Senegal - Primary Education Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICL41 USE ONLY Report No. 14443 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1735-SE) MAY 4, 1995 Population and Human Resources Operations Division Sahelian Department Mrica Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1 = CFAF 360 (at appraisal) ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank AGETIP Agence d'Excution des Travaux d'Inter&t Publique BPE Bureau des Projets Education et Formation/Education Projects Office DCES Direction des Constructions et de 1' Equipement Scolaires/ Directorate of School Construction and Equipment DPRE Direction de la Planification, de la Recherche et de l'Evaluation[Directorate of Planning, Research and Evaluation INEADE Institut National d'Etude et d'Action pour le Developpement de l'Education/National Pedagogical Institute MEN Ministere de l'Education NationalefMinistry of National Education FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 (at appraisal) January 1 - December 31 (as of 1991)  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation May 4, 1995 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUJBJECT: Project Completion Report on Senegal Primary Education Development Proiect (Credit 173 5-SE) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Senegal - Primary Education Development Project (Credit 1735-SE) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. A detailed final report prepared by the Borrower has been included as Part II. Together, these documents provide a frank and comprehensive account of project experience and outcomes. The project had four major components: (a) a sector adjustment program aiming at increasing the efficiency of primary education and at resource reallocation from the post-primary, particularly the higher education level to primary schooling; (b) an institutional development program; (c) a primary classroom building, rehabilitation and maintenance program; and (d) a quality improvement program. The project outcome is rated as satisfactory, with the exception of the resource reallocation program which proved a complete (and, in the opinion of the Government, predictable) failure. Institution building is rated as modest and the sustainability of the project achievements as uncertain because of chronic budget constraints and unproven cost recovery prospects. Covenants were not always complied with, notably in the field of accounting and auditing. The provision of adequate counterpart funds constituted a problem throughout implementation. No audit is planned. Attachment This dclument has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY ....................................... i Introduction ....................................... i Project Objectives ....................................... i Implementation Experience and Results ....................................... . i Summary of Findings and Key Lessons Learned ....................................... iii PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Introduction . B. Statement and Evaluation of Objectives. 2 C. Achievement of Objectives .3 D. Project Sustainability .6 E. Bank Performance .7 F. Borrower Performance. 8 G. Assessment of Outcomes. 9 H. Key Lessons Learned. 9 PART II: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION PART III: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1 Related Bank Loans/Credit Table 2 Project Timetable Table 3A Loan/Credit Disbursements Table 3B Country Exchange Rates Table 4 Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 5 Studies Included in the Project Table 6A Project Costs Table 6B Project Financing Table 7 Status of Legal Covenants Table 8 Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 9 Bank Resources: Missions MAP - IBRD 20043 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1735-SE) Preface This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Primary Education Development Project in Senegal, for which Credit 1735-SE in the amount of SDR 10.2 million equivalent was approved on October 14, 1986, and made effective on September 9, 1987. The Credit was closed on March 23, 1994, compared with the original closing date of June 30, 1995. It is expected to be fully disbursed, and the last disbursement is expected to take place no later than July 31, 1994. Cofinancing for the project in the amount of 5.0 million UA was provided by the African Development Bank. The PCR was prepared by the Africa Regional Office. The borrower submitted a final report, the main text of which is included as Part II of the PCR. Preparation of this PCR was begun following the Bank's final supervision mission in July 1993. It is based on material in the project file. The borrower contributed to the preparation of the PCR by submitting its own evaluation of the project's execution.   i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1735-SE) Evaluation Summary INTRODUCTION 1. This project was the fifth Bank operation in the education sector in Senegal. The First Education Project (Cr.253-SE, US$ 2.0 million, 1971) focused on improving the quality of technical and agricultural education. The Second Education Project (Cr.530-SE, US$ 15.0 million, 1975) financed science facilities, vocational training and rural youth training centers. The Third Education Project (Cr.908-SE, US$ 26.5 million, 1979) supported educational research and planning, technical and vocational education, training of agronomists, and enterprise management training. The Regional Management School Project (Cr.1638-SE, US$ 5.5 million, 1985) helped transform the business management school financed under Education HI into a regional school for the six participating countries of the West African Economic Community. All four projects have been completed. PROJECT OBJECTVES 2. The objectives of the Primary Education Development Project were to accelerate the quantitative and qualitative development of primary education, reduce unit costs, improve resource allocation and use in the education sector, and strengthen sector planning and management. 3. The project consisted of four major components: (a) a sector adjustment program, designed to improve the efficiency of resource allocation within the sector and lower per-student costs through more efficient use of teachers and facilities; (b) an institutional development program, designed to establish adequate planning, budgeting, cost control and project coordination capacities in the Ministry of Education; (c) a classroom construction, rehabilitation and maintenance program, covering three of the country's ten administrative regions; and (d) a quality improvement prograrn, supporting educational research, the establishment of a student assessment scheme, in-service training for teachers and inspectors, and the production and distribution of textbooks and teachers' guides. 4. The credit agreement contained conditionalities lincking the release of funds for primary classroom construction to the satisfactory implementation of policy measures related to resource allocation and use, notably the containment of expenditures in post-primary education.  ii 5. Given the low and stagnating primary school enrollment ratio and the declining quality of primary education obtaining in the mid-1980s, the project's policy objectives and associated investment program were timely, appropriate, and in line with the Bank's education sector policies. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 6. Implementation of the sector adjustment program (SAP) had mixed results. The first SAP objecti - increasing primary enrollments from 549,000 in SY 1985/86 to 726,000 in SY 1993/94 through more efficient use of teachers and facilities - was met in SY 1992/93 and has been exceeded since then. All efficiency measures related to this objective were implemented as agreed: INEADE developed and introduced an experimental programn of double-shift and multi-grade teaching in 75 urban and 25 rural classrooms, respectively, in the second and third years of project implementation (1987 and 1988), and trained teachers in the use of these techniques as planned at appraisal. On the basis of a positive evaluation of this pilot operation, the concept of double-shift and multi-grade teaching was accepted by both parents and the MIEN as a viable way to improve access to education, and these teaching methods were extended to over 1,400 urban and 270 rural classrooms by SY 1991/92. Together, they accounted for an enrollment increase of about 120,000 students. Eighty percent of new primary teachers were recruited at the assistant level (instituteur adjoint), as agreed, at 30% savings in salary costs. About 1,260 non-teaching staff were redeployed from administrative jobs to classroom teaching positions (against a target of 400 at appraisal), and student:teacher ratios in teacher training colleges were almost doubled, from 7:1 to 13:1, as agreed. 7. The second SAP objective - containing expenditures at post-primary levels and realocating funds thus made available to primary education - was not achieved. Specific agreements on quantitative targets for reducing higher education expenditures (containment of student bursaries, reductions in subsidies for housing, feeding, transport and medical care) were not met. On the contrary, sharply rising university enrollments caused expenditures on bursaries and social services to increase, from about 40% of the higher education budget in 1987/88 to 58% in 1992/93, contributing to an increase in expenditures on higher education from about 15% of the total education budget in 1986 to about 25% in 1992. As a result, anticipated budget re-allocations from higher to primary education were not made. In fact, the share of the education budget allocated to primary education remained at about the same level during the project period (between 46% and 48%). 8. Institutional development objectives were only partially met, as transfer of knowledge from expatriate to local staff did not take place as expected, and a considerable number of local staff trained under the project did not stay in the jobs for which they were trained. Quality improvement objectives were largely met, particularly with respect to education research, school inspectorates, and the provision of textbooks and teachers' manuals. All civil works components were completed as planned. 9. The project was implemented within overall cost estimates (in SDR) set at appraisal. However, major reallocations between disbursement categories were made, particularly for civil works whose allocation was increased by about 80%. Community participation in classroom construction and maintenance was difficult to organize and very time consuming, and the level of community contnbution was considerably lower than anticipated (only 75 out of 400 classrooms were built with community help). To speed up implementation, a major portion of classroom construction was contracted out to local firms. Government counterpart funding was problematic throughout project implementation, both for recurrent and investment costs, and the level of Government financing was less than half the appraisal figure. Cofinancing was provided by the AfDB (5.0 million UA) on a timely basis and components financed by the  iii AfDB were implemented as agreed. The project was implemented well within the timetable set at appraisal, and completed about one year ahead of schedule. 10. Key factors that affected achievement of project objectives included: (i) acceptance by parents and teachers to experiment with and implement efficiency measures such as double-shift and multi- grade teaching; (ii) provision by Government of the necessary recurrent budgets to recruit teachers for the expanding school system, in spite of increasingly difficult economic conditions; and (iii) good and consistent supervision work by both the Government and the Bank, and willingness to adjust plans and programs to deal with unexpected difficulties. