Documcnt of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MICROFICHE COPY Report No. 10406-MAG Type: (PCR) ReportNo. 10406 PANTON, W./ X31680 / T9 032/ OEDD1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1249-MAG) FEBRUARY 26, 1992 Agriculture Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. EXCHANGE RATKS Units Malagasy Franc (FMG) Year US$l equivalent 1982 349.7 1983 430.5 1984 576.6 1985 662.5 1986 676.3 1987 1,069.2 1988 1,407.1 MEASUREMENTS ANp WEIGHTS Metric Syatem ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASAC - Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit CSEP - P4blic sector Adjustment Credit (Cr6dit d'Ajustement Structural du Secteur Public). CcM - National Procurement Board (Comisesion Centrale do. March40) DZP - Department for Studies and Programming (Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation) DEFP - Department for Studies, Programming and Financing (Direction des Etudes, de la Programmation et du Financement, MPAEFW DFP - Directorate for Finance and Personnel (Direction FinanciOre et du Personnel, MPARA) DP - Programming Directorate (Direction de la Progranmation, MPARA) FIFABE - Regional Development Authority for the Betsiboka Valley (Comit6 d'Expansion Economique de la Plaine de Marovoay) FMG - Malagasy Franc (Franc Malgache) FOFIFA - National Center for Applied Research for Rural Development IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development IRRI - International Rice Research Institute ISNAR - International Service for National Agricultural Research MDRRA - Ministry of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (Ministere du D6veloppement Rural et de la R6forme Agraire) MPAEF - Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Forests (Minintere de la Production Animale, des Saux et des For8ta) MPARA - Minietry of Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform (Ministare de la Production Agricole et de la RWforms Agraire) M4RSTD - Ministry of Scientific and Technological Research for Development (Ministbre de la Recherche Scientifique et Technologique pour le D6veloppement) PCR - Project Completion Report PIP - Public Investment Program (Programme d'Investiseement Publique) PPF - Project Preparation Facility SAMANGOXY - Regional Development Authority for the Lower Mangoky Valley (Socift6 pour l'Am6nagement et la Mise en valeur de la Vall6e du Bas Mangoky) SCSR - Rice Sector Coordination Service (Service de Coordination du Secteur Rizicole) SDR - Rural Development Service (Service de Developpement Rural) SINPA - National Marketing Company for Agricultural Products (SociLt6 d'Int6r6t National dea Produits Agricoles) S0DEM40 - Regional Development Authority for the Morondava Region (socift6 de Developpement Economique pour la RAgion de Moronda a) SOMALAC - Regional Development Authority for the Lac Alaotra Region (SociftG Malgache pour 1'Am6nagement du Lac Alaotra) FISCAL YEAR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MADAGASCAR: January 1 - December 31 THE WORLD BANK R om UM ONL Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. g#ce of Directm-.Cetral OperatinF Evaluatiion February 26, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Madagascar - Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Proiect (Credit 1249-MAG) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Madagascar - Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Program (Credit 1249-MAG)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipionnts only in the perfonnance of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bankt authorization. FOR OFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ATIA I) (CREDIT 1249-MAG) Table of Contents Preface ......................................... . . . . . ..... O.i Evaluation Summary ............................................... iii Part I: Project Review from IDA's Perspective 1. Project Identity .................... ........................ 1 2. Project Background ................................... ...... . 1 3. Project Objectives and Description . .. ....... 3 4. Project Design and Organization ................................ 4 5. Project Implementation ......................................... 4 6. Project Results ....... ...... . . ....... 5 7. Financial Results ............................................ 12 8. Sustainability . . ...................................... . ... 12 9. Bank Performance ........................................... 13 10. Borrower Performance . .................................... 13 11. Consulting Services . ............ ................. ....... 13 12. Documentation and Files . .... .......................... 14 Part II: Project Review from Borrower's Perspective A. Comments from the Ministry for Livestock, Fisheries and Forests .......................... 15 B. Comments from the Ministry of Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform ........................ .......... .. ... 19 Part III: Statistical Information Table 1: Related IDA Credits ............... 25 Table 2: Project Timetable . . ..... 26 Table 3: Disbursements and Financing ............... 27 Table 4: Status of Covenants ................. 29 Table 5: Use of Bank Resources .......... 30 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ATIA I) (CREDIT 1249-MAG) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project for which Credit 1249-MAG in the amount of US$ 5.7 million was approved on February 23, 1982. The Credit was closed on June 30, 1987, two years behind schedule; the last disbursement w&s on January 26, 1988, at which time the undisbursed balance of US$ 0.05 million was canceled (1% of the credit). 1/ The Evaluation Summary, and Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division of the South-Central and Indian Ocean Department, Africa Regional Office. A draft was sent to the Government on June 7, 1989, and comments were received from the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Forestry, and the Ministry of Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform. These comments are presented in Part II. This document is based on reports (in particular the Memorandum of the President, the Credit Agreement, supervision reports and an OED Evaluation Study 2/) and correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower. 1/ The completion of this PCR was delayed by more than four years because a decision was made in FY 1989 to postpone writing the PCR until the follow-on project, the Second Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project (ATIA II), was completed. This decision was supported by the fact that the Operations Evaluations Department had already commenced with an evaluation study of the project in 1988. The decision was reversed in FY 1991 as a result of completion delays in the second project. 2/ Operations Evaluation Department, "Evaluation Study of Free- standing Technical Assistance in Support of Public Sector Management in sub-Saharan Africa - Madagascar Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project (ATIA I), A Case Study," April 13, 1989. - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ATIA I) (CREDIT 1249-MAG) EVALUATION SUMMARY Backqround 1.1 Agriculture is the dominant sector of the Malagasy economy, contributing at the time of project preparation about 40% of GDP and accounting for 80% of export earnings. The growth of agricultural production between 1970 and 1980 had been slow, with the average increase somewhat less than the population growth rate of 2.8% per year. This performance largely reflects the stagnation of rice and livestock production. 1.2 The reasons for the disappointing performance of the agricultural sector were complex and there were many interrelated causes. Some of the most critical related to policy, and institutional and managerial weaknesses. Principal factors included: (a) absence of a national consensus and workable policy measures to achieve sectoral objectives - .e-ially for the rice sub-sector, where inappropriate policies -id .seriously affected production), and the weakness of medium i ong-term investment planning; (b) disruption of the Ministry of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform's (MDRRA) tec.hnical services following the reorganization measures of 1979; (c) dilution of responsibilities among numerous institutions, limited coordination, and an absence of financial controls; (d) inflexible management structures and administrative procedures imposed on public sector companies as well as shortages of qualified technical staff; and (e) absence of links between research and extension services, leading to disparity between on-going research programs and research needs. Obiectives and Desian 2.1 The main project objectives were to address a number of the fundamental issues outlined above. Several studies were to be initiated as instruments to resolve these issues, for preparing specific action plans for reform where appropriate, and for developing the consensus for moving forward. In a number of instances, project activities wers expected to go beyond the option/consensus stage and would support the implementation of agreed reform programs. These objectives would be achieved by (i) strengthening the Ministry of Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform's (MPARA) capabilities for investment planning and project preparation; (ii) identifying action programs for achieving specific sector objectives, particularly concerning rice production; (iii) redefining the roles of key institutions responsibls for services to rice farmers and reforming them so that they could execute their functions more effectively; (iv) improving coordination among key agricultural institutions and sectoral programs; and (v) strengthening the agricultural research effort. - iv - 2.2 MPARA was to have primary responsibility for project implementation; within MP..A, the Director of the Studies and Programming Department (DEP) was to coordinate project activities and monitor all work in progress. The Rice Sector Coordinating Service (SCSR) was made responsible for the implementation of the short-term action plan for rice and related studies. Implementation Experience and Results 3.1 Taken as a whole, project implementation has been remarkably successful. Planned activities have been carried out (although sometimes in modified form), and project objectives have been largely attained. At the time of credit closing, sectoral planning was strong>r than it had been in 1981, performance of parastatals targeted for organ_.zation reform and management strengthening had improved, and a considerable reorganization a-' reorientation of programs was underway at MPARA, the Ministry of Lvestt- ': Fisheries and Forestry (MPAEF), and the National Center for Applied Rese_r for Rural Development (FOFIFA). 3.2 The project was to be implemented over two and a half years. Mid-way through the project; however, it became apparent that there were administrative weaknesses that seriously hampered implementation. The weaknesses consisted essentially of repeated delays in approving contracts for consultant services, delays in submission of disbursement requests, and failure to arrange for an audit. As a result of such delays, technical assistance to FOFIFA and the Regional Development Authority for the Morondava Region (SODEMO) needed to be corstinued beyond 1985 in order to achieve project objectives. 3.3 There is no question that ATIA I helped set in motion a process of Profound policy change. Its most clear-cut achievement was the liberalization of pricing and marketing of rice as a direct consequence of the sub-sector analysis. The Rice Study was convincing enough to persuade a number of influential officials that liberalization was the course to take. By 1985, there was enough confidence of the beneficial effects of liberalization to allow further steps. 