Benin - Borgou Province Rural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MICROFICHE COPY Report No. 10478-BEN Type: (PCR) SARMIENTO,/ X31680 / T9032/ OEDD1 ReportNo. 10478 PROJ"'CT COMPLETION REPORT BENIN BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1127-BEN, CREDIT 1127-1-BEN) APRIL 2, 1992 Agricultural Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perforrnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS The CFA Franc, Benin's currency, is tied to the French Franc (FF) in the ratio of FF 1= CFAF 50. The French Franc floats within the parameters set by the European Monetary System. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAA Caisse Autonomne d'Armotissement (Government Sinking Fund) CARDER Centre d'Action R6gionale pour le D6veloppement Rural (Regional Rural Development Agency) CCCE Caisse Centrale de Coop6ration Economique CLCAM Caisse Locale de Credit Agricole Mutuel (Local Savings and Loan Cooperative) CRCAM Caisse R6gionale de Cr6dit Agricole Mutuel (Regional Savings and Loan Cooperative) ERR Economic Rate of Return GRVC Groupement R6volutionnaire a Vocation Coop6rative (Revolutionary Cooperative Group) GV Groupement Villag6ois (Village Group) MDRAC Minist&re du Developpement RuraL et de l'Action Coop6rative (Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperative Action) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation PCU Project Coordinating Unit SONACEB Soci6t6 Nationale pour la Commercialisation et 1'Exportation du 8enin (Marketing and Export Agency) SONAGRI Soci6t6 Nationale de l'Agriculture SONAPRA Soci6t6 Nationale pour la Production Agricole GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  THE WORLD BANK FOR OmCAL US ONLY Wasleington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of DiwctscuCef,aI Opetatins Evaluatio April 2, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Benin - Borgou Province Rural DeveloDment Proiect (Creditls 1127/1127-1-BEN} Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Benin - Borgou Province Rural De-relopment Project (Credits 1127/1127-1-BEN)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II prepared by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment 2 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BENIN BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credits 1127-BEN and 1127-1-BEN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE .. ....................... EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................... iii PART It PROJECT REVIEW FROM BAIIK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . A. Project Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1 B. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . e * * * * * * 1 C. Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . . . 2 D. Project Design and Organization . . e v v v . v . . . 2 E. Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 F. Project Results . . . . e . . . . . . . e e . . . . . 5 G. Project Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 H. Bank's Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 I. Borrower's Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 J. Project Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 K. Consulting Serviceso.c..... * 0. * . 8 L. Project Documentation and Data . . . . . . . . . . . 8 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROi BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . 11 PART III: STATISTICAL DATA ..................... 15 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits . . . . . . . . . . 15 2. Project Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3. Credit Disbursements .... -........ 17 4. Project Implementation ............... 18 5. Project Costs and Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Project Results. . . . . . . . . . . 21 7. Status of Covenants ................. 24 8. Use of Bank Resources ................. 28 ANNEX 1: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 MAP: IBRD 15215R1 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients u,ly in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BENIN BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credits 1127-BEN and 1127-1-BEN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Borgou Province Rural Development Project in Benin, for which Credit 1127-BEN in the amount of SDR 15.7 million was approved in April 1981 and Credit 1127-1-BEN in the amount of SDR 1.8 million was approved in April 1986. Both credits were closed in December 1988, three years behind schedule for Credit 1127-BEN. At Credit closing, approximately 90% of Credit 1127-BEN had been disbutsed and the balance was cancelled. Credit 1127-1-BEN was fully disbursed. Final disbursement date of Credit 1127-BEN was October 1989 and of Credit 1127-1-BEN was July 1989. Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division of the Occidental and Central Africa Department of the Africa Regional Office. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the implementing, agency prepared a PCR in conformity with the "old style" PCR guidelines, but it did not adequately reflect all the points raised in the new Guidelines. Part II is therefore a summary containing the main conclusions with respect to the project as presented in the Borrower's PCR. Preparation of the PCR was done at Bank headquarters over a year after the project was closed. It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Credit Agreement for Cr. 1127-BEN and the Amending Credit Agreement for Cr. 1127-1-BEN; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and reports prepared by the implementing agency.  - iii - EZNIN BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT iCrdit 1127-BEN and 1127-1-BENs M&UK2TION SUMMARY objectives (Part r, paras 3-7) 1. Following earlier disagreements between Government and IDA on the approach to rural development that had led to cancellation of an earlier IDA-financed project, the policy environment began to improve towards the late 19700 to permit the preparation of the proeont project that aimed at improving rural incomes and promoting agricultural exports by strengthening institutions,providing servLces to farmers in the Borgou province and by provLding inputs and other direct services to farmers. Specifically, it war intended to improve cotton production for export and simultaneously to increase food crop productioci for local consumption. ImDlementatLon Sxperience (Parr I, paras 8-21) 2. In spite of some organirational changes made by Government in the course of project execution, projec- implementation went well with farmers responding positively to the incen' ve prices and supportive framework for cotton production as well as to higF yielding varieties of maize. The 1 ego technical assistance team undcJbtedly helped to strengthen CARDER- Borgou and SONAPRA ard to support research, but the absence of a formal training program for counterparts together with staff transfers meant that this resource was not exploited to the full. Bank supervision was regular and effective, permitting prompt response to problems such as the inadequacy of ginning capacity, which was oventually resolved with the financing of two additional ginneries under a supplementary credit, Cr. 1127-1-BEN. One area which was not supervised effectively, either by the Bank or project management, was construction work where delays were considerable. 1. Financial management proved to be the weakest point, with CARDER accounts not audited until 1985 and a consistently less than satisfactory accounting system. Performance of the technical assistants in this area appears to have been weak. An issue not foreseen at appraisal was the difficulties that Government would experience in providing the agreed counterpart funding, which were pervasive from 1984. Slow disbursement over the initial four years of the project (Part III, 3) was partly due to the appreciation of the US dollar in relation to the CFAP which permitted project extension for another five years. 4. A major factor in the increased crop production was the availability of animal traction which permitted cultivation of larger areas of land. By the end of the project over 27,000 farmers owned traction equipment, almost three times the project target. Research developed new varieties of cotton and maize but was not successful in developing a higher yiLlding variety of sorghum or in proposing acceptable technical packages for food crops. Communication links between research and extension were weak. The bottom-lands development program failed, mainly because of lack of farmers' participation as the benefits of the higher level technology were not proven. 5. The GRVC (collective type of cooperatLve) did not become the main vehicle for project impact as envisaged, with numbers increasing to only 167 rathir than 500. By contrast, the informal village groups, GVs, which  - iv - handle input supply and primary marketing of cotton, expanded significantly and benefitted from approximately US$ 10.7 million in "ristourneso which were used for coummunity developments. Reaults (Part I, paras 22-26, Part III, 6) 6. At the end of the implementation period, the project had reached 40,400 beneficiaries and total production of cropE exceeded targets by the following proportiones cotton 163%, maize 56%, sorghum 26%, groundnuto 33%, and cowpeas 34%. While co.tton yield was higher than appraisal estimates and maize yield equivalent, the major explanatory factor for production increases in other cropu was area expansion. Producers' net cash income was estLmated to be double the expected amount in North Borgou and over 50% higher in South Borgou. Another indication of improved living -"%ndards was the significant increase in tin roofs. 7* Government cash flow with respect to the project %;&m oe indicated precisely but is closely linked to that of the cotton subesctor. This was positive until 1964/S5 and turned negative, before becoming positive again in 1989/90. Up until 1984/85 the surplus on the cotton V account supported most of the operating expenses of the four CARDZRs in the cotton-producing provinces, something that Governnent should have done directly. 8. The project's ERR has been estimated at 35% compared with an appraisal estimate of 21%. The ERR at completion is, however, lower than estimated at the time of approval of the Supplementary Credit (50%). The increase over appraisal is mainly attributable to the higher than expected production of all crops and the improvement in quality of cotton exports. The lower rate in comparison with the one at the time of the Supplementary Credit may be attributed to the fact that incremental cotton production at the end of the project was 60,000 tons compared with the earlier estimate of 80,000. The estimate is however higher than that estimated by Government in its PCR (18%). This is mainly due to the assumptions used. In the Borrower's estimate, actual producer prlces from 1982/83 to 1989/90 were used (ranging from CFAF 60 to CFAF 110/kg for cotton for example), also the borrower includes subsidies on fertilizer as costs in additLon to project cost estimates, and the actual amounts paid by farmers. Part IIX prices are derived from the World Bank commodity price projections for inputs and outputs. Another reason ls that the Borrower did not convert historical costs and benefits into constant terms. Sustainabilitv (Part I, para 27) 9. As there is a follow-on project, oustainability is not an immediate issue. In the future, the threat posed by the shortaye of funds to maintain Government services should be mitigated by the increased roles of farmers' associations and the private sector and a recently approved project to trim the size of such services (Agricultural Services Restructuring Project). Pindings and Lessons Learned 10. Tho key finding of this project is that provision of the appropriate framework can elicit the desired production response from farmers. The organizational problems experienced did not seriously disrupt services to farmers, with the result that the response continued to be strong. Components, such as credit for animal traction equipment which met a felt need of farmers, were successful, while those which did not, such as bottom-lands development, failed. The crucial importance of taking proposed beneficiaries' requirements into account is clear. 