Tunisia - Second Urban Transport Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 13222 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2429-TUN) JUNE 27, 1994 Infrastructure Operations Division Country Department I Middle East and North Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. EXCHANGE RATES Appraisal Year Average US$ 1 = .69 Intervening Year Average US$ 1 = .87 Completion Year Average US$ 1 = 1.02 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System British/US System 1 centimeter (cm) = 0.39 inches (inch) 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 square meter (M2) = 10.76 square feet (sq. ft) 1 square kilometer (kM2) 0.38 square mile (sq. mi) 1 metric ton (m/ton) = 0.98 long ton (1g. ton) 1 liter (L) = 0.26 gallon (G) GLOSSARY CITU - Cellule Technique de Transport Urbain Urban Transport Technical Unit DGPC - Direction G6n6rale des Ponts et Chaus6es Highway Department MEQH - Ministre de l'Equipement et I'Habitat Ministry of Equipment and Housing MLT - M6tro L6ger de Tunis Tunis Light Rail System MOT - Minist6re des Transports Ministry of Transport PDRT - Plan Directeur Regional de Transport Regional Transport Master Plan SNT - Soci6t6 Nationale de Transports National Transport Company SORETRAS - Soci6t6 R6gionale de Transports de Sfax Regional Transport Company of Sfax TUNISIA - FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation June 27, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Tunisia Second Urban Transport Project (Loan 2429-TUN) Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Tunisia - Second Urban Transport Project (Loan 2429-TUN)". The US$33 million Loan was approved in May 1984 and closed on June 30, 1993, one year behind schedule. The Loan has been fully disbursed. The PCR was prepared by the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office and Part II contains the Borrower's observations. The project's original composition envisaged primary road improvements in Greater Tunis, public transport improvements in Sfax, and institution-building measures, including training, technical assistance, and preparation of urban transport planning studies. In 1987, at Government's request, the loan agreement was modified. The Sfax component was replaced by a new component to improve roads and traffic in the municipality of Tunis, and the institution-building effort was expanded to include all agencies involved in project implementation. The PCR contains an adequate account of project preparation, implementation and results. Final project cost was US$72.1 million, US$5.3 million more than the estimated cost of the restructured project. The 8% overrun was primarily due to geotechnical problems associated with road improvements in Greater Tunis. The restructured project achieved its physical goals. The re- estimated economic rate of return for primary road improvements is 45%, as opposed to 36% estimated at appraisal. Institutional strengthening had mixed results. Implementation of a sector, policy based cooperation between the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Equipment and Housing did not materialize. The Urban Transport Technical Unit established under the project was dissolved after 1987 and its staff absorbed in the Ministry of Transport. Training essentially consisted of management participation in various colloquia and seminars. Nevertheless, the project did contribute to the increase of specialists and technicians in the various fields associated with urban transport. Overall the project is rated as satisfactory, the sustainability of its benefits as likely, and its institutional impact as modest. No audit is planned. Robert Picciotto by H. Eberhard K6pp Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  TUNISIA SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2429-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This Project Completion Report describes the preparation, appraisal, and implementation of the Second Urban Transport Project in Tunisia, for which Loan 2429-TUN in the amount of US$33 million was signed on August 28, 1984 and became effective on June 26, 1985. This loan was to have been closed on June 30, 1992; however, the closing date was extended once to June 30, 1993 to allow for completion of a vital road structure south of Tunis. The full loan amount of US$33 million was ultimately disbursed, the last disbursement having been made on January 13, 1994. Parts I and III of this report were prepared by the Infrastructure Division of the Maghreb and Iran Department, Middle East and North Africa Region. They were based on information from the files of the EMENA Information Center and completion mission which took place in Tunisia in early March 1994. Part II was prepared by a local consulting firm under the direction of the District of Tunis, regional planning agency responsible for project coordination.  - ii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2429-TUN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Project Background 1. By 1980, 55% of the Tunisian population of 6.4 million was urbanized and Greater Tunis, home to 1.2 million residents, was growing at a rate of 6.9% p.a. This rapid urbanization took place in the face of inappropriate government policies for public transport companies, inadequate services to both the poor and the middle class, lack of an urban development strategy for the city of Tunis, and dearth of qualified staff in institutions serving the urban transport subsector. In 1982, just after the Bank's first urban transport project in Tunis had ended, the Bank issued a study of the urban transport subsector in Tunisia. Abandoning the single-city approach used in the first project, the study called for an assistance strategy that would adopt a sectorwide perspective, emphasize policy reform and institution building, and reinforce liaisons with non-urban transport projects. Project Objectives and Description 2. In keeping with the above strategy, the Second Urban Transport Project was designed to increase the level and improve the efficiency of transport services in Tunis and Sfax, strengthen the capacity of sector institutions to manage and plan urban transport systems, and formulate and implement a global policy for urban transport. It consisted of: (a) primary road improvements in Greater Tunis to permit through traffic to bypass the city center and achieve a more adequate distribution of downtown-generated traffic; (b) provision of bus maintenance facilities, bus stops, and terminals in Sfax, the country's second largest city, as well as a management information system for the regional transport company (SORETRAS); and (c) institutional development, including a pilot national training program for urban public transport professionals, direct technical assistance to sector institutions, and urban transport policy and planning studies. SORETRAS was to be restructured under the project and meet a set of productivity and financial targets. 3. By 1986, the Tunisian Government decided to embark on a large-scale program to reform public enterprises with Bank support. Rather than restructure SORETRAS separately and ahead of other enterprises, the Government requested that the SORETRAS component be dropped from the Second Urban Transport Project. At this stage, the primary roads improvement component was well underway, whereas the institution building component was either progressing slowly or not at all (e.g., training). In December 1987, following a mid-term review, the Bank agreed to modify the loan agreement. Without changing the original goals of the project, the new agreement eliminated the participation of SORETRAS, reallocating the most of the remaining SORETRAS funds (US$4.6 million out of US$6.0 million) to a new component aimed at improving roads and traffic within the city limits of Tunis. The Municipality of Tunis was added to the list of implementing agencies, thus - 111 - Thereafter, supervision of the Second Urban Transport Project was expanded to cover public enterprise reforms, which had been formally agreed under another Bank loan (Public Enterprise Reform Loan, or PERL). Implementation Experience 4. Several subcomponents suffered long delays. In one case, unstable soil conditions required redesign of foundations for a major interchange near downtown Tunis and caused a six-month delay. In the case of an interchange in southern Tunis, the bidding process went through two cycles, since the lowest evaluated bid was substantially above the engineer's estimate. The procurement process was slowed down by several managerial changes within the administration. The ensuing start-up delay was more than a year long and construction executed by a relatively inexperienced firm was even slower. On the other hand, street and traffic improvements being carried out by the Municipality of Tunis were achieved within the specified time frame. The parking plan together with physical changes such as right-of-way lanes for buses and the installation of traffic signals was put into effect in October 1989 to coincide with the opening of the Tunis Light Rail System (MLT). 5. The training component got off to a late start, because internal disagreements prevented the hiring of a training coordinator, a loan effectiveness condition; this delayed effectiveness by ten months. Subsequently, the needs-based program developed by the national training study was accepted by the review committee after several redrafts, but ultimately was not accepted by the beneficiary agencies. The component moved only after it was transformed into a line of credit for training with an inter-agency committee to clear proposals before the Bank's review. Similar disagreements and weak inter-agency coordination led to the postponement of the study on commercial traffic in Greater Tunis, which was later cancelled due to insufficient time prior to loan closure. The study on street maintenance in the city of Tunis was also cancelled due to insufficient time after two rounds of tendering were unsuccessful. All the major studies, however, were completed. The subcomponent involving computers, software, and related technical assistance was allowed to extend throughout the life of the project, reflecting the rapid changes in agency needs in this field. 6. The project as a whole was completed three years late in 1993, although there were considerable variations among project components. Large civil works proved to be the major source of delays, since the institutional capacity for procurement and for followup on such works was limited. Measures adopted at the time of project restructuring significantly facilitated procurement and accelerated disbursement of loan funds. - Iv - Results 7. The restructured project fully achieved its investment-related objectives. The primary road improvement component allowed through traffic to bypass the center of the city. Working in tandem with a traffic restraint plan, area signal coordination, and parking fees, this investment greatly improved central city traffic conditions for public transport and pedestrians. It also permitted a better distribution of downtown traffic at entry and exit points, whose capacity at several major intersections was being seriously impaired by the new MLT. The secondary road network was improved in the outlying districts. The project achieved most of its institution-building objectives, though sometimes not in the form originally envisaged. Under a new policy in the urban transport sector, several transport enterprises were restructured both financially and managerially while other sources of urban transport supply were being developed in the private sector. Its cancellation from the project notwithstanding, SORETRAS carried out all the reforms envisaged under the initial project design. The acquisition of computer hardware and software helped participating agencies improve and upgrade many of their technical, administrative, and service functions. Planning and policy studies, some carried out by joint teams of consultants and staff from local institutions, or with direct technical assistance, were instrumental in upgrading the skills of a host of junior professionals competent to undertake transport planning and policy development tasks. Transport planning surveys and software developed under the project created a regional data base for Greater Tunis used in all subsequent studies. 