Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14763 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BARBADOS SECOND EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2688-BAR) JUNE 30, 1995 Human Resources Division Country Department III Latin America and the Caribbean Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. GLOSSARY BCC Barbados Community College EPIU Education Project Implementation Unit IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank MOE Ministry of Education and Culture MRSU Manpower Research and Statistics Unit NTB National Training Board PCR Project Completion Report SAR Staff Appraisal Report SEN Special Education Needs SJPP Samuel Jaclknan Prescod Polytechnic S/T Student/Teacher SW Staff Weeks TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation June 30, 1995 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Barbados Second Education and Training Project (Loan 2688-BAR) Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Barbados Second Education and T1raining project (Loan 2688-BAR, approved in FY86) prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. The PCR gives a satisfactory account of project experience and outcomes. Part II is in basic agreement with Parts I and ll. The objectives of the project were to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of primary and secondary education; to enhance the efficiency, quality and relevance of technical and vocational training; and to strengthen government's capacity to manage and plan education development. These aims were to be achieved through a broad range of inputs: construction or upgrading of facilities; equipment purchases; and the creation of two new administrative units. The physical investments were supported by technical assistance and training. Project implementation was affected by the arrival of a new Government with a somewhat different project concept (implying larger physical and staff inputs, hence higher costs) and a simultaneous deterioration in the economic situation leading to shortages of counterpart funds. These two factors caused implementation delays and cost overruns, and left some buildings incomplete. But most educational facilities were provided as foreseen (although the buildup of enrollments proceeded more slowly than expected). On balance, outcome is rated as marginally satisfactory, and institutional development as modest. The prospects for the project's sustainability are mixed: the positive momentum imparted by institutional development has to be weighed against the braking force of fiscal constraint. Thus sustainability is rated as uncertain. Compliance with legal covenants has generally been good, some lapses brought on by the difficult budgetary situation notwithstanding. No audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BARBADOS SECOND EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2688-BAR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ........................ i EVALUATION SUMMARY ............................ iii PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .1 Project Identity. 1 Project Background .1 Sector Development Objectives .1 Policy Context .1 Linkages Between Project, Sector and Macro Policy Objectives .1 Project Objectives and Description. 2 Project Objectives. 2 Project Components. 2 Project Design and Organization. 2 Project Implementation. 2 Critical Variances in Project Implementation. 2 Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-Up. 3 Revision to Loan Agreement. 3 Project Costs. 3 Project Closing Date. 3 Project Results. 4 Project Sustainability. 6 Bank Performance. 6 Borrower Performance. 7 Major Strengths and Weaknesses. 7 Project Relationship. 8 Consulting Services ........................................... 8 Project Documentation and Data .................................. 8 Tls document has a restricted distribution and may bc used by recipients only in the pcrformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Page No. PART H. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Borrower's Perspective of the Design and Implementation and the Development Impact of the Project .................................. 9 PART m. STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related Bank Loans ..................................... 15 Project Timetable . .......................................... 15 Loan Disbursements . ......................................... 16 Project Costs and Financing Project Costs ........................................... 18 Project Financing . ...................................... 18 Project Results Direct Benefits . ........................................ 19 Studies/Consultancies ..................................... 20 Status of Legal Covenants ........... ........................... 26 Use of Bank Resources Staff Irputs . .......................................... 27 Missions ............................................. 28 ANNEXES Annex I ................................................. 29 Annex II ................................................. 30 Annex i ................................................. 31 Annex IV ................................................. 32 MAP IBRD 19396 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BARBADOS SECOND EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2688-BAR) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Education and Training Project in Barbados, for which Loan 2688-BAR in the amount of US$10.0 million was approved on May 6, 1986. The loan was closed on schedule on June 30, 1993 and the outstanding balance of US$1.6 million was canceled on November 2, 1993. The Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III were prepared by the Human Resources Division, Country Department m, of the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office while the Borrower prepared Part II. Preparation of this PCR was started during an April 1994 mission, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda. iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BARBADOS SECOND EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2688-BAR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Obiectives L. The project objectives were to: (i) improve the quality and cost effectiveness of primary and secondary education; (ii) improve the efficiency, quality, and industrial relevance of technical and vocational training; and (iii) strengthen the capacity to manage and plan the education and training system. Implementation ExDerience ii. The critical variances between planned and actual project imnplementation must be viewed against the changing political and economic environment since the mid 1980s when the project was prepared. The new Govermnent which came to power shortly after loan signing requested significant changes in the size/scope of the civil works activities and introduced a number of policy changes as a result of political/social pressures. The new administration relaxed the hiring freeze policy, introduced specialized remedial reading teachers, and lowered teaching loads in primary education. The deterioration in the economic situation, which led to an IMF sponsored stabilization program, was reflected in shortages of incremental recurrent funding that adversely affected the completion phase of key civil works activities. iii. Decisions which most affected project implementation included changes in the civil works component and recruitment of a specialized agency to handle the technical assistance component. The Government's decision to change the site, size and/or scope of the civil works led to implementation delays and dramatic cost overruns. This decision was exacerbated by budgetary constraints, which resulted in shortages of counterpart funds, delays in payments of contractors and suspension of works (Annex I). A notable example was the Ministry of Education (MOE) headquarters complex. The change in site selection and scope of work, resulted in a total cost of roughly US$7.1 million, versus US$3.1 million at appraisal, representing a cost overrun of about 130 percent. By project completion, US$4.0 million had been spent and the facility remained uncompleted, leaving MOE staff in the same cramped facilities and raising doubts about the effective use of project funds. With the benefit of hindsight, these excessive cost overruns could possibly have been avoided by carrying out a critical assessment of the technical merits and the fiscal implications of the proposed changes. In fact, it is likely that if the design plans and site selection for the MOE headquarters had remained unchanged, it would have been feasible to complete the facility by project completion. In comparison to the decision concerning the civil works component, the recruitment of a specialized agency proved beneficial in the implementation of the technical assistance component. From project inception through evaluation, the British Council organized a series of rnissions, assisting the Government in fleshing out the objectives of the technical assistance component, in prioritizing and scheduling consultancies and in identifying and supervising suitable consultants. Results iv. Key achievements relate to: (a) enhancements to the learning environment in the 10 amalgamated primary schools; (b) construction of two secondary schools with a total capacity of about 2000 school places; (c) reinforcement of special education needs programs; (d) adoption of a textbook procurement and distribution policy in secondary education; (e) construction of a new NTB skills iv training center (Sayes Court), which accommodates about 315 students annually; (f) construction of technician level training facilities at the Barbados Community College, which facilitated a 20 percent expansion in enrollments; (g) improvements in the delivery of courses for public servants at the Training Administration Division; and (h) production of the Barbados Directory of Occupational Classification. v. Against these positive developments, it should be noted that SAR enrollment targets have not always been met, capacity utilization at the newly constructed/renovated facilities has been hindered by staff shortages/turnover (para. 18), and there has been lack of progress in raising the student/teacher ratio, which was one of the key policy conditions of the loan (paras. 