India - Second Gujarat Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Repot No. 9570 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA GUJARAT IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 1011-IN) MAY 17, 1991 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department IV Asia Regional Office This document has a restricted distributiorn and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Currency Equivalent Name of Currency: Rupee (Rs.) Rate of Exchange: Appraisal (Sept. 1979) US$ 1.00 = Rs. 8.40 Intervening years (average) US$ 1.00 = Rs.12.25 Completion year US$ 1.00 = Rs.15.50 Fiscal Year of Borrower: GOI and GOG: April 1 to March 31 Weights and Measures: Metric System Glossary bhandara - Ungated Tidal Regulator kharif - Wet season: June - October rabi - Dry season: November - April chak - Watercourse Cultivable Command Area nala - Natural Drainage Channel watercourse - Small channL! below outlet serving a chak warabandi - A rotational water supply system (RWS) of allocating water among farmers by fixed turns and ti-ne periods; flow rate is constant, and time periods are proportional to land holding size. Abbreviations CADA - Command Area Development Authority CDO - Central Designs Organization GOG - Government of Gujarat GOI - Government of India PCR - Project Completion Report RWS - Rotational Water Supply WALMI - Water and Land Management Institute WRD - Water Resources Department (GOG)  FOR OMCUAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Olface of lrctoq-Cenera Opeotam lvaludnt"n May 17, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Gujarat Irrigation II Proiect (Credit 1011-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on India Gujarat Irrigation II Project (Credit 1011-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment '2 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OMFICIAL USE ONLY PROEc COMEtLTION RE-PORT INDIA GUIARAT IRRGTO n PROJECr (CREDIT 101 1-IN) TABLE OF CON1ENT Page, No. Preface .......................................... i Evaluation Summary .......................... iii EarI Project Review from Bank's Perspective Project Identity ...................................... 1 Background ....................................... 1 Project Objectives and Description .......................... 2 Project Design and Organization ........................... 3 Project Implementation .................................5 Project Results ......... ............................. 6 Project Sustainability .................................. 8 Bank's Performance . ................................ 9 Borrower's Perforrnance ................................ 10 Project Relationships .................................. 12 Consulting Services ................................... 12 Project Docrrmentation and Data ........................... 12 Part n Project Review from Borrower's Perspective Comments on Part I ................1................... 13 Evaluation of World Bank's Performance ..................... 15 Evaluation of Borrower's Performance ....................... 17 Effectiveness of Relationship Between Bank and Borrower ........... 19 Statement I on Budget and Expenditure ....................... 2C Part I Statistical Tables ......... ...................... 21 Table 1 - Related Bank Loans and Credits ..................... 22 Table 2 - Project Time Table ............................. 24 Table 3 - Schedule of Disbursements ........................ 25 Table 4 - Project Implementadon .......................... 26 Table 5 - Project Costs and Financing A - Project Costs .............................. 30 B - Project Financing ........................... 32 Table 6 - Project Results A - Direct Benefits ............................. 34 B - Economic Impact ........................... 35 Table 7 - Status of Covenants ...... 39 Table 8 - Use of Bank Resources A - Staff Inputs .. 43 B - Bank Missions ............................. 44 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Ivi I (CrDI 101 I-IN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Gujarat Irrigation Project in the State of Gujarat, India, for which Credit 1011-IN in the amount of US$ 175 Million was approved on April 29,1980. The Credit was closed on April 30, 1989 after an initial two-year extension and a final one-year extension of Closing Date. The final disbursement was made in November 1989 and US$ 15.7 M was cancelled. The PCR was prepared by the New Delhi Agricultue Unit of the Agriculture Operations Division 4 of the Asia Regonal Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was initiated during the Bank's final supervision mission in February 1989, and is based, inte alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Development Credit Agreement and Project Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, internal Bank memoranda, and various other reports, studies and analyses.  - iil - PROJE( T CONFLMION REPORT INDIA GUJARAT IGAffi52EPROJECI (CRErr101I-E EVALUJAT10 SUMMARY 1. The objectives of the project were to achieve an econiomic use of scarce surface water resources and to ensure a reliable and equitable supply to individual farmers through: construction of two new imgation schemes (Damanganga and Karjan); modernization of Ukai-Kakrapar irrigation system; development of Saurashtra coastal salinity ingression control scheme; establishment of a training institute for land deveiopment and water management (WALMI); econstruction of Machhu I darn; rehabilitation of Machhu II irrigation and water supply scheme; safety modifications of Machhu I dam and introduction of operational and management improvements thiough warabandi-type supply (rotational water supply [RWSJ) on existing and new schemes. The project also provided funds for preparation of new projects in Gujarat and in other States. IMmplnntation Eaj:n e, 2. Except for some specific work and components which moved ahead reasonably well, the overall implementation of the project fell well short of achieving the project's established goals and objectives despite two extensions in the Credit Closing Date from April 30, 1986 to April 30, 1989. Among the bright spots was the establishment and achievements of WALMI and the construction of Machhu II dam rehabilitation works which showed good progress. As highlighted in para. 15, Part I, constraints associated with slippage against achievement targets included persistent land acquisition problems; misunderstood and slow derivation of solutions to multi- faceted canal lining problems; persistent misunderstandings on implementation of rotational water supply (RWS) networks in terms of bothe inability of Bank missions to communicate and project staff to implement essential elements; major project restructurincluding substitution of the Machhu for the Heran sub-project in 1985; retendering of Kajan Dam; severe drought conditions from 1985 to 1987, preceded by destructive floods i 1979 and 1983 (leading to consecutive redesign of spillways at all dams); mid-tenn reductions in budgeted oudays; 'adequate construction management; and, general lack of result-oriented implementation methods by the Government of Gujarat's (GOG) Water Resources Department. These constraints led to continuous slippage of targets, with the worst slippage occurring in the construcdon of distribution networks in accodance with acceptable designs for lining and the agreed RWS procedures. Despite GOG's eventual comnitment to the introduction of warabandi-type RWS during the agreed Action Plan of 1987, the Water Resources Department reverted back to the appraisal standards of employing chak sizes of 20 ha or less at Damanganga subproject. Adoption of such small size chaks, made the field water applications impossible and the systems operations cumbersome and expensive. Paras. 18, 22 and 31 of Part I bring out this deficiency.  - iv - Project Results 3. Physical achievements, subproject-wise, are detailed in Table 4, Part III. It reflects a particularly distressing situation that whereas the subproject dams and reservoirs were virtually complete and stood ready to supply water, the conveyance systemn (especially minors and water courses) was woefully lagging in terms of its readiness to distribute water in accordance with RWS criteria, thereby delaying or denying the benefits of irrigation deliveries to the farmers. 4. Notwithstanding the lack of full accomplishment of appraisal objectives, many positive results had emanated from the project which are listed in para. 25, Part I, including ever increasing awareness and acceptance of warabandi-type RWS concept by the implementors and the farmers; creation of a much needed storage potential at Damanganga, Kaijan and Machhu II dams as well as at six bhandaras and four tidal regulators (in the Saurashtra coastal region) which will provide an irreplaceable advantage for large drought-prone areas of the state in future years. 5. Also, in terms of achievements, project impleir ntation by the Credit Closing Date of April 30, 1989 had progressed to such a stage that, given a determined push from GOG, the objectives of irrigation sector RWS goals could be significantly accomplished in the subprojects in the near future. 6. The analysis detailed in Table 6B, concludes that the economic rate of return of the project as a whole would be 3.2% as compared to the appraisal estimate of 18%. This shortfall in the economic rate of return when compared to that evaluated at appraisal was due to: (i) enormous cost escalation in both nominal and real terns; (ii) serious delays in the accrual of benefits; and (iii) a net decrease in the command area. 7 . The direct benefits as estimated on the Closing Date of the project, depicted in Table 6A, Part HI, fall far short of the appraisal estimate. The benefits, estimated to accrue at full development, would be about 80% of the estimated targets. Sustai-nabiitv 8. The project as a whole has not reached a free standing cornpletion stage, though sub-project dams are coxnplete and the canals and branches are nearing completion. Upon completion of the high-priority components, including the distribution network and strengthening of Machhu I dam, it is expected that the project, generally constructed to satisfactory standards and backed with enhanced operation and maintenance budget sanctioned through GOG's Resolution of December 20, 1988, would give long and satisfactory service to the State of Gujarat and would be sustainable over the nonnally accepted long life expectancy for projects of this type. Findings and Lessons Learnt 9. It was an unfortunate situation that despite the Bank's technical