Mexico - Apatzingan Irrigation Project

rk3cUmult of TheWorld Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 1979 PEOJECT COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO APATZINGAN IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1858-ME) Agriculture Operations Division Country Department I1 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit Mexican Peso (MexS) Currency Exchanse Rates durinq Imvlementationr (yearly averages) Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Source: World Bank Note: All US$ values in this report should be understood as US$ equivalents. ABBREVIATIONS CFE - Federal Electricity Commission (Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad) CNA - National Water Commission (Comisi6n Nacional del Agua) ERR - Economic Rate of Return IDSP - Irrigation and Drainage Sector Project (Proyecto Sectorial de Riego y Drenaje) OMS - Operations Manual Statement PCR - Project Completion Report PLAMEPA - On-Farm Improvement Plan in Irrigated Districts (Plan de Mejoramiento Parcelario) Rural Development District (Distrito de Desarrollo Rural) SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SARH - Secretariat of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos HidrSulicos) SHCP - Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaria de Finanzas y Credit0 Piiblico) SPP - Secretariat of Planning and Budgeting (Secretaria de ~lanificaci6ny Presupuesto)  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. June 11, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRE(=TORS AND THE PRESIDENT Subject: Project Completion Report on Mexico Auatzinean Imeation Proiect (Ln.1858-ME) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Mexico Apatzingan Irrigation Project (Loan 1858-ME) prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, with Part II contniuted by the Borrower. Implementation of this project was slower than planned because of counterpart funding constraints on the Borrower in the early 1980s, shortly after appraisal. The Bank and the Borrower adapted flexlily to these conditions, separating the project into two phases in 1984, and canceling one phase in 1987. The project closed in 1991, four and one-half years late, after four extensions. Major construction work proceeded rapidly on those parts of the project which did go ahead. Nevertheless, the reduced project is still incomplete. Major and minor imgation works, and local institutional arrangements, must be put in place before significant project benefits become evident. The Project Completion Report appears to anticipate these, but it may be premature. Slower than p l a ~ e implementation has, however, permitted progressive technical improvements to d be made to the water control systems, making it a possible model for similar projects elsewhere. The project contained a small resettlement component which raised no special concerns. The project is considered to be satisfactory and sustainabilityis likely if the project is completed as planned. The Project Completion Report is adequate, given the incompleteness of the project. The project may be audited. Attachment I I Thir document ham a rertricted dirtribution and may be ured by recipient#only in the performance of their official dutier. Ita contentr may not otherwire be dirclored without World Bank authorization.   HEW2 FIPATLINWI IRRIOATIOW PROJECT ( L W 1858-WE) PREFACE ............................................................................. PART I: PROJECT REVIN FRCU BANK PERSPECTIVE ....................................... P r o j u t Identity ............................................... P r o j u t Backgrourd ............................................. P r o j u t Objutive and D n c r i p t l m .............................. P r o j u t Design and Organization ................................ P r o j u t Ilplamntatim P r o j u t Results ................................................ ......................................... P r o j u t Sustainobi Lity Bank Perforumnee ............................................... ......................................... Borrouor Perforumnee ........................................... P r o j u t Relationship ........................................... Consulting Services ............................................ P r o j u t D o c ~ l l l t a t i ms d Data ................................. Lnsons Learned ................................................. PART 11: PROJECT REVIEW FR# THE BORRMRIS STANDPOINT ............................. 1.. I n t r o b c t i m ................................................... 2 Bank Perforaunce ............................................... 3 Govermnnt Perfonnure ............................................... ......................................... C Rnults Achiwed 5...Ruaaacnd.tions and Lnsons L r d ............................. PART 111: $ W R Y OF STATISTICAL DATA .............................................. Table 1: Related Bank Louu ........................................ Table 2: P r o j u t Timtable ......................................... Table 3: Loan Credit Disbursamnts .................................. A C w l a t i v e Estiarted ud Actual Dlrbursramts . ............ 8 Arnual F i m e d Expmditurn C ..C ........................... w l a t i v e F i m e d Expenditurn by Imntrnt Category ..................................... Table 6: P r o j u t Costs and F i m i q ............................... A .P r o j u t Costs .......................................... 8 P r o j u t F i m i n g C ... ...................................... Main P r o j u t Cost Figures .............................. D Original P r o j u t Costs ................................. Table 5: P r o j u t Results ........................................... A D l r u t B m f f t s B Agriculture P r o b c t i m (lPIU-lW1) .. ........................................ ..................... C .C h i l a t h Pouor Omration ............................... Table 6: Status of Logal C o m n t s .................................. Table 7: Use of Staff Rnourcn .................................... A Staff Inputs . 8 Missions . ............................................... ........................................... IThis document h u a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their omcial duties .Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization .   (LOAN 1858-WE) This document is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Apatzingan Irrigation Project in Mexico, for which Loan 1858-ME in the amount of USS160 million was approved on May 29, 1980. The loan was closed on June 30, 1991, four years behind schedule. Only US$64.4 million of the loan wae diebursed and the last disbureement wae on June 30, 1991; USS95.6 million was canceled by the Borrower. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division, Country Department 11, of the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and 111), and the Borrower (Part 11). Preparation of thim PCR wae started during a Bank supervision miasion in June 1990, and ie based, inter a l h , on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan, Guarantee, and Project Agreements; Supervision Reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda.   - iii - (LOAN 1858-ME) DoJECT COMPLETION REPORT BVALUATION SUMMARY, 1. project Ob- DeScri~tion[Darae* 3-01 3=07L - . The objective of t h e project was t o improve irrigation i n t h e Apatzingan Valley t o permit expansion and intensification of agriculture. The project would benefit some 9,800 farm families, mostly small-scale landholders (909 ejidatarios and 109 private farmers) on a t o t a l area of 109,000 hectares (ha). 2. The project's component8 were tor (a) build t h e Chilatln dam on t h e Tepalcatepec river; (b) rehabilitate t h e Cajonea and Paracuaro irrigation aystems, with a poseible back-up for diverting additional water from local atteams; (c) construct two main canals and the distribution and drainage systems f o r t h e Chilatln system; rehabilitate diversion structures, irrigation canals and drainage works; construct feeder roads and other infrastructure works t o service t h e Irrigation District; (d) clear about 11,500 ha of land and level about 74,000 ha; (e) strengthen agricultural support services (extension, reeearch and training); and ( f ) provide equipment and machinery f o r operation and maintenance. 3. Im~lementationExaerience I ~ a r a e .5.01-5.12L. The project had a delayed start-up and an extended implementation period. This waa because of counterpart funding constraint. resulting from t h e adverse macroeconomic environment caused by t h e 1982 economic crisis triggered by t h e o i l price slump. The project became effective i n December 19, 1980 and was cloeed i n June 30, 1991, a f t e r four extensions, f i v e years l a t e r than t h e expected implementation period of seven years (July 1980 t o June 1987). The Government had t o adjust t h e timing and acope of its investment program and project implementation. I n 1984 t h e project was amended and separated i n t o two phaaes under t h e Government's stabilization program, which was i n i t i a t e d i n 1982. Phase I, which included works and a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e ChilatAn aystem (with t h e Chilatan dam a s t h e main objective of implementation), was t o be completed by December 31, 1988. It was t o be financed under the project through Loan 1858- ME. Phase 11, which included t h e Cajones and Paracuaro systems, t o t a l l y independent of t h e Chilatan system, was t o be completed by December 31, 1994, without financing from Loan 1858-ME. By loan closing (June 30, 1991), Phase I was partly completed: t h e Chilatan dam was completed, t h e r i g h t bank main  canal wae 42% completed, and the left bank main canal 16% completed. A eecond amendment to the project on Auguet 18, 1987 eliminated Phaee 11. The loan aamunt had been reduced from USS160 million to USS64.4 million after loan cancellatione in 1987 and 1988, totalling USS95.6 million reflecting the two amendments in the project ecope. The total project coat of the Chilatan eyetem ae of September 1991 wae USS145.33 million, only 23.5% of the appraieal'a coat estimate of USS407 million. This wae mainly due to the radical reduction in the project's ecope. Phaee I continues to be implemented by the National Water Commieaion (CNA). If the current accelerated rate of progreae continues, Phaee I will be completed in 1995. An additional inveetment of eome USS150 million will be required which would be eligible for financing under the Irrigation and Drainage Sector Project (IDSP), Loan 3419-ME, approved in December 5, 1992. 