b) Implementation NC Said committee shall be responsible inter alia for: (i) establishing seed quality standards and monitoring their application; (ii) coordinating national seed production; (iii) establishing price guidelines; and (iv) considering the recommendations of the regional and technical seeds committees on incentive systems for producers, outgrowers and SCCs. 3.03 (c) Monitoring, NC Borrower shall submit at least once a year its seed policy and pricing review and guidelines to the Association for its review and comment; said policy reporting and guidelines to determine prices for SCCs that provide an adequate incentive to contract outgrowers, encourage the responsible use of seeds and allow the profitable operation of the SCCs. 3.04 (a) Implementation C Borrower shall not later than December 31, 1988, establish in different regions of the country and under arrangements satisfactory to the Association about six SCCs which shall be responsible inter alia for (i) supervising production of base seeds at research stations; (ii) ensuring the purchase and distribution of base seeds to outgrowers; (iii) collecting improved seeds through development projects and extension programs; (iv) supervising and training extension staff and outgrowers; (v) conditioning improved seeds; and (vi) selling commercial seeds. 3.04 (b) Management C Each SCC referred to in (a) above shall be headed by an agronomist aspects of the who shall be assisted by a seed production technician, all with Project or of its qualifications and experience acceptable to the Association. executing agency 3.05 Accounts/audit CP Borrower shall allow each SCC to: (i) open bank accounts in a commercial bank; (ii) deposit therein the receipts from the sale of seeds to finance said SCC's operating costs; and (iii) retain cash surpluses to meet working capital and assets replacement requirements. 3.06 Monitoring, NC Borrower shall: (a) upon completion of the establishment of the SCCs, review and furnish to the Association for review and comments a plan of action for reporting gradually involving the private sector in the business of seed conditioning and purchase and distribution of base seeds to outgrowers (include. offering SCCs for sale to the private sector after completion); 3.06 (b) and (b) soon thereafter take into account the Association's comments ICOVENANT STATUS DESCRIPTION OF COVENANT Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay NC - Not Complied With SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Compliance with Partiality NYD - Not Yet Due Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay  16 CLASS(ES) 4.01 (a) Accounts/audit CD Borrower shall maintain or cause to be maintained records and accounts adequate to reflect in accordance with sound accounting practices the operations, resources and expenditures in respect of the Project of the departments or agencies of the Borrower responsible for carrying out the Project or any part thereof. 4.01 (b) Accounts/audit CD Borrower shall: (i) have the records and accounts referred to in par. 4.01 (a) including those of for the Special Account of reach fiscal year audited in accordance with appropriate auditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable to the Association; 4.01 (b) ii Accounts/audit CD Furnish to the Association, as soon as available, but in any case not later than six months after the end of such year, a certified copy of the report of such audit by said auditors, of such scope and in such detail as the Association shall have reasonably requested; and 4.01 (b) iii Accounts/audit CD furnish to the Association such other information concerning said records, accounts and the audit thereof as the Association shall from time to time reasonably request. 