Tanzania - Third Technical Assistance Project

Documeiit of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Repot No.8322 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1206-TA) JANUARY 12, 1990 Agriculture Operations Division Southern Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY Nams of Currency Tanzania Shilling Currency Exchange Rate 1982 US$ 1.00 - TSh 9.56667 1983 US$ 1.00 = TSh 12.4565 1984 US$ 1.00 = TSh 18.101 1985 US$ 1.00 = TSh 16.939 1986 US$ 1.00 = TSh 51.7189 1987 US$ 1.00 = TSh 83.7174 Average for IDA Disbursements US$ 1.00 - TSh 32.09 Follow-on Project : None FIScAL YEAR July 1 - June 3n  FOR OMCAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.SA. YVES ROVANI Opratim Etuallon January 12, 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on United Republic of Tanzania Third Technical Assistance Proiect (Credit 1206-TA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Ur'ted Republic of Tanzania - Third Technical Assistance Project (Credit 1206-TA)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by fecipients only in the perfiormance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OMCAL USE ONLY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AD Agricultural Division of the MALD ASP Agricultural Sector and Policy Analysis Unit of the SPA, PMD, MALD BET Board of External Trade BOT Bank of Tanzania CAT Coffee Authority of Tanzania (replaced by TCMB-Coffee in mid 1985) CATA Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania (replaced by TCMB- Cashewnut in October 1985) CDC Commonwealth Development Corporation CFTC Commonwealth Fund for Technical Corporation CPES Crop Production and Extension Services of the Agricultural Division of the MAID (replaced the Directorate of Extension and Technical Services in mid 1985) DCA Development Credit Agreement DETS Directorate of Extension and Technical Services of the MOA (replaced by the CPES in mid 1985) DEVPLAN Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (merged with the Ministry of Finance in April 1985) EAC External Assistance and Cooperation Unit of the SPA, PMD, MALD ECGA Eastern Cotton Growing Area GAPEX General Agricultural Products Export Corporation (liquidated early .1987) IDA International Development Association of the World Bank IMF International Monetary Fund LIDA Tanzania Livestock Development Authority MALD Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (replaced MOA in April 1985) MATI MALD Training Institute MDB Marketing Development Bureau of the PMD, MALD MOA Ministry of Agriculture (replaced by the MALD in April 1985) MOPROCO Multipurpose Oilseed Processing Company (subsidiary of the TCMB-Cotton) NAFCO National Agricultural and Food Corporation NASACO National Shipping Agencies Co. Ltd. NBC National Bank of Commerce NMC National Milling Corporation NPC National Price Commission PMD Planning and Marketing Division of the MAID PMO Prime Minister's Office PPMB Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau of the PMD, MALD RADO Reiional Agricultural Development Officer This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance  SAP Structural Adjustment Programme SDR Special DRawing Rights Currency Unit SFM Statistics & Farm Management Unit of the SPA, PMD, MAD SPA Sectoral Planning Section for Agriculture of the PMD, MALD (replaced the SPC in mid 1985, SPC Sectoral Planning and Control Section for Agriculture of the PMD of the MOA (replaced by the SPA in mid 1985) SPL Sectoral Planning Section for Livestock of the PMD, MALD (established in mid 1985) TAMG Technical Assistance Advisory Committee TAC Tanzania Audit Corporation TAG Tanzania Advisory Group TALIRO Tanzania Livestock Research Organization TANITA Tanzania and Italian Cashewnut Processing Company TAiWSEED Tanzania Seed Company TARO Tanzania Agricultural Research Organization TAT Tobacco Authority of Tanzania TCA Tanzania Cotton Authority (replaced by the TCMB- Cotton in mid 1985) TCMB Tanzania Cashewnut Marketing Board (replaced CATA in (Cashew) October 1985) TCMB Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board (replaced (Coffee) CAT in mid 1985) TCMB Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board (replaced (Cotton) TCA in mid 1985) TOSCA Tanzania Official Seed Certification Agency TPB Tanganyika Pyrethrum Board TPRI Tanzania Pesticide Research Institute TTPC Tanzania Tobacco Processing Company (merged with TAT in mid 1985 to form TTPMB) TTPMB Tanzania Tobacco Processing and MNrketing Board (replaced TAT and TTPC in mid 1985) Treasury Ministry of Finance (merged with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs in April 1985) TSA Tanzania Sisal Authority TTA Tanzania Tea Authority TTB Tanwania Tea Blenders Co. Ltd. (subsidiary of the TTA) UAC Uyole Agricultural Centre Viwanda Ministry of Industries and Trade WCGA Western Cotton Growing Area  PROJECT COPLETION REPORT UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1206-TA) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ BASIC DATA SHEETo....................................... i EVALUATION SUMKARYo.................*o.................... i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT 1I. Project Identification, Preparation end AppraeAl... 4 XIll. Implementationo ........................... ..... ooo....... o.... lO IV. Operating Performance ..... .. .. ...... . . ... . ............ ..... 14 A . Concluslonsbu.mnsEpedtrst end.................. 19 ANNEXt Disbursements/Expenditures to end 1987 .....,000........................... 21  UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1206-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Third Technical Assistance Project in Tanzania for which Credit 1206-TA in the amount of US$12 million was approved on February 9, 1982. The Credit was closed on June 30, 1988, one year behind schedule. The PCR was prepared by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) for the Government and submitted to IDA by the Government. Completion reports for five subprojects (including a long, detailed one by the FAO for subproject UTF/URT/0641URT) were also prepared. These are on file with, and available from OED. The Evaluation Summary, which includes field observations and comments as well as a swmry, was prepared by the Technical Department of the Africa Regional Office in close collaboration with the Agriculture Operatiens Diviecn; S,uthern Africa Departmont, Africa Regional Office. This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and sent to the Borrower for comments. No comments were received.  -i1 - UNITED REPTBLIC OF TANZANIA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1206-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIC DATA SHRET Actual Appraisal as a 2 of toy Project Data stimate Actual Estimate Credit Number 1206-TA Project Identification Date - 10/80 Total Project Cott (SDR M) 12.5 _* _* Credit Amount (SDR M) 10.2 10.199 99.9 2 Overrun Amount Disbursed (SDR M) 10.2 10.199 99.9 Aount Cancelled (SDR M) - 0.001 0.01 Outstanding - 10.199 99.9 Date Physical Components Completed 06/87 12/88 Time Overrun (C) - 18 months 20 Proportion then Completed 1002 1002 Economic Rate of Return N/A N/A N/A Financial Rate of Return N/A N/A N/A Financial Performance - Satisfactory TI%stitutional Performance - Satisfactory Imvortant Data First Mention in Files 03/80 Appraisal No appraisal mission Negotiations 12/23/81 Board Approval 02/09/82 Signing of Credit Agreement 03/04/82 Effectiveness 04101/82 Date of Budget Revision Several Closing 06130/87 06/30/88 Other Proiect Data Borrower I Governmnt of Tanzania Ezecutipg.Agencies I PAO, TSMC, CDC *Records of expenditures by the Government are inadequate to determine what its contribution actually was. STAF lIJPT (Staff weeksI S1 82 88 84 85 88 87 8 Total Appraisal .4 16.7 - - - - - - 17.0 Negotiation - 6.7 - - - - - - 6.7 Supervision - -8.6 7.0 4.0 8.1 8.2 14.8 2.2 47.4 TfTAL .4 29.0 7.6 4.0 9.1 8.2 14.8 232 76.1  Mission Data: 2/ Date No. of Mandays Specialization Report Performance (Mo/Yr) Persons in Field Retresented (1) Date PAting Identif. (Continuous, following TA II Project - see Overview, para 5) Prepar. (Continuous, through discussions between the Government and IDA) Appraisal (As desk work, shared by the Programs and Projects Divisions) Spn.I 6/82 1 5 (a) 06/29/82 N/A Sup. II 2/82 1 6 (a) 03/03/83 2 Sup. III 7/83 1 5 (c) 07/11/83 2 Sup. IV 12/83 1 2 (d) 02112/84 2 Sup. V 7/84 1 15 (c; 08/17/84 2 Sup. VI 2/85 1 7 tc) 03/20/85 2 Sup. VII 7/85 1 7 (c) 08/26/85 2 Sup. VIIIlZ85 1 * (c) 12120/85 2 Sup. lX 4/86 1 4 (a) 07/10/86 2 Sup. X 6/87 1 3 (e) 06/19/87 2 PCR 8/88 1 18 (f) 04/10189 N/A ,1) a - Economist; b - Agriculturalist; c - Agriculturalist Economist; (d) - Loan Officer; (e) Agr. Credit Specialist; tf) - Agr. Education Specialist. (2) Often combined with other mission work. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (SDR) Estimated Actual Estimated/Actual (X) FY82/83 0.85 1.702 210 7Y83/84 2.98 2.129 71 FY84185 7.23 4.634 64 FY85186 9.35 7.034 75 FY86/87 10.20 9.039 89 FY87/88 - 10.199 100  - iv UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1206-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY I. PROJECT IDENTIFIC..TION. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 1. This project was identified by an IDA mission in October, 1980, subsequent to a visit to Tanzania by a World Bank Economic Miasion in March and June, 1980. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) provided SDR 10.2 million, equivalent at the time to US$12 million, and the Government the equivalent of US$3 million in Tanzanian Shillings. These funds were used to provide (a) technical assistance to strengthen the Government's capacity to implement agricultural policies, (b) technical assistance to prepare a short and medium term economic recovery program and to implement follow-up mec 2 res, and (c) training for staff employed primarily in the agricultural ais . '7. 2. The benefitting institutions included: the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (HALD); (b) eight. agricultural parastatals; and (c) other selecced agencies, namely Board of External Trade and National Price C ission. In addition, the Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG), which had been establishment earlier to assist the Government in formulating a structural adjustment program for economic recovery, received complementary financing from project funds. The project ultimately financ6d costs in three areas, namely: (a) 38 long-term adivsor posts and short-term consultancies and support services for 20 Government institutions and subsidiaries in 10 different locations in Tanzanial/I (b) training of staff, including a total of 111 fellowships abroad, in-service training when counterparts were available, and various local workshops and seminars2/: and (c) vehicles, office equipment, computers and supplies- -along with related services--worth SDR770,000. See Table 1 for a summary. 3. The project was an outgrowth of a small-scale operation which had been initiated by the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) in cooperation with Tanzania Seed Com-rany (TANSEED). With funding under the project, CDC had hoped to continue its ongoing operation and possibly to act as executing agency. However, the Government, while retaining three CDC advisers, decided that FAO and a special Technical Assistance Advisory Committee (TMC)manage the project funds. Agreements required in this situation, along with the changes project administration which occurred, caused delays in starting the project. 1/ Annex 2: pp. 62-65; Annex 3: pp. 1-2; p. 16; 2/ Annex 2: pp. 68-81;  v 4. The project preparation and appraisal differed from the usual approach. The main project document, the President's Report, was based on the Government's requesu for assistance and detailed discussions with IDA and the concerned agencies in Tanzania, and no separate appraisal report was prepared. The President's Report provided a framework for the project and the appraisal could be regarded as a continuous exercise with adjustments made from t'me to time as part of tha tripatrite reviews conducted by IDA, GOT, and FAO, as well as by the periodic supervisions conducted by IDA staff. However, a number of issues which should have been resolved at the preparation and appraisal phases remained pending and contributed to the slow pace in the early stages of project implementation. These were: (a) establishment of a central coordinating unit responsible for monitoring project progress and liaising between the Government institutions and participating outside agencies (i.e., IDA, FAO, and CDC); (b) the establishment of Technical Assistance Advisory Committee; (c) preparation of more elaborate and specific job descriptions for the identified Technical Assistance (TA) personnel positions; and (d) preparation of sound technical procedures for initiatirag the project operations and technical and financial mechanisms for reporting. In addition, the standard appraisal procedure could have tackled such shortcomings as the