India - Second Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY f>.je'viNv.!Ls .H, u N -, tULiJ j. [; -jpQ *1 ' i , Report No. 10023 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 1288-IN) OCTOBER 25, 1991 Agriculture Operations Division India Department Asia Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officia: duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Rupee, Rupees (Rs.) US$1 - Rs. 9.00 at appraisal (December 1980) US$1 = Rs. 12.77 (average during project years 1983 through 1989) US$1 = Rs. 15.5 on March, 1989 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations CADA Command Area Development Authority cusec Cubic meters per second DRP Dam Safety Review Panel ERR Economic Rate of Return GOI Government of India GOMP Government of Madhya Pradesh ha Hectare km Kilometers NEYRPIC A French Proprietary Name PMU Project Monitoring Unit PTC Project Training Center SAR Staff Appraisal Report USAID United States Agency for International Development WALMI Water And Land Management Institute FISCAL YEAR OF BQRROWER Government of India and Government of Madhya Pradesh: April 1 to March 31.  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.5.A. Offic ol Olrectol-. itIal Opoatkhns Evaluatm October 25, 1991 MEMORAUDUM TO. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS A2D T PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Cghbal (Madhva Pradesh) Irrieation II Project (Credi_ 128-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on India - Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation II Project (Credit 1288-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document hu a restrcted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the perfomance of their official dutl. Is contents may not othoewlse be disclosed without World Bank authodrAtlon.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPQRT INDIA CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1288-4N) TABLE OF ONTENT Preface . .......................................... Evaluation Summary ......... ......................... PART 1: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identity ...................................... 1 Background ....................................... 1 Project Objectives and Description .......................... 1 Project Design and Organization ........................... 3 Project Implementation ................................. S Project Results ...................................... 6 Project Sustainability .................................. 8 Bank's Performance .................................. 8 Borrower's Performance ................................ 9 Project Relationship ...........9 9 Consulting and Support Services ............................ 9 Project Documentation and Data ............................ 10 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Comments on Bank's Review (Part I) ........................ 12 Evaluation of Bank's Performance .......................... 29 Evaluation of Borrower's Own Perfornance .................... 30 Effectiveness of Relationship Between Bank and Borrower . .......... 30 Adequacy and Accuracy of Statistical Information ................ 30 PART Im: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related Bank Loans and Credits (Table 1) ..................... 36 Project Timetable (Table 2) .................,.,,.. 39 Schedule of Disbursements (Table 3) ........................ 40 Project Implementation (Table 4) ......... .................. 41 Project Cost (Table SA) ................................ 44 Project Financing (Table SB) ............................. 47 Direct: Benefits (Table 6A) . ................. 48 Economic Impact (Table 6B) ............................. 49 Studies (Table 6C) . 57 Status of Covenants (Table 7)............................. 61 Staff Inputs (Table 8A) ................................. 66 NMssions (Table 8B) .................................. 67 Area Irrigated - Whole Command (Table 9A) ................... 70 AreaIrrigated-AIBD Area(Table9B) ....................... 71 Yields of Major Crops (Table 10) .......................... 72 Releases to Project Area (Table 1 1) ......................... 73 Map IBRD 16044 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theit official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 1288-IN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation U Project in India for which Credit i288-IN in the amount of SDRs 27.6 million was approved on August 10, 1982. The c'.edit was closed on March 31, 1989, two years behind schedule. Final disbursement was made on October 23, 1989 and SDR 1.1 million was cancelled. The PCR was jointly prepared by the New Delhi Office of the Agriculture Operations Division, India Department, Asia Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and HI), and the Borrower (Part HI). Preparation of the PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision of the project in February 1989, and is based, inter alla, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit and Project Agreements, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Ba-k memoranda.  iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDT 1288-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Qbjetives 1. The project's objectives were to improve the canal conveyance and drainage systems, to construct additional roads, to prevent further encroachment of ravines into the project area, and to provide a more reliable source of water supply to the tail end of the command area (para. 3). Implementation E=prince 2. From the start, the project was beset with management problems which slowed project progress. However, the situation improved significantly in mid-1988 as a result of stable and positive management, only to further decline during the project's final year. Major management problems identified were: inherent weakness of the Ayacut Department's ability to control activities of strong line agencies; and frequent changes in management staff in both the Ayacut Department and the Command Area Development Authority (paras. 16-18). Reults 3. Project results were mixed. Canal security and capacity works, and aquatic weed control works approached revised targets, while canal control works fell seriously short of target as did the Ambah Intensive Block Development. Drainage, buildings, telecommunications and aerial seeding (ravine arrestation) approached or exceeded their target, whereas roads and training facilities fell short significantly (paras. 19 and 20). A major achievement of the project was the successful integration of public sector tubewells into a canal irrigation project (para. 25). In addition, the site investigations and studies of the Pagara, Kotinak and Pillowa dams recommended by the Dam Safety Review Panel (DRP) which were carried out by the Ihrigation Department led to a firm progiam for upgrading these dams (para. 22). The recalculated ERR for the project was 10.3% compared to 35% estimated at appraisal for a total project area of 221,000 ha. For the Ambah Intensive Block Development the recalculated ERR was 24.7% for a revised area of 35,000 ha compared with 34% estimated at appraisal for 40,000 ha. For the remaining command area due to canal and other improvements, the recalculated ERR was 7.9% for a revised area of 186,000 ha compared with 35% estimated at appraisal for 181,000 ha. (para. 28). Sustginability 4. Benefits from the project may only be assured through adequate maintenance of project works, and if outstanding prescribed works under state funding are completed. Urgent attention should be paid to the drainage problem of the area to prevent environmental problems (para. 29).  iv Findings and Lessons Lean 5. The main lessons of the project are: (i) More time should have been devoted to the projec. preparation which could have minimized management and technical problems encountered during prject implementation (paras. 11-12, and 16-17). (ii) Project preparation and appraisal should have emphasized the condition of existing dams that served the project area and the Bank's requirement for independent review of the safety aspects of such structures (paras. 14 and 22). (iii) Field inspections during preparadon should have recognized waterlogging problems in the project area, as well as the deterioration of drains constructed in Phase I, that could cause environmental problems (paras. 12 and 29). (iii) Cost estimates should have been more realistic and adequate provisions for physical contingencies and cost escalation should have been provided (para. 23).  PIOJECT COMPLETlONRjEPRQT INDIA CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION 11 PROJECT (CREDIT 1288-I 1PJABYJProiet Revw fOite Bnkll's P-ersDiective Project Identity Name : Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation II Project Credit Number: 1288 - IN RVP Unit : Asia Region Country : India Sector : Agriculture Sub-sector : ITigation Backoun-d 1. Madhya Pradesh is the largest State in India geographically, and in 1981 had a population of about 52 million, giving it a much lower population density than most other Indian states. The State is rich in minerals and forests, and agriculture contributed some 55% of the State's domestic production. Madhya Pradesh has a high hydroelectric generation capacity, and is one of the few States in India without power constraints. Its population is about 84% rural, with about 20% comprising tribal and backward classes. In 1979, about 66% of the population was below the poverty line. In order to increase agricultural production and to make it less dependent on the variable rainfall, the State has, since independence, given the highest priority to irrigation development. In 1980, only 2.2 million ha had been provided with irrigation facilities out of an estimated potential of about 12.9 million ha. 2. In the 1970s, the Government of India (GOI) developed the concept of command area development in response to the slow gestation rate of newly-developed irrigation projects and low production generally. Authorities were created which were intended to focus on the lower echelons of irrigation systems to carry out on-farm development, to organize and train farmers, and to facilitate supplies of inputs. In Madhya Pradesh, a separate Command Area Development Department (also known as the Ayacut Department) exists, whereas certain other States have evolved a structure where the command area development element is the operating wing of the Irrigation Department. The Ayacut Departnent was the lead agency in this project, and a senior executive in the Indian Administrative Service of Commissioner status controlled all construction, operation and maintenance