China - Tianjin Port Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14748 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT CHINA TIANJIN PORT PROJECT (LOAN 2689-CHA) JUNE 29, 1995 Transport Operations Division China and Mongolia Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of December 1 994, Currency Naame = Rnminbi Currency tUnit - Ynan (Y) Yuan rate per US$1.4) 1986 - 3.45 1990 4. 73 1987 - 3.72 1991 5. 33 1988 - 3.72 1992 5.53 1989 - 3.73 1993 5.80 1994 - 8.70 FISCAI, YEAR January I - December 31 X1E kLSUREMENT EQUIVALENTS Metric Sv s, eri BriisihUS .'x 'stem I micter (ni) -- 'S teet I squaic maeter (m ) 10.764 squr, c feet I Cubic m der (m ) = 315.315 cubic feet I kilometer (km) O0 "121 mile 1 ton-kim = 0.62 I ton-mile I ton 2-202 ')( pounds PRINC'IPAL ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMNJS USED ERR - Econiomic Rate of Return GOC - Government ot China ICR - Implementation Completion Report iCB - International Competitive Bidding MOC - Ministry ot Communications MOF Miniistry of Finance MOR - Ministry of Railways REIRR - Re-evaluated Economic Internal Rate of Return RFA - Revaluation on Average Net Fixed Assets RRFA - Rate of Return on Average Net Fixed Assets SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SEZ - Special Economic Zone SPC - State Planning Commission ITJICDC - Tianjin Harbour Constr-uctioin and Development Company 'I'MG Tianjin Municipal Government TPA - Tianjin Port Authority XTLC - Xing Tang Labor Company  FOR OFECIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT CHINA TIANJIN PORT PROJECT (LOAN 2689-CHA) CONTENTS Preface ................ i Evaluation Summary .................................... ii PART I. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .... ....... 1 A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives ..................... 1 B. Achievement of Objectives ....... ................... 2 C. Major Factors Affecting the Project ........ ............ 9 D. Project Sustainability ............................ 10 E. Bank Performance ............................ 10 F. Borrower Performance ........................... 10 G. Assessment of Outcome ........................... 11 H. Future Operation ...............................11 I. Key Lessons Learned ............................ 11 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES ......... ............... 13 Table 1: Summary of Assessments ..................... 13 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits (None) ............... 14 Table 3: Project Timetable ........................... 14 Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actul . .. 15 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation .... ....... 16 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation ...... ......... 18 Table 7: Studies Included in Project ........ ............ 19 Table 8A: Project Costs ............. ................ 20 Table 8B: Project Financing .......................... 21 Table 8C: Allocation of Loan Proceeds ....... .. ........... 21 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits ...... .. ........... 22 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants .... 23 Table 11: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........ ........... 23 Table 12: Bank Resources: Missions ......... ............ 24 Annexes: 1. Financial Analysis ......... ................... 25 2. Economic Analysis ......... .................. 28 Appendices: A. Mission's Aide-Memoire ...................... 48 B. Borrower Contribution to the ICR ................ 50 C. Map ................................... 54 This document has a restricted distiibution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. l  I i  - i - IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT CHINA TIANJIN PORT PROJECT (LOAN 2689-CHA) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) f,or the Tianjin Port Project in China for which Loan 2689-CHA in the amount of $130 million was approved on May 6, 1986. The loan was closed on October 31, 1994. The Loan was extended twice, for one year and ten months, respectively. Final disbursements were made on November 8, 1994. The Loan amount was fully disbursed. The ICR was prepared by Messrs. Toshiro Tsutsumi (Task Manager) and Han-Kang Ten (Economic and Financial Analyst) in the Transport Operations Division, China and Mongolia Department of the East Asia and Pacific Region of the Bank and reviewed by Messrs. Richard Scurfield, Chief, EA2TP and Yo Kimura, Project Adviser, EA2DR. The borrower provided comments that are included as appendixes to the ICR. Preparation of this ICR was started just before the project closing date and was based on material in the project file. The borrower contributed to the ICR with its own evaluation of the project preparation and execution.  i I  - ii - TIANJIN PORT PROJECT (LOAN 2689-CHA) CHINA EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives 1. The project's principal objective was to assist the Government of the People's Republic of China (GOC) to relieve congestion in the port of Tianjin and increase handling capacity by providing additional facilities and improving the planning, managerial and operational capabilities of its staff. The Bank also encouraged the establishment of an autonomous port authority which would be a new organizational model for public enterprises in China. The Bank helped finance: (a) 11 berths (2,150mr long) for general cargo, timber and construction materials along with yard, railway, road and other related facilities; (b) cargo handling equipment, navigational aids and harbor boats; and (c) technical assistance and equipment for: a study to minimize siltation in channels and basins; provision of a management information system; and establishment of the Port Development Center. Implementation Experience 2. Project implementation was generally satisfactory, although the closing date was extended twice, first for one year and then for 10 months due to: (a) A one-year delay in the construction of the north-side wharves, owing to unforeseen soil conditions at the construction site. This required the pile structure to be redesigned to a caisson-gravity type and bid documents to be modified; and (b) A delay in procurement of equipment for the training center, two boats and two quay-side container cranes. The former was delayed due to ,xtra time needed to finalize the scope and size of the training center; procdrement of the boats was delayed due to space shortages at the shipyard. Obtaining the cranes was delayed because of the long period devoted to bid evaluations as well as to the limited availability of space in the shipyard where the parts were to be assembled. 