necessity to provide supporting resources to TA staff under the project (e.g., tools and raw materials to the staff in engineering posts and use 1if local and regional training institutions for fellowships instead of sending all the candidates overseas). Likewise, some of the TA coneultent positions could have bn fi illed by local/regional consultants or firms. Procurement procedures used by FAO, CDC, and TMAC should have been the same; in fact, it would probably have been better if all the project activities had been coordinated by one executing agency, thereby avoiding or minimizing piecemeal handling of funds and other complications, e.g., those related to exchange rate fluctuations between SDR and other currencies and the resulting problems in maintaining an overall record on project finances. As it was, these constraints had to be gradually removed as the project gained maturity and experience. II. IMPLEMENTATION 5. The project was implemented as four components. There were three main components, namely: (a) the FAO Trust Fund Project (UTF/URT/064/URT) consisting of fellowships, consultant services, and equipment; (b) the CDC/TANSEED component, consisting of equipment and consultant services; and (c) the TAAC component, consisting of consultant services and overseas training. In addition, and partly prior to the project effectiveness, the Tanzania Advisory Group mission was financed from the project funds (details in PCR; para 3.09 and appendices A and B). 6. Implementation of the project started effectively a year later than provided for in DCA. The main reasons for the delay included: (a) the 8 months that the establishment of TAAC required; (b) the time required to make an agreement with FAO as the main implementing agency; and 'c) lack of coordination among the implementing agencies FAO, TAAC, and CDC oa administrative procedures required by the project.  - vi - 7. This preject was different from most other technical assistance projects in that it iocussed on strengthening institutions in many locations throughout the country. Commonly, technical assistance efforts aiming at institutional building focus on strengthening of the management capacity at the central level, sometimes extending to a few branches of subsidiaries outside the headquarters. A typical example is the ongoing Bank-assisted Fourth Technical Assistance Project in Tanzania which supports two central organizations. The aim of tne Third Technical Assistance Project was to meet the management improvement needs in 20 different departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Developm,at (MALD), perastatal agencies, or their subsidiaries scattered over 10 different locations in the country. Fxthermore, each of the 20 institutions or units had diverse management and training problems. Such diversity required a uniqws: (tailor-made) approach to each situation. There was no particular ad'antage to be gained from a teaw effort and complementarity. Finding suitable experts for the variety of posts and the effective deployment of these experts was a demanding challenge for the executing agencies of the project. 8. On the other hand, there were positive factors which helped the project succeed. These included: (a) the timely and appropriate response by IDA to the adjustments needed in the original plan; (b) the increased frequency of IDA supervision, especially during the advanced phase; (c) the genifna efforts bv the Government in oroviding support to the proiect's Administrative/Operation Officer; (d) vigorous efforts by the Government to identify counterparts; and (e) FAO-administered project taking over--with the Government approval--much of the administration and monitoring of other project components, thereby providing the project implementation with a mush needed coherence. III. OPEPATING PERFORMANCE AND LONGER TERM IMPACT (SUSTAINABILITY) 9. FAO was responsible for about 75 percent of tie project (FAO's UTFIURT/064/URT); the Commonwealth Development Corporsiion (CDC) was responsible for the CDCITANSEED component (3 advisors); and the TAAC was responsible for the 'supplementary' components (assistance to units other than MALD, but including the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania and the Tanzania Livestock Development Authority (Table 1). Except for FAO's subproject, progress reporting was irregular, mainly because the required procedures were ambiguous and had not been planned in advance (para 4). The approach of the project was to upgrado the operational skills in the benefitting institutions as a beneficiars-driven effort (requests for experts came from the benefitting institutions), and through the case by case deployment of individual technical assistance experts, the provision of the scientific equlpment and logistics, together with the training of selected Tanzanian staff. In general, the project exceeded the targets set in the credit documents (paras 12 to 17). The main operational shortcomings were administrative: delays in recruitment and procurement as well the failure by TAAC to prepare annual reports, accounts and audits for the supplementary tomponent as required by the DCA (Sections 3.05, 3.06, and 4.01).  - vii - 10. Almost a year and a half elapsed between project identification and its effectiveness. The operations under the largest subproject (FAO's) started late; the CDC and TAG components were already being implemented under anr earlier funded scheme up to August 1982, As mentioned, the establishment of the TMAC was delayed by 8 months. 11. Recruitment of the international consultants met with several delays under the FAO and TAAC subprojects because of the difficulties in agreeing on procedures. Such was not the case under the CDC subproject, however, as the incumbents under it were already placed through prior arrangement4. However, the project succeeded in providing 38 long- term experts and 13 short-term consultants to 29 different institutions, which was some 25 percent more than estimated at appraisal. 12. Counterpart recruitment proved equally difficult, despite a genuine effort made by the Government. Tanzanian accountants were especially difficult to recruit with the salary the Government could offer. In some cases, other qualified counterparts to work with the technical experts were unavailable in the Tanza.