4. The overriding cauee of slow project implementation wae inadequate budget allocation. Secondary factors were delays in completing final deeigne and extended contracting procedures. The implementation capacity of the executing agency, initially the Secretariat of Agriculture and Hydraulic Reeourcee (SARH) and later CNA, would have been adequate if eufficient financial reeourcee had been available at the right time. 5. Implementation of the exteneion program for famere in the project area wae affected by a elow etart-up and a major reorganization of SARH, which altered the reeponeibilitiee for technical aeeietance and impoeed restrictions on hiring pereonnel. Deepite theee limitatione, a relatively eucceeeful program was eetabliehed, with the Dietrict of Rural Development being reeponeible primarily for agronomically related aeeietance and CNA for water uee and management. Since 1990 a national policy has emerged baaed on a gradual transfer of technical aeeietance from the public to the private eector. By late 1991 private technical aeaiatance was initiated in the project area through the packing houeee and the agroinduatrial eector. 6. Implementation of the original on-farm development program of land clearing, land levelling or smoothing, and deetoning wae eignificantly cut back (28%) due to a reduction in the ecope of the project. An evolving cropping pattern dominated by orchards, unforeeen at appraisal, has also reduced the need for thie type of work. Final figures for land clearing and destoning wae cut to 28% and the other iteme were eliminated. 7. Peeulte (~arae.6.01-6.06L. The main phyeical achievement wae the completion of the Chilatan dam, which will be capable of irrigating 66,000 ha when the Chilatan eyetem ie completed in 1995. By loan closing in mid-1991, the etorage dam wae 100% completed, the right bank main canal 42%, the left bank main canal 16%, and the dietribution worke 11%. Portions of the Cajonee and Paracuaro-Cancita irrigation eyeteme (Phaee 11) were rehabilitated. Along with the Chilatan system, they will eneure reliable eources of water for about 82,000 ha when the project ie completed. By the end of 1992 eome 34,000 ha will have benefitted from the project. 8. The cropping pattern ie divereified to high value crope and well adjusted to market demande. There ham been rapid expansion in fruit and citrus fanning, moetly mango and lime, though appraisal projected increaeee in cotton, graine, vegetablee, and paeturee and eome smaller increaeee in eoybeane, and peanute. The latter two crope and cotton are abeent from the cropping pattern. Thie new cropping pattern will benefit farmere' income and  project euetainability. Full agriculture development ie now expected in the year 2000--a lag of ten years compared to appraisal. 9. The economic rate of return (ERR) for the Cupatizio-Tepalcatepec (Chilatan System) Project was calculated with Bank assistance by consultants for CNA at about 15.9%, higher than the 13.5% ERR expected in the SAR for the Tepalcatepec area. This result is consistent with the new cropping pattern of high value crope. The estimate was made in a new feasibility etudy undertaken during 1990-1991 as part of the preparation for the IDSP Project. 10. Sustainabilitv taaras. 7.01-7.04). The project ie expected to be eustainable as a result of: (a) an increasing emphasis on high-valued tropical fruits and vegetables, (b) the value-added and employment opportunities.in the packing industry, (c) the potential for industrialization of produce within the Apatzingan Valley, and (d) diversification into table grapes, tropical fruits, and seed production. 11. pindinas and Lessons Learned (paras. 13.01-13.07L. The project was negatively affected by an unfavorable macroeconomic environment, inetitutional instability, and severe funding constraints. This finding confirms the importance of a sound macroeconomic and institutional context as a condition for successful project implementation. Despite the macroeconomic problems, the project demonstrates what can be achieved if Borrower and Bank are flexible in revising a project's original scope. The main achievements were the completion of a major etorage dam (Chilath), the advanced stage of construction of the left and right irrigation systems and entrepreneurial development of high value cropping systems. (a) Apatzingan is a typical multipurpose water project that includes irrigation as a major objective but brings significant benefits in power generation, flood control, and municipal water supply. These benefits were not taken into account in the SAR. It had been decided that the power plant would be included later to maximize benefits from the water in the Chilatgn reservoir. Agricultural and non-agricultural activities are complementary and ehould therefore always be considered at the planning phase, particularly when heavy investments such as dams are at stake. These benefits were not considered ex-ante due to the lack of completed multipurpose studies during preparation. (b) The project exemplified small implementation problems caused by tardy completion of designs for major civil works in the main canal system, which, in this case, were not ready at the time of project effectiveness. The acceptance of thie delay contributed for a tardy implementation of the left main canal. (c) A significant lesson learned from implementation concerns the coat-effectiveneee and timely conetruction obtained by CNA by 1990-91 in awarding largo contract8 for civil worke am opporred to numeroue emall onee. The small contract bias wae the eetablished practice of SARH in moat of it8 hydraulic infraetructure projecte. Thie wae achieved through etrong Bank persuaeion especially during 1989-1990. (d) A good lesson for other eimilar irrigation eyetems ie to adopt new water-control technology (hydraulic automatic structures and  telemetric controls). This technology was introduced i n t h e r i g h t bank main canal and its d i s t r i b u t i o n eyetem and wae an excellent example of t h e way i n which modern technology can be applied t o t h e new Mexican systems. The f i n a l construction f i g u r e s demonstrated t h a t t h e additional coets w e r e negligible compared t o t h e b e n e f i t s from efficiency and f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e operation, and from water savings. (e) The s i g n i f i c a n t growth of t h e processing s e c t o r i n t h e p r o j e c t area, d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o a g r i c u l t u r a l production (packing f a c i l i t i e e and o i l extraction p l a n t s ) , i n d i c a t e s t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l secondary b e n e f i t s can occur from i r r i g a t i o n projects. ( f ) A f u r t h e r lesson hae been t h e d i f f i c u l t y of a n t i c i p a t i n g changes i n t h e cropping pattern. The appraisal r e p o r t (based on t h e temperate climate and on r e s u l t s obtained from other p r o j e c t s ) projected production increases i n cotton, graine, vegetables, and pastures, and some increases i n soybeans and peanuts, but t h e l a t t e r two crops and cotton a r e completely absent from t h e cropping p a t t e r n mostly because t h e s e a r e not a s p r o f i t a b l e and/or marketable a s f r u i t s and vegetables. The most rapid expansion has been of c i t r u s and other f r u i t , mostly mango and lime, and t h e o v e r a l l p a t t e r n is now w e l l d i v e r s i f i e d and adjusted t o market demands. The Mexican I r r i g a t i o n Projecte c l o s e r t o t h e t r o p i c a l area could be oriented t o higher-value cropping patterns. (g) Another lesson r e l a t e s t o a g r i c u l t u r a l extension. Experience highlight6 t h e d i f f i c u l t y of etrengthening an extension agency i n a project area when t h e agency is subject t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l and administrative norms and t o r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed a t t h e national level. Attempte f o r shortcomings have a b e t t e r chance of success through a nationally focused project, a s i n t h e case of t h e Agricultural Extension Project and t h e Agricultural Technology Project .  BPATZINGAN IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1858-ME) Bszi PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Proiect Identity Project Name: Apatzingan I r r i g a t i o n Project Loan No. : 1858-ME RVP Unit: Latin America and t h e Caribbean Country: Mexico Sector: Agriculture Subsector: I r r i g a t i o n- Rural Development 2. Proiect Backsround 2.01 Mexico's a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r contributes about 8% t o GDP, employs about 25% of t h e labor force, and provides some 26% of non-oil exports. Only about 18%of t h e t o t a l land is cultivable. An estimated 21 million hectares (ha) a r e cropped, about 6 million ha under i r r i g a t i o n . During 1950-1965, a g r i c u l t u r a l GDP growth averaged 4.3% a year, w e l l ahead of population growth, but it s t a r t e d t o decline i n t h e l a t e 1960s. This decline was i n response t o t h e higher c o s t of bringing marginal land i n t o production, a slow-down i n t h e expansion of i r r i g a t e d areas, excessive water use and inadequate drainage on many i r r i g a t e d lands. These f a c t o r s r e s u l t e d i n s a l i n i z a t i o n and reduction of cropped areas and yields. Agricultural GDP growth f e l l t o an average of 2.4% during 1965-80, below t h e r a t e of population growth. From being food s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and an a g r i c u l t u r a l exporter before 1970, Mexico became a major importer of b a s i c foodstuffs by t h e end of t h e decade. 2.02 To r e s t o r e a g r i c u l t u r e ' s performance and ensure food security, t h e Government introduced some important policy measures and took decisive s t e p s t o revive t h e i r r i g a t i o n subsector. A federal water law was enacted i n 1972 and a nationwide i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e established under t h e Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) t o control, manage, and coordinate t h e use of t h e country's water resources. A number of i r r i g a t i o n projects, some of which w e r e supported by t h e World Bank, w e r e launched during t h e 1970s t o r e h a b i l i t a t e and expand t h e subsector. During t h e f i n a l years of p r o j e c t implementation ( l a t e 1980s and e a r l y 1990s) t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s s h i f t e d toward t h e elimination of subsidies, i n l i n e with agreements made under Bank- financed AGSAL I and I1 projects. This has r e s u l t e d over t h e p a s t t h r e e years, i n a more competitive a g r i c u l t u r a l sector.  2.03 The Apatzingan Irrigation Project implemented this development strategy by: (a) eupporting rehabilitation of previously inefficient irrigation systems, (b) bringing new lande under irrigation, (c) etrengthening technical assietance to farmers, (d) contributing to increaeed crop and livestock production, and (e) increaeing employment opportunitiee. 