Rwanda - Urban Institutions Sectoral Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY Report No. 13635 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA URBAN INSTITUTIONS SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDTI 2041-RW) OCTOBER 26, 1994 Infrastructure Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  EXCHANGE RATE Unit = FRw (Rwandese Franc) 1.00 US dollar = FRw 77 (June 1989) 1.00 US dollar = FRw 150 (November 1993) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS CHR Caisse Hypothecaire du Rwanda CID Inter-Communal Development Credit Agency IDA International Development Association MINITRAPE Ministry of Public Works, Energy and Water PCR Project Completion Report PPF Project Preparation Facility UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund UNDP United Nations Development Program FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  f40 OFCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 29433 U.S.A Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation October 26, 1994 MMRNU TOTE EXIMF DRCTR AN TH PRESDEN SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Rwanda Urban Institutions Sectoral Development Project (Credit 2041-RV) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Rwanda - Urban Institutions Sectoral Development Project (Credit 2041-RW) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. The Borrower was unable to prepare Part II due to the conditions prevailing in Rwanda. The credit had 21 disbursement categories, 17 effectiveness conditions and 14 disbursement conditions. Institutional strengthening activities were aimed at 20 different entities. One condition of effectiveness required the establishment of a municipal governance structure for Kigale-a change in the political status of the nation's capital. Physical disbursements were contingent upon the imposition of a property tax. The project completely failed to achieve its objectives concerning financial and administrative improvements, better housing and land use, and small enterprise credit and development because the activities supported by the credit hardly ever started. The project was too demanding for a first urban project in a country lacking financial resources, skilled personnel and urban institutions. Lack of Borrower commitment to project goals was compounded by misunderstandings surrounding conditionality. Relationships between IDA and the Borrower were not conducive to resolving them. The PCR provides a brief but full account of project experience; it is informative on the achievements and problems and on the compliance with covenants. The overall outcome of the project is rated as highly unsatisfactory, sustainability as unlikely, and institutional development impact as negligible. No audit is planned. Attachment I I This docmwent has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officiaL duties. Its contents my not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLEIION REPORT RWANDA URBAN INSTITUTIONS SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2041-RW) Table of Contents Page PREFACE . ...................................................... i EVALUATION SUMMARY ........................................... ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity . ........................................... 2. General ................................................ 1 3. Project Objectives and Description .............................. 2 4. Project Preparation and Organization ............................. 3 5. Project Implementation ...................................... 4 6. Revision of the Project ...................................... 6 7. Project Results . ......................................... 6 8. Performance of the Association ................................. 6 9. Performance of the Borrower ................................ .. 7 10. Project Relationship ....................................... 8 11. Consultancy Services ....................................... 8 12. Project Documentation and Data ................................ 8 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ......... 10 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ................. ...11........... 1 Ms doment has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their I official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. I   i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA URBAN INSTITUTIONS SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2041-RW) PREFACE 1. This is the Project Completion Report for the Urban Institutions Sectoral Development Project in Rwanda, for which Credit 2041-RW in the amount of SDR 24.8 million was approved on June 15, 1989. The Credit Agreement was signed on September 13, 1989 and the credit became effective on November 30, 1990. It was closed on February 10, 1994. The credit was only partially disbursed (SDR 1,105,299.25), and the balance of SDR 23,694,00.75 was canceled. 