Jordan - Fourth and Fifth Education Projects

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 11513 PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECTS (LOANS 2068-JO AND 2246-JO) DECEMBER 30, 1992 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Jordanian Dinar (JD) at Appraisal 1981 JD 1.00 = US$ 3.33 US$ 1.00 = JD 0.30 End of Period 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Dinar 2.84 2.69 2.60 2.54 2.86 2.95 2.69 1.48 1.48 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS CC Community College CSS Centralized Secondary School DOP Directorate of Projects (MOE) FVSGD Follow-up Vocational Schools Graduates Division (MOE) GDPS General Directorate of Projects and School Buildings GVSS General Vocational Secondary School ICB International Competitive Bidding MOE Ministry of Education MOH Ministry of Health MOHE Ministry of Higher Education MOL Ministry of Labor MPWH Ministry of Public Works and Housing NPC National Planning Council (replaced by the Ministry of Planning NPITI Nursing/Paramedical Integrated Training Institute ODA Overseas Development Administration (British) PAR Performance Audit Report PIU Project Implementation Unit TTC Trade Training Center TTI Teacher Training Institute UNDP United Nations Development Program VTC Vocational Training Corporation FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation December 30, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Performance Audit Report on Jordan Fourth and Fifth Education Projects (Loans 2068-JO and 2246-JO) Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Performance Audit Report on Jordan Fourth and Fifth Education Projects (Loans 2068-JO and 2246-JO)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECTS (LOANS 2068-JO AND 2246-JO) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ............................................... i BASIC DATA SHEET ...................................... iii EVALUATION SUMMARY ................................. ix I. PROJECT BACKGROUND ............................ 1 Introduction ......................................... 1 Main Sectoral Issues ................................... 1 The Changing Economic, Labor Market and Education and Training Context .................................... 2 Project Objectives and Scope ............................ 2 Project Cost and Financing .............................. 3 Implementation Plans .................................. 4 II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES .......... 4 Project Management and Implementation Experience ......... 4 Project Changes ................................ 4 Implementation of the Main Project Components ............. 5 Increasing Capacity .............................. 5 Warehouse at Marka ............................ 8 Technical Assistance ............................ 9 Project Costs ........................................ 9 Sustainability ........................................ 10 Bank Group and Borrower Performance ................... . 11 III. FINDINGS AND ISSUES .............................. 11 Overview ........................................... 11 Findings and Lessons .................................. 12 Project Design and Timing ........................ 12 Procurement ................................... 13 Maintenance of Facilities and Equipment ............. 14 Weak Linkages with Industry ...................... 14 Centralized Secondary Schools ..................... 15 Institutional Autonomy ........................... 16 Project Costs .................................... 17 Cost Recovery ................................. 17 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Sustainability ................................... 17 Research and Development ....................... . 18 Conclusion .......................................... 18 APPENDIX Table 1: Enrollments in Education IV and V Project Schools, 1986/87-1991/92 Table 2: Estimated and Actual 1991/92 Enrollments in Schools under the Fourth Education Project Table 3: Estimated and Actual 1991/92 Enrollments in Schools under the Fifth Education Project Table 4: Enrollment at Tafilah Polytechnic, 1991/92 Table 5: Enrollments in Nursing/Paramedical Irbid Training Institute (NPITI), 1991/92 Table 6a: Output from Long-Term Courses at Trade Training Center at Marka, 1986/87 - 1990/91 Table 6b: Output from Short-Term Courses at Trade Training Center at Marka, 1986/87 - 1990/91 Table 7a: Overseas Fellowships, Actual No. of Fellows and Staff Months, Fourth Education Project Table 7b: Overseas Fellowships, Actual No. of Fellows and Staff Months, Fifth Education Project -1- PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECTS (LOANS 2068-JO AND 2246-JO) PREFACE This is a Performance Audit Report (PAR) on the Fourth and Fifth Education Projects in Jordan. For the Fourth Project, a Loan of US$25.0 million equivalent was approved on December 15, 1981 and was closed on December 31, 1989, two years behind schedule. Actual disbursements amounted to US$18.1 million equivalent, 27.6 percent less than the approved Loan. The undisbursed balance was cancelled in two lots: US$3,576,000 on December 31, 1988, and US$3,302,998 on June 30, 1990. For the Fifth Project, a Loan of US$18.8 million equivalent was approved on March 15, 1983 and was closed on schedule on June 30, 1988. Actual disbursements amounted to US$13.3 million equivalent, 29 percent lower than the loan amount, and the undisbursed balance (US$5,547,177) was cancelled. The PAR is based on an audit mission in Jordan in June 1992, the Project Completion Reports (PCRs) issued on August 28, 1991 and September 23, 1991, respectively;j/ the Staff Appraisal and President's Reports; the Loan Agreements; a study of the minutes of the Board meeting on December 15, 1981, and March 15, 1983, and the project files;. and discussions with Bank and Borrower staff, whose cooperation and assistance in the preparation of this report are gratefully acknowledged. The PAR confirms the findings of the respective PCRs that the Fourth Project was satisfactory and the Fifth Project unsatisfactory. The PAR supplements the information in the PCRs, highlights implementation experience and project achievements, and discusses findings and lessons, and issues in regard to the Centralized Secondary Schools, institutional autonomy, project costs, cost recovery, sustainability, and research and development. The draft PAR was sent to the Borrower for comments but none were received. 1 Project Completion Report, Jordan: Fourth Education Project (Loan 2068-JO), Report No. 9834, August 28, 1991. Project Completion Report, Jordan: Fifth Education Project (Loan 2246-JO), Report No. 9914, September 23, 1991. s PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIYIH EDUCATION PROJECTS (LOANS 2068-JO/2246-JO) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Education IV Education V Item Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Estimate Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 25.0 18.1 88.9 62.5 Underrun (%) 27.6 29.7 Loan Amount (US$ million) 25.0 18.1 18.8 13.3 Disbursed 18.1 13.3 Cancelled 6.9 5.5 Repaid (as of 12/31/91) 9.46 4.79 Outstanding (as of 12/31/91) 8.66 8.46 Date Physical Components Completed 06/87 06/89 12/87 04/88 No. months since Loan Signature 65 92 49 53 Proportion completed by above date (%) 100 100 100 100 Time Overrun (%) 41.5 8.0 Institutional Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory cUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (S$ millilon) Education IV FY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 (1) Appraisal Est. 1.00 3.70 10.30 18.20 24.10 25.10 (ii) Actual 0.73 2.90 6.12 13.36 17.99 19.42 19.42 18.12La (iio as % of() 73 78 59 73 75 78 78 73 Date of Final Disbursement: October 25, 1990 Education V (i) Appraisal Est. 0.77 6.25 15.33 17.70 18.80 (il) Actual 0.06 0.55 4.44 10.81 14.75 13.25& (ill) as % of (1) 8 9 29 61 78 70 Date of Final Disbursement: May 11, 1989 - v - STAFF INPUTS (staff weeks) FY 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Total Education IV Preappraisal 8.1 27.8 - - - - - - - - - - - 35.9 Appraisal - 26.5 2.3 - - - - - - - - - - 28.7 Negotiations - 8.0 - - - - - - - - - - 8.0 Supervision - - 8.9 15.3 27.2 19.1 10.3 3.2 7.6 5.7 5.5 4.8 2.3 110.0 Other .6 7.9 14.0 - - - .1 - - - .1 - 22.6 Total 8.7 62.2 33.1 15.3 27.2 19.1 10.4 3.2 7.6 5.7 5.5 4.9 2.3 205.2 /a Actual disbursements appear to be lower In FY90 than in FY89 because unspent funds in the Special Account amounting to US$1.3 m were returned to the Bank after project closing. b US$1.5 million of residual Special Account funds was returned after the project closed. In total, US$5.55 million of unused funds were cancelled from the loan. FY 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Total Education V Preappralsal 13.3 - - - - - - - - 13.3 Appraisal 5.2 17.3 - - - - - - - - 22.5 Negotiations - 7.0 - - - - - - 7.0 Supervision - .6 7.4 4.5 5.1 1.5 7.7 5.2 3.6 5.4 41.2 Other 1.2 7.5 - - - - - - - .1 8.8 Total 19.7 32.4 7.4 4.5 5.1 1.5 7.7 5.2 3.6 5.5 92.8 PROJECT DATES Education IV Education V Item Planned Revised Actual Planned Revised Actual Date Date Date Date Date Date First Mention in Files Negotiations 09/21/81 09/21/81 01/31/83 - 01/31/83 Board Approval 12/15/81 - 12/15/81 03/15/83 - 03/15/83 Loan Signature 01/20/82 - 01/20/82 04/11/83 - 04/11/83 Loan Effectiveness 04/20/82 06/17/82 06/17/82 07/11/83 09/30/83 11/03/83 Project Completion 06/87 06/88 09/89 12/31/87 04/30/88 04/30/88 Closing Date 12/31/87 12/31/88 12/31/89 06/30/88 - 06/30/88 -v- OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Executing Agency: Education IV Education V Follow-on Proiects Name Education V Education VI Manpower Dev. Education VII Loan No. 2246 2378 2633 2890 Amount of Loan (US$m) 18.8 40.0 10.20 40.0 Loan Agreement (Date) 04/11/83 03/08/84 11/25/85 02/10/88 MISSION DATA Type of Date No. of Specialization Staff Weeks Mission persons Represented in Field Education IV Reconnaissance 07/79 1 E 0.5 Identification 10/79 2 E,ET 6.0 Follow-up discussion 02/80 1 E 0.3 Preparation 09/80 5 A,A,E,EG,ET 15.0 Appraisal 01/81 5 A,E,EG,EH,ET 15.0 Post Appraisal 05/81 1 E 0.5 Post Appraisal 11/81 2 A,E 1.0 Supervision 1 03/82 2 A,ET 3.0 Supervision 2 06/82 2 A,ET 1.0 Supervision 3 10/82 3 A,EA,ET 4.5 Supervision 4 03/83 3 A,E,EG 3.0 Supervision 5 08/83 3 A,EA,EG 1.0 Limited Supervision 01/84 1 EA 0.5 Supervision 7 03/84 3 E,EG,EG 1.0 Limited Supervision 05/84 1 EG 0.2 Supervision 9 10/84 3 A,E,ET 1.0 Limited Supervision 01/85 1 A 0.3 Limited Supervision 10/85 1 E 0.2 Supervision 12 12/85 4 A,E,EG,ET 2.0 Supervision 13 03/86 4 E,EA,EG,ET 2.0 Supervision 14 11/86 2 EG,ET 1.0 Limited Supervision 03/87 1 EG 0.5 Supervision 16 09/87 4 A,EG,ET,OA 2.0 Supervision 17 06/88 1 ET 0.3 Supervision 18 02/89 1 A 0.4 - vi- MISSION DATA Type of Date No. of Specialization Staff Weeks Mission persons Represented in Field La Education V Identification 11/81 4 A,E,E,ET 4.0 Identification/ Preparation 02/82 3 A,E,ET 3.0 Appraisal 06/82 4 A,E,EG,ET 14.0 Prenegotiations 10/82 4 A,EA,EG,ET 2.0 Supervision 1 08/83 3 A,EA,EG 1.0 Limited Supervision 11/83 1 EG/ET 1.0 Supervision 3 03/84 1 EG 1.0 Supervision 4 05/84 1 EG 0.3 Supervision 5 09/84 4 A,E,EG,ET 0.7 Supervision 6 02/85 1 A 0.3 Umited Supervision 10/85 1 ET 0.3 Supervision 8 12/85 4 A,E,EA,ET 2.0 Supervision 9 03/86 4 A,EA,EG,ET 2.0 Supervision 10 11/86 2 EG,ET 0.7 Limited Supervision (TA) 03/87 1 E 0.3 Supervision 12 09/87 4 A,EG,ET,OA 2.0 Supervision 13 06/88 1 ET 0.3 /C A = Architect; E = Economist; EA = Agricultural Educator; EG = General Educator; EH = Health Educator; ET = Technical Educator; OA = Operations Assistant. - Vii - ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS (US$) Education IV Education V Original Actual Original Actual Allocation Disbursement Allocation Disbursement 1. Civil Works Civil Works 7,000,000 6,602,000 A (parts A, B, C&D) 5,900,000 7,325,823 B (part F) 800,000 772,677 C (part G) 1,200,000 0 2. Equipment & Furniture Equipment 4,400,000 5,234,337 A (parts A, B, C&D) 5,500,000 6,151,463 B (part F-EI-Basha) 1,200,000 972,542 C (part G-Irbid) 1,000,000 15,762 D (part H) 0 632,135 3. Services & Consultants Furniture 700,000 1,106,729 A (parts A, B, C&D) 1,700,000 1,816,364 B (part F) 300,000 376,662 C (part G) 300,000 57,574 4. Unallocated 7,100,000 0 Consultants Civil Works 500,000 309,717 Total 25,000,000 18,121,002 Technical Asst. 200,000 0 Fellowships 700,000 0 Unallocated 5,300,000 0 Total 18,000,000 13,252,823 /d Total cancelled amount after project closing: US$6,878,998. (First cancellation, effective December 31, 1988, was US$3,576,000; second cancellation, effective June 30, 1990, was US$3,302,998.) /e Cancellation: US$5,547,177.  PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECTS (LOANS 2068-JO AND 2246-JO) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction conditions changed dramatically. An economic 1. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, recession began in 1983, with a weakening of Jordan's economy was growing rapidly, oil prices and a consequent economic especially in the mining and manufacturing slowdown in neighboring countries. Jordanian sectors. The labor market was experiencing workers returned home, leading to declines in selective shortages. Jordanian planners worker remittances from the Gulf states. emphasized formal secondary vocational Demand for Jordanian export goods to the education because of the reluctance of parents region declined, and there was a sharp to accept non-formal vocational training as the reduction of foreign aid. final stage of pre-employment schooling for their children; and because the narrowness of 3. There were also changes in the the industrial base limited the potential for the structure of the educational and training required on-the-job portion of vocational system. First, in 1985 the Ministry of Higher training. The main priorities of the 1981-1985 Education was created, and the polytechnics Development Plan were to: (a) expand were transferred to its jurisdiction. Second, in provision of basic schooling; (b) increase accordance with the Education Reform of enrollments in secondary vocational education; 1987, basic education was increased from 9 to (c) expand access of children from rural areas 10 years (grades 1-10), while secondary to preparatory and secondary schooling; (d) schooling was reduced from 3 to 2 years improve the quality of education by means of (grades 11-12). This latter reform has had a adequate laboratories, equipment, teaching major impact on project outcomes. aids, and libraries; and (e) expand technician education. Project Objectives and Contents 2. This is the context in which the Fourth 4. The main objectives of Education IV and Fifth Education Projects (Education IV were to: (a) expand the supply of technicians; and Education V) were conceptualized. In the (b) expand the supply of vocational subject early years of project implementation, teachers; (c) expand general and occupational however, the economic and labor market education; (d) increase the number of general vocational secondary schools (GVSSs) and on average were operating at 55 percent of apprenticeship trade training programs; and capacity, while boys' GVSSs were only at 31 (e) increase the supply of paramedical, percent of capacity in 1991. The CSSs nursing, and midwifery personnel. To achieve averaged 58 percent of capacity. Combining these objectives, the Fourth Project was to: the boys' GVSSs and the CSSs, which enroll (a) establish a new polytechnic at Tafilah; (b) only boys, the overal utilization rate was 38 expand and improve technical teacher training percent of capacity. Output of graduates at a polytechnic; (c) convert two teacher during 1987-91 from girls' GVSSs averaged training institutes into community colleges; (d) 1,286 per year or about 60 percent of the establish four new GVSSs (two for girls and target of 2,150, and boys' GVSSs averaged 483 two for boys); and (e) establish a new per year, or only 19 percent of the target of Nursing/Paramedical Integrated Training 2,560 per year. Institute (NPITI). 8. The Polytechnic at Tafilah under 5. The main objectives of Education V Education IV is currently operating at 65 were to: (a) increase the output of skilled percent of capacity. It was originally planned workers; and (b) improve access to preparatory for operation under MOE with courses at both and secondary education in remote rural areas. secondary level (200 students) and post- The project would contribute to the secondary level (300 students). Two events, institutional development of MOE in the area however, intervened to change the nature of of curriculum development, tracer studies, and the institution and its enrollments. First, information management. To achieve these Education V included the construction of a objectives, Education V was to: (a) establish GVSS for boys at Tafilah, about 1 km away 15 new GVSSs (10 for girls and 5 for boys); from the Polytechnic. Second, when Tafflah and (b) establish 3 pilot Centralized Secondary Polytechnic was placed under the Ministry of Schools (CSSs), with boarding facilities for Higher Education in 1985, the secondary boys from rural areas. course was dropped. 6. Both projects were to provide 9. The Community Colleges at Salt and substantial amounts of technical assistance by Howwara appear to be operating substantially way of specialist services and fellowships for above the estimated levels, but enrollments at overseas studies. the NPITI are substantially below the planned level, not because of lack of labor market Results demand or lack of interest in the program among young people, but because of the strict 7. Enrollments in most of the GVSSs and requirement for practical training in local the CSSs are substantially lower than expected. hospitals, combined with the limited number of The low enrollment cannot be attributed to places available for internships. A solution to slowness of the schools in getting started, since this problem, involving placement of interns at enrollments were generally stable between other hospitals, is expected soon. 1987/88 and 1991/92. One explanation is the structural change in the educational system 10. The VTC has been expanding, indeed introduced by the 1987 Education Reform. taking over some of the excess capacity Institutions which were dimensioned for three existing in the formal system. The VTC cohorts from a given catchment area are now Amman Trade Training Center 1TC) was intended to serve only two cohorts, and established as a TTC for women. Although consequently are underutilized. Combining the training was expected to be short-term, the schools in Education IV and V, girls' GVSSs initial offerings were of longer duration, a -xl result, at least in part, of the fact that women taken to close down some of the institutions or are unable to devote more than a few hours convert them into general secondary schools, per day to course work. In recent years, which may be the best preparation for an however, short courses have been given to a uncertain labor market. rapidly increasing number of participants (unemployed, mostly men but also including Findings and Lessons some women) during hours when regular instruction is not under way. 13. Education IV and V were successful, on the whole, in constructing, furnishing and Sustainability equipping the project institutions with the main objective of increasing enrollments and 11. As the majority of project institutions thereby raising the output of skilled people to are underutilized, their sustainability is meet the needs of Jordanian industries as well uncertain, unless alternative cost effective use as the perceived demand from neighboring can be made of their facilities, such as the countries. While the projects have improved VTC's use of some of these underutilized the quality of the education and training schools, that can improve the return on the infrastructure and widened educational investment. A source of encouragement is opportunities for the people of Jordan, that the output of graduates is three times especially for women, the fact remains that higher in the girls' than in the boys' GVSSs most of the project institutions, except the two (para. 7). The Tafilah Polytechnic should be Community Colleges and the trade training able to offer alternative uses of its high quality centers operated by the Vocational Training facilities to increase the currently low Corporation, are substantially underutilized. utilization in order to improve its sustainability. Unless the situation changes soon for the The Community Colleges appear to be better, they are unlikely to be sustainable in sustainable, in light of the social demand. The the long term. The overall low enrollments NPITI at Irbid needs to solve the logistical suggest that the current small output of problems of providing internships at other graduates from these institutions is being hospitals around the country to increase borne at very high cost. enrollments and thus the return on the investments made. 14. For the above reasons, the audit finds that, while Education IV is satisfactory, 12. The VTC, with its close connections Education V is unsatisfactory, confirming the with industry, flexible programs, and potential findings of the respective PCRs. To a large for raising its modest cost recovery, is the extent, external events, over which Jordan had strongest among the project institutions where no control, had overtaken the two projects sustainability is concerned. The poor whose objectives became over-ambitious in a prospects for sustainability of the Amman rapidly changing regional as well as domestic 'ITC, due to the low enrollments and cost economic environment where the demand for recovery, could be improved by the recently skilled labor had shrunk dramatically. The introduced short-term courses for the apparent haste with which Education V was unemployed and by modifying its objective of launched contributed to its unsatisfactory serving exclusively the training needs of outcome, which was exacerbated by the 1987 women. However, given the general structural change in the educational system. underutilization of project facilities, a study could be made to determine whether the social 15. roect Design and Timing. While returns are greater than their operating costs, most of the project institutions have been and on the basis of the findings a decision be operating at substantially lower capacity than planned, those financed under Education V would bring low returns or would be totally show much lower utilization rates than those wasted. funded under Education IV. As Education V was being prepared soon after Education IV 18. Weak Linkages with Industry. The was approved by the Board, it would appear GVSS and to some extent the polytechnics there was some haste in launching the project, seem to have weak industry linkages, which buoyed by confidence that there were no accentuate their lack of competitiveness significant risks (which proved to be untrue), compared with the VTC which has excellent as the project components were repeater items links. The GVSSs and CSSs lack the authority from previous projects which had been, or to plan and arrange their own training were being, successfully implemented. programs in response to employment Evidently, the lessons from Jordan Education opportunities. When the linkages are strong, III, completed in 1984, were too late to the institutions contribute substantially to influence the design of Education V. In meeting economic and labor market goals, retrospect, Jordan would have been better besides promoting favorable work attitudes served if the implementation of Education IV, among youth. and especially the labor market conditions, had been monitored and evaluated before starting Conclusion Education V which sought to address the same issues in the same subsector. 