3. Bid evaluations, which required a dual process (one by the end-user and another by the central evaluation committee) took a long time (7-10 months) at the initial stage of the project. Although this improved after the borrower became familiar with Bank guidelines, evaluation for other contracts still required about six months, instead of the  - iii - two-to-three months maximum typical of countries at China's stage of development. This should be improved as soon as possible. Results 4. Total project cost was $321.7 million, against $282.0 million estimated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). The increase was mainly due to a rise in local prices compounded by the implementation delay (the local component was $188.1 million against $139.2 million) (para. 12 and Table 8A). The $130 million loan was fully disbursed. Remaining costs were borne by the Tianjin Port Authority (TPA). 5. The principal project objective was achieved, as the port is now more efficient. For example, productivity per vessel increased over 50 percent, from 777 tons/day in 1985 to 1,175 tons/day in 1993 (para. 14). Institutional goals were also achieved substantially through technical assistance: TPA's management information and operations control systems were developed, the Tianjin Port Training Center was established, and the siltation minimization study was completed. In addition, savings were obtained in cargo-handling costs, ship waiting and berthing time, and cargo time. The project's economic rate of return (at completion) was estimated at 15.7 percent against 19.2 percent in the SAR, which is considered satisfactory. 6. The objective of decentralizing the port authority so it could operate as a financially autonomous corporation was only partly achieved, since the function of setting tariffs is still under Government control. The issue of tariffs becomes critical in the long term because they do not fully incorporate price hikes and the Government must therefore provide the port with favorable tax arrangements. Sustainability 7. The project should be sustainable. Because it extended the port facilities, traffic will grow in conjunction with Tianjin's economic development, the Beijing-Tianjin corridor and the country in general. Further, TPA is a financially stable entity with adequate financial resources to maintain and operate the port efficiently. Moreover, with the modern equipment and extensive training provided under the project, TPA has the potential to increase the port's productivity even further and provide services at competitive costs. Findings and Lessons Learned 8. The main findings from the project's implementation was that TPA and Tianjin Harbour Construction and Development Company (THCDC) were quite capable of handling the construction and procurement of equipment. 9. A key lesson was that the project's flexible design for the wharf, which allowed it to be converted to a container terminal, was a major factor in its success. Another lesson was that procurement of goods took longer than expected because of the  - iv - dual evaluation process carried out. A third lesson was that financial targets with respect to decentralizing the setting of tariffs, should have been identified more precisely in the SAR. This can be accomplished in the near future. However, to ensure that tariffs are set correctly and do not reflect monopoly pricing (that would adversely affect users of the port), TPA and the municipal government will need to promote competition among companies that operate at the port. This may entail the formation of new companies (which could be joint ventures) and TPA divesting itself of many of its subsidiaries, so these could operate independently and compete.  I  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT CHINA TIANJIN PORT PROJECT (LOAN 2689-CHA) PART 1. lMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 1. The project's main objectives were: (a) to increase Tianjin port's capacity to handle timber, construction materials and general cargo by building specialized berths that contain modern equipment; (b) to contribute to long-term efficiency and productivity; (c) to improve TPA's efficiency through training for various aspects of port planning and development and through TA (to help with installing computerized management information systems, conducting a salutation study and establishing the Tianjin Port Training Center), that could improve TPA's managerial skills. 2. When the project was identified, most ports were badly congested; container berths, bulk cargo berths, port equipment, storage yards and transport infrastructure for distribution were in short supply. In fact, congestion was so severe that it could have constrained China's foreign trade from expanding further. Thus, the project was designed to address congestion at Tianjin port, China's third largest port at the time and the one serving Beijing. 3. The Bank also encouraged the Government to introduce organizational changes that could improve the port's management and promote its autonomy. Tianjin was the first port placed under the local municipality, which gave the TPA broader decision- making and financial authority than the Ministry of Communications (which had previously been in control).  - 2 - B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES Project Description 4. To achieve these objectives, it was decided (see Map attached) that the project would comprise 1 1 deep-water berths for ships of 30,000-50,000 dwt with work to be carried out from 1986 to 1992 in two phases: Phase 1 (1986-90) to construct 5 berths and Phase 11 (1987-92) to construct an additional 6 berths. The 11 berths were designed to be converted into container berths when needed. In the future the project would comprise both phases. It included the following components: (a) construction of five new berths on the East Pier's south side for timber, general cargo and construction materials, requiring: (i) construction of a 780 m quaywall for four berths with alongside depth of 10.5 m; (ii) con- struction of a 170 m quaywall with alongside depth of 10 m for the remaining berth; (b) construction of six new berths 1,200 m in length on the East Pier's north side for general cargo with alongside depth of 10 m; and the construction of some service boat quays; (c) dredging of about 11.82 million cu m of spoil and reclamation of 840,000 sq m of land and stabilization of the fill material; (d) provision of the required cargo handling equipment and navigational aids, and harbor equipment and boats; (e) provision of other related facilities such as railway, road, yard pavement, water supply, sewage, power supply; (f) construction of the required buildings; and (g) provision of supervision consultants. 