2. This report was prepared by the Infrastructure Division of the South Central and Indian Ocean Department of the Africa Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). Owing to the situation now prevailing in Rwanda, the Borrower has not prepared Part II. 3. Preparation of this PCR was based in particular on the Staff Appraisal Report, Credit Agreement, supervision reports, quarterly progress reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower and intemal Bank memoranda.   ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA URBANINS&FTUf IONS SECTORALDEVEOPMENT PROJECT (CREDT2041-RW) EVALUATION SUtMMARY Objectives The project was designed to: (a) several times, this point ultimately became strengten nasial and local institutions a condition of effti- u-. The responsible for the management of urban municipality of Kigali was never growth; (b) reduce budget subsidies to established, but the Bank indicated that it urban areas by placing the provision of would be satisfied with the establishment urban services on a self-financing basis; of a prefecture having virtually the same (c) achieve a more rational use of urban responsibilities and encompassing the land; (d) help provide term financing for urban area of Kigali (Prefecture of the the construction and improvement of City of Kigali, para. 5.1). housing; (e) improve the resource base and financial management of urban communes Conditions were moved from and support the Inter-Communal negotiations to Board presentation and Development Credit Agency (CID); and finally to disbursements and the number of (f) enhance the capacity of artisans, disbursement conditions became an especially in the building trades (para. obstacle to a rapid startup of the project. 3.1). The most significant condition prevented the startup of the physical components; Implementation this was the establishment of a cost recovery mechanism through the The project was prepared over a introduction of a property tax. A first four-year period. The credit became proposal was rejected by the Government effective 18 months after approval by the in July 1992 and a second rejected by the Bank's Board of Directors, and after five Constitutional Council on October 14, postponements of the effectiveness date. 1993 (para. 5.2). These delays were due to lack of commitment from the Government on the In late 1990, the International objectives and features of the project; it Development Association (IDA or "the was also due to the significant number of Association") realized that it would be conditions, one of which proved to be difficult to carry out the project as particularly difficult to satisfy, i.e. the originally envisaged, in particular because establishment of a local government for of the deterioration of the internal situation the capital city, Kigali. This was in the country, which made any operation originally a condition of negotiations, but outside of Kigali or Butare difficult. as the negotiations were moved forward Thus, from September 1991 to April 1993,  iii the Association explored options to amend ill-equipped with urban development and the Credit Agreement (reducing the management tools and insiutuions. The amount of the credit, focusing only on lack of political commitment to urban technical assistance), which culminated in development took a heavy toll on project a letter dated June 28, 1993, to implementation. Despite the signature by Government requesting that proposals be the Minister of Public Works of a letter of sent prior to August 31 for modifying and urban policy, project preparation was not relaunching the project. However, with in fact supported by a commitment on the no response from Government, the project part of the Government as a whole, to was never amended. promote the urban development of the country. It was unrealistic to design an On December 8, 1993, the urban project with sophisticated Association suspended the right of Rwanda institutional arrangements involving the to make withdrawals under the credit, and establishment or strengthening of 20 the credit was closed on February 10, different entities (para. 4.2). Moreover, 1994. The credit had financed only SDR the project execution was unnecessarily 1,105,299.25, of which SDR 354,000 for complicated, with 21 disbursement the PPF (para. 5.8). categories, 17 effectiveness conditions and 14 disbursement conditions. There was Project Results confusion in the design of this project between conditions (for effectiveness and The project did not achieve its disbursement) and sector objectives. For stated objectives. Disbursements financed example, the establishment of a municipal institutions that never achieved their administrative structure in Kigali and the objective (para. 7.1). introduction of a property tax should have not been conditions, but rather among the Conclusions and Lessons of the Project objectives of the project (para. 4.3). The physical components were described in The project lacked simplicity at general terms, which did not provide an entry, commitment from the Government accurate estimate of costs nor a detailed to its objectives and ownership of its plan for implementation. beneficiaries. The Bank did not