'Rice millers emerged to compete with parastatals, and once-skeptical farmers responded eagerly to higher prices. One Bank staff member who visited the primary rice production zones in 1986 found farmers very positive about price liberalization and planning to invest in new equipment. Moreover, liberalization of rice marketing was followed by similar measures in other areas. 3.4 A second important component was parastatal management. Here too the initial impact of the project was fairly rapid improvement, which provided an impetus for further change. The restructured Regional Development Authority for the Lac Alaotra Region (SOMALAC) became the implementing agency for the Bank-financed Lac Alaotra Irrigation Project. The Regional Development Authority for the Betsiboka Valley (FIFABE) started implementing a similar rehabilitation project with German aid. Presently, both institutions are undergoing a further phase of restructuring and privatization now that their development mandates are completed. This illustrates the need for institutions to evolve, and institution building actions to evolve also. For the Regional Development Authority for the Lower Mangoky Valley (SAMANGOKY), the project was able to reduce its staff from over 900 to less than 300 subsequent to the audit. However, these measures proved inadequate to restore the institution's ability to provide services. Fundamental problems were a lack of underlying financial profitability of the irrigation scheme and a lack of cooperation among farmers and between farmers and the SAMANGOKY project authority. SAMANGOKY is presently in the process of being closed. The same conditions prevailed at SODEMO, which was closed in 1990. 3.5 Institution building in MPARA and MPAEF did not lend itself to easy solutions. New management techniques have been introduced; some have taken root, rothers not. Solutions in some areas revealed serious problems in other aruae Within MPARA the results of institution building have been mixed, qomet'w. es transitory. 3.6 In information management and planninq for the rice sector major progress was achieved and this was institutionalized with the creation within MPARA of a Food Security Department in 1986. This Department performed well during 1986-1989 in monitoring markets and in managing the buffer stock, one of the more successful Government activities of the decade. However, now that rice markets have been privatized, the raison d'Atre of the Department can be questioned. Its monitoring functions could be performed more efficiently if they were reintegrated within the Planning Department. It is not clear that t.se Department can or should take on a major new role in food security and institution interventions. This is another case where institution building needs to evolve over time. 3.7 Important advances within MPARA have undoubtedly been obtained in resource management. Investment programming, budgeting, and personnel management have all become more effective. They need, however, constant attention and improvement. 3.8 The project created the impetus for the development of an operational program: the National Agricultural Research Program (underway since 1990), the Agricultural Extension Pilot Project (1989) which will lead to a National Agricultural Extension Project (1993), the Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (underway since 1985), the rehabilitation and reorganizatis-n of the Lac Alaotra ;-rigation scheme under an IDA financed project (from 1983). In additioa many elements of the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (1986) wove pre ared under or made possible by ATIA I. Sustainability 4.1 Overall, gains within the ministries are fragile--they remain highly dependent on external encouragement and support. It is fo : this reason that the Bank agreed to finance a follow-on project: ATIA II. This project's main objective is to build on the achievements of the first project and to continue strengthening the capabilities of all ministries involved in agriculture (MPARA, MPAEF and Ministry of Scientific and Technological Research for Development - MRSTD); in particular to create a greater independence and responsibility of MPARA and MPAEF in developing their own systems. Findings and Lessons Learned 5.1 The project has, through both its successes and its failures, taught a number of important lessons: (a) First, etudies of the rice sub-sector kind are often ignored, but the study was good enough and timely enough to be used as a catalyst to bring about a major policy reform. The rice crisis, the receptivity and astuteness of the Rural Development Minister, the willingness of decision-makers to be convinced by good analysis, the readiness of producers and merchants to respond to price signals: all of these conditions permitted the study to have a decisive impact. Of the four, only the existence of the crisis was knowable in advance. The lesson is simply this and no more. If certain key actors are receptive, technical assistance is capable of providing a seminal study that starts a process of policy reform. - vi - (b) Second, using technical assistance as a tool for institutional development is a risky and fragile undertaking. Consultants who are able to adapt to the cultural environment, understand the needs of the institution, and teach use%l techniques con cont;.ibute to institutional development. Still, their contribution is ephemeral and cannot be sustainad unless counterparts accept and make the contribution of the consultant their own. Even when they desire to do this, they can be quickly thwarted by unreceptive higher authority, by reorganizations and transfers, or by changing circumstances. The only sustainable contribution is one that is adopted by counterparts as their own and then allowed to flourish and be made useful. At the conclusion of ATIA I, some contributions had reached this point at MPARA (financial management techniques, program budgeting, investment programming, rice sector surveys and analysis). By 1991, the contributions to the rice sector analysis and program budgeting had also come to fruition. At MPAEF, however, little gain was evident. At FOFIFA the gains were adequate to allow the start-up of the National Research Program. (C) Third, management and supervision of a relatively small but complex TA project like ATIA I have been extremely difficult. There were three principal actors (the Borrower, the Bank and tf.e Consultant), each with different views of what was urgent and what was important. The consultant firm may have an important presence of five or six people, while the Bank may be absent for long periods. Decisions are made and paths taken whose consequences are apparent only later. If there is no committee or unit with general oversight, as there was not for ATIA I, coordination is lost and the project becomes a myriad of activities some partially and others totally independent of each other. The only unifying force is the periodic Bank supervision mission. No matter how talented and energetic the mission, it is largely a fire fighter and a problem solver. Once it leaves there is no pressure to enforce solutions. The project tends to become what individual consultants and individual government units think it should be. The lesson from ATIA I is that for all its successes, it should have had an oversight committee to give it a sense of direction. d) Fourth, effective 4nternal management is necessary for a Ministry of Rural Development, Agriculture or Livestock. But it is not sufficient. What is also needed is (a) an ability to deliver essential services to its clients and (b) an external environment that will permit it to function effectively. If civil service regulations make it impossible to send ministry staff into the field to conduct routine business or if the Ministry of Finance refuses to accept the products of improved management at the technical ministry, then these constraints will eliminate the positive impact of the project. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ATIA I) (CREDIT 1249-MAG) PART I: Proiect Review from IDA's Perspective 1. Project Identity Name: Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project Credit Number: Cr. 1249-MAG RVP Unit: Africa Department: South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Country Madagascar Sector: Agriculture Subsector: Institution Building 2. Proiect Background 2.1 Agriculture is the dominant sector of the Malagasy economy, contributing at the time of project preparation about 40% of GDP and accounting for 80% of export earnings. The growth of agricultural production between 1970 and 1980 had been slow, with the average increase somewhat less than the population growth rate of 2.8% a year. This performance largely reflects the stagnation of rice and livestock production. 2.2 The reasons for the disappointing performance of the agricultural sector were complex and there were many interrelated causes. Some of the most critical related to policy, and to institutional and managerial weaknesses. Principal factors included: (a) absence of a national consensus and workable policy measures to achieve sectoral objectives (especially for the rice sub-sector, where inappropriate policies had seriously affected production), and the weakness of medium and long-term investment planning; (b) disruption of the Ministry of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform's (MDRRA) technical services following the reorganization measures of 1979; (c) dilution of responsibilities among numerous institutions, limited coordination, and an absence of financial controls; (d) inflexible management structures and administrative procedures imposed on public sector companies as well as shortages of qualified technical staff; and (e) absence of links between research and extension services, leading to disparity between on-going research programs and research needs. 2.3 The following sections provide more detail on the situation prior to ATIA I implementation. -2- The Rice Sub-Sector 2.4 Rice is the main staple in Madagascar. Paddy production, which had increased in excess of 4% per annum during the 1960's, had increased by lees than 0.5% per annum during the 1970's. A substantial public investment program in rice production scnemes had failed to yield results. Meanwhile- the growing irrelevancy of the National Agricultural Research Institute (FOFIFA) had cut Madagaecar off from international advances in rice production technology. As a result, Madagascar - previously a rice exporter - needed to import 350,000 tons of rice in 1982. Private trades in inputs had been suppressed by Government, while failing to provide them itself. In 1981, the Government held a .egal monopoly over paddy collection and rice distribution in deficit areas 'he country; producer and retail prices were set by Government at leve. c'dt subsidized the urban consumer at the expense of the farmer. In 1982, wLt}, effective state control over rice marketing, the G-ivernm%nt reaffirmed its monopoly and mandated stiff penalties for illegal trade in rice. Changes were considered essential, both in policy and in institution:il arrangements, but reform was seriously impeded by the exceptionally poor quality of data, particularly on marketing. MPARA Orcanizational Analysis 2.5 The Malagasy Government appointed an energetic Lsrfhnician as Minister of MDRRA at the beginning of 1982. At that time, the Ministry was still suffering from the effects of the 1978-79 decentralization, when many of the best civil servants had been transferred to provincial ser%ces or left the Ministry. One of the first actions undertaken by the new Minister was to revamp the Ministry. It was subsequently renamed Ministry for Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform (MPARA). 