8. The final project cost rose to US$72.1 million equivalent, representing an overrun of US$5.3 million equivalent, or 8% of estimates revised during project restructuring. This was principally due to geotechnical problems with the primary roads improvement component. Despite cost and time overruns, infrastructure improvements under the project yielded an economic rate of return (ERR) of 45%. This was considerably higher than the 36% ERR forecast at appraisal as the project resulted in greater time savings due to both higher than expected productivity and wage levels. Sustainability 9. The Government's sector-based policy promoted public enterprise reforms in the urban transport subsector while introducing private provision of public transport services. At the same time, overall institutional capacity was enhanced through technical assistance, even though it has been difficult to maintain expertise within given agencies. Following a major success of implanting transport modelling and planning skills in the District of Tunis, this agency was recently redefined into an internal technical service within the Ministry of Equipment and Housing. In its new, national role the District may do well, but Greater Tunis has lost its sole regional planning agency, a competent and independent voice in policy and investment decisions in the capital area. Conclusions and Lessons Learned 10. The project suffered from having a plethora of implementing agencies, a consequence of its ambitious, sectoral approach. The implementation of complex project components was compounded by weak interaction among executing agencies. The District of Tunis had neither sufficient administrative authority nor human resources to monitor progress in overall project implementation by the other agencies. In the future, the means available to the coordinating body and its capacity to enforce project guidelines should be ensured, or the project design should be changed. Overall, project objectives were too ambitious, given its lack of leverage over the sectoral institution which had most changes to make, i.e. the Ministry of Transport (MOT). changed. Overall, project objectives were too ambitious, given its lack of leverage over the sectoral institution which had most changes to make, i.e. the Ministry of Transport (MOT). 12. Responsibility for urban transport in Greater Tunis is still dispersed among the ministerial, regional, and municipal levels. Relationships involving the different consumers of transport services (e.g., drivers, pedestrians, travelers), the agencies providing those services, and financing schemes are still diffuse and undefined. The problems faced, during project implementation, in drawing up and agreeing on performance contracts with public enterprises, the introduction of private transport services, and the selection of future transport investments indicate that none of the sector institutions is in a position adequately to represent the interests of the country's major urban agglomeration. MOT's functional range is too narrow, whereas the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Tunis is restricted geographically. It is, therefore, essential to set up a governmental authority with the capacity to plan and manage urban transport infrastructure and services, as well as the power to mobilize resources, sign contracts, and recruit qualified personnel. On the other hand, the coordination of future urban transport projects among implementing agencies may be impractical; needed are (a) a planning committee with representatives from the ministerial and other public agencies and the private sector, (b) the capacity to carry out civil works, and (c) one or more local consulting firms capable of carrying out studies. 13. The benefits from ad-hoc, demand-driven training are difficult to evaluate in precise terms. It might have been much simpler to take a supply-side approach, i.e., identify and concentrate on upgrading local training institutions and programs that serve the sector. Such an approach is now being taken under the leadership of the District of Tunis. If it is successfully managed, it should ensure greater project sustainability by increasing the number of highly trained specialists and technicians in the various fields associated with urban transport such as, inter alia, planning, engineering, transport economics, and traffic and parking management. On the other hand, an ad-hoc approach, guided by sound criteria to judge individual training proposals, can work and did work under this project. Informal evidence indicates strongly that the training component improved both the quality of the urban transport debate in technical and policy circles in Tunisia and increased the number of qualified participants. One of the most important outcomes of the institution building effort was full local transport planning capacity, including modelling and forecasting, as an end product of staff training involving a private consulting firm that not only provides services only throughout Tunisia but also has been successful in competing for contracts in Europe and sub- Saharan Africa. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2429-TUN) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Name : Second Urban Transport Project Loan No. : 2429-TUN Amount : US$33 Million Region : Middle East and North Africa Country : Tunisia Sector : Transport Subsector : Urban Transport 2. Project Background 2.1 Between 1956 and 1980, Tunisia experienced rapid urban growth and was confronted by problems of inadequate infrastructure and services, a housing shortage, and high unemployment. By 1980, 55% of the Tunisian population of 6.4 million was urbanized, compared with 33% in 1956. Growing at a rate of 6.9% p.a., Greater Tunis alone was home to 1.2 million residents; the second most populous urban area was Greater Sfax with a population of 310,000. 2.2 Urban public transport, chiefly buses running on city streets, is vital for the functioning of Tunisian cities. At the time of surveys completed in the mid-1970s, public transport accounted for approximately 70% of daily non-walk travel in the Tunis area, and approximately 36% in Sfax where the size, topography, and density of the city favored the use of cycles. 2.3 The most pressing problems faced by urban transportation at the beginning of the 1980s were: (a) inappropriate government policies for public transport companies; (b) two poorly- serviced population sectors: the poor, who relied on public transport, and the middle class, who mainly used private vehicles; (c) lack of an urban development strategy for the city of Tunis; and (d) dearth of qualified staff in institutions involved in urban transport. 2.4 The Bank's first involvement with the sector had been the Tunis District Urban Planning and Public Transport Project, financed by an $18 million credit and loan approved in 1973 -2- class, who mainly use private vehicles; (c) lack of an urban development strategy for the city of Tunis; and (d) dearth of qualified staff in institutions involved in urban transport. 2.4 The Bank's first involvement with the sector had been Tunis District Urban Planning and Public Transport Project, financed by an $18 million credit and loan approved in 1973 and closed in 1981. This project financed major capital investments for National Transport Company (Soci6t6 Nationale des Transports - SNT), the public transport enterprise serving Tunis, and for traffic management improvements by the Municipality of Tunis. SNT investments included bus fleet expansion, new bus depots, and upgrading of a suburban rail line (TGM). On the institutional side, the project helped transform the District of Tunis into a functioning regional planning agency, assisted the formation of a traffic management unit in the municipal administration, and financed the country's first urban transport planning and policy studies. The project was considered successful, but some of its achievements were not sustained, particularly those concerned with the financial standing and the productivity of SNT, and reserved lanes for public transport vehicles. This experience provided the impetus to study the urban transport sector in several Tunisian cities, searching for an approach that would increase the sustainability of improvements. The study was completed in 1982, its results serving as basis for the next ten years of Bank involvement in this sector. The study proposed an assistance strategy for urban transport in Tunisia which would: (a) adopt a sectorwide perspective in collaboration with national institutions; (b) emphasize policy reforms and institutional development; (c) reinforce the liaisons with non-urban transport projects; and (d) provide massive funds for technical assistance in addition to investments for infrastructure and equipment. The Bank's support brought about a flux of projects and studies, some of them cofinanced, or parallel-financed with other multilateral or bilateral organizations, assuring the continuity necessary for an effective urban strategy. 2.5 Since the 1970s, the Bank has provided Tunisia with 24 loans for infrastructure projects, consisting of four urban development, three sewerage, five water supply, and 12 transport projects. In the transport sector, Bank assistance has been given to six highway, one railway, three port, and two urban transport projects. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 Project objectives. In the Tunisian urban transport sector, the Bank recognized three main objectives, to: (a) improve the level of urban transport services offered to users in Tunis and Sfax, and increase efficiency in supplying these services; and improve the quality and efficiency urban public transport in Tunis and Sfax; (b) strengthen the capacity of sector institutions to manage and plan urban transport systems; and (c) formulate and implement a global policy for urban transport. -3- 3.2 Project description. The main components of the project were the following: A. Primary road improvements in Greater Tunis. The general objective of these improvements was to permit through traffic to bypass the city center and to achieve a more adequate distribution of inbound and outbound traffic. It consisted of: (a) infrastructure investments: i. construction of an interchange at the intersection of GP8 and GP9 with a connection to Route X2; ii. completion of a second carriageway for Route X2 (which was a two-lane section) between GP10 and GP9, over one 1.3 km in distance; iii. construction of an overpass of Route Z4 at Rue Cyprus-Le-Grand (Palais de Congrbs), where there was no intersection; iv. construction of an overpass (Viaduc de l'Avenue de la Rdpublique) about 500 meters long, along Route Z4 over both Avenue Bourguiba and Line 1 of the Tunis Light Rail System (SMLT), which connects the SMLT with both the railway terminal and the port of Tunis; v. upgrading of Route Z4 from Viaduc de la R6publique to the intersection with GPI (from the present seven-meter carriageway, to a full 2x2-lane section), over a 1.6 km distance; vi. completion of a second carriageway on Route Z4, from the intersection with GP1 to M6grine (to achieve a full 2x2-lane section where only a single seven-meter carriageway existed), over a distance of 2.5 km); vii. construction of the Intercommunale Sud (2x2 lane section) between GP1 and Route Z4, over a distance of 0.7 km; and viii. construction of the P6n6trante Sud, a 1.9-km long freeway, connecting the southern exit to Route Z4. This included two interchanges (one at each end), and an above-grade crossing of the national railway lines. (b) professional engineering services, requiring approximately 225 staff- months to: i. prepare detailed engineering for road links executed in the second and subsequent years of project implementation; and ii. supervise construction for all the road improvements. -4- B. Public transport improvements in Sfax, consisting of: (a) bus maintenance: construction and outfitting of a 250-bus maintenance facility in the industrial district being developed near the new fishing port; (b) improvement of bus stops and terminals: construction of about 100 bus shelters, paving of waiting areas at bus stops, improvement of the bus depot at Zeghm, and reorganization and paving at the Bab Jebli, Enfants de Bourguiba, and Dakar bus terminals; (c) professional engineering services: about 30 staff-months to complete detailed preparation of the bus maintenance facility and to oversee its construction; (d) management information system: purchase of computer hardware and software, initially for management of schedule and duty rosters, spare parts management, cost accounting, and integration of cost and financial accounts; and (e) technical assistance to the regional transport company of Sfax (SORETRAS): three experts (for about 1.5 years each), to introduce new work practices in operations, maintenance, and administration, and subsequently provide intermittent followup. C. Institution building, consisting of: (a) training program: implementation of a pilot national training program, the design of which was financed under the Third Urban Development Project (Loan 2223-Tun) and included a two-year university-level training in transport engineering and economics for four persons, workshops and seminars for about 30 professionals (some of these workshops addressing specifically the issues of traffic enforcement and related policy training), training for three trainers in bus maintenance, short traineeships for about 36 participants, and public information campaigns; (b) technical assistance to MOT: 30 staff-months for coordinating and evaluating the training program, up to about 52 staff-months of technical assistance for future project preparation and for the follow-up of policy studies related to productivity, fares, and finances of regional transport companies (SRTs) and involvement of private transport operators; (c) technical assistance for traffic management: 33 staff-months of technical assistance to the Municipality of Tunis for implementing gradually, as construction of the SMLT permits, a traffic engineering plan, including -5- one-way street system, signs and markings, channelization of intersections, and traffic lights; (d) transport planning study for Greater Tunis: this study would assess urban development, transport demand, and related investments to the year 2000. It would include the collection of up-to-date demographic, economic and transport demand/supply information, consideration of multi-modal investment alternatives and related policies, and development of transport/land use modelling capability in the District of Tunis. Computer hardware and software were to be provided separately to the District of Tunis, along with technical assistance; and (e) transort planning study for Greater Sfax: the objective of this study was the integration of public transport, highway and traffic management plans with the Greater Sfax urban development plan for the 1990-2000 period. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.1 The Highway Department (DGPC) through the Tunis Regional Directorate (DRT) of the Ministry of Equipment and Housing (MEQH) was placed in charge of completing primary road improvements in Greater Tunis. SORETRAS would be responsible for overseeing public transport improvement in Sfax. The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOT) would be responsible for studies, technical assistance, and training; it also would oversee the SORETRAS component, given its tutelary role in relation to all public enterprises in the transport sector. 5. Project Restructuring 5.1 By 1986, the Tunisian Government and the Bank had started to discuss a large- scale program to restructure public enterprises in several industrial and service sectors, including the transport sector. This program would be supported under the upcoming Bank-financed Public Enterprise Reform Loan (PERL). Rather than restructure SORETRAS separately and ahead of other enterprises, the Government requested that the SORETRAS component be dropped from the Second Urban Transport Project. Given the importance of this component, the Bank decided to conduct a mid-term review of the project with a view to restructuring it to suit the new circumstances and the early implementation experience. The primary roads improvement component was already well underway, whereas the institution-building component, particularly the training program, was not showing much progress. The training program was not moving because: (a) the bilateral funding needed to cover nearly 60% of the costs was not forthcoming, (b) the training study did not produce a training program for the sector acceptable to all client agencies, and (c) the institutions involved in the project preferred to develop and improve their own training programs rather than adhere to a centralized program mandated by MOT. -6- 5.2 In December 1987, based on the results of the mid-term review, the Bank agreed to modify the loan agreement. Without changing the original goals of the project, the new agreement eliminated the participation of SORETRAS, reallocating most of the funds originally earmarked for SORETRAS to a new component aimed at improving roads and traffic in the municipality of Tunis. The institution building effort was expanded to include all the agencies involved in project implementation. Policy objectives regarding public transport enterprises were to be pursued under the forthcoming PERL operation. The result of restructuring was a reduction in the estimated cost of the project by US$15.7 million and in the training component from US$3.26 million to US$0.63 million. The overall Bank contribution to project financing was increased from 40% to 49% of the total cost with the same loan amount of US$33 million. 5.3 The major project component, primary road improvements in Greater Tunis, remained unchanged. In light of a reduction in cost estimates from US$64.4 million, including contingencies, to US$54.7, including contingencies, for this component, it now represented 82% of the total cost of the project, compared with 78% at appraisal. The cost of the civil works represented 87% of that component, compared with 82% at appraisal. The new streets and traffic improvements component consisted of: (a) restoration of approximately 70 km of roads (35% arterial, 39% secondary, and 29% tertiary) including roads, drainage, sidewalks, signs, and traffic lights; (b) implementation of the second phase of the traffic circulation and management plan in the center of Tunis; (c) construction of priority areas for both public transport vehicles and pedestrians, including bus lanes and pedestrian streets; and (d) provision of specialized engineering services to prepare the feasibility studies and the bidding documents, and to supervise the execution of civil works. Project-financed training was extended to DGPC, District of Tunis, Municipality of Tunis, and Municipality of Sfax. Professionals working in these agencies would be trained through short courses in Tunis or abroad, as well as training programs in Tunisian universities and university scholarships abroad. Co-financing of this component was dropped. The institution building component was expanded by introducing a Traffic Management Unit into DRT to take care of traffic problems outside the boundaries of the Municipality of Tunis. The scope of policy and planning studies was broadened to examine management strategies for roads and public transport, including: (i) master plan studies for regional transportation (PDRTs), to be carried out by the District of Tunis and the Municipality of Sfax with expert assistance; (ii) a study of commercial traffic in Greater Tunis, to be carried out by the District of Tunis in collaboration with MOT; (iii) a study of transport in Sfax, to be carried out by the Municipality of Sfax; (iv) a detailed survey of the roads in Tunis, a study on road maintenance, and the organization of municipal engineering services, to be carried out by the Municipality of Tunis; and (v) updating the study on solid waste, to be carried out jointly by the District of Tunis and the Municipality of Tunis. Equipment needed to support various technical, administrative, and service functions would be procured. It would consist of computer hardware and software, parking meters, and laboratory equipment. 5.4 Project restructuring brought on major changes in implementation and management. The Municipality of Tunis oversaw the traffic improvements. The District of Tunis, the regional planning authority for Greater Tunis, was designed to share responsibility for institution building with MOT and take over project coordination. This would ensure proper liaison among implementing agencies and improved project monitoring. A project coordinator -7- would collect and transmit to the Bank quarterly progress and audit reports, as well as provide information concerning project administration. MOT would continue to develop a global policy governing all aspects of urban transport. 6. Implementation Experience 6.1 Project Timetable. According to the loan agreement, from inception to completion, the project was to have been completed by the end of 1990. The completion date was not amended in 1987 at the time of project restructuring. Although delays occurred intermittently affecting different components of the project, as a whole, the project was completed three years late in 1993. Notably, at the time of project restructuring, measures were adopted to facilitate project implementation and loan disbursement: * local contractors were permitted to bid on projects under US$500,000; * contracts by mutual agreement were authorized for utility relocation work with the contractors involved; * a special account was established to accelerate disbursements; and * the withdrawal of funds was further simplified with the introduction of the statements of expenditure for the training element, which required many small expenditures. 