15, 16). By project completion in 1992/93, the student/teacher ratio declined to 20:1 and 18:1 at the primary and secondary level, respectively, in comparison to the Government's commitment to maintain the ratios above the 1983/84 levels (primary: 23:1 and secondary: 19:f1), suggesting the system is probably more costly today than when the project was launched (Annex II). If the ratio of 23:1 and 19:1 had been reached by 1992/93 the number of teachers required at the primary level would have been only 1210 (instead of the actual 1430 employed) and at the secondary level about 1116 (in comparison to 1202), representing financial savings of roughly BD$12.0 million in 1993, or about 6 percent of the education recurrent budget. There has also been lack of progress in formulating measures to achieve cost savings in vocational subjects in secondary education. Supervision missions did not address these issues adequately, which was partly related to reliance on one consultant and the absence of a Bank staff member who would have been in a position to discuss sensitive policy issues. This was reflected in supervision reports and aide memoires which provided an uneven and incomplete treatment of implementation issues. Sustainability vi. The factor which augurs well for project sustainability relates to enhanced institutional capabilities, stemming from training provided under the project, which should lead to improved decision making and productivity. The key factors which are likely to impede sustainability are the Government's fiscal constraints, as evidenced during the last two years of project implementation, as well as the level of commitment to pursuing socially and politically unpopular measures (e.g., freeze on recruitment). In an environment of continuing fiscal austerity combined with lack of progress in improving internal efficiency, the Government is likely to experience continuing difficulties in earmarking sufficient non-salary funds for maintaining the newly constructed/renovated facilities. Lessons Learned vii. The principal lessons derived from project implementation can be summarized as follows: (i) policy conditionality should be realistically set, requesting the Govermment to take up-front action to illustrate comrmitment, and closely monitored during the life of the project, taking appropriate action when there is lack of compliance; (ii) supervision missions should be appropriately staffed with interdisciplinary teams, and led by the task manager or other Bank staff member able to handle policy discussions as well as have sufficient time devoted to them; (iii) aide memoires should provide a balanced treatment of all project components, bringing to the attention of Government authorities major implementation problems and requesting remedial action; and (iv) civil works activities which deviate substantially from appraisal estimates should only be approved after a thorough reappraisal by the Bank, irrespective of Government commitmnent to fund the cost overruns. The key lessons stemming from project implementation for the Borrower relate to the need to: (i) foster a broad based consensus among social partners on difficult reform measures prior to negotiating legal agreements with donors; (ii) continue with recruitment of a firm for overseeing the implementation of technical assistance activities; (iii) contract to the private sector the elaboration of design plans; and (iv) establish clearer linkages between technical assistance/fellowships and project objectives, strengthening follow-up of studies and emphasizing consultancies which involve the delivery of workshops rather than production of reports. SECOND EDUCATION AND TRANIG PROJECT (LOAN 2688-BAR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Proiect Identity - Project Name: Second Education and Training Project - Loan No.: 2688-BAR - RVP Unit: Latin America and Caribbean Region Country Department III - Country: Barbados - Sector: Education - Subsectors: General Technical and Vocational B. Project Background 1. Sector Development Objectives At the time of project appraisal in May/June 1985 Barbados had one of the most highly developed educational systems in Latin America and the Caribbean, having reached universal coverage in primary and secondary education and an adult literacy rate close to 99 percent. The Governnent's development objectives therefore emphasized the need to equalize opportunity, by rectifying the qualitative disparities in school facilities, to modernize the educational content and to ensure cost containment in the education system. 2. Policy Context Government authorities placed priority on four key policy issues. First, the fiscal sustainability of education spending. The Government's free education policy, high coverage of the formal education system, and relatively low student/teacher ratios (23:1 and 19:1 in primary and secondary education, respectively) led to 8 percent of GDP and 18-20 percent of the total recurrent public sector expenditure being devoted to education. While these expenditure levels reflected the high priority accorded to education they emphasized the need to reduce costs and raise student-teacher ratios, as well as improve the efficiency of the system. Second, low achievement levels, which were reflected in the 30 percent of primary school children who performed poorly in secondary school entrance examinations and about 50 percent who failed the secondary school leaving examinations.' Factors explaining this poor performance included the automatic promotion policy, the lack of remedial instruction at the primary level, insufficient instructional time, and delays in curriculum implementation in secondary education. Third, uneven access to facilities of comparable quality, particularly at the secondary level. Fourthlv, there were serious education management problems (e.g. weaknesses in educational planning), which were exacerbated by the inappropriate and congested premises occupied by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOE). 3. Linkages Between Proiect, Sector and Macro Policy Objectives The deterioration in the economic situation in the early 1980s, which was reflected in declining GDP growth rates of 3-4 percent and rising unemployment levels (11 to 18 percent from 1981 to 1984), revealed underlying structural problems (e.g., declining competitiveness in tourism and sugar, the key foreign exchange earning sectors). To overcome these difficulties, the Bank supported the Government's plans to 1/ It should be noted that scores on the secondary school leaving exam (Caribbean Examinations Council Examination), which are the only ones available, are not representative of achievement levels of all secondary school students since this exam is targeted to the upper 40 percent of the secondary school-age population. 2 diversify its markets, improve efficiency and increase vocational skills. According to the Staff Appraisal Report the Project was expected: (i) to provide the incentives to implement quality and cost effectiveness measures (e.g. improvement in student-teacher ratios, rationalization of vocational subjects in secondary schools and formulation of measures to achieve cost savings and greater efficiency in the utilization of educational facilities and resources); and (ii) to contribute significantly to human resources development, which is essential for a competitive modem economy. C. Project Objectives and Description 4. Project Objectives The objectives were to: (i) improve the quality and cost effectiveness of primary and secondary education; (ii) improve the efficiency, quality, and industrial relevance of technical and vocational training; and (iii) strengthen the capacity to manage and plan the education and training system. 5. Project Components To attain these objectives the project included the following components: construction/upgrading and/or equipping of: (a) 10 primary schools; (b) 4 secondary schools (construction of 1, upgrading of 2; and providing supplementary equipment and furniture to another); (c) facilities at the Samuel Jackman Prescod Polytechnic (SJPP); (d) training facilities at the Barbados Community College (BCC); (e) Ministry of Education Pedagogical and Administrative Building; (f) four National Training Board (NTB) skills training centers (3 new ones and 1 to be equipped); (g) Manpower Research and Statistics Unit (MRSU); and (h) the Training Administration Division. Technical assistance and local training were also provided to facilitate implementation of these components. D. Project Design and Oranization 6. The project, which was co-financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Government of Barbados, was well prepared and designed, providing timely assistance for the continuation and broadening of the activities launched under the First IBRD Education Project. The conceptual foundation of the project was appropriately based on two overriding considerations: (i) improving/modernizing the learning environment in school facilities; and (ii) raising the cost- effectiveness of the education and training system through such measures as school amalgamations and a freeze on teacher recruitment. While there appears to have been a broad-based consensus on the first point, there was a wider divergence of views on the scope and pace of the policy reform measures, particularly amongst teachers, teachers' unions, and the new Government which came to power in 1986. E. Project Implementation 7. Critical Variances in Project Implementation The critical variances between planned and actual project implementation must be assessed against the changing political/economic environment in Barbados since the mid 1980s when the project was prepared. Two points are worth highlighting. First, within one week after project signing (May 21, 1986), a new Government came to power, which wanted to ensure the project was consistent with its priorities. This led to a reassessment and renegotiation of the project, involving significant changes in the size/scope of the civil works activities, which in turn spurred implementation delays and dramatic cost overruns. Political/social pressures drove the new administration to relax the hiring freeze policy, to introduce specialized remedial reading teachers, and to lower teaching loads in primary education, in part to address the surplus supply. Second, it should be emphasized that while the project was prepared and launched during a relatively prosperous economic period it was completed during a period of fiscal austerity, which coincided with the final phase of a number of major civil works. The Staff Appraisal Report rightly identified the risks which in practice impeded project implementation, namely the relaxation of the hiring freeze, the overall economic environment and the related issue of availability of incremental 3 recurrent financing. The major variances between planned and actual implementation are summarized below: 8. (i) Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-UR The loan became effective in February 1987 with a four-month delay due primarily to protracted parliamentary discussions prior to project approval. The project therefore got off to a slow start. 9. (ii) Revision to Loan Aereement During 1987 the new Government carried out a reassessment of the project, which ultimately led to a reappraisal by the Bank, requiring preparation of supplemental documents for the loan amendment. The principal changes to the loan agreement requested were: (a) relocation of the Ministry of Education pedagogical and administrative units (i.e., headquarters complex) to a new site; (b) construction (rather than upgrading) of Queen's College at a new site; (c) construction of the St. Thomas Secondary School; and (d) construction, furnishing and equipping of one (rather than 3) new skills training center, and acquisition of equipment/furniture for one existing large skills training center and up to seven existing small centers. In October 1987 the Bank agreed to all points except (c), which was expected to leave the appraisal costs essentially the same. As discussed below, these revisions to the loan agreement ultimately had a significant impact on implementation, to the extent that they spurred large cost increases and led to a 2-year delay in launching the civil works component. 10. (iii) Proiect Costs At project completion, the total project cost was somewhat over US$52 million, in comparison to an SAR estimate of US$37.7 million (IBRD: US$10, IDB: US$17 and Government: US$10.7 million), representing close to a 40 percent increase.2 The cost overrun was financed exclusively by the Government, which spent close to US$27 million, raising questions about the need for external financing. 