4.01 (c) i Accounts/audit CD (c) For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of statements of expenditure, the Borrower shall: (i) maintain or cause to be maintained, in accordance with par. 4.01 (a) records and accounts reflecting such expenditures; l 4.01 (c) ii Accounts/audit C retain until at least one year after the Association has received the audit for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the Credit Account was made, all records (contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other documents) evidencing such expenditures; (iii) enable the Association's representatives to examine such records; and 4.01 (c) iv Accounts/audit C ensure that such records and accounts are included in the annual audit of referred to in par. 4.01 (b) and that the report of such audit contains a separate opinion by said auditors as to whether the statements of expenditures submitted during such fiscal year, together with the procedures and internal controls involved in their preparation, can support related withdrawals. NC - Not Complied With SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Compliance with Partiality NYD - Not Yet Due  17 TABLE I1: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS Borrower complied with all applicable Bank's Opeational Manual Statements. TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES - STAFF INPUTS (as of 11/22/95) Stage of project cycle Planned Revised Actual Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Through appraisal 93.6 81,700 Appraisal-Board 37.6 92,800 Board-effectiveness - Supervision 118.0 321,700 Completion 12 31,700 12 31,700 11 39,200 TOTAL 257 535,000 264.4 548,500 260.2 535,400 1/ Staff weeks include Bank-financed consultants such as FAO, but dollar amounts exclude FAO costs.  18 TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES - MISSIONS Stage of No. of Days in Expertise Implementat Developmen Type of Project Cycle Month/ Persons Field Represented ion Status t Impact Problems Year I/ Rating 2/ Rating2-/ 31 Identification 06/86 a,c,j,m I , /Preparation 10/86 4 30 a,c,m Appraisal 05/87 4 21 a,b,c,m Supervision 1 08/88 Supervision 2 02/89 4 a,g,k 2 2 Supervision 3 06/89 4 5 a,g,k 2 2 M, T Supervision 4 08/90 2 2 Supervision 5 11/90 2 11 a,b Supervision 6 08/91 3 14 a, b 3 3 F, M, 0 Supervision 7 03/92 1 20 b 3 3 F, M, 0 Supervision 8 05/92 2 7 a,c,m 4 4 F, M, O Mid-term 11/92 5 14 a,c,h,m 3 3 M, T, 0 Review Supervision 10 09/93 1 10 a 2 2 Supervision 11 03/94 2 8 a,c 3 2 Supervision 12 06/94 5 18 a,b,c,k S S F Completion 07/95 1 13 m HU S F, M ICRdraft 01/96 2 - c,m ICR discussion 06/96 2 7 a,c 1/ a = Agriculturist/Agronomist; b = Financial Analyst; c = Agricultural Economist; g = Training Specialist; h = Marketing Specialist; j = Forester; k = Extension Specialist; I = Sociologist; m = Seed Specialist 2/ 1 = problem free or minor problems; 2 = moderate problems; 3 = major problems; 4 = critical situation; HU = highly unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory 3/ F = Financial; M = Management; T = Technical; 0 = Other  19 Appendix A CONTRIBUTION DU MINISTERE DE L'AGRICULTURE DE L'ELEVAGE ET DES FORETS A LA MISSION D'EVALUATION PROJET SEMENCIER NATIONALI MARS 1995 I - INTRODUCTION Dans le cadre du developpement du secteur agricole conformement A sa politique dirigiste, la premiere Republique avait mis l'accent sur les Fermes d'Etat (FAPA) dans l'espoir d'atteindre l'autosuffisance alimentaire comme etant un objectif fixe A l'avance. Malgre le potentiel agricole de la Guinee (6,2 million d'hectares de terres cultivables), il en resulte ce qui suit: une stagnation de la production agricole d'ou proviennent les 80% des revenus de nos populations; une baisse du volume des exportations agricoles avec une chute vertigineuse des cultures de rente (banane, ananas, cafe); un deficit cerealier grave entrainant un besoin d'importations alimentaires plus accru (20-30%) des importations totales; des importations massives et anarchiques de semences de 1'tranger avec un suivi non adequat des varietes introduites. Malgre les efforts consentis, les resultats n'ont pas e satisfaisants et ce pour les raisons suivantes: manque de structure semenciere adequate (amont, aval); manque de recherche adaptative; manque de maitrise technique suffisante notamment pour les varietes d'adaptations quiequefois a l'ecologie de la Guin6e - etc. Le