2.6 Personnel administration was an area of particular weakness. The ministry had inadequate personnel recordb. It is therefore not surprtsing that MPARA had neither a policy for staff development nor a training division. Most of its staff had received some technical training but lacked knowledge of management techniques aad systems. The Bank's Sector Me.orandum of June 1983 found that there were "no higher level staff in the Ministry trained in accounting or financial management." In fact, there were few adequately trained personnel in technical specialties at any level of the Ministry. At the same time there was an excess of lower level staff on renewable contract. Agricultural Investment Planning 2.7 M"RA's planning department was small and poorly equipped. It had little L.fluence on investment decisions, and as a result the agricultural sector was burdened with a number of projects that had been poorly planned and '*adequately reviewed. The Ministry's portfolio of projects had grown rapi.' in the 1970s and early 1980s as the number of donors multiplied. The exact number of projects was not known; their current financial operations and future financial burden for the state were largely not known either. parastatal Management 2.8 The parastatals suffered from severe financial mismanagement. The 1983 Sector Memorandum noted that "budgeting is virtually an unknown art, except for the annual investment budget exercise which has become largely meaningless..." Three major rice-producing parastatals were selected for audit under ATIA I. These were the Regional Development Authority for the Lower Mangoky Valley (SAMANGOKY), which was responsible for the administration of a US$12 million IDA credit; the Regional Development Authority for the Lac Alaotra Region (SOMALAC), covering an irrigated zone -3- where the Bank had provided a US$5 million loan in the early 19709; and the Regional Development Authority for the Betsiboka Valley (FIFABE), for whom German aid was anticipated. These particular parastatals "were once highly effective inatitutions," according to the President's Report of May 1982, but their "performance [had] deteriorated under an accretion of functions and the weight of Government policies." By 1982 they were in poor condition. The Sector Memorandum remarked, for example, that "SAMANGOKY had been brought to the verge of bankruptcy by bad decisions based on inadequate financial appraisals." FOFIFA 2.9 French agricultural research institutions left Madagascar in 1974. The branches of the French institutes were then nationalized and regrouped in the National Center for Applied Research for Rural Development (FOFIFA). This parastatal's shortcomings had become increasingly manifest as connections with the international agricultural research centers and links with national extension programs were allowed to slip away. In 1980 the Bank published a study on agricultural research which concluded that the national research structure was in a state of collapse. For at least a decade prior to ATIA there had been no varietal improvement for any crop, including rice, despite the development of successful new varieties by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines. 3. Proiect Obiectives and Description 3.1 The main project objectives were to address a number of the fundamental issues ,utlined above. Several studies were to be initiated as instruments for resolving these issues and for preparing action plans for reform as well as for developing the consensus for moving forward. In a number of instances project activities were expected to go beyond the option/consensus stage and would support the implementation of agreed upon reform programs, notably in: (i) strengthening MPARA's capabilities for investment planning and project preparation; (ii) identifying action prngrams for achieving specific sector objectives, particularly concerning rice production; (iii) reaefining the roles of the key institutions responsible for services to rice farmers and reforming them so that they could execute their functions more effectively; (iv) improving coordination among the key agricultural institutions and sectoral programs; and (v) strengthening the agricultural research effort. 3.2 Technical ascistance (290 person-months) was to be provided for two and one-half years. There were to be the following outputs: (a) three activitiee for the rice sub-sector: a study of input distribution, production and marketing; an action plan; and the creation of a rice coordinat.ng unit; (b) an organizational analysis leading to improved management of MPARA; (c) a three-year investment plan for the agricultural sector; (d) financial and management audits for selected parastatals; (e) management and operational support for the national agricultural research institution, FOFIFA; and (f) project preparation studies. - 4- 4. Proiect Design and Oraanization 4.1 Faced with the combination of institutional incapacity and counterproductive policies, the project's designers thought first of improving the supply of services to the rice sub-sector, where Bank-supported projects were doing poorly. However, even an agricultural services project could not avoid addressing the fundamental institutional and managerl.1 problems. As originally conceived, the project would have had the improvement of the institutional environment among its objectives. To the designers, this meant rethinking the missions and responsibilities of various institutions as well as improving management. Yet they were thinking in very modest terms with regard to technical assistance. The original cost of the project was estimated at US$15 million, of which only US$300,000 to US$500,000 was set aside for the institutional component. 4.2 In the course of two subsequent Bank missions to Madagascar, there was a considerable change in project content. The President of Madagascar had taken a personal interest in the project and it became apparent that the Government was willing to take a more practical, technocratic approach. There would be greater readiness to follow recommendations resulting from good analysis. Thus, Bank missions decided to focus more or technical support within the framework of a smaller project. The project's name was changed to Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project (ATIA). The cost was reduced to US$5 million, principally for consultant services. Emphasis was placed on studies, on diagnosis and on support for parastatals. The underlying institutional problems of the sector as a whole had now become the target. 4.3 MPARA was to have primary responsibility for project implementation; within MPARA, the Director of the Studies and Programming Department (DEP) was to coordinate project activities and monitor all work in progress. The Rice Sectoi Coordinating Service (SCSR) was made responsible for the implementation of the short-term action plan for rice and related studies. 5. Proiect Implementation Credit Effectivenese and Proiect Start-up 5.1 ATIA I moved quickly into its implementation stage under PPF funding of US$l million and the rapid selection of a consulting firm to begin work on MDRRA and the parastatals. The Credit was declared effective on December 16, 1982, about four months later than expected due to some minor administrative delays in processing the required legal documents. Im3lementation Schedule 5.2 The project was to be implemented over two and a half years. Mid-way through the project, however, it became apparent that there were administrative weaknesses that seriously hampered implementation. The weaknesses consisted essentially of repeated delays in approving contracts for consultant services, delays in submission of disbursement requests, and failure to arrange for an audit. As a result of such delays, assistance to FOFIFA and SODEMO needed to continue beyond 1985 in order to achieve project objectives. All other project activities were completed by the end of 1985. The credit closed on June 30, 1987, after a two-year extension. Proiect Costs and Financinc 5.3 No detailed cost estimates are available. An OED Evaluation Study 3/ stated that project costs had stayed within the appraisal estimate of SDR 6.1 million. All the same, a significant shift in allocations between components had taken place. The most significant shift was from the training component to outside consultants. Outside consultants received SDR 2.8 million rather than the SDR 1.5 million appraisal estimate and training got SDR 193,000 rather than the SDR 530,000 appraisal estimate. The increase in consulting services was to a large extent the result of the unforeseen creation of the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Forests (MPAEF). Training costs were much less than expected because MPARA and MPAEF failed to establish a coherent staff training program. Appraised and actual project costs and financing are shown in Table 3.C of Part III. Disbursements 5.4 Disbursements lagged significantly behind appraisal estimates throughout project implementation. The number of implementing agencies and cumbersome procurement procedures for equipment and consulting services further complicated the issue. The Credit's last disbursement was on January 26, 1988, at which time the undisbursed balance of US$ 0.05 million was canceled (1% of the credit). Planned and actual disbursements are shown in Table 3 of Part III. Procurement 5.5 Approval of contracts for consultant's service were routinely delayed by periods up to six manths because of a growing reluctance within the National Procurement Board (CCM) to award contracts to foreign consulting firms. On three occasionb, did MPARA have to ask the President to overrule decisions of the CCM in order to hire the preferred consultant firm. 5.6 Computerization of MPARA was seriously delayed by governmental policy on computer procurement. The chairman of the governmental computer committee had to sign an authorization letter for each piece of computer equipment allowed into the country. The issue seemed to be resolved by the end of the supervision mission in November 1984, when it appeared that international competitive bidding to supply computers would be allowed. It was not until January 1988, however, that computer imports were liberalized and other makes than the one approved by Government could be procured by government offices without special exemptions.4/ 5.7 IDA supervision missions consistently followed-up on procurement issues, but were unable to markedly expedite matters. 6. Project Results The Rice Sub-Sector 6.1 The rice sub-sector study began in September 1982, just prior to the creation of a new division in MPARA, the Rice Sector Coordination Service (SCSR). At the end of the first phase of its study, a preliminary report was presented by the consulting company in February 1983, which led directly to a 3/ Operations Evaluation Department, "MADAGASCAR - Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Proiect (ATIA I. Cr. 1249-MAG). A Case Studv," April 13, 1989. 4/ Although the USAID mission was exceptionally authorized by the terms of a grant agreement to import IBM computers for use at FOFIFA. series of measures taken by the Government in May and June 1983 to remove controls over rice marketing in all but the two major surplus areas. 6.2 The consultants had conducted urban consumption surveys, analyzed farming systems, studied marketing channels and monitored marketing reforms in all six provinces. Members of the team submitted a draft of their second phase report in November 1983. This dealz with measures to be taken when rice demand exceeded supply, with the reorganization of the National Marketing Company for Agricultural Products (SINPA) and with a system for continuzed monitoring and analysis of the sub-sector. 