Burundi - Kirimiro Rural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFmFCIAL USE ONLY ReportNo. 10511 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURUNDI KIRIMIRO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1165-BU) MARCH 31, 1992 Agriculture Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their OffiCil duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  EXCHANGE RATES Unit: Burund' Franc Year US$1.00 Equivalent 1980 - 90.00 1981 - 90.00 1982 - 90.00 1983 - 92.95 1984 - 119.71 1985 - 120.69 1986 - 114.17 1987 - 123.56 1988 - 140.40 1989 - 158.67 1990 - 171.26 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 are (a) - 0.0247 acres I hectare (ha) 2.47 acres 1 kilometer (km) - 0.62 miles 1 square kilometer (ku2) - 0.39 square mile I kilogram (kg) - 2.20 pounds 1 liter (1) - 0.26 US gallon 0.22 Imperial gallon I ton (t) 2,204 pounds ABBREVIATIONS COOPEC Private savings and loan association created in 1985 IDA International Development Association IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development ISABU Burundi Institute of Agricultural Science (Institut des sciences agronomiques du Burundi) MAL Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock RDC Rural Development Company SOMEBU Burundi Consulting Agency (Societ6 mixte d'6tude du Burundi) OCIBU Burundi Industrial Crop Development Office (Office des cul- tures industrielles du Burundi) FISCAL YEAR Government: January 1 - December 31  FOR OFFCIAL USE, ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Oflic- of Directo.-G.erwl Opftatknm Evaluation March 31, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on BURUNDI Kirimiro Rural Development Proiect (Credit 1165-BU) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Burundi - Kirimiro Rural Development Project (Credit 1165-BU)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. This project has not been audited by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment IThis document has a restricted distribution and mnay be used by recipients only in the performantce of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World llank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURUNDI KIRIMIRO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1165-BU) Table of Contents Pare No. PREFACE . . . . ....... ......... .... . ............ . EVALUATION SUNMIARY l. . . . . . . . . . . . a . . . PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Identity of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3. Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4. Project Design and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5. Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Economic Results 7 8. Project Sustainability .......... . .9 8 9. Bank Performance . . .8. .. ........8 10. Borrower Performance ................. 8 11. Consulting Services . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 8 12. Project Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13. Findings and Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 PART IIs PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE PART III: STATISTICAL DATA Table 1: Related Bank Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Table 2: Project Timetables . . . . . . .. . . .. 14 Table 3: Project Costs and Financing . . . . . . . . . 15 Table 4: Main Project Objectives and Results 9 17 Table 5: Economic Analysis ....... 19 Table 6: Compliance with Major Covenants . . . . . . . . . 23 Table 7: Use of Bank Resources . . . . .......... 25 Maps: - IBRD 15319: Location of Kirimiro Project Area - IBRD 15320: Kirimiro Project Area This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION PEPORT BURUNDI RIRIMIRO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1165-BU) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Repcrt (PCR) for the Kirimiro Rural Development Project for which Credit 1165-BU in the amount of US$19.3 million was approved on June 16, 1981. Credit 1165-BU was closed fully disbursed on June 30, 1988, a year behind schedule; the last disbursement was on September 6, 1988. The PCR was prepared by the Agricultural Operations Division of the South- Central and Indian Ocean Department (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). On May 17, 1991 the Association sent the Borrowzer Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II by August 17, 1991; no response was received. Preparation of this PCR is based inter alia on the Staff Aprraisal Report, the Credit Agreement, Supervision Reports, correspondence between the IDA and the Borrower, and internal memoranda.  - iil - PROJE3T COMPLETION REPORT BURUNDI KIRIMIRO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1165-BU) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. Agriculture is the major economic activity in Burundi and generat6s almost all foreign exchange, 90 percent of which is accounted for by coffee. Food- stuffs make up a little less than 10 percent of imports. Impoverished soils and a degraded environment constitute a considerable threat to the agricultural potential of the country, 90 percent of whose population lives from farming in circumstances where population density exceeds 190 inhabitants per km2. The project was located in Burundi's most aensely populatel region and in its main coffee growing area. 2. The project, to be implemented over a period of s4.x .