11. In spite of precautions, financial management was weak and of continuing concern throughout the project. More attention should be given  to supervision of there aspects at the early stages of project implementation. 12. Lack of intermediate sanctions with respect to ron-compliance of covenants, meant that no effective action wae taken when the Borrower did not comply with certain of the subsidiary prov!.sionu of the legal agreement. Either the provisions shotuld permit more flexibility with respect to compliance or appropriate sanctions should be developed and enforced.  PROJECT COMPLETION R-EPR BENIN BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credits 1127-BEN and 1127-1-BEN) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FR-O BANK'8 PERSPECTIVX A. Proiewt Identity Project Name: : Borgou Province Rural Development Project Credit No: 1127-BEK; 1127-1 BEN RVP Unit: : Africa Regional Office Country: : Republic of Benin Sector: s Agriculture Subsectors s Rural Development B. Backaround 1. Benin has a land area of about 112,600 km2. Its population was estimated at 4.3 million in 1987, and growing at 3.1 percent per annum. With an estimated annual income per capita of US$340 in 1987, Benin remains one of the poorest nation in the world. While, in the 1970s, budgetary allocations reflected heavy emphasis on industrial and infrastructural activities (79%), insufficient provision was made to meet food production objectives. In order to bring the situation into balance, Government adopted a policy for rural development which was to achieve self- sufficiency in food production, to create internal markets by increasing agricultural incomes, and to generate exportable surpluses. However, policy execution was hindered by a shortaae of properly identified projects, restricted finances, and a series of institutional changes reulting from Governments frequent changes of senior officials. 2. A number of semi-autonomous State Organizations were responsible for the execution of programs related to Government's policy. Five such organizations fell under the general supervision of the Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperative Action (MDRAC) including SONAGRI which was responsible for procurement of inputs and cotton ginning and SONACE8, in charge of the export of all agricultural products except oil palm products. The private sector handled almost all food crop marketing, with minimal intervention from Government. In 1976 Government established provincial development agencies called CARDERs (Centres d'Action Regional pour le Developpement Rural). These agencies represented MDRAC and were made responsible for the organization and promotion of primary agricultural production, through the provision of extension services, agricultural inputs, cooperative and primary marketing services, rural roads maintenance, water and other infrastructure development. 3. The Bank-financed Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Cr. 307-BEN, Part III) was the first effort to develop Benin's agriculture on a regional basis. It encountered a number of problems, most of which were related to Government's changes in its agricultural philosophy and institutions during the implementation poriod. These problems resulted in the Bank's suspension of disbursements for nine months. The project was terminated prematurely by mutual consent of IDA and the Government. In view of the commitment of Government to pursue a more rational approach to rural development, a follow-up Zou-Borgou project was designed by a local team with the help of technical assistance. This was discarded on the basis that it was as yet premature for such a project as structural problems prevailed, but the Bank agreed to an interim Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 716-BEN, Part IrI) which was approved in May, 1977. Funds from this Credit were used to prepare the Borgou Province Rural Development Project.  - 2- C. Project Obloctiveo and De_cription 4. Q&0"gtJves. The mdin objectives of the project were to improve the level of rural incomes and to promote exports by expanding agricultural production through the strengthening and support of institutions and of technical infrastructure integrated with improved extension, cooperative, training and social services. Over four years, the project aimed at reaching some 39,000 farm tdmilies, approximately 57% of those in the Province. 5. Comoonents. These included: (a, reorganizing and strengthening the project's executing agency, the CARDER Borgou and providing improved seeds; (b) consolidation and development of farmers' cooperatives; (c) provision of inputs and credit; (d) conducting applied research on cotton and foodcrops; (e) expansion of animal traction; (f) 7:ehabilitation of bottomlands and construction of wells; (g) creation of a project monitoring and evaluation system; and (h) strengthening of SONAGRI. Unde. the Supplementary Credit, cofinanced with the French Aid Agency, CCCE, a new component was added to construct two cotton ginneries and storage facilities and to purchase trucks. D. Proiect Design ind Oraanization 6. Design. The new political environment, in which there was a clear expression on the part of Government to proceed with rural development along more rational lines, created a more favorable environment for design of a follow-up to the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project. Lessons were drawn from the latter project, in particular the need to emphasize organizational aspects and avoid commitment to a single cash crop with the resulting inability to respond to farmers' requirements. The present project was therefore predicated on promotion of both cash (cotton and groundr"uts) and food crops (maize, sorghum and cowpeas). The project concept wati not innovative, rather it was a question of diffusion of tried techn.,ques such as animal traction and cash inputs. Given that the CARDER was assigned responsibility for execution of the project, the project's scope and province-wide scale were appropriate. Project preparation was carried out in a thorough manner in Benin under the Technical Assistance Project, with the supervision of Bank staff from the Resident Mission at Abidjan. 7. Organization. In reorganizing the CARDER-Borgou, one of the project's major objectives was to simplify its structure. This was accomplished at the start of the project, but the situation changed dramatically in late 1985 when all CARDERs were subject to a new, more comprehensive organigram which took no account of che specific characteristics of Benin's six provinces. Not surprisingly, the number of personnel, which had been contained within project estimates up to that date. increased significantly (by one third in a single year). No ass, .ent of the impact of the changed organizational structure on project or, ions is given in supervision reports, but the Government acknowledged t, resources made available to the CARDERs were unlikely to be sufficient - .aable them to satisfactorily implement all the activities assigned to ;hem under the new arrangements. 8. An unforeseen reorganization of institutions involved with the project took place in 1983 when SONAn.RI was abolished to be replaced by SONAPRA. Initially the division of responsibilities between SONAPRA and the CARDERs was inadequately defined, but the CARDERs ended up taking over responsibility for the cotton ginneries. This became a major activity for CARDER-Borgou and reinforced management's focus on cotton. With the restructuring of the cotton subsector in 1987 the ginneries were transferred to SONAPRA. 9. As CARDER staff was relatively inexperienced, it was considered that implementation could best be accomplished by contracting a technical assistance team to support those disciplines which were perceived to be weak. At the start of the project, the team consisted of six experts  - 3 - recruited to work directly in the CARDER as well as a Financial Controller and a Chief Accountant for SONAGRI, an Agricultural iconomist to work in th3 project's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit under MDRAC, a Cotton Researcher attached to Cotton Reaearch Agency, RCF, and a Foodcrops Researcher in Horgou. The expatriate team for the CARDER was placed under the local Director/Project Manager, an administrative arrangement which worked well. The overall performance of most of the technical expatriate team was satisfactory. While performance of some of the financial Technical Assistance staff, especially the last chief accountant of CARDER Borgou, was satisfactory, most of the financial experts performed below expectations and both CARDER Borgou and SONAPRA still had problems with the accounting and financial systems at the end of the project. The project suffered from the lack of a formal training plan for the technical assistants to provide in-service training co their counterparts with the result that training was ign- -d _. nome instances and local staff did not receive full benefit from ths. sen-e of the technical assistants. 10. The project's monitoring dnd evaluation unit (M&E) was originally designed to be independent of CARDER admini tration, answering directly to MDRAC. Although the intention had been to permit the unit more independence of judgement thar. if it had been integrated into the structure of the CARDER, the unit's position - outside managerial control of the CARDER, yet depending on it financially - did not encourage good relations, to the extent that parallel reports on project activities were published simultaneously. Following a national Eeminar on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in 1985, which established inter alJa that M & E units should be considered ae management tools by CARDER Directors, the units were fully integrated into the CARDERs. In Borgou, relations improved between CARDER management and the M & E unit and more effective use was made of its resources. 11. Provision was made for the establishment of a Project Coordinating Unit (PCU), headed by a Pro,ect Coordinator, which was effectively the liaison office of the project in the capital. A senior staff member of the Ministry was appointed to this pout. While in theory a wide range of activities had been included in the job description, left unsupervised the Project Coordinator was ineffective und only undertook the tasks of his choosing. Discarding of the PCU at the time of CARLER reorganization in 1985 had no effect on the project. E. Proiect Imolementation 12. In the light of the excellent project results (section F), project implerantation can be judged to have been successful although not without problemns. Farmers were highly responsive to the appeal to increase cotton and food crops production, which was supported by adequate producer pricing in the case of cotton, and (after the initial two years) the timely availability of inputs. There is evidence that the improved techniques introduced for growing cotton assisted in the acceptance of similar techniques in the production of food crops. The project introduced improved maize varieties that were compatible with cotton growing and demonstrated the high potential for maize production in Borgou. Production increased significantly although farmer- did not utilize the full technical recommendations (use of inputs) to obta... the expected yields of these improved varieties. 