19. Given the profound changes in the Jordanian economy and labor market, and in 16. Procurement. As a result of light of Government fiscal constraints, the unsatisfactory experience in dealing with some greatest challenge facing Jordanian education companies which had supplied inferior goods, and training in the 1990s is to adjust the sector the MOE has proposed that the terms of objectives and strategies of Education IV and payment under the buyer's letter of credit V to the new economic realities. This would should be changed from 100 percent of c.i.f. call for a flexible policy aimed at (a) enabling value, payable against presentation of shipping Jordan to penetrate world markets, instead of documents as required under Bank targeting only those in the Gulf states; (b) procurement procedure guidelines, to 70 adjusting investments in training for the transit percent of c.i.f. value, and 30 percent after transport sector to correspond to actual receipt of the goods and approval from the demand; (c) delaying training for employment MOE's technical committee. in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia until demand rises again; and (d) stimulating and expanding the 17. Maintenance of Facilities and tourism industry or delaying further the Equipment There is evidence of poor training for travel and tourism until demand maintenance of the three CSSs. Installation picks up again. A demand-led policy would and commissioning of machines and equipment suggest increased efforts at (i) vocational seemed generally unsatisfactory due, in part, to instructor training to meet current needs in the absence of the relevant manuals and to schools, and (ii) paramedical and medical ineffective local agents representing training to meet the rising needs of the health international suppliers. The lesson is that, sector, part of which is expected to be without built-in provisions for maintenance addressed by the forthcoming Second Health and repair, education and training institutions Project. Meanwhile, a concerted effort is in remote areas are at risk of becoming non- needed to address the issue of underutilized functional whenever broken equipment or GVSSs and CSSs by increasing enrollments if damaged buildings cannot be repaired the immediate prospects for increasing immediately. Investments in such institutions employment are good, or by consolidating the operation of these institutions until such time as an improved economic environment would justify their full operation. 運｀, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT JORDAN FOURTH AND FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECTS (LOANS 2068-JO AND 2246-JO) 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND Introduction 1.1 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jordan's economy was growing at an annual rate of 9 percent, with the mining and manufacturing sectors growing at an annual rate of 18 percent. Two dominant macro-economic developments led Government to place high priority on education and training. First, it was considered that Jordan's rapidly growing and increasingly sophisticated economy required increasing levels of skilled manpower. Second, Jordan benefitted from boom conditions in oil-exporting Gulf countries by utilizing its relatively skilled labor force both in local production for export to those countries and in lucrative temporary employment opportunities in the Middle East, with consequent high levels of foreign exchange remittances. The importance of labor skills for rapid growth in a country with a meager natural resource base led Government to invest heavily in education and training. Main Sectoral Issues 1.2 Jordanian planners placed heavy emphasis on formal secondary vocational education because of (a) doubts that Jordanian families would accept non-formal vocational training as the final stage of pre-employment schooling for their children; and (b) awareness that the narrowness of the industrial base limited the potential for the required on-the-job portion of vocational training. The Bank fully supported the Government's strategy in the sector and was prepared to continue its substantial participation in Jordan's education investment, following three previous projects during 1972-1979. With its emphasis on education and training, Jordan was able to place large numbers of its well-trained labor force in the oil-rich Gulf states. During the late 1970s, when employment in the Gulf states was expanding, over a third of the Jordanian labor force migrated to these countries. The resulting remittances from workers contributed substantially to Jordan's economic growth. 1.3 Ile 1981-1985 Development Plan allocated the equivalent of US$650 million to investment in education and US$30 million to investment in training, for a total of about 5 percent of GNP. The main priorities of the 1981-1985 Development Plan were to: (a) increase enrollments in secondary vocational education (grades 10-12) to 30 percent of total secondary enrollment; (b) expand the provision of basic schooling (grades 1-9) from 91 percent to 94 percent of the corresponding age group; (c) expand access of children from rural areas to preparatory (grades 7-9) and secondary schools; (d) improve the quality of education by means of adequate laboratories, equipment, teaching aids, and libraries; and (e) expand technician education (grades 13-14). These were the conditions -2- that formed the context in which the Fourth and Fifth Education Projects (Education IV and Education V) were conceptualized. The Changing Economic, Labor Market and Education and Training Context 1.4 To appreciate the implementation experience and post-completion operation of these two projects, it is important to understand the socio- economic conditions of Jordan since the early 1980s. In the early years of project implementation the economic and labor market conditions began to change. An economic recession began in 1983, with a weakening of oil prices and a consequent economic slowdown in neighboring countries. Jordanian workers returned home, leading to declines in worker remittances from the Gulf states. Demand for Jordanian export goods to the region declined. This was combined with a sharp reduction of foreign aid. The Development Plan for 1986- 1990 emphasized investment in small- and medium-scale, labor-intensive projects in manufacturing, but by 1987/88 it became clear that the plan could not be implemented because of the economic decline and falling demand for Jordanian manufactured goods. More recently, the Gulf crisis led to (a) further losses of export markets of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; (b) loss of income in the transit transport sector; (c) loss of remittances from Jordanian workers in Kuwait and to some extent Saudi Arabia; (d) loss of income from travel and tourism; (e) increases in the import bill due to the rise in oil prices; and (f) an increased burden on the budget because of increased outlays on schools and health facilities to serve the returnees. 1.5 When Education IV and Education V were being designed, the labor market was experiencing selective shortages that led to an influx of non-Jordanian labor. The problem then was to meet labor market shortages. With the economic slowdown and the return of Jordanian workers from the Gulf states, subsequently exacerbated by the Gulf crisis, the problem has been to find employment for a rapidly increasing domestic work force. Projections show imbalances in the work force, with large numbers of white-collar workers unable to find employment. In the wake of these developments and increasing budget deficits, the Government of Jordan adopted a comprehensive medium-term adjustment program supported by an IMF Stand-By arrangement and a World Bank Industry and Trade Policy Adjustment Loan in 1989. Two features of the adjustment program having relevance to vocational education and training are: (a) a reduction of the budget deficit, and (b) a package of measures to stimulate trade and industry, including deregulation, privatization, and rationalization of Government services. The private sector will account for a more substantial share of the development initiative than was envisaged in the early 1980s. 1.6 In addition to changes brought about by the changing economic and labor market context, there were also changes in the structure of the educational and training system. First, in 1985 the Ministry of Higher Education was created, and the Polytechnics were transferred to its jurisdiction. Second, in accordance with the Education Reform of 1987, basic education was increased from 9 to 10 years (grades 1-10), while secondary schooling was reduced from 3 to 2 years (grades 11-12). The shortening of secondary schooling, as will be shown below, has had a major impact on project outcomes. Project Objectives and Scope 1.7 In accordance with the economic, labor market, and growth strategy context prevailing in 1981, as described above, the main objectives of Education IV (SAR, para. 2.02) were to: -3- (a) Meet perceived urgent needs for technicians; (b) Ensure an adequate supply of vocational subject teachers; (c) Expand general and occupational education to meet local needs in trade and commerce; (d) Alleviate skilled worker shortage by expanding general vocational secondary schools (GVSSs) and apprenticeship trade training programs for preparatory (lower secondary) school leavers and workers of any age; and (e) Meet the shortage of qualified paramedical, nursing, and midwifery personnel for basic health care programs by expanding health technician and nursing education. 1.8 Project activities included construction, furniture, and equipment for (a) a new Polytechnic at Tafilah, southern Jordan; (b) expansion and quality improvement of the technical teacher training program at Marka Polytechnic; (c) conversion of the teacher training schools at Salt and Howwara into community colleges; (d) four new GVSSs around Amman; (e) a new vocational training center northwest of Amman; and (f) a new Nursing/Paramedical Integrated Training Institute (NPITI) at Irbid. 1.9 Technical Assistance (TA) for Education IV included 54 staff-months of specialist services and 617 staff-months of fellowships. In addition, 4 person-months of specialist services and 30 person-months of fellowships would support curriculum review and development of comprehensive secondary schools. Six person-months of specialist services would support the development of the technician training program at the Marka Polytechnic. 1.10 In Education V, the main objectives (SAR, para. 2.01) were to: (a) Increase the output of skilled workers; and (b) Improve access to preparatory and secondary education in remote areas. In addition, the project was to contribute to the institutional development of the MOE in curriculum development, tracer studies, and information management, through strengthening the MOE Directorate of Projects and other directorates in the area of project preparation and implementation. 1.11 In pursuit of the first two objectives, Education V was to provide civil works, furniture, and equipment to: (a) establish 15 new GVSSs (Grades 10 -12), of which 10 were for girls; and (b) establish 3 pilot centralized secondary schools (CSSs) with boarding facilities for boys from rural areas. 