Papua New Guinea - Agricultural Support Services Project

Document of T1he World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY R_pet No. 8552 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAPUA NEW GUINEA AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT (LOAN 2276-PNG) APRIL 24, 1990 Agrlculture Operations Division Country Department V Asia Regional Office ThW docmnt ha a rstictd dbtibuton and may be wed by recipie only in the perfonrane of theik ofMci dutie Its contents may not otherwie be disosed without World Bank authriation.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit - Kina (K) K 1 - US$1.30 US$1 K 0.77 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Kilogram (kg) - 2.20 pounds 1 metric ton (t) - 2.205 pounds 1 kilometer (km) " 0.62 miles 1 square kilometer (sq km) = 0.39 square miles 1 hectare (ha) - 2.47 acres GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ADB = Asian Development Bank ASSP = Agricultural Support Services Project CSIRO - Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Resear-.h Organization DAL - Department of Agriculture and Livestock DPI = Department of Primary Industry FAOICP 8 Food and Agricultural Organization/World Bank Cooperative Program MEU Monitoring and Evaluation Unit PCR - Project Completion Report PNG = Papua New Guinea PSC - Public Service Commission TTU = Transition.il Training Unit UNDP - United Nations Development Program FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  FOR OMFCA4L M OnLY THE WORLD BANK Wa*w%tof. D-C 20 41 USA Opwac.ai twv.e,t April 24, 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Papua New Guinea Agricultural Support Services ProDect (Loan 2276-PNG) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'Project Completion Report on Papua New Guinea Agricultural Support Services Project (Loan 2276-PNG)", prepared by the Asia Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a muc disibution nd may be used by scipists only in the petfonnmce of thir offcid dutis Its cwawts may .ot othew be disclosed without Woud Dak autiaw n  FOR OFFCIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAPUA NEW GUINEA AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT (LOAN 2276-PNG) TAZLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE *............................................. i EVALUATION SUMHARY ............. ............... ii PART I s PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identify .................................. 1 Background ......... ............................... 1 Project Objectives & Description ............... ... 1 Project Design & Organization ................. .... 3 Project Implementation ............................ 4 Project Results ....... ........................... 6 Project Sustainablity ...... ...................... . 7 Bank Performance ....... ...........................8 Borrower's Performance . ........................... 9 Consultants .............. .... ...... . . 9 Project Documentation & Data ... ................... 10 PART II X PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 11 PART III : STATISTICAL DATA 24 1 Table : Project Timetable ........................ 24 2 Table : Loan/Credit Disbursements .... ............. 25 3 Table s Project Implementation ................ ... 26 4 Table : Project Costs .... ........................ 27 5 Table : Project Financing ............. ............ 28 6 Table s Studies ..... *.*.................. ..... 29 7 Table t Status of Covenants ...................... 30 8 Table s Use of Bank Resources (a) Staff Input ....................................... 31 (b) Missions ... ......... ....... .......... MAP s IBRD 16740 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officW duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authotizstion.  PROJECT COMPLETION-REPORT PAPUA NEW GUINEA AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT (LOAN 2276-PNG) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Agricultural Support Services Project in Papua New Guinea, for which the amount of US $14.1 million was approved on May 3, 1983. The loan was closed on June 30, 1989, one year behind schedule. An amount of US$5.6 million was cancelled in September 1987, the last disbursement was on November 22, 1989 and a balance of $0.06 million was cancelled at Loan account closure. The PCR was prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division, Country Departmentv, Asia Region (Part I & III), and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was started during a visit to Papua New Guinea in November, 1989, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan Agreement; Supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal P.ank memoranda.  - ii - PROJECT COPLETION REPORT PAPUA NEW GUINEA AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT --(LOAN 2276-PNG) EVALUATION SUMMARY Oblectives 1. The objective of the project was to strengthen the National Department of Primary Industry (DPI)1 including it's capacity and capability to provide necessary support to provincial governments in agricultural extension services and development planning. This vas to be achieved through the provision of incremental expatriate and national staff, fellowships, infrastructure, and operational expenditures for the Branches covering crops research, agricultural education and training, planning and economics, agricultural extension. land utilization services, project development, and livestock services. Implemetation Exrerience 2. Implementation was very slow, particularly for the two key activities of staff recruitment and training under the fellowships program vhich were to help build up staff capacity and capability. Although it had been recognized that implementation