advice and supervision inputs, the principal project objective of accomplishing operational and management improvements on the modemization and new sub-projects distribution networks, the resultant irrigation benefits to the farmers could not be achieved fully by GOG even with a three-year extension of the Credit Closing Date. The basic inability of GOG over the years in solving land acquisition and canal lining problems, and reluctance in accepting the warabandi-type RWS criteria combined with the overnding need to provide workable and equitable solutions to water shortages in the project command areas, caused abnormal delays in the implementation of distribution networks. In retrospect, there are some lessons to be learnt. These have been highlighted in detail in para. 13 (a)- (g). Principally, the Bank appraisal team had overestimated the opportunities for technical input by the Bank as well as technical input of GOG and was accordingly unrealistic when it specified a time schedule of five years for completing a composite project of such magnitude and complexity, and particularly so in the State of Gujarat which was known to experience severe floods followed by acute and prolonged droughts. A reasonable allowance should have been made in the  - v - construction s^hedule to allcw for such vagaries of nature in this drought-prone state. The State in its over-enthusiasm, had not properly assessed its land acquisition problems and had also over- estimated its administrative, organizational, technical and resource capabilities when it agreed to complete the project in five years. GOG did not make a proper and realistic analysis of all relevant aspects before committing to such a tight implementation schedule. However, once committed, the State should have adopted result-oriented goals at all levels including enforcement of contract provisions and an aggressive management attitude and capability adequate to define and achieve frequently revised implementation schedules which GOG failed to do. The Bank's other pnmary deficiencies were iL.correctly setting the size of the chak at about 20 ha which was far too small to crea te a usable minimum stream size for efficient and timely management of water supply rotations within the chak. The Bank also did not interject adequate technical support for resolving technical issues related to implementation of RWS systems and canal lining programs in a timely manner.  (CREDIT 101 1-IN) PART I: PROJECr REVEW EROM EANK'S PERSPECTIVE Prject Iden 1. Name : Gujarat Irrigation II Project Credit Number : 1011-IN RVP Unit : Asia Region Country : India State : Gujarat Sector : Agriculture Backgund 2. At the time of appraisal, India had a population of 640 M, growing at an annual rate of about 2%. Over the period about 70% of the population was engaged in Agriculture which accounted for a 45% increase in GNP. Conservatively ineasured, some 300 M people (47% of the population) still lived with incomes below the poverty line. To remove unemployment as well as significant under-employment and raise the standard of living for the poorest segments of population, Covernment of India (GOI) gave high priority to agricultural development. Accordingly, agricultural growth and the expansion of irrigation facilities were made the cornerstones in the development strategy of India's Five Year Economic Plans. 3. The Government of Gujarat (GOG) accorded high priority to Agriculture in its Development Programs in line with the priorities fixed by GOI for achieving poverty alleviation through accelerated growth of agricultural incomes. As a result, a number of irrigation projects were started in the 1950's, and between 1952/53 and 1964/65, agricultural production in Gujarat grew at an accelerated rate and, ma:nly as a result of favorable weather, agricultural production reached a peak in 1970171 and 1971/72 and in 1978/79. 4. The State of Gujarat covers an area of 19.6 M ha and had a population of about 32 M at project appraisal. Notwithstanding the State being relatively urbanized and having a large manufacturing sector, the economy of the State was highly influenced by agriculture, which, in X normal rainfall year, contributed some 35 to 40% of the State's income and employed about 6i% of the labor force. Low and uncertain rainfall in successive years makes Gujarat extremely susceptible to droughts and famine. 5. Inspite of the fact that Gujarat managed to achieve a relatively high proportion (90%) of its targeted irrigation potential durirng India's Fifth Plan (1974-79), there was a serious lag in utilization which, combined with low yields, held benefits well below the potential that v'uld have been achieved. Deficiencies in planning, design and management also contributed substantially to this unfavorable situation. 6. Against the above background, the Second Gujarat Irigation Project (Credit 101 I-IN) sought to help meet the National and State objectives of expanding agricultural development, including modernization, and addressirg the causes of under-utilization of irnigation investments with a special focus on improving the planning, design, implementation and managemnent of irrigation subprojects.  