-vars, was estimated to cost SDR 18.0 million. IDA would finance SDR 16.2 millo-. o^nd Government SDR 1.8 million. Because the project was to be managed accorAing to annual work plans, 96 percent of the funding in the Credit was unallocated. Obiectives 3. The project aimed at: (a) assisting smallholders to improve the productivity of their holdings, and thereby increase their food consumption and income, through the provision of inputs, the strengthening of extension services and the implementation of appropriate erosion control measures; (b) improving rural living conditione by building ot maintaining water sources, equipping social centers and developing wood resources to be used as fuelwood, building poles and timber; and (c) improving the quality of Burundi coffee by building washing stations. The project signaled a change from the Government's previous agricultural development strategy. Instead of centralized governmental departments being used to develop coffee production, Regional Development Companies (RDCs) were to be created as decentralized agencies, to be m&. !j responsible for the integrated development of their respective regiouc. (foodcrops, coffee, infrastructure, erosion control). One RDC was therefore set up under this project to carry out the activities that had previously been the responsibility of separate departments. Implementation Experience 4. The project was well executed, thanks to a stable, competent management taam.  - iv - 5. The extension service was not very effective during the initial phase of implementation. Starting in 1987, however, increasing use was made of the Training and Visit method and both performance and impact of the extension service have improved substantially since. Results 6. As a result of project activities, foodcrop production of major crops in the Kirimiro region continued to increase, and rice and vegetables, and the use of fertilizer were introduced. The project does not appear to have succeeded in reducing soil erosion and degradation, despite the introduction of several measures (like afforestation on hilltops and agroforestry in coffee plantations and use of fertilizers. 7. In coffee-growing, the project resulted in the planting of thirty times more trees than anticipated. Although the total number of productive trees is not known accurately, coffee yields are declining in the project area because of failure to fertilize adequately, faulty pruning, aging of trees, and the location of new plantations in marginal areas. Washing station building programs exceeded appraisal estimates and have enabled Burundi to achieve a considerable increase in the volume of fully washed coffee, which is of the high quality anticipated at appraisal. 8. In reforestation and road building, goals were also exceeded, mainly due to active community participation. The number of water supply points developed by the project was higher than had been anticipated (1,372 actual vs. 180 at appraisal). 9. The project was successful in raising farm incomes. A survey of 135 farms in the Kirimiro region in 1987-88 (three cropping seasons), six years after commencement of the project, showed cash income from sales to be an estimated FBu 19,570 per household, or FBu 13,890 at 1981 prices. At appraisal, it was anticipated that 10 years after project commencement a farm would have cash income from sales of FBu 10,980 (at 1981 prices). 10. The economic rate of return for the project is reestimated at 16.5 percent (18 percent predicted at appraisal). The similarity between the rates of return can primarily be explained by project management's effectiveness in reducing investments on unproductive activities and increasing investments in successful activities, which is fully explained by an attitude of flexibility and adjuesment during implementation. Sustainabilitv 11. Toward the end of the project, following a study of the operation of the RDCs, it appeared that, owing to the difficulties inherent in managing numercus inter-related action programs (with differing orientations: services versus commercial operations), the institutional sustainability of the project could not be assured. As a result, it was decided to discontinue the RDC experiment and to divide the activities in question betweer. the public sector (extension, research, infrastructure) and the private sector (washing-station management,  -v - marketing of inputs, seed multiplication and plant propagation). The future role of the 'IDCs will be to coordinate these actions within their own regions. Findines and Lesso-.s 1 arned 12. Important lessoie were as follows: (a) Hanaging he project according to annual work plans made it possible to adjust