respond quickly enough to rapidly deteriorating It would have been preferable to country conditions and tried to salvage a focus the project design on a few key project that would not have been easy to areas instead of trying to tackle them all at implement, even in better country the same time (municipal finance, housing conditions. finance, promotion of artisans, land management, etc.). This project underlines the need for urban projects to be simple, particularly in The last lesson that can be drawn countries like Rwanda, one of the two from this project is the need for rapid (along with Burundi) least urbanized decision-making within the Association countries in the world, and consequently when it becomes apparent that a project  iv has become infeasible. This project only deteriorated after the start of 1991, after which virtually no disbursements were made under the credit. The three years that elapsed between that date and the cancellation of the credit was too long and could have been avoided if the amendment proposed in 1991 had been formally adopted or the credit suspended (para. 8.1).   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA URBAN INSTITUTIONS SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2041-RW) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Name : Urban Institutions Sectoral Development Project Credit No. : 2041-RW Regional Vice Presidency Africa Country : Rwanda Sector : Urban Development 2. General 2.1 Prior to project design, urban development in Rwanda was the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works, Energy and Water (MINITRAPE), through its Directorate General of Urban Development, Civil Works and Housing. The minister had broad authority for the construction of housing, the setting of construction standards, issuance of property titles and preparation of urban and regional development plans. Owing to the limited capacity of the communes and an inadequate institutional framework, the minister had complete responsibility for functions which, by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, are generally delegated to the local authorities, such as roads maintenance and the collection of household garbage, even though the ministry's resources were far from sufficient for carrying out all these tasks. Urban guidelines were issued by the Office of the President and the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee for urban development, which was chaired by the Minister of Public Works. 2.2 The Government initially sought assistance from the Association in March 1984, for the financing of an urban housing sectoral strategy study, and the first identification mission took place in July 1984, with a view to defining the terms of reference for the study. The study was undertaken locally by a team of local and expatriate experts and was financed by the Study Fund under the first IDA technical assistance project (Credit 1217-RW). A second identification mission took place in November 1985 to discuss the conclusions of the recently completed study which recommended strengthening city management and reducing subsidies to urban areas. They constituted an action program for sectoral reforms in the financing of housing, management of urban land, low-cost housing, municipal finance and the organization of local institutions. Two PPFs of US$ 400,000 and US$ 110,000 in 1986 and 1988 respectively, financed additional studies to prepare feasibility studies and infrastructure preliminary design.  2 2.3 The appraisal mission went out in March 1988. It included expertise in various fields, except in engineering. Negotiation conditions were as follows: (i) approval of the draft law on the establishment of a municipal administrative organization in Kigali; (ii) approval of the draft presidential decree on the organization of the municipal entity; and (iii) the detailed resettlement plan for the upgrading program for residential districts in Kigali. The mission report specified that, "Progress in the establishment of the Kigali municipality was slow." Despite the foreseeable difficulties (it is still always a delicate political matter to change the status of a capital city), the appraisal mission decided to maintain this condition for the negotiations scheduled for September 1988, six months later. On August 9, 1988, the Association sent a telex to MINITRAPE that stated: "The establishment of a municipality is a long-term task, but the legal establishment of the entity can be done rapidly" which to the Association meant that the negotiations could still take place in September. 2.4 It was ultimately decided that the approval by the Parliament of the law establishing the municipality of Kigali and the promulgation of the presidential decree on the organization of the municipality would become conditions of effectiveness. As a result, it was possible to hold the negotiations in April 1989, but the same problems delayed credit effectiveness for a year. 2.5 Lastly, civil war broke out in October 1991. This ultimately undermined the already slow project start-up. This political environment also contributed to the lack of commitment on the part of the Government to the project and the institutional shortcomings of the institutions created by it (CID). Despite the several attempts to simplify the project (such as the reduction from eight target cities to two, Kigali and Butare), the project fell in part victim to the social disorder prevailing in the country during the period of its implementation. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 Project Objectives. The project was designed to: (a) strengthen national and local institutions responsible for the management of urban growth; (b) reduce budget subsidies to urban areas by placing the provision of urban services on a self-financing basis; (c) achieve a more rational use of urban land; (d) help provide term financing for construction and improvement of housing; (e) improve the resource base and financial management of urban communes and support the Inter-Communal Development Credit agency (CID); (f) enhance the capacity of artisans, especially in the building trades. 3.2 Project Description. The project included action in four areas: A. Resource Mobilization (i) establishment of financial affairs departments in Kigali, Butare, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi; (ii) establishment of a property tax; (iii) establishment of an Urban  3 Development Fund within CID, itself to be established; (iv) establishment of a Savings for Housing Program by the 'Banques Populaires' for the housing programs and training in housing credit. B. Urban M ement (i) establishment of urban development departments in Kigali, Butare, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi; (ii) rehabilitation of the 'Caisse Hypothcaire du Rwanda' (CHR), which would confine its activity to land development and to constructon/mortgage financing; (iii) establishment by CHR of a guarantee fund for loans made by the "Banques Populaires" for the construction of latrines ; (iv) implementation of a program to grant secure land tenure to urban residents; (v) rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and on-site sanitation in five neighborhoods of Kigali; (vi) development of about 1,100 serviced plots in Kigali and Butare. C. Employment (i) Assistance to artisans, and (ii) assistance to the construction sector. D. Project Manageixent (i) establishment of a project coordination unit; (ii) support for sectoral investments; and (iii) provision for studies. 4. Project Preparation and Organization 4.1 The project was prepared with support from Bank personnel over a four-year period (July 1984 to March 1988) by the pertinent institutions and ministries, primarily MINIRAPE, with the assistance of a group of foreign and local consulting firms. As indicated in para. 2.3 above, the concept of the project was too ambitious and it did not take into account the absence of an urban tradition in Rwanda. 4.2 For a first urban project in a country lacking financial resources, skilled personnel and urban institutions, it was risky to design a project involving eight cities, two of which were only townships, and to establish, reform or strengthen at the same time all institutions working in the urban sector. The establishment and strengthening of institutions should have begun with limited objectives. The project included: (i) rehabilitation of CHR; (ii) establishment of financial affairs departments in four cities and improvements in four others; (iii) establishment of the CID (which was never established); (iv) the strengthening of CID and the "Banques Populaires"; (v) the establishment of urban development departments in four cities and improvements in four others. As a consequence, the project was to see the establishment or strengthening of 20 different institutions. It was unnecessarily complicated, with:  4 (a) 21 disbursement categories (Annex 1 of the Credit Agreement, para. 1); (b) 17 effectiveness conditions (Section 6.1 of the Credit Agreement); (c) 14 disbursement conditions (Annex 1 of the Credit Agreement, para. 3). 4.3 Another important point was the choice of CHR for execution of civil works, urban roads and drainage improvement, and serviced plots. The role of a mortgage bank is undoubtedly different from one that manages urban works and develops new land for housing. Even if CHR had already been involved in land development and housing projects, which was not the case, the project should have restricted its activities to financial functions. With regard to road improvements in Kigali, the only executing agency should have been MINITRAPE acting on behalf of the city, as the only institution with jurisdiction in the matter. 5. Project Implementation 5.1 Effectiveness of the Credit and Project Startup. The credit was approved on June 15, 1989 and signed on September 13, 1989. The most significant effectiveness condition was the establishment of the municipality of Kigali (para. 2.5). Originally scheduled for December 13, 1989, effectiveness was postponed to March 13, 1990, then July 13, August 13 and October 12. The IDA project was finally declared effective on November 30, 1990. The municipality of Kigali was never established, but the Association indicated its satisfaction with the establishment of a prefecture with virtually the same responsibilities and encompassing the entire urban area of Kigali. 