Tanzania - First and Second Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Projects

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 961 1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT (CREDIT S/27-TA) AND SECOND SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1199-TA) MAY 31, 1991 Industry and Energy Division Technical Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 cm - centimeter = 0.39 inches 1 in - meter - 3.28 feet 1 m3 - cubic meter - 264 US gallons 1 1 - liter = 0.26 gallors 1 bbl - barrel - 42 US gallons 1 kg - kilogram - 2.2 pounds 1 km - kilometer - 0.62 miles 1 km2 _ square kilometer - 0.39 square miles 1 t - ton = 2,205 pounds 1 kW - kilowatt - 1,000 watts 1 MW - megawatt - 1,000 kilowatts 1 kWh - kilowatthour 1,000 watthours 1 GWh - gigawatthour - 1 million kilowatthours ABBREVIATIONS API American Petroleum Institute BCF Billion Cubic Feet ECU European Currency Unit EIB European Investment Bank ICB International Competitive Bidding LIT Limited International Tendering MMCF Million Cubic Feet MMCFD Million Cubic Feet per Day MWEM Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals NORAD Norwegian Agency for International Development ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Commission (India) OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries TANESCO Tanzania Electric Supply Corp. TIB Tanzania Investment Bank TPDC Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation  THE WORLD BANK FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY Washington, D.C 20433 U.S.A. Ofike dE DectiwGerwa Opuations EYaUlMh. May 31, 1991 MfEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESID6NT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on United Republic of Tanzania Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Project (Credit S/27-TA) and Second Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Project (Credit 1199-TA) Attached, for information. is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on United Republic of Tanzania - Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Project (Credit S/27-TA) and Second Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Project (Credit 1199-TA)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT CR S/27-TA AND SECOND SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT CR 1199-TA TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ....................... . .i EVALUATION SU11MARY .ii PART I; PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . 1 Projects Identity.. 1 Background ..1 Project Objectives a,ad Description Cr S/27-TA . . . . . 2 Project Objectives a,d Description Cr 1199-TA . 3 Project Design and O-ganization . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Implementation of the Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Results .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 10 Project Sustainability ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 10 Performance of Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Performance of Consultants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Performance of Borrower .... . ...... . . . . . 11 Performance of the Bank .... . ...... . . . . . 12 Project Relatior.ship .... . . . ..... . . . . . . 12 Lessons Learned .... . . . ...... . . . . . . . 13 Project Documentation and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . N/A PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance nf thbir nffie; I dilti-Q It- rnnt.fnts rr v Pnt nthwrw - . - ri' -I r I 'ithrt -1'F-rd n nL- 'thnri7 t' n  i UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT (CR S/27-TA) AND SECOND SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT CR 1199-TA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the First and Second Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Projects; Credit S/27-TA and Credit 1199-TA in the amounts of US$30.0 million and SDR17.4 million respectively. Credit. S/27-TA was approved on June 12, 1980 and closed on September 30, '982. It was 100 percent disbursed and the last disbursement was on September 30, 1982. Credit 1199-TA was approved on December 22, 1981 and closed on December 31, 1983. It was 100 percent disbursed and the last disbursement was on September 10. 1984. These projects were cLosed 8 and 7 years ago respectively and it has been impossible to obtain the missing information on costs from the borrower. The cost information is not in the Bank's files. Likewise, the information normally provided on mission timing etc., is incomplet, in the Bank's records. The borrower has been asked for the cost information and to submit Part II. but has not responded. The PCR was prepared by the Industry and Energy Division of the Africa Region Technical Department (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). Preparation of this PCR was started during a mission to Tanzania in November 1988 and is based, inter alia, on the President's Reports; the Credit and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; discussion with members of the project team; and internal Bank memoranda.  ii UN:TED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT (CR S/27-TA) AND SECOND SONGO SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT (CR 1199-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARI Backgroundand Oblectives 1. In 1974, while exploring for petroleum in offshore Tanzania, AGIP/SA made a gas discovery in the vicinity of Songo Songo Island about 150 km south of Dar-es-Salaam. AGIP relinquished their rights to TPDC (Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation) who soon contracted ONGC (Oil & Natural Gas Commission, India) to undertake further evaluation of the discovery. After 3 wells ONGC declined to continue appraisal and development of the field and TPDC approached the World Bank to assist. A technical assistance project, Cr 601-TAN, undertook to study the area, come up with recommendations and prepare a drilling program. 2. On June 30, 1980 a credit (Cr S/27-TA) for US$30.0 million was signed, whose objectives were to: (i) assess the oil/gas potential of the Songo Songo area, (ii) provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals (MWEM) in formulating energy policy, designing exploration strategy, and assessing the gas market: and (iii) provide technical assistance and training in overall project and financial management. On January 13, 1982 a Second Songo Songo Project (Credit 1199-TA) for SDR17.4 million was signed, which provided for the drilling of three additional wells (if justified), reservoir engineering studies and on-the-job training of Tanzanian counterparts. 3. Initially, the objective of the project and the drilling was to evaluate the gas reserves and confirm some oil shows reportedly found in well SS-3. Failing to find oil, the thrust could be diverted to the identification and appraisal of additional gas reserves. Implementation Experience 4. The first well to be drilled in the program, SS-6, an on-shore well, was fraught with problems. Logging equipment was held up in customs; drill bits, cementing equipment and 7 inch casing were all late in arriving; and the well never reached the programmed total depth because of the drill pipe breaking. The producing sands in previous wells were not found to be productive here, hence the well was declared dry. Some minor problems attributed to poor mud management were encountered. The second well, SS-5, encountered a 750 ft gas column in the Albian and was completed with a wellhead. 