would require considerable input of specialized staff and a careful timing of budgeting, staff recruitment, and administrative procedures, in the end it was the inability to plan, coordinate and execute in a timely manner that contributed to the slow progress. The key constraints were management, related to DPI's inadequate management capability, adverse effects of a slow process of reorganizing the department, frequent senior management staff changes, and cumbersome government regulations and procedures. Results 3. The project did not fully achieve the targets for the two key activities of staff recruitment and training under the fellowships program. According to the project implement-ion schedule, all 24 expatriate staff and 109 of the 136 national staff were to be in post, and a total of 58 staff were to proceed overseas for training, within two-and-a-half years of project start-up. Over the full 6-year project period only 16 expatriates and 74 national had been recruited and only 12 staff had been sent for training. The lNow DAL - Department of Agriculture & Livestock  - iii - combined effect has been a slower process of strengthening of the department, particularly it's crops research and extension programs. Some progress was made with the initiative in the last two years of the project to introduce in- house management skill training courses and obtain the services of a number of advisers to assist in the management of the department, the planning and implemertation of the crops research program, and planning assistance to the provinces. Sustainability 4. The limited progress in strengthening the DPI in terms of staffing, training, infrastructure, and the introduction of some management systems and skills is expected to contribute towards making the department more capable in providing support services to the provinces. Whether this limited capacity and capability improvement can be sustained will depend on the Government being able to stabilize and consolidate the DPI organization and leadership, and create an environment which is conducive to the effective functioning of the department. Towards this end a strong, long-term commitment of the Government and Donor agencies is important. Findings and Lessons Learnt 5. The project was too ambitious in terms of scope and implementation scheduling. Adequate account was not taken of the management capability of the DPI in terms of skills and systems, the effect of government recruitment policies, regulations and procedures, and the adverse effects of a slow reorganization process and frequent leadership changes. The reliance on large numbers of expatriate staff as a short-term institution building measure is of questionable soundness. The main lessons are: (a) in institution building projects, it is important to take into consideration the political, cultural, and bureaucratic environment in which the project is to be implemented. However, since it is not always possible to accurately forecast political/bureaucratic changes, project design should allow for tighter supervision, both by the Bank and Government, to enable adjustments during implementation; (b) an evaluation of the management capability of the institution to be strengthened in terms of leadership, organizational structure, skills, and systems is just as important as the more tangible aspects such as staff numbers and infrastructure; (c) the size and scope of activities should be geared to the capacity and capability of the institution (and country) to manage the activities; (d) planning of project supervision should allow for continuity, adequate frequency, and an appropriate mix of staff; and (e) since institution building is a long-term process, a strong, long-term commitment is required from the Borrower and Donor. A number of initiatives currently being undertaken by Government and Donor agencies indicate recognition of these lessons.  PAPUA NEW GUINtA AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT (LOAN 2276-PNO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANRS PERSPECTIVE Project Identity Project Name tAgricultural Support Services Project Loan/Credit Number : Ln. 2276 - PNG RvP Unit : Asia Country s Papua New Guinea Sector t Agriculture Subsector Background 1. The agricultural sector has been, and remains, the most important sector in the country, accounting for almost two-fifths of GDP and a third of its exports. It provides a livelihood to about 852 of the population. Government's policy is to increase local food production and reduce food imports, broaden agricultural exports, and improve the livelihood of rural families. In view of the importance of agriculture to the economy and the generally unsatisfactory performance of the sector, Government decided in 1980, that there was need to take appropriate measures to revitalize it. Government strategy called for greater participation of the private sector, recognition of the important role of traditional agriculture, and an improvement in the Government's agricultural support services. The support services had been weakened by severe financial constraints, a fall in administrative capability due to the rapid departure of experienced expatriate staff and the devolution of some important support functions to the 19 provinces since 1977. 