5.2 Implementation Timetable. Disbursements did not start after project effectiveness because of failure to fulfill the 14 conditions of disbursement, in particular the pre-condition for all civil works, i.e. the establishment of a mechanism satisfactory to the Association for cost recovery, in this case, a property tax. Although this issue had been discussed since 1988, the first supervision mission - in March 1991 - discovered the Ministry of Public Works was unaware that the establishment of a property tax was a condition of disbursement for all physical components of the project. In January 1992, the Government rejected a proposed property tax that it felt was too vague. Another version was adopted by the Council of Ministers on December 3, 1992, but was rejected by the Constitutional Council on October 14, 1993. 5.3 On November 11, 1988, foreseeing delays in the IDA project, the Government requested UNDP to finance the Gaculiro (in the suburbs of Kigali) serviced plots, which was part of the IDA project. This was accepted in the form of a UNCDF grant of US$ 2.9 million (RWA/88/004). On March 9, 1989, the Government also requested UNDP to finance three experts to strengthen the Urban Development Department at MINrrRAPE. This technical assistance had been included in the IDA project, not for MINITRAPE, but for  5 the cities, with a view to strengthening local urban services and not those of the Ministry. The UNDP grants were approved on September 10, 1990 for technical assistance and the serviced plots. 5.4 Unfortunately, the engineering studies for the urban roads improvement and serviced plots in Kigali and Butare were not satisfactory, and the consulting firm was requested to examine alternatives. In Butare, the site of the serviced plots was moved around from hillslope to hillslope, for years. For Gaculiro, the detailed drawings had not yet begun by March 1993. The difficulties experienced in carrying out the topographic studies partially account for this delay (para. 5.5), along with the withdrawal of UNCDF, which had made it known that it could no longer finance the operation owing to its own internal problems. 5.5 Procurement. The only components for which it was possible to launch competitive bidding were those transferred from the IDA project to UNCDF. As the executing agency since July 5, 1990, the Bank was responsible for recruiting consultants and firms. In late 1992, the Bank began international competitive bidding for firms to carry out the topographic surveys, estimated at US$ 23,010. As there were no interested bidders, a list of local consulting firms was drawn up. The letter of invitation described the Bank procedures to be followed in selection and specified that the financial bid would be opened only for firms that had a rating of least 60 in the technical evaluation. The Bank received the technical evaluation report in which all firms were rated more than 60, and the bid was approved on January 14, 1993. The contract was awarded, but UNDP canceled its grant RWA/90/010 in April 1993. 5.6 Project Cost and Financing. The project originally allocated a large proportion of the credit to housing and artisan loans (US$ 18.8 million), training and technical assistance (US$ 13.4 million together) without preparing a detailed training plan or a strategy for technical assistance as it related to the objectives of the project. In addition, it was assumed that the UNCDF would finance the civil works and serviced plots, the cost of which was underestimated at the time of project appraisal as detailed studies had not yet been completed. The UNCDF ultimately did not finance this component, and no provisions had been made under the IDA credit to finance it. 5.7 Disbursements. Some disbursements were made after effectiveness, mainly for the refinancing of the PPF (SDR 354,118) and the Special Account (SDR 668,012). From March 1991 to February 1994, only SDR 70,000 was disbursed or 0.003 percent of the credit. The graph on page 3 of Part H and Table 3 of Part H can be used to compare actual quarterly disbursements of the loans proceeds, the appraisal estimates and the profile of disbursements under urban projects in Africa. 5.8 Allocations under the Credit. The amounts spent under the credit were utilized for the topographic study, operating costs of institutions established under the project, purchase of equipment and project preparation. On December 8, 1993, the Association suspended  6 Rwanda's right to malke withdrawals from the proceeds of the credit. The credit was closed on February 10, 1994 and the balance of US$23,694,700.75 canceled. Table S.C of Part m shows the original allocations by category and actual disbursements under the credit. 