1.12 The third objective (institutional development) would be served by technical assistance, comprising 16 staff-years of fellowships and 2.5 staff-years of specialist services to strengthen the MOE responsibilities listed in para. 1.10 above. Project Cost and Financing 1.13 The total project cost for Education IV was estimated at US$50.9 million equivalent, including contingencies. The Government was to finance US$23.6 million equivalent (46 percent); UNDP, US$2.3 million equivalent (5 percent); and the Bank, US$25.0 million equivalent (49 percent). -4- 1.14 For Education V. the total cost was estimated at US$88.87 million equivalent, including contingencies. The Government was to finance US$44.8 million equivalent (50 percent); the Saudi Fund, US$22.1 million equivalent (25 percent); the British ODA, US$3.2 million equivalent (4 percent); and the Bank, US$18.8 million equivalent (21 percent). Implementation Plans 1.15 Education IV and Education V were to be administered by the Directorate of Projects (successor to the PIU established in the MOE for the implementation of the first three education projects). The Trade Training Center (TTC) and the NPITI components were to be handled respectively by the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) and the Ministry of Health (MOH). The National Planning Council (subsequently replaced by the Ministry of Planning) was responsible for the coordination of project implementation. 1.16 Both projects were planned to be implemented over a period of about 5 years: Education IV was expected to be completed by June 1987, and Education V by December 1987. II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES Project Management and Implementation Experience 2.1 Overall project management of the two projects was satisfactory, considering that some unevenness in implementation capability was to be expected with three different implementing agencies involved. Notwithstanding the provision for coordination by the National Planning Council, the project implementation teams of MOE, MOH, and VTC worked independently, with the result that the relatively less experienced MOH team did not draw full benefit from MOE's considerable implementation experience. 2.2 Project Changes. During implementation of Education V, the Loan was amended to: (a) include the construction of two warehouses for temporary storage of equipment and furniture procured under ongoing Bank-financed projects; (b) cancel funding for teaching staff housing for the GVSSs: and (c) cancel funding for the TA component, which was financed instead by UNDP following a Government request. 2.3 For Education IV, civil works were completed slightly ahead of schedule, except for the construction of the NPITI, which suffered a 3-year delay caused by a combination of MOH's lack of experience in handling Bank-financed projects and site problems. Equipment and furniture procurement for the MOE components, although delayed by 6-12 months, was completed before the Closing Date. Technical assistance was essentially completed on schedule, except for MOH short- term fellowships, whose implementation was extended one year beyond the original completion date agreed with Oklahoma State University, but which nevertheless was completed before the Closing Date. 2.4 Education IV was completed in September 1989, 27 months later than the planned date of June 1987. Consequently the Closing Date was postponed from December 31, 1987 to December -5- 31, 1989. There was a significant reduction in project cost from US$50.9 million equivalent to US$30.8 million equivalent due to a sharp increase in the foreign exchange rate compared with domestic inflation as well as keen competition in the Jordanian construction industry. As a result, US$6.9 million of unutilized loan funds were cancelled. 2.5 Implementation of Education V was facilitated by a Bank-organized seminar in March 1986 on World Bank procedures. Despite serious soil problems requiring redesign of foundations and structural elements at some sites, construction was completed with a delay of only about 3 months. The GVSSs were generally well-designed and constructed, although some of them have shown signs of structural deterioration. The GVSSs were also generally well equipped and furnished, although equipment/furniture delivery and installation were delayed by about six months. Some centralized schools, by contrast, were overdeveloped and showed evidence of some deterioration. 2.6 The project was completed in April 1988, four months later than the planned date of December 1987. Within the project, however, implementation of technical assistance was delayed by more than four years. The delay was due partly to the cancellation, at Government request, of the Bank allocation of US$0.9 million to TA, and the application for UNDP funding instead. Internal UNDP procedures caused additional delays in making the approved funds available to Government. The fellowship program, which involved upgrading of 52 teachers and MOE staff through 227 staff-months of overseas training, was completed December 31, 1989, over four years behind schedule. Implementation of the Main Project Components 2.7 Increasing Capacity. As planned, 19 new GVSSs (12 for girls, 7 for boys) and three new CSSs for boys were established. Under Education IV, the two girls' GVSSs had a target enrollment of 1,930, and the two boys' GVSSs, 3,000, with a combined projected annual output of 710 and 1,120 from the girls' and boys' schools, respectively. Under Education V, the 10 girls' GVSSs would enroll 3,840 and the five boys' GVSS would enroll 3,940. Each group of schools would graduate 1,440 students annually. The CSSs were to enroll altogether 2,520 students, and graduate 840 annually. 2.8 Enrollments in most of the project GVSSs and the CSSs are substantially lower than expected, as summarized in Table 2.1 below. As the details show in Appendix Table 1, the low enrollment does not generally reflect merely slowness in getting started, since overall enrollments were fairly stable between 1987/88 and 1991/92. As shown in Appendix Table 1, enrollments hardly increased over the period for Education IV and V project girls' schools and were actually lower in 1991/92 than in 1987/88 for Education IV boys' schools. The exception to the general stability is boys' GVSSs supported under Education V. Although enrollments in these schools increased substantially from 1987/88 to 1991/92, they still represent the least utilized of all the schools financed by the two projects, with 1991 enrollments reaching only 26 percent of target. 2.9 Utilization rates (actual enrollments as a percentage of planned enrollments) are summarized in Table 2.1, with details in Appendix Table 2 and Table 3. One explanation often cited for this low utilization of facilities is the change in the structure of the educational system introduced by the Education Reform of 1987. Under this reform, basic education was increased from 9 to 10 years, while secondary schooling was reduced from 3 to 2 years. Students who, on completing 9 years of schooling, previously would have entered a vocational school, now stay in basic education a year longer and receive only 2 years of secondary schooling. Institutions which were dimensioned for -6- three cohorts from a given catchment area are now intended to serve only two cohorts, with the result that they are now over-dimensioned and underutilized. Table 2.1: Estimated and Actual Current Enrollments In Schools Constructed and Equipped under the Fourth and Fifth Education Project (1991/92) Planned Actual Actual/ School Enrollment Enrollment Planned (%) Fourth Project Girls' GVSSs 1,930 1,025 53 Boys' GVSSs 3,000 1,115 37 Total Fourth Project 4,930 2,140 43 Fifth Project Girls' GVSSs 3,840 2,170 57 Boys' GVSSs 3,920 1,005 26 Centralized Secondary Schools (Boys) 2,520 1,469 58 Total Fifth Project 10,280 4,644 45 Grand Total Girls 5,770 3,195 55 Grand Total Boys 9,440 3,589 38 Grand Total Girls & Boys 15,210 6,784 45 Source: Vocational Education Directorate, MOE, June 1992. 2.10 The change in the secondary education structure provides only part of the explanation for non-increase in enrollments. Apparently other factors are involved. The change from a 3-year pro- gram to a 2-year program would be consistent with operation at 67 percent of capacity. Looking at the schools supported under Education IV, in total, in the girls' GVSSs, enrollments reached only 53 percent of design capacity by the school year 1991/ 92. In the boys' GVSSs, enrollments reached only 37 percent of design capacity by the school year 1991/92. For schools supported under Education V, the corresponding figures were 57 percent and 26 percent, respectively. In the CSSs (for boys), enrollment reached 58 percent. Considering the girls' schools in total, enrollment reached 55 percent, while in the boys' schools in total enrollment reached only 38 percent, or slightly more than half of what would be expected as a result of the reform. 2.11 One commonly offered explanation for the low enrollments in vocational schools is that attitudes among young people are not favorable towards entering practical vocations, preferring instead higher education. On the other hand, it could be argued that, as long as they could get well- paid employment in the Gulf states, they would not mind working in manual occupations. At any rate, assuming that the original dimensioning was appropriate, in order for the attitude factor to -7- explain the observed enrollments, it must apply more to boys than to girls, and it must reflect an increase in boys' preferences for higher education, compared with the early 1980s when the schools were dimensioned. This resulted in a low output of graduates. The number of graduates during 1987-91 from the girls' GVSSs totalled 6,430, averaging 1,286 per year or 60 percent of the target output of 2,150. Graduates from the boys' GVSSs totalled 2,416 or an average of 483 per year, which represented only 19 percent of the planned annual output of 2,560. These indicators show that the girls' schools were three times as efficient as the boys' schools, even though the output from the girls' schools was significantly below expectations. 2.12 Tafilah Polytechnic was originally planned under Education IV for operation under MOE with courses at two levels: secondary (grades 10-11) with a total enrollment of 200, and post-secondary (grades 13-14) with a total enrollment of 300, with an annual output of 250 graduates. Two events, however, intervened to change the nature of the institution and its enrollments. First, Education V included the construction of a GVSS for boys at Tafilah, about 1 km away from the Polytechnic. Second, when Tafilah Polytechnic was placed under the newly created Ministry of Higher Education in 1985, the secondary course was dropped. The Polytechnic is currently operating with a regular enrollment of 324, or 65 percent of full capacity. Additional details may be seen in Appendix Table 4. 2.13 By contrast, the Community Colleges at Salt and Howwara, where existing facilities were expanded to enroll a total of 945 students, were operating substantially above the estimated levels, with combined new enrollments of 1,800 and combined outputs of 1,550 compared with the planned output of 600. 2.14 Enrollments at the NPITI, planned for 700 with an annual output of 285, are also substantially below the expected level, as can be seen in Table 2.2. Further details are displayed in Appendix Table 5. In this case, however, it is not because of lack of labor market demand. On the contrary, there is a strong demand for qualified nurses and paramedical personnel in Jordan and a strong interest in the program among young people. The explanation given for the under-enrollment is the strict requirement for practical training in local hospitals, combined with the limited number of places available for internships. The Government said that there would be an early solution to this problem, involving placement of interns at other hospitals. 