11. Cost overruns affected primarily the civil works activities and stemmed from a combination of factors: changes in site selection and scope of works; delays in initiating civil works; lack of bids from prequalified contractors; and shortages of counterpart funds, resulting from budgetary constraints, which led to delays in payments of contractors and suspension of works (see Annex I). The two noteworthy examples are the MOE headquarters complex and Queen's College, both part of the 1987 credit amendment. In the case of the MOE headquarters, the change in site selection and scope of work, resulted in a total cost of roughly US$7.1 million, versus US$3.1 million at appraisal, representing a cost overrun of about 130 percent. Shortages of counterpart funds forced the Government to suspend works in April 1992; when the IBRD loan was closed, US$4.0 million had been spent and the facility remained uncompleted. In the case of Queen's College, the cost of the facility more than doubled to about US$7.0 million in relation to the 1987 amendment (US$3.1 million) and quadrupled in comparison to the SAR estimate (US$1.7 million). With the benefit of hindsight, the excessive cost overruns could possibly have been avoided by requesting the Government to provide detailed design plans and cost estimates during the 1987 amendment and by taking a more cautious approach in approving documents which implied such substantial cost overruns. At a minimum, the Bank should have secured the services of a suitable specialist to carry out a critical assessment of the technical merits and the fiscal implications of the proposed changes. 12. (iv) Pro)ect Closin Date In May 1993 the Government submitted a request to the Bank for a 2-year extension of the closing date, proposing to spend the balance of the IBRD loan (US$1.6 million) almost exclusively on the completion of the MOE headquarters complex. The June 1993 2/ The difference between these figures and the project costs cited in Part I of the PCR is interest and financial charges. According to Part II, which includes these charges, the MDB and Govermment contributions at appraisal were US$19.0 million and US$16.8 million, respectively (para. 45); by project completion, the total project costs increased by somewhat over 40 percent (para. 36). 4 IBRD mission worked in close collaboration with Government officials in elaborating a financial and an implementation plan for completion of the MOE headquarters. The main stumbling block proved to be the Cabinet's decision of August 20, 1993 that no funds would be made available for the completion of the MOE headquarters, which forced the Bank to close the loan on schedule and to cancel the outstanding balance of US$1.6 million on November 2, 1993. F. Project Results 13. While important qualitative improvements in the learning environment were introduced, there was no discernible improvement in the cost-effectiveness of the education and training system and mixed results were attained in institutional reinforcement, implying that the impact on the education sector was not as substantial as had been expected. 14. Improvements in primary and secondary education resulted from: (a) enhancements to the learning environment in the 10 amalgamated primary schools (accommodating some 4300 children); (b) construction of two secondary schools with a total capacity of 1980 school places (Queen's College, 930 and Wotton/Kingsland Secondary, 1050)3, which has allowed the Government to significantly improve access to quality educational facilities; (c) introduction of a reading assessment kit; (d) staff training in diagnostic techniques, library and audio-visual materials development; (e) reinforcement of special education programs; and (f) adoption of a textbook procurement and distribution policy in secondary education, which stipulates that all secondary schools be given their own textbook budgets, to be determined on a per capita basis. 15. The poor performance experienced under the First IBRD-funded Education Project (1978-85) in raising the cost-effectiveness of primary and secondary education continued during the inplementation of the Second Education Project. While the Staff Appraisal Report included enrollment projections, depicting a continuing declining trend over the 1983-90 period, the Government proved unable to meet the project's cost reduction targets, as it succumbed to social and labor union pressures to recruit a backlog of newly trained school teachers. This situation was only partly rectified by efforts to dismiss teachers during the early 1990s, as part of the Government's stabilization program. By project completion in 1992/93, the SIT ratio had declined to 20:1 and 18:1 at the primary and secondary level, respectively, in comparison to the Government's commitment to maintain the ratios above the 1983/84 levels (primary: 23:1 and secondary: 19:1, Annex II). These factors suggest that the system is probably more costly today than when the project was launched. If the ratio of 23:1 and 19:1 had been reached by 1992/93 the number of teachers required at the prinary level would have been only 1210 (instead of the actual 1430 employed) and at the secondary level about 1116 (in comparison to 1202). The potential financial savings of some 310 fewer teachers (primary: 220; secondary: 90) would have been roughly BD$12.0 million in 1993, representing about 6.0 percent of the education recurrent budget. 16. While the situation deteriorated for the sector as a whole, there was limited improvement in S/T ratios in some amalgamated primary schools (see Annex II). Nevertheless, it appears doubtful that the expected cost savings (20 percent) of these mergers materialized. Moreover, as can be seen from the table below, even the schools which experienced improvements in S/T ratios did not reach the SAR targets. This is due primarily to the larger than expected reception classes and to the decrease in the number of periods (35 to 32) that teachers are required to teach. 3/ The net increase in secondary school places was in fact about 1400 (representing a 7 percent expansion) since Queen's College already existed and was relocated to a new site. 5 Table #1 SAR Before Target Actual St Mary's Infants 23:1 26:1 21:1 St Mary's Junior 15:1 St. Matthias Boys 13:1 27:1 21:1 St. Matthias Girls 16:1 Bayley's Primary 17:1 27:1 22:1 Shrewsbury Primary 22:1 Source: Annex mR 17. While there have been some improvements in technical and vocational education and training (TVET), there has been virtually no progress in raising the relevance and cost-effectiveness of these programs. Key achievements relate to: (a) construction of a new NTB skills training center (Sayes Court), which accommodates about 315 students annually; (b) construction of technician level training facilities for the Department of Computer Studies, and the Divisions of Technology, Applied Arts, and Health Sciences at the Barbados Community College, facilitating a 20 percent expansion in enrollments by 1991/92, of which women comprised roughly 75 percent4; (c) staff training/study tours/consultancies, which facilitated the introduction of the associate degree program and a new student records system at the BCC; (d) provision of equipment to the SJPP; (e) pilot testing of a pre- vocational education program in secondary education; (f) improvements in the delivery of courses for public servants at the Training Administration Division; and (g) production of the Barbados Directory of Occupational Classification, which represents an important tool for analysis and monitoring of the labor market situation. 18. Nevertheless, SAR enrollment targets have not always been met and capacity utilization at the newly constructed/renovated facilities has been hindered by staff shortages and/or turnover (e.g., NTB, SJPP) and by lack of progress in introducing new policies. For example, there appears to have been limited progress in implementing the draft plan reviewed at negotiations for the sharing of workshop facilities among secondary schools and the SJPP; as a result the number of secondary school students in the day-release program dropped from 347 (1984/85) to 236 (1992/93), in comparison to an appraisal target of about 700, implying a substantial increase in unit costs. The overall enrollment target of about 2000 students was not reached as SJPP currently has only 1314 students. Similarly, while the MRSU benefitted from fellowships and supplementary equipment it has been unable to significantly expand its activities due in large part to staff shortages and rapid turnover. Moreover, there has been virtually no progress in improving the industrial advisory committees, industrial job analysis, and follow-up of graduates. 19. With respect to institutional reinforcement, there appears to have been a general improvement as training opportunities for managerial and technical staff expanded considerably. Nevertheless, according to Govermnent officials, the anticipated improvements did not always materialize since the level of commitment for bringing about change in the public sector was not fully assessed and resources required were not always available. Limited or no progress has been achieved in some areas (i.e. educational planning and management; budgeting procedures; school supervision; curriculum implementation; teacher appraisal). The lack of substantial progress in strengthening educational planning is particularly disappointing since this was identified as a major sector weakness 41 The upgraded facilities have permitted the BCC to introduce self-funding and income-generating courses as part of its overall cost recovery policy. 6 during the First Education Project PCRlAudit Report. Factors impeding an improvement in educational planning included: shortcomings of consultancies, staff vacancies, absence of a statutory requirement that all schools submit annual returns, and lack of strong ministerial support. The reliability and accuracy of educational planning statistics and teacher training requirements has been somewhat questionable. This situation was partly rectified towards the end of the project period, with the appointment of a senior education officer to the planning section. Likewise, there was no follow- up to consultant recommendations on the functioning of the National Training Board, which implied that the institution continued to carry out its service delivery functions, leaving a vacuum in terms of strategic planning and coordination of TVET programs. The impact on local institutions was most noticeable in the case of institutions, such as the BCC, which were already well managed and able to make the most of project resources. With regard to the formulation of measures to achieve cost savings and greater efficiency in vocational subjects in secondary education, there has been no discernible progress during the course of the project, and the issue is now being addressed in the follow-up Human Resources Project approved in July 1993.5 Finally, as already mentioned above, the MOE headquarters complex was never completed, leaving the staff accommodated in the same cramped facilities and raising doubts about the effective use of project funds. In retrospect, if the design plans and site selection had remained unchanged, it would have been feasible to complete the MOE headquarters complex in a timely fashion. G. Project Sustainablitv 20. The factor which augurs well for project sustainability relates to enhanced institutional capabilities, stenmming