13. A major factor in the production increases was the widespread diffusion of animal traction. Already by PY2 there were 12,600 pairs of oxen in the project area, of which three-quarters were considered operational. By the end of the project over 27,000 farmers owned animal traction equipment, way above the project target of 10,000. The availability of animal traction alleviated a major constraint - labor - and permitted more widespread cultivation of available land. Initial shortages of extension staff trained in animal traction techniques and problems of destumping did little to curtail the growth although the range of equipment  -4- used remained limited. The project had only allowed for financing of the equipment and not of oxen, as it was considered that most farmers already hed anlmals. In fact, demand for credit to purchase oxen was strong and had to be met from an alternative source, the local agricultural savings and credit institution (CRCAM). 14. In the came of cotton production, a number of ddjustmento were necessary in the management of this oubsector in view of the unanticipated growth. Among the many problems faced by the industry at the start oi tne project were the lack of maintenance of factoriso which were in need of rehabilitation, (compounded by a shortage of engineering capability) and the absence of clarity on the role of RONAPRA, which heeitated to f-nance the purchase of seasonal inputs and seed cotton purchases. Both problems were addressed in the course of the project. Ir. general, primary marketing was satisfactorily dealt with by the CARDER in association with the farmers, associations (GV), but poor handling, storage and processing resulted in losses in quantity and quality. 1-r a number of years, Benin received export prices for its cotton below the average for West African suppliers. With nominal ginning capacity of 72,000 tons available in 1986 and national production expected to increase in the next few years to 130,000 tons, the need for additional capacity, particularly in the major producing region of the Borgou, became pronounced. This provided the grounds for funding the two new ginneries of 30,000 tons each under CCCE financing and the Supplementary Credit. 15. Cotton research supported under the project was successful in introducing higher yielding new varieties. Food crop research started slowly, mainly because the project designers had not foreseen the need to finance manual labor for this purpose. Although the performance of the composite variety of maize which was introduced was clearly superior to local varieties, it was not resistant to streak and was only replaced in 1988 by a variety resistant to both streak and drought. The project was not successful in developing and introducing any higher yielding variety of sorghum acceptable to farmers. Systems research suffered from inadequate discussion with extension staff or with farmers themselves, with the result that proposals put forward did not meet farmers' requirements. A major problem affecting the successful implementation of research was the shortage of agents in the field. 16. The bottom-lands development program, which was to have increased rice production, did not succeed, mainly because of a lack of farmers' participation. As experienced elsewhere in Benin, farmers do not accord high priority to rice and have a low input/low risk approach. The introduction of water control structures through bunding etc. interfered with seasonal activities, but the farmers made no adjustments to their cropping systems to accommodate the additional work. As a consequence, they never became committed to higher technology rice production. Results might have been different if it had been possible to demonstrate that the benefits of the new technology would have compensated farmers for the ixtra work. The project should have tested various cropping patterns in order to discover those acceptable to the farmers. 17. At the time of project preparation and appraisal, it was intended that the GRVC type of cooperative - which recognized individual ownership of land and equipment but promoted block and collective cultivation - would become the main vehicle for project impact. Throughout the project there was no insistence on collective activity as a condition for participating in the project, and individual farmers received assistance in the same manner as groups. At the end of the project, there were only 167 GRVCs versus 500 estimated at appraisal. However, the existing GRVCs have put into cultivation larger than expected parcels of land (11,000 ha versus the appraisal estimate of 10,000 ha). As an alternative to the GRVCs, more informal farmer groupings, the GVs, essentially formed to handle the primary collection of cotton and where farmers cooperated to perform  -5- services rather than to produce collectively. The arrangements proved partlcularly successful and numbers increased from 350 to 418. 18. BLoki. At appraisal the principal risk was identified as being that poor organization and management would lead to underperformance. In order to minimize this risk, assurancea were obtained from Government that key project posts would be filled with persons of experience and qualifications acceptable to IDA and that staff turnover should be minimized. While the initial Project Manager was acceptable, be was not formally replaced for some time after his removal in 1982 and his Deputy was considered inexperienced although, when he was eventually confirmed as Project Manager in 1984, the Bank appeara to have raised no objection. only one senior member of the staff and the Director of the M&E Unit remained in place throughout the project, while there was a major upheaval of lower level staff at the time of CARDER reorganization in 1985. The movemento of personnel do not appear to have unduly affected project performance. The other safeguard against the risk of poor management was the technical assistance team whose generally satisfactory performance has been discussed above (para 9). 19. Financial management was recognized as the most significant risk. So that the project could start with a financially clean slate, annulment of debte incurred by SONAGRI and the CARDER-Borgou, was a condition of Board presentation. Furthermore, the TA team had a strong financial contingent. Nonetheless, this prcved to be the weakest side of project management and remained of continuing concern. As indicated in the review of the Statua of Covenants (Part III, 7), delays in preparation of accounts did not permit the appointment of independent auditors until 1985, while even in 1987, the accounting system was not considered entirely reliable. 20. One risk not foreseen at appraisal was the difficulties that the Government would experience in providing the agreed counterpart funding. Problems began in 1984 and continued until the end of the project. It had been recognized at the outset that financial flows in the cotton subsector were distorted to ths extent that the barOm did not reflect real costs, and agreement was obtained at negotiations on guidelines and a timetable for amending the barOme. Although a revised version was introduced a year behind schedule in 1982/83, it was not subsequently adjusted to reflect changirg costs until further reorganization of the subsector took place towards the end of the project. Another agreement not respected in full, was the one to reduce the Government's fertilizer and insecticide subsidy provided to farmers; the rate of reduction of the subsidy was slower than envisaged at appraisal, with elimination of the subsidy coming only in 1988/89. F. Prgiect Results 21. The project's objectives of improving rural incomes and expanding exports were predicated on increased production of cotton and foodcrops. In fact, the project surpassed all the production targets (Part III, 6). Even by PY4, i:he mid-point in project implementation, incremental production wao above target for all crops except groundnut. and rice. In addition some significant increases in yam and caosava production had also been observed. Sy the end of project implementation (PY 8), the project had reached over 40,400 beneficiaries, compared with 39,000 estimated at appraisal, and total production for the various crops exceeded targets at full development by the following proportions: cotton 163%, maize 56%, sorghum 26%, groundnutu 33%, and cowpeas 34%. Although for cotton, yield was higher than appraisal estimates and for maize, equivalent, the major explanatory factor for the increases in production of the other foodcrops war area expansion, as average yields remained seriously below appraisal estimates. This is substantiated by the fact that production of improved seeds surpassed targets for cotton and maize but was significantly lower for other foodcropo (Part III, 4).  22. Producers' cash flows are also estimated to have increased beyond levels foreseen at appraisal. Comparison of an enterprise with animal traction shows net cash income in PY8 to be over double that estimated at appraisal for PYS in North Borgou and over 50% the amount estimated in South Borgou. The number of houses with tin rather than straw roofs has reportedly increased Lignificantly. Cotton producers also benefitted from the "ristournes", which totalled over CFAF 3,200 million (approximately USS 10.7 million) over the period of project implementation, and were used by the GVs to carry out developments (classrooms, dispensaries, stores) for the benefit of their communities. 23. In the absence of information on the evolution of taxation over the period of project implementation, a precise lndication of Government's cash flow cannot be provided. The cash flow of the cotton subsector, after being positive until 1984/85 turned negative, and became positive again only in 1989/90, at the end of the project. This is partly due to the low prices for exports received between 1985/86 and 1988/89. However, revenues from the cotton sub-sector through the barAme supported most of the operating expenses of the four CARDERs in the cotton-producing provincee in the absence of Government counterpart funding (para 20). Although Project coats were only 95% of appraisal estimates (including the Supplementary Credit) in SDR terms, because of the appreciation of the dollar to the CFAF, they were about 60% in excess in CFAF terms and were also stretched over a longer period than envisaged. In the foreseeable future, the cash flow of the cotton subsector is expected to remain positive and operating costs, such as salaries, are not expected to increase significantly. However, some of these benefits must be attributed to other activities, such as the Second Borgou Rural Development Project. 24. The project's ERR (Part III, 6B) was estimated at the time of appraisal to be 21%. When the Supplementary Credit was financed in 1986, it was recalculated at over 50%. The analysis for this report gives a rate of 35%. The increase over the appraisal estimate can be mainly attributed to the substantial increases in production over appraisal targets, which more than compensated for lower international prices of cotton in some years, and to the improvement in quality of cotton exports. The lower rate in comparison with the one at the time of the Supplementary Credit is due to the fact that by PYS, cotton production had risen to about 69,000 tons, of which 60,000 were incremental, compared with the peak of 80,000 tons that was obtained in 1986/87 and used in the ERR estimate of the Supplementaiy Credit. The higher rate of 35% in this report in comparison with 18% estimated by the borrower in its PCR, is mainly due to the assumptions used. In the Borrower's estimate, actual producer prices from 1982/83 to 1989/90 were used (ranging from CFAF 60 to CFAF 110/kg for cotton for example), also the borrower includes subsidies on fertilizer as costs in addition to project cost estimates, and the actual amounts paid by farmers. Part III prices are derived from the World Bank commodity price projections for inputs and outputs. Another reason is that the Borrower did not convert historical costs and benefits into constant terms. 