-_an market. The ideal approach for sustained development would be for local counterparts to work with technical assistance experts for enough time to gain on-the-job experience, to have their skills upgraded through further training, and to continue performing the task independently when the technical assistance experts phase out. At the initial phase, the technical assistance personnel often must play relatively strong participatory role (actually doing at least part of the work), but toward the end of their contract their advisory role must increase. Where fairly well qualified local counterparts were adequately available, the project was able to achieve its objectives in this respect. 13. In retrospect, the Government's view was that although the project experts have revised the operational standard of the institutions in which they were placed, engaging technical assistance personnel was not a satisfactory way of solving operational problems if there were no qualified counterparts to ultimately take over. However, in general, the Government's position is that, despite this shortcoming in a number of cases, the project was useful because (a) the parastatals have now adopted an improved accountancy system; (b) the sectoral planning capacity in MALD has improved; (c) procedures for collecting agricultural statistics and other data have been established; and (d) the financial managemen. and reporting procedures of the key parastatals have improved. 14. The overseas training programs were also affected by some delays in the beginning because the selection procedures were not specific and because it was not clear which body had the right to approve the training awards. These problems were solved once the FAO Administrator/Operation Officer was appointed, and the overall training program was a success with 111 fellowships abroad and several workshops arranged in Tanzania. The training of Tanzania nationals was arranged on a progressive basis with minimum disruptions to the ongoing operation. All the trainees returned to Tanzania. 15. Equipment procurement was carried out mainly through the FAO subproject and FAO procedures were used for procurement. These procedures  - viii - require central approval from Rome for most purchases and caused delays in some cases (e.g., in getting computers). However, except for delays, the importation of equipment and materials proceeded as planned. Because the Government's finances were inadequate and the procedures were sometimes cumbersome, procurement of locally purchased items and services presented some difficulties. 16. The Financial performance of the Project was satisfactory in terms of the IDA's disbursements and FAO's financial reporting. Numerous delays occurred because of different categorization by IDA and FAO of the disbursement items and the resulting problems in reconciling the accounts and statistics. All these were solved during the final two years of the project. The exercise initiated at the early stages to collect financial reports from each of the beneficiary institutions on their local contributions did not succeed, because of the difficulties of separating these contributions from other cost items in the accounts of these institutions. Because project costs had originally been over-estimated, it was possible to provide more experts and equipment under the project than had been projected at the project preparation stage. Overall, through several adjustments of plans and budgets over the project life, the total of the assigned funds of SDR 10,200,000 was utilized except for a minor balance that remained with FAO at the close of the project. (PCR, p. 21 and Annex 1). 17. The delays in commencing the operations were closely linked with the gaps left during the project preparation phase, as already indicated (para 4). These delays, and the original over-estimation of costs that allowed exceeding of the quantitative target, made an extension of the project's lifetime by one year inevitable. 18. Periodic adjustments in project design and disbursement categories were necessary because the actual needs of beneficiary institutions had not been well-defined during the project preparation stage and, in any event, changed over time. Other factors which warranted periodic assessments, reviews, and adjustments were the limited K availability of qualified counterparts, inadequate preparedness of the beneficiary institutions to effectively utilize project inputs, and the initial difficulties arising from the absence of a coordination mechanism for project execution. The adjustments were agreed upon at tripartite meetings between IDA, the Government, and FAO, as well as by IDA management following the main supervision missions. 19. Other adjust-ments also took place. The original Terms of Reference of the P:.oject Administrator did not include all the tasks which he needed to perform and therefore had to be modified. Likewise, there were inadequate procedural guidelines for the FAO Project Administrator to follow in preparing financial reports for the Government and IDA. Also, there were differences between the IDA and FAO international bidding procedures. On the final stages of the project, the FAO Project Administrator was allowed to use the FAO procedures for procurement. Government Views 20. The Government found the project helpful and, in spite of the constraints and delays experienced, successful in the end. The project had  - ix - a more positive impact on institution where qualified counterparts were made available. The Government made a genuine effort to help make this possible. These views were further substantiated by sample interviews which the IDA staff conducted at the benefitting institutions. For itstance, the officials of the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB) indicated that the project--througb its assistance to MALD's planning and statistical work--enhanced the MDB's operations. The project also improved the operationa' capacity of parastatals and their subsidiaries by updating the books and records and instituting new and improved systems. 21. In another example, the Director of the Research Institute of Tanzania Agricu'ltural Research Organization (TARO) in Ukiriguru indicated to IDA staff that TARO clearly benefitted from the services of the long- term "cotton breeder and agricultural extension officers" recruited under the project. Also, TARO benefitted from the short-term consultancies provided for cotton pest management.. The Director confirmed that the improvements introduced through consultancies and the overseas and local in-service training of the Tanzanian nationals, as well as the audiovisual equipmeat provided under the project, significantly enhanced TARO's operational efficiency. 