ooth activities, budgets and Credit category disbursements in the light of constraints and successes met with during the execution process itself. More coffee washing stations could thus be built and the orprating costs could easily be adjusted in light of the activities of the extension service. (b) Emphasis by the extension service on agents to cooperate with local communities on a participatory basis and to endeavor to ascertain their most urgent needs, has laid the groundwork for more active private sector involvement in the follow-up projects (Coffee Sector Project and Agricultural Services Project). (c) The lack of research-extension interaction limited the effectiveness of the extension services. No messages could be developed that addressed basic farmer needs and that could have been instrumental i combatting plant diseases and erosion. (d) P -ject management teams should ensure that the terms of reference foL the technical assistance clearly define not only technical dutie, but also training responsibilities, especially towards the end of the contractual period.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURUNDI KIRIMIRO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1165-'U) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Identity of the Project Project name : Kirimiro Rural Development Project Credit number: 1165-BU RVP Unit : Africa Regional Office Country : Burundi Sector : Agriculture Subsector : Area Development 2. Backtround 2.1 Agriculture is the major economic activity in Burundi. Over 90 percent of Burundians derive their livelihood from it, working approximately one million farms averaging less than one hectare in size. It accounts for approximately 62 percent of GDP and generates almost all foreign exclbange, 90 percent of which is accounted for by coffee. Nevertheless, food imports make up about 10 percent of all imports, indicating the presence of a chronic food production deficit. 2.2 The Government's third Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1978-82) had as its main agricultural sector objectives: soil protection, food self-sufficiency, import substitution (wheat, sugar, tobacco, wood), expansion and diversification of exports (quinine, fruits and vegetables), development of livestock and fishing, arresting deforestation, and increasing the return on existing investments. To achieve these objectives, the Government encouraged the creation of cooperatives and established Regional Development Companies (RDC). The RDCs were intended to take on responsibility for all rural development activities, financed either by the Government itself or from the proceeds of external loans. The RDCs were organized as autonomous parastatals, and were expected to become self-financing. This project involved one of the first RDCs. 3. Proiect Obiectives and Description 3.1 Objectives. The project aimed at: (a) assisting smallholders to improve the productivity of their holdings, and thereby increase their food consumption and income, through the provision of inputs, the strengthening of extension services and the implementation of appropriate erosion control measures; (b) improving rural living conditions by building or maintaining water sources, equipping social centers and developing wood resources to be used as fuelwood, building poles and timber; and (c) improving the quality of Burundi coffee by building washing stations.  -2- 3.2 Description. The Froject, which was to be implemented over a period of six years on the basis of annual work programs, had the following components: - a program to provide extension services and agricultu'ral inputs for the development of coffee and foodcrop production; - the contruction of six coffee washing stations and twelve hand pulping centers, and improvement of the operation and maintenance of all hand-palping centers; - afforestation and erosion control; - a selec ive improvement of the rural road network, including the rehabilitation of bridges; - the improvement of rural water supplies; - pilot activities to promote agricultural production and improve the living conditions of the rural population; - studies, research and project monitoring; - staff training; and - the establishment of a Regional Development Company (RDC), including the provision of technical assistance for project implementation. 4. Proiect Desirn and Organization 4.1 The underlying concept was to establish an RDC in the region to carry out the Government's policy of integrated and decentralized rural development. Preparation work on the project was commissioned to SOMEBU (Soci6t6 mixte d'6tude du Burundi, a Burundi consulting agency), with the resulting studies to be revie;ed by the various ministries involved. The Bank's Nairobi office assisted SOMEBO in general matters and in its discussions with the Government on the studies, as they progressed. This phase of preparation by a Burundian team, punctuated by exchanges of views with the Bank, meant that the goals of the projeca and the resources t!e" would make use of were well understood by the interes-ed parties 1/. 