2 Project Objectives and Description 7. The project originally suppor-d three new irrigation schemnes (Damnanganga, Karjan and Heran); modernization of U *-Kakiapar irigaon system; Saurashtra coastal salinity ingrssion and control scheme; a Water and Lan anement ning Institute (WALMI), and a fund for preparation of new projects in Gujarat and other Indian States. After project arnendments of January 7, 1986, Heran subproject was deleted and replaced with the Machhu sub-project complex comprising Machhu I dam strengthening and Machhu II dam irrigation system and rehabilitation. The major components are located in distincdy different areas of Gujarat State. Damanganga and Karjan are located in the more backward Southern parts of the mainland, the Ukai-Kakrapar modemization component is located on the fertile coastal plain of South Gujarat and the coastal development component (a composite of smaller schemes) is located along the Saurashtra coast where a very productive area irrigated from wells is threatened by intrusion of saline ground water from the sea. The Machhu complex, on Machhu river, is situated in Saurashtra in Western Gujarat near the Little Rann of Kutch. 8. The project objective, as modified over time, consisted of financing a five-year time-slice of Gujarat's major project irrigation developm.ent and support programs through implementation of the following components: (a) Completion of dams and major canals and lined distribudon system down to the sub-chak level on the two on-going major irrigation schemes (Darnanganga and Karjan with cultivable command areas of 56100 ha and 56200 ha, respectively); and improving the command area road networks in each case; (b) Reconstruction of Machhu II dam, rehabilitation of Machhu II irrigation and water supply schemes and implementation of safety modifications to Machhu I dam; (c) Modernization of irrigation facilities at Ukai-Kakrapar on about 52,000 ha of which 33,000 ha was to be completely modernized and completion of drainage improvements on abcut 20,000 ha; (d) Construction of storage, diversion and distribution facilities to provide supplies for the irrigation of about 25,000 ha along coastal areas in Saurashtra, where groundwater was affected by salt-water intrusion from the sea due to overpumping. It included the construction of tidal regulators, Bhandaras, check dams and gully plugs and also envisaged afforestation of 10,000 ha along the coast and in the upper watersheds of the contributing catchments; (e) Operational and management improvements including installation of Rotaional Water Supply (RWS) networks on existing modernization and new irrigation schemes; (f) Establishing a training center for land development and water management improvements (WALMI) to fill the cadre of the special Command Area Development Authority; (g) Monitori -- and Evaluation studies; and (h) Financing of consultants, incremental staff, equipment and special studies for the preparation of irrigation projects in Gujarat and other Indian States. 9. Project physical indicators are given in Table 4 and the project cost estimates in Table SA, Part III. The proiect cost estimate at appraisal was US$ 360 M (Rs.3024 M). A Credit of US$ 175 M to finance about 49% of the total project cost was signed on May 12, 1980 and made effective on June 27, 1980. Closing was scheduled for April 30, 1986. A 2-year extension was approved through the amendments of January 1986 which deleted Heran and added the Machhu complex. A  3 third-year extansion was approved by the Credit amendment of April 28, 1988 up to April 30, 1989 at Nhich time the Credit was closed due mainly to lack of adequate overall perfornance. Financing details are given in Table 5B, Part III, which indicates the Final (March 1989) revised cost of the project as Rs.5182 M. PriJct Design and Organizadon 10. The project appraisal and the staff appraisal report covered all the key features and project execution requirements, including the organization and management structure. The Project Agreements comprehensively listed the cniteria, standards and procedures required to be followed by Government of Gujarat regarding project planning, design, construction and operation. It also required the establishment of an independent panel of experts to periodically examine the concept, design and constiuction of dams and spillways as well as the quality and adequacy of operation and maintenance. It envisaged a separate Command Area Development Wing, adequately staffed with WALMI-trained land and water development specialists to carry out water management of the completed sub-projects under RWS principles. The overall project framework was thus well defined and illustrated for achieving the end objective, vis-a-vis to ensure a reliable and equitable supply of water to individual farmers under agreed RWS operations. However, in retrospect the human and financial resources to carry out the complex and composite State-wide project in both quantitative and qualitative terms among the responsible Deparutents was considerably overestimated at appraisal, resulting in delays ard an incomplete project. 