22. The Government was also quick to point out certain shortcomings of the project. In one case, at least, the Government expressed the view that because it did not actively participate in the recruitment of the technical assistance personnel, it had little influence on the development of their attitudes and commitments. These attitudes and commitments of the staff were importart to the Government in so far as the political and cultural norms of the country were concerned. However, the Government also mentioned, that under this particular project, this shortcoming created no crisis. As for the counterparts, the Government expressed its intention to ensure that in the future the counterparts would assume the role of "central operators" from the outset, and the TA personnel would focus more on "grooming" and "backstopping". The Government insists that, whereas the TA personnel can have a greater participatory function during the initial stages, they must increasingly assume advisory role toward the end of their assignment (para. 12). It is extremely important that by the time the TA personnel phase out, the national counterparts are capable of assuming the leadership role so as to ensure continuity and sustainability. Overall Performance 23. Considering the multitude of constraints which the project encountered, especially during the initial and critical stages, the operating performance of the Government and IDA in implementing the Project was sound. The main factors which influenced project performance negatively were (a) lack of adequately detailed information on existing management strengths and weaknesses in benefitting an institution; (b) the absence of a project management unit and/or absence of a clearly designated coordinator for the project at the outset; and (c) complications which arose from a number of unresolved issues which needed attention at the earlier stages. The information needed about the benefitting institutions (point (a) above), was gradually obtained as project implementation progressed. The difficulties experienced due to the absence of a project coordinator during the initial stages (point (b) above), were reversed and, indeed, progress picked up momentum, once it was agreed that the FAO  -x - Project Administrator assume the responsibility for the overall coordination of the operation (later, his designation was changed to Operations Officer). The FAO Administrative Officer was only recruited in July 1983 (i.e, one and a half years after project start-up), and although he was charged with the coordination responsibilities only at a later stage, the project attained coherence and measurable success, and achieved its objectives. 1' Pact and Sustainability 24. The institutions which benefitted from the Third Technical Assistance Project were as many as 20. They were located at considerable distances from each other and each benefitting institution had a different set of needs. Thus, addressing the problems of all of them simultaneously was a complex and demanding task. In addition, because the technical assistance advisory staff operated as indiv44uals in different institutions, there was no advantage to be derived from a team effort as is common in similar projects. In fact, the resources made available formed more of a program than a project, and the usual means of measurment of project success--comparison of results with objectives and targets--is not very practical. Reportedly, the ongoing operational efficiency of the benefitting institutions is improving. Tanzanian specialists are now performing many of the tasks carried out by foreign experts during tte project. For instance, the sisal and cotton parastatals report satisfactory performance by the nationals. Likewise operations of the coffee and tobacco agencies are improving. For longer term the principal beneficiaries are the individuals who received training or worked alongside technical advisors. Whether the institutions initially benefitting will continue to benefit depends on whether services of that individuals can be maintained. This will require the adaption of better terms and conditions of employment as well as incentives for continued high level achievement. It is uncertain whether these conditions will be established in the timely fashion. LESSONS 25. The preparation and appraisal of the project were rather superficial (para 4), which in turn necessitated several periodic reviews and adjustments. Likewise, the three-way management approach of the project, as undertaken by IDA, FAO, and CDC independently during the earlier phase of project implementation, was not an efficient arrangement. The lack of timely and regular reporting for the "supp:ementary' component was a result of the lack of coordination and had a negative impact on the pace of earlier project execution. Despite these and other related constraints, the project managed to achieve its targets because of the beneficial factors (Para. 8) and an exceptionally energetic and persevering Administrative/Operation Officer of the largest component and the support of the supervising officer in MAWD. The project proved--as has been the case in many other projects--the overriding importance of having an excellent management team. 26. In retrospect, it would probably have been beneficial to consider local institutions and professionals for recruitment for some as technical assistance posts under the project. The Government is not able to hire them into its regular staff because of its salary constraints. Their  - xi - familiarity with the prevailing working environment in Tanzania would have been an advantage and could perhaps have accelerated project implementation. By the same token, sending some of the fellowship recipients to local or regional training institutions would have been more cost effective than sending them already. (However, their capacity and suitability was not reviewed during IDA PCR-mission.) In future project designs, these options should be explored. 27. The project execution would have been further enhanced had the staff, e.g., the engineers who worked under the TANSEED, been provided with the necessary tools, raw materials, and spare parts from the project funds. This need had not been anticipated at project preparation. 