Gouvernement de la 2e Republique, en application A sa politique lib6rale, a decide (en collaboration avec la Banque Mondiale) un programme d'actions importantes pour redynamiser le secteur agricole dont les grands axes sont specifies dans le plan interimaire de redressement national (1985-87). C'est dans ce cadre qu'on a cree les projets de premiere generation dont le Projet Semencier National, l'IRAG et le PNVA qui dans leur ensemble constituent une composante essentielle de ce programme interimaire. C'est ainsi qu'A l'actif du PSN les autorites actuelles ont decide, avec l'appui financier de la Banque Mondiale, la mise en place d'un programme national de production et distribution de semences ameliorees (riz, mals, arachide) A un prix abordable pour satisfaire la demande paysanne. Le present document qui retrace les differentes phases suivies pour la mise en oeuvre de ce programme, est la contribution du Ministere de l'Agriculture de l'Elevage et des Forets lors de la mission d'evaluation du Projet Semencier National envisagee par la Banque Mondiale en Mars 1995, suite A l'experimentation d'une phase de preparation et A la privatisation. CHAPITRE l: HISTORIQUE Ce chapitre doit retracer tout le chemin parcouru pour l'execution du programme semencier depuis la phase PPF/412/Gui (1987) jusqu'A la phase transitoire (contrats de gestion 1993/94) en passant par la phase d'execution PSN Credit 1864/GUI (1989-92) qui regroupe l'essentiel des resultats obtenus dans les domaines ci-apres: etudes agro-sociologiques; production de semences; infrastructure et equipement; assistance technique; formation (personnel et paysannat). Nonobstant, tout l'inter& qu'il peut apporter au lecteur pour la comprehension de certaines difficultes rencontr6es au cours de l'execution de projet, il est conseille de se reporter A l'annexe pour d'amples informations.  20 En attendant 1'extrait qui va suivre, retracera l'essentiel de l'itineraire du Projet Semencier National. - 8 Janvier 1987 requete, du gouvernement guineen A la Banque Mondiale, relative a une avance de fonds de preparation. - 2 Mars 1987 accord de l'avance de fonds intitule PPF/412/Gui. - 18 Mars 1987 sur demande guineenne la FAO a mandat d'intervenir avec une assistance technique dans la phase PPF. - Novembre 1987 missions effectuees pour la collecte des varietes retenues apres diagnostic -I er Fevrier 1988 signature A Washington de I'accord de credit du projet intitule CR11 864/GUI. - 27 Juin 1988 signature A Paris de la convention de I'Assistance technique avec Louis Berger International. - 29 Juin 1988 mise en vigueur de I'accord de credit 1864/GUI. - 31 Juillet au 13 Septembre 1988, mise en place de I'Assistance technique fournie par Louis Berger International. - 4 Mars 1989 mise en place de la structure des centres de conditionnement de semences avec la nomination des chefs de centre. - 20 Mars 1989 lancement de l'appel d'offre international pour l'execution des investissements relatifs aux travaux de Genie civil et A l'equipement. - Mai 1989 lancement de la premiere campagne de multiplication de semences. - 7 Mai au 7 Juin 1990 lancement des travaux de construction des centres de Koba, Kilissi et Bordo. - Octobre 1990 stage de formation des chefs de centres (Koba, Kilissi, Bordo) sur la production des semences d'especes vivrieres en regions tropicales IRAT/CIRAD a Montpellier (France). - 1991 evaluation de mi-parcours du projet par une mission de la Banque Mondiale. - 30/9 au 25/10/1991 formation DAAF en micro-informatique appliquee A la gestion des projets (Bordeaux France). - 7/11 au 6/12/1991 participation du chef de departement Construction Equipement au stage sur la maintenance et la gestion du materiel de conditionnement aux usines en France de Toy et Denis a Montaire/loire et Denis A BROUFUR et C1lment de clety (Belgique). - 22/4 au 2/5/1992 seminaire PSN A Kilissi avec appui FAO - 21 au 28/9/1992 reception definitive des 3 centres conditionnement de semences ci-dessus nommes. - ler au 20/11/1992 mission d'evaluation du PSN effectuee conjointement par des representants du