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED 11. Among the key lessons learned from this project are the following: (a) Although the policy package of this project was well designed, Government was not committed to implement the politically difficult measures in higher education, particularly when faced with vested interests and protests from pressure groups. This lack of commitment is attributable, in part, to inadequate or ineffective consultation with those most concerned by those policy changes (i.e. university management, staff and students), particularly during project preparation and appraisal, and the lack of a mechanism to keep a participatory, consultative process on policy issues alive during project implementation. To the contrary, supervision missions were advised by the Minister of Education not to visit the university to pursue policy discussions or check up on compliance with agreed policy measures. The Bank's decision not to apply the leverage that could have been used to curb higher education expenditures (block disbursements for primary classroom construction) and pressure the Government to discuss higher education policies, gave the Government the signal that the Bank was not very serious about policy conditionalities. (b) Community participation in school construction requires a clear understanding between all parties concerned as regards the level and method of their respective contributions to the program, laid down in the form of a contract so that in case of default the Government can be legally bound to finance the shortfall. In Senegal, the ability of communities to contribute to school construction was not realistically assessed at appraisal, and in the end communities contributed to about 125 classrooms out of 400 planned, with the credit making up the difference. Mobilizing communities to contribute to school construction can also be very time-consuming and labor-intensive, and may require considerable technical support and supervision from the implementing agency. In the case of Senegal, the cost of supervising community-assisted school construction was about 24% of the total cost of construction, two or three times higher than supervision costs normally charged by contractors. (c) Capacity building demands more detailed analysis and planning than it received during this project's preparation and appraisal, and a well worked out plan for supervising and supporting these efforts during implementation. It was not sufficient for the project to provide for training of local staff without adequately assesssing the institutional capacity and incentive structure to retain staff once trained. Poor working conditions, lack of logistic support and low salaries contributed to more than 50% of staff trained under the project to leave Government service soon after completing training, which helps explain why Government continued to use technical asisstance in substitution for nationals, instead of building up local capacities.  iv (d) Government did not provide its counterpart contribution to the project as stipulated in the credit agreement (contributing less than 50% of its agreed share), which resulted in implementation delays and the eventual reallocation of credit proceeds to make up the shortfall. To address this problem, consideration should be given to requiring Government to make up-front deposits of its counterpart contribution into a special account at the start of the fiscal year, or at specified intervals, as a condition for release of credit funds for the period. The legal agreement would give IDA the option to suspend dibursements if Government fails to make its deposits as agreed (solutions of this type are being applied in the infrastructure sector in AF5) . 12. Pre-investment studies carried out during the project supported the preparation of a follow- up project in primary education (Second Human Resource Development Project, Cr.2473-SE, 1994). They also provided valuable quantitative information to facilitate policy discussions in higher education and prepare an investment program in that sub-sector. Detailed analytical work on the restructuring of the vocational training system, financed under the project's studies program, is expected to lead to a project in that sub-sector, pending Govermment decisions on policy matters.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1735-SE) Project Identity Project Name Primary Education Development Project Credit Number :1735-SE Credit Amount : 10.2 million SDR RVP Unit : Africa Region Country : Senegal Sector : Education A. INTRODUCTION 1. Sector Development Objectives. The Government's objectives for the development of education were shaped by the results of a national commission on education reform (CNREF) which recommended, in 1984, that Senegal's education system should be equitable, efficient and responsive to national needs. The Commnission established three priority actions: (a) the expansion of primary education, with an intermediate target of increasing the enrollment ratio of the 7-12 age group from 52% in 1985 to 60% in 1989 (the plan period) and fuD enrolment by the year 2000; (b) the introduction of a new education structure, with ten years of compulsory schooling (primary plus lower-secondary, ages 7-16), followed by three years of general secondary education or professional training, and higher education of varying kinds and duration; and (c) changes in curriculum content including a polytechnic or polyvalent orientation, the introduction of national languages, and moral and religious education. As the financial implications of these changes were not fully worked out, the Government decided on an experimental phase of the reform, to be implemented on a Limited scale, carefully evaluated, and extended if justified by the results obtained. Tfhe project supported these objectives, with the addition of a package of policy measures aimed at improving the efficiency of resource use. 2. Linkages between Project. Sector. and Macro Policy Objectives. The Government's education sector development objectives of the mid-1980s complemented the structural adjustment programs of the 1985-1992 period, which focused on improving the management of public resources. Policy measures introduced under the project explicitly supported improved resource managemt. They fel into two categories: (a) measures to lower unit costs through more efficient use of teachers and facilities (recruiting assistant-level teachers, redeploying teachers from administrative posts to the classroom, introducing double-shift and multi-grade teaching methods, and imposing higher student/teacher ratios); and (b) measures to contain expenditures, particularly at post-primary levels (reducing student subsidies, introducing cost recovery, and establishing ceilings on the growth of recurrent expenditures for secondary and higher education), thereby allowing for the reallocation of funds from secondary and higher education to primary education.  2 B. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTVES 3. Project Objectives: The objectives of the project were to accelerate the quantitative and qualitative development of primary education, improve resource allocation and use in the sector, reduce unit costs, and strengthen sector planning and management. 4. Project Description: The project consisted of a sector adjustment program and an investment program with three main components, as follows: a) a sector adjustment progran. designed to (i) lower unit costs through the more efficient use of teachers and facilities, thereby helping to increase primary school enrollznents from 549,000 in 1985/86 to 726,000 in 1993/94, or 32% in eight years; and (ii) increase resources for primary education by reducing expenditures in higher education and transferring the resulting "savings" to primary education. (b) an institutional development program designed to establish adequate planning, budgeting, cost control and project coordination capacities in the Ministry of Education, by providing specialist services, staff training, equipment, vehicles and incremental operating costs for (i) the Directorate of Studies and Planning; (ii) a Physical Facilities Unit to oversee school construction and maintenance; and (iii) an Education Projects Office to coordinate the implementation of the Ministry's investment program. (c) a classroom construction. rehabilitation and maintenance pro rant consisting of (i) the construction of 400 low-cost, low-maintenance classrooms in three of the country's ten regions; (ii) the rehabilitation of 100 classrooms; and (iii) the implementation of a preventive school maintenance program. (d) a quality improvement program designed to increase the effectiveness of teachers in the classroom, through educational research that included an experimental education reformn program, a student assessment scheme, in-service training for teachers and inspectors, and the production and distribution of about one million textbooks and 61,000 teachers' guides. 5. Evaluation: Proiect Objectives. The conceptual foundation of the project was sound. The objectives of expanding access to primary education and improving education quality were consistent with the Government's development strategies and in line with the Bank's education sector policies. Project design recognized that resources allocated to primary education would need to be substantially increased, and proposed to find these resources by introducing efficiency measures and by reallocating funds within the education budget in favor of primary education. The latter - transferring funds from higher to primary education - tumed out to be a flaw in project design, on two counts: First, the Bank underestimated the political fallout (including strikes and riots) that would result from taking away acquired rights of university students to generous scholarships and social support services (housing, medical care, transport, meals), and overestimated the strength of Govemment's commitment to push such unpopular policy measures through. Second, higher education authorities were not very motivated to implement difficult policy changes without investments, and preferred to maintain the status quo. As a result, budget savings were not made and transfers from higher to primary education did not take place. The broad question of project design was raised by the SVP at the decision memorandum stage.  3 6. Project Design. The project was conservative in scope and correctly took account of the linited implementation capacities of the Ministry of Education and its agencies. It had several innovative features, such as the introduction of multi-grade and double-shift teaching in primary education as an internal efficiency measure, the involvement of communities in classroom construction and maintenance as a way to foster ownership and reduce the burden on the Govermnent's investment budget, and the revision of curricula and the development of textbooks that were better attuned to local conditions. The project was well prepared, with clear implementation plans and targets to be reached, as evidenced by the excellent implementation documents prepared prior and during implementation. These contributed to the successful implementation of the investment component. 7. Responsibility for Project Implementation: Responsibility for implementing policies and investments in primary education was correctly allocated to existing units of the MEN, and coordinated by the Education Projects Office (BPE) established under the project within the MEN. However, responsibility for implementing policy measures in higher education was much less clear. First, responsibility for higher education shifted during implementation, from the Minister of Education in 1986 to a newly-created Minister of Higher Education in 1988, and back again following a ministerial restructuring in 1991. Further, although the Minister of Education (or Higher Education) was nominally responsible, implementation of policy measures depended on the cooperation of the quasi-autonomous University, which was asked to introduce these measures but did not derive any financial benefits from the project. Bank supervision missions, when attempting to explain to the university authorities the rationale behind and the need for introducing sometimes difficult policy measures, were discouraged by the Ministry to visit the university, a clear indication of the Government's lack of commitment to policy changes in higher education. 