activities within the Chambal Command Area Development Authority (CADA). Under his administrative, but not technical, direction are units seconded from other line departments, including the Irrigation Department, Agriculture Department, Public Works Departnent, and Forest Department. Pret. Qbjectives and Desgition 3. The objectives of the Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation Project were: improvement of both the canal conveyance and drainage systems; construction of additional roads; prevention of further encroachment of ravines into the project area; and provision of a more reliable water supply to the tail end of the command area.  2 4. Phase II of the Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation Project consisted of the following components: a) creation of the Ambah Intensive Block Development over about 40,000 ha in the Ambah Branch Canal command, incorporating augmentation tubewells, the improvement of canals and water courses, and the introduction of level top canal operation; b) upgrading of main canals and distribution network; c) improving main and link drainage; d) upgrading and extension of rural road network: e) ravine arrestation by plantations and conservation; f) canalside plantations; g) improvements to monitoring and evaluation activities; h) studies to examine supplemental water sources and to develop improved criteria for operation and maintenance; and i) development of a training institute. All the above components are defined in Table 4, (Project Implementation) and Table 6C (Studies). 5J. Te Ambah Intensive Block Development was the core of the project and consisted of the following subcomponents: a) development of 24,000 ha in the Ambah Branch Canal distributary 33R command in Morena district, and 16,000 ha at the tail of said Canal in Bhind District; b) installation of 175 augmentation tubewells for supplemental supplies pumping into the distributaries under public control; c) provision of level top canal operation on canals down to 6 cusecs to permit ponding of water from augmentation tubewells as insurance against power failures; d) installation of additional cross-regulators in canals down to 6 cusecs to permit constant volume (constant level downstream control) mode of operation; e) trial installation of NEYRPIC hydraulically-operated gate cross regulators in distributary 33R of the Ambah Branch Canal; f) full lining down to water course level and the installation of water control and measuiing devices; and  3 g) construction of 7 storage tanks at augmentation tubewell locatdons to examine their efficacy in time of power failure. 6. General canal improvement works outside the Ambai, Intensive Block Development areas comprised the following: a) canal security works: to inhibit seepage and erosion by selectively lining the main and branch canals; b) canal capacity works: to upgrade about 114 km of existing water courses to minor canal status and about 176 km of disuibutary and minor canals with increased capacides, together with improved head gates; c) canal control works: to install about 98 cross regulators, 7 escape structures, 21 bridges and 1375 chakl outlets; and d) aquatic weed control: to isolate breeding grounds from the main canals. 7. The drainage component was intended to continue works initiated under the Phase I project, and to relieve a further 4550 ha. Ravine arrestation was also a continuation of Phase I over a further 11,000 ha. Canalside plantation was a newly-introduced component, intended to prevent animals entering the canal, to reduce wind erosion, reduce evaporation from canals, and to provide fuelwood over a length of 420 km of major canal banks. 8 . The roads component was intended to improve project area communications by construction of 25 km of new macadam roads, the widening and strengthening of 68 km of macadam roads and of 183 km of black top roads, and ancillary structures. In addition to miscellaneous buildings for the Irrigation and Public Works Departnents, some 47 building complexes would be constructed throughout the project area for management, operation and maintenance staff. 9. The project c.st for the Phase II tize slice was estimated at Rs. 556 million (US$ 61.8 million). Detailed component costs are shown in Table 5A. -roject Design and Organization 10. The overall project concept was appropriate to the development requirements and the need to improve equity of supply to project beneficiaries. It was a logical continuation of Phase I. While the canal control works, canal capacity works, canal security works, weed control and drainage, were all routine upgrading/improvement operations, the Ambah Intensive Block Development was extremely innovative with respect to augmentation tubewells, level top canals, and automatic gates. The canal and chak improvement works were to be to standards already developed in northwest India. Other ancillary components, including road improvements, buildings, studies and training were all infrastructural/support elements to raise project efficiency and to provide institutional improvements. I a "chak" is the lowest echelon in the system, commonly a 40 ha block, served by a network of water courses and field channels and operated by the beneficiaries.  4 11. 