5. The project also contained components to address the port's needs in institutional and technological development. These components comprise: (a) technical assistance for a study of methods to minimize siltation in channels and basins and training of port specialists; (b) equipment for the development of Tianjin Port Authority's management information and operations control systems; (c) establishment of the Tianjin Port Development Center for training, research and development studies.  - 3 - In particular, TPA agreed to incorporate long-term financial planning in its rolling financial five-year plan (in which it would assume the position of an autonomous entity). Project Implementation 6. The loan became effective on March 20, 1987, about five months after the legal documents were signed on October 16, 1986. Although the closing date was extended twice (due to unforeseen physical factors, not the Borrower's unsatisfactory performance), the major objectives were achieved. 7. Physical components. Prequalification of bidders, preparation of bid documents, as well as bid evaluations for civil works contracts, were undertaken prior to loan effectiveness. Construction was supervised by experienced teams from the Tianjin Habour Construction and Development Company (THCDC), whose backgrounds and professional experiences were reviewed and approved by the Bank; they were assisted by foreign consultants. TPA/THCDC applied the deep mixing method to strengthen the soft soil at the wharves, which was then able to accommodate the caisson-gravity type structure (this modification led to a one-year delay). 8. Procurement. Although no major procurement problems surfaced, there was some delay in the various stages, such as with the preparation of bid documents, evaluation, and delivery of equipment. TPA and GOC took more time than expected to evaluate bids at the beginning of the project since they were not familiar with the Bank's procurement guidelines (Table 5C). While performance in this area improved gradually, the evaluation period generally required more than six months (180 days) which was much longer than the bid validity period (90-120 days) recommended by the Bank. This was due to the GOC's multiple authorization procedures. 9. Additional container handling equipment (two quay-side container cranes and three rubber-tired gantry cranes) were procured through cost savings. The additional cranes were needed to meet the increase in containerized cargo. For the same reason, one timber berth was converted to a container terminal. This was anticipated in the SAR and all 11 berths were designed for such conversions. Delivery of the two quay-side cranes was delayed until March 1995 due to constraints in the subcontracted shipyard. However, this delay did not affect the loan closing. The loan proceeds were fully used and the remaining contractual payments were met by local funds. 10. TA components. Implementation of training and studies, including the development of Management Information System (MIS), was satisfactory. TPA provided overseas and domestic training in various aspects such as management, long-term planning and cargo handling. TPA's training for the east-pier operation was trimmed because the type of cargo to be handled was changed from general cargo, which would have required a large pool of stevedores, to container and dry bulk cargo. The MIS was satisfactorily established and covered a wide area of TPA's activities such as planning, berth operations, financial payroll, personnel management, equipment management, fixed asset evaluations, documentation, and engineering matters. The siltation study was completed as planned.  - 4 - The size of the training center was reduced, since it was reconceived as a regional institute that would be expanded in the future, instead of national center, as originally planned (following the Bank's recommendation). 11. During implementation, TPA prepared and submitted annual financial five- year rolling plans successfully; these plans indicated that TPA's financial condition would be healthy. 12. The project's final cost was $321.72 million against $281.96 million estimated at the time of appraisal. The increased costs were mainly due to price hikes in local costs, which were compounded by a delay in implementation (from $139.2 million to $188.1 million). For example, steel was Y 1,000/ton at appraisal, but Y 3,300- 3,500/ton in 1994. 13. No environmental or resettlement problems arose during implementation. 14. Throughout implementation, the primary objective to increase port efficiency was achieved: the average cargo-handling period per vessel for general cargo was reduced from 2.1 days in 1985 to 1.8 days in 1993 (a 14 percent reduction). Further, when the increase in vessel size is included in the calculation, vessel productivity increases more than 50 percent, from 777 tons/day in 1985 to 1,175 tons/day in 1993 (see Table 6). Moreover, the institutional goal to establish a financially autonomous entity was achieved, except that tariffs are still under Government control. Because tariffs do not fully reflect price increases, the Government must provide TPA with favorable tax arrangements, such as exemptions. Under these arrangements, the TPA has an incentive to become more efficient, because it will be able to retain more of its savings. 15. In the long term, ports should encourage competition among companies that operate the terminals to increase efficiency. In this regard, a new container handling company (the Oriental Company) was created and is competing with the exiting container terminal operated by Tianjin Container Company. The Bank highly recommends this approach be adopted at other ports, where appropriate. Also, an independent firm, Xing Tang Labor Company (XTLC) was established to provide personnel for the East Company and No. 6 Company, which operate at the east pier (their construction was financed by the Bank). 16. Decentralization. From June 1984, some of the management and financial functions of the port were decentralized from the central Government (MOC) to the municipality. While the latter assumes most of the responsibility through the port authority, which handles daily management, operations, construction and development, major projects and plans that affect the port's long-term development still need to be approved by MOC. In order to avoid placing a financial burden on the municipality, port finances were restructured in mid-1984; all its tax obligations were eliminated, which improved its financial position. To date, this arrangement has not been altered.  - 5 - 17. The decentralization has significantly affected the port's financial and management structure. The following table summarizes the key financial terms of the restructuring. Date of Size of Project Needing Major Decentralization State Approval Effects June 1984 Rehabilitation projects Port is exempt from all over Y 30 million taxes, funds and depreciation payments All medium and until the end of 1995 large-scale new projects 18. Financial performance. The port's financial performance from 1985-93 has been satisfactory. A comparison of performance with that projected at appraisal indicates that the actual average annual growth rate of before-tax income was 8.4 percent during 1985-92 compared with the 3.9 percent forecast in the SAR. However, the average annual increase in operating revenue of 14.5 percent (7.7 percent forecast in the SAR) was offset by the rise of operating costs of 21.6 percent (7.4 percent forecast). Before-tax income in 1992 was Y 274.1 million, compared with the SAR's Y 129.7 million, and the figure increased by 13.8 percent to Y 311.9 million in 1993. The total volume of traffic handled by the port in 1993 was not very different from the level forecast (33.9 million tons in the SAR vs. 34.6 million tons). 19. The SAR's financial forecasts were developed when the country controlled prices for almost every major commodity at the national level; as a result, cost increases and inflation were rare. In addition, the Government allocated major resources during the previous three decades and only charged users the "planned" prices. At appraisal, there was no indication that either the cost of resources or the rate of inflation would change. Therefore, the financial forecasts assumed that: (a) real port charges would remain virtually constant; and (b) the rate of inflation would be minor (from 6 percent-7 percent during 1985-92). These assumptions, although reasonable at the time, now appear very conservative due to the much higher than expected inflation. 20. During 1985-93, although the Government tightly controlled the port's tariffs, unit tariffs increased by an average of 20.9 percent a year. However, this increase still did not match average unit price increases in operating costs of 31.7 percent (the result of sharply rising fuel, materials and wage costs, and depreciation (most of which have to be paid on the basis of market prices, which were much steeper than the rise in regulated government tariffs). Highlights of the port's income statements for selected years, compared with the SAR forecast, are summarized below with details shown in Table 1.1, Annex 1.  - 6- 1985 1990 1992 1993 Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual ----------------------------(Y million)------------------------------ Net revenue (after operating taxes) 250.3 181.9 365.0 278.7 644.3 305.1 1,139.9 Less: Total operating costs 91.8 78.2 200.8 114.5 360.9 129.3 832.2 Operating revenue 158.5 103.7 164.2 164.2 283.4 175.8 307.7 Average net fixed assets 658.0 663.0 1,395.0 1,454.0 1,838.0 2,004.0 2,050.0 Return on average net Fixed assets (%) /a 24 16 12 it 15 9 15 Operating ratio /b 37 43 55 41 56 42 73 /a Return on average net fixed assets = operating revenue/average net fixed assets. fi Operating ratio = total operating costs/net revenue. 21. TPA's financial performance in 1993 was better than expected at appraisal due to the preferential financial arrangements stemming from decentralization. Operating ratios, however, continued to deteriorate and were higher than the appraisal targets because costs rose rapidly, while tariffs remained lower. Thus, if the current tariff system is not changed, TPA's operating costs are expected to exceed its operating revenue in 1997 (based on the annual growth rates of costs and revenues between 1984-93). 22. The rate of return on average net fixed assets (RRFA), although still quite satisfactory, also declined from 24 percent in 1985 to 15.4 percent in 1992. The decrease was largely due to the rise in operating costs. TPA's fixed assets (RFA) were revalued in March 1993 and it was expected that after this, the RRFA would decline even further in 1993. However, it dropped only slightly (to 15.0 percent). This was because: (a) the RFA was too conservative (carried out for the first time in more than 40 years it increased fixed assets only by an average of about 30 percent in book value and 15.3 percent in net value); (b) the impact of the RFA was further diluted when the value of new fixed assets was averaged with the low-valued fixed assets from the previous year; and (c) the 8.6 percent increase in operating revenues in 1993 absorbed some of the negative impact from the RFA. Thus, it is very important for TPA to apply the proper market value on its fixed assets so it can adequately depreciate its aging facilities and then replace them without jeopardizing the port's future financial capacity. 23. Beginning in July 1993, TPA adopted new financial reporting procedures in order to align Chinese accounting procedures more closely to the Western accounting system. Based on the new procedures, some accounts were abolished and replaced by others. The purpose of the new system is to accelerate the commercialization and privatization of the port by providing westernized accounting instruments.  - 7 - 24. Present performance. At the end of 1993, despite the rapid rise in operating costs, the port's financial position was still sound. The actual current ratio in 1992 was 5.7, which was lower than the SAR's original forecast of 19.2 but still acceptable. Also, debt service coverage during 1985-92 was much better than the SAR forecast, and current assets exceeded liabilities. The percentage of net current assets in the form of cash, however, declined from 80 percent in 1985 to 75 percent in 1992 and to 55 percent in 1993. For the same years, the share of accounts receivable increased from 6 percent to 14 percent and then to 39 percent. Accounts receivables rose due to: (a) the merger of special funds with other accounts, and (b) the merger of accounts with the two other TPA-owned firms (the Foreign Ship Agent Company and Fuel Supply Company) which had higher accounts receivables. 