8. Risks: The SAR correctly identified project risks as (i) delays in the construction of primary schools owing to MEN's limited implementation capacity and untested cost-sharing arrangements with conmmunities; and (ii) failure to fully achieve the sector adjustment measures, particularly in higher education. The first risk was addressed late in the project cycle when it became apparent that neither the MEN's planning unit (with respect to school mapping) nor its school construction unit (with respect to planning, managing and supervising school construction) was competent to handle the modest 400- classroom construction program, in spite of significant project support in terms of staff training, technical assistance and logistics. Eventually, in 1993, two other models of managing the remaining school construction program were tried, the first by an NGO (Aide et Action which had experience in classroom construction), and the second by a non-Governmental agency (AGETIP), which had an established track record in managing small civil works contracts. Both agencies quickly completed the remaining civil works program, at lower unit cost. This experience led the MEN to delegate the management of the civil works program under the follow-up IDA project (Cr. 2473-SE) to AGETIP. 9. The second risk - containment of subsidies in higher education, a conditionality for release of funds for the second and third tranches of primary school construction - was not vigorously addressed under the project. Conditionalities were eventually waived, and efficiency measures in higher education deferred to an upcoming higher education project. C. ACEVIEMEmNT OF OBJECT1ES 10. Policy Objectives: The Sector Adjustment Program (SAP). The SAP's first objective was to increase primary enrollments from 549,000 in SY 1985/86 to 726,000 by 1993/94 by lowering unit costs through more efficient use of teachers and facilities. This was to be accomplished by applying five  4 efficiency measures: (i) recruitment and training of 80 percent of new teachers at the instituteur adjoint (assistant) level to eventually reach a ratio of tnstftuteur adjoint/insfftuteur of 47:53; (ii) redeployment of 400 teachers from administrative positions to classroom teaching by 1991; (iii) experimentation with and introduction of double-shift teaching in 75 urban and multi-grade teaching in 25 rural classrooms by SY 1989/90; (iv) increase of student teacher ratios in teacher training colleges to about 15:1 by SY 1988/89; and (v) consolidation of specialized civil service training schools by 1988/89, based on a study to be conducted in 1987. The SAP's second objective was to increase the primary education budget by containing expenditures in higher education and reallocating funds thus made available to primary education. Three measures were foreseen: (i) reduce the fellowship budget by 26% in real terms; (ii) reduce indirect subsidies (student support services) in real terms by 51% by 1994; and (iii) introduce cost recovery systems such as student loans. Also, ceilings were to be set on the growth of administrative expenditures, for a cumulative reduction of 7.7% in real terms by 1994. 11. With respect to the first objective, primary enrollments increased faster than projected, from 549,000 in 1985/86 to 738,000 by 1992/93, to a significant degree as a result of the introduction of double-shift and mulit-grade teaching, which accounted for 120,000 additional students being accommodated, and to a lesser degree through the new classrooms constructed during that period. The 400 classrooms financed by the IDA credit contributed only marginally (about 20,000 student places) to the enrollment increase. The rate of increase (at 4.2% p.a.), however, was only slightly higher than the population growth rate (averaging about 3.0%) so that the proportion of the school-age population enrolled increased only marginally, from 54% to 59% over the period. 12. By 1992, eighty percent of new primary teachers were recruited and deployed as "inshtuteur adjoint" (assistant teacher), as agreed, at 30% savings in salary costs. About 1,260 non- teaching staff were redeployed from administrative jobs to classroom teaching positions, three times the appraisal target. After experimentation in 1987 and 1988, double-shift teaching was finnly established by 1992 in about 1,400 urban classrooms and multi-grade teaching in 270 rural classrooms, more than ten times appraisal targets. Student:teacher ratios in teacher training colleges were doubled to 15: 1, as agreed. A study on civil service training schools was conducted, but its recommendations were not implemented. On balance, though, the Government was conmmitted to this part of the policy adjustment programn. 13. With respect to the second objective, measures to contain expenditures in higher education and transfer cost savings to primary education were not implemented as agreed. On the contrary: higher education's share of the education budget increased from 23% in 1986/87 to 26% in 1992/93 because of sharply rising enrollments at the university (from about 5,000 students in 1985 to approximately 21,000 in 1993), with corresponding increases in expenditures for scholarships and subsidies (up from 40% of the higher education budget in 1986/87 to 58% by 1992/3). Not surprisingly, the planned increase in primary education's share of the total education budget did not materialize (it fluctuated between 46 and 48%). 14. The student subsidy question, a key policy measure, was never resolved, in part because of continuing and sometimes violent student protest, and vocal opposition of faculty staff. The leverage that could have been exercised to curb higher education expenditures - i.e. blocking the release of Credit funds for the second and third tranches of primary school construction - was not used. The reasons advanced by the Bank for this action were that: (a) all adjustment measures related to primary education were successfully implemented; (b) spending on higher education, as a percentage of total education expenditures, was not considered excessive (it was, in fact, lower than in most Sahelian countries); and (c) political turmoil needed to be avoided in difficult economic times. Eventually, the Bank decided not to penalize primary education for lack of progress in resolving higher education financing problems, and the  5 Govemment was asked to deal with these under an upcoming higher education restructuring program. 15. The SAP was supported by an extensive program of studies (Annex Table 5). These focused on the expansion of primary education, the development of educational planning, efficiency improvements in secondary and technical education, efficiency improvements in higher education, and sector planning and financing. Studies were completed as planned; those in secondary and higher education were expanded to include eight pre-investment studies for a planned operation in technical and vocational education. Technical assistance and local staff training programs were adequately integrated with the studies program. 16. Institutional Development Objectives: Institutional development objectives were partially met. First, the MEN's Directorate of Planning, Research and Studies (DPRE), which benefited from long-term technical assistance, extensive local staff training in-country (113 people) and overseas (6 senior staff), and the provision of computer equipment and programs, had, halfway through the project, developed a reasonable capacity for educational planning and budgeting, data collection and analysis, publication of statistical yearbooks, and school mapping. However, management of the DPRE was consistently weak, staff tum-over high and motivation low, and in the end the unit failed to establish itself as the intellectual heart of the ministry. During preparation of the follow-up project (Second Human Resources Development Project, Credit 2473-SE), low capacity of the planning department was cited as a limiting factor in implementation. 17. The physical facilities planning unit (DPI), set up in the Directorate of School Construction (DCES) to plan and manage the MEN's school construction and maintenance program, did not meet its responsibility. Systems and procedures set up with help from extemal expertise were not maintained after the technical assistance left, equipment was not maintained, and the DCES got sidetracked into school maintenance (which was not its main function, but which it executed successfully). At project end, responsibility for managing the MEN's school construction program was transferred from the DCES to the private sector (AGETIP), and the DCES was downgraded from a directorate to a division within the MEN's Directorate of Management and Administration, responsible for rehabilitation and maintenance. 18. The education projects office (BPE) was established as planned and eventually developed an acceptable capacity for project coordination and administration. However, the BPE was, in the end, grossly overstaffed, with marginally qualified people, and the competence of the unit was questionable. Two long-term technical assistance staff - a pedagogue/planner recruited for two years to coordinate the pedagogical aspects of the project, and an administrator recruited for one year to set up the project's management and accounting systems - stayed on for the entire six-year project period. The Bank continued to approve Government's requests for extending these TA positions. The Govemrnment, for its part, failed to recruit Senegalese nationals as counterparts to the two expatriate staff so that, at project end, these key positions were still not occupied by nationals. 19. Quality Improvement Objectives: There were three major quality improvement components: (a) strengthening the national pedagogical institute (INEADE); (b) improving the primary schools inspectorate; and (c) producing and distributing textbooks. INEADE successfully carried out its mandate of introducing the education reform program through a pilot operation in 100 primary schools, evaluated the results of this experiment, and provided pedagogical support to the education system. The inspectorate system was strengthened at the regional and departmental levels through staff training and logistic support, and has become capable of providing support to teachers and school principals at the school level (additional support for the inspectorates is provided under Cr.2473-SE).  6 20. INEADE also set up a capacity to develop manuscripts and produce textbooks and teachers guides, and at project end more than 1.5 million textbooks and teachers' guides were procured, exceeding appraisal targets by about 30%. The distribution of textbooks to schools, however, tumed out to be very difficult to organize using the MEN's facilities and personnel, and was eventually tumed over to the private sector using some 60 commercial outlets. Cost recovery through the sale of books was implemented under the project as agreed, but was not adequate during the first two years to finance the cost of replenishing book stocks due to the limited number of sales outlets at that time. The scheme laid the foundation for a financially self-sustaining textbook system under the follow-up project (Cr. 2473-SE). 21. Physical Objectives: There were no critical variances between planned and actual implementation of the investment program, with most quantitative targets achieved as planned. 22. The objective of the classroom construction program (400 classrooms in three project regions) was achieved. The project's philosophy of community participation in classroom construction was found to be extremely time-consuming, with considerable variations in approach from one locality to the other, and costly because of the need for extensive technical assistance to mobilize communities and assist with the construction process (supervision costs represented about 24% of total construction costs). With this approach, managed by the DCES, it took more than four years to complete 100 classrooms, one quarter of the total - obviously an unacceptable pace. Nevertheless, it was shown that community participation can be a viable option for school construction provided that supervisory assistance is intensive and well-organized, construction methods adapted to local practices, and community contributions well understood and within the capacity of villagers to deliver. An emergency program of 100 classrooms in the Dakar area, responding to pressing needs for classroom space, was approved by IDA on an exceptional basis and quickly completed by private contractors at high unit costs (US$ 18,000 per classroom). Because of slow implementation progress with the MEN-managed construction program, the third phase was split into three parts, divided between DCES (30 classrooms), an NGO (45 ) and AGETIP (100), with the objective of testing out the best approach for use in future projects. The work was completed on time by the three parties, at relatively low unit costs (US$ 11,000 per classroom). The excellent experience with private sector management of school construction, including community participation, led the Government to use AGETIP as its contract management agency for school construction under the follow-up project (Cr. 2473-SE). 