5. Songo Songo 7, the first well drilled in the second project, was drilled to the deep objective within the Jurassic which was found dry; however, it was completed as a gas well in the Albian as in SS-5.  iii Well SS-8, was also drilled to the deep objective and all horizons were dry, (no gas). The well was abandoned. After some deliberation TPDC decided to proceed with SS-9 as a deviated well but the equipment necessary to accomplish the deviation was out of order, hence the well was drilled vertically. The well encountered the producing horizon and tested gas. The well was completed as a producer with a wellhead. 6. In a strict sense the project was successful in delineating natural gas reserves, but failed to identify an oil resource as there is probably no oil to be found. The welis could have been drilled with less expense with better project management, especially during the First Songo Songo Exploration Project. Probably some unsuccessful wells could have been avoided by taking more care with the original geophysical interpretation. This is one of the least expensive aspects of any exploration program, but can have great impact on the overall cost. Lessons Learned 7. Efficient implementation of the Songo Songo Projects was hindered by lack of clearly defined management authority. The drilling manager was given conflicting instructions from TPDC's staff and its petroleum advisor and, subsequently, from the advisor to the Minister. The authority of the drilling manager was gradually increased. The lesson for future exploration projects with inexperienced national oil companies (assuming that experienced oil company partnership is not possible) is that a detailed drilling program should be prepared by the drilling manager and agreed with government officials at the start. A project implementation unit should be set up, with clear lines of authority and responsibilities, where results could be reviewed and problems could be resolved. Once the program has been agreed, the drilling manager must be given absolute authority for the conduct of the drilling. Government's local currency contribution should be placed under the manager's authority in advance. 8. In principle, the two projects offered an excellent opportunity for on-the-job training, supplemented by overseas training. In practice, the training objective has only been moderately successful. The principal problem appears to have been lack of sufficiently qualified and motivated candidates. In the future it is recommended that the drilling manager and the exploration advisor should prepare detailed training programs, for agreement with the Govetnment, who in turn should identify suitable candidates with assured availability for the proposed training. Strict assessment of the candidate's performance must be built in. This applies not only to drilling but to all aspects of the operations including exploration, financial planning, accounting and management. 9. The Tanzania Songo Songo project is an example of a 'sub- commercial" oil and/or gas field where Bank involvement in helping developing countries can be very positive, provided there is an economic use for the resource. The Songo Songo Exploration project was successful in finding the gas, but it is still undeveloped. It would have been appropriate to investigate gas uses and economics in greater depth before executing the drilling program.  UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT CR S/27-TA AND SECOND SONGO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROJECT CR 1199-TA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Prolects Identity 1. Names I First and Second Songo Petroleum Exploration Projects Credit Numbers s Cr S/27-TA and Cr 1199-TA RVP Unit : Africa Region Country s United Republic of Tanzania Sector : Energy Subsector : Petroleum Background 2. Total energy consumption in Tanzania in 1979 was approximately 7.5 million tons of coal equivalent, i.e., 500 kg per capita. Of this total onlv 1.2 million tons or 16Z was represented by commercial energy (mainly imported crude oil and refined products which accounted for 95 percent of all commercial energy, the rest being made up by coal and hydro). Between 1960-72, demand for commercial energy grew at an average rate of 7.2 percent per year. The growth rate fell drastically, however, to 1.4 percent between 19/3-77 following steep increases in product prices reflecting higher costs of imported supplies, and measures to curb gasoline consumption by imposition of restricted driving practices. In 1978-79 the petroleum import bill was US$110 million and accounted for about 30 percent of Tanzania's merchandise imports. 3. At appraisal, Tanzania had large and diversified potential energy resources. Its inferred coal reserves were 1500 million tons; its hydro potential estimated at 2100MW; and it had vast sedimentary areas suitable for oil and gas generation and accumulation. 4. Since 1969, AGIP/SA (Italy) had been exploring for petroleum in offshore Tanzania under a production sharing agreement. In 1974, AGIP made a gas discovery in the Songo Songo area, about 150 km south of Dar-es- Salaam, and quickly decided it could not be developed and produced in an economical manner and relinquished its rights to Songo Songo to the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC). Between 1976 and 1979, TPDC contracted the Oil & Natural Gas Commission of India, (ONGC) to drill two more wells on the structure. Although the first well, SS-2, blew out, caught fire and was lost, the next two wells, SS-3 and SS-4, were  - 2 - productive and one of them, SS-3, indicated the presence of oil. TPDC requested ONGC to assist them in the appraisal and development of Songo Songo, but ONGC declined sinc" th6y were already financially committed elsewhere. 5. In September 1979, the Minister of Water, Energy, and Minerals requested Bank Group assistance for the appraisal. and development project. Two studies were financed by a technical assistance credit (601 TAN) which undertook to analyze the technical data, confirm the exiscence ox natural gas and prepare a drilling program. Project CbJectives and Description - Cr S/27-TA 6. Proiect Obiectives: The main objectives of the project were: (a) To assess the oil/gas potential of the Songo Songo area; (b) To provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Water, Energy & Minerals (MWEM) in: (i) overall energy policy formulation, (ii) designing an exploration strategy in petroleum, and (iii) assessing the potential market for natural gas. (c) To provide technical assistance and training to TPDC in: (i) overall project management (Songo Songo); and (ii) financial management. 7. Project Components: The project consisted of two phases; (a) Phase 1: (1) Assessment of the oil and gas potential of the Songo Songo field by the drilling and testing of an off-shore and an on-shore well, and the provision of materials and consumables including exploration and drilling management services. (2) Training of TPDC's staff in logging, formation evaluation, reservoir description, material and logistic management, financial and ope:ational management and seismic data processing and interpretation. (b) Phase II: (1) Completion of the wells (above) for production. (2) Consultants' services to carry out feasibility, reservoir and engineering studies for the development of the reservoirs. (3) Provision of exploration and drilling management services to carry out the drilling and testing of further wells and on-the- job training of TPDC's staff. (4) TechnKal assistance to MWEM to review the fiscal and management structure of TPDC, preparation of an energy development plan, formulation of a long-term exploration and petroleum negotiation strategy and assessment of the medium and long-term potential for the utilization of natural gas in Tanzania.  