Community development in Colombia

NUMBER 77 ED Precis u Operations Evaluation Department December 1994 Community Development in Colombia At its completion the Bank's $25 million they did receive were far poorer To implement the project the first urban development project in Co- thantheirhighcostsseemedto justify. Secretaria de Integracion Popular lombia was judged a dismal failure. It (SEP) was established in the supported the building of community Project goals President's office. A national council centers in slum areas, to channel and of government agency representa- coordinate the delivery of services to Through a loan of $25 million, the fives handled inter-agency coordina- poor households. Sophisticated coordina- Bank supported the Programa de tion. Local issues were handled by tion mechanisms proved unworkable in Integracion de Servicios y Participa- local councils consisting of regional Colombia's highly centralized govern- cion Comunitana (TPC m its efforts staff from all the national agencies ment structure. When projectiaids ran to improve living standards for slum plus municipal officials. In each ur- out, no one was available to run or fund dwellers. Designed to increase local ban zone a local board was estab- the centers. capacity to solve local problems, the lished to coordinate the work. project provided services for 200,000 Representation on these boards was A decade later, an OED auditfinds low-income and squatter families in intended to give marginal house- that the project has had a substantial im- 23 mid-size cities. It was hoped that holds an influence in urban affairs pact.* The community buildings community groups, to be nurtured by that matched their numbers. provided a focus for community activi- the project, would eventually take ties. Once project funds were used up, over the provision of services and The community center buildings, coordination among services started to fund the centers' operating costs. at $430,000 apiece, went against the take place naturally, a byproduct of their prevailing wisdom, which was to proximity within the buildings. The project was ambitious and promote the use of low-cost technolo- Colombia's attempts to decentralize gov- perhaps uniquely comprehensive. It gies in urban development. Yet it was ernment services facilitated and induded a job bank, worker training, the buildings which ultimately pro- validated this development. Not all credit and technical assistance to vided the foundation for a relatively arrangements succeeded but the facilities small businesses, childcare, pre- successful community development provided and the associated training school and primary school programs, program. helped to create small businesses and a literacy promotion, health and nutri- bustling local economy. A variety of tion services, adult education, cul- Dismal outcome social activities got going. And the for- tural events, recreation/creation of ward and backward linkages of project parks, legal assistance clinics, installa- At the close of the investment investments led to very valuable lion of water and sewerage facilities, phase, in 1984, the Bank judged the benefits. creation of community groups, and project to have failed. It was not clear housing credit. Problems addressed Organization The project, approved in 1978, "Perbrmance Audit Report, Co- responded to a long period of urban The project provided for large lombia: First Urban Development growth and migration that changed multi-purpose community centers to Project-, Reot No. 1558, June 30, Colombia from a largely rural nation funnel and coordinate the assistance 1994. OED reports are available to into one that was 70 percent urban. of nine ministries and agencies, elimi- Bank executive directors and staff The urban poor lacked basic ameni- nating gaps and overlaps. Previously from the Internal Documents Unit ties and were not receiving their fair these agencies had provided services and from Regional lnfmation Ser- shares of health, schooling, child independently, from dispersed and vices Centers. care, and other services. Services hard-to-find offices in city centers. which entity would cover the centers' doned. The buildings provided suit- what the projec hoped to achieve but operating costs. able platforms for delivering services not an insignificant accomplishment. in dangerous neighborhoods. They The coordinating mechanisms had symbolized the government's con- Conclusions proved nearly useless, because most cern with the problems of the urban of the organizations involved were poor. Their high-quality construction Participation. The project did not centralized bureaucracies that pre- kept repairs to a minimum, achieve the form or quality of partici- pared their budgets and work plans pation anticipated. This was partly at least a year in advance. Though the Notwithstanding its long gestation because it bypassed existing commu- national and local committees met, period the project eventually in- nity organizations; several center di- and discussed what needed to be creased the capacity of the various rectors believe that the project still done, the representatives could not agencies to deliver services to the pays a high price for not involving the change decisions that their agencies urban poor. It achieved its housing community in planning. had already made. and infrastructure aims and today it successfully delivers educational, "All-out attack" vs gradualism. The Because the project was so com- nutritional, health, and childcare ser- project tried to do too much at once. plex, managers had focused on the vices. The surrounding neighbor- In projects with a plethora of compo- activities that were easiest to imple- hoods are filled with small nents, implementers concentrate on ment-especially physical works-to businesses specializing in the activi- the goals that are easiest to achieve. the detriment of service coordination, ties taught in the centers. Centers Projects that approach problems in- development of community organi- have begun delivering new services crementally or sequentially allow de- zations, and regularization of land including senior citizen activities and velopment agencies to "declare tenure. municipal recycling victory" more often. The goals of delivering services Living conditions around many of Decentralization. The project's pio- through beneficiaries' own organiza- the centers have greatly improved, neering attempt at decentralization tions and involving squatters more helped by home improvement loans was severely constrained by its highly fully in urban decision making (to 7,400 families) and the regulariza- centralized political milieu. But once proved elusive. Viable community tion of property titles. Shacks have loan disbursements were finished and organizations did not materialize. To been replaced by paved streets and the national and local coordinating a large extent this was because the attractive brick houses connected to bodies stopped meeting, coordination target communities had not partici- municipal services, and shared decision making began to pated in project planning. Project de- take place spontaneously between the signers had limited their Within the centers, coordination local staff of the various agencies. consultations to mayors, politicians, between agencies is now routine. Colombia's official attempts to decen- and other high-ranking spokesper- For example, IPC uses SENA (the tralize government services facilitated sons. Communities never knew that national apprenticeship service) and validated this development. community development centers buses to take senior citizen groups were coming until the buildings be- on field trips, TPC recruits trainees Leadership. Leadership is vital to gan to be constructed. for SENA, the health clinics tend sick provide the political leverage, knowl- children from the schools and day- edge, and diplomacy necessary for Ten years on, a success care centers, and the school children prodding competing agencies, obtain- use the IPC libraries. But whether the ing funds and policy changes, and Today, all but one of the 23 centers project has strengthened the directing complex programs. Not are in active operation. Between 1986 government's capability to coordi- enough allowances were made for the and 1994 the centers shifted through nate activities of the various execut- limited implementation capacity and five institutional frameworks and ing agencies beyond these local lack of experience of the newly cre- several periods of limbo without activities is questionable. ated SIP. Efforts to develop SIP had a budgets or staff salaries. But the pro- limited impact because it was a presi- gram survived and its recurrent costs The centers have never been dential agency, and indeed was sub- have proven modest. handed over to community control. sequently disbanded by a later chief However, community participation executive. Most of the activities of the With less solid and visible commu- is apparent in sports, and cultural community centers today are owed to nity buildings, the program would and commercial activities subsidized the personal attributes and initiatives almost certainly have been aban- or paid for by the centers-far from of the center directors and their staff. OED Pr&is is produced by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank to help disseminate recent evaluation findings to developmentprofessionals within and outside the World Bank. Theviews herebare those of the Operations Evaluation staff and shouldnot beattributed totheWorld Bank or its affiliated organizations. Pleaseaddress comments, and enquiries to the managing editor, RachelWeaving, G-71r37, World Bank, telephone 473-1719. Internet: rweaving@worldbank.org December 1994