from training provided under the project, which should lead to improved decision making and productivity. The key factors which are likely to impede sustainability are the Government's fiscal constraints, as evidenced during the last two years of project implementation, as well as the level of commitment to pursuing socially and politically unpopular measures (e.g., freeze on recruitrnent). In an environment of continuing fiscal austerity, combined with lack of progress in improving internal efficiency, the Government is likely to experience continuing difficulties in earmarking sufficient non-salary funds for maintaining the facilities constructed/renovated under the project and for the provision of adequate instructional materials for school facilities. H. Bank Performance 21. Bank performance was particularly strong in the initial phases of the project cycle (identification/preparation/appraisal) but was relatively weak during the supervision phase.6 While supervision missions were fielded at regular intervals, their composition was inadequate as they did not include multi-disciplinary teams, and often consisted of only one consultant. This implied that a disproportionate attention was devoted to some areas of project implementation (e.g. civil works) to the detriment of others (e.g. policy issues, education programs, compliance with legal covenants). While the use of the same consultant for the majority of supervision missions provided continuity, the absence of Bank staff at critical periods in project imnplementation was inappropriate, particularly for 51 The study on the formulation of measures to achieve cost savings and greater efficiency in vocational subjects in secondary education was produced with a delay and fell considerably short of its mnndate. The British Council funded another consultancy, which produced a report documenting the uneconomical nature of these course offerings and suggesting remedial actions. A MOE committee was subsequently set up to prepare an action plan, which became one of the dated legal covenants of the Human Resources Project. 6/ According to the MIS data, 65 percent of staff resources were devoted to identification/preparation/appraisal in comparison to only 35 percent for supervision. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the data might underestimate somewhat the actual staff weeks devoted to supervision to the extent that the reporting for some years is incomplete. 7 the discussion of sensitive policy issues. Bank staff members led only 3 out of the 12 supervision missions carried out during the life of the project. Furthermore, the staff weeks (s.w.) devoted to supervision fell considerably below planned levels as well as the Bank norm for similar projects. For example, during the FY89-92 period, somewhat less than 3.0 s.w. were spent per year, on average, in comparison to the planned level of 10 s.w. and to a Bank normn of 11 s.w. for education projects. 22. In general, the majority of supervision reports, aide memoires and confirmation telexes failed to highlight the lack of progress in the areas of project implementation which ultimately fell considerably short of their goals. Supervision reports and aide memoires tended to focus on the civil works components, monitoring closely compliance with preparation of design plans, tendering, and physical implementation. By contrast, most of the supervision reports rated compliance with legal covenants a " 1 " and the aide memoires stated that "loan covenants are being met essentially as scheduled", while the important S/T ratio covenant was not fulfilled. In one case (July 1989 supervision report), the legal covenant category was rated a "2", indicating moderate problems, but this was not brought to the attention of either Bank management or Government officials. 23. The principal lessons derived from project implementation can be summarized as follows: (i) Policy conditionality should be realistically set, taking account of political and technical feasibility, and the Government should take up-front action to illustrate commitmnent. During the life of the project, the policy conditionality needs to be closely monitored and appropriate action should be taken when there is lack of compliance. (ii) Supervision missions should be fielded at regular intervals, appropriately staffed with interdisciplinary teams, and led by the task manager or other Bank staff member able to handle policy discussions as well as have sufficient time devoted to them. (iii) Aide memoires should provide a balanced treatment of all project components, bringing to the attention of Government authorities major implementation problems and requesting remedial action. (iv) Civil works activities which deviate substantially from appraisal estimates should only be approved after a thorough reappraisal by the Bank, irrespective of Government commitment to fund the cost overruns. I. Borrower Performance 24. Major Strenhs and Weaknesses The major strengths of the Borrower's performance are related to: (i) political stability and relatively limited ministerial turnover during 1986-92; (ii) an experienced Project Implementation Unit with limited staff turnover and competent personnel/management familiar with Bank procedures and the implementation of donor-funded projects; (iii) elaboration of regular status reports; and (iv) recruitmnent of an international firm (British Council) to handle the technical assistance component of the project. The key weaknesses can be summarized as follows: (a) lack of political resolve to tackle politically and socially unpopular measures; (b) staff turnover in some institutions (e.g. MRSU, SJPP); (c) reliance on in-house capabilities for elaboration of design plans rather than contracting this work to the private sector, which contributed to implementation delays during the initial years of the project; (d) lack of close follow-up of the project's monitoring indicators, which makes it difficult to ascertain its quantitative accomplishmnents; and (e) lack of clear linkages between technical assistance/fellowships and project objectives. The key lessons stemming from project implementation for the Borrower relate to the need to: (i) foster a broad-based consensus among social partners on difficult reform measures prior to negotiating legal agreements with donors; (ii) continue with recruitment of a firm for overseeing the implementation of technical assistance activities; (iii) contract to the private sector the elaboration 8 of design plans; and (iv) establish clearer linkages between technical assistance/fellowships and project objectives, improve supervision of consultants, strengthen follow-up of studies, emphasize consultancies which involve the delivery of workshops, rather than preparation of reports, and request that all participants produce concrete outputs by the end of their fellowships. J. Project RelationshiR 25. The working relationship between the Bank and the Borrower can be characterized as amicable, productive, and problem free. Bank staff/consultants generally provided sound advice, even though some areas were relatively neglected (para. 22). The relationship between the IBRD and the IDB was likewise amicable and collaborative. A number of joint missions were organized in the earlier stages of the project cycle, which provided a good opportunity for discussing project and sector issues in an integrated fashion. During the supervision phase, an engineer from the local IDB office also collaborated in supervising the project. While working relationships remained solid during the supervision phase, each institution appears to have mounted its own supervision effort, concentrating on its respective project components. Towards the end of the project, the two Banks were sending conflicting messages to the Government on the importance of the policy conditionality. While the preparation of the follow-up Human Resources Project provided the World Bank an opportunity to re-emphasize the importance of improving internal efficiency by raising the student/teacher ratio, the IDB dropped the student/teacher ratio covenant from its project. In retrospect, a greater effort should have been made to organize joint supervision missions and to send consistent messages to the Government. K. Consulting Services 26. The Government secured the services of the British Council for the implementation of the technical assistance/fellowships components of the project. From project inception through evaluation, the British Council organized a series of missions, assisting the Government in fleshing out the objectives of the technical assistance/fellowships, in prioritizing and scheduling consultancies and in identifying and supervising suitable consultants. During the life of the project there was a substantial conversion of technical assistance funds into fellowships, which Barbadian authorities found more useful. The quality of the consultancies and the utility of the reports produced was generally good. A British Council evaluation mission, carried out in June/July 1992, found the effectiveness and impact of the technical assistance and fellowships to have been generally positive. It should be stated that there were exceptions. For example, the Hemingway report on ways of reducing the costs of technical/vocational subjects in secondary education fell considerably short of its mandate. Nevertheless, the British Council proved responsive to the Goverunent's needs by redoing the work at no additional cost. The evaluation mission also concluded that where training institutions had links with Barbadian authorities through consultants the fellowships tended to be particularly successful. L. Project Documentation and Data 27. The Staff Appraisal Report was satisfactory and the economnic analysis was of high quality. The SAR, in fact, has been identified as one of the few in the Bank's education sector portfolio to analyze the sectoral implications of the introduction of cost efficiency measures (i.e. school amalgamations). The data availability for preparing the PCR was generally good, with all status reports prepared by Government and all supervision reports readily available. However, most aide memoires made references to annexes, which were not available in either division or LAC files. On the Government's side, data on project monitoring and evaluation indicators was not always readily available. With the benefit of hindsight, it might have been more practical to have a shorter list of indicators routinely reported in all status reports, and to insist on close monitoring by the Government. 9 PART II. PROJECT REV[EW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Design and Or2anisation 28. The Second Education and Training Project - Loans 2688-BAR and 201/iC-BA - was a follow-up on Loan 1642-BAR. It was designed to extend Government's policy of rationalising and modernising the education and training system by increasing educational opportunity; improving educational quality at both primary and secondary levels, fostering the quality and industrial relevance of technical and vocational education and training at the post secondary level; and strengthening the capacity of Ministries to plan and manage the education and training system. These objectives not only arose out of the principal issues of the sector but generated a set of strategies which were shared by the relevant parties of the project beneficiaries. 