4.2 The RDC was given p. 3:y responsibilit, ;or project implementation under the general supervision -. the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL). Research activities were to be carried out by the Burundi Institute of Agricultural Science (ISABU). The staff employed by MAL in the project area was absorbed by the RDC. The project was implemented on the basis of annual work programs, prepared by the RDC, reviewed by its Board of Directors and MAL and submitted to IDA for approval. I/ The preparation work for this project was jointly carried out with the preparation work for the concurrent Ngozi II Integrated Rural Development Project, which is the subject of a separate PCR.  - 3 - 4.3 For Burvndi, the project was innovative, in the sense that the approach to agricultural development was new in various ways: (a) the emphasis wac placed on crop diversification, and inclueion of both environmental (rsforestation, erosion control) and social elements (wazer cupply); and (b) a new administrative structure was created by eliminating the centralized vertical type of organiza- tion and replacing it with an autonomous regional en.ity, the RDC. 4.4 The project was well prepared, given the objectives and the strategy chosen. Elements that contributed to the smooth execution of the project were: (a) to have the project management team and IDA agree on annual work plans, which allowed flexibility in responding to newly identified needs (uneer the terms of the Credit Agreement, 96 percent of proceeds we -allocated); and (b) to interest the private sector (farmer associations, c-, atiaves, traders) in plant propagation (100 percent of coffee and forest plants) :.d marketing of inputs (roughly 20 percent sold through cooperatives and private agents). In retrospect, however, not enough precautions had been taken to address the potential risks that the design team had identified at the tinm of appraisal. These risks were: (a) the difficulty in ovetcoming the complexity of the project (the number of components and the type of technical messages to be extended--most of which were new not only to farmers but also to extension agents); and (b) full integration of the various "horizontal" services--extension, erosion control, washing station management, building of infrastructure, etc. --within a relatively short time period (five years), against the background of an overall objective which called for RDCs to be run like corporations and not like branches of a public service agency. 5. Project ImRlementation A. General 5.1 Credit Effectiveness. The project was declared effective on June 2, 1982, a delay of three months caused by bureaucratic tardiness in meeting the conditions of effectiveness (obtaining the :_gal opinion and publishing the Credit Agreement in the official gazette). 5.2 Im21ementation Schedule. Primarily as a result of efrectiveness delays, closure of the cre.t was postponed by 12 months. 5.3 Project Costs. Project costs were higher than expected, because ofs (a) an increase in the .ea served by the extension services; (b) construction of 23 additional coffeL washing stations; (c) financing of a greatly expanded rural infrastructure program; and (d) higher distribution of coffee seedlings and low seed station efficiency. The increase in projert costs of the Kirimiro Project were financed in part by Government and in part by cross-financing from the Ngozi III Credit (Cr. 1192-BU) in the amount of SDR 2.0 million. 5.4 Disbursements. The estimated and actual disbursements for the project are given in Table 3.C of Part III. The credit was fully disbursed by June 1988 and the last disburs.ament was on September 6, 1988. 5.5 Changes in Project Desian. The main changes in project design were: (a) an increase in the number of coffee washing stations from 6 to 29; (b) an  -4- increase in the nvmber of communes targeted for extension serviceq from 7 to 24 in 1987; and (c) addition of a component to encourage wider interest in livesto_k.i activities (higher incomes, source of manure). B. Extension 5.6 Foodoroge. The major technical messages dissem.inated through the project were: widespread use of improved seed; planting of banana trees under better conditions (construction of contour embankments and planting of protective grasses such as setaria or tripsacoma); and use of fortilizero and pesticides. Because of poor organization and agent treining, the extension service did not prove very effective during the early years of the project; the Training and Visit method vas therefore introduced in 1987. A shb.,c.age of subject matter specialists still persists in the project area. Extension did succeed in lncreasing fertilizer use and erosion control where foodcrops are concerned. The extension system was backed up by seed multiplication plots initially managed by the RDC but subsequently more and more by farmers themselves with RDC assistance, the aim being to lower the cost of seed and involve farmers more closely. The value of these plots was limited, however, as varieties grown were not of much interest to farmers, or gave mediocre yields because of disease, poor choices for plot locations, and poor or absent linkage with the research apparatus. Production of quality seeds is still less than demand. In addition, research is poorly integrated with extension programs. 