Sudan - Gezira study mission (Vol. 9 of 15) : Annex III : services to agriculture

c-~~~~~~~~~R l-y RU!'N 1 u RECORDS CENTER ROOM IIB-1 1966-C8 MATERIAL Box NO, z 0 cn: H tAH t:0  - ii - ANNEX III SERVICES TO AGRICULTURE TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE 1. GEZIRA LIGHT RAILWAY .... 1 2. THE GINNERIES . ........... ....... ........... 4 Contract labor ..... 0.0. ........ .4 Organization .......... .... ........ . 6 Efficiency .. ............ ......... 7 3. MARKETING PROCEDURES .................................. . 9 Cotton ..................................... . ... 9 Grading procedures ........ ........ ..... 9 The problem of quality .............. 13 The reserve price policy....*......... 15 Sales support practices .............. 17 Proposal to establish a cotton marketing authority.. ....... ........ 19 The publicity effort ........... ........ 20 APPENDIX A - MARKETING PROCEDURES ............. 22 Lint Grading and Standardization ........ .... 22 Note on the American grade system .... 26 APPENDIX B - MARKETING PROCEDURES ............. 30 Importance of Data on Fiber Properties..... 30 4. ~MARKETIIG PROCEDURES .......................... 34 Groundnuts ............. 34  ANNEX III C H A P T E R 1 GEZIRA LIGHT RAILWAY The Gezira Light Railway, comprising a rather extensive network of some 700 km of narrow gauge line, is in itself a transport service organization of substantial size. It came into being during a period when rail systems were markedly the most reliable method of transport. Its major purpose has remained the transport of seed cotton from the growing areas to the ginning factories, but over time other bulk ma- terials such as fertilizer, insecticides, seeds, sacking, etc. have been added to the freight list. The main question relating to the O.L.R. is whether further extension of the network would be economically feasible. The relative economies of road versus rail systems are not easy to evaluate because little cost information is available. What data are available suggest that the economics of transport are still in favor of the rail system as a whole. The only reference point in regard to road transport is provided by contractor quotations which are reportedly of the order of 23-30 m/ms per ton-kilometer; these rates would include contractor profits and other factors. The cost of transporting the cotton harvest over the present rail system varies with yield. Data for the late 1950's and early 19601s, according to documents made available to the mission, indicate that "pre-Managil" costs ran to about 14-15 m/ms per ton-kilometer for a typical yield of 3.5-h k.p.f. Assuming higher yields and some increase in efficiency, ton-kilometer costs should be still lower in the future. A more useful comparison would be the cost of transport on the realistic basis of new extensions into sections of the Scheme. To get some idea of the economics involved, the mission analyzed the cost of transport on 20 kilometers of rail if it were extended into the Abdel Magid area. The added cost of this extension, including personnel as well as capital items, is estimated to be of the order of LS. 116,000; on the basis of 50 year depreciation, this would mean computed charges of some LS. 2,330 per year. If average operating expenses for the whole system are assumed for the 20 kilometer section, the cost of transport for an average production of 3.5 k.p.f. would be on the order of IS. 1,783.1/ From the total of these figures, the estimated cost 1/ From the yield of 3.5 k.p.f. can be inferred a ton-kilometer operating cost of about 15 m/ms and a production of 5,943 tons (12,000 feddans at 3.5 k.p.f.).  - 2 - ANNEX III over the 20 kilometers, on this basis, would be a minimum of about 35 m/ms per ton-kilometer which, although purely indicative, suggests that rail transport may not be the most economical method to extend the collection,system. It may be added that the present traffic control system may prove inadequate if the rail network were substantially in- creased. The flexibility of road transport is likely to increase its possible benefits to the economy with the passage of time. An exam- ination of the possible modernization of G.L.R. would be useful in this respect. For instance, it may well be worth studying the so-called "integrated system" used in the U.S.A. for transporting cotton between field and ginnery. It was not possible for the mission to examine in detail whether such a system could be adapted to conditions in the Gezira. A tightening of the labor situation could change significantly the economics of labor utilization in the Sudan. Current methods of work may have to be changed, and in time modern materials handling methods or principles may become much more attractive than they are today. The system used in the U.S.A. is based on specially-designed lorries which, with great efficiency and precision, load directly in the field containers filled with cotton, and transport them to the ginnery where they are unloaded. The lorries are fitted with a hydraulic Jack for loading and unloading. The containers are specially designed for the purpose and can be used inside the ginnery; they are open-mesh metal boxes. Similar methods might perhaps be applied in the Gezira and any study of road transport should consider the possibility of using specially-designed lorries for the transportation of the cotton seed bags or of any other inexpensive containers. This might result in a direct saving of labor used in the loading and unloading operations and an indirect increase in the time which could be made available for picking. It is assumed, of course, that the identification of the deliveries made by each farmer would remain possible. The present traffic control system is simple and effective under present conditions but it might prove inadequate if major extensions were undertaken. Each collection station is checked daily by telephone, and when an adequate amount of cotton is available along a line, one or more trains are dispatched from district headquarters. The line layout is simple, and dispatch is not a problem. The Wad el Shafie Traffic Inspector, who is senior, is responsible for any overall coordination that may become necessary. A major problem however is the need for improving the communications network which is used for all railway operations. The telephone network breaks down at frequent intervals and the emergency network of 15 radiophones, established for this purpose, is inadequate as a replacement. It is suggested that the wider use of these instruments be studied as well as the maintenance costs involved.  - 3 - ANNEX III From an operational standpoint, the affairs of the G.L.R. appear well in hand. The mission noted much evidence that the management of the G.L.R. takes an interest in applying modern principles of adminis- tration. For instance, executive duties and responsibilities have been defined with clarity and a considerable effort has been made to make management objectives as specific as possible. An effective budget control procedure has been established: although no information on actual expenditure is available from the Accountant's department at Barakat, all purchase orders are priced before dispatch, and the prices are set against the appropriate budget section; also, budget position summaries are produced. A bonus element has been incorporated in the pay scale of locomotive drivers as well as the work groups of the main- tenance engineering section. There are opportunities for further improve- ment through relating pay to productivity, wherever possible, and through the introduction of work planning techniques and work analysis methods. The management concepts already being used by the G.L.R. organization suggest that the time may have come when further advances could be introduced. Expertise needs should be reviewed to this end. As for more efficient utilization of the transport equipment, it occurs to the mission that there might be opportunities for accepting private freight business without this affecting G.L.R. service to the Scheme. The possibilities should be investigated.  ANNEX III C H A P T E R 2 THE GINNERIES On the whole, as mentioned in the Main Report, the ginneries appear to have adequate capacity in terms of the immediate future and seem to be fairly efficiently run. Nevertheless, there is room for significant improve- ments. The comments here relate only to their internal operation: the administration of the large seasonal labor component, the internal manage- ment structure, and the efficiency of the old and new ginneries. 1. Contract Labor The operation of the ginneries is highly seasonal, of course, and coincides to a considerable extent with the picking season. The provision of seasonal workers is a substantial operation in itself and is understand- ably left largely to inkependent contractors. There are separate tenderings for Hassa Heissa and Meringan, and an average year requires approximately 14,000 workers at each of these complexes. The majority of these workers come from outside the Gezira region under conditions negotiated with the contractor--terms, advance loans, transport arrangements etc. The annual value of the labor contract at Meringan and Hassa Heissa is some