29. Innovative aspects of the project were evident in the inter-ministry collaboration generated and the utilization of a management consultancy firm to assist with the implementation of the technical assistance component of the project. Three Ministries - Education, Labour and the Civil Service - participated in the implementation of the project. There were therefore very significant levels of cooperation, collaboration and information flows among the participating ministries and agencies which contributed in no small measure to the successful implementation of the project. 30. Two main events impacted negatively on the timing of the project. These were a major review and subsequent re-negotiation of the project following the assumption of office by a new administration on 28 May 1986 and the stabilisation programme of 1991 which led to a severe contraction in resources available to the project. Had these events not occurred, there is every reason to believe that the time would have been appropriate for the implementation of the project. 31. The roles and responsibilities of the participating institutions, while not specifically documented, were understood and undertaken by the relevant authorities. These included identifying and selecting personnel for training; arranging for substitutes; planning and scheduling for specialist services, preparing, vetting and approving terms of reference; evaluating curricula vitae and selecting consultants; reviewing, evaluating and commenting on the quality of training, and of the consultants reports; preparing equipment specifications and participating in the relevant aspects of the procurement of significant furniture and materials; and participating in Banks' supervision missions, as well as in the periodic review missions of the management .onsultant, the British Council. 32. The extensive planning and consultations with the practitioners in the education sector prior to the finalisation of the plans for the schools was the main contributory factor to the successes of the civil works component of the project. 33. Lessons learned in the execution of the First Education Project were drawn on by the Project Implementation Unit. Changes were made to the design of the roofs to make them more resistant to hurricanes while the sloping windows of the First Project were altered to vertical windows to make them more accessible to cleaning. The buildings of the primary schools were also constructed around an open courtyard to permit the principals to have visual control of the school plants. 34. The agreement with the British Council for the management of the technical assistance and training component of the project made provision for an inception mission, a mid-term review and an evaluation mission at the end of the project. The inception mission allowed all the participating Ministries and institutions to better articulate, prioritise and prepare for their respective technical assistance and fellowship sub-components. Through the mid-term review the beneficiaries not only assessed the level of progress realised but were able to shift proposed consultancies to areas of greater need which became evident following the inception mission. The evaluation mnissions enabled all - 10- parties to look in retrospect at the achievements and failures of the programme. It also made possible the identification of issues and strategies in the education and training system which were reflected in the design of the IDB Primary Education Progranmne and the new IBRD Human Resources Project. B. Project ImDlementation 35. The project was modified in September/October 1987 as a result of the re-negotiations with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in December 1986. The major differences were: (a) 18 instead of 21 small schools would be amalgamated to 10 larger schools, the St. Stephen's School was reduced to a capacity of 630 pupils and existing facilities were to be renovated into an Infants/Nursery School for 270 pupils; (b) Queen's College would be built on a new site and the Wotton Secondary would be a 1050 instead of a 1200 school; (c) two rather than four skills training centres would be provided; (d) the provision of supplementary equipment and furniture at the Samuel Jackman Prescod Polytechnic would be financed by [BRD instead of IDB; and (e) the new Headquarters facility of the Ministry of Education would be relocated at the old Queen's College site at Constitution Road, St. Michael. The technical assistance component and other aspects of the project remained as planned (appraised). 36. The outcome of these modifications resulted in a delay of 24 months in the implementation of the civil works component and a delay of 18 months in the technical assistance component of the project. By September 1993, project costs had increased by BDS $39.6 mnillion or 43.2% over the appraisal estimate of BDS $91.6 million. This escalation in cost was due substantially to cost and time overruns in construction work where increases ranged from 14% on the Barbados Community College's expansion to 163 % on that for Springer Memorial Secondary School. The latter school was included in Package Three which was adversely affected by the stabilisation progranmme which started in 1991. There were other costs including those for road works which were not considered at appraisal. C. Project Results 37. The civil works targets of the IDB component of the project were fully realised. The primary schools were built, two secondary schools were constructed, one upgraded and a fourth was provided with supplementary equipment and furniture. The civil works targets of the IBRD component were not fully met. Construction of the extension to the Barbados Community College and of the new Sayes Court Skills Training Centre (now the C. Lomer Alleyne Training Centre) were completed. However no work started on the Harrison Point Skills Training Centre nor the upgrading of seven existing centres and construction of the Ministry of Education and Culture Headquarters Complex was only 35% completed. 38. All completed schools, the extension to the Barbados Community College and Sayes Court Skills Training Centre were fully equipped and furnished. The Sainuel Jackman Prescod Polytechnic and Harrison College received supplementary equipment and furniture. In addition, equipment was supplied to the Manpower Research and Statistics Unit of the Ministry of Labour and books and equipment were provided for the Training Division of the Ministry of the Civil Service. However, the books earnarked for the primary schools were not procured. 39. Technical assistance represented another significant dimension of the strategy to achieve the project objectives. Of the 94 persons who received fellowships, the vast majority received training in Britain and the balance was shared mainly between U.S.A. and Canada. The 258 fellowship months at appraisal increased over the life of the project reaching 355 at the closing date. Of this latter figure, 338 fellowship months or 95 % of the training was realised. In general, the vast majority of the purposes of the fellowships were substantially achieved. - il - 40. Twenty-five consultancies amounting to 38.25 staff months were undertaken. At appraisal there were 101 staff months but these were reduced to 53.75, with the remainder being converted to fellowship months as personnel needs became increasingly apparent Given this adjustment, approximately 71% of the consultancies was implemented by the close of the project. 41. The other aspect of the human resources development component was the provision of local training. The bulk of this training was targeted at improving quality of instruction in schools. The project supported the production of a remedial reading diagnostic est for primary schools and the necessary training for teachers was provided. Of the 348 staff months of local training budgeted, 165 educational administrators received 25.5 staff months of training; 1700 teachers received 126.5 staff months and 112 other public officers received 52.0 staff months of training giving a total of 204 staff months carried out with a success rate of 58.6%. D. Project Sustainabilitv 42. Sustainability of the physical upgrading of the facilities at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels can be assumed if the appropriate budgetary provisions are made and programmnes of effective maintenance of plant, equipment and furniture are put in place. With Boards of Management being responsible for the management, care and upkeep of the facilities at the secondary and tertiary levels, the quality of contingency and preventive maintenance will be effectively carried out. The Ministry's Building Section has responsibility for the maintenance of facilities at the primary level. Recent re- organization of this Section, along with a programme to enable principals to take responsibility for minor maintenance work at their schools, is aimed at raising the quality of maintenance at this level of the system. 43. Cost effectiveness at the primary level has not improved as planned. The appraisal target was to reduce operational costs by 20% at the primary level but this has not been realised. Indeed, pupil/teacher ratios declined from 20-19 rather than increased from 20-23. This suggests that the system is less cost effective than at the beginning of the project. Staffing policy on recruitment of teachers will be a critical element in achieving any improvement in the cost effectiveness of primary education. 44. There has been an addition of 1400 places at the secondary level, giving a 7% increase in capacity. This has advanced the policy of eliminating "primary tops" and senior schools in the system. The numbers have been substantially reduced (e.g. from 15 composite schools to 5 and from 6 Senior Schools to 1) and with the completion of the St. Thomas Secondary School, this objective will be fully realised. This assumes that the number of Assisted Private Secondary Schools will be maintained. 45. Qualitatively, the project has made an impact at the secondary level. A pilot pre-vocational education programme is in progress in six secondary schools and there are signals that its expansion to the wider system can have positive effects on teacher quality, student achievement, and the system of national certification. Other aspects of qualitative improvements include the teaching of specialist subjects such as Information Technology where network systems are in place; Business Studies where some schools have modem office centres which provide students with simulated learning experiences; the re-organisation of the textbook procurement and distribution policy giving each school its own textbook budget on a per capita basis; and the development of libraries as library and media resources centres. These improvements resulted from fellowship training and consultancy assistance under the project. Their sustainability is contingent upon continued staff upgrading and relevant deployment, effective supervision and feedback; and appropriate budgetary provisions. 