2.15 Whereas the project GVSSs and CSSs have been sluggish in enrollment development, the VTC in recent years has been expanding, indeed taking over some of the excess capacity in the formal system and drawing off students who might otherwise have been channelled to GVSSs. Today the VTC operates 16 training centers, two training institutes, and eight urban development centers, providing a total capacity for 16,000 trainees. It has a total staff of 750. In 1991 it provided 13.5 million man-hours of training in 202 programs for 17,231 trainees in cooperation with 3,240 employers. Future plans include the construction of 12 training centers and the expansion of existing centers. One of the strengths of the VTC is its flexibility. In addition to its own facilities, it is also able to utilize other available training resources through cooperative arrangements; for example, with GVSSs with underutilized capacity. The GVSS at Tafilah is one such school. -8- Table 2.2 Enrollments in Nursing/Paramedical Integrated Training Institute (NPITI), 1991192 Planned Actual Actual/ Institution Enrollment Enrollment Planned (%) Nursing College - 205 Paramedical Institute - 119 - Total 700 324 46 Source: Ministry of Health, June 1992 2.16 The VTC Trade Training Center ('ITC) at Marka (near Amman) was projected to serve 600 trainees annually and have an annual output of 500 (SAR, para. 2.22-2.27), but its actual capacity is about 250. Planned to be the seventh in a network of trade training institutions, it was established as a TTC for women. Although the training was expected to be "short-term", the initial offerings seem to have been of longer duration in practice. This is a result, at least in part, of the fact that women were unable to devote more than a few hours per day to course work. Initially most of the training activity was devoted to "long-term" courses (1 - 2 years). Since the first graduates were turned out in 1987, more than 90 percent of the "long-term" courses completed were 2-year courses, as can be seen in Appendix Table 6a. 2.17 By the end of the 1990/91 year, 352 women had graduated from courses in radio and tele- vision repair, office machine repair, retail sales, typing and office skills, child care (discontinued), and tailoring. In recent years, however, "short-term courses" (2 - 6 months) have been given to a rapidly increasing number of participants (unemployed, mostly men but also including some women) during hours when regular instruction is not under way. These courses have included radio and television repair, retail sales, and tailoring. By the end of the 1990/91 year, 816 participants had completed such training, including 442 in 1990/91, when a program for the unemployed was started (Appendix Table 6b). However, data on placement of graduates are lacking, largely because neither the MOE nor any of the project institutions conducts any tracer studies of their graduates (see para. 3.29). 2.18 Warehouse at Marka. The new PIU warehouses at Marka are in use, greatly expanding the capacity of the Procurement Division to receive goods. The new warehouses have been built with no insulation, however, which makes them uncomfortably hot in the summer and cold in the winter. In the winter, temperatures can fall below freezing, which could cause damage to some kinds of goods. There is no central heating. It was noted that the old warehouse was insulated. 2.19 Technical Assistance. For the MOE component, overseas fellowships amounting to a total of 397 staff-months were provided under Education IV (68 percent of SAR estimate), and 230 staff- months were provided under Education V (3 percent above SAR estimate), as shown in Table 2.3. Additional details are shown in Appendix Table 7a and Table 7b. Specialist services amounting to a total of 24 staff-months were provided under Education IV (65% of SAR estimate). For the MOH -9- component, overseas fellowships amounting to a total of 73 staff-months were provided under Education IV (38 percent above SAR estimate). Table 2.3: Overseas Fellowships, Technical Assistance Program, Fourth and Fifth Education Projects In support of: Total Staff Months Fourth Project GVSSs 186 CCs 174 Centralized Schools 8 Curriculum Department 6 Project Directorate 17 Computer Directorate 6 Total, Fourth Project 397 Fifth Project Total, Fifth Project 230 Grand Total 627 Project Costs 2.20 The total actual project cost for Education IV was US$30.8 million equivalent, 40% under the appraisal estimate. The Government financed US$10.6 million equivalent (34 percent); UNDP, US$2.1 million equivalent (7 percent); and the Bank, US$18.1 million equivalent (59 percent). 2.21 For Education V, the total actual project cost was US$62.5 million equivalent, 30% lower than the appraisal estimate. The Government financed US$24.7 million equivalent (40 percent); the Saudi Fund financed US$21.5 million equivalent (34 percent); the British ODA, US$2.4 million equivalent (4 percent); UNDP, US$0.6 million equivalent (1 percent); and the Bank, US$13.3 million equivalent (21 percent). Sustainability 2.22 Generally, sustainability is deemed to be likely for public educational institutions when they are manifestly meeting a felt need and are functioning as planned; policy and institutional support (e.g. from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance) is clearly evident, and there is an adequate recurrent budget for operations and maintenance. 2.23 Considering the extent of under-utilization of the project GVSSs, especially the boys' GVSSs, and the CSSs, the sustainability of these schools appears to be uncertain unless ways can be found - 10 - to utilize the facilities more efficiently. The girls' schools have higher utilization rates than boys' schools, but enrollments do not appear to be rising. While the output of graduates from the GVSSs has fallen far short of expectations, a source of encouragement is that the girls' schools in 1991 on average achieved 60 percent of the appraisal target, whereas the boys' schools reached only 19 percent of the appraisal target. Utilization rates for the boys' schools are rising, but the current enrollments are so low that no optimism is warranted unless a significant change occurs. One positive feature is that the VTC is able to utilize excess capacity in some schools and thus can improve the return on the investment. 2.24 The Tafilah Polytechnic, currently operating at about 65 percent of capacity, needs to raise its utilization rate to ensure its long-term sustainability. It is a high quality institution which could serve the whole of southern Jordan if adequate arrangements could be made to attract, retain, and serve more students and other clients. 2.25 The CSSs as they are presently organized and operated face an uncertain future in regard to their sustainability. Overall enrollments are less than 60 percent of target. It has not been possible to operate the CSSs as planned, specifically in regard to dormitory accommodations. In addition, staff turnover is high, and policy commitment to, and practical likelihood of, using these schools as magnets for nomadic communities remain uncertain. 2.26 The Community Colleges at Salt and Howwara appear to be meeting a strong social demand, but because of the changed economic conditions in Jordan, the external efficiency of these and other Community Colleges may be low. A December 1991 Bank supervision mission, noting that over 50 percent of Community College graduates were unemployed, urged the Government to review its policy on Community Colleges and its relevance to labor market needs (Aide Memoire, dated January 24, 1992, para. 15). In 1986, the OED audit on Education III (Loan 1781-JO) had noted that during the early 1980s the number of community colleges (both Government and private) had multiplied to 45, with a total enrollment of 32,000 in 1983/84, even before the pilot Zarqa Community College (ZCC), funded under Education III, could be evaluated. The audit advised caution, pointing out that, in view of the rapid growth of the community college system, "it may be prudent for the Government to evaluate the impact and the benefits of community colleges, particularly the [Education III] appraisal assumption that the ZCC would achieve cost economies.... The task of evaluating the effectiveness of the community colleges to strengthen the administration of individual colleges, and thereby ensure their viability, might appropriately be undertaken by the newly created (1985) Ministry of Higher Education..." (PAR No. 6251, dated June 16, 1986, para. 23). 2.27 Although enrollments at the Irbid NPITI are also substantially below the expected level, it is noted that there is a strong demand for qualified nurses and paramedical personnel in Jordan and a strong interest in the program among young people. The institution and the training are sustain- able, but until the logistical problems of providing internships at other hospitals around the country can be solved, return on the investment will be low. Probably the highest level of sustainability, relative to the other project institutions, is exhibited by the VTC, with its close connections with industry, its flexibility, and its possibilities for cost recovery. Long-term sustainability would appear to depend upon the VTC's ability to raise the level of cost recovery significantly above the current 10 percent. - 11 - Bank Group and Borrower Performance 2.28 The Bank. On the whole the Bank performed creditably, providing adequate and timely support, including the establishment of a Special Account, to the Borrower. The audit, however, is in agreement with the Education IV PCR (para. 4.02) on the project design being overly optimistic in its expectation that the MOH would be able to implement the Irbid NPITI on schedule. Supervision missions could have given more attention to the projects, particularly during the period 1985-88, when it must have been apparent that the emerging socioeconomic problems could adversely affect certain project institutions (Education IV PCR, para. 8.02). A generic problem seemed to be the lack of Bank staff continuity in project supervision, with the result that there was a lack of consistency in following up on problems, as in Education V, which could have benefitted from closer attention being given to the construction and operation of the pilot CSSs and the under-utilization of loan funds (Education V PCR, para. 8.03). 2.29 Borrower. The Borrower satisfactorily met its obligations on the planned project activities required for loan effectiveness, and complied with all covenants. The MOE and VTC worked expeditiously to launch the projects, but the MOH had delays in its fellowship program. The new General Directorate of Projects and School Buildings (GDPS) was established in 1987, replacing two former separate agencies. The GDPS has overall responsibility for project implementation and liaison with the various project entities and the Bank. The Borrower did not make full use of the Special Account, to which an initial deposit of US$2.5 million equivalent was made in July 1986. By the Closing Date of Education V two years later, less than US$1.0 million had been utilized, and the undisbursed balance was returned to the Bank. This may be explained by the fact that GDPS staff did not use procurement procedures other than ICB procedures, by which reimbursements of expenditures were made directly from the Bank through lengthy withdrawal application procedures. III. FINDINGS AND ISSUES Overview 3.1 Education IV and V were implemented as planned, with only minor changes that did not affect the main thrust of the projects, which was to increase the output of skilled people. External factors stemming from weakening oil prices and the subsequent recession starting in 1983 had a negative impact on the projects. In retrospect, the projects were made vulnerable by what appears to have been unduly optimistic expectations that Jordan would be able to sustain high economic growth based largely on the continued prosperity of its oil-rich neighbors whose needs for skilled workers were being met by Jordan's better educated and trained people. It was essentially a fragile base on which to expand the secondary and post-secondary education and training system which had been growing rapidly since the 1970s. The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 highlighted Jordan's vulnerability to external factors over which it had no control, but which nevertheless have had a pervasive impact on the education and training system. 