2.04 The project ie located in the froet-free Apatzingan Valley. Though it was noted for ite fruit and vegetablee, the valley had been unable to realize its potential because of a lack of reliable water sourcee for year- round irrigation. Annual rainfall average8 685 mm, 90% falling between June and October. Irrigation usee a variety of unconnected water eourcee, including from springe, streams, river divereione, tube welle, and a small dam. Land reform was carried out in the project area in the 19300. The project area was occupied by 9,800 farm familiee. Approximately 75% of the land is held by "ejidatarioe," A/ who make up 90% of the land holdere, while the other 25% is owned by private farmere. The lande to be irrigated are already part of the land owned by "ejidoe" and private farmere. 3. Project Obiectivee and DeecriDtioq 3.01 The purpose of the project, to be carried out in the Apatzingan Valley in the Cupatizio-Tepalcatepec Irrigation Dietrict in the central part of the State of MichoacAn, wae to provide irrigation facilitiee and agronomic technical assistance for approximately 40,000 hectares in the Cajones and Paracuaro irrigation eyetems, and 69,000 hectaree in the ChilatAn irrigation system. The project wae approved by the Board in May 29, 1980 for a total of USS408.8 million, of which the Bank would finance USS160.0 million and the Government USS248.8 million. 3.02 The project wae to provide for the conetruction of the Chilatan Irrigation System (Phaee I),a/ Rehabilitation of the Paracuaro and Cajonee Irrigation Syeteme (Phase 11),a/ and other activitiee related to acquieitione, extension, and studiee. 3.03 ChilatAn Irrioation Svetem (Phaee I). The main work was construction of a rock-filled clay core dam on the Tepalcatepec river, about 103 meters high and with a otorage capacity of 600 million cubic metere (of which no more than 350 million cubic metere would be live etorage). The dam was to yield approximately 1,000 million cubic metere each year and to provide sufficient water to irrigate about 66,000 ha. Other worke were: (a) construction of f/ Eiidatari~ - emall farmer, member of an w,entitled to use a plot of land of a certain ejido. - U A Q eettlement of emall farmere in public lande expropriated under the agrarian reform. 21 The Chilatan Syetem and the Paracuaro-Cajonee Syeteme were denominated Phases I and I1 later, during project implementation, to eplit prioritiee and coete reflected in the project'e amendment.  (i) a spillway on the left bank of the Tepalcatepec river to discharge about 7,000 cubic meters per second of excees flood waters; and (ii) an intake tower on the right bank of the Tepalcatepec river; (b) construction and, where necessary, lining of (i) a main canal of about 53 kilometers on the right bank of the Tepalcatepec river; and (ii) a main canal of about 93 kilometers on the left bank of the Tepalcatepec river; (c) conetruction of (i) distribution systems for the right and left banks of the Tepalcatepec river totalling about 1,224 kilometers; and (ii) drainage canals totalling about 628 kilometers; (d) construction of (i) about 1,455 kilometere of new and improved roads; and (ii) acceee roade, a work camp, six small pumping stations, houses for staff, office buildings, and telephone lines. 3.04 (Phase IIL. This consisted of rehabilitating: (a) the Cajones water diversion structure; (b) about 27 kilometers of main irrigation canals aerving El Marquez; and (c) the Las Burrae water divereion structure. 3.05 Other work. were construction and, where necessary, lining of: (a) about 26 kilometers of canals to link the Cajones and Paracuaro irrigation mysterna; (b) about 630 kilometers of distribution canale; (c) about 203 kilometers of drainage canals; and (d) construction of about 692 kilometer. of roads, construction of houmes for ditch riders, and installation of telephone lines. 3.06 0 e c n ude : (a) acquisition of equipment to operate and maintain the facilities)  (b) land clearing on about 11,500 hectaree and land leveling, including, where appropriate, land emoothing, on about 74,000 hectares; (c) acquieition of rights of way for roade and canale, appropriate compeneation for crop damage caueed by the Project, and reeettlement of farmere, including meaeuree for their indemnification; (d) etrengthening and expanding SARH'e exteneion eervicee to farmers through the creation of additional exteneion centere, the employment and training of etaff, the provieion of equipment and euppliee, on-farm demonetration programe, and the provision to farmere of advice about irrigation and drainage; (e) review and analyeie of the uee of local water eourcee in the Cajonee irrigation eyetem; and (f) etudiee for the further development of irrigation and drainage in the Cupatizio-Tepalcatepec river basin. 3.07 The total project coet eetimated by SAR wae USS408 million equivalent, of which 80.1% (USS325.8 million) wae for the Chilatan Syetem and 19.9% (USS81.2 million) for the Paracuaro and Cajonee Syeteme. (For more detaile eee Table 4-D). 4. Proiect Deeian and Oraanization 4.01 The project concept eucceeefully addreeeed the major conetraint to irrigation in the Apatzingan Valley. The farmere in the project area were well eetabliehed and organized and benefitted from reaeonably good marketing facilities. Nevertheleee, only 62,000 ha of a total command area of 96,000 ha could be fully irrigated throughout the year, and the balance of 13,000 ha in the project area had never been irrigated. Overall efficiency of the eyetem wae eetimated at only 30% due to a lack of: (a) control etructuree and meaeurement devicee, (b) maintenance of conveyance and dietribution eyetems, (c) land levelling, (d) water etorage facilitiee, and (e) night irrigation. 4.02 After analyzing different project deeign alternativee, the project consultante together with the Bank and SARH coneidered the beet eolution to providing adequate water to the valley'e irrigable land to be the improvement and rehabilitation of the exieting eyeteme in one part of the project area (Cajonee and Paracuaro) and the erection of a dam on the Tepalcatepec river at Chilatan, combined with the conetruction of two main canale in the remaining area (ChilatSn system). Ae a complement to the civil worke, agricultural support services were to be inteneified through expaneion of the exteneion service, cloeer collaboration with the local agricultural experiment etation, and on-farm improvemente through a program called PLAMEPA (On-farm Improvement Plan in Irrigated Dietricte or "Plan de Mejoramiento Parcelarion). The only environmental ieeue envieaged at project appraieal wae the involuntary reeettlement for the reeidente in the area of the future lake to be formed by the Chilatan Dam (eee end para. 5.05). 4.03 Deeign, conetruction, and operation of the project were carried out according to well eetabliehed institutional arrangement6 and proceduree  first by SARH and then by CNA (1989-1991) when the hydraulic infrastructure branch of SARH was incorporated into the CNA in early 1989. The project was satisfactorily prepared initially by SARH and a Mexican consulting firm. The responsibilities of the various project entities were clearly defined. Initially, the irrigation district was responsible for all aspects of technical assistance to farmers. In 1985, this activity, along with operation and maintenance, passed to the newly formed Rural Development Districts which were based on municipal boundaries. When the CNA was formed, the irrigation districts were reestablished to handle operation and maintenance and to provide technical assistance to farmers in water use and management. Agronomic technical assistance remained with the Rural Development Districts, but the quality was considered inferior to the extension provided by the Irrigation District. The present trend in Irrigation Districts is that agronomic technical assistance will be provided by private agents. 4.04 The scope and scale of the project were appropriate. Project preparation could have been more thorough in the final designs for civil works. This was particularly the case with the design of the Chilatan dam, which started after project implementation and was finally completed by consultants at the end of 1982. The studies and designs for power and municipal water supply projects were not completed by the time of project preparation. A small modification in the dam design was introduced later in 1987 to provide an additional penstock for power generation. Designs for the two main canals should have been more advanced at the project preparation stage. They were completed only by late 1989. 4.05 The strongest element in project organization and management was construction and the weakest was agronomic technical assistance for the project farmers. This is characteristic of hydraulic infrastructure projects in CNA's portfolio, including those financed by the Bank. There has been a tradition of expertise in the management of construction projects, but support for public sector extension to farmers has varied over the past decade. Despite project specific efforts, public extension has generally suffered from a lack of resources, inadequately trained technicians, and high personnel turnover. These shortcomings are now being addressed in the Agricultural Extension Project (Loan 2859-ME) approved in June 25, 1989 and in the Agricultural Technology Project (Loan 3465-ME) approved in May 4, 1992. 5.01 The most critical discrepancies between planned and actual project implementation were in the completion date and project scope. Appraisal estimated December 31, 1986 as the completion date. Amendments to the legal documents on January 14, 1985 separated the project into two phases. Phase I, which included works and activities in the Chilatan Irrigation system, with financing from the loan, wae to be completed by December 31, 1988. This was partly completed by June 30, 1991, the final completion and closing dates. Phase 11, which included the Cajones and Paracuaro systems, was to be completed by December 31, 1994, without financing from the loan. A second amendment on August 18, 1987 eliminated Phase I1 and canceled USS90.0 million from the loan amount. An additional USS5.6 million was canceled in 1988. Due to budget constraints Phase I could not be completed in 1988 and it is now scheduled to be completed by late 1995. These were considered by the Government and the Bank the right decisions to face the budget constraints, delays and priorities in the CNA portfolio of investments. Phase I of the  project continuee to be implemented by CNA, and if the current rate of progreee continuee, it will be completed in 1995. (It ie financed partly (50%) by the Bank under the Irrigation and Drainage Sector Project (IDSP), Loan 3419-ME) on one of the priority eubprojecte to be initiated in the firet implementation year.al Total project coat ae of September 1991 wae USS145.33 million, 23.5% of the appraieal eetimate of USS407 million. Thie was mainly due to the reduction in the ecope of the project (Table 4A) and extent of completion in part of the right and left bank canale of the Chilatan Syetem. To complete the project (Chilatan Syetem) an additional investment of eome USS15O million ie required. The original SAR eetimate for the Chilatan Irrigation Syetem wae USS325.8 million (gee Table 4-D), very close to the actual figuree. 