'Ihe project management structure, with the Ay-^ut Department as the leadl agency for the Government of Madhya Pradesh (GOMP), was prescr;bed by current and still existing GOMP organization, and the project was framed around this structure.This same project inmanagement structure worked reasonably well during the execution of the first phase of the project. However, many of the difficulties experienced ;n the Phase II project may be directly ascribed to the weakness of the systeia where the Ayacut Department had under its direction units fiom four major departments (Irrigation, Agriculture, Forestry and Public Works Departments). This situation resulted in a complex management structure, with staff nominally responsible to the command area development authoiity (CADA) but with their careei strulcture in another. It would kave been more appropriate for the Irrigation Depurtment to have been charg.d with irrigation and drainage works, for the Public Works Department to have been responsible for roads and buildings, and the Ayacut Department to have been in charge of conservation activities, infiastructural development and studies. Other states have successfully assigned each specialty within a command area to the appropriate line agency, with specified procedures for coordinadon. In general, this latter structure was less dependent upon the individuials concerned. 12. Except for the integration of groundviater component, the project could have benefitted if more time was allowed for preparation. The feasibility of groundwater development was based on inadequate information on groundwater quality presented to the appraisal mission which was not critically examined by the mission and which resulted ini implementation delays. Reasons for concern about preparation are: a) The project envisaged introduction of sophisticated "level-top" canal operation procedures which required highly responsive gates and operations procedures, which proved inappropriate to local conditions, and required either liniited trials in a pilot area, or a far more detailed analytical basis for wider introduction. In consequence, this central innovative element of the project was unsucc?ssful and also resulted in delays in implementation.2 b) In continuation of (a) above, NEYRPIC gates were specified to be installed in distributarv 33R of the Ambah Branch Canal for demonstration purposes, but at appraisal (Annex 7 para. 8 of the SAR) these were found to be too radical to be introduced on a project scale. It was also determined during implementation that importation of said gates were not feasible, and that they were unlikely to be manufactured in India due to objections from the manufacturers and for licence/patent reasons. c) 40,000 ha specified for augmentation tubewells were not carefully reviewed for groundwater quality. 16,000 ha area in the Ambah Branch Canal in the Bhind area had to be abandoned due to high salir :ty. And only after further investigation was the second augmentation tubewell area transfeiTed to the Bhind Main Canal. d) Based on a 1985 Landsat interpretation, waterlogging was a problem in areas covering about 30,000 ha (about 9% of the command area). However, only 4550 2GOMP noted that it was at the Bank's recommendation that they agreed to electrically- operated gates to provide uninterrupted supplies during shut-down periods. They considered this to be too sophisticated for this type of operation. However, GOMP failed to come up with a suitable alternative. At project closing, the test model installed by the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi ha zI not been successfully demonstrated.  5 ha of drainage was included in Phase 11. It is likely that the area was marginally smaller in 1980 at appraisal. However, the probletmi must have been well known to the Agriculture Department at that time. In addition, field inspection would have indicated how much dtterioration due to lack of maintenance had occurred on drains constructed in Phase 1. e) The canal service road improvement component was not included at project appraisal, though earlier identified. This was surprising in a project more concerned with impro' ig operation and mainitenianice than with construction, withiout which maintt,. . Bwould have been inhibited during the monsoon season. The component was suu... .uently added with Bank agreemenlt. f) Funding of the training facilities was not included at initial project idendfication and preparation, although it had been considered at appraisal. Following GOMP recommendation, the Bank subsequently agreed to inclusion of this component in September i983, a delay which was partly responsible for its slow development. 13. The two most positive aspects of the project were the installation of augmentadon tubewells and the formation of the Project Monitoring Unit (PMU). Due to power availability in Madhya Pradesh, the augmentatior. tubewvei. had, under the project, improved production at canal tail areas. The PMU had carnied out excellent monitoring and evaluation to assist project management and state agricultural planners to improve project operation, and to draw conclusions generally on the operation of projects of this type. 14. The project is served by one major dam and three minor dams in Madhya Pradesh, and two major dams and a barrage in Rajasthan. The Bank's operational guidelines required independent review of the safety aspects of all dams serving the project. Given the age of some of these structures (several were built in the early part of the century), preparation and appraisal did not place adequate emphasis on their condition. It took Bank supervision missions until March 1987 to persuade the Irrigation Department of GOMP to take positive action in ensuring the safety of the structures. 