Project Objectives and Description - Cr 1199-TA 8. Project Objectives: This project was a continuation of the previous project (Cr S/27-TA). The primary objective of the project was to explore for oil, particularly in the deeper horizons of the Songo Songo field. In the process, the drilling would confirm the estimates of the quantities of gas discovered during the First Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Project; show whether any recoverable liquid hydrocarbons were present; and explore further for gas. 9. Project Components: The project consisted of three parts; (a) Part A. Assessment of the offshore oil and gas potential of the Songo Songo field by the drilling, testing, evaluation and if justified, completion of three wells in the Songo Songo field. (b) Part B. Preparation of reservoir engineering studies and of a field development plan. (c) Part C: On-the-job training of TPDC staff in drilling operations, geological interpretation and geochemical analysis. Project Design and Organization 10. The period between the late 70s and early 80s was a time of high oil prices, and petroleum importing countries were looking for alternative sources of energy. The timing was appropriate for Tanzania to seek to delineate an oil and gas discovery. However, because the project was poorly designed, Tanzania has not as yet been able to utilize indigenous energy resources (the Songo Songo natural gas). There were institutional problems within TPDC which hampered the smooth operations of the project. TPDC did not establish a Project Implementation Unit which could have been charged with the sole responsibility of project planning, scheduling, supervision and management. There were unclear responsibilities of the drilling manager. No one associated with the project anticipated that equipment would be tied up in customs and not available when needed. The Natural Gas Utilization Study should have been carried out prior to the implementation of the exploration project in order to determine whether or not a market exists for the gas in the Tanzanian economy, and set up the priorities for the utilization of the gas. 11. The First Songo Songo Project (Cr S127-TA) was appraised in January 1980 and the Credit Agreement was signed on June 30, 1980. As was common in this type of project, only a President's Report was prepared. Terms of reference for the dril_ ag consultant and the exploration consultant were drawn up before the appraisal mission. The ex, :.ration consultant used for the project was the same as the one which E s used for the feasibility study. To finance studies which would take place before the effectiveness of the credit, the Government requested a PPF in the amount of US$400,000. The total project cost was estimated at US$49.5 million of which US$45.0 million would be foreign exchange. IDA's contribution was set at $30.0 million due mainly to the necessity of having  - 4 - all of the drilling funds in place when the drilling starts. The EIB agreed to contribute 350,000 ECU (US$500,000). 12. The EIB funds were designated to be used as follows: (a) 18 months consultancy services in the MWEM in the field of Petroleum Economics, (b) 18 months consultancy services for a Senior Explorationist, (c) 12 months consultancy services for a Natural Gas Utilization Study. 13. The first project was designed to finance four wells; however, should the results of the first two wells be negative, then the project could stop at that point and the remainder of the funds would be cancelled. Because of unexpected delays and extra expenses attendant with these delays, the financing could only be used for two wells. The remaining two wells had to be financed from the second project. 14. The Second Songo Songo Project (Cr 1199-TA) was appraised in September 1981, and the Credit became effective on February 23, 1982. As in the First Songo Songo Project, only a President's Report was prepared. The contracts for the drilling and exploration consultants were extended so that they would be available for this project. IDA's share of the project was estimated at appraisal to be SDRl7.4 million (US$20.0 million approximately). From the OPEC Fund, an amount equivalent to US$12.0 million, and from the EIB an amount equivalent to US$8.0 million would be contributed to the project. It was agreed that the cofinancing ratio between IDA, EIB and OPEC would be as follows; IDA 50 percent, OPEC 30 percent and EIB 20 percent. This percentage was changed for the financing of the SS-9 well where IDA's pcrtion was 62.5 percent and OPEC's was 37.5 percent due to EIB's reluctance to finance SS-9. As in the first project, TPDC was designated the implementing agetucy. Implementation of the Projects 15. The following is a rather detailed account of the drilling activities in the project, and the difficultie- and problems which were encountered. These problems greatly influenced the overall cost of the project and possibly could have been avoided, for the most part, by assigning responsibility and accountability to a certralized authority within a Project Implementation Unit. 16. Songo Songo 6: This well was the first one to be drilled under Cr S/27-TA and was spudded (started) on Jan 23, 1981. Problems arose early with the customs clearance for the logging equipment so that the equipment was not available for the first logging run; hence the decision was made to abandon the logging run scheduled at 3000 feet. At a depth of about 6700 ft, the exploration consultant recommended that the well be plugged and abandoned as a nonproducer from the Albian reservoir sands. The Bank, however, recommended that drilling continue to about 11,000 feet or 200 feet into the Jurassic shale. The main producing sands in SS-3 and SS-4 were found very low in SS-6, the main sand body only 16 feet above the gas/water contac-. After reinterpreting the seismic data, the exploration  - 5 - consultant agreed with ti- Bank's recommendation to drill abead. In attempting to drill ahea.4 -he drill pipe immediately twisted off. All attempts to extract the drill pipe from the hole were futile and the well was subsequently abaaidoned after drilling no more hole and wasting over a month attempting to retrieve the lost drill pipe. At the request of TPDC and against the strong recommendations of the drilling consultant, tubing was set in the hole and the project's only wellhead (at the time) was installed on the well. The well was officially suspended on April 9, 1981 at a d-pth of 6,718 feet. Aside from sone of the delays mentioned above, further delays were encountered by (i) lete arrival of drill bits, (ii) the off-loading jetty collapsing, (iii) late arrival of cementing equipment, and (iv) late arrival of casing for the middle section of the hole. Subsequent to the drilling of this well it was recognized that technical difficulties were aggravated by managerial problems especially the absence of close and effective project control. 