5.7 Coffee-aroinAt. The technical messages for coffee growing focussed on the propagation and distribution of seedlings, mulching, fertilizing, pruning, and pest control. f C. Coffee Washina Stations 5.8 The washing stations used a floating reception method which should have provided for good grading, however, faults in the design and actual construction have been found that will have to be repaired. The waste waters created by the washing process do not create pollution. Several tests were done and all were negative. The washing stations needed five years to reach capacity output (since this was a new technology in the region). D. Reforestation and Erosion Control 5.9 Thanks to a determined effort to obtain community participation, tree nurseries are now managed by groups of planters. Major planting efforts were undertaken, particalarly on the summits of eroded hillsides. These planting programs, which exceeded the original goals, were carried out either with project resources or by communes or private planters. 5.10 Erosion control activities were undertaken with active community participation. Hillside communities were organized by project agents to dig contour ditches, plant anti-erosion hedges, and encourage farmers to rotate crops and take greater care in planting banana trees.  -5- E. Rehabilitation and Development of Water SuDolV Points 5.11 This activity was executed with active cooperation by local communities. Project management insisted that agents always cooperate with local communities on a participative basis and endeavor to ascertain what they regarded as urgent needs. It is highly possible that this program was instrumental in encouraging the notable participation by ^ommunities in the road building program and in the setting up of nurseries to prrc-agate young coffee and forest plants. F. Monitorina and Evaluation 5.12 This component was one of the weak points of the Kirimiro project although technical assistance was used. A considerable body of data exists but there is doubt as to Its reliability; besides, the data were never proces&ed. Although frequently the subject of concern by supervision missions, this component never showed any improvement in performance. G. Livestock 5.13 Introduced late in the course of the project (1988), this component focused on small stock and emphasized the distribution of young chicks and vaccination. The resources in play were very limited. 6. Proiect Results 6.1 The project was successful in meeting its objectives. It succeeded in increasing farm household incomes in real terms and is expected to meet or exceed many of its appraisal targets. A. Extension 6-. FoodcroDs. It is diffi lt to ascertain what the actual changes were in total foodcrop production as a result of project activities, since output figures are available from 1983 onwards only for the seven original communes. No figures are available for the 17 other communes brought into the project after 1987. In the seven original communes, fooderop output rose from 159,000 metric tons to 257,000 tons, or an increase of 62 percent over the life of the project. This represents a 5.5 percent annual increase (a 1.7 percent increase was predicted by the appraisal report). Rice production increased from 40 to 480 tons and vegetable production from 32 to 480 tons. Rice and vegetable crops were major focii of the extension activities. 6.3 Coffee Growina. Distribution of young plants greatly exceeded goals (30 times), the main consequence being an increase in the total land area under coffee. However, most new plantaticns have been established on land that is only marginally productive and show low yield potential. Project management was successful in involving farmers in the production of young plants: coffee-tree nurseries (inputs provided free by the RDC) are managed entirely by planters associations. Mulching rates to depths of 15 cm or more were used by 80 percent of the farmers. Demand for fertilizer (urea) declined because both planters and researchers regard it as unprofitable for coffee, so much so that usage in 1990 was virtually nil. Pruning tools were less and less used because they were  - 6 - regarded as too expensive. Spraying with insecticides was practiced in 100 percent of cases. Yields of coffee parchment per tree are very difficult to determine and estimates from independent sources vary widely. A complete survey was to be carried out in 1991. Total output of parchment coffee (washed and fully washed) rose more rapidly than anticipated: from 7,159 metric tons (average for 1982 and 1983) to 8,965 tons (average for 1986 and 1987 for the seven original project communes), or an increase of approximately 