28. The weakness in reporting and providing financial data on the non-FAO components made it difficult to assess how these components performed. Despite the FAO Project Administrator's numerous efforts, and despite the IDA missions' repeated requests that such reports be made available, the issue remained unresolved. Formal coordination of all project activities by one person would probably have corrected the situation. Because reporting on the FAO-administerea component was good (although sometimes delayed because of FAO head office reviews), a line management/coordination arrangement would probably have improved these aspects. In general, implementation of a project component by a Government committee (in this case TAAC) without a permanent staff or secretariat, does not appear practical in the light of experiences of this project. 29. Since there were no bonding arrangements made to encourage the trainees to return to their respective sponsoring institutions, about 102 of the returnees were absorbed elsewhere. This level of 'defection' falls within the tolerance range of the GOT Civil Service and was, therefore, not a major issue. Although the return of as much as 90% of the trainees to their respective institutions appears satisfactory, the redeployment of the remaining 10% elsewhere did not benefit the sponsoring institutions (although, of course, the economy at large probably benefitted). 30. The project achieved its operational targets despite the difficulties mentioned earlier. More than 99 percent of the credit proceeds wiere disbursed. The readiness of the Government to request, and IDA to agree, to adjustments to the plans and budgets facilitated these results. 31. Except in a few cases, the work of the experts was highly appreciated by the Tanzanian authorities and they have indicated on various occasions their desire to have this type of assistance continue, e.g., as a TA V project. The results of the project--despite the initial delays and many problems during implementation--appear adequate to favor further projects of the same nature. In Tanzania's current development phase, there are numerous essential staff positions--many of them relating to promotion, planning, improvement of efficiency, and accelerated growth of organizations--for which experienced Tanzanian staff cann 'e found (or released from other equally important functions). These posts are scattered or form such small clusters that it is not feasible to form separate projects out of them. But the approach used should be regarded as a program rather than a project with definite objectives. A program would be less subject to criticism about poot coordination, difficulties in  -xii- measuring achievements, and so on. However, should the Government consider filling such positions in the parastatals through a future prL ram, the people should clearly concentrate on activities that help parastatals to perform functions that are suitable for them, 'such as development planning, research, regulatory functions, and quality control and similar activities. Within any future technical assistance program in Tanzania, the experts would need sufficient support, careful work planning, adequate supervision, and back up to be efficient in their work and be able to concentrate on essential tasks. This kind of support could be provided by a specially assigned senior Tanzanian officer or by a senior expatriate as a coordinating officer as happened during the latter part of this project.  Table 1 The Third Techilcal AssIstance Pro1ect Pro1ect Components and Ezuerts Recruited PAO-administered Supplementary Component Component CDC I x~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ II .I I I A. Long-Te IMALD ML |Plann1ng Industries MALD IALDI Advisers IO tarast. (UPC) (BET) HALD Parast. Parast. (38) (9) (16) (1) (4) (1) (6) (1) B. Short-Term Consultancies (4) (1) (8)* *The TAG - 3 Development Specialists plus 5 support Economists.  UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1206-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Agriculture to the backbone of the Tanzanian economy accounting for more than 801 of its exports' earnings, approximately 50Z of the Gross National Product, and providing the means of livelihood to about 907 of its populatlon of 21 million. Over the past 25 years the population's rate of growth hae been at an average of 3Z per anum. 1.02 Starting in the mid-1970'oa griculture, and in turn, eSports volum and earnlngs, suffered from a sharp decline with a contin suc down- ward trend, wbich has been attributed to several factors of varying impacts: the slack of real producer prices vi-a-avis world prices and domestlc costs; the sh rp upward aOve nt of food crops prices ln comparison to those of xport crops; the rising adminsltrative and marketing costs of the agricul- tural parastatals handling these crops and generally suffering from poor organization, inefficlent operations and inadequate financlal management; the Inadequacy of the foreign exchange allocation. to meet the requirements of the agricultural sector; the inadequate emphasis given to agricultura. research and extension; and specific euvironmental and inputs problems related directly to specific crops. 1.03 Consequently, in 1980, and In a major effort to deal with the economic difficulties suimarized above, the Government formulated an Export Rehabillation Prograne (ERP) which was introduced in April 1981, followed bj a wider National Economic Survival Program_. Both programes were aimed, among other objectives, at mobllizing ill possible resources to arrest the decline in the volume of agricultural production and exports. To assess the ERP and its detailed requirements, an IDA apprai&al mission visited Tanzania in October-November 1980 during which time a technical assistance project was identified in principal to help achieve the Programme's objectives.  -2- 1.04 The Project was envisaged to address several major issues covered by the EP and to contribute into resolving specific bottlenecks to increased agricultural production, and thereby axports, through effecting improvements in the financial controls and reporting procedures of key MOA parastatals, in the operations and maintenance of agricultural plants and processing machinery, in crop cultivation practices, and in the planning capacities of the MOA. Furthermore the Project was intended to render assistance to the Governmnt in preparing a Structural Adjustment Programe (SAP), and to advance staff performance, particularly in the agricultural sector. The technical assistance programe under the Project was to comprise of consul- tants in various disciplines to be assigned to a number of Government insti- tutions, of provisions for large scale overseas and ln-service training for staff, and of the suppl7 of essential equipment and transport facilities. 