11. The direct responsibility for planning, design and implementation of the project rested with the Irigation Departnent which l1ter became the Water Resources Department (WRD). The State's independent Central Designs Organization (CDO) prepared detailed designs of earthen and masonry dams and canals and canal structures. It was assisted by the Gujarat Engineering Research Institute in Vadodara and the State's agreed Dam Review Panel (for major irrigation projects) on resolving the specialized technical issues referred to them from time to time. The Central Water Commission of GOI also rendered advice to CDO on specific issues refen-ed to it such as flood hydrology. 12. Construction methods were boadly outlined in the Staff Appraisal Report. Although conceding that the construction would continue to be by and large labor intensive, a stipulation was made in the report that where quality control and safety was especially important or q""-ities difficult to estimate in advance, the WRD would implement the work with heavy and specialized departmental equipment. In addition, it was made mandatory to carry out compaction of dams, canals and road embankmnents with mechan; A equipment. In this context, the construction of the entire earthen dam component in Machhu I dam complex was efficiently completed using the Department's equipment 13. Descrptions and specifications for each subproject and the major components listed in the Staff Appraisal Report were generally adequate. However, in the way of a constructive critique, principal shortcomings in project implementation and concept can be summarized as follows: (a) Inadequate time was allowed for the resolution of land acquisition steps under State law including situations that required condemnation proceedings some of which persisted throughout implementation, holding up critical Alements of some subprojects, particularly canal construction. (b) Inadequate allowance was made for time-consuming resolution of design and construction issues involving, testing and decisions inherent in the design and selection of suitable canal linings. The problem was complicated by occurrence of substantial areas of heavy (clayey) soils with expansive tendencies calling for a flexible lining such as bricks or tiles and related difficulties with quality control in the manufacture of concrete tiles, all of which resulted in a time-consuming trial and error situation.  4 (c) Tle early decision by GOG to retender Karjan Dam as required to fulfdll Bank procurement requirements following its initiation by the public sector Gujarat State Construction Corporation, and subsequent award to a private sector contractor was a time-consuming and disruptive expetience for all concerned. (d) An early decision by GOG to delete the Heran subproject for socio-environmental reasons led to a full restructuring and re-evaluation of the project in 1985 that resulted in the inclusion of the Machhu subproject complex all of which was a time- consurning and disruptive process. (e) The Staff Appraisal Report specified in the Design Standards of the distribution network that chak sizes should, in general, not exceed 20 ha. This specification was, in reality an inherent errr and an obstacle in the implementation of RWS. Thereby, despite GOG's agreements in the Action Plans of April 1987 and April 1988 to implement irrigation in accordance with warabandi-type RWS, ie., chak sizes of between 30 and 60 hectares, the Department had initiated and then reverted back to appraisal standards of emnploying chak sizes of 20 ha or less (some as small as 5-6 ha) which were too small to effectively implement the agreed RWS networks. The Department rejected the Bank's interim suggestions of combining the adjacent smaller chaks into larger chaks (30 to 60 ha) and creating water course linkages so that the entidtled discharge at the outlet could fonn an adequate irrigation stream GOG's insistence on literally following the appraisal report's specified standards and not constructing required additional parallel water courses, as rcommended in the agreed Action Plans, had thus ruled out the accomplishment of warabandi-type RWS in 56,CY)O ha at Damanganga. (f) The project's implementadon schedule of 5 years was in retrospect far too optimistic. It is none-the-less found to be typical of most Bank financed 5-year irrigation projects in India which have been shown to slip an average of about 2 years due to a variety of masons including insufficient mobilization time, delays in land acquisition, poor management, slow procurement processing, etc. However, it may be argued that the accumulated 3-year extension of this Credit resulting in large shortfalls in meeting physical objectives (requiring an estinated additional 2 years to complete) was also due to deficiencies in the appraisal analyses of the time required for administering and managing this particular complex and widespread muld-component project comprising five major multi-element irrigation sutrojects and several large support progiamn' (VALMI, Interstate Planning Facilities, other studies, etc.) which was also designed to set new and improved standards for construction quality and operation performance. This large performance shortfall was also due to the occurrence of both unforeseen and unprecedented floods and droughts. Severe localized rainstorms in 1979 and 1983 caused the failure of Machhu n1 dam and state-wide redesign of spillways at all dams twice in succession. This was followed in 1985-87 by three of the most severe water short years of record throughout Gujarat resulting in a