MARA (PSN, DNFPR) du BDPA (J. Dissard) et de la Banque Mondiale (J.P. Vautherin, Chandra Pattanayak, Mathurin Gbetibouo). - 15 au 21 Fevrier 1993 mission de Mr. Djibril AW qui a retenu pour le projet Semencier National une phase transitoire de 2 ans avec un contrat de gerance. - 3 Mars 1993 communique radio a l'intention du secteur prive (ONG, operateurs 6conomiques, associations et organismes publics) pour les interesser au demarrage du processus de privatisation des centres de Koba, Kilissi, Bordo et Kamalo. - 28/4/1992 approbation par Washington de l'amendement de l'accord de credit 1864/GUI apres reajustement pour tenir 2 ans de phase transitoire. - 26 Septembre 1993 signature contrat de partenariat avec la CFDT.  21 - 20 Octobre 1993 signature contrat de partenariat avec A.C.T. - 5 Janvier 1994 signature contrat de partenariat avec ASODIA - 3 au 6 Mai 1994 participation PSN au seminaire sur les operations de decaissement organise par la Banque Mondiale a Conakry. - 24/10 au 4/11/1994 organisation seminaire de formation A la gestion comptable des chefs de centres Semenciers (Koba, Kilissi, Bordo, Tindo, Bareng) avec assistance technique FFA. - 18 Novembre 1994 les semences sont A l'honneur avec le premiere visite de Madame le Ministre Mme Makale CAMARA au Centre Semencier de Kilissi (Kindia) - 12 Janvier 1995 visite de Mme le Ministre au Centre Semencier de Koba (Boffa) - 23 au 24 janvier 1995 premiere reunion de haut rang convoquee par Madame le Ministre autour de la problematique des semences Guinee. CHAPITRE II - PHASE PREPARATOIRE I - RAPPEL DES OBJECTIFS Conform6ment au plan interimaire de redressement national, il est inscrit a l'actif du projet la mise en oeuvre d'un programme national de production et de distribution de semences ameliorees (riz, mais, arachide) adaptees aux conditions ecologiques et economiques de la Guinee en vue de contribuer a ameliorer le revenu des petit et moyens exploitants. Pour realiser ce programme, le projet a adopte la demarche suivante: identifier apres collecter les varietes locales des especes riz, maYs, arachide, manioc; evaluer leur valeur agronomique et leur degre d'adaptabilite aux differentes zones naturelles dans le but de determiner les plus performantes afin de proc6der a leur multiplication apres divers tests. II - RESULTATS OBTENUS En reference au rapport AG : UFT/006/GUI, les resultats ci-apres on et enregistres A - Au niveau collectes des varietes locales a - Riz = 31 varietes dont: 15 pour le sol de coteau et montagne; 9 pour le sol de bas-fond; 4 pour le sol plaine; 3 pour le sol de mangrove; b - Mais = 20 varietes; c - Arachide 10 varietes; d - Manioc 11 varidtes  22 B - Au niveau des introductions etrangeres a - Riz = 10 varietes b - Mais= 5 varietes c - Arachide 7 varietes d - Manioc 3 varietes resistantes a la mosaYque 11 convient de signaler que les essais et observations ont e conduits en stations en collaboration avec la recherche. C - Au niveau semences de base Au depart de cette phase de pr6paration, la recherche a fournir les quantites suivantes: Riz = 2,3 tonnes; MaYs = 0,250 tonnes; Arachides - 0,4 10 tonnes D - MULTIPLICATION AU NIVEAU DES CENTRES DE CONDITIONNEMENT ET SEMENCES A l'issu des travaux de station les recommandations faites aux Centres sont consignees dans le tableau ci-apres. DESIGNATION RIZ MAYS ARACHIDE KOBA Balanta, Rock 5 _ KILISSI CK4, Samba konkon Perta Labiriya, Maressi Kaolack, CK4, Nankin BORDO IRAT 109, 112, 144 Perta IDSA 6, Nankin Gambiaca, Kaolack CK4 BARENG Diassengue TINDO Perta CHAPITRE III - PHASE D'EXECUTION DU PROJET Elle est la phase active dont les principales operations sont axees sur: la production avec la mise en place du programme de multiplication des semences en milieu rural; les infrastructures et 6quipement; 1'installationl de trois magasins d'appui et l'6quipement de 5 centres en materiel de conditionnement; la mise en place de la structure du projet soutenue par une formation aux techniques de production et de gestion comptable. A - INFRASTRUCTURE ET EQUIPEMENT 1'essentiel de ce chapitre se trouve consignes dans les tableaux d'evaluation des investissements realises en infrastructure et equipement de 1987 A 1995. En recapitulant ces investissements il se degage le masse monetaire suivante: Equipement = 806.604.448 FG Infrastructure 1.738.229.386 FG 2.544.833.834 FG N.B. : Pour les details il est recommande de se reporter en annexe 11 (Infrastructure et Equipement).  