5.02 The overriding cauee of elow project implementation wae inadequate budget allocation. Secondary factore were delaye in completing final deeigne and extended contracting procedures. Even without theee latter two difficultiee, the lack of funding would etill have been a problem. Implementation capacity of the executing agency wae adequate, provided eufficient financial reeourcee that had been available at the right time. 5.03 The reduction in project ecope reeulted from the Government'e etabilization program intended to addreee the underlying ieeuee of financial crieie of 1982. The project had been prepared and appraieed when the economic climate wae much more favorable and when it wae anticipated that oil earninge would relax the financial conetrainte on growth. Bank mieeione during 1982, recognized the elow progreee in project implementation. They euggeeted concentrating only on rehabilitation worke and postponing conetruction of the dam and part of the Chilatan eyetem to a later etage. The Government conducted ite own in-depth analyeie and decided not to change the order of implementation. It began conetruction of the dam (in mid-1983) in the firet phaee, including plane to concentrate on worke related to the damfe command area in the Chilath eyetem. The eecond phaee wae to cover rehabilitation of existing echemee (Paracuaro-Cajonee). The Bank, in turn, conducted an independent evaluation of both alternative6 in mid-1984 and found the Government'e propoeal (reasonable and) acceptable. Given the advanced etage of work, it became the moat economic alternative (ERR of 13.4% for the firet phaee and 13.5% for the entire project). The legal document6 were amended accordingly on January 14, 1985. 5.04 Lack of counterpart funding after the 1985 amendment continued to be the major conetraint to project implementation. Counterpart funding during the yeare of 1988 and 1989 wae extremely difficult to obtain due to eevere reductions in public eector inveetment under the "Economic Solidarity Pact". Periodically, there were injection6 of funde to eupplement the original budget allocatione to keep the project progreeeing at a minimum acceptable pace. The cloeing date wae extended on four occaeione: two for one year each (June 30, 1988 and June 30, 1989), one for one year and a half (December 31, 1990) and the laet one for eix monthe (June 30,1991), at which time the final loan amount of USS64.4 wae fully diebureed. 31 CNA renamed the Chilatan Irrigation System in 1991 ae Cupatizio- Tepalcatepec which ie the name of the main river and valley.  5.05 Ae t h e p r o j e c t wae being reformulated ( i n 1984) t h e Bank became aware of t h r e e problem8 with t h e Chilatdn dam: ( a ) t h e panel of experts' report on t h e dam design had not been elaborated and furnished t o t h e Bank before bidding invitatione, (b) bidding and contractual decieione concerning t h e dam had been taken without Bank approval, and (c) an unexpected l a y e r of reeidual material (rock) more permeable than expected wae found i n t h e l e f t abutment during excavation f o r t h e dam'e foundation. A l l diebursemente against expenditure8 f o r t h e dam w e r e held i n abeyance pending t h e outcome of an ex-poet review of t h e pertinent documente. The experte' report was received by t h e Bank (by l a t e 1984) and found t o be eatiefactory. With regard t o point ( b ) above, it was decided a f t e r exteneive consultation within t h e Bank t h a t , given t h e Bank'e previous inaction toward widespread non-compliance with i t 8 procurement requirement8 i n t h e Chilatdn Dam by Mexican a u t h o r i t i e s , any complaints of mie-procurement should focus on substantive grounds, not only on procedural ones. On t h i e basie and upon f u r t h e r analysie, t h e Bank approved t h e contract f o r t h e dam with t h e understanding t h a t t h e Bank would r e q u i r e strict adherence t o procurement requirements i n t h e future. With regard t o point (c), t h e design team and t h e SARH panel of experte decided t o remove p a r t of t h e permeable material and t o construct an inspection/drainage tunnel i n s i d e t h e abutment. During t h e f i n a l stages of construction, cement was i n j e c t e d i n s i d e t h e tunnel t o reduce f i l t r a t i o n 8 t o t h e o r i g i n a l deeign level8 (80 l/s). The r e e u l t e w e r e s a t i s f a c t o r y and i t e c o s t increased t o t a l c o s t of t h e dam by 4%. Resettlement of families affected by t h e newly constructed dam was implemented on echedule without d i f f i c u l t y . 5.06 A new f e a t u r e i n t h e p r o j e c t ( i n 1991) was t h e design and i n e t a l l a t i o n i n t h e r i g h t bank main canal (20,300 ha)--its construction was i n i t i a t e d i n e a r l y 1990--of a f u l l y automated i r r i g a t i o n system with automatic hydraulic mechanisme of cross regulators ("Duck-peak" w e i r s ) , hydraulic flow modules and computerized control, and monitoring systems. A s i m i l a r system i e l i k e l y t o b e i n s t a l l e d on t h e l e f t bank main canal when t h e on-going construction w i l l begin again i n 1992. Plane a l e o c a l l f o r i n s t a l l i n g , on a p i l o t basis, gravity-fed pressurized i r r i g a t i o n . The l a t t e r change is a t t r i b u t a b l e t o Bank supervision missione which convinced CNA t o r e v i s e its designs i n order t o have a syetem operationally f l e x i b l e and more e f f i c i e n t , compatible with t h e new cropping p a t t e r n of t h e project. It is expected that t h e s e innovations w i l l serve a s models f o r o t h e r i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t s , eepecially on t h e Central P a c i f i c coast (e.g., i n South Sinaloa, Nayarit, Colima and Michoacdn). 5.07 I r r i g a t i o n i n f r a e t r u c t u r e maintenance i n t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t had been mediocre, d e s p i t e t h e p r o j e c t ' s provision f o r maintenance equipment (only a portion was acquired). I n t h e f a c e of f i n a n c i a l conetraints, SARH has given p r i o r i t y t o construction over maintenance. Reeponeibility f o r maintenance e h i f t e d from t h e I r r i g a t i o n District t o t h e Rural Development District i n 1985. However, t h e RDD (primarily responsible f o r rainfed developmente) lacked t h e experienced personnel and machinery t o c a r r y out t h i s function. Recently, ( a f t e r 1989) t h e t a s k has reverted t o t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i e t r i c t under CNA, which has t h e necessary e x p e r t i s e and means t o f u l f i l l t h i e function. Reeponeibility f o r operation and maintenance i e now being t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e water ueere organizationa, which w i l l a l e o b e responsible f o r c o l l e c t i n g t h e water fee8 t o cover t o t a l operation and maintenance costs, i n a eustainable, eelf-sufficient way. Cost recovery f o r operation and maintenance of t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t hae been d i f f i c u l t . Operation and maintenance c o s t s t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t some MexS45,OOO p e r hectare. I n  1990 the farmere agreed to a fee of Mex$8,500 per hectare, and in 1991 it roee to Mex$30,000 per hectare. The dietrictVm target under the IDSP project ie to reach eelf-eufficiency in 1994. CNA'e local administration expects to reach it earlier by late-1992. The ultimate goal ie to tranufer operation and maintenance function8 to the water ueere organizatione. 5.08 Agricultural exteneion activitiee were to begin with a revised and expanded program immediately after loan effectivenees (December 19, 1980), under the direction of the irrigation district. The program wae expected to produce benefite before the dam and other infrastructure were completed. Before 1983, little progreee had been made in terme of exteneion programe, deepite the repeated concern of eupervieion mieeione. Then, in 1983, the program began to advance. Leaderehip, organization, etaffing and programming began to improve, and the agriculture experiment etation played a eupporting role. A manager of exteneion wae appointed by SARH to the Irrigation Dietrict, and the Irrigation Dietrict was divided into five unite, each with a chief and aeeietante plue field extension agente. Unfortunately, eince 1984 the Government hae impoeed eevere reetrictione on hiring. Today the exteneion program, which eince 1985 hae been run by SARH'e Rural Development District, has eettled at 22 univereity-graduate-level epecialiete plue 50 technical-level exteneion etaff, about half the number anticipated at appraieal. Thie diecrepancy may not be eerious ae it eeeme becauee of the trend among producere and their aeeociationr towards contracting with coneulting firme for exteneion eervicee or hiring their own epecialiete rather than relying on the public sector. Capable coneulting firme are beginning to meet the demand. Thie ie a good eolution for the farmere that can afford private exteneion. 5.09 The extension program formerly concentrated on agronomy, through field vieite and training. At appraieal it wae envieaged that very limited aeeietance would be offered to farmere in irrigation and drainage. CNA has pureued a policy of encouraging the producere themeelvee to contract epecialized firme for help with on-farm irrigation and drainage plane and eyetems. Only a limited service ie provided by CNA. Thie approach ie good and it ie gradually gaining acceptance. 5.10 The original on-farm development program of land clearing, land levelling or emoothing, and deetoning hae been only partly implemented. The main contributing factore have been (a) a reduction in project eize, (b) delaye in completing the major conveyance and distribution worke for bringing water to the farme, and (c) the positive adoption of a high-value cropping pattern dominated by orcharde, which wae unforeeen by appraieal, under which the need for theee on-farm worke ie being reduced. 5.11 A eocio-economic study to determine the capacity of the project's beneficiariee to pay for operation and maintenance ( O M ) wae submitted in September 1986, about nine monthe late. Its relevance hae been reduced by the delay in completing the project. The main finding wae the confirmation of farmere' capacity to pay the O W coete. Other mtudiee concerning the further development of hydraulic works in the Cupatizio-Tepalcatepec river baein were the topographical eurveye and the deeignm of the left and right bank eyeteme, including its modernization (mentioned in para. 5.06). The overall evaluation of the etudiee and deeigne ie eatiefactory.  