46. Improvements in the efficiency, quality and industrial relevance of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) at the post secondary level have been assured by the quality of - 12 - fellowship training of key personnel at the Samuel Jackrnan Prescod Polytechnic (SJPP), Barbados Community College (BCC), National Training Board now Barbados Vocational Training Board (BVTB), Manpower Research and Statistics Unit (MRSU) and the T-tining Division. There is evidence of improved performance of Instructors at SJPP and BVTB, and Tutors at BCC; student performance has improved; and feedback from industry acknowledged improved relevance of training progranmmes. The graduates of the Information Technology of BCC are in very high demand by the private sector, for example. There is increased demnand for the training programmes of the Training Division and resource personnel, following the Training of Trainers course, are more confident in using the audio-visual aids technology procured under the project. This helps to explain the increased interest in the courses offered. The outstanding feature of the MRSU has been the production of a Barbados Directory of Occupational Classification based on the latest addition of the ILO 1988 Intemational Directory of Occupational Classifications. The job titles in the Directory were incorporated in the 1990 Population Census Survey in Barbados. 47. Budgetary constraints and the difficulty of recruiting staff in some areas at SJPP, BCC and BVTB may limit the extent to which the full benefits of the project investment can be reached and sustained. 48. Technical assistance was provided to strengthen the institutional capability at the Ministries of Education, Labour and the Civil Service. Increased training opportunities for management and technical staff were provided but the impact on efficiency and productivity has been limited in some areas. In the Ministry of Education, for example, there are still major weaknesses in teacher appraisal, educational planning and management, curriculum evaluation and development, and budgetary procedures. Problems of staff turn over, persistence of traditional systems of operation, slow progress in modernizing the management information system, budgetary constraints and unsatisfactory physical conditions all contributed to limited progress in these vital areas. The Institutional Strengthening component of the IDB Primary Education Prograrnme will provide assistance in tackling these deficiencies in planning and managing the education system. Some assistance is being offered to other beneficiaries under the IBRD Human Resources Project. E. Borrower's Own Performance 49. Project's successes are attributable to the Borrower's performance in a number of areas. There were regular monitoring of progress; occasional consultation with the technical staff of the IDB local office; raising of issues and seeking clarification during periodic joint IDB/IBRD supervision missions; flexible scheduling of procurement activities to coincide with the opening of schools; and timely consultation by the Ministry of Education with principals, staff and parents on the amalgamation and opening of new school facilities. In addition the engagement of a consulting firm to provide management services for the implementation of the technical assistance component of the project was a valuable measure. This was greatly facilitated by the use of inception, mnid-term and periodic (annual) missions which the firm undertook. Its maintenance of a local liaison officer also helped to clarify issues, resolve concerns quickly and facilitate the effective conduct of consultancies and fellowship training. 50. The staffing of the Education Project Implementation Unit was also a critical factor in the successes of the project. Key EPIU personnel were not only with the project from its inception but were quite knowledgeable about Banks' procedures which made it possible to maintain effective working relationships with various parties associated with the project. 51. There were, however, a number of factors which affected project execution. One of the contractors, a Venezuelan firm of Inversions ABA, was awarded a contract for three primary schools but it experienced serious cash flow problems. Work on the three schools was delayed by more than a year because the Contractor had difficulty in purchasing materials on a tirnely basis. To minimise - 13 - the contractors internal problems, the EPIU adopted a policy of always honouring valuations promptly, in some cases even before the stipulated payment period of 28 days. 52. The project was the subject of a careful review when a new administration assumed office in May, 1986. A number of modifications to the civil works component were proposed which necessitated a renegotiation with the Inter American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The review resulted in a delay of two years in starting construction work on the schools/institutions and an overall increase in project cost of approximately 43.2 percent. 53. The stabilisation programme with the International Monetary Fund which started in October 1991 also impacted adversely on the Borrower's performance in the execution of the project. The austerity measures adopted had the effect of scaling down expenditure on capital projects. The EPIU's 1991-92 budget was cut back by 35%, contractors on schools in package three were advised to scale down their operations in September 1991, construction on the Ministry of Education headquarters building and pedagogical unit was suspended in April 1992, and most of the remaining activities under the Human Resources Development component were terminated. In a real sense, the EPIU was powerless to prevent the delays in commencing and completing the project and the additional costs directly related to the Government's stabilisation programme with the International Monetary Fund. F. Bank's Performance 54. Both Banks provided invaluable support at vital stages in the evolution of the Second Education and Training Project. Specialist assistance was provided to the local project preparation team which eliminated the need for substantial UNESCO support as was done in the preparation of the First Education Project. The composition and professionalism of the appraisal mission resulted in a timely and successful appraisal of the project. It is worthy of note that the Bank was able to secure co-financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to the tune of US $19.0 million or 41.5% to the project. The other proportions were: IBRD, US $10.1 million or 21.8% and Barbados, US $16.8 million or 36.7%. IDB's contribution was based essentially on IBRD's appraisal of the project. 55. Joint IBRDIIDB supervision missions were undertaken regularly during implementation. However, the size of IBRD's team was limited for the most part to one Technical Education Specialist, perhaps due to the fact that IDB operates a field office in Barbados and made local expertise available, especially the Local Engineering Specialist. These visits were very useful in clarifying issues of procurement, refining specifications for equipment and furniture; granting approval in the field for tender documents; and modifying implementation schedules and the technical assistance component of the project. The latter adjustments were made in response to the changing needs of the beneficiaries. The supervision missions also helped to strengthen the Bank's relationship with the various beneficiaries of the project. 56. A major weakness of the Bank's performance could be linked to its reliance on a single Specialist in Technical Education who was virtually responsible for all aspects of implementation. Any weaknesses in project components, e.g. the substantial variance between appraisal estimates of Ministry of Education Headquarters building as well as St. Lucy Skills Training Centre and the pre- tender estimates could be due to this reliance on a single officer for supervision.' It should be noted 7/ While indeed the Bank's reliance on a single consultant may have contributed to weaknesses in supervision, as discussed in Part I, the primary responsibility for cost estimates and for project implementation rests with the Government. - 14 - also that this project was implemented during the period when the Bank (IBRD) was undergoing substantial internal restructuring. 57. One lesson to be leamt is that periodic supervision by knowledgeable technical Bank staff helps to ensure timely compliance with procurement and disbursement conditions which are critical to the effective implementation of the project. 58. Another lesson is that careful attention by the client to Bank requirements for issuance of change orders and adjustments in costs of project components would obviate possible obstacles to re- imbursement applications. 59. A further lesson is that client staff receive valuable technical knowledge and expertise in project preparation and implementation through on-going interaction with Bank personnel. 60. Perhaps the most imnportant lesson to be learnt is that major project delays, for whatever reason, will have implications for cost escalation and for not realising all the project targets. G. Loan Effectiveness and Project Start Up 61. As stated earlier, the re-negotiation of the project in December 1986, resulted from a major review undertaken by the new Administration which took office on 28 May, 1986. The modifications to the civil works component of the project received the approval of both Banks between September and October 1987. By December 22, the Government had complied with all conditions of effectiveness which came towards the end of a three-month extension that was granted. 62. The project also experienced a delay in the selection of the Special Tenders Committee and this in turn delayed the processing of the applications for pre-qualification. Construction did not start until October 4, 1988. However, the technical assistance component started as early as June 22, 1987 with an inception mission by the consulting firm, the British Council. - 15 - PART III. Statistical Information 1. Related Bank Loans Loan Title P~~~~Urpose Aproa SatsComt 1642-BAR General Education and 1978 Completed 1.8 years of Skills Training delay 1642-BAR General Education and 1983 Completed Supplemental Loan Skills Training 3634-BAR General Education Tech, 1993 Not yet Effectiveness Human Resources Voc. Educ. and Trng. effective expected by Labor Market Support June 18, 1994 2. Project Timetable Ite-:. .. ........P'.--.-. ..:- .. :.t. Identification 10/84 10/84 Preparation 2185 2/85 Appraisal Mission 5/85 5/85 Loan Negotiations 3/86 3/86 Board Approval 5/6/86 5/6/86 Loan Signature 5/21/86 - 5/21/86 Loan Effectiveness 9/86 12/86 2/6/87 Loan Completion 12/31/92 3/30/93 Loan Closing 6/30/93 6/30/93 Comments: Project preparation took less time (7 months) than other Bank-funded education projects (22 months) since it was a follow-up operation. Effectiveness slipped by about 4 months due primarily to protracted Parliamentary discussions prior to project approval and to the initiation of a reassessment of the project by new Government. While the project closed on schedule, the Ministry of Education headquarters complex remained uncompleted. - 16 - 3. Loan Disbursements ................ ...... .", . .........'....... ' ' .. '.'. .....;ti' iS'f Df''f'0'";tAd"'St'''' ''f'l,--0S:00;0.:'S. '''',: ' '' ;' ' ';'' . ' . ' ." . .'.''. ''.' .. ... .... .. ""....''.''.'.'