25. As cotton is a major source of foreign exchange for the country, the increases in production and the improvement in quality of exports have certainly contributed to macro-economic growth objectives. Benin has been traditionally self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs, but the increases in production under this project have enabled more supplies of maize to be channelled to the deficit South of the country and improved national food security. While farmers' incomes have increased, there is no evidence of any reallocation of income or alleviation of poverty among vulnerable groups. The project was not designed with this end in mind nor was any particular attention paid to women and no data have been collected on these matters. No specific attention was given to environmental matters either and, in view of the possible detrimental effect of sustained cotton production on the soil, as well as the destruction of the vegetative cover as cultivated areas have been extended, this is an area which merits investigation. The report on research (para 15) and the evidence of the  uptake of animal traction (para 13) illustrate the technological impact of the project. With respect to institutions, SONAPRA and especially CARDER- Borgou were considerably strengthened by the attention received under the projoct. 0. kro1ect Sustainabilitv 26. In view of the existence of a follow-on project, the sustainability of benefits is not an immediate issue. In the future, there is likei-. to be a growing role for farmers, associatione and the private sector and a corresponding diminution of that of public sector institutions like the CARDER and SONAPRA. In addition, the recently approved Agricultural Services Restructuring Pro4act will streamline CARDER activi*ies with a view to reducing operating costa. This should help to alleviate the ever-present problem of shortage of Government resources while at the same time ensuring provision of services to farmers. H. Bank's Performance 27. The staff of the Bank's regional office in Abidjan were conscientious in supervising preparation carried out under the Technical Assistance Project. At the time of appraisal and subsequent negotiations, much care was taken to try and resolve any issues (particularly financial ones, para 19) which might have impeded the operations of the project. Supervision was carried out on a regular basis twice a year. In the early year., most attention was given to production aspects and it might have been beneficial to have had more intensive supervision of financial matters at that stage, since the accounting staff were obviously having trouble in bringing financial records up-to-date. The poor performance of most of the components unrelated to cotton or maize suggests that more attention should have been focussed on these aspects by supervision missions. 28. The main strength of the Bank's performance with respect to this project has been its close supervision, which enabled it to respond to problems such as the need for extra ginning capacity. Yet, despite this regular contact, once the project was underway, the Bank was unable to influence organizational changes. It did not oppose the standard CARDER organigram, introduced in 1985, which was obviously unsustainable and contrary to the Bank's avowed objective of simplifying the structure of CARDER-Borgou. The Bank was also not in favor of the CARDERs having responsibility for cotton ginning, an issue not resolved until during negotiations of the follow-up project. The situation with respect to institutional matters suggests that there is a need for greater dialogue with Government on broader policy issues to ensure a propitious environment for individual projects. I. Borrower's Performance 29. Preparation of this project was only initiated because the Borrower improved the policy environment for rural development projects. Although participation in preparation of officials outside the Technical Assistance Project team may have been minimal, there was widespread familiarity with the objectives and components of the project by the time it came to be appraised. The Borrower promptly met conditions of credit effectiveness except for the need to provide the legal opinion, which delayed effectiveness by seven months. Once the project was underway, the Borrower's terdency to reorganize its institutions in the sector contributed to management problems and did not facilitate smooth operations. As indicated in para 18, project personnel was not always entirely satisfactory. A further problem was the transfer of some of the staff who had been trained, such as the counterpart to the Input Supply and Credit Specialist. In the early years of the project, there were some problems related to procurement of inputs. At a later stage, the issue of counterpart funding became preeminent.  30. The main lesson for the Borrower is the importance of creating an environment favorable to achievement of objectives. In this case, the maintenance of an incentive cotton price and the provision of a oound input supply and marketing structure ensured the positive response of farmers. %t the sam time, strict control needs to be maintained over the costs of creating the necessary environment and a more consistent approach adopted towards public sector institutions. J. prolect Relationshii- 31. The strength of the relationship between the Bank and the Borrower with respect to this project lay in the good relations between supervision staff and project management, w,hich permitted a fairly prompt response to issuea as they arose. 32. Relationships between the Bank and other cofinancers: IFAD for Cr. 1127-BEN and CCCE for Cr. 1127-1-BEN, appear to have been good. IFAD staff participated in a few supervision missions and provided advice with respect to the monitoring and evaluation component, but otherwise their professional input was minimal. CCCE has been closely monitoring the performance of the cotton subsector together with the Bank. 33. There appears to have been no relationship between the Government and IFAD apart from the financial one of Borrower and Funding Agency. The relationshtip between the Borrower and the CCCE with respect to this project has been cloue since the CCCE participated in the preparation and appraisal of the follow-up project. K. Consulting Services 34. The performance of the large technical assistance team provided under the project is discussed in para 9. One implication of the involvement of such a substantial team, together with the inadequate training carried out and the movement of local staff, is that the sustainability of project activities could be expected to be low. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the complicated financial situation would not have further deteriorated without such an intensive input of financial expertise both from the long-term TA staff and occasional consultants. 35. Contractors performed abysmally. In the cases of both the offices for CARDER Headquarters and the Training Centre at INA, the original contractor went out of business. The Government's Rural Engineering Division completed the work on the CARDER HQ, which was finished 5 years behind schedule, while the Training Centre was still unfinished wher. the project ended. The Seed Treatment Plant, mentioned in the App.aisal Report as sufficient to handle 600t, was apparently constructed with a capacity of 6,000 to 7,000t and, becauee oi. technical problems, had still not begun functioning by the end of the project. Given improved seed production, excluding cotton, of only 193t by the end of the project (Part III, 4), even a 600t plant would have been excessive. The performance of contractors under the project suggests the need for tighter control on the part of the Bank and Project Management both of the process whereby contractors are appointed and of the execution of their assignments. Given the weakness of the CARDER's Rural Engineering Division, which was not in a position to adequately supervise construction works, a heavier engineering input on supervision miesions might have been desirable (only one mission included an engineer). L. Proiect Documentation and Data 36. The legal agreements for this project were comprehensive. The problem in ouch cases is the lack of prioritization among the provisions coupled with the absence of intermediate sanctions. For example, it was clearly not warranted to stop disbursement because cost recovery on seeds  -9- was not instituted by December 31, 1983. This provision appears t3 have been simply ignored by Bank staff, others, such as reduction of input subsidies, were subject to exhortation but no financial pressure. There is a need to make certain provisions more flexible so as to allow for extenuating circumstances and to give thought to development of intermediate oanctions for non-compliance with suboidiary provisions. 37. Most project components, with the possible exception of the development of the farmers' cooperative movement, were implemented along the lines indicated in the Appraisal Report, suggesting that it did provide a useful framework for both the Borrower and the Bank during implementation. 38. Most data relevant to the preparatioa of the PCR were available either from the Division or the Africa Information Services Center. A major exception was the Audit Reports, only the one for the final year was available at Bank Headquarters. Some of the information included in Parts I and III of the PCR has been drawn from the PCR prepared by the Borrower.  BENIN BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (credits 1127-BEN and 1127-1-BENl PART II l/: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Overall, the Borgou project was successful in the context of the cotton boom. Thanks to this project, a market economy replaced one based on subsistence production. The impact of the project was basically positive despite some shortcomings. A. POSITIVE ASPECTS 2. These include: a) the massive participation of farmers in the project, which amounted to 80% of holdings by the end of the project; b) the enthusiasm of farmers for cotton production favored by the Government's policy of incentive prices for cotton production in the first six years of the project, with the consequent increased use of inputs; c) the improvement in farmers' incomes owing to the significant increase in crop production, notably cotton, with the corollary of food self-sufficiency and the opening up of the rural economy to market forces; d) raising the technical level of extension staff through various types of training exercises, which brought about an improvement in extension work with farmers; e) farmers' associations taking charge of input supply and primary marketing; f) the encouraging results of Agricultural Research, notably the introduction of new high yielding varieties .of cotton and maize; 9) the eupansion of animal traction; and h) the improvement in financial management. B. SHORTCOMINGS 3. These include: a) the absence of improved varieties of sorghum to provide to farmers; 1/ The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the CARDER-Borgou prepared the PCR along the lines of the old format. The PCR contains no direct evaluation of performance by the Bank, the Borrower or co-financiers or of the effectiveness of their relationships. Part II therefore contains the main conclusions with respect to the project as presented in the Borrower's PCR.  - 12 - b) the inappropriateness of the technical packages proposed for food crop. with respect to the cropping systems uued by farmers including their practice of mixed-stand cropping; c) the failure to apply the recommended doses of inputs on certain crops; d) the persistence of itinerant cultivation (slash and burn) with the resulting deterioration of the environment, which is becoming of increasing concern particularly in the district of Banikoara where cotton is the most widely cultivated in the province; e) use of only a limited range of animal traction equipment, thereby restricting operations to ploughing and earthling up; f) the failure of the bottom-lands development program; the few that were developed are mostly under-utilized; g) the insufficient number ot drinking wells provided; h) the lack of outlets for food crops which translates into low prices for producers; and i) the mobility of personnel; of all the senior personnel, the only one who remains at the CARDER-Borgou is the Director of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. 4. Many leasons have been drawn from the experience acquired and the errors committed in the course of project implementation. These lessons correctly point to the fact that it would be preferable, in designing future programs, to incorporate what has been learned and avoid proposing solutions derived without the active participation of project beneficiaries. 5. The underlying causes of the shortcomings experienced in carrying out the project are (i) human - farmers, reticence to accept innovations, the inadequate performance of certain extension agents etc.; (ii) material - delayed purchasing of equipment, lack of improved varieties of certain crops...etc.; (iii) structural - cumbersome administrative procedures;.and (iv) financial - the fact that Benin Government counterpart funds were not released. 6. The strengths of the project are numerous and point to the overall positive impact which has been highly beneficial to the people involved. They also account for the economic rate of return which is quite acceptable in the light of previous estimates. (The economic rate of return estimated in the Borrower's PCR came to 18%. The explanation for the difference between this estimate and the one in Part III of this PCR lies mainly in the assumptions used for cotton prices from PY9 to PY20. In the Borrower's estimate actual producer prices in 1989/90 were used (CFAF 104.25/kg), while Part III prices are derived from World Bank commodity price projections (an average of CFAF 133.50/kg over the period. Another reason is that the Borrower did not convert historical costs and benefits into constant terms.) 7. On the basis of everything that has already been said, we can conclude that the Borgou Province Rural Development Project (Phase I) has brought about a rise in the standard of living of the population, has helped to slow down the rural exodus from our countryside and has had numerous side effects thoroughly appreciated at all levels of society in the Borgou Province. 8. In short, one can take heart again and conclude that the failures and gropings of eight years of project implementation have not been in vain: they have permitted the identification of a good number of conditions  which today seem indispensable to helping farmero succeed in improving their productivity and their living conditions. 9. In such a context it is easy to understand the motivation behind the hopes of the population of Borgou to see the continuation (in a second phase) of the consolidation, expansion and intensification of the gains made under this Rural Development Project. 10. We would therefore like to thank all the funding agencies for their unconditional support, as well as all the institutions and individuals who, from near or far, have contributed to the execution of this Project.  - 15 BENIN BORCOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ICredits 1127-BEN and 1127-1-BENI PART imia STATISTICAL DATA 1. RELATED BANK LOANS AND/OR CREDITS Year of Title IumSa A&nooval status Commen= Cr. 307-BEN To stimulate 1972 Cancelled Disappointing Zou-Borgou production of performance Cotton cotton. mainly due to Project institutional problems. Cr. 716-BEN To strengthen 1977 Completed Inter alia Technical SONAGRI and CARDER responsible for Assistance and prepare ag. preparing Project investment projects. present proj. Cr. 1877-BEN Consolidating gains 1988 Underway Second of first project, Borgou preparlng medium-term Rural Dev. program for rural Project sector, reorganizing cotton sub-sector. No-tQgs Cr. 307-BEN was reviewed in a Project Performance Audit Report (No. 2034, April, 1980) which pointed out that the uneconomic competition between cotton and maize had reduced incentives to produce cotton, the weakened administration of the project had resulted in a deterioration of services to farmers and that changes in government institutions had nullified institutLonal experience. Both cotton and food production (except for groundnuts) were below appraisal targets. Positive aspects included: a measurable increase in the use of animal traction, acceptance by farmers of improved techniques in maize and cotton production Pnd pest control measures for cotton, and the activity of village groups.  - 16 - 2. EROJECT TIMETABLE Date Date Item Planned Agtual Identification 9/78 10/78 Preparation 1979 1979/80 Appraisal Mission 5/80 5/80 Credit Negotiations 1/81 1/8.1 Board Approval 3/81 4/81 Credit Signature 4/81 4/81 Credit Effectiveness 8/81 3/82 Project Completion 6/85 12/88 Credit Closing 12/85 12188 cr. 1127-1-BEN Credit Negotiations 2/86 2/86 Board Approval 3/86 4/86 Credit Signature 4/86 5/86 Credit Effectiveness 6/86 2/87 Project Completion 6/88 12/88 Credit Closing 12/88 12/88  - 1.7 - 3. CREDIT DISBURSEMNTS CumulAtive Estimated and Actual Disbursements Bank ?isnal Year Appraisal Actual/ Estimate Actual Appraisal (USS 000) (Us$ 000) Credit 1127-BEN 1982 2300 1106 '3 1983 6800 3142 46 1984 12300 5857 48 1985 17400 8241 47 1986 20000 10663 53 1987 13195 66 1988 14652 73 1989 16667 83 1990 17734 89 Date of Final Disbursement: 10/23/89 Amount cancelled: SDR 144,485.77 C=redit 1127-1-BEN 1987 n.a. 1292 1988 1617 1989 2148 1990 2364 Date of Final Disbursement: 07/19/89 Fully disbursed.  4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTAT ION Appraisal IndicatM Ratimate IPY41 Actual PY^81 Comments Cooaerative Move-ment Additional Groups GRVC Soo 167 Intended to be main vehicle for project impact. GV - 418 Increase of 68 over project period. Water Dyeelounent Bottomland dev.(ha) 500 100 Not popular with farmers. Rehab. wells 100 100 Achieved PY5. New wells 30 3C Achieved PY6. Improved Seed (t) Seed Farm Outgrowere Cotton 830 38 2698 Maize 100 107 16 Sorghum 85 - - Groundnuts 211 39 20 Cowpeas 50 11 - Fertilizer (t) 6600 9733 Consumption of fertilizer peaked in PY5 at over 12,500t Insecticides (1) 500000 380000 Estimate for PY8. Consumption of insecticides peaked at almost 1 million litres in PY6. Ploughs 10000 27065 Total number of animal traction equipment owners in Province. Cone&ruct$on Completion Date Planned Actual CARDER HQ 1982 1987 Original enterprise failed, work completed by Dir. Nat. G6nie Rurale. INA Training Centre 1982 1990 Unfinished at project completion.  - 19 - 5. Proiect Co-tstend financino A. Proiect Costs (SDR million) Actual/ Actual/ Expenditure Category Appraisal Realloc. Actual Appraisal Realloc. Estimate Amounts % % 1. InsQcticideo, fert- 4.10 5.16 5.19 127 101 ilizers etc. 2. Civil works & 2.64 2.33 2.11 80 91 buildings. 3. Equipment. 1.60 1.38 1 * 73 85 4. Vehicles: (a) for parta A, B, C, 1.85 1.26 1.28 69 101 D & E of Project. (b) for part F of the 0.95 0.85 0.86 91 102 Project. 5. Local personnel & other operating costs: (a) for parts A, B, C, 11.94 12.56 11.53 97 92 D & E of Project. (b) : r part F of the 1.18 0.11 0.13 11 113 oject. 6. %;nsultantsl services 4.10 6.11 5.68 139 93 studies & scholarships. 7. Refunding of advances. 0.50 0.54 0.54 108 100 8. Ginning & transport equipment for part H - 2.79 3.03 - 109 of the Project. 9. Unallocated. 2.70 0.00 0.00 0 0 Other (CCCE) 9.70 9.70 - 100 7 _ _- TOTAL 31.56 42.79 41.22 131 96 Comnentzs - Costs cover both Cr. 1127-BEN and Cr. 1127-1-BEN and include project financing by the Government and CCCE as w611 as by IDA and IFAD. - Actual costs only available according to expenditure categories, so the same breakdown has been used to compare these with appraisal estimates and amounts reallocated following Cr. 1127-1-BEN in 1986. - At appraisal 50% of costs were foreign exchange, although the breakdown is not available for all categories of actual costs, the data that exist suggest a similar proportion of actual expenditure in foreign exchange.  - 20 - S. Prolaet Finanging (SDR Million Equivalent) INiil Alloabn Reied Credkt Reed Amounts Actual Crdi 1127-SEN PDA FAD GOB IDA FAD GOB VA IFAD 006 MA FA 008 1. hnsetlcds, fttre, ete. 2.40 1.70 0.00 2.96 2.14 0.00 3.02 2.14 0.00 3.04 2.15 0.00 2. CM Wo*s & Buldlig 1.10 0.80 0.74 1.10 0.80 0.74 0.97 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.0 0.69 3. Fquipmnt 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.81 0.57 0.44 0.59 0.40 0.39 0.51 0.37 0.29 4. Vels..: 1la for Past A. SAC,MhE of Prect 1.10 0.7S 0.00 0.37 1.20 0.00 0.76 0.60 0.00 0.74 0.53 0.00 fbl for Pat F of the Proct 0.66 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.50 0.35 0.00 0.49 0.37 0.00 S. Lal Peronnu & Otw Op.. Cat: la) for Parts A. I.C.D&E of Poet 5.00 3.60 3.34 3.87 2.69 2.51 4.72 4.33 3.52 4.90 3.55 3.06 (bl for Puat F of the Project O.50 0.35 0.33 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 . Constat S8vias Studies & soholarsN 2.35 1.75 0.00 1.96 2.93 0.00 3.56 2.55 0.00 3.18 2.50 0.00 7. efeundbg of Advanss 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 8. Guinnon & Tranp. EquWpent for Part 11 of the Poject - 3.40 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.00 9. Unlcaed 1.60 1:10 0.00 0.38 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 TOTAL 16.70 11.00 4.88 15.70 11.00 3.73 15.70 11.00 4.69 16.56 10.17 399 cAmm.f Credi nvsed at tme of flnanchg of Cr. 1127-1-BEN In 1986, aounte wubnp^tny rdeaad *c lndlotsd In following oklwnn. Cred 1127-14SEN Pioposd Actul Epenltums Calteoy VA CCCE OA CCCE 8. OIning Equpren 1.60 0.00 1.60 0.00 Oth 0.00 9.70 0.00 9.70 TOTAL 1.80 9.70 1.80 9.70 items fanced by CCCE Includ: ch work., pon stwoa nd othe *4upmefnt  21 - 6. Proiect Results A. Direct Benefits Appraisal Estimate Actual Actual/ Actual/ Indicators PY4 PY7 PYs PY4 PY7 8 t Beneficiaries 39000 39000 40483 104 104 output (000t) Seedcotton 19.78 26.57 69.93 354 263 Maize 19.38 32.52 50.76 262 156 Sorghum 27.51 41.17 51.76 188 126 Groundnuts 6.32 9.67 12.82 203 133 Cowpeas 3.55 5.64 7.58 214 134 Rice 3.70 3.70 1.96 53 53 ar (000 ha) Seedcotton 21.73 23.10 53.00 244 229 Maize 20.69 21.47 33.44 162 156 Sorghum 35.38 35.94 70.27 199 196 Groundnuts 8.58 8.96 14.73 172 164 Cowpeas 8.29 8.53 16.66 201 195 Rice 2.00 2.00 1.65 83 83 Yield (kg/ha) Seedcotton 910 1150 1319 145 115 Maize 937 1515 1518 162 100 Sorghum 778 1146 737 95 64 Groundnuts 737 1079 870 118 81 Cowpeas 428 661 455 106 69 Rice 1850 1850 1188 64 64 Act. PY4/5 Act. PY8/ Producer Cash Flows Actual Appraisal Appraisal (CFAF 000, Current Terms) PY4t5 .P4/5PY5 Net Cash Income * North Borgou Without Project 115 - - With Project 95 121 - 127 - With + Animal Traction 224 498 468 222 209 South Borgou Without Project 25 - - - - With Project 124 278 - 224 - With + Animal Traction 286 326 437 114 153 * As reported by Project's M&E Unit. The first "With Project" figure is for PY4, while the "With + Animal Traction" figure is for PY5.  - 22 - B. Economic Impact Appraisal Actual Appraisal Supplementary (At Final Estimate Credit Develooment) Economic gate of Return 21% Over 50% 35% Underlyina hAsumotions 1. Avoraisal Only the project's directly quantifiable, incremental benefits taken into account. All project costs except those of SONAGRI marketing, and research components, together with technical assistance associated with these components were included. Prices were converted to constant 1980 prices. Project activities assumed to be maintained at PY4 levels from PY5 onwards, although maximum physical benefits not achieved until PY7, after which assumed constant. Project life of 20 years. Incremental crop output valued at farmgate prices estimated using world market prices as a basis. Incremental farm labor requirements included as an economic cost and valued at CFAF 230/man- day. 2. Suoplementarv Credit Same methodology as in original appraisal. Cost stream included actual investment and operating costs over the period 1981-85, the costs of the proposed investments in the ginneries, port storage capacity and trucks and project operating expenditure for the remainder of the life of the project. Benefit stream computed holding the output of foodcrops constant at actual 1985 levels while cotton production assumed to grow to about 80,000 tons. For cotton, output valued using economic farmgate prices derived from Bank forecasts. Prices converted to constant 1986 basis. 3. Final Develooment All project costs taken into account as data did not permit identification and exclusion of SONAPRA marketing, research components and associated technical assistance. Cost stream includes actual investment and operating costs over the period 1981-89 and project operating expenditure for the remainder of the life of the project. Benefit stream computed holding outpat constant at actual 1989 levels. Output and fertilizer from 1990 onwards valued using economic farmgate prices derived from Bank forecasts with exchange rates of US$ 1 - CFAF 2/3 for 1990 and USS 1 = CFAF 250 for 1991 onwards. Incremental labor requirements valued at CFAF 450/man-day. Other farm costs valued at CFAF 20,000/ha. Prices converted to constant 1990 basis. Commentet The high rate of return achieved reflects the positive impact of the project on production, particularly of cotton. Actual foodcrop production up to PYS was included in the final analysis as it was considered that continued financing of the CARDER, animal traction equipment and seeds contributed to the increase in production. If foodcrop production is maintained at the level of 1985, the ERR drops to 24%.  - 23 - C. Studio&a Puryose an Defined at comments Studfl Aoorainal Bottomland To assess the physical No major study appears development. development and to have been cultivation potential undertaken. Bottomland of 2,400 ha of development began only bottomland in Borgou in 1982 because of and to prepare, by initial difficulties December 1981, a in recruiting a program for developing surveyor and a about 500 ha. draftsman. Although program established, bottomland development did not find favor with farmers, with the result that only 100 of the 500 ha planned were developed. Preparation of a To be undertaken in Prepared in 1985 by possible follow-up PY3. the FAO/World Bank project. Cooperative Programme in collaboration with officials from MDRAC and CARDER Borgou.  - 24 7. Status of Covenante 2/ section/Covenant Statue of Compliance 4.01 Borrower to cause Following abolition of SONAGRI in CARDER-Borgou to carry 1982 and replacement by SONAPRA, out parts A, B (ii) and division of responsibilities G of the Project and, inadequately defined, although together with SONAGRI, CARDER eventually took over Part B (i) ... and ginneries, formerly a SONAGRI SONAGRI to carry out responeibility. Assumption of Part F and, together these liabilities aggravated with CARDER-Borgou, Part CARDER's financial problems. ti) . Borrower to provide the Funds not provided promptly (para fund., facilities, 4.02), complaints in 1983 that services and other ginneries not maintained. resources required for carrying out the project. 4.02 Borrower to ensure Funds considerably delayed in availability to SONAGRI 1982 and 1983, but situation by October 31 of each improved subsequently. year of the funds necessary for the purchase of inputs. To cover local costs, Although complied with initially, Borrower to make reports from early 1984 indicate deposits into Advance that funds were not readily Account in name of available to CARDER. The problem CARDER-Borgou at CAA, grew steadily worse from 1985 the amount of such until the end of the project, deposits to be reflecting a shortage of sufficient to meet counterpart funds. Project expenditures for immediately following quarterly period. 4.03 Borrower to nominate a Initial appointees satisfactory Project Manager and but Project Manager detained in Deputy responsible for 1982 and replaced by Assistant administration and who was considered inexperienced, finance whose but continued to act until qualifications and formally appointed Project experience should be at Manager in 1984. Replaced in all times satisfactory 1987. to the Association. 5.01 Borrower shall cause Financial situation of CARDER- CARDER-Borgou and Borgou as of June 30, 1981 only SONAGRI to maintain established in December 1983. records adequate to Accounts brought almost up to reflect in accordance date by mid-1985 for both CARDER with consistently and SONAPRA but even in 1987, maintained appropriate accounting system not considered accounting practices the entirely reliable, shortcomings 2/ Only those Covenants where compliance was not satisfactory are covered.  - 25 - operationo and financial with respect to internal control condition of CARDER- procedures. Borgou and SONAGRI. Borrower shall cause Due to delays in preparation of CARDER-Borgou and financial statements, independent SONAGRI to (i) have auditors were not recruited until their accounts and 1985 and work on audit of financial statements for accounts up to end-1984 was only each fiscal year completed by April 1986. Despite audited, in accordance some improvements, delays with appropriate continued with the 1986 audit of auditing principles CARDER-Borgou being received in consistently applied, by August 1987. independent auditors acceptable to the Association; (ii) furnish to the Association as soon as available, but in any case not later than four months after the end of each such year, (A) certified copies of its financial statements for such year as so audited and (B) the report of such audit by said auditors. 5.04 To ensure adequate Satisfactory compliance in the cotton production early years of the project but no incentives the Borrower consultation with the Association shall, by March 31 for in 1984 when price wae not each year of the altered from previous year. Project, set the minimum Subsequent supervision missions price for seed cotton to did not report on this issue. be paid to producers on delivery in accordance with criteria satisfactory to the Borrower and the Association. To recover an adequate Although input prices were portion of its costs for raised, the rate of increase was the support of cotton substantially below that foreseen production the Borrower by the Project, as a result the shall: (i) progressively Government subsidy remained raise the price charged higher than expected. Interest to farmers for rates reported to vary fertilizers and considerably according to nature insecticides to levels of item financed. No distinction satisfactory to the made in prices of goods provided Borrower and the on credit or for cash until Association; and (Li) 1987/88. Interest rate criteria (A) for the 1981/82 satisfactory to IDA do not appear cotton campaign, charge to have been established in the interest at the rate of course of the project. at least 11% per annum for seasonal and medium term credit to cotton growers and (B) for subsequent campaigns, adjust such interest  -26- rate in accordance with criterla satisfactory to the Borrower and IDA. To ensure that costs in Introduced for 1982/83 campalgn tho cotton sector are but not subsequently adjusted to properly reflected the reflect changing costs. Borrower shall introduce for the 1981/82 cotton campaign a revised cotton bar#me, satisfactory to the Borrower and IDA. 5.05 The Borrower shall, by No information available. This December 31, 1983, take suggests that there was no all actlon necessary to attempt at cost recovery. In cause farmers in the viow of inadequacy of accounting Borgou province to pay system, it is doubtful whether for improved seed for costs could even have been foodcrops furnLshed to established, let alone covered by them, such payment to be sales. sufficient to cover the Borrower's costs in producing and dietrLbuting such seed.  - 27 - B. Misign Month/ No. of Days Perform. Type of Mission Year, Persona in Fil[ d Status Probleme Through Appraisal Preidentification 7/78 1 4 - - Identification 10/78 2(A,E) 14 - _ Prep. Reviews 1979 Several Several - - Appraisal 5/80 5 n.a. - - Supervision 1. 6/81 1(A) 9 1 _ 2. 9/81 2(A,A) 11 1 _ 3. 2/82 2(A,F) 9 2 F 4. 12/82 3(A,E,N) 10 2 F,M 5. 6/83 2(A,M) 12 2 F,T 6. 12/83 3(A,L,E) 20 2 F,T 7. 6/84 7(A,L,E, 20 2 T,O A,F,M,T) 8. 11/84 2(A,F) 18 2 F,O 9. 6/85 1(A) 17 2 T,F 10. 12/85 2(E,F) 13 2 T,M 11. 3/86 3(E,F,A) 22 2 M 12. 10/86 1(F) 10 2 F,M 13. 4/87 2(A,F) 12 2 F,M 14. 10/87 2(A,F) 15 2 F,M 15. 4/88 4(A,A,F,F) 9 2 F,M 16. 11/88 2(A,F) 5 2 F,M Notecs Preparation was carried out by SONAGRI's Bureau d'Etudes under the Technical Assistance Credit (716-BEN) and several short-term visits were made by staff from the Abidjan office during 1979 to supervise and review progress. From mid-1983, Supervision Missions of this project usually also supervised Zou and Atacora Projects at the same time. Key to Expertise: A - Agriculturalist, F = Financial Analyst, E = Economist, N - Engineer, T - Training Specialist, M - Monitoring and Evaluation specialist, L = Livedtock Specialist. Key to Performance Status: I - Problem free or minor problems 2 - Moderate problems. Key to Type of Problemst F - Financial, M - Managerial, T - Technical, 0 - other  - 28 - 8. IUse of Bank Resources A. S TO TASl FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 TOTAL Preparation 39.0 30.4 -- - - -- - 69.4 Appraft -- 32.4 35.2 - - 67.6 N.gotfatfOa/Board -1 t3.1 -- 13.1 Loan Proessing (LOP) 0.5 4.5 13.1 0.7 -- -- -- - - -- 18.8 .... .... .... ..... .... .... ..... .... ..... .... ..... .... ..... ..-.... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .. S.i-total 39.5 67.3 61.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 168.9 Supervision 5* 5.2 18.8 15.5 16.2 14.4 18.9 8.9 10.5 10.7 -- 119.1 Project Adinistration (PAD) 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.0 -- -- -- -- 2.0 Project Coapletlon Report -- -- - -- - - - -- -- -- -- 5.9 4.0 9.9 ... ... .... ..... .... .... ..... .... .... ... ..... .... ..... .... ..... .... .... ..... ..... ..... .... .. Sub-totat 0.0 0.0 5.2 18.9 15.5 16.4 14.8 19.2 9.9 10.5 10.7 5.9 4.0 131.0 TOTAL 39.5 67.3 66.6 19.6 15.5 16.4 14.8 19.2 9.9 10.5 10.7 5.9 4.0 299.9 o e 9s _ *- _ _ October 4, 1991  -29 - ANNEX 1 Page i of 22 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS BENIN Borgou I PCR Project Costs (CFAF 000) ,.................................................................................................... Expenditure Category PY1 PY2 nY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 PY7 Total FE 1. Insecticfdes, fert- 143836 343011 530612 885825 295956 0 0 2205240 14 1685936 76 hiEters etc. 2. Civil works & 55609 298601 185110 120584 145013 59973 53279 918169 6 550901 60 buildings. 3. Equipment. 21634 262990 28644 30522 23922 20634 73609 461955 3 369564 80 4. Vehicles: (a) for parts A,B,C, 103544 80893 14441 51828 115965 99394 46667 512732 3 410186 80 D & E of Project. (b) for pert F of the 0 3972 390626 8713 0 0 0 403311 3 322649 80 Project. 5. Local personnel & other operating costs: (a) for parts A,B5C, 282279 963739 596673 707221 938174 601797 807676 4897559 32 0 0 D & E of Project. (b) for port F of the 0 15386 5634 5820 8960 5792 12813 54405 0 0 0 Project. 