3.5 percent per annum as against the 2.8 percent per annum forecast at the appraisal stage. It is not certain, however, that this rate of growth can be sustained (a possible lack of mulching materials, new plantations established on marginal land, and an increase in diseases). The long-term production increase for the purpose of calculating the rate of return of the project was therefore adjusted to 2 percent per annum. B. Coffee Washing Stations 6.4 These facilities were a novelty in the Kirimiro region. Farmers have massively shifted the delivery of their coffee from manual pulping centers to washing stations during the project period, the only limiting factor being the distance between the farm and delivery point. The main reason for this shift was that the price offered to farmers for cherries delivered to washing stations was the same as the price offered for the equivalent amount of parchment coffee. As it saved the farmers from certain intermediate tasks (drying, depulping), this amounted to an incentive large enough to make farmers enthusiastic deliverers of cherries and encouraged Government to respond by accelerating the establishment of washing stations. The incentive price was justified by the expectation of a premium price on the world market for fully washed arabica coffee (about 15 percent on average). This premium was not realized until 1989, due to problems downstream in the coffee chain (hulling, storage and transport). The implicit subsidy was indirectly financed through outside funding, but was in the end justifiea when the quality problems were recognized and resolved (outside the context of the project). 6.5 Twenty-nine coffee washing stations were cnnstructed during the course of the project (as against six anticipated at appraisal) and have been responsible for a cumulative output of 16,500 tons of fully washed parchment coffee of very high quality (92 percent grade A), with a green to parchment ratio of 82 percent. At the present time, the throughput of the washing stations is roughly equivalent to 72 percent of the coffee cherries produced in the region, as against 0 percent at the time of appraisal. The cherry to parchment ratio is still mediocre (5.6) owing to poor grading at reception and inadequate management (no management handbook used, lack of discipline of staff, over-drying and rejection of lower qualities instead of repassing). C. Reforestation and Erosion Control 6.6 Approximately 5,800 ha of woodlots were planted in the region. Although these are now beginning to generate income (fuelwood, charcoal, poles and wood for construction), the RDC was unable to provide data on actual income flows. At the time of the project completion mission, the plantations inspected appeared to be in good condition. An important agroforestry program (with Grevilea) was undertaken in coffee plantations on an individual basis.  -7- 6.7 As part of the erosicn control activities, a total of 21 km of protected ditches were dug in the course of the project. This and other measures (contour planting, crop rotation, etc.), however, have been insufficient to stop erosion and soil impoverishment. D. Rehabilitation and Development of Water Supply Points 6.8 This activity far outstripped original targets, with 1,372 springs rehabilitated as against the 180 anticipated at the time of appraisal. The rehabilitation had only positive effects, particularly as reg'.rds health and the saving of time formerly spent in carrying water (development of new sources). E. Monitoring and Evaluation 6.9 Despite the collection of a large amount of information, it is not known what land areas were under cultivation and what quantities were produced on farms that had the benefit of extension services; in addition, yield figures are questioned by both extension and research personnel. F. Livestock 6.10 This component was introduced late in the project, when much o; management's attention was focussed on other activities, as a result, no results were apparent at project closing. G. Training 6.11 Pr, ct agents have received training in various fields. The RDC organized training ograms for administrators of cooperatives and individuals responsible for running farmer associations. H. Incomes 6.12 The project was successful in raising farm incomes. A survey of 135 farms in the Kirimiro region in 1987-88 (three cropping seasons), six years after commencement of the project, showed cash income from sales to be an estimated FBu 19,570 per household, or FBu 13,890 at 1981 prices. At appraisal, it was anticipated that 10 years after project commencement a farm would have cash income from sales of FBu 10,980 (at 1981 prices). 