23. The classroom rehabilitation program was successfully irnplemented by the DCES and appraisal targets were met. About 1,000 maintenance guides were prepared and distributed and almost 700 tool kits provided to about 460 primary schools in the three project regions, along with some construction materials. An important element of the program was an information carnpaign to help sensitize authorities and villagers to the need for school maintenance, while the availability of tools and materials motivated a number of school principals and parent-teachers associations to organize rraintenance committees and implement regular maintenance programs. D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILT 24. Major components of the project are sustainable. The textbook scheme, for example, was designed to be self-financing in that proceeds from sales of books to parents or students were to be deposited into a revolving fund used to finance the replenishment of book stocks. Set up and tested under the project, the system is being expanded country-wide under the ongoing education project (Cr. 2473-SE) and is expected to be self-sustaining. The school maintenance program introduced under the project is  7 sustainable, provided that the Government continues to make the (relatively small) budgetary provisions for maintenance materials begun under this project. Efficiency measures in primary education introduced under the project are also sustainable (continued application of double-shift and multi-grade teaching, recruiting instituteurs-adjoints instead of instituteurs), although their cost-saving effects will become less pronounced as the education system matures and these measures are fully applied on a national scale. 25. Capacity building efforts were successful in the short term, as local staff were trained in areas such as educational planning and management and began to fill key positions in the MIEN. Paradoxically, however, their training and growing expertise made them attractive candidates for more lucrative or challenging jobs outside the public service and many of them joined the private sector or international organizations (including the World Bank). Clearly, capacity building will require additional attention in follow-up operations, probably in the form of short-term expertise for specific well-defined tasks and through long-term twinning arrangements with external institutions having the necessary expertise. This approach is being implemented under the follow-up project (Cr. 2473-SE). E. BANK PERFORMANCE 26. Project preparation took four years, from issue of the IEPS in September 1983 to credit effectiveness in September 1987, providing a long lead time for consensus building and for agreeing on major policy issues. The appraisal mission considered the Government's plans for development of the sector too ambitious and correctly took its weak implementation capacity into account in designing the project, focusing on key policy measures and institutional strengthening. The project's financial package was well balanced, with the IDA credit accounting for 61% of project costs, the AfDB for 27% (classroom maintenance, institutional strengthening of INEADE and textbooks), and the Government and communities for the remaining 12%. Relations were considered good with other agencies established in Dakar, but decidedly weak with the AfDB, the major cofinancing partner in the project. (There is, for example, no evidence of any joint IDA-AfDB project supervision missions). There were detailed implementation plans for each project component, which helped structure the IDA supervision process. Performance indicators were not explicitly developed, although the legal covenants provided a good framework for checking implementation progress, especially with respect to the policy package. 27. During the almost six years of project implementation, from effectiveness in September 1987 to completion in December 1993, there were ten supervision missions. The first six missions consisted of only two persons - an education economist or planner and an architect - whose attention focused mainly (and understandably) on implementation of the sector adjustment programn, and on contractual and procurement issues. The composition of later missions was more polyvalent through the addition of education and textbook specialists, and more attention was paid to educational content and quality issues (textbook production, teacher training, the functioning of the inspectorates and the application of the education reform). The resident mission also began to play a more active role in supervision, with an operations officer specifically assigned to follow up on ongoing activities and participate in the semi-annual supervision missions. Continuity in mission staffing as well as headquarters support was adequate. Although not officially reported as supervision missions, some supervision work was carried out during the later stages of the project, when a follow-up project was being prepared. 28. There was no formal mid-term review of project perfornance. However, the supervision missions of June 1988 and November 1990 conducted comprehensive reviews of project performance in connection with the second and third tranche releases for the classroom construction program. These reviews however focused on the implementation of the sector adjustment program, not on details of  8 physical progress. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 29. Government participated actively in project preparation and, with the help of external and local consultants, conducted a large number of well-prepared pre-investment studies for consideration by the Bank's appraisal team. At credit effectiveness, the project unit (BPE) was established, a local director appointed, and the unit was off to a quick start. The initial focus was (correctly) on starting up the classroom construction and maintenance program, implementing the pilot program for education reform, developing the textbook component, and strengthening the MEN's planning capacity. On balance, project management was competent throughout implementation, in spite of frequent changes in managers (five directors in six years). There were, however, too many local staff - 23 at project end, where about half would have sufficed. The BPE was supported by two long-term technical assistants: an education adviser and a project administrator. The major weakness of this setup was that the BPE directors tended to rely on the two TA staff and did not seriously seek to replace them with Senegalese professionals. The few Senegalese that were recruited as counterparts for the administrator's position were not satisfactory and left after a short period of time. Conversely, the TA staff were not motivated to find and train local counterparts and remained on staff for six years, until project completion. 30. Government's performance in implementing the policy package was decidedly mixed. Efficiency measures in primary education were implemented as agreed and objectives were met or exceeded, thus demonstrating Government's commitment to the expansion of primary education. However, Government was clearly not committed (or lacked the political courage) to implement policy measures designed to contain expenditures in higher education, with the result that the agreed transfer of resources from higher to primary education did not take place and primary education did not expand at the rate it could have done. 31. Cumbersome administrative procedures within the MEN, aggravated by long delays in contract approvals by the tender board, were a major cause of implementation delays, particularly in the school construction program. The lack of counterpart funds for project expenditures (20% of the cost of civil works and 20% of incremental operating costs) was a continuing problem which was never resolved. Although budgeted, counterpart funds were not released by the Ministry of Finance when needed (or not released at all) and some contractors resorted to padding their accounts so that the IDA portion (80%) of the inflated contract price would cover their actual costs. In the end, the Government contributed only about 50% of its agreed counterpart contribution to the total project cost (Annex Table 6B). 32. There were continuing problems with the financial management of the project, ranging from incorrect recording of expenditures, mistakes in withdrawals from the special accounts, inadequate intemal controls, and late or incomplete submissions of audit reports. It is difficult to understand why these problems did occur, given the presence of a full-time (expatriate) financial manager in the project unit and the availability of qualified intemational auditors in Dakar. 33. Coordination between the various implementing units and the BPE, and contacts between the BPE and the Bank were generally adequate. Serni-annual progress reports were produced on time, and in sufficient detail. Financial reporting, however, was weak throughout project implementation, an observation which is confirmed by the annual audit reports.  9 G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES 34. Overall performance of the project is rated "satisfactory". Major policy objectives in primary education were achieved. This provided a solid basis for developing the policy framework and investment program for the follow-up operation, which again focuses on primary education (Cr.2473-SE). Policy objectives in higher education were not achieved, despite continued dialogue between the Bank and the Government on the importance of controlling the growth of higher education expenditures. When it became clear that no progress was going to be made, these issues were deferred to a follow-up operation, a free-standing higher education project, currently under preparation. The project's physical objectives were met, with civil works components completed and educational equipment, furniture and textbooks delivered as planned. Institutional and capacity building objectives were partially met but turned out not to be sustainable. They need further attention under follow-up operations. 35. With respect to improving education content and quality, the project was largely successful. As a result of the project, Senegal's education system has become more coherent in its objectives and structure and more relevant, as demonstrated by the availability of good quality textbooks, the participation of parents and communities in the educational process, the introduction and acceptance of double-shift teaching as a viable method of increasing enrollments, the strengthened role of the inspectorates, and the introduction (on a pilot basis) of pedagogical innovations. 36. Project implementation suffered from serious institutional and management problems. Important among these were the Government's cumbersome procurement procedures, the long delays in getting bid documents processed and approved, and the slow passage of documents through the central tender board. Despite reasonably competent Senegalese project directors and long-term technical assistance, the operation of the education projects office (BPE) of the MEN was inefficient: there were too many staff, some of whom were insufficiently qualified, and internal procedures for moving the paperwork through the system were not well developed. H. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 37. Among the key lessons learned from this project are the following: (a) Although the policy package of this project was well designed, Government was not committed to implement the politically difficult measures in higher education, particularly when faced with vested interests and protests from pressure groups. This lack of commitment is attributable, in part, to inadequate or ineffective consultation with those most concerned by those policy changes (i.e. university management, staff and students), particularly during project preparation and appraisal, and the lack of a mechanism to keep a participatory, consultative process on policy issues alive during project implementation. To the contrary, supervision missions were advised by the Minister of Education not to visit the university to pursue policy discussions or check up on compliance with agreed policy measures. The Bank's decision not to apply the leverage that could have been used to curb higher education expenditures (block disbursements for primary classroom construction) and pressure the Government to discuss higher education policies, gave the Government the signal that the Bank was not very serious about policy conditionalities. (b) Community participation in school construction requires a clear understanding between all parties concerned as regards the level and method of their respective contributions to the program,  10 laid down in the form of a contract so that in case of default the Government can be legally bound to finance the shortfall. In Senegal, the ability of communities to contribute to school construction was not realistically assessed at appraisal, and in the end communities contributed to about 125 classrooms out of 400 planned, with the credit making up the difference. Mobilizing communities to contribute to school construction can also be very time-consuming and labor-intensive, and may require considerable technical support and supervision from the implementing agency. In the case of Senegal, the cost of supervising community-assisted school construction was about 24% of the total cost of construction, two or three times higher than supervision costs normally charged by contractors. (c) Capacity building demands more detailed analysis and planning than it received during this project's preparation and appraisal, and a well worked out plan for supervising and supporting these efforts during implementation. It was not sufficient for the project to provide for training of local staff without adequately assesssing the institutional capacity and incentive structure to retain staff once trained. Poor working conditions, lack of logistic support and low salaries contributed to more than 50% of staff trained under the project to leave Government service soon after completing training, which helps explain why Government continued to use technical asisstance in substitution for nationals, instead of building up local capacities. (d) Government did not provide its counterpart contribution to the project as stipulated in the credit agreement (contributing less than 50% of its agreed share), which resulted in implementation delays and the eventual reallocation of credit proceeds to make up the shortfall. To address this problem, consideration should be given to requiring Government to make up-front deposits of its counterpart contribution into a special account at the start of the fiscal year, or at specified intervals, as a condition for release of credit funds for the period. The legal agreement would give IDA the optVon to suspend dibursements if Government fails to make its deposits as agreed (solutions of this ., are being applied in the infrastructure sector in AF5) .  11 PART II: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION CREDIT: IDA No. 1735-SE EDUCATION PROJECT LOAN: BAD No. CS/SN/ED/87/014 COORDINATION UNIT (UCP) P.O.B. 822--DAKAR Tel.: (221) 22.43.54 (221) 22.36.46 Fax: (221) 22.34.65 COUNTRY: SENEGAL PROJECT: PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT EXECUTING AGENCY: MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION FINAL REPORT ON EDUCATION PROJECT IV May 1994  12 SUMMARY A. INTRODUCTION (REVIEW OF PREVIOUS PROJECTS) 1. Education Project I 2. Education Project II 3. Education Project m 4 Education Project IV B. PROJECT PREPARATION FRAMEWORK 1. The Educational Context 2. The Economic Context 3. Project Objective C. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF EACH COMPONENT 1. The Sectoral Adjustment Program (SAP) 2. Strengthening of the Directorate of Planning, Research and Studies (DERP) 3. Strengthening of the Directorate of School Construction and Equipment (DCES) 4. Rehabilitation of 100 Classrooms 5. Establishment of a System for Preventive Maintenance of the Schools 6. Construction of 400 Primary School Classrooms 7. Strengthening of the National Pedagogical Institute (INEADE) 8. Strengthening of the Primary Education Inspectorate 9. Publication of Textbooks D. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 1. Project Management and Internal Performance 2. Impact on the Initial Costs and Objectives 3. National Counterpart Funding 4. Procedural Constraints 5. Medium and Long-Term Effects of the Projects  13 A. INTRODUCTION (REVIEW OF PREVIOUS PROJECTS) Since 1972, Senegal has at regular intervals received World Bank loans for the development of education. They included the three successive projects described below. 1. Education Project I, for which the credit agreement was issued in 1972, was aimed primarily at technical teaching. It financed: * the Institut Universitaire de Technologie, now known as ENSUT * the Ecole Normale Superieure Universitaire de Technologie (now known as ENSETP) * the Lycee Technique Peytavin * upgrading of the Ecole d'Agriculture de Ziguinchor * the study on upgrading of the Ecole de Formation Maritime 2. Education Project II, funded by a 1975 credit agreement to strengthen scientific and technological teaching by expanding the field of nonfornal education, financed: * the construction and outfitting of eight scientific and technical units for secondary-level classes * the construction and outfitting of four middle-level schools * the construction and outfitting of five middle-level centers of practical teaching 3 upgrading of the Centre National de Qualification Professionnelle (CNPQ) 3 strengthening of maritime training 3. Education Project m, under a 1979 credit agreement, covered an even broader field by adding support for primary education to the strengthening of scientific and technical courses. The project's activities were directed at the following areas: L. Primary education * Creation of the Institut National d'Etude et d'Action pour le Ddveloppement de l'Education (INEADE)--for which equipment, study grants and expert advice were provided * Construction and outfitting of the Ecole Normale Regionale (ENR) at Kolda * Construction of 82 elementary-level classrooms, with the use of local materials u. Technical and vocational courses * An increase in the capabilities of ENSUT and ENSETP; refurbishing of the Delafosse and Peytavin technical schools; and strengthening of the CNQP  14 iii. School of Agriculture: the Institut National de D6veloppement Rural (INDR) at Thies--construction and outfitting of the premises, plus technical assistance and training scholarships iv. In the management field: the Ecole Superieure de Gestion (CESAG)- construction, outfitting and training courses 4. Education Project IV, which went into effect on July 17, 1987, was aimed at quantitative and qualitative development of primary teaching as defined in the following paragraphs, mainly in three disadvantaged regions: Diourbel, Fatick and Louga. B. PROJECT PREPARATION FRAMEWORK 1. THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT The high point in preparation of Project Four was undoubtedly the meeting of the Etats Generaux de l'Education et de la Formation (EGEF), which revealed the low level of school attendance in Senegal and the failure of teaching quality to meet the country's needs and expectations. The consensus which emerged at that meeting created the master Ecole Nouvelle project; targeting of the goal to achieve universal school coverage by the year 2000; the revision of current curricula; and the defining of long-term priorities and strategies. 2. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT For Senegal--as for the rest of the countries in the region--the 1980s were a period of economic crisis sparked by a variety of causes, both endogenous and exogenous. Faced with that situation, Senegal adopted an austerity policy. It featured the 1980-1984 Economic and Financial Revitalization Plan (Plan de Redressement Economique et Financier--PREF) and the 1985-1992 Medium and Long-Term Structural Adjustment Plan (Plan d'Ajustement Structurel a Moyen et Long Terme--PAML). The chief purpose of both plans was to restore the macroeconomic and financial balances needed for sustainable growth. In this context, the different sectors were called upon to redouble their efforts to maximize the existing potential and resources. That was the scenario in which Education Project IV was designed to take into account the objectives set forth in the Seventh Economic and Social Plan for the education sector, to wit: quick growth of elementary school classes and implementation of the reform envisaged--which explains why the "Primary Education Development Project" is first and foremost a strategic program adhering to the general principles of the Structural Adjustment Plan (Plan d'Ajustement Structurel-PAS).  l 5 3. PROJECT OBJECTIVE The Government's goal for the year 2000 is universal school attendance. Given the 3 % annual growth rate for the school-age population and the dismal level of overall enrollment (52 % in 1986), however, unless some changes are made in the present schedule of outlays in the primary school sector and its share (about 23 %) of the total operating budget, the enrollment rate will drop back to 38%. Accordingly, the general purpose of the project is to help the Government spur qualitative and quantitative development of primary education within the framework of the structural and sectoral adjustment programs by using education-oriented resources more effectively and strengthening the sector's institutions. Priority in doing so would be assigned to the primary schools. C. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF EACH COMPONENT The Fourth Project is only one of several stages in the long-terrn process leading to universal school attendance and implementation of the educational reform, and it is from this vantage point that the various components cited below should be considered, without losing sight of the requisite interaction between quantitative and qualitative development. The interventions of this phase of the project are confined to the Diourbel, Fatick and Louga regions, particularly because of the low level of school achievement posted in that area. 1. THE SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM (SAP? 1. Objectives Objective 1: To boost primary enrollments from 549,000 in SY 1985/1986 to 726,000 in 1993/1994. This will require the following measures: a. an increase in the ratio of instituteurs-adjoints/instituteurs (assistant teachers to regular teachers) from 47:53 at the start of the project to 80:20 by the time it is completed. b. the redeployment of 400 teachers currently engaged in central and regional administrative positions [to classroom teaching]. c. the institution of a system that calls for double shifts and multigrade classes and will allow an increase of 20,000 in enrollment without any additional impact on the budget. d. provision for more rational use of normal school faculty by cutting the ratio of professors to students from 1:7 to 1:15. Objective 2: To increase the primary education budget, which will entail: a. a cutback in the financing of higher education by means of * a 26% reduction in the fellowship budget * the introduction of a student loan system  l6 * a 51 % slash in the real value of student support services (COUD) by SY 1994/1995 b. holding the rate of budgetary increases to * 1 % for the central administration office * 1.5% for secondary education * 1 % for higher education These steps are designed to increase the enrollments by 180.000 students--including 18.00 from the three project regions--between 1986 and 1995. 2. Results obtained Objective 1. The following results were achieved in regard to this goal: a. At the national level, real attendance reached 738,560 students in SY 1992/1993-i.e., one year before the target date with a net increase of 189.6students. b. In the three regions covered by the project, the anticipated increase is 35% higher than the estimates, since 24.280 students were enrolled instead of the 18,000 originally envisaged. REGIONS 1985/86 1992/93 NET DIFFERENCE P4 (no DIOURBEL 24,500 31,390 6,890 28.1 FATICK 35,900 45,620 9,720 27.1 LOUGA 23.,900 31.57 7.670 32.1 TOTALS 84,300 108,580 1,280 23.6 SENEGAL 549,000 738,560 189,560 34.5 c. The ratio of assistant teachers to regular teachers rose from 29:71 in SY 1987/1988 to 58:42 in SY 1992/1993. Progress in this respect seems slower than anticipated. d. The number of teachers redeployed was not the 400 contemplated but a total of 1,262 since the start of the project-in other words, three times the target figure.  