6.3 There were intense discussions on the report with officials of MPARA in August 1984, by which time the split-up of MPARA into two ministries had occurred (MPARA and the newly created MPAEF). As a result of these discussions, the report's recommendations were fully understood and supported within MPARA. The final version, disseminated in October 1984, was discussed at an inter-ministerial level. This process led to the creation of an inter- ministerial committee to formulate an action plan covering pricing, imports and marketing of rice. 6.4 The consultants were supposed to provide further assistance for training in August 1984 under an amendment to their second contract, but implementation was postponed because of delays in Government approval. Three training sessions were entrusted to an agro-business management institute in Paris by sub-contract and were conducted from mid-February to mid-April 1985. The topics treated were the basic principles of micro-economics, economic analysis of projects, and marketing and price analysis. A U.S. consulting firm trained staff of SCSR in market monitoring, household consumption surveys and data analysis. 6.5 Under the third contract, the consultants conducted seminars on microeconomic theory in early 1985 and assisted SCSR in assessing the impact of the 1983 rice reforms. Data gathering on -narket prices and urban consumption patterns by MPARA had become routine by 1985. 6.6 As the first phase of the rice study was being completed, SINPA virtually collapsed. It was unable to pay its employees in April and May 1983. This development was the immediate reason of the Government's rapid move to liberalize rice marketing. At the end of April the Minister of Rural Development announced to a consultative group of donors that the Government had adopted a new policy which would permit free marketing of local rice and the sale of imported rice at prices reflecting long-term world market trends. A Decree and a Ministerial Order published in May and June put the new policy into effect. The state ,nonopoly was replaced by free competition between private traders and public enterprises engaged in the trade, except in the SOMALAC and FIFABE project areas 5/. The establishment of indicative prices was intended to ensure reasonable prices, but these were never effective. 6.7 By the end of 1984 it was agreed that this component had made a substantial impact. Not only had the consultants' preliminary report helped to convince top officials to decontrol the rice pricing and marketing system. It had also led to the creation of an inter-ministerial committee to prepare an action plan for the subsector, which was considered as perhaps the most significant development, since lack of coordination in the sector had been a major weakness of government policy. 5/ The exceptions were significant because these two projects were providing 40% of marketed rice. 6.8 Further measures were taken in 1985, helped by pressure from the Bank and other donors, who gave assurances that food aid would be available in case of need. While liberalization was deliberately undercut at many points by government officials and cthers, there is evidence that the moves were successful in generating a supply response. This supply response allowed Madagascar to stop an accelerating increase in rice imports. Imports fell from 350,000 tons in 1982 to 60,000 tons in 1990, by which time Government had ceased official imports. The Bank supported Government during the whole of this period, up to 1986 under ATIA I, subsequently under the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (Cr. 1691-MAG), with policy and technical advise. MPARA Strenathenina 6.9 MPARA hired a French consulting firm in late 1982 to conduct a diagnostic study of the ministry's organization, identifying problems and recommending measures to resolve these problems. The consultants were in Madagascar from May to July and submitted a report in September 1983. The division of MPARA into two ministries (MPARA and MPAEF) occurred during the consultants' stay. They included both in their report. 6.10 Consultants worked with the two staff departments that were created in the 1983 reorganization: Programs, and Finance and Personnel 6/. They focused on four management systems: Sector programming and project monitoring and evaluation Finance and budget Personnel and training * Information 6.11 The five consultants assigned to these tasks arrived in July 1984 and remained for one year. They were joir.ed by personnel from two local sub- contractors, RINDRA and Fivoarana. 6.12 Ministry officials participated fully with the consultants in the diagnostic study. A steering committee of senior officials from both MPARA and MPAEF provided general direction to the consultants. The study was submitted in September 1983 and Ministry officials generally agreed with the consultants' findings (for example the overstaffing situation in regard to unskilled personnel, the lack of effective information and communication) and some of the recommendations had already been implemented (e.g., personnel units in both m.nistries). 6.13 A second contract was awarded to the consulting firm for the purpose of implementing the recommendations of its diagnostic study. The next phase involved implementation of recommendations. The consultants spent a year from mid-1984 to mid-1985 at the task. since the ministry's performance could be improved on many fronts, the perceptions of the consultants and of ministry staff sometimes diverged on the matter of what needs were most urgent. The responsiveness of outside consultants to the perceived needs of ministry staff was occasionally questioned as time passed. 6/ During project implementation, MPARA was divided into six departments, two staff departments and four line or technical departments (in French: "Direction"). The departments were sub- divided into services which in turn were sub-divided into divisions. The four line departments had branch offices in each of the six faritany (provinces). Staff departments (Programs and Finance and Personnel) received the bulk of ATIA I's support. - 8 - 6.14 By March 1985, activities focused on personnel management, budgets, sub-sector analysis methodology and project monitoring. Computerized systems were being developed by consultants, but few computers were available on which ministry personnel could be trained. The project procured four micro- computers for MPARA in 1985. 6.15 In the area of personnel management, detailed personnel surveys were carried out to identify training program priorities and lay the basis for future personnel policies. 6.16 To strengthen MPARA's capability in performing sub-sectoral analysis, data bases were developed to provide essential inputs and staff was trained in the use of these data for analysis purposes. 6.17 A system was designed to assist MPAR2 in project monitoring, however, by the end of the project, the system had not yet been fully implemented due to a shortage of qualified personnel and equipment. 6.18 Considerable effort was devoted to the development of program budgeting, even though use of the technique had not been foreseen by the project's designers. The consultants found that their Malagasy counterparts were very receptive to the idea because they wanted to gain better control over the ministry's activities. For a time the program budgeting activity proceeded without obstacle, but it later became apparent that the Ministry of Finance wanted only traditional budget presentations. Program budgeting was destined to remain strictly an internal exercise for the life of ATIA I, and additional efforts had to be devoted to the traditional budget on which Finance insisted. The new budgeting system had, however, enabled the Ministry to reduce the amount of time needed to prepare the annual budget. MPAEF Strengthenina 6.19 The creation of MPAEF had not been foreseen when ATIA I was designed. The existence of the new ministry obliged ATIA to duplicate much of its managerial, financial and personnel work. 6.20 The consulting firm, which had been contracted to do the investment planning exercise in MPARA in November 1982, was chosen to provide technical assistance to MPAEF, but start-up was delayed by six months in a dispute over the contract award. The technical assistance program covered a 13-month period from May 1984 to June 1985. The initial team had four members with specialties in economics and policy, personnel, and planning and finance. RINDRA, a local firm, was selected to participate as a sub-contractor but as late as November 1984, arrangements were still under review by MPAEF. 6.21 In the beginning, much emphasis was placed on organizational issues, which in retrospect was excessive. In particular, substantial effort was put into the definition of a new organizational structure while comparatively little attention was given to the change process and to the need to involve staff in the changes about to be introduced. Consequently, application of the niew structure affected work processes and required a significant period of adjuBtment. Overall, project results have been tenuous at best. 6.22 A personnel database was developed, after a survey of all staff throughout the country. By project closing, the system was not yet effectively used. 6.23 The project produced a strategy for each of the MPAEF sub-sectors (livestock, fisheries and forestry). These strategies were based on an in- depth review of each of the sub-sectors, and produced a valuable database and policy analysis tool. The further development of the system was, however, constrained by difficulties in managing and updating the database. In - 9 - addition, staff lacked sufficient economic training to interpret the data and use many of the analytic tools in the system. 6.24 A project monitoring system was developed, but not implemented due to a lack of computer equipment and because of a severe fragmentation of information within the Ministry. The system was designed to monitor the technical and economic performance of projects and was developed in conjunction with the budget monitoring system. Agricultural Investment Plannina 6.25 The investment planning exercise at MPARA began in November 1982. The consultants and a team of 15 Malagasy officials developed an Interim Investment Program consisting of 60 projects. A draft report was prepared in ten months but its presentation was delayed another two months because of the split up of MPARA in mid-1983. The original group of consultants was considered by the Minister to have done an excellent job. They trained Malagasy counterparts in the process, but this was destined to be a one-time effort, and the staff that gained good experience from the exercise were soon dispersed within the ministry. 6.26 A year later a French consultant arrived to work with the Program Departments of MPARA and MPAEF from mid-1984 to mid-1985 on methods for an annual revision of what came to be called the Public Investment Program (PIP). The draft three-year investment plan of November 1983 contained detailed dossiers on 60 projects, which were for the most part descriptive, not analytical and weak on economic analysis. Even so, the exercise had been quite useful. Most importantly, it had served as a training vehicle for 15 ministry staff. In addition, the two ministries now had a reasonably complete picture of their portfolios, which was not clear to anyone before. Developing the plan revealed the almost complete lack of sectoral and sub- sectoral strategies. The investment program consisted of a series of free- standing projects rather than sets of projects designed to implement strategies. It also became clear how little grasp the ministries had of project financial flows and future funding requirements, both from government budgets and from donors. Parastatal Manaaement 6.27 The consultant firm started its audits of FIFABE, SAMANGOKY and SOMALAC in August 1981. Audits of these parastatals produced financial and organizational analyses that led to the implementation of improved financial and organizational systems, under the financing of other donors (Germany for FIFABE and France for SOMALAC). Substantial improvements were achieved in the cases of SOMALAC and FIFABE. 