6. Revision of the Project 6.1 Owing to the difficulties experienced by the project, and especially the internal conditions in the beneficiary country, in September 1991 it was proposed that the project be revised by reducing the number of cities from 8 to 2 (Kigali and Butare) and eliminating the artisan and construction industry components. This change would have lowered the cost of the project from US$ 66.2 million to US$ 31.2 million. 6.2 A second revision was proposed by a memo of April 27, 1993, which stated, "The property tax is vital to the success of the project. Given the importance of this legislation, the possible options for project revision seem to be (a) canceling the components for which the property tax is a condition of disbursement or (b) suspending the credit for a short period of time, say three months, and canceling the credit if the legislation is not approved during that lapse of time." The memo proposed canceling all physical components, including upgrading of the neighborhoods in Kigali and the serviced plots in Butare, as weUl as the provision of equipment and vehicles to the municipalities. The memo also stated, "The project would as a result become a sort of technical assistance operation, carrying out studies and preparing the groundwork for physical improvements to be made in a second project." 6.3 Another solution would have been to remove the condition of establishing a property tax and carrying out the rehabilitation works and serviced plots under the responsibility of MINITRAPE. That memo of April 27, 1993 was not foUowed up by any proposal to the Government, but a letter of June 28, 1993 to the Minister of Public Works requesting the Government to submit proposals to the Bank for revising the project before August 31, 1993 in order to avoid the subsequent suspension of the project. Suspension occurred on December 8, 1993 and the credit was canceled on February 10, 1994. 7. Project Results 7.1 Since the project never started, it never achieved its objectives. None of the planned works were begun and the credit financed only studies and the operations of institutions established by the project. 8. Performance of the Association 8.1 The Association is responsible for a large share of the difficulties experienced by the project during preparation and implementation. Despite the over-reaching of the urban housing sectoral strategy study for Rwanda, the Association adopted its recommendations wholesale, without adjusting/adapting them in the light of lessons learned from its other  7 experience in urban projects in the country. In addition, the Association showed a lack of flexibility when it became evident that project conditions could not be met, and did not make rapid decisions when the civil war rendered the project infeasible. The Association should have ensured that the amendment proposed in 1991 became a reality or canceled the project 18 months earlier than it, in fact, did. 8.2 The project was appraised in an overly-optimistic manner, specifically: (i) Requesting the establishment of the municipality of Kigali as a condition of negotiation was unrealistic. Given the numerous steps involved in creating a municipality, this condition could have served, instead, as an objective of the project. (ii) Requesting the establishment of a property tax as a condition of disbursement for all civil works seriously compromised project execution. (iii) Including 17 effectiveness conditions, 14 disbursements conditions, and 21 disbursements categories in the Credit Agreement made the credit far too complicated and difficult to implement. 8.3 Longer preparation missions with more broadly-based skills (engineer, urban planner, financial analyst, etc.) might have shown that the 59 recommendations made by the preparation study carried out by expatriate consultants were too ambitious and unrealistic. It was nevertheless decided to add two other components treated in less depth in the study: artisan promotion and the linkages between national and sectoral investment programming. 8.4 During the implementation period, a total of six supervision missions visited Rwanda: one in 1990, three in 1991, one in 1992 and one in 1993. A total of 154.5 staff-weeks was devoted to the project throughout the project cycle, but this figure underestimates actual resources used because no time was recorded for 1984, 1985 and 1986, even though preparation began in 1984. The real figure should be about 200 staff-weeks, which is the average for investment projects. Section 8 of Part HI, Tables 8.A and 8.B give more details on the missions and staff/consultant inputs. 9. Performance of the Borrower 9.1 The performance of the Borrower was mediocre because, since the outset, the Minister of Public Works had only very partially bought into the concept of the project. Some manifestation of this lack of agreement with the project design/objectives include: (i) The Minister was not pleased to have to transfer some of his responsibilities to other institutions.  8 (ii) He did not agree with the latrine components, and felt that Rwanda did not need the World Bank to build latrines. (iii) He did not want any more physical components such as urban road improvement and drainage works. 