17 e. Use of the double shift system started as of the first year of the project. The evaluation showed the following results: SCHOOL YEAR CDF CMG 1987/88 506 1988/89 780 1989/90 1,040 223 1990/91 1,362 142 1991/92 1,412 271 1992/93 1,031 208 By the end of that period (1992/93), the gain in additional enrollments consisted of 122,000 students. This resulted in cost savings of approximately four billion CFA francs. f. The assignment of professors at normal schools reached a ratio of 1:13 for the entire group in that category. Objective 2. This goal appears to be the least realistic of those set since the project was originally conceived. The results obtained failed to live up to expectations. e There was no reduction in the volume of expenditures on higher education. Quite the contrary: the figure continued to rise steadily. The budgets of the different subcomponents underwent the following changes: Higher Education Teaching Budget Cumulative % School Year (Billions of CFAF) Fellowships Coud (a) (b) (a) + _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~(b) 1987/1988 11.1 3.0 1.4 39.6 1988/1989 11.2 3.2 1.4 41.1 1989/1990 14.1 3.5 3.4 48.9 1990/1991 15.8 3.6 3.5 44.9 1991/1992 14.4 3.6 3.9 52.1 1992/1993 16.8 5.5 4.3 58.3  1B The secondary education budget also underwent constant changes between 1988 and 1993. Budget Education (Billions of Secondary Administation School Year CFAF) Education Centml 1987/1988 48,0 12,4 25S,8 1,7 3,5 1988/1989 52,4 14,1 26,9 1,8 3,4 1989/1990 62,5 14,2 22,7 1,8 2,9 1990/1991 60,3 14,5 24,0 1,8 3,0 1991/1992 61,7 12,7 20,7 1,7 2,7 1992/1993 67,0 14,3 21,3 2,6 3,9 CO NCLUSIOI All in all, the various components of the Sectoral Adjustment Program have been implemented. Perceptible results were obtained, and some of them even exceed the target goals. The major constraint--which was, after all, foreseen--consists of the inability to control the growth of the budget for higher and secondary education. 2. STRENGTHENING OF TIHE DIRECTORATE OF PLANNING. RESEARCH AND STUDIES (DPRE) 1. Objectives The Directorate of Planning, Research and Evaluation (DPRE) is specifically responsible for: a. planning school attendance rates at each level of education; estimating the needs for budgetary resources; and identifying ways to generate the necessary financing; b. setting up a system to monitor costs and conducting the annual reviews of the expenditures and budget for education; c. gathering and analyzing demographic, school attendance and budgetary statistics for the entire sector and publishing them each year; d. including urban areas and secondary education in school mapping (la carte scolaire);  1S e. holding annual seminars for the regional and departmental staff on statistics, school mapping and the projection of real demand for school enrollment. 2. Specific studies Study No. 1: Factors determining the demand for enrollment in rural areas * To define the strategy and costs for extending primary education to the rural area. Study No. 2: Financing the expansion of primary education * To identify the measures needed to heighten the efficacy with which resources are allocated to and used for primary education. Study No. 3: Determination of school mapping * To ensure that the planning process extends the process of school mapping to rural area and post-primary levels. Study No. 4: Improving the efficiency of general secondary education and technical courses * To identify the areas in which secondary and technical courses could be taught more efficiently. Study No. 5: Heightening the efficacy of higher education * To identify the areas in which higher education could be made more efficient. All of these studies constitute individual components of a sectoral planning process which from now on will be used to determine the optimum growth rate of enrollments at each teaching level, along with the corresponding financial and budgetary consequences. This program is the centerpiece of the project. Its execution should provide new bases for expanding the program for the development of education and the definition of new priorities. 3. Assistance utilized The Directorate of Planning and Educational Reform (the former DPRE) received: * 52 man-months of grants for studies abroad * 48 man-months of technical assistance (UNESCO-CIEM) in the fields of education economics, school mapping and higher education) * Courses for the training of 113 agents in school mapping for the IREE and EDEE, plus a study trip to Tunisia for the core team * Data processing equipment, logistical support and assistance in management operation  2C 4. Results obtained * Implementation of the SAP * The completion of 12 studies (7 of them on higher education) * Annual distribution of the statistics yearbook. CONCLUSION All things considered, although there has been a certain amount of improvement in the component, the development and implementation of school mapping failed to produce the results targeted by the project. The same is true of the cost control mechanism and budgetary analysis. From the operational standpoint, the planning system has not yet crossed the line that separates the daily handling of data in the provisional approach and those used as a basis for decision- making. 3. STRENGTHENING OF THE DIRECTORATE OF SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND EOUrPMENT (DCES) In view of the initiatives espoused by local groups and communities in regard to school construction, the project seeks to reinforce that input in various ways through physical works: rehabilitation, maintenance and the building of new classrooms. 1. Objectives a. Creation of a Physical Facilities Planning Unit (Division du Patrimoine et de l'Information--DPI) within the DCES; b. Decentralization of operations in the three regions of the project by setting up regional technical coordinators (CTRs); The duties of the new division would consist of: c. Constant updating of a computerized inventory of assets; d. Yearly drafting of the plans and budgets for the maintenance, rehabilitation and enlargement of schools; and e. The establishment of construction standards. 2. Assistance utilized * 11 man-months of overseas study * Technical assistance missions (SCAAN, APOGEE and PERIGEE) * Data processing and logistical equipment * Operational support for the division.  21 3. Results obtained * Survey of school assets * Assignment of 3 regional technical coordinators (CTRs), one for each region * Utilization of GESPAT software * Setting of 1990 price schedules. CONCLUSION Although installation of a technical coordinator in each region resulted in better handling of local problems, the overall objectives were not achieved in their entirety for a number of reasons: human, organizational and institutional factors, among others. The most glaring weakness of this component consisted of the difficulties encountered in setting up the Physical Facilities Planning Unit (DPI). 4. REHABILITATION OF 100 CLASSROOMS 1. Objectives One hundred classrooms were to be refurbished in the project areas, along with repairs and completion of furnishings where needed. 2. Assistance utilized * three man-months of technical assistance 3. Results obtained * The rehabilitation of 102 classrooms, distributed as follows: Louga 22 Fatick 47 Diourbel 33 CONCLUSION The component was satisfactorily executed.  22 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM FOR PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF T1FE SCHOOLS 1. Obiectives a. To alert the beneficiaries and users of the schools (communities, parents' associations, school superintendents and teachers as well as the students themselves) to the need to perform maintenance and small-scale repairs. b. To ensure effective attention to the items required inside each school, following indications provided by the technical coordinators. The project ensures: a. The preparation of a maintenance guide (2,500 copies) b. Training for school superintendents and teachers c. The provision of 3,500 tool kits and supplies of materials d. The services of specialists, and e. The defraying of operating expenses. 2. Assistance utilized - 33 man-months of advisory services - 3,509 man-days of in-country training (44 local seminars), distributed as follows: Louga 14 Diourbel 13 Fatick 17 3. Results obtained * The distribution of 688 tool kits plus construction materials (through the 461 target schools): Diourbel 176 kits Fatick 299 kits Louga 213 kits * The design and distribution of posters emphasizing preventive maintenance and audio- visual aids (film and video) * The production and distribution of a maintenance guide (1,000 copies) * The organization of a "maintenance committee" in each region * An information campaign designed to apprise the authorities and the populace of the project activities.  CONCLUSION The component is rated as completely successful, provided that its activities are continued after the termination of the present project. 6. CONSTRUCTION OF 400 PRIMARY SCHOOL CLASSROOMS 1 . Objectives In order to set up a school construction program with the communities, the project's goals were: a. To draw up plans for low-cost construction and maintenance of classrooms, patterned on traditional and widely adaptable models; b. To use the plans cited above to build 400 classrooms in three stages (50, 175 and 175 units), with the help of a construction guide that is to be distributed. The Directorate of School Construction and Equipment (DCES) was asked to evaluate each stage from the standpoints of: adaptation of the plans so as to arrive at standardized outlays; the extent to which the population took part; and any problems encountered in implementation. The necessary changes would then be made prior to execution of the following stage. The construction would be jointly ensured by the technical coordinators and the communities, under the supervision of the DCES. The credit was granted to finance: 100% of the construction materials; 80% of the skilled labor; the school furnishings; local training for the communities; and the cost of printing the construction guides. 2. Assistance utilized 0 65.5 man-months of advisory services.  24 3. Results obtained The construction of 400 classrooms in three stages (see table below). Number of Classrooms Unit Cost/M2 Construction Phase Built Site (in US$) Method Used I 50 Louga 14 243 Community Diourbel: 14 208 participation Fatick : 22 178 II 100 Dakar (city) Private 75 Louga . enterprise Diourbel: Community Fatick . participation mII 175 Louga . 177 AGETIP (100) Diourbel: 177 NGO assistance & Fatick 133 activities (45) DCES (30) CONCLUSION The 400-classroom program was completed in five years. Only one fourth of that number were built in accordance with the original concept of community participation. The transferral to and construction of 100 classrooms in the city of Dakar does not appear to have been a relevant addition to the project, and it triggered an excessive increase in the costs of the component (395 million CFAF), even though the initial expenses actually dropped by more than 30%. Implementation of this component fell far short of the objectives, decisions and the accomplishments originally envisaged. 7. STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL PEDAGOGICAL INSTIJTE (INSTlTUT NATIONAL D'ETUDE ET D'ACTION POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'EDUCATION--INEADE) This component directly addresses the concerns as to the quality of education by preparing the INEADE for the task of carrying out pedagogical innovations.  25 1. Objectives a. To adapt study programs and develop appropriate instruction methods and teaching materials, based on research and trial use in the classroom. b. To compile batteries of tests, starting with the areas of French language and mathematics, and use them to evaluate the progress made by the students. c. To set up ongoing training programs for primary school teachers and inspectors. d. To develop the structure and contents of the revised program of initial training for assistant teachers, in collaboration with the normal schools and the Directorate of Primary Education. e. To conduct pilot testing in 25 multigrade classrooms and 75 double-shift classes and utilize the results thereof. 2. Assistance received * 65 man-months of advisory services (SODETEG) * 112 man-months of grants for overseas study * In-country training in the areas of innovation, research and evaluation (8,170 man-days) * Operational support for the component * Construction of a new INEADE building (delivered in July 1992). 