6.28 Technical assistance to a fourth parastatal, SODEMO, had not been explicitly envisaged, although the Credit Agreement did provide for management audits of parastatals to be selected. The audits of the initial three parastatals prompted Government to attack management problems in other parastatals on its own, and MPARA began implementing a general reform program for parastatals under its authority. In this context it requested the Bank to provide technical assistance for the reorganization and reorientation of SODEMO. A Bank supervision mission in May 1983 was agreeable to the idea but made it conditional on the Government's release of funds for SODEMO's multi- year work program. Provision of technical assistance was delayed by the slow and at first only partial release of these funds. A management expert and a training specialist were finally provided to SODEMO for a two-year period starting September 1984. The management expert performed a useful service in revealing to the Government the extent of the financial crisis at SODEMO. There were enormous losses, overstaffing, and salary arrears of 9-12 months. - 10 - 6.29 As a result of the audits a training program was established for general managers and financial directors of selected parastatals, starting in early 1984. A local institution, the Centre Dour la Formation des Cadres, located south of the capital at Antsirab6, was the contractor for this component. Some 58 individuals representing 24 parastatals and the monitoring divisions of MPAEF and MPARA attended needs-assessment workshops and then attended the seminars. The judgement of participants in the training program was that it had been useful and relevant despite the inadequacy of physical facilities. The sessions revealed to ministry staff that they needed to define more precisely the respective roles of the ministry and of parastatal management. This led to efforts to clarify ministerial policies. Strenathening FOFIFA 6.30 At the Bank's suggestion, the Government asked the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) to conduct an in-depth review of FOFIFA's management and organization. This was done in January- February 1983. In essence, ISNAR found that FOFIFA was excessively compartmentalized, unresponsive to national research needs, inappropriately staffed, burdened with an unwieldy system of field stations, poorly managed, and inadequately funded. ISNAR rwcommended sweeping organizational and managerial changes, which were accepted by the Minister of Rural Development and quickly turned into proposals by ministry staff. The Bank was unwilling, however, to approve their implementation until some fundamental decisions were made about FOFIFA's role as a national research organization (particularly on the scope of activities and the required financing and organizational structures). 6.31 The project's initial focip was on the reorganization of FOFIFA along lines suggested by the ISNAR resort, but the Bank supervision mission of May 1983 considered it premature to reorganize without having resolved issues of research strategy, program priorities and program content. In October 1983 a new Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research for Development (MRSTD) was created and FOFIFA was placed under the aegis of this ministry. 6.32 A Bank supervision mission in October 1983 continued to emphasize the need for defining research objectives and priority programs before reorganizing FOFIFA as the ISNAR study had suggested. The mission would not agree to finance technical assistance until FOFIFA had a functioning Board of Directors, a Managing Director and a Scientific Committee. In addition, the mission insisted that FOFIFA, which had issued no financial statement since 1979, had to have an effective accounting and internal control system. Technical assistance was finally provided with the hiring of an agricultural research programmer and a financial director on two-year contracts. The former arrived in September 1984, but the latter's contract was delayed until March 1985. The late starting dates of these contracts deferred the completion date of the FOFIFA component until March 1987. With joint financing from USA-ID, seminars on farming systems research were conducted in 1985. 6.33 The choice of the research programming consultant was not fortuitous. ISNAR recommended several qualified individuals, but FOFIFA passed over several to pick someone who was not as well qualified. The consultant stayed four years at FOFIFA, working for both the first and second projects, but is considered to have contributed little to improved research programming. Bank supervision missions had failed to properly intervene in the selection process. 6.34 It was not until November 1984 that a supervision mission reached agreement with FOFIFA and MRSTD on procurement of computer, office and laboratory equipment, and supplies for the former. It was also agreed that a - 11 - laboratory equipment specialist would inventory existing FOFIFA equipment to see what needed repair or replacement. 6.35 Management improvements were slow to materialize. FOFIFA had, since 1979, been unable to pass an audit. It was not until 1986 that the agency's accounts could be certified by auditors. There were other delays. FOFIFA's Board was supposed to appoint a Director of Administration and Finance to replace the management consultant, but the position was not filled until early 1987, just as ATIA I support for FOFIFA was ending. Support to FOFIFA was continued under the follow-up project. Agricultural Extension 6.36 One component of ATIA I not explicitly planned was for technical assistance in agricultural extension. ATIA I provided to MPARA an adviser who was hired as an individual rather than through a consulting firm. This arrangement caused initial difficulty in finding a method to pay for the services. 6.37 When the consultant arrived in September 1984, expecting to be a Training & Visit (T&V) System advisor within the existing IFAD-supported Highland Rice Project (Ln 116-MAG), she discovered that there had been a misunderstanding. The zones where she was to work were not part of the IFAD- supported project, and there was no operating budget. Further, it became evident that the Director of the Extension Department and the Minister had conflicting expectations. The former intended to use the presence of an expatriate adviser as the justification for receiving increased resources, while the latter w3nted to start a T&V pilot activity without any additional budgetary resources. It was agreed that the consultant would be assigned the responsibility to design a pilot T&V effort in Antananarivo province. She was also to begin training staff in T&V methods for the 1985/86 agricultural year, but it was agreed that no additional budgetary resources were to be used. Bank staff did agree that the project would purchase mopeds and bicycles for extension staff. 6.38 Work in the two T&V pilot zones in the first year consisted of sharply cutting from 125 to 35 the number of extension agents and of reducing their data collection duties to allow them to concentrate on extension. This improved their morale. As a result of her activities, it was agreed that the pilot project area would be expanded, and eventually, these activities led to the Agricultural Extension Pilot Project (Cr. 2150-MAG), which was approved by the Board in May 1990. Proiect Preparation 6.39 Two contracts were financed from the Credit for the purpose of improving MPARA's project preparation. Rather than training MPARA staff to do a better job of appraising projects, the approach was to hire outside firms to carry out feasibility and engineering studies, because it was felt to be a more efficient use of available resources given budgetary constraints and the skills mix within the Ministry. One such contract was awarded to a consulting firm, which worked with MPARA staff on a system to inventory medium-scale irrigation schemes. Work under the contract was completed in early 1984. A second contract was awarded to a combined foreign/local group to conduct studies and prepare bid documents for rehabilitation work on three irrigated perimeters. The work on the irrigation schemes culminated in the formulation of the Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1589-MAG). - 12 - Training 6.40 Malagasy officials benefitted from training outside of Madagascar under ATIA I sponsorship, but there was considerably less of it than originally planned. At the end of 1985, when 81% of the Credit had been disbursed, only SDR 58,700 or 11% of the programmed amount had been spent on training. The training that was done tended to be ad hoc, used more as a supplementary incentive than as part of a systematic program to meet the most urgent needs of institutions and individuals. It was nonetheless thought to have been of good quality and to have been entrusted to good institutions. 7. Financial Results 7.1 No rates of return were calculated, because a technical assistance project is exempted from this requirement. 8. Sustainability 8.1 Taken as a whole, project implementation has been remarkably successful. Planned activities have been carried out (although sometimes in modified form), and project objectives have been largely attained. Sectoral planning has become stronger than it was in 1981, performance of parastatals targeted for organization reform and management strengthening was improving, and considerable reorganization and reorientations of programs were started at MPARA, MPAEF, and FOFIFA. 8.2 There is no question that ATIA I helped set in motion a process of profound policy change. Its most clear-cut achievement was the liberalization of pricing and marketing of rice as a direct consequence of the sub-sector analysis. The Rice Study was convincing enough to persuade a number of influential officials that liberalization was the course to take. By 1985, there was enough confidence of the beneficial effects of liberalization to allow further steps. Rice millers emerged to compete with parastatals, and once-skeptical farmers responded to higher prices. One Bank staff member who visited the primary rice production zones in 1986 found farmers ecstatic about prices and planning to invest in new equipment. What is more, liberalizing controls over rice marketing were followed by similar measures in other domains. 8.3 A second important component was parastatal management. Here too the initial impact of the project was fairly rapid improvement, which provided an impetus for further change. In fact, the parastatal component was important in carrying development agencies through a transition period, during which they implemented important projects. Their jobs are now done and it is up to farmers, with the support of government provided agricultural services, to take responsibility for management and maintenance of the irrigation schemes. All four parastatals included in the project now fit into Government's policy of transferring commercial activities to the private sector and for closing down non-viable activities. 