6. Consultants' services 231587 434995 309845 410189 334501 300285 227492 2248895 15 2065616 92 studies & scholarships. 7. Refunding of advances. 194012 0 0 0 0 0 0 194012 1 125430 65 8. Ginning & transport equipment for part H 0 0 0 0 0 507913 459040 966952 6 951826 98 of the Project. 9. Unallocated. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 1172315 3002754 2384942 2556760 2296518 1863420 2049000 15325709 6482108 42 % 8 20 16 17 15 12 13 Conversion factor 1990 1.42 1.45 1.48 1.47 1.25 1.14 1.06 Costs in 1990 terms 1664.69 4353.99 3529.71 3758.44 2870.65 2124.30 2171.94 CFAF million Of which 1 204.25 497.37 794.19 1302.16 369.95 0.00 0.00  -30- ANNEX 1 Page 2 of 22 BENIN 8ORGOU I PCR Lconomic Analysis (CFAF million) ,............... ........................................................................................... ... Incremental Costs Benefits Project Seeds FertiL- Insect. Labor Other TotaL Incre. Net Costs izer Cn-Fsrm Production Benefits .................................. ...................................................................... ......... .............. ........................... PYI 1271.52 4.94 91.75 155.88 156.87 60.70 1741.66 541.83 -1199.82 PY2 2987.36 26.96 243.17 274.91 1004.51 391.86 4928.77 4080.08 -848.69 PY3 2263.87 62.70 676.98 544.72 2306.42 938.12 6792.82 8964.54 2171.72 PY4 1961.75 103.38 1182.77 589.60 3408.83 1428.60 8674.93 12825.40 4150.46 PYS 1958.63 150.07 1374.44 1070.27 4683.83 1960.06 11197.30 7134.57 -4062.73 PY6 1969.20 213.80 1073.14 1257.03 :742.08 2393.20 12648.45 9645.59 -3002.86 PY? 1931.41 219.53 648.07 939.54 4647.42 2025.98 10411.95 7540.06 -2871.89 pYs . 869.72 194.77 885.28 396.75 4981.64 2141.36 9469.52 14912.85 5443.34 PY9 869.72 194.77 762.72 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9726.46 13115.45 3388.99 PYlO 869.72 194.77 787.46 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9751.20 10974.91 1223.71 PYII 869.72 194.77 800.37 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9764.11 10830.83 1066.71 PY12 869.72 194.77 832.43 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9796.17 11328.26 1532.09 PY13 869.72 194.77 856.60 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9820.34 11396.66 1576.32 PY14 869.72 194.77 865.03 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9828.77 11581.14 1752.38 PY15 869.72 194.77 862.35 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9826.09 11462.90 1636.81 PY16 869.72 194.77 859.70 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9823.44 11534.06 1710.61 PY17 869.72 194.77 852.27 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9816.01 11601.50 1785.49 PYls 869.72 194.77 849.67 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9813.41 11679.15 1865.73 PY19 869.72 194.77 837.48 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9801.22 11751.15 1949.93 PYZ0 869.72 194.77 837.37 776.25 4981.64 2141.36 9801.11 11747.68 1946.57 0.352116  -31- ANNEXK 1 Page 3 uf 22 BENIN B4RGOU I PCR Economic Analysis (CFAF milLion) Alternative foodcrop scenario .............. ........................... ................................. ....................................................., ,,... .. Incremental Costs Benefits Project Seeds Fertil- Insect. Labor Other Total Incre. Net Costs izer On-Farm Production Benefits PYl 1271.52 4.94 91.7 155.88 156.87 60.70 1741.66 541.83 .1199.82 PY2 2987.36 26.96 243.17 274.91 1004.51 391.86 4928.77 4080.08 -848.69 PY3 2263.87 62.70 676.98 544.72 2306.42 938.12 6792.82 8964.54 2171.72 PY4 1961.75 103.38 1182.77 589.60 3408.83 1428.60 8674.93 12825.40 4150.46 PYS . 1958.63 121.47 1374.44 1070.27 4139.65 1705.86 10370.32 6105.19 -4265.13 PY6 1969.20 141.55 1073.14 1257.03 4950.87 2013.62 11405.41 7883.48 *3521.93 PY7 1931.41 105.83 648.07 939.54 3507.78 1466.14 8598.77 5898.78 -2699.99 PYS 869.72 121.49 885.28 396.75 4140,55 1706.20 8119.99 12603.00 4483.02 PY9 869.72 121.49 762.72 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8376.93 10873.42 2496.49 PY1O 869.72 121.49 787.46 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8401.67 8951.23 549.55 PYI1 869.72 121.49 800.37 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8414.58 8994.57 579.99 PY12 869.72 121.49 832.43 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8446.64 9484.02 1037.38 PY13 869.72 121.49 856.60 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8470.81 9544.94 1074.14 PY14 869.72 121.49 865.03 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8479.24 9669.61 1190.37 pYt- 869.72 121.49 862.35 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8476.56 9527.54 1050.98 P 869.72 121.49 859.70 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8473.91 9566.35 1092.43 PY1( 869.72 121.49 852.27 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8466.48 9607.84 1141.36 PYle 869.72 121.49 849.67 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8463.88 9650.96 1187.07 PY19 869.72 121.49 837.48 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8451.69 9694.78 1243.09 PY20 869.72 121.49 837.37 776.25 4140.55 1706.20 8451.58 9692.56 1240.98 0.240684  BEN IN BOR80 I PCR PlO PY1 PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 PY7 PY8 P19 Pnto P7I1 PY12 P113 P114 PY15 PY16 P117 PT18 PY19 P120 Productlon (t) Total Cotton 9375 10444 22980 36181 S9314 60048 82210 44363 68949 Naize 13670 16922 19414 20876 29325 39324 42941 40947 50756 sorghun 19930 22131 25137 30044 39294 47202 49100 46752 51764 Groundnuts 4875 3678 3144 3492 5345 6364 10413 12221 12822 Cowpeas 2500 3554 4742 5107 6134 6002 8375 7684 7562 Incremental Cotton 1069 1305 26806 49939 50673 72835 34988 5974 Nafze 3252 5744 7206 15655 25654 29271 27277 37086 Sorghwu 2201 5207 10114 19364 27272 29170 26822 31834 Grounduuts -1191 -1731 -1383 470 14689 5538 7346 7947 Ccwpeas 1054 2242 2607 3634 3502 5875 5184 5062 Prices (CFAF/kg) Cotton 96.7 148.3 175.0 121.8 59.3 70.9 102.2 161.6 146.3 115.1 117.1 124.2 125.2 127.3 124.2 124.2 124.2 124.2 124.2 124.2 Naize 68 97 114 99 53 37 42 50 43 42 40 42 42 42 43 S4 45 47 48 481 Sorghun 71 97 106 97 53 39 43 51 45 43 41 43 43 43 44 45 47 48 49 49 k Grounduts 60 65 80 80 95 95 85 50 71 48 32 24 25 33 31 30 28 27 25 25S Compeas 85 90 85 110 125 176 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160g Val.of Prod.tCFAF mill.) Cotton 103.4 2017.8 4691.1 6083.8 3004.0 5161.0 3575.1 9624.3 8714.1 6857.1 6978.0 7401.1 7461.6 7582.5 7401.1 7399.1 7399.1 7399.1 7399.1 7399.1 Maize 221.1 557.2 821.5 1549.8 1359.7 1083.0 1145.6 1854.3 1594.7 1557.6 1483.4 1557.6 1557.6 1557.6 1599.7 1642.9 1687.2 1732.8 1779.6 1780.1 Sorghun 156.3 505.1 1072.1 1878.3 1445.4 1137.6 1153.3 1623.5 1432.5 1368.9 1305.2 1368.9 1368.9 1368.9 1405.8 1443.8 1482.8 1522.8 1563.9 1559.9 Grounivuts -71.8 -112.5 -110.6 37.6 141.5 526.1 624.4 397.4 564.2 381.5 254.3 190.7 198.7 262.3 246.4 238.4 222.5 214.6 198.7 198.7 Coupeas 89.6 201.8 221.6 399.7 437.8 1034.0 829.4 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 809.9 Total 498.6 3169.3 6695.6 9949.3 6388.3 8941.8 7328.0 14309.4 13115.5 10974.9 10830.8 11328.3 11396.7 11581.1 11462.9 11534.1 11601.5 11679.1 11751.2 11747.7 Conversion to 1990 prices Con. factor (cot. 1.42 1.45 1.48 1.47 1.25 1.14 1.06 1.06 Total val.prod. 541.8 4080.1 8964.5 12825.4 7134.6 9645.6 7540.1 14912.9 13115.5 10974.9 10830.8 11328.3 11396.7 11581.1 11462.9 11534.1 11601.5 11679.1 11751.2 11747.7 Alternative foodcrop production scenario Foodcrops at P14 levels Val.of Prod.(CFAF mill.) Maite 221.1 557.2 821.5 1549.8 829.7 579.2 657.5 782.8 673.2 657.5 626.2 657.5 657.5 657.5 675.3 693.5 712.2 731.4 751.2 751.4 Sorghua 156.3 505.1 1072.1 1878.3 1026.3 755.2 832.7 987.6 871.4 832.7 793.9 832.7 832.7 832.7 855.1 878.2 901.9 926.3 951.3 948.8 Groundnuts -71.8 -112.5 -110.6 37.6 44.7 44.7 40J0 23.5 33.4 22.6 15.0 11.3 11.8 15.5 14.6 14.1 13.2 12.7 11.8 11.8 Cowpeas 89.6 201.8 221.6 399.7 454.3 639.6 581.4 S81.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 581.4 Total 395.2 1151.5 2004.5 3865.5 2354.9 2018.7 2111.6 2375.3 2159.4 2094.2 2016.6 2082.9 2083.4 2087.1 2126.4 2167.3 2208.8 2251.9 2295.7 2293.5 Tot. Inct. cotton 541.8 4080.1 8964.5 12825.4 6105.2 7883.5 5898.8 12603.0 10873.4 8951.2 894.6 9484.0 9544.9 9669.6 9527.5 9566.3 9607.8 9651.0 9694.8 9692.6  BENIN Borgou I PcR Irpit nalysis .............. PTO PY1 P12 PY3 PY4 Pff PY6 PY7 Pws-20 Total Area (he) cotton 12500 10146 20048 32037 39120 S2983 68371 40997 53000 Maize 19525 21335 23392 27931 35036 41350 45759 45312 33439 Sorghum 33210 37103 39977 49902 57254 61912 60608 63733 70273 Crosndwts 8120 5943 4729 4954 7222 8174 10161 13736 14734 Cob"" 7685 9548 12487 13122 13838 14624 15801 18561 16662 Incremental Area I;otton -23S4 7548 19537 26620 40483 55871 28497 40500 Naize 1810 3867 8406 15511 21825 26234 25787 13914 Sorghum 3893 6767 16692 24044 28702 27398 30523 37063 Lroeudumts -2177 -3391 -3166 -898 54 2041 5616 6614 Compeas 1863 4802 5437 6153 6939 8116 10876 8977 Proxduction (t) Cotton 9375 12157 23741 36501 5931s 60048 82210 44363 68949 maize 13670 16922 19414 20876 29325 39324 42941 40947 50756 Sorghu 1990 22131 25137 30044 39294 47202 49100 46752 51764 Groeuduuts 487s 3678 314 3492 5345 6364 10413 12221 12822 Coeipeas 2500 3554 4742 5107 6134 6002 8375 7684 7562 Inrermntal Cotton 2782 14366 27126 49940 50673 72835 34988 59574 Maize 3252 5744 7206 15655 25654 29271 27277 37086 Sorghum 2201 520? 10114 19364 27272 29170 26822 31834 Groundurts -1197 -1731 -1383 470 1489 5538 7346 7947 Copeas 1054 2242 2607 3634 3502 5875 5184 5062 Area with Traction Cotton 7549 10749 18546 23263 34214 41459 32045 37574 Raise 7408 7224 11552 17517 24406 19033 19120 21498 Sorghum 23245 16932 22642 26100 31396 22579 23745 3O545 Groundcuts 5444 3633 3414 9217 7600 8383 11332 9057 Cmpeas 0 0 4538 4104 *8366 899 1056 3876 Incremental with Traction Cotton -1530 4906 12699 17303 26314 36316 18523 26325 oaise 833 1779 3867 7135 10040 1206S 11862 6400 sorgm 1791 3113 7678 11060 13203 12603 14041 17049 Gr andts -1872 -2916 -2M3 -2 46 1755 4830 s568 compmas 373 960 10B7 1231 138B 1623 2175 1795 Incremental Minuet cotton -824 2642 6838 9317 14169 19555 9974 14175 Maize 977 2088 4539 8376 11786 14166 13925 7514 Sorghua 2102 3654 9014 12984 15499 14795 16482 20014 6roundsuts -305 -475 -443 -;Z6 8 286 786 926 X CoWpeas 1490 3842 4350 4922 5551 6493 8701 7182 91  SENIN Borgau I PCR Irput Analysis .... . . . . . PTO Pn1 Pn2 Pn3 P14 P15 P16 PY7 P18 PY9 Pmo PYI1 PY12 PY13 PY14 PY15 PY16 P11T Pmla P1t9 PM20 Incremental Labor ('000 days) Cotton -276 884 2289 3119 4743 6545 3338 4745 maize 176 376 817 1508 2122 2551 2508 1353 Sorghti 379 658 1623 2338 2791 2664 298 3604 Groumiuts -13l -205 -191 -54 3 123 339 399 Coweas 201 519 587 665 749 877 1175 970 Total 349 2232 5125 7575 10409 12760 10328 11070 Cost (CFAF million) At CFAF 400/day 0 1 2 3 4 5 4 4 At CFAF 45O/day 0 1 2 3 5 6 5 5 Other farm costs At CFAF 20000/ha 61 392 938 1429 1960 2393 2026 2141 Inputs Fertilizer(tons) lMPn 1700 2177 2695 3627 5410 8149 7508 5438 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 6510 Urea 150 241 550 1456 2512 3109 3266 2019 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 DAP 0 0 8 1 8 1294 619 418 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 ISP 0 0 0 0 0 0 279 50 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 Insect. ('0001) 150 254 299 450 567 877 970 701 380 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 1 Inputs (Incremental) 41 Fertilizer(tons) WPK 476.95 994.85 1926.8 3710.3 6"49.4 5808.0 3738.4 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 4810.2 Urea 91.4 399.72 1306.4 2362.1 2959.0 3115.9 1869.2 2526.6 25?6.