17. Songo Songo 5: This weAl, the first one to be drilled offshore, was spudded on May 26, 1981 using the posted drill barge, Vermillion Bay. As the planned follow-up wells to SS-5 coulu not be drilled by the barge because of excessive water depth, it was suggested that the drill barge be used by selecting locations in ehallow water which could be drilled from the barge. This, of course, assumed that SS-5 would be a producer. At about 5700 ft, the drillpipe became stuck in the hole and twisted off. Rather than attempt to extract the pipe, it was decided to sidetrack, anticipating that attempts at retrieval could continue for weeks. Investigations afterwards pinpointed that hole problems; which caused the stuck pipe, were exacerbated by insufficient mud additives being available on the rig site, caused by poor planning on the part of the drilling consultants. A drill stem test in the zone 5616-5721 feet confirmed the existence of a 750 ft gas column and suggested overall reserves in the Songo Songo gas field of about .8 trillion cubic feet. Plans to drill the well deeper were abandoned and the well was suspended with a Christmas tree (an oil well control device installed on the surface). 18. Songo Songo 7: This well, which was the second offshore well in the program and was the first well drilled under the project Cr 1199-TA, was spudded on October 16, 1981 using the same drill barge. The hole was deviatad so as to allow testing of the reservoir from a location suitable for the drilling barge. After spudding and drilling to 405 ft, operations were shut down for over two weeks waiting on the arrival of the casing for the upper part of the well. This delay was caused by problems in the issue of letters of credit. Four attempts were made to cement the next section of casing at 3929 ft. Failure appeared to be due to lack of spare parts for the mud pumps which seemed to break down during the cementing process. Upon completion of the cementing job, drilling did not commence because there was no barite (weight additive for the mud) on board the rig, entailing about one week shut-down. At a depth of 4040 ft a rather strong gas zone was encountered which in SS-5 had not been gas bearing. The well was drilled to a total depth of 11,080 ft and was finally plugged back to 7148 ft fcr final production. The well flowed on a production test at a rate of approximately 21 million cubic ft per day. The rig was released from SS-7 location on March 31, 1982.  - 6 - 19. Songo Son_o 8: Songo Songo 8 was spudded on April 10, 1982 using the drill barge Vermillion Bay. The top of the producing sands were found some 350 ft below the top of the gas/water contact for the area, or some 700 ft below the depth where this formation had been forecast in the drilling prognosis. The logs suggested that the formation was water-wet, therefore no drill stem tests were run. After the cempletion of SS-8, the drilling barge was lent to AGIP who used it to drill the well at Mnazi Bay. The use of the rig by AGIP was very fortuitous in that it allowed time for all of the drilling results in Songo Songo to be evaluated before the decision to drill SS-9 had to be made, without paying standby or demobilization charges. 20. Songo Songo 9: After the disappointing results of SS-8, it was felt that sufficient reserves had not been proved nor could the field sustain a daily production of gas which would be sufficient to feed a power plant and a fertilizer plant, hence it was felt necessary that SS-9 be drilled. The EIB felt that they could not justify financing the operation, therefore IDA and the OPEC Fund were alone in the financing. The drilling costs were then divided 62.5 and 37.5 percent for IDA mnd OPEC Fund respectively. TPDC invited AGIP to take over the drilling consultancy for the well SS-9. AGIP concurred and after submittal of a bid, was awarded the contract, replacing the original drilling consultant firm. 21. The well, SS-9, was spudded on November 19, 1982 using the drilling barge, Vermill'.on Bay. Although originally planned to be a deviated well, the equipment necessary to perform the deviation was found to be not in working order. Attempts to bring in the equipment from overseas proved fruitless, hence the well was drilled vertically. The producing horizon was found about where anticipated and tested gas at a rate of approximately 23 MMCFD. A Christmas tree was installed on SS-9 and the rig was released on January 29, 1983. The drilling contractor decided not to demobilize the rig immediately but to stack it in Tanzania to await possible drilling opportunities in the area. 22. Repair of Wellheads at SS-3 and SS-4: At about the time of the completion of the drilling on SS-8, it was noticed that the wellheads at the SS-3 and SS-4 locations (drilled by ONGC) were leaking gas. In order to prevent a catastrophe and possibly injuring the reservoir or causing an environmental problem, IDA agreed to fund the repair of these wellheads as well as upgrade the equipment on some of the wells, under Credit 1199-TA as follows: (a) Installation of well jackets and work decks to protect well heads from navigational hazards on SS-5, 7, and 9. (b) Upgrading the inflow performance of wells SS-5, 7 and 9 by the replacement of present bottom hole assemblies with 44 in tubing and wellheads, and (c) Complete work-over of wells SS-3 and SS-4 in order to upgrade them to API standards for gas wells. 23. Depending upon the work which was to be done, estimates of the costs of the work ranged up to approximately US$3.5 million. Towards this amount, the EIB promised up to US$0.5 million contingent on the payment of arrears by the Government. By the time all of the bills in the Songo Songo  projects were paid, there were no funds left in the IDA credit which co0.d have been diverted to this work, hence financing had to come from elsewhere. 24. Natural Gas Utilization Study: This study was started at about the same time as the completion of SS-7 with consultants which were chosen by TPDC and the EIB. The draft report was ready in October 1982. The Bank, although not financing this phase of the project, approved of the choice of consultant. In general, the report suggested that the two most attractive uses of the Songo Songo gas are for an ammonia urea fertilizer plant for export and/or for domestic power generation. A plant proposed to T'PDC by AGRICO (US) would produce 1,150 tons/day of ammonia and 1,725 tons/day of urea and would consume 54 MMCFD of gas 310 days per year over a 25 year life, a total of 420 BCF. For power generation, an estimate has been made by a Bank consultant for a combined cycle gas turbine power generator required to meet peak demand of 80 megawatts would consume up to 16 MMCFD and require reserves of 150 BCF at a 60 percent load factor over 25 years. In practice Agrico withdrew from the ammonia/urea project and there is currently no investor committed to its implementation. Tanesco is still reviewing its power generation options now based on 165 MW of gas- fired plant. 