23 B - PRODUCTION ET EVALUATION DES COUTS Dans ce domaine, les tableaux qui suivent exposent les bilans des activites de 3 annees consecutives (1990 - 1991 - 1992) et leur analyse a permis egalement d'evaluer les couts de production. Pour mieux apprecier les resultat il importe de connaitre le taux des e1lments qui ont contribue a l'evaluation de ces charges. Ce sont: (i) emballage, 3%; (ii) achat semences, 6%; (iii) produits phytosanitaires, 24%; (iv) carburant/lubrifiant, 16%; (v) divers services exterieurs, 15%; (vi) amortissement, 36%. COMMENTAIRE De l'examen de ces tableau, il apparait clairement que c'est une periode d'intenses activites qui se caracterise par des charges importantes relatives aux gros investissements (Infrastructure) qui ont pese lourdement sur les resultats de l'exploitation consignes ci-dessus. on est tente de penser s'ils ne sont pas encourageant. Cependant il ne faut pas perdre de vue que le projet arrivait tout juste au passage entre 2 phases de production : la phase artisanale et la phase industrielle qui attendait pour sa programmation, la reception definitive des unites de conditionnement de semences. Force est de reconnaitre dgalement que des le depart, la gestion de type industriel et commercial n'etait pas reconnue comme une priorite etant entendu que certains prealables n'etaient pas encore reunis dans la premiere phase tels que: identification de la production liee a la demande; mise en place de toute la structure; formation d'un reseau de paysans (groupements, villages semenciers, cooperatives); promotion des semences conditionnees par une etude de marche; textes legislatifs et normes de production. ACQUIS DU PROJET Apres le lancement de la premiere campagne de production (Mai 1989) les acquis du projet se resument comme suit: - la realisation de 3 unites de conditionnement de semences d'une capacite de stockage de 1.000 T chacune, dotes d'equipement performant pour le sechage, le traitement et le conditionnement des semences. - la formation d'un personnel d'encadrement et d'un reseau de paysans multiplicateurs selectionnes grace a une maitrise des techniques de production. - la creation effective d'un marche des semences alors que dans un passe recent, il n'etait que marche potentiel. Ce qui permettra de planifier pour satisfaire la demande. - la formation des groupements, villages semenciers qui s'interessent progressivement a la gestion des actions comme : production, collecte, commercialisation etc. - le zonage des perimetres semenciers et debut d'amenagement des bas-fonds reserves a la multiplication grace a une collaboration BTGR/PSN. - la mise en place d'un syst&me de communication radio, - les Centre de Conditionnement de Semences sont en train de devenir un pole d'activites economiques avec la diversification et l'intervention du credit.  24 CHAPITRE IV - LA PHASE TRANSITOIRE Etant donne les couts de mise en oeuvre du projet, il etait illusoire au lendemain de la reception definitive des centres d'esperer interesser le prive (operateur economique, organisation paysanne) A la reprise de l'activite semenciere bien qu'il en avait et fait mention dans l'accord de credit (I 864/GUI). Devant la situation, le seule alternative qui s'offrait A nous (Novembre 1992), c'etait d'envisager une phase transitoire, passage oblige parce que les conditions de privatisation dtaient loin d'etre reunis. Cette phase que nous abordons dans sa conception doit necessairement servir A la mise en route d'un processus de privatisation des centres conform6ment A la politique liberale du gouvernement de la 2e Republique. Pour son execution les objectifs ont ete fixee : (i) rationaliser la production pour r6duire les couts; (ii) developper le