6.2 Primary Roads of Greater Tunis. Under this component, the project financed the construction of two interchange complexes and an overpass on the lake-side road (Z4) just east of the downtown Tunis; other at-grade improvements were also carried out on the Z4 corridor, as well as on some arterial roads in the north of the city. Main implementation problems were due to the instability of the soil in the Z4 corridor, delays in land expropriation, and slow procurement activities. The problem of the unstable ground had been anticipated during project appraisal, but was not resolved due to a common resistance by the Borrower to invest in preventive engineering. Procurement problems occurred when it became necessary to re-bid on a major contract (interchange complex in south Tunis), since the lowest evaluated bid was substantially above the engineer's cost estimate. The second bidding cycle, including a new round of pre-qualification, was even slower to process than the first due to frequent changes in administrators in DGPC in the latter half of the project. The total impact of these obstacles was a six-month delay in completing the major GP8/GP9/X2 interchange and a much longer delay in constructing overpass on the southern freeway, the last missing link in upgrading the route Z4 to expressway standards. In fact, this contract turned out to be on the critical path for project completion. 6.3 Road and Traffic Improvement in Tunis. The rehabilitation of streets along existing bus routes, construction of streets and sidewalks along future bus routes in new neighborhoods, and the implementation of traffic and parking plans were achieved within the specified time frame. Other physical changes such as right-of-way lanes for buses and the -8- installation of traffic signals were completed by October 1989 to coincide with the opening of the Light Rail System (SMLT). In fact, implementation was generally uneventful owing to the Municipality's many years' experience in carrying out physical works of that nature and excellent working relations with the Bank. In addition, an inventory of city streets was completed as planned, but the street maintenance study was never fully "owned" by the technical directorate of the Municipality and did not get done. A parallel street rehabilitation and traffic management project, modelled after the Bank-financed operation, was concurrently implemented by the Municipality of Tunis with financing in the amount of US$8 million equivalent from Arab Economic and Social Development Fund. Some subcomponents were actually switched between the two operations to facilitate bidding through grouping like items together, i.e., the Bank loan financed the entire traffic signal component and the Arab Fund loan financed civil works for intersection improvements. 6.4 Institution Building. Training and technical assistance got off to a late start and lasted throughout the project. This delay was the result of internal disagreements on the goals of the training program and the failure at the outset to develop a needs-based training plan acceptable to all the agencies involved. There was also a question of the executing agency for the program, since the Tunisian Administrative Code was too unwieldy for the processing of many small demands and claims needed in training. The component moved only after it was re-conceptualized into a demand-driven line of credit, administered by the District of Tunis, but managed through a multi-agency selection committee, and required Bank clearance for every single application. The program was not entirely ad hoc, the District having carried out in 1990 a sectoral training needs assessment and set up a three-year (1991-1994) training program for professional staff and higher technicians. Another casualty of weak project coordination during the early implementation stage was the study on commercial traffic in Greater Tunis. It was postponed and later cancelled due to lack of time to implement it before loan closure. All the other studies were completed. Computers hardware and software were acquired one year late. 7. Results 7.1 Project Cost The cost of the final project rose from US$72.1 million, compared with US$82.5 million equivalent estimated at appraisal and US$66.8 million equivalent estimated at the time of project restructuring. This overrun of US$5.3 million, or 8%, was due principally to the Greater Tunis primary roads improvement component, which overspent its budget by US$3.3 million equivalent owing to geotechnical problems. Due to these cost overruns and the resultant dwindling of available loan funds, works on two sections of the North-South corridor (interchange on route Z4 at the Palais des Congrbs, southern inter-communal link) that were to have been financed under the project had to be postponed to some future project. Even though Bank loan funds were reallocated to civil works from other categories, the loan fell short of financing the corresponding 55% of the total cost of the overpass for the southern freeway. Consequently, the Tunisian government provided an unanticipated US$3.3 million equivalent, consisting of US$1 million equivalent for the interchange and US$2.3 equivalent for the overpass. -9- Public Expenditure Review. After this successful period, CITU disappeared within months that followed a succession of director-level and minister-level changes in MOT. After trying to save the unit for some months, the Bank's project team moved the focus of institution building away from MOT to DRT, District of Tunis, and Municipality of Tunis. 7.4 At the local level, the District of Tunis and the Municipality of Sfax made much more use of the project than originally planned and improved their transport planning, policy making, and traffic management capabilities considerably. The District, using a joint staff/consultants team, successfully completed a major transport planning study for Greater Tunis (PDRT), which provided project ideas and a data base for the relevant part of the Eighth Transport Plan. The Tunis PDRT proposed a primary highway program for the region under the Eighth Plan and provided projections for the demand of various modes of transport by 1996 and beyond (2001). These were adopted as a basis for further plans by the transport operators cooperative and DGPC. The District also managed the PDRT study for Sfax, which developed short-, medium-, and long-term (1993, 1996, 2001) proposals for the highways, traffic, and public transport. These were in the ready-to-appraise form, but the expected Third Urban Transport Project never materialized. 7.5 Environmental Impact. Through the improvement of the road links which constitute the eastern bypass of the city center, the project improved the condition of regional and inter-regional routes for all types of road transport. The project transformed the patterns of accessibility, leading to planned urbanization on the outskirts of central Tunis. These roadway transformations, above all, benefitted the local population by connecting suburban neighborhoods with another. In future similar projects, measures anticipated in response to the need for improved environmental management and regulation would normally include equipment to measure vehicle noise and pollution, as well as the development of an updated system for registering vehicles. 7.6 Economic Reevaluation. With Bank financing under the Fourth Urban Development Project (Loan 2736-TUN), the District of Tunis engaged a local consulting firm to prepare Part II of the PCR and confirm the economic rate of return (ERR) on the infrastructure investments supported by the project, i.e., improvements to the primary road network in greater Tunis and to streets and traffic in the municipality of Tunis, the latter having replaced public transport improvements in Sfax. Economic benefits were based on savings in vehicle operating costs and passenger travel time due to vehicle-owners' average household incomes. The economic analysis of the primary road improvements undertaken at the time of appraisal showed an ERR of 36% with various sensitivity tests confirming the attractiveness of the investment under all likely scenarios. The analysis was built around a computer-based road network configuration and origin-destination travel pattern, which produced estimates of peak hour vehicle kilometers and vehicle hours over the whole network. The software used to the reevaluate the ERR, the EMME/2 transport model, provided a more sophisticated tool for travel demand analysis. It showed an ERR of 45%. The higher ERR is mainly due to greater time savings due to both higher productivity and wages than originally forecast. A more detailed discussion of the project's economic benefits and methodology used in evaluating the ERR is provided in Part II. 8 Sustainability 8.1 The principal risk identified during project preparation was that the implementation of a sector-based policy dependent upon cooperation between MOT and MEQH might not work as hoped for in the project design. In effect, there was an intrinsic dichotomy in terms of incentive structure: the MEQH controlled the major portion of investment funds under the loan, whereas - 10 - MOT had little money and numerous policy changes to make. The only leverage the Bank had over MOT was persuasion. Nonetheless, following an interim period when MOT's policies were at cross- purposes with those espoused under the project, MOT became an interested partner. After 1987, MOT took the lead in reforming the public-owned transport sector and took measures to introduce private participation therein. Therefore, though CTTU did not survive, the underlying project objectives were achieved in a way that suited local ideas in these matters. The capacity of MOT in transport policy and planning in the 1990s is immeasurably higher than it was in the early 1980s, at least in part due to project activities. 8.2 The training component essentially consisted of management participation in various colloquia and seminars; not until the end of the implementation period did the sectoral institutions have in mind a clear training agenda for urban transport. The benefits from ad-hoc, demand-driven training during most of the implementation period are difficult to pin down. There are many indications, however, that benefits are considerable, including a visibly strong Tunisian presence at a series of professional seminars and conferences, some of which were organized in Tunisia with partial financing by the project. Progress is also evident in an increased number of highly trained specialists and technicians in the various fields associated with urban transport (e.g., planning, engineering, transport economics, traffic and parking management). 