25. The most noteworthy points of the balance sheet during these years can be found in Table 1.2, Annex 1, and are summarized as follows: 1985 1990 1992 Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR ----------------------------(Mln. Yuan)-------------------------------- Net fixed assets 685.3 776.0 1,448.0 1,884.3 1,853.3 2,090.8 Current assets 113.2 195.0 129.3 305.8 274.3 198.3 Special fund assets 22.1 35.0 183.8 44.0 327.3 44.0 Total 802.6 1.006.0 1761.1 2,234.1 2,454.9 2.333.1 Equity 695.9 900.5 1,416.5 1,106.7 1,696.4 1,202.9 Long-term debt 1.0 37.6 43.4 1,053.8 182.9 1,041.7 Current liabilities 26.4 6.2 45.9 9.2 48.2 10.3 Special funds 97.3 61.7 255.3 64.4 527.4 78.2 Total 802.6 1.006.0 1,761.1 2.234.1 2,454.9 2.333.1 Debt/equity ratio -- -- 3/97 49/51 10/90 46/54 26. Future performance. Under present financial arrangements, despite the recent high increase in operating costs, the port still enjoys healthy liquidity, leverage and profitability ratios because it is exempt from all taxes, funds and depreciation payments (to the Government). These conditions have not been altered over the last 10 years. The port's new responsibility for financing all its capital investment programs has not yet impacted on its cash flow (Table 1.3, Annex 1), but is expected to weigh more heavily in the near future. In addition, its current preferential tax terms, which will expire in 1995, could change at any time in the coming year.  - 8 - 27. Considering the higher growth rate of operating costs and TPA's future financial obligations, the port's financial personnel should test many scenarios prior to negotiations with government officials. The critical issues are: (a) Tariffs. To offset the rapid increase in operating costs, tariffs should be adjusted every year in line with the general price index; (b) Revaluation of fixed assets (RFA). To improve the port's financial capacity to replace its aging equipment, RFA should be carried out periodically; (c) Investments. To enhance the port's cash flow, some non-cash generated infrastructure investments (such as for dredging and construction channels and breakwaters) should be financed by the State; (d) Foreign exchange risks. Due to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, it is expected that TPA will have to pay an additional Y 61.0 million annually for its foreign loans. Econoniic Re-evaluation 28. The economic analysis presented in this report is based on actual data on traffic, operational performance, economic costs and the benefits of project components. The methodology used in the revaluation was similar to that in the SAR and is briefly summarized as follows: (a) Capital investment and maintenance costs were revised to reflect 1994 prices and included in the cost stream; (b) The benefit stream, also reflected in 1994 prices, was also included, and consists of savings in port handling, ship port time (berth and waiting), and cargo port time (berth and waiting); (c) A project life of 20 years was assumed and the capital investment period for all berths was from 1985-95; (d) Benefits started to accrue both for the construction-material berth and the container berths in 1990. For general cargo berths, benefits started in 1993. 29. During project implementation, the use of the berths changed due to changes in the composition of the traffic. In particular, the growth of timber traffic was much slower than the SAR estimate. Thus, TPA decided to use the existing general cargo berths to handle the shrinking timber traffic and convert the four timber berths into three container berths. This conversion was taken into account during the planning stage, in the design of the timber berths. It was also considered in the economic analysis for this ICR.  -9- 30. Some expenditures (about 1 percent of total project costs) were allocated to the newly established Port Training Center to improve the operational and managerial efficiency of port staff. The results of these 'improvements are not quantifiable in monetary terms and, consequently, a conventional cost-benefit analysis of the investment cannot be made in the usual manner. However, the payoff is expected to be large. 31. When reviewing the three project components together, it appears that two major factors had a positive impact on improving the revalued economic internal rate of return (REIRR): (a) the lower average daily ship cost in the port; and (b) better than expected traffic performance for the cargoes. Conversely, these factors will be offset by: (a) the higher cargo handling costs; (b) the higher economic capital cost; and (c) the delay in project completion. 32. After the data was revised, the REIRR for the project was 15.7 percent, which is slightly lower than the SAR estimate of 19.2 percent, but still acceptable. A detailed analysis is presented in Annex 2. 33. The REIRR and SAR estimates of the project in terms of economic rates of return and net present value (NPV) are given below. SAR ICR Best estimate of rate of return (%) 19.2 15.7 NPV (12%, million Yuan) 310.1 /1 487.2 /1 January 1986 prices. C. MAJOR FACTORs AFFECTING THE PROJECT 34. Major factors affecting the project are summarized as follows: Positive factors: (a) The developing economy of the area and the country which increased port traffic; (b) The Borrower's expanded capacity to implement projects; (c) Simplicity of project design; and (d) Use of an advanced construction method to improve the soft soil (MDM), which saved costs.  - 10 - Negative factors: (a) Underestimation of the limit of decentralization in the port's financial administration; (b) Price hikes during implementation, that increased both project and port operation costs; and (c) Underestimation of the difficulty in organizing a training center for nationwide use. D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 35. The project can be considered sustainable. It expanded port facilities and raised productivity, and port traffic will grow in conjunction with the economic development of the Tianjin area, as well as the Tianjin-Beijing corridor and the country. Further, TPA is a stable entity with enough financial resources to maintain and operate the port efficiently. Moreover, with the modem equipment and extensive training provided under the project, TPA has the potential to increase the port's productivity even further and provide services at competitive costs. E. BANK PERFORMANCE 36. The Bank's performance in identifying issues and preparing the project was thorough and timely: The project was identified in June 1984 and appraised in June 1985. Bank staff resources were used efficiently (130.4 staffweeks), both until appraisal and during supervision with an annual average input of 9.1 staffweeks, including all specialties throughout the duration (see Table 12, Bank Resources). Also, it gave adequate consideration to the design of the wharves (all 11 berths were designed in a way that they could be converted to handle containers). 37. However, its performance could have been better if it had more carefully assessed the training needs during appraisal: while the SAR provided for a comprehensive Port Training Center for the entire country, the plan has not fully materialized. 38. Regarding procurement, the Bank took a consistent position and provided appropriate instructions and guidance, when necessary. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 39. In general, the Borrower's performance was good and preparation and implementation were adequate. Pilot reforms decentralized the administration of Tianjin port, provided it with financial autonomy and separated the major construction works from daily port administrative functions by the establishment of an independent entity (THCDC). Both TPA and THCDC succeeded in implementing the reforms. As shown in Table 10,  - 11 - Part II, covenants were mostly met. The Borrower's performance, therefore, was satisfactory. 40. Although operations are satisfactory, the Borrower will need to closely monitor the activities of the new east pier, with its advanced systems of managing information and equipment, to determine the level of increased efficiency. G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 41. This project is assessed as satisfactory since it achieved all the major objectives without any shortcomings. 42. The net present value is positive, Y 487.2 million against Y 310.1 in the SAR (see para. 33), when flows are discounted at 12 percent for the major portion of the investment. H. FuTURE OPERATIONS 43. The project has provided the port with the capacity to handle traffic up to around the year 2000. It is important for authorities to prepare the next phase of the development since planning and construction will take several years; any delay that will lead to congestion will be a great loss to the national economy. 44. The efficiency of the port as well as its financial performance will need to be monitored in the future; several indicators of port productivity, such as ship waiting time, cargo handling volume per day per vessel (as indicated in para. 13), and moves (load/unload) of container boxes per hour per crane, can be used. These will be available from the statistics provided by TPA. 45. TMG as well as TPA have asked the Bank to assist in financing a follow-up project for port expansion. The Bank has proposed that it include various modes of transportation that interface at the port so that maritime traffic will be considered along with road and railway linkages. Discussions between GOC and the Bank are underway. I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 46. The key lessons from the implementation are: (a) Decentralization of control over China's port system can be carried out satisfactorily. An autonomous corporation for port construction (THCDC) proved viable when staffed by competent professionals. TPA and THCDC performances were quite satisfactory. (b) Port decentralization now needs to include tariff setting; tariffs are still under Government control, and operating costs cannot be fully reflected. Also, TPA needs to pay more attention to improving productivity by introducing more competition among corporations that operate at terminal;  - 12 - (c) Flexibility in the project design, such as that of the wharf, which allowed it to be converted to a container terminal, proved well-advised; and (d) Procurement of goods took longer than expected (more than six months) due to the country's dual-evaluation process; in the future it could be shortened if evaluation procedures were simplified or the meetings were better coordinated. Government effort is under way.  - 13 - PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: SUMMARY OF AssESsMENTs A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Macro policies x Sector policies x Financial objectives x Institutional development x Physical objectives x Poverty reduction x Gender issues x Other social objectives x Environmental objectives x Public sector management x Private sector development x Other (specify) x B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain x Highly C. Bank performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification x Preparation assistance x Appraisal x Supervision x D. Borrower performance Preparation x Implementation x Covenant compliance x Operation (if applicable) x E. Assessment of outcome x  - 14 - Table 2: RELATED BANK LoANs/CREDrIS Loan/credit title Purpose Year of approval Status Preceding operation 1. Three Ports Project expansion 1982 completed on 6/30/88 Following operations 1. Huangpu Port Project expansion 1987 completed on 12/31/94 2. Dalian Port Project expansion 1988 completed on 12/31/93 3. Ningbo and Shanghai Ports Project expansion 1988 to be completed on 12/31/95 4. Xiamen Port Project expansion 1988 completed on 3/31/95 Table 3: PRoJEcT TIMETABLE Date Date Item planned actual Identification 6/84 Preparation - 11/84 Appraisal 4-5/85 6/1-14/85 Negotiations 02/86 03/3-6/86 Board approval 03/86 05/06/86 Signature - 10/16/86 Effectiveness 03/20/87 Project completion 12/31/92 10/31/94 Loan closing 12/31/92 10/31/94  - 15 - Table 4: LoAN DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL Period Dates Planned ($) Actual ($) Disbursements Cum. Disbursements Cum. Disbursements Disbursements 01/01/87-03/31/87 5,000,000 5,000,000 0 0 04/01/87-06/30/87 2,000,000 7,000,000 1,103,906 1,103,906 07/01/87-09/30/87 7,000,000 14,000,000 1,787,353 2,891,259 10/01/87-12/31/87 4,000,000 18,000,000 3,081,646 5,972,904 01/01/88-03/31/88 4,000,000 22,000,000 2,858,471 8,831,375 04/01/88-06/30/88 4,000,000 26,000,000 156,625 8,988,000 07/01/88-09/30/88 4,000,000 30,000,000 1,362,238 10,350,239 10/01/88-12/31/88 9,000,000 39,000,000 1,963,906 12,314,145 01/01/89-03/31/89 4,000,000 43,000,000 3,319,761 15,633,906 04/01/89-06/30/89 6,000,000 49,000,000 1,444,432 17,078,338 07/01/89-09/30/89 12,000,000 61,000,000 8,261,335 25,339,674 10/01/89-12/31/89 9,000,000 70,000,000 4,255,862 29,595,535 01/01/90-03/31/90 10,000,000 80,000,000 1,802,362 31,397,897 04/01/90-06/30/90 10,000,000 90,000,000 8,088,650 39,486,547 07/01/90-09/30/90 5,000,000 95,000,000 4,702,752 44,189,299 10/01/90-12/31/90 5,000,000 100,000,000 8,632,302 52,821,601 01/01/91-03/31/91 5,000,000 105,000,000 6,263,147 59,084,748 04/01/91-06/30/91 5,000,000 110,000,000 3,981,068 63,065,816 07/01/91-09/30/91 5,000,000 115,000,000 2,477,108 65,542,924 10/01/91-12/31/91 5,000,000 120,000,000 11,035,335 76,578,259 01/01/92-03/31/92 5,000,000 125,000,000 297,873 76,876,132 04/01/92-06/30/92 5,000,000 130,000,000 4,283,73$ 81,159,870 07/01/92-09/30/92 2,496,204 83,656,074 10/01/92-12/31/92 5,587,028 89,243,102 01/01/93-03/31/93 5,446,689 94,689,790 04/01/93-06/30/93 57,107 94,746,897 07/01/93-09/30/93 10,000,940 104,747,837 10/01/93-12/31/93 14,239,825 118,987,663 01/01/94-03/31/94 2,284,397 121,272,060 04/01/94-06/30/94 4,086,562 125,358,622 07/01/94-09/30/94 1,741,648 127,100,270 10/01/94-12/31/94 2,899,730 130,000,000 01/01/95-03/31/95  - 16 - Table 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Implementation Project Planned Actual Completion components start