25. Training: Although training was not a major component during the first project, a number of TPDC people were trained during both projects and consisted of the following; (a) Two TPDC wellsite geologists were assigned to SS-5 and 6. Their knowledge of mudlogging and electric logging improved substantially. (b) Two other geologists were assigned to SS-7 and 8 and were exposed to a variety of operations from drilling, logging, testing and completion. These men went on to attend courses at Exlog in the U.K. These men aleo attended an "Overpressure Detection" course in the U.K. (c) The TPDC geophysicist worked with the exploration consultants in their head office in the U.K. He was able to get some training in seismic mapping by constructing maps of the Songo Songo area. 26. Project Costs: The estimated project cost of the First Songo Songo Petroleum Exploration Project Cr S/27-TA was US$49.5 million of which US$45 million was foreign exchange. As is shown in Table 5. ii Part III, all of the foreign component of the cost was expended. There is no clear data that would show if the full amount of the local funds were expended. Expenditures on budget items were appropriate. However, expenditures were not made as targeted. The initial plan was to drill four wells, but due to institutional problems mentioned (para. 16 and 17) above, all of the project funds were used up in the completion of only two wells. There were frequent delays on the part of the Borrower in the approval of invoices and submitting withdrawal applications for the Bank to pay.  27. The estimated project cost for the Second Songo Songo Project Cr 1199-TA was US$44.8 million of which US$20.0 million of the US$40.0 million foreign component was from IDA funds. The full amount of the foreign component was expended on the project (see Table 5. Part III). As was the case with the First Songo Songo Project, the Second Songo Songo Project also experienced delays in the approval process of contractor invJices for payment. 28. Financial Problems: Soon after SS-6 started, it became evident that the project was in serious financial problems in that sufficient funds would not be available to complete the project as planned. It was hoped that additional sources of cofinancing could be identified or that AGIP could be pressed to make a decision on whether or not they would make a bottom-hole contribution to the project, which AGIP eventually decided not to do. On March 27, 1981, the Minister of the MWEM formally requested IDA to consider making an additional credit towards the cost of the overall program. At the same time the Minister requested the EIB and OPEC to consider financial assistance towards the 4-well program. 29. In September 1981, a proposal was made for the Second Songo Songo Exploration Project which would start as soon as possible in order to utilize the same drilling barge as was being used in the First Songo Songo Exploration Project. To demobilize the barge and to find and mobilize another comparable rig, not only would take a great deal of time, but would be very expensive due to the standby time and the extra mobilization and demobilization costs. It should be remembered that at this time, there was a worldwide shortage of drilling rigs. In this second project, the EIB and OPEC had both agreed to cofinance the operation up to US$15 million. it became important to avoid demobilizing the Vermillion Bay. It would take some time to get the project through the normal cycle within the Bank. The EIB and OPEC were equally convinced that they would participate, however, their agreement to contribute would only become effective once IDA's funds were in place and the credit effective. In the interest of the project, however, and with an aim to saving funds, the Government of Tanzania agreed to finance the continuation of the project beyond SS-5, if necessary, without the Bank's formal signing of the Credit Agreement. The Bank, however, moved rapidly in approving the second project and it started without any delay. 30. At the end of the Songo Songo drilling program, disbursements Lo the various suppliers and contractors were delayed for long periods. Indeed, final disbursement to the drilling contractor for the demobilization fee was delayed for well over a year so that the contractor, in the end, had to threaten legal action to be paid to enable him to meet his financial commitments on rig payments. In the last half of 1984, all of the disbursements were made thus depleting the IDA Credit. The EIB and OPEC agreed to increase their share to 40 and 60 percent respectively thereby picking up the possible deficit. 31. Procurement: Procurement was a very important facet of these projects as the quality of the supply of services could well affect the implementation and the outcome of the projects. To facilitate the procurement of the many items and services and to provide the flexibility  - 9 - necessary for the drilling operation, the Project Agreement was amended so that procurement of equipment and materials estimated to cost US$300,0J0 (instead of US$100,000), could be awarded through Limited International Tendering (LIT) procedures satisfactory to IDA, provided that, the aggregate cost of contracts so awarded shall not exceed US$1.5 million (instead of $2.0 million) equivalent. In addition a new paragraph was inserted which stated that contracts for services other than mud logging, cementing and testing, estimated to cost US$500,000 equivalent or less, may be awarded through LIT procedures satisfactory to IDA, provided that the aggregate cost of contracts so awarded shall not exceed US$3.5 million equivalent. The following discus- the procurement procedures involved: (a) Exploration Consultants: Requests for bids were sent out to a number of firms on a short list which was made up by the borrower and approved by the Bank. The exploration consultants were chosen according to Bank guidelines for the initial part of the evaluation of Songo Songo, (Cr 601-TAN). After completion of the initial study, the consultants were requested by the borrower to remain in place to continue the study during the First and Second Songo Songo project. (b) Drilling Consultants: A snort list was drawn up by the borrower and was approved by the Bank. The evaluation of the bids and the choice of consultant was made by the borrower according to Bank guidelines. After completion of the initial study under Cr 601-TAN the consultants were requested by the borrower to remain on the project to continue the study. The drilling consultants took a major role in procurement of all of the drilling materials and services and participated in the evaluations of the bids. Because of rather poor performance of the drilling consultants, TPDC, after drilling SS-8, decided to replace the consultants by AGIP, who agreed to undertake the work subsequent to SS-8. (c) Sub-bottom Survey Contractor: The sub-bottom survey contractor was procured by means of Limited International Tendering (LIT) procedures acceptable to the Bank. The sub-bottom survey contractor was financed by funds from the Tanzanian Investment Bank (TIB). (d) On-Shore Drilling Contractor: Two bids were received as a result of the Limited International Tendering. A rig belonging to Sonatrach was chosen on the basis of bid evaluation according to Bank guidelines. (e) Off-shore Drilling Contractor: There were no bids received in response to the call for bids by International Competitive Bidding (ICB), reflecting the rather tight contracting market prevalent at that time. After enquiring of a number of possible contractors, the posted drilling barge, Vermillion Bay, from Blocker Drilling & Marine Co., was contracted for.  - 10 - (f) Drilling Materials and Supplies: A number of bids were received to supply drilling materials and supplies, in response to a request by Limited International Tendering. The evaluation of the bids and the choice of the firms to supply the materials was made according to Bank procurement procedures under the supervision of the drilling consultant. (g) Drilling and Technical Services: Services such as mud logging, wire-line services and cementing were procured by means of International Competitive Bidding (ICB). Bids were evalt-ated according to Bank guidelines under the supervision of the drilling consultant. 32. The project was audited annually following Bank guidelines. The records indicate a clean audit report. Results 33. Unfortunately, the project failed to find oil which was hoped for and was hinted at by an interpreLation of the results of SS-3. Although a show of oil was found in SS-5, it was not deemed to be significant. So far as proving a sizeable reservoir of gas, the project can ue said to have been successful. An estimated recoverable reserves of 800 BCF of gas are thought to have been proved so far. The gas utilization study has identified a number of uses for the gas from Songo Songo which includes power generation and fertilizer manufacturing. Further uses have been identified, principally for supply to industry in Dar, and also small quantities (with doubtful economics) as compressed natural gas for vehicles and for domestic uses. Actual utilization of the resource has not started until now (April 1990). 34. To date no decision has been taken regarding the utilization of the Songo Songo gas reserves, in part because of strong Government attachment to the idea of fertilizer production for which it has not been possible to put together a viable scheme. The option of power generation appears economically interesting, but has been delayed because reserves may not be sufficient for both fertilizer production and power generation. The country is basically power short and could use the Songo Songo gas for power generation to advantage. The Energy Assessment Report issued in November 1984 addressed the gas issue and recommended that feasibility studies for a pipeline from Songo Songo to Dar es Salaam be initiated without delay. The pipsline study was completed in 1989 but only now (April 1990) is Tanesco updating its Least Cost Expansion Program to identify the possible role of a major supply of natural gas. Proiect Sustainability 35. The Borrower now has a good cadre of exploration staff who have proven themselves quite capable of undertaking exploration activities.  - 12. - Performance of Contractors 36. Throughout the project, contractors seemed to do a credible job, this in spite of the frequent problems with processing and payment of invoices by TPDC. One or two instances occurred where equipment, on which stand-by payments were being made, failed to function when the need arose. The Contractors during the project included the drilling contractor, contractors for shipping, aircraft, well services, and suppliers of equipment and materials. Most of the "small" contracts were negotiated by the drilling consultants, hence both the contractor and the consultant were fully aware of contractual conditions and the intent at the time of signing. Despite delays in processing of payments to some contractors resulting in huge backlogs of unpaid bills, the work continued without related delays, much to the credit of the contractors involved. Performance of Consultants 37. Drilling Consultants: TPDC was not pleased with the performance of the drilling consultants. Although the firm was recognized to be good, TPDC felt that the personnel associated with the operation were not the best which could have been obtained. Many of the delays encountered in drilling SS-6 were directly attributed by the Borrower to mismanagement. The failures in SS-6 were repeated again in SS-5 and could have resulted in catastrophe had TPDC not had access to drilling mud materials elsewhere within their operations. The drilling consultants were requested by the TPDC to replace all those personnel deemed responsible for the poor performance if the consultants intended to remain as drilling consultants. As mentioned above, between the drilling of wells SS-8 and SS-9, the drilling consultant was replaced. The borrower seemed to be satisfied with the replacement's performance. 38. Exploration Consultants: TPDC was most displeased with the performance of the exploration consultants during the drilling of SS-6 by (i) failing to run logs or to take cores of the prospective reservoir section and (ii) failing to identify the most interesting zone worthy of testing. It is not evident by reading reports and correspondence that the exploration consultants were staying on top of the results and integrating these into the current geophysical interpretation. With a costly drilling campaign, a great deal of talent should have been brought to bear on the seismic data to ensure that the best interpretation was being presented or used for placement of development wells. Performance of Borrower 39. To have avoided some of the problems encountered during the drilling, perhaps TPDC could have been more knowledgeable of what the consultants were doing, or (more accurately) not doing. In part, however, the consultants were hired just so TPDC would not have to involve themselves with the day-to-day operations. Moreover, many of the failures of the consultants are flagrantly obvious in retrospect; however, at the  - 12 - time they probably were impossible to detect without detailed information together with a lot of practical experience. 40. It is strongly felt that the operation, on the part of the Borrower, could have proceeded much more smoothly if a Project Implementation Unit had been set up and maintained from the beginning. This unit could have handled all of the problems which were encountered and could have communicated directly with the con-ultants, contractors, and the Bank without having everyone from the Minister and below involved. Moreover, the Unit could have presided over periodic meetings where progress, or the lack of it, could have been discussed. 41. The Borrower could have been more diligent in approving invoices and submitting withdrawal applications for the Bank to pay. Arrears to a consultant at times got as high as over US$400,000 and still the consultant was expected to advance funds etc., suggesting that the approval process within the Government was so complicated that it encouraged delays. Performance of the Bank 42. The Bank faced a formidable task in encouraging the Borrower to keep the project going in the face of overlapping authorities and responsibilities; however, perhaps the Bank should have made the move sooner to arrange for one of the consultants to be in charge of the operation. The Bank could have requested that the consultant in charge replace those people who had not demonstrated responsibility and initiative and, perhaps by so doing, could have saved some money and down time. In retrospect, it might be argued that Bank staff chose the wrong solation by themselves assuming too much authority by getting involved with the day-to- day operations and decision making, which could have been perceived as diluting whatever authority had been given to the consultants. 