3.2 Internal factors, stemming from the 1987 reform of the structure of the educational system, also had a negative impact on the projects. Basic schooling was extended by one year, while the 3- year secondary schooling was shortened by one year, thereby reducing the potential GVSS student body by 1/3. The MOE authorities explained that, even if the secondary student base were expanded - 12 - by widening the catchment area, the GVSSs, designed for 3-year programs, could not easily be adapted to the requirements of the new 2-year programs. Evidently, the 1987 Education Reform changed the structure of basic education without adequate measures to ameliorate the negative impact on the secondary structure, leaving the project GVSSs grossly under-enrolled. Conse- quently, the average annual output during 1987-91 was 60 percent for the girls' GVSSs and only 19 percent for the boys' GVSSs, as measured against the appraisal targets (para. 2.11). 3.3 Undoubtedly the projects have improved the quality of the education and training infrastructure and generally widened further the already enviable (by regional standards) educational opportunities for the people of Jordan. A specially notable achievement of the projects are the increased opportunities for women's education and training, a continuing trend in Jordan which has been in the forefront in supporting equality in education for women. At the same time, however, the gross underutilization of good quality educational and training facilities raises questions on the scope of the projects, and especially the timing of Education V, which was launched soon after implementation started for Education IV. 3.4 The overall low enrollments suggest that the small output of graduates from these institutions is being borne at very high cost. Thus, the sustainability of most of the project institutions, with the exception of the two Community Colleges and the VTC trade training centers, appears uncertain in their present operation. The overall situation leads this audit to conclude that, while Education IV is satisfactory, Education V is unsatisfactory because the latter's shortfalls are more severe under the drastically changed socioeconomic conditions in Jordan -- economic recession and rising unemployment To a large extent external events, over which Jordan had no control, had overtaken the two projects, whose objectives were pushed out of line by the rapidly changing regional as well as domestic economic environment where the demand for skilled labor had shrunk dramatically. Education IV fared better because it financed the development of a variety of institutions geared towards meeting different needs, whereas Education V was focussed on the expansion of GVSSs and establishment of pilot (i.e. experimental) schools, for which the demand and need, in retrospect, were overestimated. The 1987 change in the structure of the education system exacerbated the problems of stagnant or declining enrollments and the flow of students from the preparatory level to the secondary level. Findings and Lessons 3.5 Project Design and Timing. While Education IV was designed to meet the multifaceted needs of the education and training system at the secondary and post-secondary levels, and was launched when Jordan was at the height of the rapid economic growth stage, Education V was more narrowly focussed on the GVSSs and three pilot centralized secondary schools ostensibly to meet the needs of largely nomadic communities in the remoter regions of Jordan. In 1991/92, the five boys' GVSSs funded under Education V showed an average of 26 percent enrollment against the appraisal target, ranging from a low of 10 percent in Al-Shouma South, to a high of 35 percent in Al-Karak. The 10 girls GVSSs under Education V, had an average enrollment of 57 percent against the appraisal estimate. Enrollments in the GVSSs under Education IV were slightly better for the two boys schools, slightly worse for the two girls schools (Appendix Table 1). 3.6 Considering that preparation for Education V was carried out in March 1982 soon after Board approval of Education IV in December 1981, it would appear that there was some haste in launching Education V. Both projects implicitly assumed that part of the output of the education and training - 13 - system would go towards meeting the known skilled manpower shortage in the Gulf states. Clearly, this type of demand is inherently unstable, based as it is on political as well as economic considerations. Establishing costly institutions to satisfy, at least in part, external demand over which Jordan had no control is a very risky business of which the Bank should be extremely wary. Although too late to affect the design of Education V, the OED audit report on Jordan Education III cautioned that, "In the long run, the role of all the [project] institutions in meeting manpower shortages would depend on the complex factors that affect the supply and demand of skilled labor in Jordan and the surrounding Arab countries and the sensitiveness of the economy to changes in Jordan's oil-rich regional environment" (PAR No. 6251, op.cit., para. 18). In retrospect, the country would have been better served if more time had been allowed for assessing the effects of Education III or the implementation of Education IV before launching Education V which was directed at the same subsector and was addressing the same issues as the earlier projects. 3.7 Given the fact that the majority of project institutions are underutilized, it is unlikely that their social returns would be greater than their operating costs. A study could be made to determine whether this assumption is correct, and if so, to consider closing down some of the schools by consolidating enrollments. Another option might be to convert some of the institutions into general secondary schools, which may be the best preparation for an uncertain labor market. 3.8 Procurement. In the process of tender evaluation under the two projects, problems arose in assuring acceptable levels of quality and compliance. Experience suggests several measures may be taken. First, the level of bonding and terms of payment in connection with equipment procurement seem to be inadequate to assure compliance with the contract. The Procurement Division of the GDPS has recommended changes in both the level of bonding and the terms of payment. In accordance with the World Bank procurement procedure guidelines, the standard contract for equipment procurement commits the buyer to open a letter of credit equal to 100 percent of the total cost, with 100 percent of c.i.f. value payable against presentation of shipping documents. The GDPS Procurement Division would like to change the terms of payment to 70 percent of c.i.f. value payable against presentation of shipping documents, and 30 percent after receipt of the goods and approval from the technical committee of the MOE. The Procurement Division would also like to raise the level of the compliance bond from the present level of 20 percent to 25 percent. 3.9 Second, some companies evidently have bad track records in terms of the quality of the goods they supply. Although the standard procedures can usually catch shipment of inferior goods, the process costs time and money. The Procurement Division has recommended blacklisting companies which consistently supply inferior goods. They would not be invited to tender in future. It is also noted, however, that the standard tendering conditions specify that tenders are to be accompanied by performance and testing documentation where available. Greater weight should be given to such documentation in the evaluation of the tenders. 3.10 Third, sometimes local agents of international suppliers have only limited responsibility and authority to act on behalf of the supplier if problems arise. The procurement division would like to be able to strengthen the requirement for a local agent by stipulating the presence of full repre- sentation. 3.11 Maintenance of Facilities and EAuipment. Maintenance of facilities appears to be a problem for the more remote schools, even when they are easily accessible by highway. Although the audit - 14 - mission did not inspect all three project CSSs, the visit to the Mafraq CSS (on the main road 75 km from Amman) brought out problems which, in varying degrees, are common to all. The Mafraq CSS seems to be beset by problems of structural and water damage to the buildings. Building maintenance is poor. Even simple repairs of broken floor tiles appear to face delays and difficulties in assignment of responsibility. Evidently the authorities give low priority to allocations for repair and maintenance. This raises the question whether the recurrent cost implications had been thoroughly considered before the decision was taken to proceed with the establishment of the three CSSs. This maintenance problem will become increasingly acute as the many new schools built in the last few years begin to show signs of wear. 3.12 Most of the machines and equipment were installed, operational, and in use. In some cases, however, machines and equipment were still not installed. In other cases, equipment intended for use in training (e.g., typewriters to be used in a course in typewriter repair) were not in use because of the absence of service manuals, spare-parts lists, and catalogs. The problem is attributed to: (a) the absence of installation manuals, which apparently were not delivered with the goods; (b) the inability of the local agent to act with the full authority of the supplier; and (c) the non-performance of the supplier despite repeated approaches. Although these can probably explain a number of cases, investigation revealed that another probable explanation is that installation manuals, service manuals, spare-parts lists, and spare-parts catalogs were not specifically mentioned in the tendering documentation. 3.13 The basic problem appears to be the lack of any provision for an adequate operations and maintenance (0 & M) budget and for in-house staff to be responsible for maintenance and repair. Without built-in provisions for 0 & M, education and training institutions in remote areas are at high risk of becoming inefficient if not non-functional whenever broken down equipment cannot be repaired immediately. Investments in such facilities would bring low returns or would be totally wasted. 3.14 Weak Linkages with Industry. The GVSSs, and to some extent the polytechnics, seem to have weak industry linkages, highlighting their lack of competitiveness in contrast with the VTC which has excellent connections. This may be seen in two ways. First, in the general vocational secondary schools and polytechnics, instructional personnel generally have no industrial experience. This appears not to be perceived as a problem among MOE officials or school management. Second, industrial attachment for these two-year programs appears to be successfully applied, in the sense that students are generally placed in industry, but there is no follow-up by instructors. There is only supervision by industry, with progress reports to the school. 