3. Results achieved X Restructuring of the INEADE pursuant to decree (June 1987) X Evaluation of the CDFs and pilot classrooms (July 1989) * Establishment of the pilot schools and monitoring of trials in 100 pilot classrooms * Training of teaching personnel and inspectors in the new methods (research) * Study on pre-evaluation of the reform (July 1991) * Design and execution of school projects. CONCLUSION Execution of this component enabled INEADE to become a pedagogical research and training institution of note. 8. STRENGTHENING OF THE PRIMARY SCHOOL INSPECTORATE Since educational reform only materizes in the classroom and through the teachers, the role of the inspectors is critical as a source of pedagogical support and control.  26 1. Objectiv In the context of carrying out the decentralization policy at the regional and departmental levels: a. To upgrade educational planning and improve management of the staff, the budget and the equipment. b. To strengthen the support and supervision of teachers. c. To reinforce the role of pedagogical helpmeet assigned to the assistant inspectors of primary education. 2. Assistance utilized * 20 man-months of advisory services * 50 man-months of overseas study grants * 1,720 man-days of in-country training (seminars) * Six national seminars on innovation and system management X Logistical support for the IREE/IDEE and the component. 3. Results obtained 3 Preparation and distribution of teaching material for all IREE and IDEE training courses 3 Installation of regional structures (school mapping) * Undertaking of innovations and on-site teacher training by the inspectors * Drafting of the proposed decree creating and organizing the Academic Inspections CONCLUSION The objectives of this component were accomplished except in regard to 'decentralization.' The project execution period was not long enough to allow effective instruments to be set up and decentralization measures to be taken. 9. PUBLICATION OF TEXTBOOKS 1. Objectives The main purpose of this component is to produce and distribute textbooks consonant with the new programs for primary grades. The intermediate objectives consist of:  27 a. Setting up a "Textbook Publishing Unit' (Unite d'Edition de Manuels Scolaires-UlEM that will compile, edit and publish the new manuals: 1,072,000 student texts (one book for every two pupils) and 61,000 teachers' guides. b. Reducing the price to 30% less than the market figure. c. Establishing royalty payments through a leasing system. d. Setting up a fund to finance additional printings. 2. Assistance utilized * 20 man-months of advisory services (SODETEG) * 18 man-months of scholarships for overseas studies * In-country training in the drafting of manuals and textbooks (1,297 man-hours).  28 3. Results obtaine * The production of 1,267,930 textbooks, including 39,300 teachers' guides, (in four successive stages). DIRECT STAGE TITLES PUBLISHED CLASS NO. OF SALES I __________ __________________________ C O PIES 1 SIDI AND RAMA: Student readers Cl 160,000 CM1/2 15,400 1989190 Mathematics: Student workbooks Ci 160,000 CM1/2 3,230 Mathematics: Teacher's manuals CIUCP 5,000 CM1/2 300 French Language: Teacher's manuals CUCP 5,000 Practical Training: Textbook Cl/CP 5,000 2 SIDIA AND RAMA: Student readers CP 135,000 1990/91 Mathematics: Student workbooks CP 135,000 SIDI AND RAMA: Student readers CE1 135,000 SIDI AND RAMA: Student readers CE2 120,000 3 SIDI AND RAMA Math: 1991/92 Student textbooks CE1 120,000 SIDI AND RAMA Math: Student textbooks CE2 110,000 Mathematics: Teacher's manuals CE1/CE2 6,000 French grammar: Teacher's manuals CE1/CE2 6,000 Practical training: Teacher's manuals CE1/CE2 6,000 4 SIDI AND RAMA: Student readers CM1 135,000 1992/93 French textbook: Teacher's manuals CM1/2 6,000 Reprints of Student readers CI 60,000 Stages 1 Sturdent readers CP 60,000 and 2 Student readers CE1 45,000 CE2 50,000 TOTALS 1,464,000 18,980 Student textbooks 1,425,000 18,630 Teacher's manuab 39,000 300 * Acquisition, remodeling and outfitting of warehouses and outlets * Establishment of a sales and leasing system based on one book per pupil * Reduction of selling price to more than 50% below the market figure * Setting up of the FEMEN Fund, using the proceeds from nonprofit sales of 385,000 school books.  29 CONCLUSION This component-which is one of the most 'visiblew parts of the project--has been obviously successful, even surpassing the target goals established. D. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 1. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL PERFORMANCE The Education Projects Office (BPE), initially under the Ministry of Equipment, was transferred at the end of Project Three to the Ministry of National Education. This seemed to be a logical move, since the overall project fell exclusively within the education sector. Going back for a moment to Project Three, it should be noted that the transfer occurred as a result of a report citing the failure to accomplish the agreed qualitative and substantive objectives. It was assumed that the education policy elements set forth in the credit agreement could be achieved by managing the education project in the same way as a construction project. The ex post evaluation on execution of Project Three is edifying in this respect. As to the BPE operating capacity, after completion of its task of executing Education Project Four and in the light of six years of activity, the following conclusions may be reached: (i) When compared with the previous situation (Project Three), progress has unquestionably been made. The main targets of the project--substance and qualitative objectives- -were again accorded priority during the execution period, as has been emphasized in all of the evaluation reports. The fourth project has been a true education project: it made the existing system more coherent and further clarified the new education policy (approach to publishing, community and NGO participation in classroom construction, the increase in enrollment owing to introduction of the double-shift system, diagnostic study of the university, strengthening of the inspectorates and teacher training, experiments in educational reform, and the like). But it is difficult to quantify and put a price tag on these major qualitative results. (ii) Intrinsically--in other words, from the standpoint of its inherent objectives--Education Project Four had a number of flaws, due mainly to the way it was managed, although the overall results are clearly positive. Management suffered from two major problems: a. The first consisted of the excessively protracted delays in execution, most of which resulted from compulsory adherence to local procedures (DDI, CNCA, etc.). The school construction component--and to a lesser degree that of the textbook publishing- were particularly affected by this cumbersome approach. On the other hand, however, the accomplishments in areas not subject to the customary procedures (the staff training,  30 preventive maintenance, the inspectorates, the INEADE, planning, higher education and the like) were especially tangble, and even exceeded the initial programming. b. The second problem was the weakness of BPE intemal management. From the start, the BPE had inherited two counterproductive elements: an overabundance of staff who were frequently underqua]ified at the base; and a management system that was hobbled by the strictures of public administration. The combination of these two factors weighed more or less heavily on the managerial dynamics of that Office and its top-heavy organizational chart hampered internal operations (see the attached appendix). [end of sentence missing at bottom of page 201 The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the BPE had four new directors in succession during the execution period. 2. IMPACT ON THE INMAL COSTS AND OBJECTIVES Financing of the project was ensured by three different sources: e International Development Association (IDA) e The African Development Bank (AfDB) * National counterpart funding. On the whole, the costs and objectives were well handled despite their diversity, except for the transferral of one hundred classrooms from the initial project areas to Dakar. That move-which also had very little justification--proved to be very costly to the project since it entailed construction work in an urban environment. (See the comparative table of construction costs attached as an appendix.) 3. NATIONAL COUNTERPART FUNDING In retrospect, it would seem that the breakdown of project costs into two parts (80% IDA, 20% Government) for the same payment of operating expenses may well have been an error in the original concept of the project, based on an overly optimistic estimate of the Treasury's true financial situation. Consequently, provision of the counterpart funds posed great problems throughout the project execution period, given the refusal of supply and service purveyors to accept the arrangement requiring 20% of the amount payable to be covered by the public authorities. 4. PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS Restrictions imposed by the procedures were and continue to be extremely burdensome. The commitment and disbursement of credits entail excessively long administrative prerequisites that do not appreciably smoothe the conduct of operations. The same applies not only to local regulations but also to donor procedures requiring all too many statements of non-objection.  31 The impact of these enforced waits dampened both the amount of the grants and the credibility of the executing agencies (the BPE and the MEN). 5. MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE PROJECT The evaluation of results achieved by Education Project Four made it possible to redefine the education sector's position in the general context of development and structural adjustment in Senegal. Thus fortified by the experience acquired and the success achieved, the Government is now starting, with support from AID, to prepare a very sizeable program entitled PDRH2. The BPE was the technical, methodological and institutional kingpin in the preparations that led to Education Project Five, which once again addresses all of the concerns evoked by the preceding project, but on a larger scale.   33 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1735-SE) PART m: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status approval Preceding operations 1. Cr.530-SE (Second Education Science, vocational, and 1975 Completed 1984 Project) rural youth training 2. Cr. 908-SE (hird Education Improve primary education 1979 Completed 1987 Project) and training 3. Cr. 1638-SE (Management School) Establish a regional 1985 Completed 1993 management training center Following operations 1. Cr. 2255-SE (First Human Integrated Health Services 1991 Under Resources Development Project) implementation 2. Cr. 2473 (Second Human Expansions and Quality 1993 Under Resources Development P&ect) improvements in Education implementation Table 2: Project Timetable Steps in proJect cycle Date planned Date actual Identification (Initial Project Brief) September 22, 1983 Preparation March 1983 October 1983-September 1985 Appraisal March 1985 October 1985 Negotiations October 1985 July 1986 Letter of development policy N/A N/A Board presentation January 1986 October 14, 1986 Signing July 1986 July 1, 1987 Effectiveness November 1986 September 9, 1987 First tranche release At effectiveness September 9, 1987 Second tranche release June 1988 December 2, 1998 Third tranche release June 1990 January 25, 1991 Project completion December 31, 1994 December 31, 1993 Loan closing June 30, 1995 March 23, 1994  34 Table 3A: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ '000) IDA Fiscal Year, 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Appraisal estimate 0.5 0.9 1.7 2.7 4.0 5.6 9.2 11.5 12.0 Actual 0.0 1.2 3.4 6.71 8.17 9.47 12.67 13.35 Actual as % of estimate 0 133 200 248 204 169 138 116 Date of final disbursement _ Table 3B: Country Exchange Rates Year Exchange Rate (CFAF per US$1) Annual Average 1986 346.30 1987 300.54 1988 297.85 1989 319.01 1990 272.26 1991 282.11 1992 245.69 1993 290.85 Appraisal year average (1985) 360.00 Intervening years' average (1986-1993) 294.33  35 Table 4: Key Indicators for Project Inplementation PoL;cy Measure Target Actual 1. Recruit trainee teachers at an wfituenr Increase current ratio of 47:53 to Policy impleented as agrmed. adjoinruzstiteu ration of 80:20 for 1986/87 80:20 by 1994. Recruitment taling place at onward. 