8.3 Notwithstanding significant institutional gains, the recent redefinition of the role of the District of Tunis as an internal technical service within MEQH may eventually have a negative impact on the sustainability of objectives of the Second Urban Transport Project, notably insofar as the development of stronger urban transport policy and project analysis at the urban area level are concerned. Initially, there was an attempt to build this capacity in MOT. When that effort did not give the desired results, emphasis was given to building this capacity in the District and have it re- exported to other institutions. As a semi-autonomous regional planning agency, the District evolved into a highly competent and comparatively independent voice in policy and investment decisions for the national capital area. Because of the District's new organizational locus within a technical ministry, this role may not continue. Fortunately, what will survive are the trained individuals. There is a pattern of these people moving from one institution to another, as conditions and leadership change, looking for the best opportunities to apply their skills and ideas. In this sense, sector institution building can be said to endure, even if individual institutions rise and fall. 8.4 The sustainability of benefits derived from improvements to the regional and municipal transport network will largely depend on the timely upgrading of roadway infrastructure (e.g., additional interchanges and expressways) and the enforcement of traffic regulations (e.g., restricted lanes, parking fines). - 11 - 9. Bank's Performance 9.1 During the planning stage, project design was allowed to become too complex, given the absence of a strong in-country coordinator. Also, financial arrangements for the training component relied too heavily on counterpart and bilateral funds. The need for project restructuring, though principally based on the Government's request to eliminate the participation of SORETRAS, was successfully used to streamline, simplify, and otherwise improve project design. Project coordination turned out to be the most difficult aspect of project design. The District of Tunis, agency chosen to play this role after the demise of C-IT, performed well in monitoring project activities, but did not have (nor could have) sufficient administrative power to coordinate such diverse institutions as the DGPC, DRT, MOT, and the Municipalities of Tunis and Sfax. During the remaining implementation period, the Bank contributed to institutional and human resources development in the area of urban transport planning in the District of Tunis, while essentially continuing to manage the project from Washington. 10. Borrower's Performance 10.1 DRT competently undertook its tasks in the execution of the primary roads improvement component. The Department of Streets and Roads of the Municipality of Tunis was quite effective as concerns the city's road and traffic and introduced a new traffic management plan following the start of the operation of the MLT. The District of Tunis and the Municipality of Sfax, with consultant assistance, developed their respective PDRTs. Despite these considerable successes, some key institutional issues and constraints to further subsector development have yet to be resolved. In Tunisia, responsibility for urban transport is dispersed among the ministerial, regional, and municipal levels. Relationships involving the different consumers of transport services (e.g., drivers, pedestrians, travelers), the agencies providing those services, and financing schemes are diffuse and undefined. The problems faced, during project implementation, in drawing up and agreeing on performance contracts with public enterprises, the introduction of private transport companies, agreement on a comprehensive training plan, and the selection of future transport investments indicate that none of the sector institutions is in a position adequately to represent the interests of the country's major urban agglomeration, i.e, Greater Tunis, or its secondary cities. 10.2 The functional range of MOT has proved to be too narrow, while the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Tunis restricted geographically. In fact, the administrative system seems to lack a homogenous structure. It is therefore essential to set up a governmental authority with the capacity to plan and manage urban transport infrastructure and services, as well as the power to mobilize resources, sign contracts, and recruit qualified personnel. The District of Tunis, in its role as coordinating agency, had neither sufficient authority nor human resources to affect the progress in overall project implementation by the other agencies. As a result, annual audits of project accounts found variations in administrative and other project-related performance from one agency to another. The coordination of future urban transport projects among implementing agencies, including the means to enforce project guidelines, may be impractical; clearly needed, however, are (a) a planning committee with representatives from the ministerial and other public agencies and the private sector, (b) the capacity to carry out civil works, which DRT can do independently with some training, and (c) one or more local consulting firms capable of carrying out studies, which now exists in Tunisia. - 12 - 11. Project Relationship 11.1 Since the early 1970s, when the First Urban Transport Project was conceived, the Bank and our Tunisian counterparts have continued to forge and solidify close working relationships across the transportation and urban development sectors. Through the course of our ongoing dialogue, the possibility of an eventual Third Urban Transport Project has often been entertained and discussed. The various agencies concerned have expressed their preference for direct support for city- based, specific urban transport projects rather than through a countrywide, multi-mode transport sector operation. Whether or not the Bank is involved, a future project could have as its primary targets the road network for secondary cities and continued upgrading of roads on the periphery of the capital to expressway standards. Such a project would serve as a vehicle for the improvement of the decision-making bases and investment policies in secondary cities. The Sfax PDRT, developed under the Second Urban Transport Project, could be used as a model for the other cities since it covers all aspects of urban transport and includes long- and short-term recommendations and provides a techno-economic evaluation of selected investments. A future project would necessarily need to aim at building a viable institutional framework and invest more wisely in developing human capital by supporting such providers of training as the SNT Training Center, which specializes in vocational training, and especially the National Engineering School at Tunis (ENIT). The latter has recently introduced transport planning into its in-service training curriculum, which is a focal point of the current training plan being implemented by the District of Tunis. Moreover, the future urban transport subsector dialogue, whether entirely internal or involving the Bank or other international agencies, must urgently consider fare-subsidy relationships in the sector, which have not been fully resolved. 12. Consultants' Services 12.1 Consultants employed to carry out the various studies under the institution building component, as well as those who provided technical assistance for the other components, completed their tasks satisfactorily. The local consulting firm, a project beneficiary, helped develop the PDRTs for the Tunis and Sfax regions, as well as prepared Part II of this report and the project economic reevaluation. It performed exceptionally well, its work reflecting the highest professional standards, as evidenced by its success in winning competitively bids for work outside Tunisia. 13. Project Documentation and Data 13.1 The staff appraisal report and the legal documents provided a useful framework and other documentation available posed no particular problems for the compiling of information needed to prepare this project completion report. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2429-TUN) II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. PREFACE 1.1 The objective of the Second Urban Transport Project, financed under Loan 2429-TUN granted on August 28, 1984, was to improve urban transport services in Tunis and Sfax, strengthen the institutional capacity for the management and planning of urban transport systems, and formulate and implement a comprehensive transport policy. 1.2 This project was composed of: - primary roads improvements in Greater Tunis; - street and road traffic improvements in the city of Tunis; and - studies, training, and institution building. 1.3 The first component, representing nearly 85% of the total cost, had a considerable impact on traffic conditions in Tunis. The second component, which dealt with the municipal road system, albeit less costly, had a favorable impact on the traffic conditions in the city of Tunis. The third component, which comprised training, technical assistance, and studies had a decisive impact on institutional development. 1.4 This Completion Report on the Second Urban Transport Project contains two chapters: one on the restructuring and municipal road system; the other on the institutional component. 2. ROAD NETWORK IN GREATER TUNIS AND MUNICIPAL STREETS Road network improvements A. Actions taken to improve the road network: 2.1 This project component includes the development of primary roads and interchanges along the North-South corridor of Greater Tunis. The following table retraces the programmed actions as well as cost overruns and delays, which occurred during implementation. - 14 - Implementation Schedule for the Primary Road ImprovementsComponent Subcompocat Beginning End Date Delays Initial cost Final Cot Delays Observations Cm 000) (7 000) (COt, TID 000) 1. GP8/GP9 Interchange Feb. 1987 Aug. 1990 23 months 5900 9620 3720 2. X2 Recalibration June 1987 March 970 1200 230 1989 3. Cyprus-le-Grand Viaduct Not executed 4. Republique Viaduct Nov. 1986 Nov. 1989 12 months 9536 15311 5775 5. Z4 Recalibration between April 1986 Feb. 1988 1620 1950 330 Republique and GP 6. Z4 Recalibration between March 1986 April 1988 3047 GP1 and Megrine 7. Southern Intercommunal Not executed 8. Southern Expressway April 1989 June 1993 11170 13850 2680 B. Development impact on improvements to the streets in Tunis 2.2 The objectives of the primary road improvements in Greater Tunis were to: - ease traffic congestion in the southern part of the city of Tunis through the main southern thoroughfare connecting to Road Z4; - ensure the North-South traffic interchange through the Avenue de la R6publique viaduct; - redistribute northbound motorized traffic by improving the interchange GP8/GP9 and recalibrating route X20 with 2x2 lanes; - ease congestion at heavily trafficked exits and crossroads (e.g., Avenue de la R6publique, Boulevard Mohammed V, crossroads GP8/GP9). 