15. The appraisal of the project was less than satisfactory: a central aspect of the project (the advanced canal operation proposals) was poorly analyzed; the groundwater resource for augmentation wells was not critically assessed and subsequently proved to be problematic; and the proposal to introduce rotational water supply system was not understood or not supported by the Borrower. This background affected implementation, which in any case was not smooth, by adding uncertainties, revisions, and the basis for disputes. GOMi had commented that the advice received from Bank's supervision missions was not always consistent, causing further delays and confusion. However, the extent of reformulation requlired during execution presented supervision staff with problems and issues to resolve. While the appraisal process was not as detailed as it should have been, it was inevitably limited by the inadequacy of the preparation work available to the appraisal staff. Project Implementation 16. Table 8B indicates that at no time did the project rise above 2/1 rating (under the old rating system), and, between January 1985 and February 1987, it was close to being a "problem project." Thereafter, in response to stable and positive management, it improved significantly until mid-1988 when it commenced a further decline, only to be rated by the final supervision mission as a "problem project" in February 1989. Two major reasons for the decline are:  6 a) inhetent weakness of the Ayacut Department's ability to control the activities of strong line agencies; and b) frequent changes in management of both the Ayacut Department and Chambal Command Area Development Authority and associated project staff. 17. Partly as a result of the somewhat complex management and funding structure of the project, the paradoxical situation arose in several financial years where unit managers complained of shertages of funds, yet at the end of the fiscal year unutilized funds were returned to GOMP. In addition, staff responsible for the dam safety and quality control aspects of the project, felt that due to the management structure. they were unable to impose their authoaity in the project which was controlled by another department. Without Bank intervention, this would have had serious consequences instead of just being a cause for delays. 18. Table 7 shows that project covenants were generaily complied with satisfactorily, with the exception of those pertaining to funding, studies, rotational water supply3, and submission of audit reports. Project Results 19. Project physical achievements are shown in Table 4. Canal security works, canal capacity works and aquatic weed control works almost reached revised targets. Canal control works on the other hand fell seriously short of their targets. This last component is esseniial to better canal operation on which the project rationale is based and therefore has serious implications. Ancillary components had mixed results in that drainage, buildings, telecommunications, and aerial seeding (ravine arrestation) almost reached or exceeded their targets, whereas roads and training facilities fell short significantly. 20. In the Ambah Intensive Block Development, most components fell significantly below revised targets. In the case of augmentation tubewells, this was due to the need to relocate 71 units from Bhind area of the Ambah Branch Canal to the Bhind Main Canal command due to salinity. Water course lining has achieved dismal results due to indecision by the Irrigation Department on designs and materials4, and to procurement delays. Indeed during the February 1989 supervision mission, it was learned that the project had unilaterally decided to halt further works due to high costs. However, it was fully demonstrated during the drought year of 1988 that the 103 augmentation tubewells now operational in 33R command of the Ambah Branch Canal provided considerable irrigation potential and helped to maintain irrigation supplies. 21. The Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI) had initially been intended for locadon either at Gwalior or Raip?ir. Following GOMP request, the Bank agreed to relocation of WALMI to a central location at Bhopal to serve the State more easily, provided a project training 3This project objective was consistently resisted by GOMP, and as a result there were problems with the definition of the appropriate infrastructure. While GONlIP has noted that this caused delays in execution, it was in fact resistance to an agreed project concept. 4GOMP notes that changes by the Bank in the specifications of materials allowed for lining led to delays in this component: this is true, but the changes were an attempt to improve on the quality of works, which were unacceptably poor based on the original standards.  