Rainfed rural development in Morocco

28370 NUMBER 61 *EDPrecis m Operations Evaluation Department May 1994 Rainfed Rural Development in Morocco Before 1978, Morocco's agricultural promoted higher spending on rainfed proval, despite lengthy gestation pe- development strategy concentrated on agriculture in order to alleviate rural rods. Complex designs were ap- irrigation, bypassing the country's poverty, help conserve soil and water, proved despite the misgivings of 1.2 million rainfed farmers. Four Bank- extend the life of reservoirs, and lead to Bank regional staff. But this approach supported rainfed pilot projects for agri- new investment in downstream irriga- was consistent with mainstream cultural development were approved tion. After some resistance, the govern- thinking about rural development in between 1978 and 1982. A recent OED ment of Morocco agreed and the first the late 1970s. By the time Oulmes- audit* finds that benefits did flow out of Bank-supported rainfed project was ap- Rommani was approved (1982), the the projects, but were not commensurate proved in 1978. Total costs of the four Bank was beginning to understand with the resources invested. Many of the projects amounted to $425 million, of the difficulties associated with com- problems encountered by these projects which the Bank was to contribute $158 plex area development projects, but could have been avoided had financial million. the project's design remained un- and drought risks been assessed more changed. adequately. The government urged the incor- poration of social infrastructure com- Implementation Background ponents-rural roads, schools, health centers, drinking water systems, and Implementation was delayed al- Agricultural development in Mo- market places-in three out of four of most throughout by shortages of lo- rocco has been dominated by invest- the projects. Only the Middle Atlas cal funds and organizational prob- ment in irrigation for more than 70 project retained a simple design, fo- lems. The counterpart funding prob- years. A plan prepared in the 1930s to cused on livestock development. lems were foreseen prior to approval, irrigate a million hectares in the plains but badly underestimated, and still has a strong influence on agricul- The initiative proved ill-timed, projects were approved without cor- tural investment. Rainfed agriculture Morocco's Three-Year Austerity Plan responding changes in design or fi- was largely ignored until the 1970s. of 1978-80, following severe financial nancial arrangements. Six years of se- difficulties in the m-id-1970s, applied vere drought between 1978 and 1992 In 1977, one year before the first of tough measures to cut back public added to the difficulties faced by these projects was approved, two- investment and focused on the implementors. thirds of Morocco's population was ru- completion of ongoing projects. The ral, and virtually all of Morocco's 1.2 government's planned allocation to million private land owners were rainfed agriculture fell to less than 2 rainfed farmers. Rainfed farms pro- percent of its total commitment to ag- duced 76 percent of crop production by riculture-less than was needed for value, and almost all of livestock pro- timely implementation of the Bank- duction, but only 18 percent of the agri- supported projects that were soon to culture budget was committed to be approved. rainfed agriculture and forestry, and 4 percent to the livestock sector. Outcome The stimulus to redress this imbal- Design ance came from outside Morocco, pri- marily from the World Bank and FAO. The design of numerous project Between 1972 and 1976, Bank dialogue components was incomplete at apr, exedtelfLfrsevis n edt agricultural extension, which has been sustained. Technology Many of the rainfed agricultural technologies with which the projects started were costly to intro- duce and maintain, and unattractive to resource-poor farmers. These were replaced by a few robust tech- nologies, which spread because ii l they were profitable: olive, fig, and vine planting on sloping land, and the introduction of new, higher yielding soft wheat varieties. Some new farming practices have been widely adopted to conserve soils, but the cost-effectiveness of the practices is unknown. Much of the planned reforestation was imple- mented successfully by contractors, which created employment but gave rural communities little stake in the results. As pilot actions, the projects schools, and health infrastructure t seht Developments were too large, and weak monitor- were frequently met. But these were ing and evaluation (M&E) lowered development inputs, not outputs. their value as experiments. No time Project components that served s a exbftwon services led was built into the project designs for small farmers directly developed t ff th Agricul start-up activities, contributing most slowly, and the overall effect of the probably to the projects' weak M&E projects on farm incomes cannot be performance. well established because too few i um**d from previous data are available. t~iet,teproject seeks Despite apparent problems, the t &v*Wp arxi transfer wdvoA- projects were not formally restruc- Institutions .optW ismore wsponsive to tured until after a mid-term review in 1985 and a special action pro- The projects' complex institu- gram (SAP) in 1987, eight years af- tional arrangements, with three lay- d ter serious funding shortages were ers of coordination among up to t try P r first experienced. Even then, the full eight agencies, worked surprisingly I . I systems for forest- potential of the SAP was not well because of effective working re- reached because the program was lationships between provincial dire to livestock graz- not fully communicated to the tors of agriculture and provincial I aW a major study looling implementing directorates. governors. Agricultural staff in each fays A fiToe oag- province became motivated to work nundSoWn st successor dutoegt Overall, the projects succeeded responsively with farmers in their lon sppoTts land consolida- more in providing economic and so- fields through the introduction of a tko in rafed areas, destonlN cial infrastructure than agricultural modified training and visit system. of fertfle lowlands, and hillside services. When local funds were This was an important change to- planting with fruit tres. available, physical targets for roads, wards a client-oriented approach to OED Prwcis is produced by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank to help disseminate recent evaluation findings to development professionals within and outside the World Bank. Theviewsherearethoseofthe Operations Evaluation staff and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations. Please address comments and enquiries to the managing editor, Rachel Weaving, G-7137, World Bank, telephone 473-1719. May 1994