2.3 The execution of these actions resulted in a number of benefits, such as: - easing traffic congestion on main arteries and crossroads; - reducing commuters' travel time; and - enhancing overall economic performance, which is the main focus of this ex-post evaluation report. -15- - 16 - Municipal street project 2.4 The Municipality of Tunis carried out several actions within the framework of the Second Urban Transport Project. These actions dealt mainly with primary road improvements and street light installation. The total amount allocated to these subcomponents was about TD 6,310,000, of which TD 4,340,000 were for primary road projects and TD 1,970,000 for equipment. The World Bank's share in financing them was US$4,902,000 (TD 4,411,800 equivalent), representing about 70% of the total component cost. The component's description, its costs, and its qualitative impact on urban transport and traffic within the city of Tunis are given in the following tables. - 17 - MUNICIPAL SUBPROJECIS Investments in Infrastructure Project Description Cost Completion Project Impact No. (TD 1,000) time 1 Municipal road system 559,100 1987 Reduction in downtown traffic congestion strengthening in the city of - Reduction in vehicle operating costs (less Tunis wear and tear caused by poor pavement conditions) 2 Rebuilding of sidewalks 163,000 1987-88 - Enhanced urban environment along some arteries in the - Improved pedestrian safety city center 3 Municipal road system 323,400 1988 Reduction in traffic congestion within the strengthening along the city northern periphery - Reduction in vehicle operating costs (less (El Menzah) wear and tear caused by poor pavement conditions) 4 Municipal road system 291,000 1988 - Traffic improvements in the city center strengthening in the city due to better traffic distribution at entry center, in particular and exit points - Ave. Libert6 - Reduction in vehicle operating costs (less - Ave. Cyrus Le Grand wear and tear caused by poor - Ave. Carthage pavement conditions) and some time saving 5 Sidewalk strengthening in 181,000 1989-90 - Improved environment the city of Tunis - Improved pedestrian safety 6 Secondary and tertiary road 891,000 1989-91 - Better flow of city traffic system rehabilitation in the - Better connection with the primary road city of Ibn Khaldoun network - Reduction in vehicle operating costs (less wear and tear due to poor pavement conditions 7 Drainage works in the city 230,000 1989-90 - Enhanced urban environment of Ibn Khaldoun 8 Rehabilitation of the 778,000 1991-92 - Better flow of city traffic secondary and tertiary road - Better connection with the primary road systems in the cities of network Kabaria and Djebel Djeloud - Reduction in vehicle operating costs (less wear and tear due to poor pavement conditions) - Improved safety 9 Rehabilitation of the 662,100 1990-92 - Improved flow of city traffic secondary and tertiary road - Better connection with the primary road system in the city of network Ouardia Reduction in vehicle operating costs (less wear and tear due to poor pavement conditions) - Improved safety 10 Drainage works in the city 260,400 1989-91 - Improved urban environment of Ouardia - 18 - MUNICIPAL SUBPROJECIS Investments in Equipment Project Description Cost Implementation Project Impact No. (1000 period TD) 1 Extension of the traffic control 1,210,000 1989 - Traffic improvements at main intersections, system in the city of Tunis mainly those crossed by the Tunis Light Rail System (SMLT) - Safety improvements at these intersections for all transport vehicles - Optimal operation of the SMLT since the present traffic control system gives it the right- of-way over other vehicles 2 Acquisition of spare parts; 319,145 1991 - Optimal operation of traffic light equipment personnel training actions (e.g., less frequent malfunctioning) - Improvement in the repair of traffic control equipment 3 Acquisition of vertical traffic- 277,000 1992 - Improved traffic and road safety light equipment - Improved urban environment 4 Equipping information centers 163,900 1992 - Better use of computer technology with microcomputers and software - 19 - Economic rate of return Introduction 2.5 Of the two components analyzed, primary road network improvements and the subprojects executed by the Municipality of Tunis (e.g., streets, installation of traffic signals), the former component had the greatest impact. The cost ratio of the two components was 1:7 and the impact on the network was mainly due to primary road network improvements. The impact on municipal streets was more localized (e.g., traffic decongestion at some intersections, right-of-way given to public transport). However, economic benefits derived from project were shown to be mainly due to actions taken to improve the primary road network. Thus, in carrying out the economic impact analysis, a conservative approach was taken to combine the two component costs while only taking into account the benefits resulting from the primary road network improvements. Methodology 2.6 Unlike so-called "commercial projects," for which financial rates of return (profits in relation to expenses) are the main performance indicators, infrastructure projects are evaluated through the economic rates of return obtained on a national scale. Two methods are generally used to conduct such studies; to wit, the reference price, or cost-benefit method, and the so-called "impact method." (i) The cost-benefit method is based on the costs and benefits of the project in relation to a reference situation. In this particular case, the reference situation is the one where the Tunis primary road network excludes improvements made within the scope of the Second Urban Transport Project. This reference situation has to be compared to the one where the network includes the enhancements resulting from the project. This method entails taking into account a reference price system to correct the economic distortions and displaying the actual cost and benefits to the population in the project area. In this case, adjustments must be made so that economic costs and benefits would be net of taxes. (ii) Based on the market price system, the purpose of the impact method is to assess variations in income of economic units (Treasury, businesses, households) resulting from the project. These revenue variations at the level of the national economy represent the algebraic sum of the variations found at the level of each unit. Insofar as the global variation of income is positive, the project is acceptable. 2.7 In practice, these two methods ought to lead to the same results if the same scenarios are used in either method. The first method, based on cost-benefit analysis, was used later for the economic evaluation of the improvements to the regional road network under the Second Urban Transport Project. Assumptions Costs and benefits inventory 2.8 Economic costs comprise investment expenditures and operating costs. - 20 - 2.9 Investments. The project's investment costs were used as they appeared on the implementation schedule provided by the Ministry of Equipment and Housing. This schedule showed yearly costs of each subcomponent completed between 1986 and 1993. These costs did not include direct or "invisible" taxes.' 2.10 Operating Costs. Since two situations are being compared, operating costs are derived on the basis of infrastructure developed within the scope of the project. The scenarios retained are: (i) maintenance costs for each road section resulting from implementation year n+2 until year n +6 at the rate of 1% per year of the investment cost; and (ii) 2% of the investment costs from year n+7. 2.11 Benefits. Two kinds of economic benefits were derived from this project: (i) First, those derived from motor vehicle operation. In fact, the opening of new roads that shorten commutes, reducing traffic congestion, and improving certain road sections resulted in mileage gains (x km) and in time savings (x hours). These two assumptions were used in comparing both situations and their difference and then showing the advantages of one situation over the other. This analysis was carried out on the basis of vehicle operating costs, according to (a) mileage-based costs, which include the consumption of fuel and lubricants, wear and tear on tires, and maintenance and repair costs; and (b) fixed annual costs, which include insurance and depreciation expenses. (ii) Second, those derived from time saved by the users of the new infrastructure. Decreasing transport time is the main objective of urban transport infrastructure development. Quantifying time as an economic value gained by users within the project situation in comparison with the reference situation permitted an evaluation the benefits provided by the project. The estimated value of time was calculated on the basis of the average hourly income per worker, representing the economic cost of labor in Greater Tunis. 1/ Direct taxes refer to "visible" taxation levied against contracts for civil works and studies (Value Added Tax or VAT). "Invisible" taxation can be found in the contracts' itemized price list on such consumer items as gasoline. An estimate of these taxes was expressed as a percentage of contracts for civil works and studies. - 21 - Calculations 2.12 Passager vehicle operating costs: - fuel and lubricants; - tires; - maintenance and repair; - annual depreciation expenses; and - other fixed costs (e.g., insurance). 2.13 The assessment of these items followed the common approach for this type of analysis. It was based on unit costs and the specific consumption of each item and the extent to which passenger vehicles were used in urban areas. Items Cost in Km (000) Fuel 26.6 Lubricants 1.0 Tires 5.8 Maintenance spare parts 9.1 labor 2.0 Annual depreciation expenses 56.1 Insurance 6.3 TOTAL 107.0 2.14 Value of Users' Time. As mentioned above, the benefits of an urban transport system are essentially realized through travel time reduction experienced by the users. The results of recent household surveys 2 show that families using motor vehicles have, on average, earnings of about TD 610 per month and those using public transport TD 350. 2.15 The average hourly income per worker is calculated as follows: Monthly income Hourly income -------------------------------------------------------------------------------.... No. of workers per household x No. of working hours per month 2.16 The number of working members per household was 1.58 and the number of working hours was 180 per month. The value of hourly income per worker was set at TD 2.142 per hour for transportation by private vehicle and TD 0.954 per hour for transportation by mass transit. Moreover, the time value varied with the users' motive. The following is generally accepted: work- home motive, 50%; and other motives, 30%. V El Mourouj Feasibility Study - 22 - 2.17 By using this approach, the 1993 time value was shown at TD 0.518 an hour per passenger vehicle unit (pvu). Since the base year of the economic evaluation was 1993, it was assumed that the time value would increase in proportion with income (in real terms), i.e., 3% per year until 1996; and 2% per year beyond 1996. Network simulation 2.18 It should be noted that the impact from developing new infrastructure, whether the road network or facilities, is spread throughout the network and not directly to the specific area of development. To show the impact of the Second Urban Transport Project on the network, we used the EMME/2 model to conduct a simulation of the efficiency of the Greater Tunis road network in both the project and reference situations in 1993, 1996, and 2001. To this effect, we used the following: - origin/destination matrices in 1993, 1996, and 2001 expressed in passenger vehicle units: matrices at rush and non-rush hours; - Greater Tunis primary road network under both situations; and - traffic taken counts in 1993 of the main entry and exit points and major intersections of the network to support the matrices. 