8.4 Overall, gains within MPARA, MPAEF and FOFIFA were, however, fragile-- they remained highly dependent on external encouragement and support. It was for this reason that the Bank agreed to finance a follow-on project: ATIA II. This project's main objective is to build on the achievements of the first project and to continue strengthening the capabilities of all Ministries involved in agriculture (MPARA, MPAEF and MRSTD); in particular to create a greater independence and responsibility of MPARA and MPAEF in developing their own systems. - 13 - 9. Bank Performance 9.1 The project was closely supervised from Washington in its initial years. During the first eight supervision miseions (through 1985), there was considerable staff continuity, which was broken after 1985. Soon after the reorganization took effect, in 1987, the resident mission took over supervision responsibility. 9.2 Initially all project activities came under the aegis of the Rural Development Ministry (MDPRA later MPARA), even though the link was somewhat tenuous in the case of the rice producing parastatals. Once MPARA split into two parts, however, and FOFIFA was placed under MRSTD, there were three distinct ministerial entities involved. It should be noted that on the Malagasy side there was no coordinatina unit. committee or individual. Supervision missions dealt with each of the four major components shown above as a separate entity. This approach had two advantages. First it prevented delay in one component from damaging another. Second, it allowed supervision staff to learn more about project implementation by being able to work at lower levels in ministries. But the approach had the distinct disadvantage that there was no coordination of components on the Malagasy side; there was no higher authority to pressure laggard units to hasten project implementation; and it required a considerably larger effort on the part of Bank staff than otherwise would have been needed. 9.3 Bank supervision missions failed to take a firm stand in some procurement issues (e.g. selection of the consultant for FOFIFA) and rarely went beyond noting procurement problems in Aide Memoires and supervision reports; the procurement of computer equipment was especially affected. 10. Borrower Performance 10.1 Commitment on the part of the Government was high; officials had been receptive to consultant analysis and recommendations, and were willing to implement a number of policy reforms and organizational changes as a result. 10.2 Project implementation experience showed the constraints affecting performance facing civil service agencies in Madagascar. Heavy administrative controls, shortage of mid-level professionals, overstaffing at lower levels, inadequate operating oudgets, and low salaries are the principal problems. However, frequent reorganizations and high staff turnover have also been characteristic of the institutional environment. 11. Consulting Services 11.1 When the project was being prepared, it was known that a large amount of expatriate consulting services would be needed. Prior to this project, there had been strong opposition from Malagasy authorities to the use of expatriate consulting services; it was therefore a major accomplishment that this project was accepted by the Borrower. The delays in approving consulting contracts that ensued during project implementation was the result of bureaucratic procedures and continued opposition to the use of expatriate consultants within the National Procurement Board 11.2 With few exceptions (see also 6.33), the perfornance of the consultants has been good. The active involvement of supervision missions in the work planning and output of the consultants has been very beneficial. - 14 - 12. Documentation and Files 12.1 The PCR is in part based on an OED evaluation study of the project 7/ and in part on an independent review of project files at headquarters and in the field. All information was readily available, with the exception of project costs, consulting services and training. No information could be obtained on the actual number of consultant staff monthz and cost of these services, and on the cost and amount of training provided under the project. 7/ Operations Evaluation Department, "Evaluation Study of Free- standing Technical Assistance in Support of Public Sector Management in sub-Saharan Africa - Madagascar Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project (ATIA I), A Case Study," April 13, 1989. - 15- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ATIA I) (CREDIT 1249-MAG) PART II: Proiect Review from Borrower's Perspective A. Comments from the Ministry for Livestock. Fisheries and Forests on the Draft Proiect Completion Report 1. General Comments 1.1 The reminder of the status of the aa-icultural sector prior to the ATIA project is needed so as to put the analyt.'. (f the various aspects in its proper context, but in doing this there w_s 'o need to dwell on certain unfavorable points. The Government's effo_L.s to rehabilitate the national economy were, in any case, also hampere-d by external factors: debt service, deteriorating primary commodity pricet, the fall in the dollar, etc. 1.2 As a whole, there is an obvious imbalance in the manner in which the evaluation was conducted. On the one hand, the report dwells on certain rather insignificant details, while on the other it glosses over some important aspects of the project and even bases its comments on unsubstantiated assertions. 1.3 It is true that the ATIA project was conceived and initiated under the former Ministry of Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform (MPARA), but to base the evaluation too much on the results obtained in that Ministry and on what took its place risks giving a false idea of the project as a whole, inasmuch as the latter is part of general Government policy. 1.4 A candid evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the project should not go beyond what is permissible by highlighting differences among the country's top leaders, such as the conflicts between the Minister for Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform and the Director of the Agricultural Extension Department or between the Chairman of the Board of the Regional Development Authority for the Morondava Region (SODEMO) and that company's Manag'ng Director. 1.5 The evaluation attributes the delays in contract approval and organization of loan audits to cumbersome administrative controls and even to the inadequate implementation capacity of Government staff. However, this problem should be viewed not ae a mere procedural issue but in terms of the very foundation and philosophy of the legislation currently in effect. The fact that the public auditors were overwhelmed with work should not have automatically prompted the selection of private firms. A precedent is quickly established and it is not always possible to control its scope when it is extended to other areas. Similarly, the use of the credit is governed by the general regulations for the management of public firances because it is money borrowed by the Government. It was therefore a matter of finding a middle path without either totally rejecting the regulations in effect or excessively delaying project implementation. These solutions were hard to find and the decisions hard to make. Lack of implementation capacity, which relate to technology and resources, should not be confused with a lack of implementation capability attributable to current legislation. 1.6 Along the same lines, the presentation of draft budgets according to the program budgeting system presuppcses an in-depth reform of the law on public finance management. This was a decision that could not be speeded up. This is why the Ministry of Finance did not immediately follow MPARA's lead - 16 - in this direction, even though the system offered good results in technical terms. 1.7 Generally speaking, the overall organization of a project is mutually agreed upon by Government and Bar.k representatives. If there was no provision for a coordination committee for the ATIA I project, this oversight cannot be blamed on the Malagasy leaders alone. Furthermore, while the evaluation report might regard as beneficial the approach adopted by Bank supervision missions of dealing with the various implemienting ag-ncies separately, the Malagasy leaders tend, on the contrary, to think that this approach accentuated the project's lack of organization, in that the missions consulted staff who had only a limited idea about the project, seeing it only from the aspects in which they were directly involved. Therefore their reactions could not always be constructive because they were not fully conversant with the general policy and philosophy behind the project. 2. Comments on Certain Specific Points Made in the Report Plannina of Agricultural Investments 2.1 No institutional arrangements had been made prior to the start-up of the project in November 1982. The staff who were assigned to the ICTAD 8/ office to carry out this project came from different departments and services of MPARA and there was no provision for them to form a permanent unit within the Ministry. It was therafore quite normal fcr them to return to their original posts on completion of the project. A similar group can be brought together, however, according to need and field of specialization, for the short-term evaluation of certain project3. This was done in the case of the evaluation of the Continental Fisheries and Fish Farming Extension Project with UNDP/FAO and also for the Vocational Forestry Training Project in Fianarantsoa with French assistance and in Morondava with Swiss assistance. And it is done every year for the establishment and updating of the Public Investment Program (PIP). The experience gained from project evaluation and seczoral programming is maintained and always applied. Manacement of MPAEF 2.2 On reading the evaluation report it is hard to see the grounds for tne negative things said concerning MPAEF. "Open conflicts" and "openly hostile" are astonishing expressions and furthermore are quite contrary to the actual situation. In 1984 MPAEF was finding its way, taking stock of the past and studying its priorities. This called for the preparation of various documents and the undertaking of various analyses, tasks that were entrusted to Malagasy specialists. All this was extra work in addition to the project itself. Had there been better knowledge of the situation and greater understanding, the consultants would have been r e patient towards their Malagasy counterparts and would have involved tt..:m more fully in the project. In this way, they could have participated as real counterparts, ready to continue the work after the consultants left. This would also have enabled the consultants to avoid working in isolation. 2.3 The forestry and livestock sectors, while represented at the department level in the former MDDRA, were not given the same support as the agriculture, sensu strictu, and irrigation sectors. The fisheries sector was only a small division within the livestock department. The forestry and livestock projects financed at that time by the Bank did not have a significant impact on these sectors as a whole. The current development of the Malagasy economy fully justifies the institutional reorganization adopted R/ Exact meaning of abbreviation not available. by MPAEF in 1985. The fisheries aector is growing in importance and shrimp is now the country's third biggest export. 2.4 Since the team of consultants was not all that united itself, it was ineffective in its role as motivator and catalyst. This role is crucial, however, to the success of a technical asaist'nce project. 2.5 The report claims, without providing the slightest proof, that: "elsewhere, the beneficial effects of progress made earlier at M'AEF have been lost, and this institution is, if anything, worse off than when it was part of the combined MDRRA Ministry in 1981." 