substandal drain on State finances and diversion of Department staff to drought scarcity programs. Nature's intervention has contributed to the implementation delays but the extent of such delays vis-a-vis shortfalls ^aused by inaccurate scheduling is impossible to quantify. However, it may be important during future irrig4don project preparation to include a reasonably adequate allowance of time for variables including: severe vagare of nature; socio-cultural practices including extended holidays; unexpected financial constraints; mobilization delays; procurement delays; procedural delays; implementation of Dam Review Panel suggested investigations and resolution of design issues; and, more training as needed to improve the implementation efficiencies of staff and associated construction agencies. It is estimated that the sum total effect of these factors would restrict the availability of time for actual  5 construction to only about 50% of that considered at project preparation and apprisal stages. (g) The appraisal had over-estimated the capability of GOG to complete the required implementation of distribution networks in accoidance with RWS principles within the time frame of five years. Accordingly, intrduction and full implernentation of RWS concept in Gujarat State, which was hitherto following the Shejpali system for many decades, needed: muldple crossover and follow-up steps including the overoming of inertia and reluctanee associated with a complete changeover from one system to the other, commitment in full to agreed critena at the management level with regard to intended RWS operation and water management principles; modification of State-wide legal framework; mnobilization of famers willingness to accept and participate in the new system; training of planning and design staff; preparation of a manual of design guidelines for network planning, including structures; metdculous construction of distribution network and structures basod on RWS standards and criteria; trairing for operations staff; finalization of operating plans and establishment of farmers organizations for active participadon. Given this situation and related complexities of managing the widely dispersed and diverse project components within Gujarat and, the quantum of multi-disciplinary inputs needed for achieving the project objectives, the appraisal mission should have forrnulated a more realistic time schedule. It is, in retopect, apparent that the borrower aid its implementor, in over-enthusiasm, agreed to the implementation schedule of five years without proper and realistic analyses. 14. The project fell well short of achieving the project's established goals and objectives in both quanttative and qualitative terms despite two extensions, totalling three years, of the Credit Closing Date from April 30, 1986 to April 30, 1989. Project implementation condnued to experience delays, both avoidable and unavoidable, leading to significant perfonnance deficiencies right from the early stages of the Credit. Furthermore, it would not be reasonable to blame "stan up" delays since several major components were on-going at appraisal. Except for some specific works and components which moved ahead reasonably well, the overall implementation of the project was less than satisfactory. Among the bright spots was the establishment of WALMI according to the agmed schedule though it too suffered a lack of progrss for many years before becoming an effective trainng institute. Persistent slippages against achievement targets were encouterd because the physical implementadon of major components of almost every subproject fell short of the targets soon after the finalization of the sequential Revised Implementation Schedules. Numerous revised implementatdon schedules were loosely formulated by GOG at regular intervals and during each semi-annual review, the sub-projects persistently lagged behind the targets which had been revised only a few short months before. The dam and spillway works on Machhu II dam rehabilitaton wors (included in the Credit through project amendment of January 7, 1986) constituted one of the rare works complexes that was executed with reasonably good speed as was also the roads network, although the latter works were often found defieient quality-wise. IS. Persistent land acquisiton problems, slow technical decisions and related slowness in dewrmining suitable canal lining designs and installaton methods, time-consming retendering of Karjan Dam, a major project reformulation (substitution of the Machhu Dam's reconstruction and modificadons for the deleted Kaijan subproject), extensive and persistent drought for three yeas (from 1985 to 1987) preceded by unprecedented and destructive floods in 1979 and 1983 (leading to consecutive redesign of spillways at all dams), inability of Bankl missions to communicate and GOG staff to implement canal lining and RWS programs, were major factors in the slow implementation by the WRD. The severe diversion of physical and financial resources to drought scarcity programs, and frequent reassignments of the staff, also were 'stent constraints to progress. Deficient constrcdon management, mid-term reductions in budgeted outlays, and lack of sult-oiented scheduling and co-ordination, and implementation methods of the Department,  E were the other principal factors which contributed to shortfalls in progress even during the non- drought affected years. Interrlated constraints associated with these factors led to continued slippages of targets. 