2.19 We then: - simulated these various matrices, at different time intervals, on the two above-mentioned networks; - calculated the determinants for both project and reference situations: vehicles x km and vehicles x hours at different time intervals; - calculated the project's "technical" benefits in vehicles x hours and vehicles x km by subtracting the two simulations at a specified time; and - interpolated the benefits between the completion dates of the various works and 1993, and extrapolated the foreseeable benefits beyond 2001; 2.20 The economic analysis is presented in the following tables. - 23 - Economic Rate of Return (TD 000 in 1993 constant prices) Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Investment costs 0 1941 10086 8821 5712 1996 3957 7857 2140 Operating and 0 0 0 0 0 37 161 233 233 maintenance costs Annual benefits 0 0 0 0 8327 11598 15529 20240 26363 Net benefits 0 -1941 -10086 -8821 2615 9565 11411 12149 23989 Year 1994 1995 19% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Investment costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Operating and 233 375 499 571 571 571 675 675 675 675 maintenance costs 15000 Annual benefits 27432 28190 28613 32102 36368 41315 47055 53723 5372 53723 Net benefits 27199 27816 28115 31531 35797 40744 46381 53049 53049 68049 ERR = 44.7% - 24 - 3. INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENT 3.1 The institutional component carried out under the Second Urban Transport Project covered three areas: - training, through seminars and study tours, targeted to staff at agencies located in Tunis and Sfax which operate in the sector; - the acquisition of computer hardware and software; and - technical assistance and studies. Training program 3.2 The training program, which was financed under the Second Urban Transport Project, benefitted the following institutions: - District of Tunis; - Ministry of Planning and Regional Development; - Highway Department of the Ministry of Equipment and Housing; - Regional Directorate of Equipment and Housing in Tunis; - Ministry of Transport (Department of Planning and Studies); - Municipality of Tunis; and - Municipality of Sfax. 3.3 The project also benefitted organizations such as the Tunis Light Rail System (MLT), the National Transport Company (SNT), and regional transport companies. The main programs and their costs are as follows: - Fifth Conference on the Development and Upgrading of Urban Transport in Developing Countries; Sao Paolo, Brazil; September 24-28, 1990: TD 18,077; - International Seminar on Urban Transport organized at the Center of Studies on Urban Transport (CETUR), Ministry of Equipment, Housing and Transport; Paris, France; May 25-June 22, 1990: TD 6,047;. - International Congress on Urban Transport (CITTU) in Arab and African cities; Tunis; November 28-30, 1990): TD 10,564; - Urban Transport Policy; training session at ENIT (with ENPC); Tunis; December 10-13, 1990: TD 9,450; - Training session on "Road planning, design, and implementation" at Amman University; Amman, Jordan; June 1-12, 1991: TD 4,590; - Seminar on Road Safety; Tunis; May 28-31, 1991: TD 3,888; - Nineteenth World Congress on Roads; Marrakech, Morocco; September 22-28, 1991: TD 12,901; - 25 - 3. INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENT 3.1 The institutional component carried out under the Second Urban Transport Project covered three areas: - training, through seminars and study tours, targeted to staff at agencies located in Tunis and Sfax which operate in the sector; - the acquisition of computer hardware and software; and - technical assistance and studies. Training program 3.2 The training program, which was financed under the Second Urban Transport Project, benefitted the following institutions: - District of Tunis; - Ministry of Planning and Regional Development; - Highway Department of the Ministry of Equipment and Housing; - Regional Directorate of Equipment and Housing in Tunis; - Ministry of Transport (Department of Planning and Studies); - Municipality of Tunis; and - Municipality of Sfax. 3.3 The project also benefitted organizations such as the Tunis Light Rail System (SMLT), the National Transport Company (SNT), and regional transport companies. The main programs and their costs are as follows: - Fifth Conference on the Development and Upgrading of Urban Transport in Developing Countries; Sao Paolo, Brazil; September 24-28, 1990: TD 18,077; - International Seminar on Urban Transport organized at the Center of Studies on Urban Transport (CETUR), Ministry of Equipment, Housing and Transport; Paris, France; May 25-June 22, 1990: TD 6,047;. - International Congress on Urban Transport (CITTU) in Arab and African cities; Tunis; November 28-30, 1990): TD 10,564; - Urban Transport Policy; training session at ENIT (with ENPC); Tunis; December 10- 13, 1990: TD 9,450; - Training session on "Road planning, design, and implementation" at Amman University; Amman, Jordan; June 1-12, 1991: TD 4,590; - 26 - - Seminar on Road Safety; Tunis; May 28-31, 1991: TD 3,888; - Nineteenth World Congress on Roads; Marrakech, Morocco; September 22-28, 1991: TD 12,901; - Traffic and Road System Management; Tunis; October 14-18, 1991: TD 10,979; - Cost Accounting Training in Transport Companies; November 11-14, 1991: TD 3,959; - Conference on "Cities, Transport, and Traffic in the Maghreb": TD 2,87; - Acquisition of, and training in, transport planning software (EMME/2): TD 18,900; - Technical assistance related to traffic at major intersections in Tunis: TD 12,594; - Conference on the Development and Upgrading of Urban Transport in Developing Countries; Tunis; February 15-19, 1993: TD 24,000; - Training session on "Road system management through geographical information system," organized by ENIT, April 26-30, 1993: TD 10,205; - Continuous six-month training on "Traffic lights and control equipment maintenance," organized by ENIT, for high-level technicians employed at the Municipality of Tunis and the Regional Department of Equipment and Housing of Tunis (Ministry of Equipment and Housing): TD 12,000; - Twelfth World Congress on Roads; Madrid, Spain; May 16-21, 1993: TD 12,322; and - Urban Transport International Conference, organized by the Center of Studies on Urban Transport (CETUR), Ministry of Equipment, Housing and Transport; Paris, France; June 7-July 2, 1993: TD 43,710. 3.4 The above training program only included the main actions carried out within the scope of the Second Urban Transport Project. It is, therefore, difficult to provide the total cost of project-supported training program and to assess the trainees' acquired knowledge. Nevertheless, judgment expressed as to the effectiveness of these training actions has been generally positive in light of the subject matter dealt with and the reputation of the institutions involved. Acquisition of computer software and hardware 3.5 All agencies participating in the project except for the Municipality of Sfax, acquired computer hardware and software, consisting mainly of microcomputers. The total cost was TD 261,400, with the World Bank's share equal to 75%; i.e., US$219,900 (equivalent to TD 197,910). - 27 - Studies and technical assistance 3.6 The following studies and technical assistance were carried out with World Bank financing under the Second Urban Transport Project were: - Regional Transport Master Plan for Greater Tunis (PDRT). This study was implemented by the District of Tunis with assistance from a local consulting firm in joint venture with a foreign one succeeded in: producing an in-depth analysis of the transport situation in Greater Tunis based on the results of a 1985 household survey and other traffic surveys (e.g., origin/destination survey); defining short-, medium-, and long-term economically feasible transport strategies followed by an investment plan for 1991, 1996, and 2001; and devising a transport planning matrix to assess various projections of transport demand, test projects designed to expand or improve the transport network, and measure their impact. The study, which cost TD 156,800, helped establish a unit in the District of Tunis to ensure the followup of the Regional Transport Master Plan. However, the turnover of staff assigned to this unit might have been too high to ensure the necessary intervention and followup of the PDRT. - Regional Transport Master Plan for Greater Sfax (PDRTGS). This study was implemented by the same consulting firm on behalf of the Municipality of Sfax in an effort to harmonize urban development and transport system improvement in Greater Sfax. It envisaged: defining the short-, medium-, and long-term composition of the road network as well as the public transport system most suitable for the region; carrying out an assessment of future investments for which resource mobilization would be likely; and setting up, as in Greater Tunis, a transport planning matrix, which would be the unit's main tool for the followup of the PDRTGS. This study, which cost TD 204,800, started in 1990 and was completed in 1992, whereas the implementation of the study's recommendations has not yet started. - Technical assistance to improve traffic on the main Tunis interchanges. The objective of this assistance was to help set up a traffic office within the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Equipment and Housing in Tunis (DRT), whose main functions were to: carry out traffic surveys on a regular basis at road entry and exit points and crossroads under DRT supervision; update statistics through surveys and traffic counts of Tunis road network; and participate in technical studies on roads with responsibility for traffic components. This assistance took place over two and one-half years (1988-1990) and cost TD 507,100. The traffic office set up with this assistance is still in operation and performs its defined tasks. - Feasibility study for the Municipal Sector Investment Program. Financed under the Second Urban Transport Project, this study was not aimed at transportation but at municipal development with a indirect and partial upgrading of urban transport infrastructure. This study, which cost TD 350,000, focussed on: institution building with emphasis on decentralization; mobilization of municipal resources together with a better policy for cost recovery and local taxation; improved municipal management - 28 - and management tools development (e.g., computerization); the restructuring of the municipal finance agency into an autonomous entity with a transparent financing policy and greater authority over the selection and the size of projects; and training needed to enhance the quality of local government employees. The Municipal Sector Investment Project is being financed under World Bank Loan 3507-TUN in the amount of US$75 million and other loans and grants from bilateral donors (e.g., USAID). It became effective in 1992. During the first two years, implementation of the World Bank- financed project showed an impressive quantitative advancement (i.e., disbursements) as well as qualitative (i.e., better selection of priority investments and subproject preparation). Moreover, the impact on road infrastructure is discernible. The feasibility study also laid the groundwork for the financing of the Government's Municipal Development Program under the Eighth Plan (TD 425 million which in current terms is 80% higher than investments financed under the Seventh Plan). Overall assessment of the impact of the institutional component 3.7 The institutional component improved the institutional framework in urban transport to wit: - projects identified by the PDRT and PDRTGS have been at least partially taken into account in the Eighth Plan; - trainees from local organizations (e.g., District of Tunis, consulting firms) have acquired knowledge in planning tools; and - the establishment of new operational units within some institutions such as DRT has led to a better understanding of traffic and road management. 