43. During the preparation time for the Second Songo Songo Project, the Bank moved with speed in approving the second credit. This was done, as mentioned above, to take advantage of contracts already in place and to avoid extra mobilization and demobilization charges. This efficient and speedy transition allowed the program to continue without delay. 44. The Bank could have acted more forcefully in trying to implement the training component of the project. Under the circumstances, however, with problems appearing almost constantly, it was difficult at the time to see this as a priority. Despite these problems, on-the-job training and the occasional technical seminar were attended by most, if not all, TPDC technical personnel. Project Relationship 45. Relationships between Bank and Borrower, Bank and Implementing Agency (TPDC), and Borrower and Implementing Agency, were all satisfactory. Bank/EIB relationships were satisfactory overall. Bank did feel that Borrower was too slow in addressing problems of implementation, payments  - 13 - etc., and this slowness caused recriminations and much extra work as suppliers sought to be paid. Most suppliers performed well despite the slow payment. In one respect, the role of the Bank in drilling decisions and managemenEt, the Bank staff probably got too involved and tried to undertake too much line management. Lessons Learned 46. As a great deal of time and money was spent on drilling wells which were located on the basis of a seismic interpretation, very little effort seems to have been spent in attempting to get a second or even a third interpretation. The fact that the first well in the program did not agree with the seismic map, should have alerted everyone to the possibility that this most basic information could be faulty and in need of reinterpretation. There is very little evidence in the files that much attention was paid to the geophysics by either the Borrower or the Bank, nor is there any indication that the data were thoroughly reinterpreted once wells encountered markers deeper than expected. In future projects of this type, more attention should be paid to the basic geological and geophysical data before siting the drilling rig. 47. In the initial phase of the project, the Bank should have insisted that the Government set up a Project Implementation Unit staffed by Tanzanians and by knowledgeable, experienced, expatriate technicians before the work proceeded. With an efficient unit in place, most of the prob'ms encountered might have been addressed and solved. Future projects of this nature should have a well staffed and knowledgeable Project Implementation Unit in charge. 48. Credibility of the Bank and the Borrower has been hurt by delays in payment for services performed or materials supplied. Some of these delays in payment were apparently deliberate especially regarding demobilization payment to the drilling contractor. Notwithstanding the reasons for non payment, which should always be resolved in a timely fashion, non payment should not drag on in a seemingly endless fashion causing contractors and suppliers to spend a great deal of time on follow up including a need to address their complaints through a variety of channels. The failure to approve invoices for payment on a timely basis is counter productive in that the consultant, contractor or supplier becomes less enthusiastic to do a good job. More importantly, his attention is diverted from the job to the more mundane pursuit of payment. 49. At the time of the writing of this PCR, some seven years after the drilling program, the production and utilization of the natural gas from the Songo Songo Field has not occurred. It would clearly have been appropriate to investigate gas uses and economics in greater depth before executing the drilling program.  - 14 - Project Documentation and Data 50. The credit agreements and President's reports were a good basis for project execution and control. Data required for the PCR were readily available in the files.  - 15 - PART IIIs STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans Credits Loan/Credit Year of Title Purpose Approval Status Cr. 1604-TA To relieve bottlenecks 1985 In Progress Petroleum and to reduce waste and Technical rationalize the petroleum Assistance distribution system and Project also develop strategies for the use of indigenous gas resources.  - 16 - 2. Proiect Timetables (a)Project Cr S127-TA Item Date Date Date Planned Revised Actual - Identification (Executive Project Summary) 09/79 - Preparation not recorded - Appraisal Mission 01/80 - Credit/Negotiations 05/08/80 - Board Approval 06/12/80 - Credit Signature 06/30/80 - Credit Effectiveness 09/80 09/12/80 - Credit Closing 09/30/82 09/30/82 - Credit Completion 06/83 09/07/82 2. Proiect Timetables (b)Project Cr 1199-TA Item Date Date Date Planned Revised Actual - Identification (Executive P~,oject Summary) 06/81 - Preparation 08/81 - Appraisal Mission 09/81 - Credit/Negotiations 11/81 - Board Approval 11/22/81 - Credit Signature 1/11/82 - Credit Effectiveness 01/82 02/23/82 - Credit Closing 12/31/83 12/31/83 - Credit Completion 06/30/84 9/10/84  - 17 - 3. Loan Disbursement (a)Credit S/27-TA Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ '000) FY 81 F" 82 FY 83 Appraisal Estimate 25,000 28,000 30,000 Actual 12,671 29,250 30,000 Actual as Z of Estimate 51Z 104Z lOOZ Date of Final Disbursement: September 7, 1982 3. Loan Disbursement (b)Credit 1199-TA Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ '000) FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 Appraisal Estimate for Total Donor Finance 32,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 IDA Portion 16,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 Actual for IDA Disbursement 8,424 16,983 18.682 18,718 Actual 2 of Estimate 52.62 84.92 93.42 93.62 Date of Final Disbursement: September 10, 1984 Comment: The Presidert's Report did not include a disbursement profile for the IDA portion of the overall finance. Total donor finance was expected to be disbursed over two years and IDA share was expected to be 502 of each invoice. A weakening of the SDR shortly after approval reduced the IDA share to about 47Z.  - 18 - 4. ProJect Implementation (a)Credit S/27-TA Estimated Completion Date Indicators At Appraisal Actual or PCR 1) Completion of drilling 12/3/80 5/2/81 of first well 2) Completion of drilling 3/31/81 1C/12181 of second well 3) Energy Development Plan 6/30/82 Not finalized. Overtaken by the preparation of the Bank energy assessment report of November 1984. 4) Exploration and Negotiation 6/30/82 No formal strategy documlent produced but the Ministry has developed and implemented a successful strategy. 5) Natural gas utilization 6/30/81 Completed study 4. Project Imnlementation (b)Credit 1199-TA Indicators Appraisal Estimate Actual or PCR Estimate Completion of drilling 1/22/82 3/12/82 of first well Completion of drilling 5/14/82 7/02/82 of second well Completion of drilling 9/10/82 10/29/82 of third well Comments: Physical performance was close to appraisal estimate throughout.  - 19 - PrSOlCt Cost and Financing 5.1 Pro oats (a) CR S127-TA _ _praisal Estimates Actual Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total - US$ million-----US$ million DrilflDtgL lbil 1.6 18.5 16.1 C Loption of woll s 2.7 2.7 Techncal tssistanco t4 wE - 1.0 1.0 Tech. Assist. to TPDC: (lot Pha..) Pre-drill. Otago - 0.6g/ 0.6 drilling ota&o 0.1 1.9 2.0 Training of TPDC staff - 0.5 0.6 I.Consult. Servtys' (2nd Phase) Pre-drill. Stage 0.1 1.9 2.0 Well completions A Resorvoir studies - 0.3 0.8 Su.