7 center (PTC) was established in the project area to satisfy project needs. WALMI was subsequently funded under the nationwide USAID program, and funding was deleted from the Credit. To date only temporary premiises exist for demonstration farms. There are still no PTC facilities at Morena to cater for project training requirements, although they are soon to be constructed in the Commissioner's Complex. While WALMI, Bhopal has followed a highly ambitious and successful training program, the programs at the proposed PTC facilities could not be organized due to delays in completion of infrastructure. However, training programs were temporarily conducted at the Agricultural Farm in Morena for departmental field staff and farmers. 22. Dam safety requirements were neglected by the Irrigation Department until they were made stringent conditions for the first Credit extension in March 1987. As a result, GOMP caused its Dam Safety Review Panel (DIRP) to inspect all project related dams in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Emerging from these reviews were recommendation for remedial works on the major dams and barrage well upstream of the project. With respect to Pagara, Kotwal and Pillowa dams within the project area, the Irrigation Department carried out all site investigations and studies recommended by the DRP in a competent and diligent manner, such that an approved detailed program of remedial measures on each dam had been developed. GOMP has committed to carry out these works. The positive, albeit dclayed, studies leading to a firm program for upgrading these dams is a major success for the project. 23. Project costs are shown in Table 5A. From a time slice target of Rs. 556.3 million (US$ 61.8 million), actual expenditure at the final closing date of March 31, 1989 amounted to Rs. 707.2 million (US$ 45.6 million), with an estimated additional Rs. 375.6 million (US$ 24.2 million) required to complete outstanding works prescribed under the time slice. This gives a revised project cost estimate of Rs. 1082.8 million (US$ 69.8 million). Some of the reasons for an almost doubling of project costs when actual prescribed q~.antities were in general reduced were: inadequacy of cost estimates due to out of date unit rates and inaccurate quantities, increase in labor and materials cost, and rise in establishment costs as a result of the two-year credit extension. 24. In common with many other projects in India, studies were in general very delayed. Table 6C describes these fully. Studies under the direction of the PMU concerning project monitoring, and those under the direction of the Irrigation Department on dam safety, were well-executed. The Management and Maintenance Study which was awarded in June 1987, was suspended soon after initiation due to funding problems. The Water Resources and Management Study was awarded in June 1988. The study of the operation of NEYRPIC automatic gates was not possible as the project imported only one gate instead of several as intended. The study of an electrically- controlled gate was commenced after its installation in December 1988. In short, a most disappointing record in a project designed to consider improved water management above all other aspects. 25. The major impact of the project has been the successful integration of public sector tubewells into a canal irrigation project. Although it is still too early to quantify the impact of this component, continued irrigation in areas served during the drought of 1988 is clear evidence of their contribution as indicated in Table 9B. Since project inception, the improvement in reliability of power for the augmentation tubewells has meant that the level top principle is no longer important, in that pumping can reliably be made to coincide with canal releases. Indeed, in the relocated augmentation tubewells in the Bhind Main Canal area, level top earthworks will not be required. Another variation in this area is that the augmentation tubewells are situated such that should farners on each minor canal form responsible and accountable cooperatives, the auginentation tubewells would be handed over to them for operadon and maintenance, and possibly for running costs payment. This is a most important experiment, which could have far-  8 reaching results in India. 26. The Chambal Irigation System and the Chambal Inrigation Project have contributed significantly to poverty-reduction and social improvement in the project area through increased availabili.y of water for irrigation. This is especially true for the tail end areas previously so tenuously supplied with water. The major adverse effect has been the large built-up of water logging, which, if not corrected, will worsen. 27. The results of the project must also be considered in the broader perspective of the Chambal Irrigation System operation, which should not be considered totally in conjunction with improvements under Chambal Irrigation Project. The objective of the project was to progress from about 188,000 ha irigated (aggregate of two seasons) in the late 1970s to 221,000 ha at the end of the current project. However, reference to Table 9A shows that there has instead been a decline to 124,000 ha in 1982/83, followed by a gradual rise again to over 169,000 ha during 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89. The reasons for this disappointing achievement are excessive diversion to powerful groups at the head end of the system, erratic supplies released at the Rajasthan/Madhya Pradesh border at Parvatti aqueduct, (as shown in Table 11), and inappropriate canal operation. Thus, by this criterion, the project has not been a success. However, yields over the same period have dramatically increased as shown in Table 10. This increase was due to increased use of fertilizer, improved agricultural extension, and in places, improved water reliability. Indeed, Chambal is considered to have one of the highest yields of crops in the entire State. 