marche et diversifier les activites pour accroitre le chiffre d'affaires; (iii) former le personnel d'encadrement; (iv) identifier avant la fin de la premiere annee le future repreneur dans le secteur prive ou associatif; (v) faire une etude pouvant apporter les informations et les conclusions permettant d'elaborer un programme de transfert au secteur prive avec ses chances de succes. II importe de savoir aussi que le financement de cette phase transitoire est assure par le reliquat du credit destine initialement A la realisation des investissements de la 26 phase concemant notamment les centres de Tindo, Bareng, 6 centres secondaires et le laboratoire central de contr6le et certification. Le tableau qui suit va indiquer tous les renseignements sur la repartition des fonds au secteur prive. Tableau Repartition reliquat fonds de cr6dit aux gestionnaires contractuels (en US dollars). CENTRES GESTION- FRAIS DE PRESTATION DU REMUNE- NAIRES FONCTIONNEMENT GESTIONNAIRE RATION TOTAL US$ PAR MOIS REMUNE- TOTAL CALEND- RATIONS _________ _______ RIERS 1+2+3 Fixes Variables Remun- Remune 2 ans (Achat, eration ration traitement) fixe variable KOBA ASODIA 62.000 80.000 340.000 30.000 14.176 400.000 572.000 KILISSI A.C.T. 70.000 80.000 170.000 30.000 7.083 200.000 380.000 BORDO CFDT 66.000 80.000 306.000 30.000 15.300 360.000 536.000 198.000 240.000 816.000 90.000 36.559 960.000 1.488.000 N.B.: Ce montant affichd est faux, il doit etre remplace par 12.750 US$ Des le depart cette phase a eu une incidence malheureuse sur la campagne agricole 1993/1994. Elle s'est caracterisee en effet par une hesitation des partenaires contractuels A prefinancer ladite campagne en attendant le versement de l'avance de demarrage, qui pour des raisons administratives et de procedures commencait, A prendre du retard; ceci a eu pour consequences : retard dans I'achat et la distribution des intrants; retard dans I'acquisition des frais de fonctionnement. Tous ces raisons ont amene la Direction du PSN a dui consentir des efforts pour: allouer des fonds pour l'achat des intrants; autoriser l'utilisation du reliquat de fonds des comptes bancaires de Centres pour supporter leur fonctionnement. Apres que les fonds soient mis A la disposition des contractuels depuis 15 A 18 mois, les resultats obtenus sont enregistres annuellement dans les tableaux ci-apres:  25 TABLEAU l: CAMPAGNE AGRICOLE 1993 - 1994 Centres Esp6ces Superficie Nombre Semen. Redevance Rembo- Achat en Total (ha) paysans distribudes engrais ursement Kg en kg en kg KOBA Riz 73,38 176 14.972 1 T 4.247 4.438 8.685 KILISSI Riz 36 105 2.520 -- -- 32.365 32.365 Mais 6 15 150 300 36.200 36.500 Arachi. 8 80 640 833 20.985 21.818 TOTAUX 50 200 3.310 -- 1.133 89.550 90.683 BORDO Riz 175 129 14.000 34.089 26.798 21.796 48.597 Mais 60,5 49 1.210 12.408 22.284 33.217 33.217 Total 235,5 178 2,610 46.497 37.731 44.080 81.811 TABLEAU II: CAMPAGNE AGRICOLE 1994 - 1995 Centres Especes Superficie Nombre Semen. Redevance Rembo- Achat en Total (ha) paysans distribudes engrais ursement Kg en kg en kg KOBA Riz 73,5 176 4.691 9.382 50.618 60.000 Mals 3,500m2 1 __ KILISSI Riz 36 117 4.605 -- 30.000 36.900 Mais 6 16 150 6.900 5.284 5.443 Arachi. 60 275 7.310 195 2.004 12.437 TOTAUX _ 102 408 12.365 -- 16.599 38.152 54.780 BORDO Riz 139 169 15.058 26.100 33.559 49.702 83.261 Mais 58 108 1.160 -- 16.362 33.724 53.086 Total 197 277 16.218 52.921 83.426 136.374 Interpretation des resultats De l'interpretation des resultats enregistres d'apres les tableaux ci-dessus pr6sentes, il ressort que les couits de production sont eleves et cofitent entre 3.000 a 3.500 FG/Kg. Ce qui denote que: (a) la production n'a pas degage un cash flow positif permettant de creer les conditions de rentabilite en reduisant les cofits; (b) le diversification meme si elle est amorcee quelque part elle n'a pas augment6 le chiffre d'affaires des centres. En conclusion il apparait la meme situation qu'il y a 2 ans dans des conditions differentes. Ce qui peut signifier que les gestionnaires n'ont pas fait preuve de leurs competences techniques (en matiere d'industrie et commerce) et financieres meme si elles existent quelque part, malgrd le volume des fonds engages avec une large autonomie de gestion. Ceci peut se comprendre parce que le contrat n'implique aucun risque pour le gestionnaire. C'est l'etat que paie les frais au cas oui l'operation s'avere non rentable.  