5.12 Becauee of t h e experience of SARH and CNA i n i r r i g a t i o n and dam conetruction, t h e appraisal correctly concluded t h a t t h e r e w e r e no major riske associated with t h e project. However, nobody could have anticipated t h e severe financial constraints due t o t h e eharp deterioration of Mexico's macroeconomic situation t h a t affected project implementation. The encouraging sign is t h a t conetruction of t h e right bank main canal has greatly accelerated i n 1991. Four major contractors a r e a t work. Construction w i l l commence on t h e l e f t bank main canal i n 1992, and t h e Chilatln i r r i g a t i o n system is expected t o be completed i n 1995 under t h e IDSP. 6. Proiect Reeults 6.01 The principal phyeical achievement of t h e project has been the construction of t h e Chilatln dam, which i e f i l l e d t o capacity and w i l l be capable of i r r i g a t i n g 66,000 ha when t h e right and l e f t bank main canals and t h e distribution systeme a r e completed i n 1995. By loan closing i n mid-1991, t h e r i g h t bank main canal was 42% completed, t h e l e f t bank main canal 169, and t h e distribution system 11%. Construction is continuing a t an accelerated pace with financing from t h e IDSP. About 14,000 ha w e r e rehabilitated i n t h e major Cajones-Paracuaro system before project revision i n 1985. Appraisal envisioned t h a t t h e project would i r r i g a t e about 109,000 ha. A s revised, t h e project w i l l eneure r e l i a b l e eources of water for a t o t a l of about 82,000 ha of i r r i g a t e d cropped land when it is completed. By t h e end of 1992, some 34,000 ha w i l l have benefitted from t h e project's works. Obviously, t h e f u l l e f f e c t of t h e project'e investments w i l l accrue only a f t e r completion of t h e e n t i r e Chilatan system ( r i g h t and l e f t banks). 6.02 The most significant impact of t h e project on agricultural production has been on t h e cropping pattern. A t appraisal, it was projected t h a t most of t h e increase i n production would be from cotton, grains, vegetables, and pasturee and t h a t some increases would come from soybeans and peanute ( r e l a t i v e l y low-value crops). In fact, t h e increaees i n production output and value have come from a rapid expansion of c i t r u s and other f r u i t e , mostly mango and l i m e . The area under grain (maize, eorghum, r i c e ) increaeed by an average of s l i g h t l y over 3% f o r t h e f i r s t f i v e years (1987-1991), compared t o t h e average f o r t h e preceding f i v e years, whereas t h e area planted with mango and l i m e increased 76% and melon and vegetables increaeed 18% (Table 5B). The aforementioned crops constitute approximately 75% of t h e cropping pattern, t h e remainder spread among beans, pasture, forage and broom eorghum, eesame, papaya, and banana. Cotton, soybean and peanuts are abeent. The divereified cropping pattern is apparently adjusting t o market demands. 6.03 Agricultural production of staple grains has been below appraisal eetimatee, which w e r e based on completion of a larger project by t h e end of 1986 and t h e attainment of f u l l agricultural development by 1990. Full agricultural development is now expected i n 2000--a l a g of t e n yeare. To date, average f i e l d crop yields have been below appraieal expectation8 and w e l l below t h e potential of t h e area. For example, both maize and eorghum yields a r e about 1 ton per hectare l e e s than t h e yields obtained regularly by t h e b e t t e r farmers i n t h e area (3 tons per hectare f o r maize and 4 tone per hectare f o r sorghum). The local experiment s t a t i o n obtains 7 tons per hectare i n maize t r i a l s with farmere. The appraisal tended t o overestimate f i e l d crop yielde and t h e epeed a t which output would increase, which i e why it made overly optimietic production projections. For example, i n t h e e a r l y project years, incremental production was expected t o come immediately and exclusively  from a etrengthened exteneion program. Thie wae unrealietic given the poor exteneion service and the absence of support from the experiment etation at project start-up, coupled with the length of'time it normally takee to eetablieh an effective exteneion program. 6.04 There are two dietinct planting periods in the froet-free valley: fall-winter and spring-summer. With a reliable eource of water, it wae considered poeeible at appraisal to plant a second crop in spring-ewer on the eame fields that were planted in the previoue fall-winter. To date, double cropping hae been insignificant, although it ie projected to build up to about 10,000 ha of maize and sorghum in 1996 ae conetruction of the right bank distribution eyetem ie completed. 6.05 The project ie not far enough along to permit an ex-poet ERR. Completion of the Cupatizio-Tepalcatepec project (right bank and left bank) ie continuing ae part of the IDSP. The project ie expected to be complete by late 1992 (for the right bank) and by late 1995 (for the left bank). The ERR of 15.9% wae aeeeeeed again by coneultante,%/ with Bank aeeietance, under a new feasibility etudy financed by the Bank and produced in 1990-1991 ae part of the preparation of the IDSP project. 6.06 While power generation benefits were not anticipated in the SAR nor in the original deeign of the dam due to the lack of complete etudiee and designs at appraisal time, later in 1990, CNA and CFE (Comieibn Federal de Electricidad) made a etudy while the dam wae being built and agreed to modify the project slightly to provide a penstock for a future power houee. Adaptations in the deeign were made accordingly. The cost of the adaptation wae incorporated into the dam coete. CFE now hae a schedule to implement the small power generation facility that will operate in coordination with irrigation demands. The power plant will have two Francie turbines of 14 megawatts each and ie expected to generate 121 million kilowatt houre per year. At the time of PCR preparation, the power project coete were not available to the Bank but a range of USS10 million to USS12 million ie likely. The value of annual power generation (about 120 million kilowatt houre) estimated by the marginal value of electricity (US$60/1000 per kilowatt houre) which ie about USS13 million/year. In mid-1992 CFE put out the conetruction of the power facility to tender ae a "turn-key" project eyetem, expected to be completed by late 1993. (For more technical details, eee Part 111, Table 5C). 7. Pro1ect Sustainability 7.01 The outlook for the project'e viability ie good. one of the main reaeone for optimiem ie the increaeing emphaeis by producere on high-value fruit and vegetablee, combined with increased value-added and employment opportunitiee in the produce-grading and packing induetry. There are about 50 emall and medium-eize packing houeee for fruit and vegetables, two big oil extraction plante proceeeing limee, and 12 packing plante for mangoe. Theee plante utilize production that comee primarily from the project area. Limee are harveeted almost year round, and mangoe for about four months. The valley, with it8 divereified cropping pattern, ha8 a dietinct advantage over many other irrigation districts, which grow mainly graine and will probably 41 CNA - Eetudio de Factibilidad del Proyecto de Riego Cutapizio- Tepalcatepec, ICATEC-Mexico, D.F., 1991.  need to switch from grain production to other crops in anticipation of effects future competition of grains will have in a free market with USA and Canada. 7.02 Besides the expansion of existing agricultural and related activities, there are new opportunities for the future. One example is fruit and vegetable processing. At present, industrialization consists only of grading and packing fruit. Apart from oil-extraction plants for limes, there is one plant in the valley for pulping limes. The pulp is shipped outside the region for the extraction of pectin and the juice is discarded as waste. With a steady production of fruit, such as limes and mangos, opportunities exist for a fully integrated industry within the Valley of Apatzingan. 7.03 Maintenance of the irrigation eystem is a concern because inadequate maintenance could affect the availability of irrigation water. The public eector hae generally performed thie taek poorly in the past. The current policy of CNA eupported by the on-going IDSP project is to transfer this function gradually to the water ueers. Already there are eome 22 Irrigation District6 (two thirds of the total area in Irrigation Districts) in the country that are traneferring irrigation operation and maintenance to the users organizations. Considering the high level of organization and progressive nature of farmers in the project area, a similar transfer of responsibility should take place in the near future. In the meantime, CNA's irrigation district has strengthened its efforte to maintain project infrastructure. There has been a great improvement in the collection of water fees since 1991 and the District is now 72% self-sufficient for operation and maintenance. In 1988 this figure was only 7%. 7.04 The Apatzingan Agriculture Experiment Station ie conducting research on alternative crops in addition to working on crops already being grown. Possible alternatives include table grapes, tropical fruits, sunflowers, and soybeans. For table grapes and tropical fruite, which can be produced in the winter off-season, work is centered on variety testing. For sunflowere, new varietiee for irrigated condition6 are being inveetigated. A technical package already existe for soybeane, but the abeence of an oil- extraction plant impedes its development. Climatic conditions favor the production of seede for many graeses and legumes, most of which are still imported. 7.05 Technical aseietance for the development of orchard6 has been provided mostly through the private sector, in particular by the packing houses for the mango and lime industries. 8. Bank Performance 8.01 One strength of the Bank's performance was its conetructive reaction to the financial constraint6 that elowed project implementation. This was manifeeted by the Bank's: (a) continuing support for the project in spite of substantial delaye, (b) increasing diebureement percentage8 on several occaeions, and (c) granting extension6 to the closing date. 8.02 The Bank's input in project preparation was minimal becauee the project was reasonably well prepared by SARH and a local consultant firm. Appraisal was appropriately staffed for the task and included an engineer, an agriculturalist, and an economiet. The appraisal task was carried out in a  profeeeional manner--the major reservation being overly optimietic projections of agricultural development, as explained in paragraph 6.03 above. Power generation and water eupply were not considered at appraisal time due to the lack of etudiee and deeigne. 