completion start completion delay (months) Civil Works 1. South-side main work 08/86 03/90 03/87 12/90 9 2. Soft soil improvement 12/89 06/87 11/89 -1 3. North-side wharves Foundation 08/89 10/88 09/89 1 Superstructure 08/87 12/92 08/89 10/93 11 4. South-side storage yard 11/90 07/89 11/90 0 5. North-side storage yard 04/91 10/93 6. Dredging 12/92 09/93 9 7. Railway 12/93 8. Power supply station 12/90 06/88 03/91 3 Equipment 9. Handling equipment South-side wharves 08/86 12/91 06/87 10/91 -2 North-side wharves 08/87 12/92 06/88 12/93 12 Quay-side cont. cranes 08/92 05/95 10. Boats 04/91 12/93 05/92 10/94 10  - 17 - Table 5 (cont'd): B. Training: (1) Training for East Pier Operation Items Planned Actual Direct Working Staff Stevedore 2,935 34 Driver 674 212 Auxiliary Workers 1,416 314 Management and Administrative Staff 891 296 Total 5.943 856 (2) Training for Port Operation Item\Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total Management Staff Financial 218 163 284 143 808 Service 893 622 448 562 2,525 General management 2,049 4,274 3,273 1,547 11,143 Others 2,730 3,407 3,756 2,876 12,769 Subtotal 5.890 8,466 7.761 5.128 27,245 Workers On-the-job training 948 560 3,060 509 5,077 Operators 1,179 1,155 5,467 1,033 8,834 Mechanical maintenance 128 498 278 178 1,082 Safety training 1,898 4,632 6,111 2,471 15,112 Others 4,583 6,139 4,082 2,123 16,927 Subtotal 8.736 12,984 18.998 6,314 47.032 Total 14,626 21,450 26.759 11.442 74.277  - 18 - Table 5 (cont'd): C. Procurement (ICB, over US$ 1 million) Contract Bid Evaluation Evaluation Amount in Documents Report Period US$ Equiv. to the Bid to the Signing Required Items ('000) Bank Open Bank Contract (months) South side Gantry cranes 9,400 07/88 09/88 04/89 05/89 7 Timber loader 1,761 01/89 03/89 12/89 03/90 9 Mobile cranes (25t) 1,059 02/89 05/89 12/89 04/90 7 Quay-side gantry cranes 9,859 10/92 12/92 02/93 06/93 4 Rubber-tired gantry cranes 3,519 10/92 12/92 02/93 04/93 3 North side Level ruffmg cranes 11,760 07/91 11/91 04/92 05/92 5 Mobile cranes (40t) 2,430 01/92 03/92 10/92 12/92 6 Mobile cranes (25t) 6,410 01/92 03/92 10/92 12/92 6 Tractors 1,589 01/92 03/92 10/92 02/93 6 Oil supply boat 5,300 07/91 11/91 05/92 08/92 6 Water supply boat 1,266 07/91 11/91 05/92 08/92 6 Computer system 1,776 06/90 10/90 12/90 05/91 2 VTMS 3,596 08/91 08/91 12/91 02/92 3 Sewerage treatment system 1,013 06/88 07/88 08/88 06/89 10 Table 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION ----------------------------Productivity Increase------------------------- General cargo Container Construction mater. 1985 1993 1985 1993 1985 1993 Ship time (days/vessel) 7.9 5.4 4.7 1.5 2.0 1.5 No. of vessels 1,520 1,824 557 2,025 318 287 Total ship days 12,008 9,850 2,618 3,038 636 431 Cargo volume ('000t) 9,330 11,576 900 4,820 980 1,211 Productivity 777 1,175 344 1,587 1,541 2,813 (t/day/vessel) Produc. increase (%) 51.3 361.6 82.6  - 19 - Table 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT Siltation Minimization Study (a) Purpose as defined at appraisal. Analyzing the source of sedimentation, evaluating sedimentation problems at the project area and providing mitigation measures. Determine if dredged material dumped at the site would return to the dredged channel and basin in the future. (b) Status. Satisfactorily completed in December 1989. (c) Impact of study. The proposed dumping area was evaluated appropriately. Dumped dredged material would not return to the basin and channel. This was confirmed by periodic field observations during implementation. 2. Development of Operations Control and a Management Information System (a) Purpose as defined at appraisal. Developing a computer management system covering a wide area of TPA activities: planning, berth operations, cargo transportation, financial, payroll, personnel management, equipment management, fixed asset evaluations, documentation, and engineering. (b) Status. Satisfactorily completed in August 1992. (c) Impact of study. The system was established satisfactorily and is now operational (it can also link with the Dongfang container company's system).  - 20 - Table 8a: PROJECT COSTS Planned Planned Actual Actual Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total ------(Y'000) -($'000) -(Y'000) ---------- ------ ($ 000) -------- South side Reclamation 7,363 - 7,363 2,301 - 2,301 62,650 0 62,650 13,404 0 13,404 Site preparation 8,054 - 8,054 2,517 - 2,517 10,050 0 10,050 2,150 0 2,150 Wharf construction 16,339 26,963 43,302 5,106 8,426 13,532 69,640 58,285 127,925 14,899 12,470 27,369 Dredging basin 5,837 7,725 13,562 1,824 2,414 4,238 11,450 0 11,450 2,450 0 2,450 Soft soil consoli- dation 43,187 28,266 71,453 13,496 8,833 22,329 46,800 1,075 47,875 10,013 230 10,243 Railway 16,918 - 16,918 5,287 - 5,287 35,300 421 35,721 7,552 90 7,642 Water supply, power, etc. 8,861 26,579 35,440 2,769 8,306 11,075 15,760 21,921 37,681 3,372 4,690 8,062 Aux. building 68,582 - 68,582 21,432 - 21,432 139,480 327 139,807 29,842 70 29,912 Highway & pavement 7,395 4,934 12,330 2,311 1,542 3,853 25,000 19,304 44,304 5,349 4,130 9,479 Transformer station 2,432 9,728 12,160 760 3,040 3,800 39,260 25,941 65,201 8,400 5,550 13,950 Revetment (dam) 7,827 - 7,827 2,446 - 2,446 2,220 0 2,220 475 0 475 Equipment 8,691 98,758 107,450 2,716 30,862 33,578 2,680 175,696 178,376 573 37,590 38,163 Others 3,312 5,517 8,829 1,035 1,724 2,759 168,520 21,599 190,119 36,055 4,621 40,676 Subtotal 204,8 208,470 41327 64000 65147 129,147 62881 324567 953,377 134,534 69,441 203,975 North side Dredging 53,635 - 53,635 16,761 - 16,761 86,130 0 86,130 16.793 0 16,793 Wharf construction 19,718 32,672 52,390 6,162 10,210 16,372 110,340 124,635 234,975 21,513 24,300 45,813 Soft soil consolidation (with south side) 8,250 6,463 14,713 1,609 1,260 2,869 Highway & pavement 7,690 10,979 18,669 2,403 3,431 5,834 29,900 13,489 43,389 5,830 2,630 8,460 Railway 3,085 - 3,085 964 - 964 5,530 0 5,530 1.078 0 1,078 Water supply, power, etc. 4,003 5,994 9,997 1,251 1,873 3,124 5,940 9,950 15,890 1,158 1,940 3,098 Equipment 11,168 60,506 71,674 3,490 18,908 22,398 1,480 162,230 163,710 289 31,630 31,919 Subtotal 99,29 110,15 209.45 31,031 34.422 65.453 247,570 316.767 564.337 48,269 61760 110,02 Port Development Institute Building 3,309 - 3,309 1,034 - 1,034 12,870 0 12,870 2,181 0 2,181 Facilities 32 4,413 4,445 10 1,379 1,389 40 3,246 3,286 7 550 557 Subtotal 3,341 4,413 7,754 1,044 1.379 2,423 12.910 3,246 16,15 2187 550 2.737 Technical assistance and training 13,962 11,040 25,002 4,363 3,450 7,813 14,630 8,647 23,277 3,130 1,850 4,980 Custom duties 15,926 - 15,926 4,977 - 4,977 Total base cost 337,328 334,075 671,403 105,415 104,398 209,812 Physical contingencies 33,734 33,408 67,139 10,542 10,440 20,981 Total 371.062 367.482 738,538 I5957 114.838 230.793 Price contingencies 74,358 89,370 163,728 23,237 27,928 51,165 GRAND TOTAL 445,419 456.853 902,271 139.194 142.766 281,958 903.920 653.227 1.557.147 188.120 133,601 321.721  - 21 - Table 8b: PROJECT FINANCING Sources Planned Final ($'000) ($'000) Bank loan 130,000 130,000 Domestic financing (TPA and Government) 152,000 191,721 Total 282.000 321.721 Table 8c: ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS Category Original Final Actual allocation allocation disbursements Ln. Ln. Ln. ($'000) ($'000) ($'000) 1. Civil Works 50,000 46,000 2. Goods 51,000 81,600 3. Consultants service & training 3,500 2,400 4. Unallocated 25,500 0 Special Account Cancellation - - Total 130. 