80:20 ratio. Actual ratio reached 58:42 in SY 1992/93 2. Redeploy 400 primary teachers from Redeploy 200 teachers by SY 1262 primary teachers have administrative to classroom teaching positions. 1987/88 and 200 by SY 1989/90. been redeployed, three time. appraisal target 3. Introduce double-shift system in urban and Experiment in first year. Evaluate Experimental phase with 500 multi-grade system in rural schools. and extend in following years. classrooms completed in first year. Program extended to 1412 DS and 270 MG classrooms by 1992/93. 4. Increase student:teacher ratios in teacher Increase ratio from current 7:1 to Ratio reached 13:1 in 1992193 training colleges. 15:1 by SY 1988/89. S. Reduce operating costs of specialized civil Complete feasibility study by Study completed October service training schools. February 1988. Implement plan by 1989. Not implemented 1988/89. 6. Reduce subsidies to higher education by: Subsidies increased from 39.6% to 44.8% of higher education budget. (a) reducing the fellowship budget Reduce from 1985/86 level by 89% in Fellowship budget increased SY 1987/88 and by 3 % per annum by about 6% per annum from SY 1988/89 through 1994/95. between 1997/1998 and 1992/93. (b) establish cost recovery systems Complete study on student loans by Study completed December June 1988. Conduct experiment in 1989. Experiment not SY 1988/89 to SY 1990/91 conducted (c) reduce indirect subsidies Reduce budget of campus services Expenditures increased by a by 8% between SY 1985/86 and SY factor of 2.5 over project 1994/95. Implement plan to period. Plan to privatizc privatize student services student services being considered in proposed Higher Education Project. 7. Establish ceilings on growth rates for recurrent Limit growth of administrative and Administrative budget decline expenditures of central administration, ondary higher education budget to 1 % per from 3.5 % to 3 % of total and higher education. annum and secondary education to education budget. Secondary 1.5 % per annum. Implement cost education budget decreaed savings plan. from 25.8% to 24% and higher education budget increased from 23.19% to 26.2%  Table 5: Studies Included in the Project Study Purpose Status Impact of Study 1. Determinants of Demand for Define strategy and cost of expanding Completed June 1989. Used for planning purposes Education in Rural Areas rural primary education. (school map). 2. Financing of Primary Education Identify measures to improve efficiency Completed June 1989. Results used in developing of resource allocation and use recurrent budget estimates. 3. Preparation of School Location Integrate school mapping into the Completed May 1989. Preparation of school maps has Plan planning process become regular feature of planning process. 4. Efficiency of Secondary general Identify areas for cost savings Completed March 1989. Recommendations not and Technical Education implemented. 5. Student loan scheme in higher Assess feasibility of introducing a Study completed June 1989, Recommendations not education student loan scheme in place of student including pilot scheme to test implemented W subsidies feasibility 6. Efficiency of higher education Analyze internal efficiency of the Study completed May 1989 Results being used in preparation University of Dakar of higher education restructuring project. 7. Regrouping of higher education Prepare a plan to restructure and Plan prepared in 1989. Some restructuring measures to be establishments consolidate tertiary level institutions implemented under proposed Higher Education Project 8. Social Costs in higher education Analyze costs of student support Study completed June 1989. Results used in policy discussions (COUD) services at the University of Dakar and on higher education. prepare plan to privatize certain services 9. Restructuring plan for vocational Inventorize existing training Plan prepared November 1989 but No tangible results so far. Plan training. establishments and propose measures to not implemented. may need updating to account for restructure the system. changes in system since 1989.  Table 5: Studies Included in the Project (Continued) Study Purpose Status Impact of Study 10. Training needs in the modem Assess training needs. Study completed 1989. Results used in policy discussions sector on VET sector development but no decisions taken so far. 11. Training needs in the informal Assess training needs. Study completed 1989. Results used in policy discussions sector on VET sector development but no decisions taken so far. 12. Tracer study of vocational Asses internal efficiency of vocational Study completed 1989. Results used in policy discussions graduates training systems on VET sector development but no decisions taken so far. 13. Evaluation of contents and methods Analyze relevance of vocational training Study completed 1989. Results used in policy discussions of vocational training programs on VET sector development but no decisions taken so far. L 14. Functional literacy training in Prepare to increase literacy levels of Study completed 1990. Results used in policy discussions industry employed workers on VET sector development but no decisions taken so far.  38 Table 6A: Project Costs Appraisal estimate (US$M) Actualllatest disbursement esima Local Foreign Total SDR UA CFAF costs Costs IDA AFDB Gov-t. Category 1. Civil Works 2.65 1.38 4.03 4.16 0.80 147 2. Furniture 0.62 0.61 1.23 0.36 0.12 - 3. Equipment and Vehicles 0.05 1.02 1.07 0.59 0.25 25 4. Textbooks 0.21 1.05 1.25 - 1.45 - 5. Specialist Services 0.70 2.95 3.65 3.78 0.78 6. Training 0.63 0.70 1.33 0.07 0.67 - 7. Incremental Operating Costs 0.49 1.86 2.35 0.75 0.40 164 TOTAL BASE COSTS 5.35 9.57 14.91 9.71 4.47 336 Total Contingencies 2.08 2.61 4.69 0.41 0.05 - TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 7.43 12.18 19.61 10.1 4.52 336 Table 6B: Project Fmancing Appraisal estimate (US$M) Equivalent to: Actua/Latest expenditure estimates: Local Foreign Total costs Costs Source MBRDJIDA 3.80 8.20 12.00 10.2M SDR 10.1M SDR AfDB 1.35 3.98 5.33 5.OM UA 4.5M UA Domestic Contribution 2.28 - 2.28 820M CFAF 336M CFAF TOTAL 7.43 12.18 19.61 _  Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants Senegal Primary Education Development Project M - MET N - NOT MET P = PENDING SECTON No of COVENANT STATUS COMMENTS ACTION TAKEN OR Credit Ag_ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ REQUIRED 3.01 (b) (i) Make available annually to project counterpart fund for school M No action required. oonstruction equal to 15% of value of construction contracts. 3.01 (b) (ii) Appoint and maintain sufficiently qualified project staff in M No action required. adequate numbers. 3.03 Maintain project unit (BPE) with function and staffing specified M No action required. in credit agreement. 3.04 Borrower and IDA shall, in June 1998 and June 1990, or such M Second review, linked to release of third Application of certain policy and later dates as shall be agreed upon, review progress in carrying tranche of school construction, conducted in efficiency measures have resulted out sectoral adjustment program. November 1990. All measures linked to in achievement of objective, i.e. educational objectives are being implemented improve access to and qualiy of xn and targets are being met. Budgetary primary education. Higher measures are not being respected; agreed education restructuring is being ceilings on higher education expenditures are treatod in a separate oporation. being exceeded and reallocations in favor of primary education are not being done. 3.05 The Borrower shall: M Preventive maintenance program No action required. (a) no later than June 30, 1988, develop and discuss with IDA a successfully completed. MEN should be preventive maitnnce program; able to extend to other areas. (b) thereafer, assign responsibility for said program to headmasters and teachers of primary schools as part of their regular responsibilities.  SECTION No of COVENANT STATUS COMMENTS ACTION TAKEN OR Croft Apganmt ___________________________________ REQUIRED 3.06 The Borrower shall: Al fellowship programs have been No action required. (a) prepar and implament annual local and foreign training M completed and staff have resumed their programs, agreed upon with IDA, for mcn staff responsiblc for positions. the execution of the project; (b) award fellowships on the basis of selection criteria and procedures agreed upon with IDA; (c) appoint fellowship recipients to posts commcnsurate with their trining. 3.07 The Borrower shall: (a) furnish to IDA for its comments, sudics included in the M All studies were completed in 1990. Specific actions to be included in sectoral adjustment program; folow-up projects. (b) implement recommendations and conclusions of said studies N Recommendations resulting from studies as agreed with IDA. being discussed in context of prepartion of follow-up projects in vocational training and higher education. 3.08 In carrying out school construction program, the Borrower M Self-help construction has worked School construction has boen shall, to the extent prmctical, favor the use of local materials and satisfactorily but slowly, completed. No specific action maintenance methods suitable for the community in which required. schools will be built. 4.01 The borrower shall: P Project accounts have not been kept in Final audit to closing to be accordanoc with sound practices. In the submitted by June 30, 1994. (a) maintain records and accounts adequate to reflect, in past, audit reports have been seriously accordanc with sound accounting practices, the operations, overdue but the situation has improved resources and expenditures of the project and submit annual recently. audits; (b) for expenditures made on the basis of statetnent of expenditures (SOES), maintain special accounts and provide scmi-annual audits of such accounts and SOES.  41 Table 8: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total Through Appraisal 57.5 22.3 79.8 Appraisal-Board 46.6 46.6 Board-Effectiveness 0.2 5.0 5.2 Supervision 7.8 13.9 6.3 11.4 6.1 15.7 10.0 4.2 75.4 Completion 4.0 4.0 TOTAL 57.5 69.1 12.8 13.9 6.3 11.4 6.1 15.7 10.0 8.2 211.0  42 Table 9: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of Projeat Cycle Month/ Number of Days in Spec iaition Performance Rating Type of Problem Year Persons Fildd RVpresented1 Implementation Development Status Obiectives Through Appraisal 10/85 5 25 E, A, EC Appraisal through Board - - - Approval Board Approval through - - - Effectivenes Supervision Supervision 1 11/87 2 9 EP, A 2 1 Budgetarv re-allocation of savings between budget categories not carried out Supervision 2 06/88 2 11 EP, A 2 2 Contracts: delays in launching studies and implementing cost recovery measures Supervision 3 02/89 2 17 EP, A 3 2 Policy: delays in launching sector adjustment program (SAP) Supervision 4 12/89 2 5 EP, A 2 2 Policy: Government not living up to its obligations for policy and budget measures as agreed under SAP Supervision 5 03/90 2 6 E.O 2 2 As above Supervision 6 11/90 2 E, 0 2 2 Pedaeoeical: untrained primary teachers placed in classrooms Supervision 7 12191 4 16 E, EP, T, 0 2 2 Management: excessive delays in school construction, late submission of audit reports, delays in provision of counterpart funds Supervision 8 03/92 5 5 E, EP, T, 0, 2 2 Poin : adjustment measures A in higher education not implemented Management: delays in school construction Supervision 9 10/92 2 4 EP, A 2 2 Management: Abrupt firing of project director and delays in recruiting a replacement. Supervision 10 07/93 3 11 EP, e, A 2 2 Financial: Qualified audits Key: E =Educator A= Architect/Implementation Specialist EC=Economist T=Textbook Specialist EP=Education Planner O=Operations Officer  IBRD 20043 ' ALGERIA 16 15 14 3 12 MAURITANIA SENEGAL fALI R _ * Podor GA'A - S E N E G A L T~~~E rU, "- '- J 0aganaSE GA BISSAU I GUINEA ZA r' PRIMARY EDUCATION SIERRA LEONE *;<pCOEI j -1 DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ClAPRIA' d U I , Lv ~~~~~~~~~~~~* Departmentalinpcoae for Primary Education INT-LOUIS ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Regional O,spectorates r,af _ -le 43 | ~_ / for Primary Education 16P Project Areas A Department Capitals I Region Capitals N Natiaona Capitals .2 Matam' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Department BoundariRs Region Boundaries Kiemer XL,nguere Interna tonal Boundaniea RILOMETERS 15 ,TIAaouane 9: DIOL BakEe