7. Economic Results 7.1 The economic rate of return of the project is reestimated at 16.5 percent (compared with 18 percent estimated at appraisal). This is an approximate figure, based on extrapolations of both production volumes and prices (known only for the years from 1987 to 1990). Given the lack of data, it has been estimated that approximately 3 percent of the increase in the volume of existing fooderops produced and 100 percent of the increase in rice and vegetables production can be ascribed to project extension efforts. The long-term production increase in coffee production due to the project was estimated at 2 percent. Where coffee washing stations are concerned, account has been taken only of marginal gains. It proved impossible to ascertain what income was obtained on forest plantations  (fuelwood and construction wood), for lack of information on volumes produced and prices obtained; they have therefore bh n excluded from the rate of return calculations. The general consensus is -nat this component was successful. 8. Proiect Sustainabilitv 8.1 The project established a decentralized integrated project authority, but-- towards the end--deficiencies became sufficiently serious to convince both Bank and Government to reverse this decision. The reason was not deficient management; it was mainly that, in spite of the irtention to make RDCs a commercial operation, they continued to be run as Government services, at cost levels that were unsustainable. After a study of the functioning of the RDCs had been carried out, the decision was taken to spin off the revenue generating activities as independent enterprises (notably the coffee washing stations) and to revert back to Government the services oriented activities (notably extension and road maintenance). These decisions were taken with the basic objective to ensure the sustainability of project results in the long-run. The privatization of the coffee washing stations is being implemented under the Coffee Sector Project (Cr. 2123-BU); the transfer of services back to the technical ministries is being implemented under the Agricultural Services Project (Cr. 2024-BU) and should be completed by end 1992. 9. Bank Performance 9.1 The general view is that the Bank, from the outset, succeeded in establishing a climate of confidence both with the RDC and the central authorities. This proved to be of particular value for the approval of annual work plans, which made it possible to respond to both the constraints and successes achieved during the actual course of execution of the project. Project management found supervisions effective and helpful. 9.2 The project was monitored on a regular basis, and missions consisted of the right specialists needed to resolve the particular prob.ems encountered. On the whole, the RDC appreciated the assistance afforded it by the supervision missions both in the organizational and technical spheres and in abiding by the general policy underlying the project. The Bank should have emphasized the importance of organizing the Monitoring and Evaluation Division more efficiently and should have insisted on replacing the washing station technologist. 10. Borrower Performance 10.1 The performance of the RDC was mixed. Much progress was made in terms of meeting project objectives, despite the many organizational and managerial problems ereountered while implementing the RDC concep. Unfortunately, no meaningful connection was established between research and extension, primarily because the focus of the research service, at the time, was supply driven and donors had little interest in on-farm activities. 11. Consulting Services 11.1 The project made use of technical assistance, particularly in the sphere of general management (finances, supplies, monitoring). This assistance was  stable and well integrated into the project apparatus, although more emphasis was put on its technical than on its training responsibilities, to the extent that some project agents had difficulties taking over their appointed obligations once technical assistance staff had departed (e.g., the washing station technologist). 12. Project Documentation 12.1 According to the project management team, the Staff Appraisal Report was particularly useful in defining the general policy underlying the project and the strategy to be followed in drawing up annual work plans. The Credit Agreement, in turn, was particularly useful in defining and prescribing the use of administrative procedures (requests for disbursement, procurement methods, etc.). Data on fooderop production from the beginning of the project was not available at the time the PCR mission visited Burundi. Other data were obtained from the RDC or Bank files. 13. Findings and Lessons Learned 13.1 The major lessons the Bank and the Government can draw from this project aret (a) Managing the project according to annual work plans made it possible to adjust both activities, budgets and Credit category disbursements in the light of constraints and successes met with during the execution process itself. More coffee washing stations could thus be built and the operating costs could easily be adjusted in light of the activities of the extension service. (b) Emphasis by the extension service on agents to cooperate with local communities on a participatory basis and to endeavor to ascertain their most urgent needs, has laid the groundwork for more active private sector involvement in the follow-up projects (Coffee Sector Project and Agricultural Services Project). (c) The lack of research-extension interaction limited the effectiveness of the extension services. No messages could be developed that addressed basic farmer needs and that could have been instrumental in combatting plant diseases and erosion. (d) Project management teams should ensure that the terms of reference for the technical assistance clearly define not only their technical duties but also training responsibilities, especially towards the end of the contractual period.  - 11 - PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROMI BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE (No comments were received.)  - 13 - PART KIIs STATISTICAL DATA Table Is RELATED BANK PROJECTS Year of Loan Title Purpose ADDroval Status Coments Arabica Coffee Increase product. 1969 Closed Impact dif- Improvement and quality of in ficult to Project coffee Jun.76 judge. (Ngozi I) Second Coffee Follow-up of 1975 Closed Lack of good Improvement above Project in monitoring Project Sep.80 systems (Ngozi II) Agricultural Strenghten the 1989 Replaced Services Sector national extension In Kirliiro & Project system pro- Ngozi Proj., greos but on a Coffee Sector Improve policies 1990 national Project and invest in plants, scale research and training  - 14 - Table 2: PROJECT TIMETABLES Planned Revised Actual Executive Project Summary 8.8.79 8.8.79 Preparation 79 79 Preappraisal Nov.79 Appraisal Mar.80 Mar.80 Negotiations May 80 May 80 Board Approval Jun.81 Jun 81 Credit signature Dec.81 Dec.81 Credit Effectiv. Mar.82 Jun.82 Credit Closing Jun.87 Jun.88 Jun.88 Project Completion Dec.86 Dec.87 Dec.87 Comments: At identification, the main issue was either to strengthen govern- ment services or to create a regional development agency to ensure integrated development. The last prevailed. Preparation was done by local consultants (SOMEBU). At appraisal, some components of the projects were eliminated and/or simplified. The IDA Credit was closed on June 30, 1988 but operations contin- ued with IDA financing (SDR 2.0 million) from the Ngozi III Project (Cr. 1192-BU).  - 15 - Table 3t PROUJECT COSTS AND FINANCING A. Proiect Costs Agpraisal Actual M'n FBu 000 SDR M'n FBu 000 SDR Construction (1) (1) 910 7,690 Equipment & vehicles (!) (1) 410 2,690 Consultants & training (1) (1) 630 4,130 Operat. expenses (1) (1) 1.900 12.460 TOTAL 1,927 18,000 3,850 26,970 (1) In the Credit Agreement, 96 percent of IDA funds were unallocated. Comments: The increase in total costs is due to expansion of the extension services to 17 additional communes, 23 additional coffee washing stations were built, a greatly expanded rural infrastructure program, much higher distribution of coffee plants, and low seed station efficiency. B. Proiect Financinf ARgraisal Actual 000 SDR x 000 SDR X IDA Construction (1) 6,900 Equipment & vehicles (1) 2,500 Consultants & training (1) 3,700 Operat. Expenses (1) 5.100 16,200 90 18,200 a/ 67 Government 1.800 10 8.770 33 TOTAL 18,000 100 26,970 100 (1) see note (1) on A - Project Costs a/ In 1989 IDA provided SDR 2.0 million from Ngozi III Credit for continu- ing work programs. Government financing share increased due to delay in implementation, increase in some activities compared to appraisal, including financing of 9 washing stations.  - 16 - Table 3 (cont'd)s PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING C. IDA Disbursement Schedule cumulative (SDR million) FY 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Appraioal 0.6 1.9 5.3 8.8 12.5 16.2 - - Actual 0.2 1.2 3.8 6.7 10.5 13.5 15.6 16.2 Actual as a X of Appraisal 33 63 72 76 84 83 96 100  - 17 - Table 4: MAIN PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS jJn3k Agyraisal Actua I. Coffee Ptoduction . plants distributed ('000) No. 1,000 29,800 . planters benefitted ('000) No. 21 20 . urea sold t n.s. 39 . tools sold ('000) No. n.s. 29 . washing stations built No. 6 29 . parchment produced in year 10 t 1,600 8,270 / . cherry/parchment ratio ratio 4.9 5.6 . green/parchment ratio % 81 82 . quality parchment (% Al) % n.s. 92 II. Food CroM Production . fertilizers t n.s. 5,700(e) pesticide bags No. n.s. 23,800 ,seeds .crops t 290 m market gardening ('00C0 bags n.s. 25(e) compost units No. n.s. 347 rehabilitated swamps ha -- commercial warehouses No. - . anti-erosion ditches ('000) m n.s. 21 produce _/ % 9/ 18 514 / rice t 0 144 / vegetable % g/ n.s. 1,653 4/ m. gudlf rchr . spting rehabilitstion No. 180 1,372 roads built/rehabilitated km 109 2,500 bridges built/rehabilitated No. 25 70 IV. FOSPlantatdo . RDC ha 3,000 4,100 communes/private ha 1,000 1,700 na.-non specified; n.e. non valabble (e) - eadma a/ With 29 washing stations plus handidepulping cenes hi Dean maize, casava, swee potatoes, goundrs, couia #I Percet Imas after 10 yeu gi Fot the 7 coamues considered at appraisal  KIRIMIRO RURAL DEVELPMENT PRODJECT F.I. 21. NuIEcc E68018k AfoIysI T*oro 3 2 a 4 a a I a 9 sO to 82 St2 8 8