. CUMulatves a '.Estimaedad AculDisbu.em.t Appraisal 0.1 1.0 3.0 5.8 8.0 9.3 9.8 10.0 Estimmte Actual 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.6 2.8 4.6 7.1 8.4 Actual as % 0.0 0.0 30.0 28.0 35.0 49.0 72.0 84.0 of Estimate Date of final disbursement: 11/2/93 Comments: The funds made available under the loan were disbursed at a much slower rate than foreseen at appraisal due mainly to the slow start-up, with cumulative disbursements for the period 1986-1988 representing only 22 percent of appraisal estimates. The inability to utilize fully the loan proceeds by project completion was primnarily due to shortages of counterpart funds for completion of the Ministry of Education headquarters, which forced the Bank to cancel the balance of US$1.6 mnillion. -17 - 4. Project Implementation - - Planned -- -Actual -Months Project Component Completion Completion of Delay- Civil Works Primary Schools 12/90 7/93 31 Secondary Schools 12/89 7/93 43 BCC Training Facilities 12/89 6/91 18 NTB Skills Trng. Ctrs. 12/92 11/90 0 MOE Headquarters 12/90 Incomplete 42+ Furniture and Equipment Primary Schools 12/90 6/93 30 Secondary Schools 12/89 3/94 51 BCC Training Facilities 12/89 2/94 50 NTB Skills Trng. Ctrs. 12/92 4/92 none MOE Headquarters 12/90 incomplete 42+ SJPP (Polytechnic) 12/88 1/91 25 Manpower Research 12/87 11/90 35 and Statistics Unit Training Adm: Division 12/87 2/91 38 Ed. Proj. Imple. Unit 12/87 1/89 13 Technical Assistance 12/90 8/92 20 Local Trainin2 12/91 8/92 8 Studies 12/91 8/92 8 Comments: Changes in site selection, which were requested by the new Govermnent in 1987, resulted in major delays in project implementation. Two notable examples are the MOE headquarters complex and Queen's College. While architectural design plans were generally satisfactory, the decision to prepare some architectural design plans at the Education Project Implementation Unit (EPIU) in the early years of the project spurred further delays due to poorly developed in-house capabilities. The quality of the civil works constructed under the project is considered good by regional and international standards and the supervision of the civil works activities by EPIU staff and private contractors was satisfactory. The procurement of equipment was carried out satisfactorily in accordance with Bank guidelines. Nevertheless, there were a number of problems with the equipment, such as lack of adherence to specifications, lack of warranties, and slow follow-up by the procurement agent in addressing defective equipment. 18 5. Proiect Costs and Financing A. Project Cost USS Milliou (inlduding Contingendes) Appraisal Estimate Revised Estimate. aS Actual i: f E : E iLocat iForetgn Local Foreiga Lcaci Forsgn Proiect -comn'msst Costs Exzg Costs Total Casts Exchange Costs Total C06tst. Ei4iine:Cast. Totw] Primary Schools 5.7 4.5 10.2 5.7 4.5 10.2 9.0 7.0 16.0 Secondary Schools 4.7 4.1 8.8 5.5 4.8 10.3 9.3 8.0 17.3 BCC Training Facilities 3.0 3.4 6.4 3.0 3.4 6.4 3.3 3.8 7.1 NTB Skills Trsining Centers 2.1 2.1 4.2 1.4 1.4 2.8 1.1 1.2 2.3 Institutionat Development 2.5 2.2 4.7 2.5 2.2 4.7 2.9 2.5 5.4 (ncluding MOE Headquarters) SJPP 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 Manpower Research & Stat. Unit 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 Training Administration Div. 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 Ed. Project Implement. Unit 2.2 0.3 2.5 2.2 0.3 2.5 3.2 0.3 3.5 TOTAL PROJECT COST 20.4 17.2 37.6 20.6 17.0 37.6 29.0 23.2 52.2 al These figures refer to the 1987 loan amendment B. Project ESnandng USS Mlliion O~~inal Kevl~~~ed Acual uBIt r E twe Cateo Allocation Allocation Disburseanit Civil works 4.2 3.9 3.8 Furniture and equipment 3.0 3.3 2.2 Technical assistance, training and 1.9 2.1 1.8 fellowships Professional services 0.5 0.4 0.6 Unallocated 0.5 0.3 TOTAL 10.0 10.0 S.4 Co-financing (IDB) 17.0 17.0 17.0 Domestic 10.7 10.7 26.8 TOTAL 37.7 b/ 37.7 b/ 52.2 bl Totals may not add to the figures in tables in 5A. due to rounding - 19 - 6. Project Results A. Direct Benefits Indicators Appraisa Revised Estimated at Appraisal Estinate -Estimate Closing Date % A. Civil Works/Equipmenit (Number of Facilities) (i Primary Schools 10 10 10 1C' (ii) Secondary Schools a/ 4 4 4 i00 (iii)BCC Training Facilities 1 1 1 10WI (iv) NTB Skills Training Centers bI 4 9 1 I (v) MOE Headquarters 1 1 0 n.a (vi) SJPP 1 1 1 1I0 B. Technical Assistance (Staff Months) (i) Fellowships 258 332 338 123 (ii) Specialist Services 101 54 c/ 38 38 C. Training (Number and Staff Months) (i) Educational Administrators 221 - 165 -! (26 sm) (ii) Teachers 2300 - 1700 65 (127 sm) (iii) School Guidance Counselors 40 - 112 f" 280 (52 sm) D. Monitoring indicators See Annex IV a' The loan agreement included the construction of one secondary schi A and the upgrading of three others. The 1987 amendment provided for the constructi.on of two secondary schools and upgrading of two others. b/ The loan agreement provided for the construction, furnishing .-nd equipping of three new skills training centers and equipping and furnishing of another; as a result of the 1987 amendment, the project was to provide for the construction. furnishing and equipping of one and the acquisition of equipment/furniture for one large and seven s.-rnTl :c ters. c/ The difference between this figure and the SkR estimate represents a conversion of technical ass,st. feliovwships. d/ ThL differences between this fgure and the SAR estimate represents training of public officer- ',. r -.t ti r consultancies. Comments: Civil works targets included in the 1987 loan agreement amendment were attained with the exceptions Ol --he MOL headquarters and the NTB skills training centers. Issues related to low facility utilization pers:s- due to sauf shortages/turnover (e.g., SJPP, NTB). - 20 - B.Studies/Consultancies General 1. Audio Assess requirements 11/15/87 12/12/87 Completed Enhanced quality Education Visual Aids of Training Division of training for Audio-visual Aids programmes Technology, through application of audio-visual aids methodologies. 2. Institutional Survey Training 11/15/87 12/20/87 n Created pool of Strengthening Division's trained resource requirements for personnel to institutional spearhead training strengthening and of staff in the adopt appropriate public sector. strategy to achieve objective. :3. Initial Upgrade and 4/4/88 7/1/88 Increased exposure Educational strengthen planning to modemn Planning and budgetary techniques in processes in the educational Ministry of planning including Education. greater reliance on computer applications. 4. Supplies Rationalize the 1/24/88 4/24/88 " Revised policy on Management system of selection, textbook loan Textbook procurement and scheme resulting in L oan Scheme distribution of decentralization of textbooks. its operations. It is now a self financing scheme at the school level. 5. Supplies Rationalize thc 1/24/88 4/24/88 h More efficient Management system for purchases system of Purchasing and supplies, purchases and and Supplies supplies in place. 6. School and Strengthen linkages 10/4/88 11/2/88 Provided Ministry between schools and information on Libraries Ministry libraries and strengthening increase the library and media relevance of library resources resources in student management mn learning. schools. - 21 - - -j o ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. ... . ... .. Ar -,e1U Ddned. at atdat aueJpc St General 7. Audio Visual Assess and 5/14/88 6/10/88 Completed On-going Education Aids strengthen television upgrading of studio management television studio and equipment facilities and use of maintenance some in-house capability in Audio equipment Visual Aids maintenance Department. capability. 8. Guidance and Provide on-the-spot 7/31/88 8/14/88 " Sensitized guidance Counseling training for new counselors and Guidance Counselors other school in the school system. personnel to their respective roles in an effective school counseling programme. 9. Educational Establish a testing 2/9/88 4/10/88 Precipitated Testing and and measurement training of key Measurement unit in the Ministry staff that are of Education. expected to play an important role in designing, establishing, and operating a tests and measurements unit. 10. Guidance Provide on-the-spot 3/4/89 3/18/89 Enhanced and training for new confidence of Counseling Guidance Counselors Guidance and strengthen Counselors in supervision system. undertaking their duties in the school system. 11. Training of Provide resource 1/3/89 1/27/89 Created a pool of Trainers personnel of Training resource personnel Division with with skills and training of trainers. techniques in designing and delivering training programmes. General 12. Information Modernize 2/17/90 4/l/90 Completed More efficient Education Technology administration and student record strengthen relevance system in operation of curriculum and enhanced offerings through student learning application of through increase information use of information technology. technology in some programmes. - 22 - 13. Initial Assess curriculum 414190 4/28/90 Provided exposure Curriculum evaluation and to curriculum Development development review and activities with a view development to strengthen and methodology in the modernize these system. processes. 14. Special Enable teachers to 3/17/90 4/9/90 Greater awareness Needs address with greater of the problem of Neecodsry) confidence the SEN at the problems and secondary level challenges in and adoption of teaching children more enlightened with special approaches in a educational needs number of schools. (SEN) at the secondary level. 15. Special Enable teachers to 4/15/90 5/5/90 Greater Education tackle problems of prominence given Needs SEN at the primary to the problem of (Primary) level with greater SEN in school success. planning and organization. 16. Special Enable primary and 9/8/90 9/29/90 Increased use of Education secondary teachers to teaching/learning Needs cater to children with approaches (Primary & SEN. targeted to children Secndary) with SEN. 17. Training Provide school 5/29/90 6/26/90 Greater awareness Consultancy personnel with and utilization of in strategies and information Information techniques for sources in teaching Literacy and utilizing library /learning process Management resources more at the school level. of Learning meaningfully in the Resources teaching/learning process. - 23 - ~~~~~~~~~~~. -,,...-,- - . -.,,,-.--.-.,,,-..- . . . .. -. , s.-. . . .. ..........e. ,.. .... .. .. Technical 18.Curriculum Strengthen and 3/16/91 4/13/91 Completed Adopted Vocational Development modernize curriculum Education curriculum development & Training development processes in the processes in the revision of some system. subjects at the primary and secondary levels. 19. Curriculum Provide alternative 9/9/91 9/29/91 Adopted pre- Framework strategies for vocational for Upper delivering pre- programme in six Secondary vocational secondary schools education at the with the emphasis secondary level. on profiling student competencies. 20. Vocational Assess organization 1/13/88 3/11/88 Focused attention Education and delivery of on the need for vocational an effective education with a planning and view to coordinating strengthening the TVET authority coordinating role in Barbados. of the National Limited progress Training Board attained in (NTB). restructuring the NTB. 21. Pre- Survey prospects 5/24/88 6/25/88 Precipitated vocational for adoption of increased interest Education pre-vocational in and pursuit of education overseas training approaches in by key personnel Barbados. who are now in leadership positions at the national level. 22. Manpower Strengthen 1/18/88 2/19/88 Limited progress Planning MRSU's attained in (Initial) capability in job improving MRSU analysis techniques operations. and manpower planning processes. -24 - ~~ ::.~: ~.:: . M* . . ...4... X*. Technical 23. Manpower Strngthen 11/14/88 12/2/88 Completed Provided ground Vocauzal Planning MRSU's work for the Educed= (Second) capability in job preparation of & 1fl analysis techniques directory of and manpower Occupational planning processes. Classification for Barbados. 