8.03 Supervieion missions were adequately staffed, ueually with an irrigation engineer and an agriculturaliet, who were joined by an economiet on occaeione when the economic viability of the project wae checked. The mieeione were thorough, but the intervals between them were somewhat erratic. For example, 12 monthe elapeed between the second and third mieeione, and 15 monthe between the fourth and fifth missions. There wae, however, one ehort mieeion in between the fourth and fifth mieeione to Mexico City to diecuse the implementation probleme of numeroue projects in the portfolio at that time. The 15-month interval was a critical period. The project wae being reformulated by the Government, and the Bank ehould have been more directly involved. The fifth mission in early 1984 was compreheneive and included an in-depth ex-poet analyeie of the Government's scheme for project revieion that eventually led to a major amendment to the legal documents in January 1985. The intervale between the majority of the remaining mieeione up to 1988 were eix monthe. From 1988 to loan closing in mid-1991 the intervals extended from eight to 12 monthe. In the face of investment reetrictione during much of thie latter period there was no need for cloeer supervieion. 8.04 Continuity of Bank staff dealing with the project wae leee than ideal, that eleven yeare elapeed from appraieal to loan cloeing undoubtedly contributed. During thie period eix different engineers, five different agriculturaliete, and three economiete participated in 15 mieeione. 8.05 Final deeigne for major civil worke in the right and left main Chilatan canale were not ready at the time of loan effectiveneee, which resulted in implementation and diebureement delays. (Financial reetrictione overehadowed the problems caused by deeign delays, however.) Thie wae the classic leeeon of many similar infrastructure projects and it prompted the Bank to introduce the requirement of submitting final designs at the time of Board presentation (OMS 2.28 - October, 1978, State of Project Preparation Neceeeary for Loan Approval). 8.06 Another leeeon relates to agricultural extension. Experience highlights the difficulty of strengthening an exteneion agency in a project area when the agency ie subject to institutional and administrative norms and reetrictione imposed at national level. Attempts to overcome ehortcominge have a better chance of success through a nationally focused project, as in the case of the Agricultural Extension Project and the Agricultural Technology Project. 9. Borrower Performance 9.01 The major strength of the Borrower was the executing agency's (SARH, later CNA) dedication and expertiee in construction. Continuity of thie expertise wae maintained despite budget constraints and two major reorganizations of SARH. The main weaknesses were in contracting proceduree, maintenance of canale, and exteneion. The eetabliehed practice of SARH in moet of its hydraulic infrastructure projecte including Apatzingan was to divide the conetruction of irrigation civil works into small eegmente. The result wae a large number of small contractors working on the same worke,  thereby complicating taupervieion, prolonging construction, and usually resulting in increased costa. One of the leseone learned by the Borrower in this project (as well as in the Rio Fuerte-Rio Sinaloa Irrigation Project, Loan 1706-ME) was the coat-effectiveness of changing (in 1990-1991) to larger contracts that attracted bigger contractors in a more competitive basis. The deficiencies associated with maintenance and agricultural extension were discussed in paragraphs 5.07-5.09. 9.02 Except for the fault with contracting practices, the civil works component of the project was generally well managed by SARH and later by CNA. Supervision missions were initially concerned about the inadequacy of the management and coordination of extension and agricultural planning. By the end of 1983, however, improvements were apparent in the management of these programs but budgetary resources became scarce, thus delaying project implementation. 9.03 Performance in reporting wae initially poor. The first semi-annual report was received almost two yeare after loan effectiveneee, and it included information only about civil worke. Timelineee of the reports improved, but reporting on aspects other than civil works was spotty. 9.04 The executing agency deployed ite own staff effectively. CNA relocated project construction headquarters in early 1991 from Apatzingan to a new building near Tepalcatepec, closer to the construction site. The Irrigation District office is expected to move there in the near future. Management of local consultants was mixed. Mention has been made of the tardy completion of the final designe for main canals and the final report of the panel of experts for the dam. By contrast, use of an international firm to design the automated irrigation eyetem has been exceptionally effective. 10.01 The main strength of the Bank-Borrower partnership was the common recognition of the pragmatic need to reduce the scope of the project given budgetary constraints related to the adveree macroeconomic environment. The main weakness was the breakdown in communication between the two as the project was being reformulated during 1983, which resulted in the Bank accepting the decieion of the Government on the bade of an ex-poet evaluation in 1984. The relationships of the Bank and the Borrower with other Government agencies such as the Secretariat of Finance and Public credit (SHCP) and the Secretariat of Planning and Programing (SPP) worked along well established lines of authority. 11. Coneultina Services 11.01 The Borrower employed national consulting services during project preparation to provide the feasibility etudy, the final designs for the left and right bank irrigation systems, the Chilatan dam and to meet the Bank's and Government's requirement for verifying dam deeign and safety (panel of experts). Their technical performance wae eatiefactory, although delivery of the final designs wae late, ae already mentioned. An international consulting firm wae contracted later during project implementation (1990- 1991) to design a fully automated eyetem for a portion of the project area (chilatan right bank system). It hae performed well, and CNA is now installing the eyetem in accordance with the firm'e recommendations. In 1991  another national coneulting company was contracted to update the feasibility etudy on the new project conditionalitiee. There were no unusual probleme with the conetruction contractore. 12. proiect Documentation and Data 12.01 Project preparation and ite SAR were baeed on satiefactory baseline data regarding eoil, hydrology and engineering and provided good guidance for implementation. The only problem was the delay in the preparation of the detailed deeigne for the Chilatan Irrigation Syetem. 12.02 The legal documents for the project adequately reflected the agreements reached during negotiations. One of the weaknessee of the legal documente, for thie project and others, which was brought to the attention of the Bank by the Borrower, was the variation in threehold amount6 for ICB procurement among similar irrigation projecte in Mexico. Thie variation caueed eome confueion and made monitoring difficult. Threehold amounts were eubeequently standardized among projects. There wae one major amendment in January 1985 reflecting agreement on reducing the ecope of the project to be financed from the loan. Subsequent amendments reduced loan eize, increased disbursement percentages, and extended loan cloeing datee. 12.03 The Staff Appraisal Report wae comprehensive and detailed, and eerved ae a ueeful tool for project implementation. Supervision reporte provided satiefactory information neceeeary for the preparation of the PCR. The information the Bank aeked to be made available before the final combined eupervieion and completion mieeion in November 1991 was incomplete. Coneiderable additional input was required to calculate project benefits, particularly on investment coete and etatietical data on agricultural production. The semi-annual progress reporte submitted to the Bank by the Borrower should have been more complete in their coverage of agriculture eupport eervicee and agricultural production (para. 9.03). 13. Leesons Learned 13.01 The project wae negatively affected by an unfavorable macroeconomic environment, inetitutional instability, and severe funding conetrainte. Thie confirme the importance of a sound macroeconomic and inetitutional context ae a condition for eucceeeful project implementation. The project aleo demonstrates what can be achieved in the face of severe financial conetrainte if both Borrower and Bank remain flexible in revising a project'e original scope. The main achievements were the completion of a major storage dam (Chilatan), the advanced implementation etage of the left and right canal and the entrepreneurial developmente of high value crope integrated with markets and the industrial sector. 13.02 Apatzingan is a typical multipurpoee water project that includes irrigation ae a major objective. Significant benefits also can come from power generation, flood control, and municipal water eupply. Theee benefits were not taken into account in the original project design. A power plant wae included later in the project implementation period to maximize benefits from the uee of water of the Chilatan reservoir. Agricultural and non-agricultural activities are complementary and should be considered together at the planning phaee, particularly when large inveetments euch as dams are at stake.  13.03 The project experienced some small implementation problems resulting from tardy completion of designs for major civil works in the main canal system. In this case, the designs were not ready at the time of project effectiveness (see para. 8.05). The acceptance of this delay contributed to the tardy implementation of the main canals. Final designs of major components should always be required before effectiveness. 13.04 A major lesson learned fron implementation concerned the gains in cost-effectiveness and timely construction resulting from CNA's switch to large contracts for civil works instead of numerous small contracts. The SARH had regularly relied on small contracts in most of its hydraulic infrastructure projects. The result of switching to larger contracts (1990- 1991) was cost-effectiveness thus attracting larger contractors on a more competitive basis. 13.05 A good lesson for similar irrigation systems is the adoption of new water control technology (hydraulic automatic structures and telemetric controls). This technology was introduced in the right bank main canal and its distribution system and demonstrated how modern technology can be applied to the new Mexican systems. The final construction costs demonstrated that the additional costs were negligible compared to the gains in efficiency and flexibility of operation and in water savings. 