28. Reference to Tables 6A and 6B shows benefits derived from the project. Direct benefits in Table 6A show a marked rise at the projected full development of 250,000 ha compared with appraisal estimates. Table 6B shows the project's economic impact. The recalculated ERR for the project as a whole was 10.3% compared to 35% estimated at appraisal for a total project area of 221,000 ha. For the Ambah Intensive Block Development the recalculated ERR was 24.7 for a revised area of 35,000 ha compared with 34% estimated at appraisal for 40,000 ha. For the remaining command area due to canal and other improvements, the recalculated ERR was 7.9 for a revised area of 186,000 ha compared with 35% estimated at appraisal for 181,000 ha. The decline in ERRs was mainly due to cost overruns, delayed benefits, and decline in economic prices of some commodities. Project Sustainability 29. The project works, if adequately maintained, are likely to yield continued benefits. This is contingent on all outstanding prescribed works being completed under State funding. A major concern is the ominous development of waterlogging and consequent salinity, which would develop into the serious "usar land" (wasteland) problem similar to that in neighboring Uttar Pradesh. It is urgent that GOMP attends to the neglected drainage of the area to prevent environmental problems. Bank's P ance 30. The Bank should have allowed more time for GOMP to prepare the project, as evidenced by the groundwater quality in Bhind area the Ambah Branch Canal and the increase in project costs. Although the Ambah Intensive Block Development was the most important component, it was undoubtedly over-imaginative and non-replicable with respect to automatic controls. Drainage estimates were seriously below requirements. 31. As Table 8B shows there was an almost total absence of agriculture input in project  supervision up until early 1985, when the multi-discipline task force concept was introduced by the Bank's Agriculture Unit in New Delhi. Thereafter, all the required disciplines were involved in project supervision. Partly as a result of this, perfoimance ratings improved. Its later decline was due entirely to project management deterioration, which the Bank clearly pointed out but with negligible effect. It was only at the first Credit extension that the Bank was able to persuade GOMP to tackle the drainage problem pragmatically, to initiate the two major water resource and management studies, and to initiate serious dam safety studies. On the subject of water management training, the Bank provided technical assistance. Borrower's Performance 32. The project's performance was satisfactory under the following components: monitoring and evaluation (due to a well-managed and staffed PMU), augmentation tubewell installation, canal security and capacity works, and ravine arrestation. However, except between 1986 and 1987 when progress was reasonably satisfactory, the performance of project management and the component units (with certain exceptions) was below optimum resulting in delays in filling staff vacancies, equipment procurement, and construction, and delays in carrying out studies and dam safety activities, and confused financial allocation to component units. This is not a criticism of individual performance, but rather of the weakness of the project institution. Project Relationship 33. Personal and professional relationships between Bank and Borrower's staff were always cordial. GOMP without exception provided promptly project data requested by the Bank. Consulting and Support Services 34. The following government organizations, acting as consultants, undertook the following project-financed studies: a) Water Resources and - Central Water and Power Research Station Management Study (CWPRS), Pune in Association with Water and Power Consultant Services (WAPCOS). b) Management and - WALMI, Bhopal Maintenance Study c) Dam Safety Study - Central Soils and Materials Research Station (CSMRS), Delhi and Central Water Commission (CWC). d) Canal Bank Road Study - Central Road Research Institute (CRRI), Delhi 35. All project construction was undertaken by contractors. Watercourse lining and road construction works, also carried out by contractors, were of substandard quality, and action is being taken by GOMP to improve quality of works.  10 Project Documention and Data 36. The SAR with its supplemental data volume were detailed with respect to institutional, management and technical aspects, and provided Bank staff with adequate guidance on the project's development and its components as intended at appraisal. 37. As noted above, the PMU carnied out exemplary work in reporting, monitoring and evaluation which were of high standard. GOMP's project staff prepared data required for the project completion report.  11 PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  12 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Comments on Bank's Review Contained in Part I -