24. Testing Enable NTB to 2/6/89 3/17/89 Led to overseas Certification design and training of key and Quality establish testing NTB staff but Assurance certification and limited progress in quality assurance in designing and Vocational criteria (standards) establishing Educational in vocational testing Training education. certification and quality assurance criteria. 25.0ccupational Enable Ministry of 10/9/89 10/20/89 Produced and Classification Labour to produce distributed a an Occupational Barbados Classification for Directory of Barbados based on Occupational ELO's 1988 revised Classifications Directory of which was utilized Occupational in the 1990 Classification. National Census. 26. Vocational Provide basis for 1/18/92 2/29/92 No progress made and rationalizing the in restructuring the Technical delivery of TVET delivery of TVET Education programmes at the programmes at the Policy and secondary level. secondary level. Cost Study - 25 - : .. '' '- :. *-. ' :' ~~~~~~~~~. . . . . . . . ... : -"'.-.'-':- .'-'"' Generl 27. Evaluation Assess initial impact 6/14/92 7/3/92 Completed Major of Technical of technical achievements Assistance assistance included: Component component of Loan 2688 BAR. *imp)roved capability in management and supervision of the education system; *strengthened and increased relevance of TVET at the tertiary level; *data bases and studies informed the preparation of education sector component of the new Development Plan (1993-2000); and *enhanced public sector training capabilities. 26 7. Legal Covenants CREDIT DESCRIPTION AGREEMENT OF TIME SECTION COVENANTS FRAME STATUS COMMENTS 3.02(a) Maintain PIU satisfactory to the Bank Duration of project OK PIU has been generally well staffed, even though financial difficulties led to a reduction in personnel in recent yers. 3.02 (b) Fumish to the Bank bi-annual progress reports. Duration of project OK EPIU has provided satisfactory reports but failed to include information on project indicators. 3.02 (c) Furnish to the Bank and the IDB the draft revised September 30, 1988 OK Textbook policy under textbook procurement policy and refrain from implementation. purchasing books under the project until the final policy has been adopted 3.04 Keep IBRD and IDB informed on attainment Duration of project OK Progress repors generally contain of educational objectives and provide annual briefing on education policies statements on major education policies/plans, and reforms. 4.01 (a) Maintain records and accounts in accordance with Duration of project OK EPIU has maintained records and sound accunting practices. accounts in a sound manner. 4.01 (b) Have accounts audited and furnish the Bank with Duration of project OK Audit reports submitted in audit report as well as certified statements of the timely fashion and documented special account no major problems. 4.01 (c) Maintain separate records and accounts reflecting Duration of project OK expenditures under the loan agreement 4.02 Maintain student/teacher (S/T) ratios above the Duration of project RVS Recruitment of a backlog of level prevailing during the 1983 school year trained teachers during 1986-89 (primary: 23: 1; secondary: 19:1) and not higher resulted in declining S/T ratios. than 35 in primary schools and 30 in secondary Inspite of efforts to redress this schools. trend in the last few years, the SIT ratio targets were impossible to attain by project completion. The follow-up Human Resources Project includes a revised timeframe for raising S/T ratios. ACT Needs use of formal remedies to bring about compliance NYD Not yet due OK Covenant complied with RVS Needs to be revised SOON Compliance expected in reasonably short time - 27 - 8. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs (Staff Weeks) .. ....~ ~~ . -. : .........: - . . -: , - :.- , . . .. , - ., . , , ,~~. .. ..,, * . .s...Y Identification a/ 0.4 Preparation 21.4 - - - - - - - - Appraisal 17.5 25.4 - Negotiations - 9.5 - - - - Supervisionbl - 2.0 11.2 6.1 5.2 2.7 .2 2.6 8.5 5.0 Completion - - - - - - - - - 2.8 a/ The staff weeks for project idendfication are relatively low since identifiration took place in conjunction with supervision of the First Education Projec. b/ The staff weeks for FY90/91 appear excessively low As they am inconsistent with those in table 8B. - 28 - B. Missions Stg orP9~t(y ~ Mab 1u~t of Paa-i Sta Wee . ... . ... ....... eId R a Status Identification 10/84 1(M) 0.4 Preparation 2/85 1(E) 21.4 Appraisal 5/85 4(A,E,GE,TE) 42.9 Subtotal 64.7 G M L F P Supervision I 12/86 2(GE,A) 2.8 2 1 na 1 na Supervision H 5/87 2(GE,TE) 2.0 ---na---------------- Supervision IN 11/87 2(TE,A) 3.6 2 2 na 1 na Supervision IV 7/88 1(TE) 1.6 2 2 na 1 na Supervision V 1/89 1(TE) 1.0 2 2 na 1 na Supervision VI 7/89 1(TE) 2.0 1 1 2 1 1 Supervision VII 11/89 l(TE) 2.4 1 1 1 1 1 supervision VIII 5/90 1(TE) 2.8 1 1 1 1 1 Supervision IX 11/90 1(TE) 1.2 1 1 1 1 1 Supervision X 7/91 1(A) 2.2 1 1 1 1 1 Supervision XI 12/92 2(E,OP) 5.2 2 2 2 3 2 Supervision XII 6/93 1(A) 1.8 2 2 2 3 2 Subtotal 28.6 Completion 4/94 2(A,E) 2.8 TOTAL 96.1 bl A- archect; E- economist; GE- gsneral educatr M- manaer (Deputy Division Chief); OP- operations assistant; TE= technical educator c/ G- overal sutms; M- managemen L- legal covenanw; F- fads xvidablity- P procurement 1 = No significant problems 2 = Moderate problems 3 = Major problems 4= Major problems, but the problems are not being adequately addressed. Comments: The frequency of Bank supervision was generally satisfactory, with an average of 2 missions annually. During the December 1991-June 1992 period no formal supervision missions were carried out as the preparation of the follow-up Human Resources Project was underway; nevertheless, this involved in-depth discussions of implementation problems and lessons learned during the on-going project. Staffing of supervision missions appears inadequate as close to 70 percent involved only one mission member; this resulted in some issues (e.g., cost-effectiveness, cost overnus) not being adequately addressed. - 29 - Annex I Cost Overrmns on Civil Works Activities (US$ Million) PoetCMPOnen bl Aot %ofpr.S I 1) LCF Primary School 5.8 62 - - xx xx xx xx Secondary School 9.3 145 xx xx xx xx xx BCC Tmg. Facilities 1.8 49 - - - xx xx NTB Skills Tmg. Ctrs. n.a. n.a. MOE Headquarters 0.7 23 c/ xx xx xx xx xx SS: Site selection SW: Scope of works DD: Delays in design DC: Delays in construction LCF: Lack of counterpart funds LB: Lack of bids from prequalified contractors a! The decision in 1986 by the new administration to review the entire project following the change of Government delayed the implementation of the civil works component by about 24 months. b/ Including professional services. c/ If contruction had been reactivated in 1994, the estimated cost would have been about US$7. 1, million which implies a cost overrun of about US$4 million or 130 percent. 30 Annex II PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS AND STUDENT/TEACHER RATIOS, 1979-1992 Year Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Enrollment Enrollment S/T Ratio S/T Ratio 1979/80 34672 21014 24 21 1980/81 34036 22248 23 22 1981/82 33395 22448 22 20 1982/83 32061 21375 24 19 1983/84 30748 21375 23 19 1984/85 29392 l 21501 22 19 1985/86 28750 21230 20 20 1986/87 28519 21164 20 18 1987/88 28845 21185 19 18 1988/89 28113 21169 1 8 18 1989/90 28845 21156 18 18 1990/91 27722 21042 18 17 1991/92 27883 21222 1 9 18 199193 27858 21196 20 18 Source: Ministry of Education 31 Annex III Pupil/Teacher Ratio of Analgamated Schools under Project II Primary Schools Pupil/ Teacher Ratio's Existing Amalgamated Before I After Present .1 I I I RoLL jSt. Mary's Infants {St. Mary's r23:1 T21:1 T335 St. Mary's Junior Primary 15:1 St. Augustine Boys Cuthbert Moore 14:1 21:1 328 ! t, Augustine Girls IPrimary 17:1 iSt. Stephen's Infants St. Stephen's 19:1 22:1 638 St. Stephen's Junior Primary 20:1 St. Matthias Boys St. Matthias 13:1 21:1 358 St. Matthias Girls Primary 16:1 St. Peter's Girls Roland Edwards 17:1 16:1 312 Speightstown Boys Primary 15:1 Mount Tabor Primary Mount Tabor 14:1 17:1 139 Primary Bayley's Primary Bayley's Primary 17:1 22:1 558 Shrewsbury Primary 22:1 St. Boniface Primary Gordon Greenidge 19:1 21:1 273 Black Bess Primary Primary 12:1 S elah Primary Selah Primary 20:1 17:1 309 St. Swithin's Primary 10:1 Hillaby Hillaby/Turner's 9:1 20:1 328 Turner's Hall Hall Primary 19:1 _ Total enrollments _ 3 578 Total Primary Schools enrollments 27 168 % of Total Primary Schools enrollments 13.2% BARBADOS SECOND EDUCATION AND TRAINMNG PROJECT MONITORING INDICATORS PROJECT OBIECTIVE COMPONENTS OF ACIVrnES INDICATORS 1987 1911 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT_ 1.00 ODJECnVE A 1.10 Anslgaintg 21 I. No. of sch built 2 3 3 1 2 4 3 3 mll, enmnlc lIp c the cost preny shools ino 10 2. No. of KA amwlgnaated 5 6 6 2 4 6 6 6 elfTcvses Of larger schools to obain p tyms td highertdelteacher 3. SbdentrTeacher radts 1:23 1:24 1:21 1:25 1:18 1:19 1:27 1:21 smtaly aucatim radtos 4. UnIt cost per student 1 IU 1352 place (USS) 1.20 Upgsraing 3 I. No. of sch upgaded I I I exing secondary sdho nd eatmbliahuig 2. No. Of new rh built I on w 1.20 Place tecondo y rcKool 3. StuoentiTeacher rijos 1:19 1:20 1:21 1:19 1:23 1:20 4. No. of somk_ iun 4300p 3578p sch with good physkal fscilikes 4000s 2950s 1.30 Providing technk l I. No. of gaff nonth 44FEL 119FEL ancssawe & taining mo: ofTedmcal Assist. 36SP 165P 2. No. tcWtdmin. trained IBMD 170Ct 32a 165a (a) inp e reading nd 3. Redsingwigs est wr-11 bn prvnuay scoaes KhOos St. Mattw's Prbmry 46.9 45.6 42.9 S9. CbrBtlebera Boys' 46.7 50.5 44.3 NATIONAL AVERAGE 48.6 55.6 49.9 (b) bhc leahn of 4. Whether systemn have speci Abjects in been estblished sxeandary scbools (a) Bustamis Studies 6 2 centres setup (b) Cotputr Studis Trng. Trng. Flw-u tchs. tr5aied bc5gn csrupsd twg (c) hnlrove curricukbn 4. Whether systems have imaplanamin stnst4gy been establshed Prevocations project Project etUp iUpltd (d) inprovc txtbook 5, No. of txibbs procured 192228 272654 prour nd tad ditributed distrbution systesM 6. No. of txbks vailable in clasrma Data ha not been analysed (per subject srea) _ 33 Annex IV a' -t - t N n U.* o~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - s I a. -hX t tAh!i I PROJECT OSJECIIVE COMPONENTS OF AcnvMEs INDICATORS 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 I992 1993 APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT APP ACT 3.00 OEJECTIVE C 3.10 Prvidiuu TA ar: I. Staff mnihs of TA (.3 e dien p-ming provided 26F 26F Straw) die and nMwugMi 2. Ahcumeot odeduuatn 26SP BSP in.atuinlu (b) inroducing song- m g t a plung G t plan teem b.gding 3. Ausmsnei of inrove- ad_p th pocan ad cost mats in P 4dgt ld al" uvhw .ncblsi processe spat. (c) vig preoductil 4. A_nsast of yslity aflPihlndsoatais of psised asslWs 3.20 Provii uedn I. Camuncl of new Stat Conpit ConLt. ConsL. rblItes for te fciles COWst. con$t. bgina maspd. Mils. of Eidxsd 2. MOE saff anenis w facilites 3.30 Adoptig _mnmtlo 1. Conuct studio ad gbin inrane vng and ...aen feasibiky foernde dflckIay hnpkmnaiwn (a) Iatingy MARCH (b) Mas& Pontr APRIL D D IMAGING Report No: 14763 Type: FOCR
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Project Completion Report
Barbados - Second Education and Training Project
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Organisation
Groupe de la Banque mondiale
Type de document
Project Completion Report
Pays
Barbade
Source
Banque mondiale