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 2526.6 DAP 0 8 0.55 8 1294.4 618.9 417.d 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 520.95 TSP 0 0 0 0 0 278.75 50.35 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 Insecticides(l) 103.92 149.41 300.12 416.97 726.59 819.98 551.37 230 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 PricesCCFAF/kg or L) NPK 164 181 215 205 135 116 111 119 100 103 104 108 111 112 112 112 111 111 109 109 Urea 148 154 201 178 109 94 96 98 90 93 96 100 103 104 103 102 101 10o 99 99 DAP 169 193 223 211 140 123 116 120 100 105 106 11I 115 11r 117 117 116 116 116 116 TSP 145 162 181 175 124 109 103 109 88 93 93 97 1OO 102 102 102 103 103 103 103 Insecticides 1500 1840 1815 1414 1473 1533 1704 1725 1725 1725 12 1725 17 1725 1725 12 1725 12 1725 1725 Vatue(CFAF will.) KPK 78.2 180.1 414.3 760.6 870.7 673.7 415.0 572.4 481.0 495.5 500.3 519.5 533.9 538.7 538.7 538.7 533.9 533.9 524.3 524.3 Urea 13.5 61.6 262.6 420.5 322.5 292.9 179.4 247.6 227.4 235.0 242.6 252.7 260.2 262.8 260.2 257.6 255.1 252.6 250.1 25J.1 DAP 0.0 1.5 0.1 1.7 181.2 76.1 48.5 62.5 52.1 54.7 55.2 57.8 59.9 61.0 60.8 60.7 60.6 60.5 60.4 60.3 TSP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.4 5.2 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 Insecticides 155.9 274.9 544.7 589.6 1070.3 1257.0 939.5 396.8 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 776.3 Total val. Inputs 247.6 518.1 1221.7 1772.4 2444.7 2330.2 1587.6 1282.0 1539.0 1563.7 1576.6 1608.7 1632.8 1641.3 1638.6 1636.0 1628.5 1625.9 1613.7 1613.6 ( Z Of ihich fert. 762.7 787.5 800.4 832.4 856.6 865.0 862.4 859.7 852.3 849.7 837.5 837.4 D  BENIN Borgou I PCR Irput Anartyis Seed costs Pn1 PY2 P13 PY4 ns PT6 PV7 P18-20 (CFAF 000/ha) Halze 4.2 Groundnuts 11.5 In 1990 terms Cotton 1.3 male 4.4 Groumdmits 12.1 Total Incre. Cost Cotton -3.1 9.9 25.5 34.7 52.8 72.9 37.2 52.9 Nale 8.0 17.1 37.2 68.6 96.6 116.1 114.1 61.6 Groundmits 0.7 24.8 68.2 80.3 .... .... .. ... .... ... .. .......... ................ 4.9 27.0 62.7 103.4 150.1 213.8 219.5 194.8 Alt. (Foodcrops at Pr4 Levels) seed Halze 8.0 17.1 37.2 68.6 68.6 68.6 68.6 68.6 Total 4.9 27.0 62.7 103.4 121.5 141.6 105.8 121.5 Alt.tab P15 Incre. food lab. In PT 4457 Incre.Lab. 9199 11002 7795 9201 Vat.(CFAF fItIIon) 4.14 4.95 3.51 4.14 Alt.other Incre.food area In P14 44810 85293 100681 73307 85310 Val.(CFAF iIIon) 1705.8 2013.6 1466.1 1706.2 fim 0._ O ~  Borgou I PCR FarnSate Price for Cotton Current Pricas Ite Unit 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 CIF Cotton fibre (1) USS/t 1597 1854 1790 1320 1088 1250 1400 1670 1820 1630 1650 1720 1730 1750 1720 Qusaity Discont (2) 319 371 358 211 54 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Freight, ins. etc. US$/t 110 101 100 105 115 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 FOB Cotonou USS/t 1168 1382 1332 1004 919 1068 1280 1550 1700 1510 1530 1600 1610 1630 1600 FOB Cotonou (3) CFAF/t 384140 525236 582084 450706 317836 320250 381440 494450 464100 377500 3820 400000 402500 407500 400000 Less: SUMPRA operations CFAF/t 20200 21420 21435 22004 20620 32153 34333 17420 19546 16453 16453 16453 16453 16453 16453 Financial charges CFAF/t 26226 14000 23678 10800 25040 19990 17100 14300 14657 12212 12212 12212 12212 12212 12212 Port charges & transit CFAF/t 7590 7500 20169 11688 14203 13154 12479 7204 16790 19005 19005 19005 19005 19005 19005 Storage 4 handling CFAF/t 3051 2360 1063 3887 3804 8000 5395 6977 1018 2488 2488 2488 2488 2488 248 Transportation CFAF/t 9766 9766 6500 9526 9598 9600 8970 10851 20027 19103 19103 19103 19103 19103 19103 Price mi tigate CFAF/t 317307 470190 509239 392801 244571 237353 303163 437698 392062 308239 313239 330739 333239 338239 330739 Less girming costs: operations CFAF/t 35160 42519 39713 32053 42667 36778 33957 33358 38902 36253 36253 36253 36253 36253 36253 Insurance CFAF/t 3471 3329 733 569 2999 2225 1133 2732 2076 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 Vat cot. seed (Equiv. lint)CFAF/t 24000 24000 35500 40457 15844 40334 28747 29902 42506 44400 44400 44400 44400 44400 4400 value of fibre CFAF/t 302676 448342 504293 400636 214749 2364 296820 431510 393590 314235 319235 336735 339235 344235 336735 0% Eqiiv.seed cotton (5) CFAF/t 115017 170370 191631 152242 83752 92609 120509 175193 160191 128836 130886 138061 139086 141136 138061 I Less: Deprec.in storage (12) CFAF/t 1150 1704 1916 1522 838 926 1205 1752. 1602 1288 1309 1381 1391 1411 1381 Transport to factory CFAF/t 8518 11618 9454 8053 13630 11571 10383 6033 6532 6619 6619 6619 6619 6619 6619 Purchasing, begging etc. CFAF/t 8629 8736 5250 20842 iO003 9253 6738 5856 5785 5827 5827 5827 5827 5827 5827 Val.seed cotton at market centre or farwgate CFAF/t 96720 148312 175011 121824 59282 70859 102182 161552 146273 115102 117131 124234 125249 127279 124234 ........................... Notes (1) CIF prices based on *World Bank Revision of Primary Comodity Forecasts, December 1990 & Narch 1991 (2) Ouality discount of 20X from 1982-1984, 16X in 1985 & 5 in 1986 & 87 due to poor grading and selling. (3) Converted to CFAF at average exchange rates prevailing each year to 1990; from 1991 exchange rate of USS1=CFAF 285 used (4) ActuaL giming rates to 1991 as foiltos 38X (1982-85). 39X (1986 &87), 40.6X to 1990 and 412 from 1991. Costs obtained from SONAPRA. N oo Ph  - 37 ANNEX I Page 9 of 22 BENIN WRGOU I PCR ....................................... Economic Farwate Prices ........................ ,,,,,,,,..,,,,............... ...................................................................... * 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 . ,, ,,,,0 .,............ ..... .. ..... -- UREA *.-- -- - 1990 USS PER TOM................ F.0.B.(1) * 226 196 254 200 134 133 156 140 157 FREIGHT & INSURANCE (2) * 71 73 74 74 62 57 50 53 50 C.l.F * 296 269 328 274 196 190 206 193 207 . *-------------------------1990 CFAF PER KG.-----.-.-.-- ------------------ . C.I.F. (3) 0 98 102 143 123 68 57 61 62 56 PORT HAND./STORAGE(4) * 11 11 11 11 9 9 8 8 8 . FINANCIAL CHARGES (5) * 13 14 19 17 9 8 8 a 8 . WAREHOUSE VAL. COTONOU ^ 121 127 174 150 86 73 77 78 71 . TRANSP.COTONOU-BORGOU (6) * 12 12 13 13 11 10 9 9 9 WAREHOUSE VAL. 8ORGOU * 133 139 186 163 97 83 86 87 80 . DISTRIBUTION CHARGES (7) * 14 15 15 15 12 11 10 11 10 FARNGATE PRICE * 148 154 201 178 109 94 96 98 90 FOOTNOTES (1) Bank c fmnodity price projectfors;Urea(FOB N.W.Europe bagged;45-0-0) (2) Freight & Insurance charges Europe-Cotonou. (3) Converted to CFAF at actual everoge exchange rates prevafiLng each year. (4) Port handling & storage from SONAPRA. (5) Financial Charges at an average rate of 13.5X of CIF price. (6) Transport from Cotonou to Parakou;Average distance of 415 In at about 20.6 CFA/ton/k. (7) Distribution charges taken at 10 FCFA/kg.  - 3 - AlNNEX. 1 Page iO of 22 BENIIN SORGOU I PCR ... ..... ................................. .......... Economic Farmgate Prices ........................................... ... ...........--------------*--------....---------..--------.-.............---------------------.............. * 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 *..... .... . ..... ---- .... .... ---- UREA 1----------------------------1990 USS PER TON ---------------- * F.O.B.(1) * 157 156 168 178 188 190 176 FREIGHT & INSURANCE (2) * 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 C.I.F * 207 206 218 228 238 240 226 * *----------------------------1990 CFAF PER KG .----------------- * C.I.F. (3) * 56 59 62 65 68 68 64 PORT HAND./STORAGE (4) * 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 * FINANCIAL CHARGES (5) * 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 * WAREHOUSE VAL. COTONOU 71 74 78 81 85 85 81 TRANSP.COTONOU-BORGOU (6) * 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 WAREHOUSE VAL. B8RGOU * 80 83 86 90 93 94 89 DISTRIBUTION CHARGES (7) * 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 * FARNGATE PRICE * 90 93 96 100 103 104 99 ---- -........- -..-.-- --.--- ....................................... ................ ......................*........ ........................ FOOTNOTES (1) Bank commodity price projections;Urea(FOB N.U.Europe bagged;45-0-0) (2) Freight & Insurance charges Europe-Cotonou. (3) Converted to CFAF at USS1=CFAF 272 for 1990 and USS1=CFAF 285 from 1991 onwards. (4) Port handtlng & storage from SONAPRA. (5) Financial Charges at an average rate of 13.5X of CIF price. (6) Transport from Cotonou to Parakou;Average distance of 415 km at about 20.6 CFA/ton/km. (7) Distribution charges taken at 10 FCFA/kg. ........................2==== =====================  - 39 - ANNEX 1 Page 11 of 22 BENIN BORGCU I PCR ...................... ................................ ........ Economic Farmgate Prices ............... ................ ................................... .............................................................................. * 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 *.... ----. .... .... . ---- .... . . .... .... . .... .. ..... ..... .. POTASH(KCL) ...-..-..... ---------------------------.1990 USS PER TON.--------------.------------------ * F.O.B.(1) 116 109 125 124 86 78 89 105 98 FREIGHT&INSURANCE (2) * 92 94 96 96 81 74 65 69 65 C.I.F * 209 203 221 219 167 152 154 174 163 * ---------------------------1990 CFAF PER KG.--------------------------------- * C.I.F. (3) a 69 77 97 98 58 46 46 56 44 PORT HAND./STORAGE (4) 11 11 11 11 9 9 8 8 8 BAGGING (5) * 9 9 9 9 7 7 6 6 6 FINANCIAL CHARGES (6) * 9 10 13 13 8 6 6 8 6 * WAREHOUSE VAL. COTONOU * 97 107 130 132 83 67 66 77 64 TRANSP.COTONOU-BORGOU (7) * 12 12 13 13 11 10 9 9 9 * WAREHOUSE VAL. BORGOU 109 120 142 144 93 77 74 87 72 DISTRIBUTION CHARGES (8) * 14 15 15 15 12 11 10 11 10 FARMGATE PRICE * 123 134 157 159 106 88 84 97 82 ................................... ............................................................................... FOOTNOTES (1) Bank commodity price projections;KCL FOB Vancouver(0-0-61) (2) Freight fram Europe to Cotonou plus USS 15/ton for extra distance Vancouver/Europe. (3) Converted to CFAF at actual average exchange rates prevailing each year. (4) Port handling S storage from SONAPRA. (5) Bags at 4700 CFA/ton and bagging at 1300 CFA/ton. (6) Financial Charges at an average rate of 13.5X of CIF price. (7) Transport from Cotonou to Parakou;Average distance of 415 km at about 20.6 CFA/ton/km. (8) Distribution charges taken at 10 FCFA/kg.  - 40 - ANNEX 1 Page 12 of 22 BENIN BORGOU I PCR .................................... .... ...... ............ Economic Farngate Prices ............. .......... ..... ,*... ... ........................ ...................... ........ a 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 .. .. .... ----. .... .... . .... .......... POTASHNKCL) . --------------------1990 USS PER TON----------------- * F.O.B.Cl) a 98 94 95 101 105 105 106 FREIGHT&INSURANCE (2) * 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 C.I.F * 163 159 160 166 170 170 171 * ----------------------------1990 CFAF PER KG----------------- C.I.F. (3) * 44 45 46 47 48 49 49 PORT HAND./STORAGE (4) * 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 BAGGING (5) * 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 * FINANCIAL CHARGES (6) * 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 * WAREHOUSE VWL. CIOwOu U 64 65 65 67 68 69 69 * TRAMSP.COTOkVWU-BORGOU (7) a 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 WAREHOUSE VAL. BORGOW 72 74 74 76 77 77 77 DISTRIBUTION CHARGES (8) * 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 a FARIATE PRICE 82 84 84 86 87 87 87 ................................... ............................................................. FOOTNOTES (1) Bank commodity price projections;KCL FOS Vancouver(O-0-61) (2) Freight from Europe to Cotonoua plus US$ 15/ton for extra distance Vancouver/Europe. (3) Converted to CFAF at USS1aCFAF 272 for 1990 and USS1=CFAF 285 from 1991 onwards. C4) Port handling & storage from SONAPRA. (S) lags at 4700 CFA/ton and bagging at 1300 CFA/ton. (6) Financial Charges at an averagq rate of 13.5X of CIF price. (7) Transport from Cotonou to Perakou;Average distance of 415 In at about 20.6 CFA/ton/km. (8) Distribution charges taken at 10 FCFA/kg. B-