26 Conclusions generales phase transitoire En tirant les lecons de cette phase de gerance privee, il apparaSt que les gestionnaires ont passe a cote du plan d'action mis au point pour sa bonne execution. Pour s'en convaincre, il convient de noter que les resultats obtenus n'ont pas permis d'augmenter le chiffre d'affaires des CCS, ni faire la promotion de semences, ni assurer la formation du personnel, ni identifier les futurs repreneurs locaux ni meme elaborer les procedures devant conduire a la privatisation. En conclusion aujourd'hui, la plus part des agents s'accorde a reconnaitre que le contrat n'est pas en soi une demarche menant a la privatisation. 11 est premature de s'engager dans cette voie sans au prealable maitriser les contraintes d'ordre technique, economique et sociale qui permettent de poser les conditions objectives de chance pour un succes. CHAPITRE V: SUGGESTIONS ET RECOMMANDATIONS La production des semences est une activite permanente qui obeit a la loi du minimum de liebig: selon laquelle si l'un des elements fondamentaux: la recherche (creation varietale) le PSN (producteur semences) la vulgarisation (diffusion des semences) fait defaut ou son action s'avere insuffisante, il limite et entrave l'action des deux autres. Dans 1'etat actuel de developpement de I'agriculture, il est difficile d'atteindre le seuil de rentabilite des centres (niveau d'activite permettant de generer un benefice). Les gestionnaires le reconnaissent (cf rapport d'activites) et continuent a utiliser les fonds empruntes par la Guinee sans risque aucun parce que epargnes de toute participation financiere. Pour eviter de deplacer le probleme et compromettre l'un des piliers de notre developpement, il est sage de continuer sur la lancee de depart avec une decentralisation de la gestion. Le processus est deja engagee avant la signature des contrats et se developpe progressivement dans les differentes activites tant dans la collaboration avec les paysans qu'avec celle des autres partenaires comme IRAG, SNPRV, BTGR, credit etc. Ceci permnettrait de sortir de la lethargie vecue depuis bient6t 2 ans, afin de poursuivre notre programme vers le professionnalisme de semences. l'objectif tel que pr6conise doit etre a moyen et long terme. Pour y parvenir il faut prendre pour base la formation des groupements prives (exploitants petits et moyens) specialises et vivant en partie de la production des semences. II convient donc de definir les elements qui conditionnent la mise en oeuvre de 1'entreprise et de son fonctionnement. En fait il faut distinguer 2 fonctions: (i) les fonctions perennes qui restent une prerogative de l'Etat. Elles s'identifient a la planification au controle de la production semenciere (controle de qualite et certification); (ii) les fonctions temporaires par opposition aux premieres. Elles sont transferables au secteur prive (production, traitement, distribution etc...).  27 Des le depart il est indispensable de s'engager a faire une etude a tous les niveaux (technique, march6, organismes) permettant de determiner rationnellement par ordre de priorite les actions a privatiser distribution, approvisionnement en intrants, produits etc... En ce moment la privatisation se veut progressive en l'adaptant au niveau technique du monde rural lequel s'integre au developpement de ]'ensemble du secteur agricole. A/ SUGGESTIONS Pour atteindre les objectifs assignes au projet it est opportun de proceder a la mutation de la structure actuelle en Service National des Semences et Plants de Guinee (SENASEP Guinee) place sous la tutelle directe du cabinet du Ministre conformement a la conception de base et a 1'execution du projet qui est reste sous sa haute responsabilite. La mutation sollicitee offrirait la possibilite de: faire des etudes s6rieuses sur les charges actuelles en vue d'eliminer dans le futur tous les 6lements qui ne sont pas intrinsequement lies aux activites industrielles et commerciales; organiser les paysans en vue de leur participation active aux activites commerciales et industrielles liees aux semences et commencer a les interesser pour les associer progressivement a la gestion des centres; rendre les centres semenciers de plus en plus autonomes et assurer une formation au personnel dans une demarche de privatisation ou il pourrait trouver sa place; creer un v6ritable organisme de controle et certification afin de donner aux semences de guinee un label leur permettant d'etre concurrentiel vis-a-vis de l'ext6rieur; creer de liens de travail avec les organismes de credit implantes dans les zones d'activite des centres; organiser des missions de consultation pour aider a la realisation des objectifs. En conclusion, la fonction en voie de creation, la privatiser hativement amene le risque de la faire disparaitre, ce qui exposera le pays a des consequences graves: (a) la disparition d'un entrepreneur prive. d'autant plus dommageable que s'il est Guineen: (b) I'abandon d'une activite dont l'interet pour le developpement rural est pourtant evident. Justification: Nous sommes assures de la viabilit6 du programme parce que partant sur une base sOre dont: un personnel suffisamment qualifi6 et forme pour la cause possedant une experience de 8 ans dans la filiere donc capable de concevoir et de soutenir 1'execution d'un programme semencier; une infrastructure de base solide avec un equipement performant; une disponibilite de varietes ameliorees par espece ayant fait leur preuve; une pr6sence d'un reseau de paysans multiplicateurs de semences acquis & la cause et possedant un bon niveau technique a renforcer permanement; 1'existence de groupements semenciers plus ou moins formels capables de gerer et administrer les activites de production pour un depart et les autres, comme le traitement et la distribution pour un futur proche s'ils beneficient d'une assistance technique et financiere adequates; 1'existence d'un marche de semences solvable assure d'une extension progressive etant donne les besoins d'une population croisante et le contexte geopolitique de la sous region; le renforcement des relations avec des institutions de plue en plus performantes telles que: IRAG, SNPRV, BTGR qui sont des collaborateurs obliges; la possibilite d'elargir la production des semences a celles forestieres, fourrageres et marakch&res; I'identification des methodes d'approche nouvelles pour la promotion des semences.  28 B/ RECOMMANDATIONS La production des semences amelior6es est avancee comme etant la condition essentielle pour l'accroissement de la production agricole. Pour ce faire, une planification s'impose en vue d'organiser et definir l'ensemble du programme semencier envisage. It peut s'articuler somme suit: definir le schema de production; definir le systeme de multiplication et d'attribuer les taches de production des differents stades de multiplication aux differentes structures existantes recherche, CCS, groupements, cooperatives, organismes de developpement, societe prives etc.; definir les objectifs quantitatifs de production; delimiter les zones de production; inscrire au catalogue les varietes retenues pour la multiplication; definir les moyens humains et materiels pour liberer ou chercher les ressources financieres. Pour realiser tout ce programme il est important de tenir compte de certaines considerations generales a savoir: assurer la liaison et la coordination entre les differents services ou organismes engages dans la production semenciere; mettre en place une politique de prix incitatif notamment au niveau paysannat; reviser p6riodiquement et adapter le programme afin d'elever constamment son efficacite; installer des centres secondaires pour faciliter la distribution des semences.  IBRD 20468 --- -- - -r- -- S E N E G A L G U I N E A G U I N E A . I NATIONAL SEEDS PROJECT T. 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