-total 1.8 22.3 24.1 Phjs'iical conting. 0.8 4.9 6.2 Pric:e co.ntingencios 0.4 3.8 8.7 T',tel Projvct Cost 2.5 80.5 33.0 n.e. 80.6 aJ Taxes and duties exempt. 5.1 PrOject Financing (b) CR S/27-TA Planned Credit Actual Source Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total ------ US$ million---------------US$ million------- IDA - . 30.0 30.0 30.0 EIB -.- 0.5 0.5 0.5 Government 2.5 -.- 2.5 n.a. Total 2.5 30.5 33.0 30.5  - 20 - 5.2 Pro1ect Costs (a) CR 1199-TA Appraisal Estimates Actual Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total -- ---- US$ million------------US$ million------- 1. DriIlIng RIg . Operat ng costs S00days - 9.8 9.6 b Demobilization - 8.2 3.2 2. Tech Servle s - 0.6 6.6 8. Tangible. A con- usable. Inel. Well o"pI. *quip. - 4.1 4.1 4. Enginering, constr and *upport sorv. 4.5 5.6 10.0 S. ugat. a exploration advisory services - 4.0 4.0 6. Reservotr Engineering Studies - 0.8 0.8 7. Contingencies a. Physical - 5.1 S. 1 b. Price 0.3 1.7 2.0 Total Project Lost 4.6 40.0 44.8 n.a. Proiect Cost and Financjng 5.2 Proiect Financinu (b) CR 1199-TA Planned Credit .ctual Source Local Foreign Total Local r reign Total -------- US$ million---- US:, million------- IDA - 20.0 20.0 - 18. 18.7 EIB - 8.0 8.0 - rO 8.0 OPEC Fund - 12.0 12.0 - 12.0 12.0 Government 4.8 - 4.8 n.a. - n.a. TOTAL 4.8 40.0 44.8 n.a. 38.7 38.7  - 21 - 6. Project Results (a) CR S/27-TA A. Direct Benefits: Not applicable B. Economic Impact: No quantifiable benefits before production C. Financial Impact: No quantifiable benefits before production D. Studies: (a) Energy Development Plan. This was superseded by UNDP/WB Energy Assessment dated November 1984. (b) TPDC Financial and Managerial Structure Study. Report prepared by Commonwealth Secretariat. The structure was implemented and is substantially still in existence. (c) Formulation of Exploration and Petroleum Negotiation Strategy. No formal strategy was prepared. However the informal strategy adopted by Government and TPDC was, in most respects, in line with the "ideal' strategy encouraged by the Bank. (d) Gas Utilization Study. Study by IGDC indicated commercially interesting possibilities in fertilizer, power generation, industry and other uses. Known gas reserves were insufficient to supply all of these needs. 6. Project Results (b) CR 1199-TA A. Direct Benefits: Not applicable B. Economic Impact: No quantifiable benefits before production C. Financial Impact: No auantifiable benefits before production D. Studies: Project included reservoir engineering studies to verify reserves in place. (a)Reservoir Engineering: Studies undertaken by ECL quantified the reserves in place and indicated gas producibility that could potentially be commercially interesting.  - 22 - 7. Status of Covenants (a) CR S127-TA Brief Description Selection of Cov-nants Applicablo Compliance Remarks Ro later than Dec. 31, 1980, the CRA 3.02 Yoe Borrower shall employ a (a) management consultant whoso qualifications, experience and terms and conditions of employment shall be satisfactory to the Borrower and IDA. No later than Dec. 31, 1980, the CRA 3.02 Yes Borrower shall employ an Energy (b) Specialist and an economic advisor whose qualifications, experience and terms of employment shall be satisfactory to Borrower and IDA. Promptly after completion of Part CRA 3.04 Mutually agreed UNDP with the Bank prepared C of tho Project or no later than (b) by IDA and the Energy Assessuent Report six months after the Closing Borrower to for Tanzania which overtook Date, the Borrower shall prepare *acept the the Energy Development Plan. and furnish to IDA a report of strategy as Without a formal document, the the Energy Development developed. Borrower has in place a Negotiatiofe Strategy. successful Exploration and Negotiation Strategy. 7. Status of Covenants (b) CR 1199-T Brief Description Selection of Covenants Applicable Compliance Remarks The Borrower shall employ no CRA 8.02 Yos later than April 30, 1982 or (a) other date as the Borrower and Association may agro upon, an energy specialist and economic advisor whos selection, qualifications and experience and terms of employment satisfy the Association's guidelines. The Borrower shall prepare no CRA 8.02 No This was overtaken by the later than March 81, 1983 the (b) Energy Assessmont Report draft Energy Development Plan and prepared by UNDP with the submit it to tho Association for Sank. review. In order to assist the Borrower CRA 8.08 Yes in the preparation of exploration (a) strategy, the Borrower shell employ qualifi*d consultants no later then April 80, 1982. Tho Borrower shall prepare tho CRA 8.08 Yoe draft exploration strategy no (b) later than September a0, 1982.  - 23 - S. Staff Input (a) CR S/27-TA St;r Of Monab/ Number of Staff I/ Specialty Performance / C.Ye * Yer Persone Weeks Rating Preparation I 79 8 8.2 Economist .1 Geologist .6 Consultant Appralsal SO 6 .8 Advisor 1.4 Chief 16.4 Economist .5 Engineer .5 Financial Analyst 4.9 GeologIst Negotiations 80 4 2.1 Economist .4 Financial Analyst 2.8 coololot .1 TchnT?cal Preparation II 80 6 4.0 Chief .8 Deputy Chief .7 Economist .2 Financial Analyst 8.7 Geologist Lending Operations 80 2 4.0 Loan Officer SURir ton SPN 1 .4 Economist Project Admin. 81 2 2.8 Loan Officer 0.7 Oper. Asat. Supervision 81 9 0.6 Loan Officer 0.4 Chemical Eng. 0.9 Deputy Chief 15.1 Economist 26.2 Engineor 0.6 Financial Analyst 4.2 Geologist 0.1 Operations 0.3 Technical Project Admin. 82 2 0.8 Loan Officer 0.1 Oper. Asst. Supervision 82 5 0.1 Asst. Director 2 9.6 Economist 22.4 Engineer 0.6 Financial Analyst 2.5 Geologist Project Admin. 88 1 1.1 Oper. Asst. 2 Supervision 88 8 8.2 Economist 2 1.2 Engineer 0.1 Geologist Project Admin. 88 1 0.2 Oper. Asat. 2 Supervision 8a a 8.2 Economist 2 1.2 Engineer 0.1 Geologist Project Admin. 84 1 0.2 Oper. Asst. 2 Supervision 84 4 0.0 Advisor 2 0.1 Economist 8.8 Engineor 0.0 FInancial Analyst Supervision 86 4 0.0 Economist 2 1.8 Engineer 0.1 Geologist 0.9 Engineer Supervision 88 1 0.1 Geophysicist PCR 89 0.1 Geophysicist PCR 89 1 1.9 Geophysicist TOTAL 1687 1/ Date are inadequat to split staff time In the field and headquarters. 2/ 1) Problm free or minor problem. 2) Moderate problem. 8) Major problm.  - 24 - . Sttaff nput (b) CR 1100TA Sta of Month/ Number of Staff Al Specialty Performnce CycT- Year Persons Wekn Rating Throush ADPraISal Pr paration I 80 1 8.4 Loan Officer 81 8 0.0 Deputy Div. Chlif 8.1 Economist 0.2 Geologlst Appraisal 82 8 0. Asset. Vice Pros. 8.6 Economist 0.5 Financlal Analyst 62 1 6.2 Loan Officor Nbgotlations 82 1 0.1 Economist Preparation I1 82 a 1.1 Division Chief 1.2 D-p. Division Chief 2.2 Economist 88 1 0.4 Engineer Proj .Adminstration 82 2 0.8 Loan Officer 0.1 Operations Asst. SUegrvision upe rvision 82 5 0.1 Division Chief 1 10.8 Economist 6.2 Engineer 0.1 Financial Analyst 0.6 Geologist Supervision 88 1 0.4 Enginoer 1 Proj. Admin. 83 2 0.7 Loan Officer 1 0.2 Operations Asst. Supervision 88 4 11.8 Econemist 1 17.7 Engineer 0.6 Financial Analyst 1.8 Geologist 1 Proj. Adin. 84 1 1.1 Operations Asnt. 1 Supervision 84 4 0.2 Div. Chief 8.8 Engineer 7.7 Economist 0.0 Engineer Proj. Admin. 88 1 1.0 Loan Officer 1 Supervision 85 1 0.2 Dsp. Division Chief 1 Supervision 86 2 0.6 Engineer 1 0.4 Engineer PCR 89 1 1.0 Goophysicist I PCR 90 2 0.0 Country Economist 1 0.1 Economist Supervision 90 1 0.2 Engineer 1 TOTAL 118 4 Al Date aro Inadequate to split staff weeks spent In the tfold and at headquarters.