3.15 The GVSSs and the CSSs seem to have limited flexibility to respond to labor market demand, demand from industry, and social demand. There is a willingness and eagerness to use facilities for community activities involving training. But they seem to lack the authority to plan and arrange their own training operations in response to employment opportunities. Typically vocational and technical education and training institutions are justified in terms of their economic and labor market outcomes. When such institutions have strong industry linkages, they contribute substantially to meeting eco- nomic and labor market goals. They also promote favorable attitudes among young people, who more clearly see in their studies the relevance to the world of work. To ensure success, it behooves designers of vocational/technical education/training projects to provide for effective linkages between training institutions and industry. - 15 - 3.16 Centralized Secondary Schools. The three pilot CSSs, conceptualized as a body of services to assist in the settlement of the Bedouin population, are less than fully operational. There are two major reasons. Firt, there is high turnover among professional staff, especially for scarce special- izations such as English, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics. The principal at the Mafraq CSS was trained specifically for the task of managing a centralized school, and then after three years was seconded to the Regional Directorate. This is an illustration of a perennial problem. As soon as staff are properly certified, they are seconded elsewhere. The CSSs have to contend with frequent staff changes because salaries, working conditions, and job promotion systems, are not sufficiently attractive to retain teachers, who in any case prefer not to teach in remote areas. 3.17 Scond the CSSs were intended as a magnet to encourage the nomadic communities to send their children to school, if not to help them adopt a more settled life. Evidently efforts at settling nomadic people elsewhere (e.g. Kenya and Somalia) have met with little success. In the present case, it is unclear whether any survey was carried out to ascertain the interest of the nomadic community in placing their children in a boarding school. Although the official reason given for not operating the dormitories was budgetary constraints, it would appear that the equally cogent reason was the lack of response from the nomadic community. There is also some doubt about the origin of the idea of these pilot schools, whether it came from the Bank or from the Government. In any case, the experiment could have started with one instead of three pilot schools. 3.18 To attend the Mafraq CSS, students travel from as far away as 70 km, a daunting undertaking in view of the fact that public transportation is infrequent and irregular. There are no special vehicles for transporting students. The absence of dormitory accommodation for students makes it difficult for the CSS to serve precisely the population for whom the institution was intended. 3.19 The project experience suggests that the CSSs could be made more relevant and effective by a systematic assessment of the felt needs of the target beneficiary groups so that an appropriate commitment of resources could be made to strengthen the CSSs as a social and economic service center, providing not only formal education and training, but also health, family, non-formal education, agricultural extension and entrepreneurial skill training services. All this would require a measure of political commitment which at present appears to be absent. In short, if there is to be a public policy in support of settlement of nomadic populations, it will require substantially greater commitment than the CSSs seem to have had. 3.20 Institutional Autonomy. If the linkage with industry remains weak, as indicated in para. 3.10, the instruction in the GVSSs and the polytechnics will become increasingly irrelevant to the needs of industry, as industry changes under the influence of new technologies and new markets. Thus, industry will become less and less interested in employing the graduates of these institutions perceived to be irrelevant, and the training will become simply a costly route to frustration for young people entering the labor market. 3.21 Training institutions, particularly the GVSSs and polytechnics, need to have the flexibility and autonomy to be responsive to employment opportunities in a timely way by staying in close touch with industry, labor market conditions, and the community. Central authorities are ill-suited for this purpose. Autonomy requires a certain measure of financial independence which is not a feature of public training institutions. Thus, the question of cost-sharing by conferring a greater degree of budgetary independence (i.e. to dispose of funds as the institutions see fit, within broad guidelines) is critical to institutional autonomy. Industry can and should bear their fair share of the burden of - 16 - training, in terms of both financing and operations. Employers will be interested in working with training institutions only if they see the relevance of the training to their own needs. 3.22 Currently, however, the fees bear no relationship to the actual cost of training. Although it is not desirable or practicable to charge full costs for all training, especially at the secondary school level, and for providing training for the unemployed, there would be a training market, serving firms, the community, and groups of private individuals, if training institutions had the autonomy to offer services in accordance with demand, charge reasonable market rates, and retain the revenues for use within the institution to cover the cost of materials, upgrading equipment, and topping up of teacher salaries for additional time worked. In addition, training products (e.g., furniture produced in a carpentry course) could and should be sold at reasonable market rates, the revenue retained by the institution for covering the cost of materials, upgrading of equipment, and payment of a reasonable wage to the student for his work. There are now bylaws to be processed by the Government allowing all such revenues to be used by schools, teachers, and students, and a Bank sector financial study, scheduled to start in late 1992, is expected to make recommendations on cost recovery. 3.23 Autonomy is also needed to give courses, hire staff, especially on a course-by-course basis for short-cycle demand-driven courses, and charge and retain fees. At this time principals are not even consulted prior to hiring staff. In order to move toward greater autonomy, exemplified by the discretion to make decisions at the local level to respond to needs, management training is needed for principals. In addition, there would be a need for new guidelines, simplification of routines, and streamlining the reporting of statistics. Greater autonomy for training institutions is consistent with the goals of the adjustment program that Government has embarked upon. It would facilitate cost- sharing with industry, mobilizing more resources than Government itself is able to mobilize, and make the institutions more responsive to demand from industry and the community. It would also increase levels of motivation among both students and faculty. 3.24 Autonomy in the TTCs under the Vocational Training Corporation would enhance their considerable potential to serve local industries and the community without increasing the burden on central financing, but the Tr'Cs are hampered by central control. In the case of the CSSs, they are located in remote and sparsely populated areas and intended to provide the Bedouin community with a broad range of services. The Bedouin community is interested in training services, especially carefully targeted short-cycle courses linked to practical development projects, such as pump-repair, pipe welding, etc., and is willing to pay. Greater autonomy for the CSSs would enable them to be more flexible in deciding on the training services to be offered. 3.25 PMoect Costs. The format of project cost reporting (by categories of expenditure) in the PCRs may serve the Bank's accountability requirements, but provides no useful information on which to base a critical assessment of the cost effectiveness of the investments of Education IV and V. The reported cost underruns (paras. 2.20 - 2.21) were attributed in part to lower than expected contract prices for civil works, but the unavailability of unit costs makes it impossible to compare actual and appraisal costs in regard to physical construction, furniture, equipment, consultants and fellowships. To that extent the audit is unable to affirm that the cost underrun has not been at the expense of, for example, the quality of equipment or the actual floor areas constructed. The absence of actual unit costs weakens any attempt at estimating the cost effectiveness of operating the project institutions, beyond a general assumption, based on reported low student enrollments and space utilization, that the institutions are run at high cost. - 17 - 3.26 Cost Recovery. Today, students at Tafilah Polytechnic receive not only free training but also free housing at the dormitory or, if they live off-campus, pocket money equal to JD 10 per month. For other polytechnics, the fellowship program has been stopped, and students pay 50 percent to 60 percent of the actual costs of training. Although there will always be a rationale for provision of training services at a highly subsidized rate for the needy, global undirected subsidies encourage over- consumption and waste. There is a need to review the financing of vocational education and training institutions with the aim of enabling them to serve more efficiently as agents of economic development through flexible pre-employment training and subsequent upgrading of the labor force. 3.27 Two sections of the technical/vocational training system could be improved immediately. First, in the VTC-operated training centers, the average level of cost recovery is currently around only 10 percent from sales of products, reflecting the policy that VTC training is offered as a public service. There may be reason to have variable rates, but more resources for training could be mobilized if the contributions from the private sector were higher. This would help reduce the recurrent cost burden on the government. Second, the Amman Trade Training Center, worthy for its efforts to provide modern trade training for women, seems to be operating far below design capacity. That, together with the low rate of cost recovery, makes its sustainability doubtful. The recent trend toward short- term courses for the unemployed will improve its sustainability, but at the same time it should guard against adjusting the training program to changing circumstances at the expense of its objective of serving the training needs of women. 3.28 Sustainability. Although there is no conclusive evidence on the lack of sustainability of the GVSSs and CSSs, the low enrollment rates make it difficult to imagine how the flow of benefits from the training carried out in most of these schools can match the costs incurred in their construction and operation. Even ignoring the initial investments, continued operation of many of these institutions as vocational schools involves high unit costs, absorbing resources that might be better applied elsewhere. Although the operations in some GVSSs might be sustainable from a social demand perspective, it may be questioned whether the system of GVSSs can serve Jordan's skill needs better than the regular secondary schools. In regard to the CSSs, the lack of policy commitment and the absence of strong demand from the nomadic communities raise serious doubts about the sustainability of these schools. In the case of the VTCs, the flow of benefits from their operations may be adequate to cover costs, although conclusive evidence is not available, but the system of financing vocational training lacks the kind of linkages between costs and benefits that could guarantee sustainability. Higher levels of cost recovery would improve financial sustainability and at the same time promote labor market relevance to secure a sustained flow of benefits. Increased levels of utilization of the Amman VTC with cost recovery would greatly improve its sustainability. 