9.2 As presented in the appraisal report, the project was already difficult to execute in 1988. The situation in Rwanda deteriorated so precipitously after 1990 when the civil war broke out, that its implementation became absolutely impossible. The table of covenants in the Credit Agreement, Section 7 of Part III, shows that most of the covenants were never satisfied. In conclusion, the performance of the Government was mediocre owing to the complexity of the project, lack of ownership on the part of the Government and, lastly, the circumstances created by the civil war. 10. Project Relationship 10.1 The relations between the parties involved in the project were not good. Relations between IDA and the Government were strained, owing to the delays in meeting the effectiveness conditions and later disbursement conditions. Relations with CHR deteriorated at the end of the project, when a Bank mission, in January 1993, wrote in its aide-memoire that CHR did not demonstrate either the capacity or resolve to implement the project in accordance with the Credit Agreement and subsequent agreements. In a letter dated January 16, 1993 addressed to the Association, CHR wrote that it would not accept the statements made by the supervision mission, which were not accurate. CHR maintained that the ten- month delay in the recruitment of the consulting firm was attributable to the Association (para. 5.5). It also regretted that "the mission leader did not so much as set foot on the CHR premises to meet its management." Finally, the working relations between the parties involved in the project were lastly handicapped by three successive changes of project managers, nominated by the Minister of Public Works. 11. Consultancy Services 11 1 In general, the services rendered by consultants were not fully satisfactory, especially at the preparation stage. Most of the staff assigned by both the foreign and local consulting firms to help the Government prepare the project were more grounded in theory and academia than they were true experienced practitioners in urban development and municipal management. Detailed engineering studies for rehabilitation works were judged satisfactory. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.1 The original project documentation was not satisfactory. The appraisal report was clearly too long: 53 pages of text and 100 pages of annexes, and still failed to provide the clarity - with regard to the objectives, the timing, and description of activities - necessary  9 for sound implementation. In particular, Annex 4 on detailed cost estimates running 36 pages and Annex 5 on the execution of project components running 12 pages were largely a repetition of Chapter III. Moreover, the project documents did not contain a detailed description of the physical components.  10 PART n: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Due to the country situation, the Borrower has not prepared Part II.  - 11 - RWANDA URBAN INSTITUTIONS SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Credits Credit Purpose Approval Status First Water Supply Project To improve water supply in five 1983 Completed Credit 1345-RWA secondary urban centers. Second Water Supply Project To strngthe institutions responsible 1987 Almost Credit 1783-RWA for water supply and sanitation and Completed improve water supply in rural eas. 2. Project Timetable Planned Revised Actual Date Date Date Identification 07/84 Preparation 11/85-12/87 Appraisal .03/88 Post-appraisal 07/8 Negotiations 04/24/89 Board Appoval 06/15/89 Loan Signature 09/13/89 Effectivene 12/13/89 03/13/90 11/30/90 Credit Closing 12/31/96 02/10/94 .  - 12 - 3. Credit Disbursements Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (in USS million) WB Fiscal Year SAR Estimates Actual % Disbursed Profile and Quarter FY 90 Dec.31, 1989 0.25 March 31, 1990 0.50 0.48 June 30, 1990 0.95 0.96 FY 91 Sept.30, 1990 1.40 1.44 Dec.31, 1990 3.15 0.51 1.59 1.92 March 31, 1991 4.90 1.52 4.75 3.20 June 30, 1991 6.65 1.52 4.75 4.48 FY92 Sept.30, 1991 8.40 1.52 4.75 5.76 Dec.31, 1991 10.40 1.55 4.84 7.04 March31, 1992 12.40 1.58 4.94 8.96 June 30, 1992 14.40 1.58 4.94 10.88 FY 93 Sept.30, 1992 16.40 1.58 4.94 12.80 Dec.31, 1992 17.90 1.59 4.97 14.72 March 31, 1993 19.40 1.59 4.97 16.00 June 30, 1993 20.90 1.59 4.97 17.28 FY94 Sept.30, 1993 22.40 1.59 4.97 19.20 Dec.31, 1993 23.65 1.59 4.97 21.12 March 31, 1994 24.90 1.59 4.97 23.04 June 30, 1994 26.15 24.96 FY 95 Scpt.30, 1994 27.40 26.24 Dec.31, 1994 28.20 27.52 March 31, 1995 29.00 28.16 June 30, 1995 29.75 28.80 FY 96 Sept30, 1995 30.50 29.44 Dec.31, 1995 32.00 30.08 Marrsh 31, 1996 30.72 June 30, 1996 31.36 FY 97 Sept30, 1996 31.68 Dec.31, 1996 32.00 March 31, 1997 June 30, 1997 *TIe profile was issued on July 26, 1993, for Urban Projects in Afiica  -13- 35 Rwanda Urban Institutions - Disbursements 30 - - 20 - is 10 0 * . a, aa *. a. * a, o a e a a * a f a a. a 3 a> V! t n s 7 n 1 ee n r 7 qI 1 e n q7 -|---_ Estimat - Actual Profile  -14. Creit