16. The components which lagged most consistently and severely included mninor distribution networks, field channels and construction of aqueducts on Left Bank Main Canal of Damanganga and Ka:Jan; modernization and improvements of canals and distribution systems to the 8 ha sub- chak level and field channels of Ukai-Kakrapar, construction of main canal and distribution network of Machhu II Irrigation Scheme; drainage systems under the Damanganga, Karjan and Machhu II irrigation subprojects; erection of spillway gates at Kajan dam; dam safety modifications of Machhu I dam and lift irrigation components of Saurashtra Coastal Sub-project. 17. The most severe lag occurred in the implementation of minor distibution networks. This situation was distressing in view of the fact that whereas the subproject dams and reservoirs were virtually complete and stood ready to supply water, the distribution networks were woefuLy lagging in terms of their readiness to distribute water in accordance with agreed RWS procedures and criteria, thus, delaying interminably the benefits of irrigation deliveries to the farmers. 18. Despite GOG's commitment to the introduction of warabandi-type RWS, the WRD continued an overniding reluctance to actually construct and operate RWS networks as agreed. GOG also exhibited reservations with regard to the rigorous application of RWS principles under the existing legal framework. GOG did not initiate the needed steps with the promptness required to clear those obstacles standing in the way of fully introducing RWS, including orientation of system design features, training of design and operation staff, preparing the planning and design manual, finalizing operating plans, and amending the Irrigation Act. 19. Construction quality on some project components remained a cause of concern throughout the project implementation and remained generally variable and at times alternated between acceptable and poor. Quality of dam construction on Karjan conformed to very good professional standards. The quality of constructon on Damanganga and Machhu II dams was also good. However, the standards of canal lining in Damanganga continued to remain, by and large, poor though there were intermiittent improvements. Frequent bulging and/or disintegration of concrete lining blocks occurred at random in reaches of canal along with joint cracking in the uppermost tiers of some canals. The plastic film underlining placed behind pre-cast concrete block lining had been punctured at many spots during placement of blocks, thereby losing its intended utility as a barrier against seepage. The cast-in-situ concrete lining in Damanganga cracked at places where cohesive non-swelling soil layers (non-expansive soils) of adequate thickness were not provided in expansive black cotton soil reaches. The Central Quality Control Unit discharged its "policing role" only when it was adequately strengthened towards the advanced stages of construction. Particularly, the state of disrepair of a large number of lined reaches in Damanganga canal system presented an unfortunate example of poor quality construction and comnplete lack of interim maintenance. In accordance with agreements in 1987 and 1988, GOG had to initiate a comprehensive work programme for recdfication of defective work, which was in progress and proceeding in the right direction at closing. 20. Reservoir operation and flood forecasting manuals of Damanganga and Karjan dams were furnished by the Water and Power Consultancy Services albeit late, inclusive of prior Bank comments and approved by the Dam Safety PaneL However, the urgently needed third operation and maintenance manual for the Machhu Complex by the Nadonal Insdtute of Hydrology (Roorkee), lagged severely and was still in the drafting stage. Proect Results 21. The physical achievements under the project up to the revised Closing Date of April 30, 1989, following a three-year extension, are listed in Table 4, Part ml. From this, it is noted that Kaijan, Damanganga and Machhu II dams and spillways are vitually complete; completion of canals and branches at Damanganga and Kaijan subprojects is 93.5% and 82%, respectively. Also,  completion of the distribution network is 52.5% at Damanganga and only 22% at Karjan. Machhu II main canal was 26% completed but there was no progress on its distribution network. On the Ukai-Kakrapar modernization subproject, Karanj irrigation block and Surat drainage block are complete while the Hajira and Umrath irrigation blocks are 50 to 60% complete. On the Saurashtra Coastal Salinity Works Complex, check dams and nala plugs are virtually complete, excluding original targets, tidal regulators and bhandaras are 65% complete, and the conservation program is just 42% of the target. Progress on the construction of lift irrigation works is nil though irrigation of 5,120 ha was accomplished by the farmers through their own pumps. 22. It is in the minor network conveyance system (especially minors and water courses) and the drainage network that the most serious delays have occurred. At Damanganga (56000 ha