13.06 The significant growth of agricultural processing in the project area directly related to agricultural production (packing facilities and oil extraction plants) indicates that substantial secondary benefits can be gained from irrigation projects. Despite the project's shortfalls, it was able to bring about substantial economic development in the region. In particular, it reflects the great potential of the area for tropical agriculture and shows that further investment aimed at improving the efficiency of water use (the limiting factor for expansion) would be worth considering. 13.07 A further lesson is the difficulty of predicting changes in the cropping pattern. The Project Appraisal Report projected production increases in three crops (soybeans, peanuts and cotton) that are not being produced in the area now, mostly because these are not as profitable and/or marketable as fruit and vegetables. And the most rapid expansion has been in crops not highlighted in the Project Appraisal Report. The overall cropping pattern is now well diversified and adjusted to market demands. The Government's market- oriented policy during the final project years (1989-91) favored the development of competitive commercial crop production along with the expansion of private technical assistance. This had positive effects on the performance of large-scale irrigation in Mexico. 13.08 Another lesson relates to agricultural extension. Experience highlights the difficulty of strengthening an extension agency in a project area when the agency is subject to institutional and administrative norms and to restrictions imposed at the national level. Attempts for shortcomings have a better chance of success through a nationally focused project, as in the case of the Agricultural Extension Project and the Agricultural Technology Project.   APATZINGAN IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1858-ME) PART 11 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT 1. Introduction 1.01 On the behalf of the Borrower (NAFIN), the Comisi6n Nacional del Agua (CNA), Subdirecci6n General de Planeaci6n y Finanzas, prepared an ex-post evaluation of the project and delivered a draft copy of the summary (Part 11) to the Bank, translated into English, by mid-February, 1993. The full evaluation report in Spanish so far was not delivered to the Bank but is expected to come soon. This section contains a summary of the main report, focusing in the Government's view and the conclusions reached regarding its own and Bank's performance and the lessons to be learned from the Apatzingan Project (Cupatitzio-Tepalcatepec). 1.02 The progress established with respect to the construction of the works included in the project, indicate that at present, the storage dam of Chilatan is finished, which represents the most important head work of the projected irrigation system. The water conveyance works and the irrigation zones are still in process of being constructed, with limited headway, though completion of these works is expected around 1995. 1.03 Due to this stage of advance in the implementation of the Project, and the time required for the full development of the agricultural activities of this kind of project, the conclusions that can be drawn up to the present cannot be terminating, especially in relation with issues such as cost variations, the project's impact on local agricultural production and the present, and the lessons that can be obtained. 1.04 For the above reasons, the comments expressed in the following text will place greater emphasis on the project development observed up to the present, and the lessons that can be obtained. 2. Bank Performance 2.01 Bank performance during the presentation and initial evaluation of the project, as well as during the implementation period in which the credit was disbursed, was considered, in general, satisfactory, and in some aspects, even outstanding. 2.02 Especially when confronted by the adverse circumstances that brought about the severe funding constraints that the project had to cope with during the disbursement of the credit, and that provoked serious delays in the contruction process, the Bank demonstrated great adaptability and dedication to the project's implementation. 2.03 These attitudes of the Bank permitted the Government to rely on its participation during a much longer period than that originally foreseen.  In this way, the project benefitted from considerable funding support that, under other circumstances, would have been negligible. Moreover, it must also be recognized that these same positive attitudes made possible the important changes that were required during the adjustment of the project's scope because of the financial crisis of that time. The aforementioned changes implied a considerable reduction in financial costa that would have been incurred under the original loan conditions. 2.04 The Bank also played the role of promoter of technological changes, by recognizing, and decidedly supporting, the modification of the systems for water metering and control structures in the conveyances and dietribution network of the irrigation system. This facilitated the change to automatic systems with greater operations efficiency that, at relatively low cost, will permit in the future to cover greater cropped areas and consequently, generate additional benefits for the Apatzingan Irrigation District. The installation and operation of these systems will be useful for demonstration purposes for other irrigation systems in Mexico. It will not only be useful for training technical staff in the use of modern technology in this kind of operations, but also will serve to foment the introduction of those techniques that prove to be most adequate for the development of irrigated areas. 2.05 The financial participation of the Bank in the project's cost was appropriate. On several occasions, the disbursement percentages were modified in order to help solve the problems brought about by the financial crisis, and in order to be able to adapt to the changes provoked temporarily in the cost structure of the Project by the occurrence of sudden important variations in the exchange rate of the Mexican currency. Otherwise, the procedure and completion of the disbursements were done efficiently and without undue difficulties. Moreover, the Bank has accepted to continue collaborating in the funding of the Project after the conclusion of its participation under the Loan 1858-ME, through a credit supporting the Irrigation and Drainage Sector Program. 2.06 The Bank's supervision of the project was most useful as it propitiated valuable technical interchange and collaboration for a better instrumentation of the Project. 3. Government Performance 3.01 The preparation of the project was carried out successfully by the Mexican Government. Studies were carried out with appropriate depth and scope, sufficiently so as to be able to propose correctly and exactly, according to the criterion of that time, the best options for the works required for the improvement and expansion of the District that would permit a rational exploitation of the available hydroagricultural resources of the zone. However, it must be recognized that there were probably certain deficiencies in the inter-institutional activities that sought to achieve multiple benefits from the hydraulic potential for irrigation and the generation of electrical energy. Perhaps the design of the Chilatan Dam could have obtained more benefite of the runoffe it regulatee. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the omission of the generation of electricity in the preliminary stage of the project was due, at leaet in part, to the abundant existing supply of electricity at that time and market conditions  t h a t indicated t h a t t h e installment of a generating plant i n Chilatan was not sufficiently attractive. 3.02 The coneiderable delay and redeeign t o which t h e project was submitted during its implementation w e r e t h e direct effect6 of t h e economic c r i e i e t h a t occurred i n Mexico a t t h e beginning of t h e decade of t h e eighties. Given t h e d i f f i c u l t y of foreeeeing euch circumetancee and t h e i r duration, it would eeem unjuetified t o coneider t h a t t h e planned implementation program was too ambitioue. In t h i e eenee, it ehould be taken i n t o account t h a t t h e main problem t h a t affected t h e implementation of t h e project, ae i n t h e caee of many othere, even on an international ecale, wae derived from a macroeconomic context t h a t eurpaeeed t h e poeeibilitiee of internal maneuvering. From t h i e perspective, it i e clear t h a t t h e adjuetmente made i n t h e project'e ecope, w e r e eolutione demanded by circumetancee, adopted i n order t o be able t o continue t o give an Fmpulee t o t h e development of t h e d i e t r i c t e , notwithetanding t h e limitatione m e e d by funding conetrainte. Under theee terme, t h e Mexican Government demonetrated t o be flexible and pragmatic i n i t e decieione regarding t h e implementation of t h e project. 3.03 The project has been put into operation following t h e normal procedure6 of t h e Government, t h a t i n general, eeem t o be functional. Certainly there have been probleme during t h e implementation of t h e agricultural technical aeeietance programe and t h e coneervation of t h e Dietrict. Theee have been t h e reeult of, apart from t h e already mentioned funding conetrainte, t h e modificatione i n national policiee, which now expreee t h e need t o place emphaeie on greater beneficiary participation i n t h e payment of t h e coete of irrigation-related activitiee. Although with t h i e i n i t i a t i v e it can be expected that farm activitiee w i l l become more eelf-eufficient, and t h e eervicee more efficient, it i e aleo t r u e t h a t theee policiee have implied, i n t h e caee of t h i e project, t h a t t h e inteneity of t h e reepective worke hae been lees than t h a t programmed. However, it i e coneidered t h a t there has been progreee i n t h e improvement of t h e eervicee and it i e foreeeen that, with t h e etimulue t h e Government hae given t o t h e tranefer of t h e Districte t o t h e ueere, and t h e organization of t h e l a t t e r t o operate, coneerve and administer t h e i r eyeteme, i n a relatively short time, theee w i l l reach eatisfactory levele of operation, especially with reepect t o t h e coneervation of t h e infraetructure. 3.04 The construction of t h e worke of t h e project is coneidered t o have been carried out i n accordance with approved technical c r i t e r i a and with adequate quality. Moreover, during t h e implementation of t h e Apatzingan Project, with Bank eupport, t h e Government opted f o r t h e inetallation of equipment and infraetructure correeponding t o an advanced and eeldom ueed technology which offere coneiderable advantage6 f o r irrigation water management and permite reaching higher efficiency levels than those obtained with t h e traditional techniques included originally i n t h e project. The Mexican Government decided t o modify t h e deeign of t h e Chilatan Dam i n order t o permit t h e inetallment of an e l e c t r i c a l energy plant t h a t w i l l produce important additional benefite, beeidee thoee related with irrigation. 