2.6 Without getting bogged down in fruitless argument, some clarifications should help to present a more accurate picture. * The Ministry has, since 1984, been introducirg the computerization of personnel managerant. This project has never been abandoned and is atill being implemented, although the results are not yet fully satisfactory. * The Ministry has, since 1985, formulated its development policy, which has been reviewed and updated as part of the Public Sector Adjustment Credit. * The Ministry has, since 1986, adopted the principle of program estimates, which consists in linking budget execution to the implementation c' specific programs, according to the priorities established and within the budget envelope allocated. Reason: regardless of whether or not the preparation and presentation of the budget is based on a clearly-defined policy and a clear priority ranking, the final allocation of resou-ces to a sector was and still is made in an arbitrary manner. rhe Ministry tried to rationalize, at least in terms of budget execution, the use and management of its funds and to link loans and programs. * In the eyes of the consultants and perhaps also of the Bank such a system has no value because it did not follow their ideas. Everything evolves, but it is not possible to change everything overnight. MPAEF has now adopted the program budgeting system and is currently preparing a training program that is based on the evaluation of what has been done in MPARA, in order to cut costs in a reasonable fashion. * The Ministry has, since 1985, regularly monitored the execution of the financing. In addition to the customary statements requested by the Ministry of Finance, an execution statement of the financing from the general budget and the de-velopment budget, and external financing has been prepared and analyzed each quarter. Administrative guidelines have been put in place in each authorization office for this monitoring. A collection of regulations and circulars on the matter of public finance has been compiled and distributed to all those in charge of management. * In the area of farmer assistance, the Ministry has prepared executive guides for every ministry employee at every level and operating guides for all the crops in the sector for which that person is responsible. - 18 - In the area of training, much progress has been made: * three applied agricultural science and technology schools have been reopened to train middle-level managers for the Government and private farms; * several refresher courses have been organized locally for secretarial and accounting personnel and also for the benefit of technical staff in various fields: data processing, economic studies, financial management and project analysis. * a number of training courses were also organized abroad for technical staff in the same fields. Lessons Learned from the ATIA I Proiect 2.7 The second paragraph of this section speaks objectively about the risk and fragility of using technical assistance as a tool for institutional development, but the conclusion drawn from this is not based on any objective analysis or indeed any kind of analysis at all, where MPAEF is concerned. * A coordination system is certainly essential in any complex technical assistance project involving several agencies or several components, but to ensure that it is effective, it is vital that all the parties involved adopt it together and follow it. * A Ministry involved in training and rural development must be efficiently managed but will still be ineffective if institutional changes do not mesh with the overall environment. And this was perhaps the biggest failing of the ATIA I project: to have tried to ignore this environment or to force it to conform too quickly to the new principles adopted. This complex universe is made up of culture, tradition and political philosophies. And it is the most difficult, the slowest tc change, but to understand it and adapt to it is the key to success. 3. Recommendations 3.1 In light of these comments, some recommendations are put forward here for the drafting of the final report. (i) The status of the agricultural sector prior to the ATIA project should be briefly reviewed, without dwelling fruitlessly on certain unfortunate aspects, and this should be linked with the external constraints that have hampered the Government's efforts to rehabilitate the Madagascar's economy. (ii) The analysis of the results achieved and the overall situation of MPAEF should be reviewed in a more objective manner, as an element in an integrated and concerted Government policy. (iii) With respect to the project as a whole, the impact of the external environment should be examined in much greater depth and in a far more objective manner, and the assessment of the results achieved altered accordingly. - 19 - B. Comments from the Ministry of Aaricultural Production and Aqrarian Reforms on the Draft Prolect Completion Report 1. Rice Subsector 1.1 Achievements The study on the rice subsector began in Septsmber 1982 and was carried out in three phases: - Phase 1: Diagnostic study based on the collz-tion oif data, findings of existing studies and other information on the sector, thoair analysis and the formulation of policy options, in particular as regards prices and marketing, with a view to offering sufficient incentives to rice growers. This phase, which ended in February 1983, enabled the Government to formulate a new policy centered on the liberalization of trade in paddy and its derivatives, except in the reserved SOMALAC and FIFABE zones. The new provisions became effective in June 1983. - Phase 2: In-depth study on the marketing policy approach adopted by the Government and determination of the practical means for its implementation. - Phase 3: Technical assistance and training of higher-level personnel of the SCR and additional study on the restructuring of the public rice marketing system. Computer hardware was provided during phases 2 and 3 of the study and SCR personnel trained in its use by the study team. 1.2 Evaluation The study made it possible to overhaul the national rice marketing system, which went from a highly State-controlled system without incentives to orne that was open to market forces and where competition among purchasers was to increase producer prices. The following positive impacts were noted: 1. As regards production The price and marketing policy is a key factor in the production incentive system. Since 1983, the rate of growth in rice production has been good. 2. As regards the balance of payments Imports consequently fell frcm 351,000 tons in 1982 to 162,000 tons in 1986. The savings in foreign exchange caused by that drop had a positive impact on the balance of payments. 3. As regards budget resources The elimination of large consumer subsidies means that the resources thus freed can be allocated to investments in production and to increase the general State budget. - 20 - 4. As regards institutions (a) The liberaliLation of rice trade enabled public enterprises operating in the sector to practice their own trade policy, which improved the financial situation for some of them. The case of SINPA is very significant in that regard. (b) The project helped strengthen the country's capacity for analysis and formulation of agricultural economic policy. The training programs given on site or abroad during phase 3 involved microeconomics, economic analysis of projects, international trade, agriculture and food policy, market systems, agricultural price analysis and data proceBsing applied to rural development. 1.3 Conclusion The rice component of the ATIA I project unquestionably had very positive effects both from the national and sectoral standpoints and as regards the Ministry of Agriculture and its agencies. This is because the decision-makers immediately capitalized on the results of the various phases of the study by taking appropriate measures. Lastly, the accomplishments were consolidated through the training of national staff, who learned how to carry out the same type of studies. 2. Reorganization of MPARA: personnel manaaement 2.1 Achievements The objectives of ATIA I were: - to carry out a survey of personnel; - to establish a computerized personnel database; - to draft a procedures manual; - to formulate a training program for MPARA personnel; - to organize the Personnel Office. With a view to establishing a human resources management system on the one hand and increasing efficiency on the other, complementary action was planned in the form of the establishment of a skills aad job classification system and an improvement in the monitoring and management procedures for temporary staff. The consulting firm, with the active participation of Government personnel, carried out the works under two contracts. The personnel survey was completed in March 1985 and involved some 4,500 staff of all types. Immediately afterwards, the first computerized database was established using KMan software. The Personnel Office was organized in early 1986, with the definition of job descriptions for the Systems Unit, Studies Division and Payroll. During the same year a training program for MPARA personnel was formulated, reflecting the findings of a survey of Ministry officials. The job skills and description classification took until early 1987, with coverage of about 65%. The procedure for monitoring temporary staff began in 1987. - 21 - 2.2 Evaluation The survey and establishment of the database facil'.tated control of staffing levels and the existence of the human resources entity. Administrative career management was considerably improved as regards both quality and quantity to the extent that the preparatory works can be anticipated owing to the use of the database. There has also been an improvement in the processing of pay and family allowances as well as other compensation-related operations. Although the benefits of the assistance are tangible, problems have nevertheless persisted: - The deficiency of information flows and disparity of data processing procedures at both the central and decentralized levels, which hampers computerized file management; - The personnel monitoring timetable is not always respected; - The discussions on the analysis of skills and job descriptions were not always comprehensive and greater cooperation with the departments and decentralized offices would have ensured better results. 2.3 Conclusion In terms of personnel management, the results of ATIA I are as a whole positive. It made it possible to lay the bases for sound management and help integrate the human resource component into the Ministry's management system. 3. Reorganization of .4PARA: finance and budaet 3.1 Achievements The project aimed to improve MPARA's financial and budget management system. To that end, three types of action were carried out, namely technical assistance, training and capital investments. - Technical assistance: The consultants formulated computerized systems and introduced them for the first time. The budget execution monitoring system was computerized using existing data taken from public accounting ledgers. The notion of program budget was introduced and developed to provide better control of the Ministry's progranmming/budgeting cycle. - Training: Six higher-level staff from the Finance and Personnel Department were sent for training in public finance and computer science. - Canital Investments: Acquisition of computer hardware and vehicles. 3.2 Evaluation The project facilitated the establishment of a sound management tool that was a major step forward. Nevertheless, probably owing to a desire for perfection, details received inordinate attention, whereas the reliability of data was highly relative and the data collection system not efficient. 