130.000  - 22 - Table 9: ECONOMIC COSTS, BENEFIT AND MAJOR FINANCIAL INDICATORS SAR ICR Total Traffic (1993): 33.9 34.6 Of which: General Cargo (min. ton) /a 9.9 11.6 Construction Materials (mln. ton) 1.5 1.2 Container ('000 teu) 465 482 Financial (1992, in %): Return on average net fixed assets 8.8 15.4 Operating ratio 42.4 5.6 Debt service coverage 1.8 4.7 Debt/equity ratio 46/54 10/90 Current ratio 19.2 5.7 Economic (1994 prices): Total cost (million Y) 1,002.55 1,904.38 NPV (million Y) 639.43 487.20 Economic rate of return (in %) 19.20 15.70 /a Including timber traffic.  - 23 - Table 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS Agree- Section Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comnments ment Date Date Loan 2.02(b) ok 10/16/86 Borrowers to open special account. Project 4.01(a) ok 10/16/86 TPA shall maintain proper records and account. 4.01(b) ok TFA shall have accounts Audited financial audited and furnished to reports have been the Bank not later than received on time six months after end of and reviewed by the fiscal year. Bank. Bank 4.03(a) ok By December 31 of each TFA has submitted year, prepare and furnish the Five-Year to the Bank a financial Rolling Financial plan for each of the next Plan to the Bank five years. before December 31 each year. Table 11: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS FY 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total Preappraisal 16.9 13.6 - - - - - - - - - 30.5 Appraisal - 63.5 35.4 - - - - - - - - 99.9 Negotiations - - - 6.5 - - - - - - - 6.5 Supervision - - - 11.0 4.3 11.3 11.8 13.8 6.4 9.8 4.5 72.9  - 24 - Table 12: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS Month/ No. of Days in Specializations Performance Rating Type of Year persons in field represented status /a trend /b problems /c Identification/ Preparation 03/84 7 7 EGR,EC,FA, - - - EC,OP,EC,FA Appraisal 061855 5 14 EGR,EC,FA, - - Post Appraisal 10/85 4 7 EGR,EC,FA,EC - - - Lending Arrangement 12/85 1 1 FA - - Procurement 10/86 1 4 PR - - Supervision I 10/86 2 7 EGR,FA I - - Supervision 11 10/88 4 5 EGR,OP,EC,FA 1 2 Supervision III 09/89 2 4 EC,FA 1 2 Supervision IV 12/90 2 5 EGR,FA 2 3 M (con- struction delay) Supervision V 02/92 1 5 EGR 2 2 - Supervision VI 09/92 2 5 EGR,EC 2 2 Supervision VII 03/93 2 1 EGR,OP 2 2 Supervision VIII 09/93 1 1 EGR 2 2 Supervision IX 11/93 2 4 EGR,EC 2 2 a I = problem free or minor problems; 2 = moderate problems; 3 = major problems. /b 1 = improving; 2 = stationary; 3 = deteriorating. /c M = Management; P = Procurement.  -25 - ANNEX 1 ANNEX 1: FINANCIAL ANALYSIS Table 1.1: TIANJI PORT AuTHoRiTY: LNCOME STATEMENT (December 31, Y'OOO) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Traffic: WhoLe port ('000 ton) 18,562 18,181 17,252 21,094 24,369 20,633 23,776 29,286 37,192 Port authority ('000 ton) 18,049 17,709 16,740 20,316 23,344 19,417 22,458 27,678 34,591 Of which: containers ('000 teu) 115.5 133.1 144.5 266.4 265.8 286.7 339.8 393.5 481.9 Revenue Loading/unLoading 161,998 179,766 158,545 199,990 242,446 236,031 297,300 438,140 669,614 Storage 28,848 36,417 19,370 25,595 43,395 32,479 23,062 39,318 37,511 Sales 26,122 25,411 20,827 18,141 18,447 17,289 19,871 17,028 153,965 Other 41,844 44,697 49,843 69,374 100,414 92,507 123,681 172,496 319,580 SubtotaL 258,812 286,291 248,585 313,100 404,702 378,306 463,914 666,982 1,180,670 Less: operating tax (8,492) (9,781) (8,474) (10,771) (14,219) (13,258) (15,815) (22,709) (40,721) Total- Net Revenue 250,320 276,510 240,111 302,329 390,483 365,048 448,099 644,273 1,139,949 ------ ....... .. ... .. - - -- - - -- - - -- .... . - - - - - - - Expenditure Loading/unloading 46,036 54,171 57,063 78,869 108,223 113,425 138,795 202,826 395,735 Storage 9,516 11,573 12,227 16,768 20,505 23,115 27,683 46,323 61,564 Sales 22,470 21,744 18,351 16,978 18,432 16,592 19,694 16,595 144,101 Other 13,800 15,412 21,371 30,786 44,576 47,689 69,452 95,111 230,809 TotatL operating costs 91,822 102,900 109,012 143,401 191,736 200,821 255,624 360,855 832,209 Operating Revenue 158,498 173,610 131,099 158,928 198,747 164,227 192,475 283,418 307,740 -- - - - - - - - . ...... .. . . .. . . .... . -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Add: Nonoperating revenue 142 221 78 694 1,242 6,023 15,546 10,708 17,680 Less: Nonoperating expense (2,516) (2,994) (5,923) (8,489) (10,126) (12,054) (14,698) (20,010) (13,540) Income Before Tax 156,124 170,837 125,254 151,133 189,863 158,196 193,323 274,116 311,880 -- - --- -- -- - - . . ... .. --- -- -- - - ....... .... .... --- -- Return on average net fixed assets (X) 24.1 21.7 13.0 13.7 15.5 11.8 11.8 15.4 15.0 Operating ratio 36.7 37.2 45.4 47.4 49.1 55.0 57.0 56.0 73.0 Source: Tianjin Port Authority and Bank staff. Dec-94  - 26 - ANNEX 1 Table 1.2: TIANJIN PORT AuTHoRITY: BALANCE SHEET (December 31, Y'000) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ASSETS ==..u== Current Assets Cash & bank deposits 90,827 88,738 60,009 64,784 80,516 91,007 132,002 205,629 423,820 Accounts receivabLe 6,755 17,661 26,291 32,355 24,882 15,239 27,290 37,871 297,609 Inventories 15,591 22,578 19,158 24,202 32,200 23,088 25,388 30,774 50,070 Subtotal 113,173 128,9T7 105,458 121,341 137,598 129,334 184,680 274,274 771,499 Fixed Assets At cost 778,847 1,021,559 1,230,968 1,364,456 1,519,713 1,660,095 2,082,066 2,177,236 3,055,930 Less: depreciation 93,566 106,045 126,030 146,322 176,638 212,069 258,341 323,884 809,750 SubtotaL 685,281 915,514 1,104,938 1,218,134 1,343,075 1,448,026 1,823,725 1,853,352 2,246,180 Special Fund Assets 22,153 71,003 105,823 157,475 172,572 183,767 225,294 327,314 -- ....-- ------- ------ ------ ------- --- -- -- - - ------ ... ...... ..... Long-Term Investments -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 212,520 Other Assets /1 -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- 1,076,850 TotaL Assets 820,607 1,115,494 1,316,219 1,496,950 1,653,245 1,761,127 2,233,699 2,454,940 4,307,049 =zz ==S====== ========= ======5 ==