4. peeulte Achieved 4.01 The completion of t h e Chilatan Dam and t h e progreee achieved i n water conveyance and dietribution eyeteme have already permitted t h e  incorporation into irrigation of soma areas and an improved supply of irrigation eervicee t o a considerable area. These effects are becoming more noticeable i n the farm production of the area as the project keeps progressing and the agricultural production processes begin t o consolidate. 4.02 Up t o the present, there are more positive modifications i n the production schemes. The cropped area has increased, especially that of crops with high commercial value euch as orchards and vegetable.. However, thie progress should be judged with precaution, as due t o its recent existence and yet limited ecale, it is not easy t o determine up t o what extent the mentioned changes have occurred as the reeult of the implementation of the project, and t o what extent they are the reeult of other promotion activities implanted by the Mexican agricultural sector and market changee. 4.03 A t present it is foreseen that the real cost of the project, up t o its completion, w i l l be less than that calculated in the original studies, that is, nearly 1.2 t r i l l i o n peso., a t 1991 prices, instead of the original budget of 1.5 t r i l l i o n pesos, also a t the same prices. In spite of the above, due mainly t o the delays i n obtaining benefits, as the result of the slowdown of the works in the irrigation zone and the limited impact on farm production, and due also t o the discapitalieation of the agricultural sector and delaye in the availability of technical amsietance, it is considered that the income return of the project w i l l be modest, i f we exclude the benefits from the generation of electricity. These additional benefit. w i l l mean an important increase i n the t o t a l net benefits, improving the global income return of the project . 5. -8 and Lasons Learned 5.01 It is obvious that an important recommendation derived from the Project is t o give a etimulu. t o multipurpose projects for the exploitation of available resources. In thie sense, it is coneidered necessary t o concentrate on an analysis of multiple objectives in the preliminary investment etudy stage, when the scale and general characteristic. of the projecte are determined. 5.02 Moreover, given the positive results i n Apateingan, the analysis and application, when pertinent, of more modern methods of water control and metering in the conveyance and distribution networks in other Mexican Irrigation Districts are t o be reconmended, especially i n thoee syeteme with a limited supply of water and high productivity potential. 5.03 In new projects as -11 as other operation systems with important but underexploited potential, it is urgent t o mearch for new alternatives that would guarantee the availability of the other support services for production, euch as credits and technical aesietance of adequate intensity and quality. The availability of these services, up t o now, has frequently escaped the control capacity of the local authorities that implement the projects, and t h i s shortcoming, has had an important impact on the targets of farm production that have been only partially reached. Because of the primordial importance of theee services for the success of the projecte, it is recommended t o analyze alternative mechanisms in order t o assure their availability i n the project areas.  ION PROJ4ET (Loan 1858-XB)   PART I11 TABLE 1 Page 1 of 2 MEXICO WATZINGAN IRRIGATION PROJECT (Loan 1858-a) 04/28/66-12/31/73 01/25/68-06/30/77 07/11/78-06/06/81 02/19/74-06/08/81 05/08/75-09/30/83 10/14/80-12/31/86 03/16/82-12/31/88 Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 07/30/79-06/30/91  PARTm TABLE1 Pqo2of2 LarJlitl. -P-. Y a u mtu r t . m-v Ln. W-M Prxro D m l a p 137,000 ho of 1974 Carpleted i n Slow Implementation, Irriytim Project. irriytim lmd in the 1982. design deficiencies, Lorn: UStTlll Prxro b i n , includlm budget constraints and -1. L o n : contructim of r', lack of technical uSS25M. irriytim Infrostructwr, aerletance. m d p r w i e i m of Reevaluated i n 1978. rgricultural u r v i c n Objectives partiall y attained. Main Issues: Lou water charges and poor w; poor accomtinge; poor comterpart fuding; cost overrurs. Ln. 979-M S i n l w D m l a p 105,000 ha of 1974 Capletad in SLw inplamtation for Irrig. Project. irrlg. Lmd 1982. e n r reasons as above. Lon: USS7M in the Sinlocl Revised i n 1978: b i n , incl. c o n t n r t i m Irrigation targets of r'md frrig. r h e d and carpleted infrostructure, nd uder Sinelm 2. prwirim of agr. Revised objectives rervicn. achieved. Main issuer: low water charges and poor OW. Ln. 1106-rn Rfo P w t i r l r d o b i l f t r t f m of 1979 Carpletad i n PCR mder preparation TurteMfo S i n l o r the Rio t u r t e I r r i y t i o n 1-1. (as of September, Project Lon: US892 I( Dirtrict (60,000 ha) md 1992). capletion of 76,000 ha in the Rio S i n l w Irriytim Dirtrict. Ln. 1 m - M Dml-t of 10,000 ha 1981 Capletad. PCR carpleted Apri 1, Ocormi Irrfg. of irriytd Lmd md 1989. Report no. 7782. Project. prwirim of tochnicrl Lon: USWm .uirt. Ln. 2100-M k j o Rio Rahrbilitrtion of 105,000 1- Carpletad. PCR carpleted December, Brrvo/Rio Sm J u n ho m d prwirim of mar. 1988. Report No. 7578. Irrfg. R.k.bi1. u r v l m a cworine Project. 208,000 ha. Loon: uSs1m Ln. 3419-M Ilobmfration of the 1Wl Effective by The project i s expected Irriytim md Ikxicm irriytion J u n 1992. to caaplete the Drrimg8 k t t o r ruk.ctor, thr- the rehabi1Itation progrm Project. r.k.bf1ftrtim nd and correct OW Lon: UsUoOM trrnfu to urn of 21 deficiencies of the f r r f y t i m dfrtrfctr at comtry'e nmin n t f o n l Lml. irrigation schemcs (including Rio Fwrte/Rio Sineloa).  PART I11 TABLE 2 Page 1 of 2 - Board Approval - - Signature Date Date of Effectiveneaa Source: Divieional'8lack Booka and Project Timetables COMMENTS: lIesues raised at each ataae of nroiect cvcle Identification: No special conrmenta Project Preparation: Minor delay. of only about three months Appraisal: Appraisal miaaion war, on achedule Date of Effectiveneaar Date of effectiveneaa war, December 19, 1980, four month. later than planned, due to amall delays in providing technical information Closing Date: The cloming date waa extended four times (a total of four years) from the original cloeing date of June 30, 1987 (on 06/30/88, 06/30/89, 12/31/90; and 06/30/91)   PART I11 TABLE 3A 8PATZINGAN IRRIGATION PROJECT (Loan 1858-ME) CUMULATIVE ESTIHATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEEUSNT (US$ million) Date of Final Diebureementr 06/30/91 Amount Canceled1 USS95.6 million Original Cloeing Date: 06/30/87 Actual Cloeing Dater 06/30/91     MEXICO MATZINGAN IRRIGATIONPRO= 1858-rn PRO= PINANCINO d bl21 (In uss million) P l u u r d h n S ofTotrl P i d S ofTotrl Soumeof Fincing &-mat Fincing 08105191 F i i n g Commoatr - IBRD 1. Civil Worh and Enpineering 113.00 27.6 58.46 40.1 2. Land L e v e l i and Clearing 16.80 4.1 1.52 1.O 3. Equipment 5.00 1.2 1.76 1.2 4. On-farm Development. Externion, 6.20 1.5 2.65 1.8 Training, Studie8and Technical Support 5. UnallocatcdlProntInd Fee 19.00 4.7 0.01 TOTAL IBRD 39.1 64.40 44.1 !# 160.00 -GOM 248.80 60.9 81.53 55.9 d TOTAL FINANCING 408.80 100 145.93 100 a/ Final amountr includii thore documented h g btho rpockl account. 3 USS90.0 million were canceled from the Bank lou~ 08/18/87. on cl An additional USS5.6 million fromthe Bank loan were c.ncelod on August, 1988. -dl From the total Bank loan USS2.97 millionhave been dnam on the rpocial accountwhich hrvsbwn fully documentedu of 0810511991. el GOM contributiornare calcuhtcd by rubtrrctingWorld Banktotal ffitrul dirbummcatr from actrul project exponditurn, exclub taxer.   PART 111 TABLE 4D MEXICO &PATZINGAN IRRIGATION E B Q J E a (LOAN 1858-ME) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ORIGINAL PROJECT COSTS L e f t Bank S y s t e m T o t a l C o s t s P a r a c u a r o A r e a C a j o n e e A r e a M a c h i n e r y 61 E q u i p m e n t -: SAR - Annex I1 - T a b l e s 1 5 and 16.  PART 111 TABLE 5A ION PROJECT (LQm1858-la)  ANDVOLUMEOF W m O N OF MAJOR CROPS:1982-1991 .IIncludcrnuh,pinrorphum,.Idrice.  ElwLLu TABLE SC TURBINE EFFICIENCY POWER CAPACITY ROTATION VELOCITY 327.27 r.p.m. OUTLET VELOCITY 618 r.p.m. SPECIFIC ROTATION VELOCITY FLOW CAPACITY PER UNIT NET MAXIMUM HEAD NET MAXIMUM DESIGN HEAD GENERATOR EFFICIENCY POWER FACTOR INSTALLED CAPACITY ANNUAL GENERATION AVERAGE 120.96 GWh  PART 111 TABLE 6 Page 1 of 2 MEXICO Rojoct (including itr wlt), the rtlultr echicvcdby the Roject, and the extent to which the investment. operation and maintenancecorrtr of the faciliticl provided under the Project havebocn recovered or required by the provisionsof thu Agreement,to identifythe gooband mrvices f i n dout of the "p& of the Loan. and to d i l o ntheir u n in the Roject; (ii) amble the Bank's accralikd rcprwmtativuto visit the facilitierand construction sites includedin the Projectand to examinetbe goodsfinancedout of the p d of the Lorn and any relevant recordsanddocumcatr;and (iii) furnirh or caumto be furnishedto the Banlc sucho t k informationMthe Bank shall rcaronably request concerningthe Roject, the expmditureof such proceedsand the goodsand &icu finnncedout of suchp r o d s . Seaion 3.04 (c) The GOM, promptly dtw completionof tboProject. -192 Compliance I but in any eventnot lnta than om you &the ongoing ClosingDateor such lstn dateMmay beagreedfor this purposcbetween the GOM and the Bank, prepare and furnish to the Banlc r q m t t on tbo exccutionand initial operationof the Roject, itr wrt and benefitr and on the accomplirhmentof the purpose4of the Lorn. Section3.06 The GOM shall tdce or c a w to bcuken all ouch An required Complied with actionMshall bc neceararyto acquireMand when needed all such land and rightr in rcrpcct of land M ahall be r q u i d for w i n g out the Rojed.  PART 111 TABLE 6 Page 2 of 2  PART I11 TABLE 7A - WATZINGAN IRpIGAuON PROJECT (toan 1858-ME) JTSE OF STAFF RESOURCES (WEEKS Through Appraieal Appraieal Through Board Approval Through Effectiveness Source: Bank HIS and Divisional Black Booke.  PART m TABLE 78 MEXICO Bomww. Nwio~Fiiaa,S.A. I Exocutivo m:SABHCNA/WnruL d.A@uhun y BoCUMIHidnllUCOl-CornidonNacio~ldd Apu. FirdYou: J.ouuy 1 -Do~mbor31 -- Name of Cumacy (IbbnvLdoq): M o k PIIor (bcort) ~ C u m y Bxchap.Il.tr. A p p W You Avorap: (1978-79) USS1.00 MuS22.8 lntorvcningYou Avanp.: (1985-86) USS1.OO kIuU7S Lur Y w Awn-: (1991) USS1.OO = M.10,000 a = agriculfllCisf, b = m,=en*, c d finnnciptd y s t ; e = deputy divisionchiefi f = coanulm 1 = problem-free or minorproblem; 2 = modenteproblem; 3 = mjor problems; 4 = majorpmblenu, objectivmwill not be mst. F = fmau~irl;M = mmrgerirl; T = technical; P = politid, end 0 = otheroverall &/ Included time e p d mother PlOjeckl.