3.29 Research and Development. The VTC needs qualified research, development, and evaluation staff to assist in the development of effective methods in labor market analysis. The VTC itself is well-placed to estimate national labor demand. The question is whether each vocational training center should have the competence to assess the local community labor market demand to which its training programs could be geared. Although the VTC has done some tracer studies of graduates, it seems that neither the polytechnics, the GVSSs, nor the MOE does tracer studies to determine the employment rate of graduates and the extent to which their training is used in their work, although there have been studies of employer attitudes and level of satisfaction with trainees. A tracer study, however, would (either on a full census basis or on a sample survey basis) trace the students who completed training at some time in the past (say, a year ago or three years ago) and find out what - 18 - proportions are employed, unemployed, not in the labor market, e.g., studying, etc. It should be pointed out, however, that tracer studies are usually very expensive. 3.30 Effective research and development requires the backup of strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E), which is possible only with a firmly established institutional base. Evidently, M&E is weak or non-existent in the MOE and MOHE, which need systematic evaluation of their technical/vocational training programs to ascertain their effectiveness if they are to respond quickly to changing needs. Conclusion 3.31 Given the profound changes in the economic and labor market conditions in Jordan, the aim of the education and training system today should be to develop a skilled labor force adaptable to the changing domestic and regional labor markets. In view of the Government fiscal constraints, it is imperative to reduce the burden on central funds without sacrificing the return on the heavy investments in vocational education and training that Education IV and Education V represent. This means that the original goals of these investments should be adjusted to the new economic realities. This is the greatest challenge facing Jordanian education and training in the 1990s. 3.32 The challenge would call for a flexible policy which would: (a) aim at Jordanian penetration of world markets, in addition to those of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia possibly through training tailored to the needs of exporting firms; (b) adjust investments in vocational training to increase support for the transit transport sector according to actual current demand; (c) delay training targeted at employment in the Gulf states until demand rises again; and (d) either launch a coordinated drive to revive and expand the tourism industry or delay further training for tourism until demand rises again. A demand-led policy would suggest increased efforts in two areas: (a) vocational instructor training and curriculum revision to meet the need for exports to world markets; and (b) paramedical and medical training because of the need for increased outlays on health facilities to serve Jordanians returning from the Gulf states. (The latter is expected to be partially addressed in the forthcoming Second Health Project). Meanwhile, a concerted effort is needed to increase the utilization of the under-enrolled GVSSs and CSSs if the immediate prospects for increasing employment are good, or to consolidate the operation of these institutions (e.g. by combining the enrollments of different schools, if feasible, or using the facilities for non-formal education, including adult education) until such time as an improved economic environment would justify their full operation. - 19 - Aoendix Table 1: Enrollments in Education IV and V Project Schools, 1986/87-1991,92 Ratio Enroll- ment 1991/92 Planned to 1987/ 1988/ 1989/ 1990/ 1991/ Enroll- Planned Graduates School 88 89 90 91 92 ment (%) to 1991 Fourth Project, Girls GVSSs 405 410 404 463 483 1,020 47 673 Al-Nozha Amm 1, Girls 570 580 589 555 542 910 60 1,148 Al-Rasfa Zarqa, Girls 975 990 993 1,018 1,025 1,930 53 1,821 Total Fourth Project, Boys GVSSs 431 397 342 325 371 1,080 34 568 Al-Amir Abd Aijun, Boys 770 634 666 710 744 1,920 39 573 Al-Rasfa Zarqa, Boys - - - 1,201 1,031 1,008 1,035 1,115 3,000 37 1,141 Total Fifth Project, Girls GVSSs Abu Al-Anda 290 300 306 310 320 480 67 468 Ajlun 215 220 238 215 191 320 60 541 Al-Baqa'a 390 401 410 350 324 320 101 731 Al-Ramtha 135 145 153 123 101 320 32 281 Al-Salt 165 168 178 175 180 320 56 264 Al-Sharieh & Al-Houson 230 254 266 270 288 320 90 368 Bayadir Wadi Al-Sir 260 270 272 280 289 480 60 519 Ma'an 50 65 68 60 55 320 17 186 Madaba 129 139 142 160 190 480 40 679 Zarqa 219 215 244 240 232 480 48 572 Total 2,083 2,177 2,277 2,183 2,170 3,840 57 4,609 Fifth Project, Boys GVSSs Al-Karak 114 194 235 242 265 760 35 587 Al-Shouna South 36 38 80 76 96 1,000 10 84 A-Tafilah 86 76 208 190 139 640 22 66 Jarash 168 128 180 210 244 760 32 410 Mar Al-Hamun 153 147 218 240 261 760 34 238 Total 557 583 921 958 1,005 3,920 26 1,275 Source: Actual enrollment, MOE, PIU, June 1992; Planned enrollment, World Bank, PCR, p. 12. - 20 - Notes: 1. There appears to be some disagreement on the planned enrollment figures between those reported by the World Bank (PCR, p. 12) and those reported by Government, which are approximately 96% of the figures given by the Bank, except for Ma'an, where Government gives 280, or 87.5% of the Bank's figure of 320. 2. In the school year 1988/89, basic education was increased to 10 years (grades 1-10), and secondary education was reduced from 3 to 2 years (grades 11-12). It might be expected that enrollments would show a dramatic decline (by about 1/3) as a result, but no such decline is visible. On the contrary, the only sharp change is an increase in enrollments in the boys' schools supported by the Fifth Project. -21 - Aovendix Table 2 Estimated and Actual 1991/92 Enrollments in Schools under the Fourth Education Project Opening Planned Actual 1991 Actual 1991/ School Date Enrollment Enrollment Planned (%) Girls' GVSSs Al-Nozha 1986 1,020 483 47 Al-Rasifah Zarq 1986 910 542 60 Total Girls 1,930 1,025 53 Boys' GVSSs Al-Amir Abd. Ajlun 1987 1,080 371 34 Al-Rasifah Zarq 1986 1,920 744 39 Total Boys 3,000 1,115 37 Total 4,930 2,140 43 Source: MOE, June 1992 - 22 - Aoendix Table 3: Estimated and Actual 1991/92 Enrollments in Schools under the Fifth Education Project Opening Planned Actual 1991 Actual 1991/ School Date Enrollment Enrollment Planned (%) Girls' GVSSs Abu Al-Anda 1987 480 320 67 Ajlun 1987 320 191 60 Al-Baqa'a 1987 320 324 101 Al-Ramtha 1987 320 101 32 Al-Salt 1987 320 180 56 AI-Sharieh & Al-Houson 1987 320 288 90 Bayadir Wadi Al-Sir 1986 480 289 60 Ma'an 1987 320 55 17 Madaba 1982 480 190 40 Zarqa 1987 480 232 48 Total Girls' GVSSs 3,840 2,170 57 Marj AI-Hamam 1987 760 261 34 Al-Shouna, South 1987 1,000 96 10 Jarash 1987 760 244 32 Al-Karak 1987 760 265 35 AI-Tafilah 1987 640 139 22 Total Boys' GVSSs 3,920 1,005 26 CSSs for Boys Qasr Al-Halabat/Dubail 1987 840 760 90 Al-Baij-Sabha 1987 840 350 42 Ma'an-Mrieqah 1987 840 359 43 Total Centralized Sec. Sch. 2,520 1,469 58 Total 10,280 4,644 45 Source: Vocational Education Directorate, MOE, June 1992. The figures on planned and actual enrollments in the Ministry of Planning appear to be different from those above. - 23 - Appendix Table 4: Enrollment at Tafilah Polytechnic, 1991/92 Subject Year 1 Year 2 Total Electrical Engineering 25 18 43 Chemical Engineering 19 14 33 Air Conditioning 27 22 49 Mining 11 10 21 Automotive 41 19 60 Machinery and Production 14 18 32 English 12 32 44 Arabic 11 31 42 Total 160 164 324 Source: Tafilah Polytechnic, June 1992 Note: The number of applicants in 1991 was about 200. This corresonds to the dormitory capacity, which is around 200. The capacity of the dormitory is cited as a limiting capacity. Another limiting capacity is believed to be the declining student demand for polytechnic training. It is believed that the decline may be exacerbated by the recent postponement of military service. - 24 - Appendix Table 5: Enrollments in NursinglParamedical Irbid Training Institute (NPITI), 1991/92 First Year Second Year Third Year Total Nursing College 99 67 39 205 Paramedical Institute 53 66 - 119 Total 152 133 39 324 Source: Ministry of Health, June 1992. -25- Apendix Table 6a. Output from Long-Term Courses at Trade Training Center at Marka, 1986/87 - 1990/91 Course Course 1 Year 2 Year Total Radio & Television Repair 1 35 36 Office Machine Repair 4 35 39 Retail Sales 10 29 39 Typing & Office Skills 0 97 97 Child Care (discontinued) 0 20 20 Tailoring 10 111 121 Total 25 327 352 Source: Marka Trade Training Center, June, 1992 Table 6b: Output from Short-Term Courses at Trade Training Center at Marka, 1986/87 - 1990/91 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 30 63 85 196 442 Source: Marka Trade Training Center, June, 1992  - 27 - Apoendix Table 7a. Overseas Fellowships, Actual No. of Fellows and Staff Months, Fourth Education Project Number of Duration Staff- Field of Study Persons (Months) Months GVSSs Beauty Culture 2 6 12 Beekeeping 2 6 12 Bookkeeping 2 6 12 Child Care 2 6 12 Commerce Education 4 6 24 Dairy Production 2 6 12 Diesel Mechanics 1 6 6 Farm Machinery 1 6 6 Forging & Pattern Making 1 6 6 Greenhouse Management 1 6 6 Horticulture 2 6 12 Instrument Making 2 6 12 Nursing 2 6 12 Nutrition 1 6 6 Sewing & Fashion 2 6 12 Telecommunications 2 6 12 Tool & Die Making 2 6 12 Community Colleges Administration 8 2 16 Architecture 1 6 6 Carpentry 1 9 9 Chemical Technician 1 7 7 Chemical Workshop 1 7 7 Civil Engineering 2 6 12 Construction 1 7 7 Laboratory Instructor, Electrical 1 7 7 Mechanical Technician 2 7 14 Mechanical Workshop 1 7 7 Mining & Drilling 1 9 9 Nutrition 3 6 18 Surveying 3 6 18 Teaching Aids 1 7 7 Theory Teaching, Electrical 1 9 9 Workshop Instructor, Electrical 1 7 7 Workshop/Drilling 2 7 14 -28- Number of Duration Staff- Field of Study Persons (Months) Months Curriculum Department Curriculum Development 1 6 6 ProEctis Directorate Administration 1 1 1 Engineering 2 8 16 Comprehensive Schools Administration 4 2 8 Computer Directorate Computer Programming 6 1 6 Total 76 - 397 Source: MOE, 1992 - 29 - A&vendix Table 7b: Overseas Fellowships, Actual No. of Fellows and Staff Months, Fifth Education Project Number of Duration Staff- Field of Study Persons (Months) Months Auto-Mechanics 3 6 18 Beauty Culture & Hair Dressing 3 6, 18 Business & Commerce Teaching 7 3 21 Central Heating 2 6 12 Central School Administration 3 3 9 Ceramics and Jewelry 3 3 9 Computer Programming 5 1 5 Dress-Making 3 3 9 Food Industries 2 6 12 Gardening (Protected Planning) 1 6 6 Industrial Electricity 3 6 18 Industrial Electronics 2 6 12 Instrumentation & Control 3 6 18 Management Supply 4 3 12 Manpower Planning 1 9 9 Metal Work & Plumbing 2 6 12 Nursing 3 3 9 Student Guidance 1 9 9 Survey Techniques, Tracer Studies 1 3 3 Techniques of In-Service Training 1 6 6 Visual Aids for Voc. Schools 1 3 3 Total 54 230 Source: MOE, 1992