3.3 Conclusion Two points should be stressed: - 22 - - The project objective was achieved overall in that the financial management of the Agricultural Ministry was vastly improved. - The project brought out certain problems that were dealt with under ATIA II. 4. Planning of agricultural investments 4.1 Achievements - Training of higher-level staff in project selection methodology and project technical, financial and organizational evaluation; - Training of one higher-level staff in the use of the microcomputer (end of 1986); - Study and submission of projects classified by subsector and priority; - Acquisition of a vehicle for official travel. 4.2 Evaluation Strengths: - The list of projects was used to establish a long-term investment program (six years); - Formulation of project selection criteria; - Point of departure for the establishment of a programming system. Weaknesses: - Insufficient time allocated for training and for the teams to complete the works, in particular the field surveys; - Insufficient equipment. 4.3 Conclusion The project enabled the Office to improve its actions associated with the Ministry's programs, projects arid activities. 5. Management of narastatal enterprises 5.1 Achievements Four public enterprises -- SAMANGOKY, FIFABE, SOMALAC and SODEMO -- under MPARA were included in the project. All four were development companies. SAMANGOKY: Two reports on the financial position and internal control were prepared. FIFABE: Seven reports relating to technical, legal and organizational analyses of the entity were drafted and subsequently supplemented by a financial audit of a loan from the German Government through the German Development Bank. - 23 - SOMALAC: Some 10 reports covered technical, financial and organizational aspects and led to recommendations for the establishment of more efficient structures. SODEMO: The project made it possible to finance the services of a technical assistant with expertise in business management. More than 600 management training sessions for administrators and directors and for financial officers were organized under the auspices of a local agency. 5.2 Evaluation For the first three enterprises, the studies were used to formulate rehabilitation programs; in this respect at least the project results were very positive. Technical assistance did not produce satisfactory results owing to reasons "external" to the project. 5.3 Conclusion The project enabled the enterprises to formulate rehabilitation programs and to bring new vitality to their development mission, based on a maximum of decision making inputs. 6. Acricultural extension 6.1 Achievements The "training and visit" system was tested in the two pilot areas in the Antananarivo agricultural extension district (CIRVA), namely Ambatolampy and Ankazondandy. The main activity under the ATIA I was the training of field staff in the new system as the means needed for implementation were obtained only at the end of 1984 and early 1985 for the automobile. In light of the experience acquired in these two pilot areas, it was initially decided to prepare the necessary items (survey records) for the preparation of the study on agricultural extension planned under ATIA II and to begin a study on what should be done before the study, which was to culminate in an agricultural extension master plan and a national agricultural extension plan. 6.2 Evaluation The experience in the two pilot areas made it possible to customize an extension system based on group contact that was suited to Madagascar's socioeconomic environment and to break away from using an off-the-shelf product as initially planned, i.e. a system based on contact and follower farmers. In addition, during implementation of ATIA I, the field staff in the two pilot extension districts were able to acquire training in the microplanning of activities and work organization. The weaknesses would include a delay in providing the transportation means needed for smooth operation. In addition to the extension districts, the Provincial Agricultural Extension Office and the Agricultural Extension - 24 - Department did not have the transportation means that would have enabled them to provide support to the field staff. 6.3 Conclusion overall, the project's agricultural extension component did not achieve its objective because no specific action could be taken vis-a-vis the small farmers. However, the pilot phase provided the bases for improving the approach used in the rural areas and especially for the preparation of the National Agricultural Extension Program for ATIA II. - 25 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ATIA I) (CREDIT 1249-MAG) PART III: Statistical Information Table 1: Related IDA Credits Credit Title Year of USS Status Approval (million) Agricultural Credit Project 09/1980 11.50 Closed (Cr. 1064-MAG) (12/31/86) Second Mangoro Forestry Project 06/1981 2000 (06c//d (Cr. 1161-MAG) (06t30/87) Second Village Livestock and Rural 02/1982 1500 11osed Development Project (Cr. 1211-MAG) (12t31/S8) Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit 05/1986 20.W Closed (Cr. 1691-MAG) (06/30/90) Lac Alaotra Rice Intensification Project 03/1983 18.00 Clo( d (Cr. 1337-MAG) (03/31/91) Cotton Development Project 12/1983 (/39Closed (Cr. 1433-MAG) (06t30/91) Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 04/1985 12.00 Ongoing (Cr. 1589-MAG) Second Agricultural Institution Technical 06/1986 10.00 Ongoing Assistance Project (Cr. 1709-MAG) Second Agricultural Credit 05/1987 10.00 Ongoing (Cr. 1804-MAG) Forestry Management and Protection Credit 02/1988 700 Ongoing (Cr. 1878-MAG) National Agricultural Research Project 06/1989 24.00 Ongoing (Cr. 2042-MAG) Environment Project 04/1990 26.00 Ongoing (Cr. 2125-MAG) Agricultural Extension Pilot Project 05/1990 3.99 Ongoing (Cr. 2150-MAG) - 26 - Table 2: roject Timetable Original Actual Preparation 1980/1981 Appraisal Mission July 1981 President's Report April 27, 1982 Negotiations April 1982 IDA Board Approval May 18, 1982 -,edit Signature May 28, 1982 Credit Effectiveness August 26, 1982 December 16, 1982 Credit Closing June 30, 1985 June 30, 1987 Last Disbursement December 31, 1985 January 26, 1988 - 27 - Table 3: Disbursements and Financing A. Estimated and Actual Disbursements of Credit 1249-MAG (SDR '000) Fisca] Quarter Ending Appraisal Estimae Actual Actual as % of Year _ _ Credit Quarterly Cumulative Quarterly Cumulative 1983 XMI 82 900 900 853 853 16.4 III 83 155 1,008 19.4 VI 83 189 1,197 23.0 1984 IX 83 297 1,494 28.7 XII 83 900 1,800. 148 1,642 31.6 11184 435 2,077 39.9 VIU4 62 2,139 41.1 .985 IX 84 434 2,573 49.5 XII 84 1,800 3,600 347 2,920 56.2 III 85 514 3,434 66.0 VI 85 1,600 5,200 355 3,789 72.9 1986 IX 85 273 4,062 78.1 XIM 85 68 4,130 79.4 III 86 164 4,294 82.6 VI 86 117 4,411 84.8 1987 IX 86 33 4,444 85.5 XMI 86 131 4,575 88.0 111 87 47 4,622 88.9 VI 87 17 4,639 89.2 1988 IX 87 177 4,816 92.6 Xal 87 152 4,968 95.5 11188 188 5,157 99.2 Cancellation 43 0.8 - 28 - B. Disbursements by Category of Cr. 1249-MAG (SDR '000) j/ Category Actual Estimate 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total 1. Equipmeat -- 67.8 114.3 248.8 95.6 74.3 169.1 770.1 990.0 2. Consultant's Services for DEP, _ 507.9 873.8 930.7 288.0 220.6 2.8 2,823.8 1,500.0 SAMANGOKY, SOMALAC, FIFABE, MPARA, AND FOFIFA 3. Consultant's Services for the Planning 187.8 266.0 20.2 -- 27.5 16.2 517.7 510.0 of Rice Production and Marketing 4. Training . 24.8 24.2 10.9 61.9 70.8 - 192.5 530.0 5. Refunding of Project Preparation 853.0 -- - - - - 853.0 890.0 Advance 6. Unallocated - - - -- -- - - 780.0 Total 853.0 788.3 1,278.3 1,210.6 445.5 393.2 188.1 5,157.0 5,200.0 (in USS '000) (1,158.0) (1,070.2) (1,735.4) (1,643.5) (604. 8) (533.8) (255.4) (7,059.6) C. Project Financing a/ Source Original Actual Actual as % of Estimated (thousands) (thousands) IDA 5,200 5,700 5,157 7,001 99.2% Government 912 1,000 120 _/ 163 13.2% 6,112 6,700 5,270 7,164 86.2% 1/ Files lack information on disbursements expressed in US dollars. 2/ Exchange rate for original financing column taken at time of negotiations, for actual financing at time of disbursement. 3/ Incomplete estimate. - 29 - Table 4: Status of Covenants Section No. Description Status 3.04 (b) (v) Preparation of mid-term Project review by Condition met. Borrower by June 30, 1983. 3.04 (d) Preparation of completion report by Borrower by Not complied with; Borrower provided Part 11 of new style December 31, 1985. PCR. 3.05 (a) Submission of draft agricultural investment plan by Condition met with delays (February 1984, final version). February 1, 1983. 3.05 (b) Submission of proposals for strengthening planning Condition met with delays. capability of DEP by February 1, 1983. 3.06 (a) Submission of short-term action for rice sector by Condition met. Short-term action plan submitted February February 1, 1983. 1983. 3.06 (b) Submission of results of studies on rice imports, Conditions met. Rice studies were consolidated into two phases distribution systems, inputs, etc. by May I, 1983. with agreement of IDA. First phase (Nov. 1982-April 1984) looked at production systems, consumption patterns, marketing flows and made recommendations on short-term action plan and Submission of results of studies on rice marketing and rice pricing, marketing, import policy. Second phase (Aug. 84-July 3.06 (e) marketing institutions by June 1, 1983. 85) focussed on strengthening rice marketing institutions and supporting initiatives begun under first phase. 3.07 Submission of proposals for strengthening SOMALAC's Condition met. and SAMANGOKY's management by July 15, 1982. 3.08 Submission of findings of studies on MPARA and Condition met. Regional Developntent Authorities organizations and of proposed reorganization measures by April 1, 1983. 3.09 Submission of program to strengthen FOFIFA management Condition met with delays. and research activities by March 31, 1983. 3.10 Creation of Rice Coordinating Unit by August 31, 1982. Condition met. 3.11 Submission of training proposals to IDA for approval. Condition met. 3.12 Submission of list of agricultural parastatals to be audited Condition met with delays. by December 31, 1982. 4.01 Maintenance separate project accounts, audited by Condition met with significant delays. independent auditors, and submission certified financial statements no later than six months after fiscal year ends (MPARA). 4.02 Maintenance separate project accounts, audited by No longer applicable to SOMALAC and SAMANOOKY (audits independent auditors, and submission certified financial covered under these projects, see 3.07 above). For FOFIFA stements no later than four months after fiscal year ends not met until 1987. (autonomous agencies; SOMALAC, SAMANGOKY, FOFIFA). Table 5: Use of IDA Resources A. Staff Inputs Stage of Project ifcle FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 Total Preparation 46.1 46.1 Appraisal 20.2 20.2 Negotiations 6.1 6.1 Supervision _ 3.3 27.4 28.5 21.1 7.7 2.7 0.6 91.3 46.1 29.6 27.4 28.5 21.1 7.7 2.7 0.6 163.7 w B. Supervision Mission Information Supervision Month/ Number of Days in Specialization Performance Type of Mission Year Persons Field Represented Ranking Trend Problem 1 10/82 2 1 1 Economists (2) 1 1 2 06/83 2 5 Economist 1 2 M Public Administration 3 11/83 3 14 Economists (2) I I P Public Administration 4 03/84 2 15 Economist I 1 M Public Adm. Spoc. _ 5 07/84 2 3 Economists (2) 2 1 P,O 6 11/84 3 7 Economist 2 1 M,O Public Administration Extension/Research 7 03/85 3 Economist 2 1 M,O Public Administration Extension/Research 8 05186 1 20 Economist 2 NA 9 12/86 2 14 Economist I NA Extension/Research F = Financial M =Managerial T = Technical P = Political 0 = Procurement NA = Not Available
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Completion Report
Madagascar - Agricultural Institutions Technical Assistance Project
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