3.8 Some shortfalls still exist, such as respect of the need to follow up on studies from the time they are programmed until they have been carried out and in this context, to maintain continuity. - 29 - TUNISIA SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2429-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 1: Related Bank Loans Loan Number and Title Purpose FY Status Loan 937/Credit 432- Financing of a major upgrading program for the 73 Completed; TUN National Transport Company (SNT) serving the PPAR #5013 Tunis District Urban national capital region and a substantial traffic 3/27/84 Planning and Public management program in downtown Tunis, as well as Transport Project contributing to the establishment of the Tunis District as a planning authority for the capital region. Loan 1705-Tun Financing of upgrading and sites-and-services for 77 Completed; Second Urban low-income families in Tunis and Sfax; small traffic PCR #5131 Development Project management component in Sfax. 6/14/84 Loan 1841-TUN Financing of: (i) equipment for vehicle inspection, 80 Completed; Fourth Highway Project traffic control, and enforcement of traffic regulations; PCR #8648 (ii) technical assistance for inter-modal transport 5/18/90 planning; (iii)study on transport sector liberalization and; and (iv) training and organizational needs assessment for the Highway Department (DGPC). Loan 2223-TUN Financing of : (i) comprehensive upgrading in four 83 Completed; Third Urban selected settlements; (ii) a sites and services and PCR in Development Project housing credit scheme in three settlements; (iii)a progress pilot revitalization program of the Hafsia neighborhood in the Medina of Tunis; (iv) technical assistance for project implementation, institution building, and pre-investment studies; (v) design and feasibility studies for the main arteries in Greater Tunis; and (vi) a parking management study in downtown Tunis. - 30 - Table 2: Project Timetable Planned Revised Actual Identification 04/82 - 04/82 Preparation Beginning 07/82 - 07/82 Preparation End 09/83 - 09/83 Pre-appraisal Mission 10/83 - 10/83 Appraisal Mission 10/83 10/83 12/83 Ian Negotiations 04/84 - 04/84 Board Approval 05/29/84 - 05/29/84 Loan Signature 08/28/84 - 08/28/84 Loan Effectiveness 06/28/85 - 06/28/85 Loan Closing 06/30/92 - 06/30/93 Project Completion 12/30/90 12/31/92 12/01/93 - 31 - Table 3: Cumulative Loan Disbursements (USD millions) riginal Estimates Revised Actual FY Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Actual vs Actual vs FY Annual Cmav AnlCai Original Revised 1985 0.99 0.99 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 8.1% 100.0% 1986 4.30 S.29 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 1.5% 100.0% 1987 5.94 11.23 1.49 1.57 2.77 2.85 25.4% 181.5% 1988 7.44 18.67 5.34 6.91 5.15 8.00 42.8% 115.8% 1989 6.26 24.93 6.75 13.66 5.75 13.75 55.2% 100.7% 1990 4.12 29.05 4.68 18.34 6.09 19.84 68.3% 108.2% 1991 2.80 31.85 5.99 24.33 4.49 24.33 76.4% 100.0% 1992 1.15 33.00 2.27 26.60 3.39 27.72 84.0% 104.2% 1993 6.40 33.00 3.71 31.43 95.2% 95.2% 1994 1.57 33.00 100.0% 100.0% Table 4: Project Costs (US$ million) Appraisal Estimates Revised Estimates Final Costs Variations - ---------------------------------------------with Revised Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Estimates Primary Roads - Tunis Civil works 30.17 22.95 53.12 21.18 26.31 47.49 28.34 26.20 54.54 7.05 15% Land 9.01 - 9.01 5.80 5.80 5.80 - 5.80 - - Engineering Services 0.69 1.61 2.30 0.43 1.01 1.44 1.51 1.15 2.66 1.22 85% Subtotal 39.87 24.56 64.43 27.41 27.32 54.73 35.65 27.35 63.00 8.27 15% Public Transport Improvements in Greater Sfax Bus Depot, Stops & Terminals Civil Works 3.79 3.10 6.89 Equipment 0.37 1.66 2.03 Management Information System 0.08 0.30 0.38 Professional Services 0.37 0.85 1.22 Subtotal 4.61 5.91 10.52 Streets and Traffic - Tunis Civil Works 3.92 4.24 8.16 2.16 2.34 4.50 -3.66 -45% Equipment 0.10 0.31 0.41 0.09 2.21 2.30 1.89 461% Engineering Services 0.06 0.27 0.33 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.29 -88% Subtotal 4.08 4.82 8.90 2.26 4.58 6.84 -2.06 -23% institution Building Training 0.97 3.88 4.85 0.13 0.50 0.63 0.19 0.28 0.47 -0.16 -25% Studies/Technical Assistance 0.52 2.06 2.58 0.39 1.56 1.95 0.70 0.73 1.43 -0.52 -27% Equipment - - 0.12 0.37 0.49 0.03 0.25 0.28 -0.21 -43% Subtotal 1.49 5.94 7.43 0.64 2.43 3.07 0.92 1.26 2.18 -0.89 -29% Front-End Fee 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 - - TOTAL 45.97 36.49 82.46 32.13 34.65 66.78 38.83 33.27 72.10 5.32 8% Table 5: Project Financing (US$ million) Appraisal Estimates Revised Estimates Actual Bilat- Munici- Munici- SORE- eral pality pality MEQH TRAS Bank Aid MEOH of Tunis Bank MEOH of Tunis Bank Primary Roads - Tunis Civil works 29.72 - 23.40 - 23.31 - 24.18 29.01 - 25.53 Land 9.01 - - - 5.80 - - 5.80 - - Engineering Services 0.69 - 1.61 - 0.43 - 1.01 1.51 - 1.15 Public Transport Improvements in Greater Sfax Bus Depot, Stops & Terminals CMI Works - 3.79 3.10 - - - - - - - Equipment - 0.37 1.66 - - - - - - - Management Information System - 0.08 0.30 - - - - - - - Professional Services - 0.37 0.85 - - - - - - - Streets and Traffic - Tunis CMI Works - - - - - 3.92 4.24 - 2.16 2.34 Equipment - - - - - 0.10 0.31 - 0.58 1.72 Engineering Services - - - - - 0.10 0.23 - 0.01 0.03 Institution Building Training 0.78 - - 4.07 - - 0.63 - - 0.47 Studies/Technical Assistance 0.58 - 2.00 - - - 1.95 - - 1.43 Equipment - - 0.12 - 0.37 0.03 - 0.25 Front-End Fee - - 0.08 - - - 0.08 - - 0.08 TOTAL 40.78 4.61 33.00 4.07 29.66 4.12 33.00 36.35 2.75 33.00 Table 6: Status of Compliance with Covenants Amended Loan Agreement Rererence Description Status of Compliance 3.01 (a) Borrower to provide the funds, facilities, staff, services, and other Complied with. resources required by agencies and institutions responsible for carrying out the project. 3.02 (a) Borrower and the Municipality of Tunis to enter into a subsidiary loan Complied with. agreement. 3.03 (a) Ministry of Transport to maintain the Coordination and Study Not complied with. The Committee has been inactive Committee for Urban Transport for the duration of project since 1986. Repeated discussions with DGTT and implementation. the District of Tunis were unsuccessful. 3.03 (b) Ministry of Transport to maintain the Urban Transport Unit (CTTU), The Technical Unit, set up in 1984, was functioning with the General Directorate of Land Transport (DGTT) to support the well but was disbanded in 1986 due to policy Coordination and Study Committee. reorientation. 3.03 (c) District of Tunis to collect or prepare the records, reports, accounts, and Complied with. other information referred to below in Sections 3.06 and 4.02. 3.04 (a) (i) Municipality of Tunis to employ traffic management and engineering Complied with. consultants to assist in carrying out its activities under Parts B and C of the project; (ii) DRT to employ engineering and construction supervision consultants to assist in carrying out Part A of the project; (iii) DGTT to employ transport consultants to assist in carrying out its activities under Part C of the project; (iv) Municipality of Sfax to employ transport planning consultants to assist in carrying out its respective activities under Part C of the project; and (v) District of Tunis to employ transport consultants to assist in carrying its activities under Part C of the project. Table 6: Status of Compliance with Covenants Amended I*an Agreement Reference Description Status of Compliance 3.06 (a) Borrower to furnish the Bank the plans, specifications, progress reports, Complied with. contract documents and work and procurement schedules of the project promptly upon their preparation. 3.08 Municipality of Tunis to prepare and present to the Borrower and the Contract signed in August 1987; initial report issued Bank for approval a draft of the parking management plan, by June 30, in March 1988 and final report in July 1989 and 1988; and implement the agreed plan. received by the Bank on April 30, 1990. 3.09 DGTT to: (i) prepare and present for Bank review a study identifying Complied with. actions necessary to stimulate the involvement of private companies in the transport sector by December 31, 1987; and (ii) formulate and implement an action plan for private sector investments in transport. 4.02 DRT, DGTT, District of Tunis, Municipality of Tunis, and Municipality Complied with, but reports were generally two-three of Sfax to establish and maintain separate records and accounts adequate months late each year. to reflect in accordance with consistently maintained appropriate accounting practices the operations, resources, and expenditures in respect of the project, and submit to the Bank project account audit reports by September 30 of each year. - 36 - Table 7: Missions Stage of No. of No. of Days Specialization Nature of Project Cycle MonthlYear Staff in Field Represented' Ratings Problems Identification 5/82 1 5 TS CE 6-7/82 2 15 TS 10-11/82 2 10 CE Preparation 11/82 1 10 CE 1-3/83 6 TS 10/83 5 25 VP TS ECON TRG FA Appraisal 12/83 3 10 CE HE TS Supervision 7/84 1 10 ENG TS 9/84 1 5 TS 12/84 1 5 TS 5/85 2 10 TS 11-12/85 4 10 TS ME 12/86 2 5 TS 2 Financial ME Political UP 9/87 2 10 TS 2 Financial 3/88 1 5 TS 2 Financial ME 11/88 1 5 TS 2 Financial Managerial 2/89 1 10 TS 2 Financial Managerial 6/89 1 10 TS 2 Financial 10/89 1 10 TS 2 Financial 2/90 1 10 TS 2 Financial 6/90 1 10 TS 2 Financial 12/90 1 5 TS 2 Financial 6/91 1 10 TS 2 Financial 2/92 1 10 TS 2 Financial 6/92 1 2 TS 2 Financial 4/93 1 2 ME 2 Financial Completion 2/94 1 9 OA 2 Total days in field 219 1/ CE - Civil Engineer 2/ 1 - Problem free or minor problems ECON - Economist 2 - Moderate Problems HE - Highway Engineer 3 - Major problems; which are being addressed ME - Municipal Engineer 4 - Major problems; which are not being OA - Operations Analyst addressed TS - Transport Specialist UP - Urban Planner - 37 - Table 8: Staff Inputs (Staff Weeks) Preparation Appraisal Negotiations Supervision PCR Total To FY 83 26.2 26.2 FY 84 13.4 61.6 11.9 3.1 90.0 FY 85 22.4 22.4 FY 86 22.0 22.0 FY 87 13.7 13.7 FY 88 13.0 13.0 FY 89 112.2 112.2 FY 90 17.6 17.6 FY 91 10.8 10.8 FY 92 6.2 6.2 FY 93 8.1 8.1 FY 94 8.9 8.9 Total 39.6 61.6 11.9 229.1 8.9 351.1  � D �О и т л -� О г  -v2 TUNISIA 3 ARIANATU SA 2GREATER TUNS Tuni AirorfLOCATION OF PRIMARY ROAD IMPROVEMENTS SECOND URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT PROJECT G? Roads Interchanges Viaiduct A2 Sub -Compone nts Al Al Interchange GP8/GP9/X2 A2 Voie X2, between GP 9 and GIP10 5 ~A3 Interchange on Voie Z4 :i Palais des c Congres L A GOULE T TE \/iaduct on Avenue de la Re'pubhique AB along voieZ4)over AveneBourguibacnd B3TUNIS sMetro Léger de Tunis y We c Voie Z4, from Ru, d'ltabie to Pénétrante 8 Sud DI Voie Z 4, from Pénétrante Sud to Megrine D2 Intercommunale Sud, between Z4 and ~ GPI CE Pénétrante Sud, between Z4 and c Sortie Sud E DMEGRIÑE, D2Me tro Leger deTunis (PhaiseI)ib RADES Existing Roads r Tu,o, - - --Planned RoaidsI tLan Built - up Areas Salt Lake -e361 -International Boundanies ALGERIAJ BE -~ AR F-KILOMETERS a