1.05 Following protracted negotitaUons *nd exchange of iossions between the Government and the MA, the latter approved the Project on 9 February 1982, and its Development Credit Agre_ment (DCA 1206-TA) was signed on 4 March of the s*o year. It became effective on 1 April from which date implementation was carried out ending In December 1987, following the e tXnsion of lts original completion date of end December 1986. Part of the proceeda however, were used retroactively to cover cost. related to the Project's preparation phase, and to those of an Advisory Group (TAG) which was assisting the Government ln preparing the above-mentioned SAP and whose services had already comenced in November 1981. The total foreign allocation of the DCA was SDR 10,200,000, then equivalent to approximately US $12,000,000, while the local contribution by the Government was estimated at the equivalent of US $3,000,000 In Tanzanian Shillings. 1.06 The more specific objectives of the DCA were: (a) To strengthen the Goverrment's capacity to implement agricultural policies end measures aimed at increasing the volume of agricultural production through a programe of technical assistance to the MOA. and to other Project beneficieries;  -3- () To prepere a short and medium term economic recovery plan through the provision of technical advisory services to Devplan, and to implemnt follow-up moasures related to the economic rocovery plan through the provision of technical assistance; (c) To provide training for staff inployed primarily in the agricul- tural sector, with special ephasis on the development of local ln-service skill improvement programes 1.07 For objectives (a) and (b) above, SDR 7,120,000 were allocated, objective (c) received an allocation of SDR 1,120,000 and the equipment component was allocated SD1 770,000. Out of the balance, SDR 170,000 were allocated for the Project's preparation costs and SDR 1,200,000 were left for future allocations. By the end of the Project more than 99% of the total bad been disbursed, although with substantial changes in the final allocations to the different components and as detailed in Annez 1. 1.08 From these objectives, more direct and elaborate ones were formulated prior to, and, in response to subsequent influences, after the sanctioning of the Project and which were relevant to the specific objec- tives and allocations of the individual posts coming under the consult- ants' services. Section II of the report covers the first category and Section III will detail the latter changes and modificatione. 1.09 In addition, several institutional changes also took place during the Project's execution leading to alterations in some of the original envisaged inputs, as will be detailed under Section III, while the Project's design Itself, covered under Section 1I, came short of addressing a number of factors which resulted in delays in an overall imediate implementation in part, and in part ln a somewhat limited achievement in some of the areas covered by the technical assistance.  4- II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATON, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.01 As already mentioned, the Project was first Identified in principal In October-November 1980 by an IDA appraisal alislon for the URP, and was recum"eded by the mission in December of the some year. 2.02 Stmiulg from the URP's objectives to eliminate or reduce the economic constraints facing TanzanLa and as suarized ln paragraph 1.02 above, the Project, as a progrape of technical assistance,was formulated by the Govriwut and jointly appralsed with the IDA until it was greed upon and the DCA aetioned. The bulk of the propgam was Intended to be delivered to the MA (for improved aprLcultural sector planning), and to Its major crops producing and exporting parastatals (for improved flnaenal operatios and reporting, engineering perforance and agricul- turaL cultivation practices), while the balance of the technical *dsist- ance prowesimo eovered the sezviceo of the TAG for Dewplan a a separate casonpnt, ad the rest comprlsed of staff training, equipment, and supplementary techical assistance to be identified at a later stage by tke TAAC which would also review the Project's execution 4ad progress. Per the DCA's terms the TAAC was to be established at not later than 30 June 1982, to be chaired by Treasury and to include the KOA, Devpln, Viwanda and the BST as members. The Coinittee was estabLished on 8 Narch 1983. 2.03 Following are the beneficeries and consultants' services originally agreed upon. The acronya in brackets stand for the institutions that were restructured or reorganized later during the Project's duration, and shall henceforth be used in this report. A. OA(HAULD) 1. SPC(SPA) 3 Agricultural Planning Economists; El 2. DETS(CPES): 1 Agricultural Planning Economist;  3. s 1 Accountant; 4. 1D 1 1Project Adinitrative Officer; 3. IPeaCtatale/lubeldiarees: 1. AO 1 ApScultural Produc:ou EoC at; 1 Accountant; 2. ?C&(?OS-Cotton) s 3 Accoutants; 2 #lemaical Ianncer; 1 Ginnwy Maintenance ntgiuew; 1 01 Hill Meintevrae Zineer; 2 AgScultraltets; 3. CAT(Scf fee) s 3 Accountants; 1 3.olv Engineer; 1 Coffee Processing Enlgneer; 4. i2 Accountants; 1 lehncl Engner; 1 held Machiner,- EgiLnee; SiSal Proceesing 3ng1er; 5. TWSUD 1 Seed Production Manager; 1 Agronomist; 1 hum Manaer; C. pIan 3 Develoment Speciallete for the TAG, supported by 5 coiomiesta.  In WAdtion a *uder of ehot-tei coultauCy sevtces were eavisaged but wera left for ftutw identIficatIon. 2.0& Subsequent to the esteUslment of the TAC other awe of sWppi emtax7 technica sdaitms wee establshbed covering pesializa. t11ime a instituatIos that bad bee left for mbh fetut. dent ifcs- ese, but hose f.tione wer closeoly lSed to the objective of the Project. aese weret A.~ ~~~~~ . : 1. TA_(TTPW) 1 Tobacco Agrom.Ist; 1 Internal Auditor; 1 Acfntma; 2. sDA/UcOO : 2 t2Accoutats; 3. SC Accosntsat; 5. 53? : 1 Accountant; 1 Trade Policy Adviser; 1 xPort Finance Adviser; 1 Market Information Adviser; C. UaC S 1 Acountant. 2.03 Apet fru these servies Identifted prior to ead after the DCW' sanctioning, the identificateo and uus titutional allocati(on of the two othew technical assistance InuIts of the project, I.. equipment ant training, wer left open.  -7- Despite the length o0 neptiatio med the mber of appraisl carred out, the Project's prpeatios did not aecamodate *11 the relevnt details, whether those pwrtainig to the Project's infrstructutr, or others related to subsequent delePmets whch Ve not completely uforesseable durin the preatory p_ae. Undoubtedly the mins of the Project in bedgetay tewms d In tears of the ovwerall alloatilons of the different categori of techical sstance, but we Lmprtant In terms of the caleity of the specialiatims that were to be provided or that were left for futur idetiflcatlon, In additlon to thc mier of the Govermnt ia:t e tut=ss lolved during thi phase, all contributed to suc shorteomig despite the prolonpd ansintom t srtaken to establish the te ical assistamcw sae * the beneficiary institutions. TSM os a factor that led to a sIX month delay In Ms_itting the Project pro pol following the UPs approwal and Its introductionin April 1961. 2.07 St my also be relevant to point out her, that subsequent rrng_siauts whie were agred upon ia June 1982 and offictally endored in January I983(but which were already envitsaed durlng this preparatory phase), entrasted the vbo'e project (cmept for 3 posts) ad m of ilts budget to AD without considering the allocattons for thee 3 posts nor for the supplmeatary techical assisetance lnuts, or even the cost of the TAG eervces, for which part paqment had alreay boe made under the Project. Thi isoue as rectified but not before mid 1983 with a substantial lose of tlm and efforts to complete Implesentation, arrangements. 2.08 No preset conditions were md e prior to the DCA' sainctlonng, ecet that mawures wro agreed upon to ewtAblimb the TAAC by 30 June 1982 (wbich was only doe tn Hareb 1983 as reported above ), the appointment of a Project Administrative Officer by the sme date (effected only ln July 1963), and the appointment of a Flanuecal nalyst for the PPK9 by 30 September 1982, wbich m*t no delays as the post had alrady been filled through another project intended to strengthen the PP1B.  2.0 Atta_Imet I to this reot (prepared prior to the PCR), and coverin the propacation and Implesmntation of the sub*equent FIA emponet of trut fi project UTIUT/O6/IT, attmpts to detail the major tisue that wwr eithe not fully covered or emitted durtig the Project' PC e tio d dign, ad the cous_qut operational problms. As ths c_onpnt w th ujo we under the Project, the effects wew corespendigly ot a maj Impact. Driefly, the" ioous wee: Ci) The cneclusion of the DC laror to tial vrifications of the tet to whch the eipient betecLies could fully utilixe scA te1d4ical MastaCeo a cM.lmnt It Wi th nsceMs"sa local Man- purer and ateral inpts. (Li) Th aewal chwarter of the individual job desriptim, and taim-settlment o c rtain prreqite . e- Qf de Iojets 'tant role with rad to theP a pending pet year accomnt, of the parstatals. (i1i) The loes thampletecoideration given to the then 4atwicated restnutuing of soee pwastatals Into maketing bards, or to identical on-going technteal assistae to .ieh peastatals by Othe aid ag""eni, both necessitating fundamsetal changes in the consltants' ervices later on. (10) The mn-provtison of atwrial/equip et allocations to the 9 enginerSing poets despite the infWror codition of the plants and the absence of such matrials locally * well as of the necesary foreign *echange for their purchae from abroad. (v) The absonce of a coherent echacnim for a propt and systematic utlllzation of the subtantial training allocations for oversea fellow- sbhip wads.  -9- (wi) The absence of details on futur financial reporting procedures, oan procureot mecbanisms, ad, particularly when this FAO component be,am operational, the incoiostnciles of administrative nd technical reportlng procedures tbht wer then established. (vll) The use of the 81 currency unit for establishing the DCA's budget, with constant xchange rate fluctuatiove In trms of the curenciles used for paqmnts, particularly the U $, ther*y not only prevenutng an accurate later montoring of actual versus planned disbursemoets, but also of the subsequent projections for the coeit- m_nts established throughut the Project. Mbreover, specially with the Project's long duration, serious difflculttes would have * zF"Xd m d such fluctuations been advrse to the SR value. 2.10 urtharmore had the WA condtione that the TAC was to be established prior to the Project's sanctioning, considerable delmay ii i1mp_tation could have bee evolded the sae argument applies to the fillng of the Project dinistrative Officer coordilation post, although mention Is warzanted here that the role of this post, which was later filled through the FAO, was not cler as far as to what its func- tions were to be outside the PAO component. This wa eventually clarified but at a much lter stage. The case with the Financial Analyst post for the PPIN was different as alreay reported (par. 2.08). 2.11 In s*ury, and based on Its plonned Inputs nd objectives, the Project was more of a program than a cbohrent project, comproisng 6sts of activities pwtly intended for long term institutional goals, and pWtly as an imediate remedy to production and eport bottlenecks. When viewed through th ERPs development objectlves, its identification went a long way ln concentrating on the right issues, but nelther Its propare- tion nor its appraisal or plans for Implementation were comprehensive enough to avoid the complicatlons that arose during Its implementation.  10 - 111. DfLDI" TION 3.01 Apt from the sorvces of the TAG which were already on- going when the Project's agreent was concluded La erech 1982, the start- up of techical assistace delivey did not cmmmese until August 1982 wben one pot for TANS= was filled through the CDC and that was 1 year before the CDC contract ew officially finlized. -The ne post wa not filled until Jun 1983 through the 1*O frm which date a gradual build up of inuts bega. The factors behd theme coa iderable delays wre various and proably can best be repoted through the manner in which the Project was ecuted. 3.02 Prior to the sanctioning of the DCa, the Goverament and the IDA Identified FAG as a pssible Iplemnting agency to handle the bulk of the Project, acept for the 3 pots identified for TASU, which wwe to be eusted to th CDC in view of its pst and cotiued uassstance to ths subsidiay, and ceept for the supimutay assistance that was to follow the establishment of the TAC. 3.03 Following furter ovr_omnt ad MD dlcussion that sub. sequently Included PAO, carried out in Nty - June 1962, draft agreements with the TAD ad the CDC ww prepard in June 1982 an wer eventually flnalilzd i Januay and in Augut 1983, at a foreign cost of US $11,885,60 and