Allocatio md Disbm by CaDgoy (i SDR) C_rI y fftmaia ActuaIBalam 1. Civil Work (a).j 2.710,000 0.00 2,710,000.00 (a).ii 1.160,000 0.00 1,360,000.00 (.a)ii 540,000 0.00 540,000.00 (b).i 3.260,000 0.00 3,260,000.00 (b)ii 390,000 0.00 390,000.00 (c) 930,000 0.00 930,000.00 Toal 1: 9,690,000.00 0.00 9,690,000.00 . EqXipmsm(, 'bd md knw. (a).i 160,000 40,51257 119,4S7.43 (a).ai 30,000 433.11 79,566.39 (b).i 1,550,000 0.00 1,550,000.00 (bii 700,000 0.00 700,000.00 Tabi 2: 2,490,000 40,945.68 2,449,054.32 3. Opwraodg Coas (a) 160,000 0.00 160,000.00 (b) 470,000 0.00 470,000.00 (c) 3,410,000 17,743.35 3,392,256.65 Toai 3: 4,040,000 17,743.35 4,022,256.65 4 ArtiamCrodis 310,000 0.00 310,000.00 . TramiqW (a) 310,000 395.78 309,604.22 (b) 310,000 0.00 310,000.00 (c) 2,790,000 12,025.34 2,777,4.16 Tab! 5: 3,410,000 12,421.62 3,397,573.38 6. CamuIt a'm & Sludi. (a) 30,000 0.00 80,000.00 (b) 620,000 12058.05 607,941.95 To! 6: 700,000 12,053.05 637941X95 7. Rafibdimg of PPF 400,000 354,113.49 45,381.51 a UmlcabJd 3,760,000 0.00 3,760,000.00 Spejcu Accow 0.00 668,012.06 (661,012.06) GmaIs T Lac 24,300,000 1,105,299.25 23,694,700.75  - 15 - 7. Status of Covenants of dte Credit Agreement Section Stat u Description of Covent commnsats .01 (b) OK Special Account opened at BNR Opened co May 22,1990 .01 (b) OK Subsidiauy Loan Agreement between CID Signed an June 12, 1990 and Government .01 (c) OK Onlending betweon CD and citics of Signed June 20, 1992 Kigali and Butare .01 (d) OK Subsidiary Loan Agreement between Signed aon June 19, 1992 Govenmmt and ELECTROGAZ .02 (a) OK Project Accout Depsit of FRw 40 mi .03 No Provision of sufficient staff for the Project Management Unit .04 (b) Putial Qirtedy progess reporting .04 (b) No 3-year PIP by Nov.30 each year 3.05 (a) OK E Wablishment of CHR Moaitoring Unit 3.05 (b) No Agreeme for training of sector secislista by march 31, 1990 3.05 (c) No CHR program to control operating expes by Decmber 31, 1990 3.05 (d) No Appoimnt of heads of financial These towns wer dropped frm departmet in Ruhange and Giaei the prject, but without may formal by December 31, 1990 amendmet to the Credit Agremet 3.05 (e) No samblialunat of Hosing Fund by Desgd to receive repyment December 31, 1990 for upgrading and serviced plb. .01 (a) OK M_e of adeae rords by ProjectUnit ..01 (b) Prorp Submission of audits report by D for 1992, but Wfratio ProectUnit IOt complta 4.02 (a) OK Mainc_no of adqe ecords by CHR. CID . d cite 4.02 (b) Pnogr Submissio, of dit rport by Do. f 1992, but inmation CHR, CID and cities _ot campkt.  - 16 - 7 Status of Covenants of the Credit Agreement Schedule 1, Para. 3, Conditions of Disbursement [Section Status Description of Covenant Comments 1 For upgrading civil works: a OK Signature of 'Contrat Programme' CHR and Govermnent b OK Management agreement between Kigali and CHR for upgrading and serviced plots c OK Management agreement between Butare and CHR for serviced plots d No Approval of site plans, expropriations Resetlemen plan needed to be and cost recovery surcharges updated e No Establishment of suitable mechanism Property Tax legislation was never for cost recovery approved 2 No For street improvement and sanitation CHR refused to establish a Guarantee works in Kigali: establishment of a Fund and, more genally, refused to Guarantee Fund by CHR for loans for grant loans for latrines latrines construction 3 OK For rehabilitation of CHR: staffing of CHR monitoring unit 4 No For support to construction sector: agreement with an implementing agecy for execution of this program 5 No For support to artisan development: agreement with an implementing agency and cities for this program 6 OK For taining of Banques Populaires staf: prepration by BP of a plan for housing loan program in upgrading neighborhoods  - 17 - Ja. A: Staff inputs (staff-weeks) FY LENP LENA LENN SPN PCR Totals 1986 0.1 0.1 1987 9.2 9.2 1988 24.0 23.8 47.8 1989 18.8 9.0 0.4 28.2 1990 5.6 5.6 1991 7.9 7.9 1992 19.5 19.5 1993 10.6 10.6 1994 20.6 5.0 25.6 TOTALS: 33.3 42.6 9.0 64.6 5.0 154.5 This gives a total of 154.5 staff-weeks for the entire project cycle. Nonetheless, this total is not accurate, because the preparation began in 1984, but there is no time recorded for FY 84, 85 and 86.  - i - B: M lSam Data 9bap o MOunh Dsys k Nwunber of Sp.cakadm N _*bwr. o0 a Projed Cycle Year Fil penm rep uad Staf-day sbu Idetificaim 1 07/84 3 1 E. 3 da Identi&tion 2 11/S5 4 1 E. 4 da Preparuica 1 09/86 a 2 E.A. 12 da Preparaziw 2 05/87 10 4 E.F.F.U. 40 dA Proparic 3 094S7 14 6 E.F.F.U.A/A. 34 da Pfepwraion 4 12(17 3 2 E.S. 16 da Apranl 03/U 1 5 E.F.U.S.S. 90 wa POO-ApraiAll 07/81 11 4 E.F.S.S. 44 W Pregotiann 1 10/88 a 4 E.F.I.S. 32 we Prie-agoaia4m 2 02/39 12 4 E.F.I.S. 46 Wa Possew 07/19 16 2 E.F. 32 Wa P,043g00 c 03/90 6 2 E.L 12 1a Supovim 1 09/90 7 1 E. 7 2 Supwvisk 2 04/91 7 1 U. 7 3 Supevisioe 3 09/91 10 3 E.F.I. 30 3 Supervisio 4 11/91 15 I F. 15 3 Supmvisim 5 03i92 7 1 E. 7 3 Supmviso 6 01/93 7 3 E.F.S. 21 3 Tod of MismimstffDays: 502 KIy b speciiza E. Fonmist F. Fh l.cia Analyst L Engm S. Saniic. Specialist U. Urbs a A. Ariia Spe