2. Since the country's independence in 1975, Banks support for agricultural development was aimed at rehabilitation and diversification of the tree crop sector and at rural development. The importance of support services in agricultural development was recognized and the need to strengthen them was emphasized in the Banks Agriculture sector Review, 1981. The key providers of support services in the public sector were the national and provincial Departments of Primary Industry (DPI). The project was formulated to strengthen the national DPI.l/ ProJect ObJectives and Description 3. As described in the Appraisal Report, the objective of the project was to strengthen the national DPI including its capability to provide necessary support to provincial governments in the agricultural sector particularly in extension services and development planning. The major constraints affecting DPI were identified as. inadequacies in planning and evaluation; insufficient numbers of experienced, qualified staff; inappropriate staff training arrangements; inadequate linkages with provincial governments. The project as conceived was described in the SAR as being essentially a 'software project' which would lead to significant increases and upgrading of staff and organizational changes in DPI. Further, it was envisaged that the project would have a long gestation period and many of its expected benefits would be either of a general .L Now DAt - Department of Agric..ture & Livestock  -2- nature i.e. increase in competence and efficiency of staff, or would come in the form of avoided losses the likelihood and extent of which are difficult to assess. Funds were provided for salaries of expatriate and national staff, travel and subsistence expenses, utilities and rental and operation of vehicles, consultancies, fellowships, civil works, equipment and vehicles. Major project components were the followings (a) Crop Research - Establishment of a Crop Research Division, to be headed by an experienced, technically qualified Director, and supported by a Deputy Director and administrative staffs provision of scientific, technical, and support staff, infrastructure and equipment; postgraduate training program to improve the competence of 21 national scientific staff. (b) Agricultural Education and Training - Conversion of the Highlands Agricultural College at Mt. Hagen to an in-service training facility for central and provincial DPI staff through the provision of two Education Officers, three technical staff,and construction of some new and upgrading of existing facilitier; minor improvements at existing pre-service Colleges at Popondetta, Vudal. and Sepik. (c) Planning and Economics - Strengthening of DPI's Planning, Economics and Statistical Sections of the Planning, Economics and Marketing Branch through provision of 6 expatriate scientific staff and a number of local technical staff to enable the sections to help provincial planning efforts and the Departments own planning monitoring requirements. Cd) Agricultural Extension Support - Assignment and recruitment of six scientific and four development officers for the Extension Advisory, Publications, Radio Broadcast and Libraries Units of the Section. Four officers of the Extension Advisory Unit were to be located in each of the country's major regions to be accessible and readily available to the provinces. (e) Land Utilization Services - Provision for expatriate and national Scientific Officers and technical support staff to assist in soil erosion studies, a land capability survey of alienated land, and completion of an ongoing CSIRO land evaluation for subsistence and cash cropping. (f) Agricultural Proiect Development - Five Scientific Officers and support staff to be acided to the Agricultural Development Section of the Agriculture Branch to enable it to increase its capacity for preparation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of export crops projects. (g) Livestock Services - Nine stock inspectors to be recruited for the animal disease and pest surveillance program; an expatriate pathologist and funds for essential facilities and equipment at the central veterinary laboratory. (h) Fellowships - In addition to the post-graduate training in crop research, the project provided for training overseas of 58 staff for durations ranging from short-term courses to one year of formal education.  Mi) Consultancies - 69 man-months of expatriate technical assistance including provision for development of data system and the coordination of national and provincial planning,identification and preparation of agricultural projects, and development of training materials for in-service training courses. 4. In 1986, after the mid-term review, an additional component was added to the project at Government request. This was to provide for the setting up of a Transitional Training Unit(TTU) in the Program Management Unit of the Department of the Prime Minister. TTU's objective was to assist in the strengthenir.g of management training and development programs in key departments and provinces and training institutions. The first client of the TTU was to be the DAL. Proiect Design and Organization 5. The project was prepared by the PNG Department of Primary Industry with assistance of a FAO/CP team and given final shape by the Bank at appraisal. The need for the project and its conceptual foundation was agreed and understood by all parties concerned. The project was based on the agricultural sector review underzaken by the Bank in 1981. which had concluded that a revitalization of the sector required a strengthening of its support services; that the long gestation period required for institutional and manpower development efforts necessitated corrective action as early as possible; that without staff upgrading and assistance from the national level. most provincial DPIs would be unable to effectively carry out their responsibilities. The PNG government concurred with these views and consequently requested Bank assistance in the prepara- tion and eventual funding of a project to strengthen the national DPI. 6. In retrospect, the project design was over ambitious and unrealistic in that it sought to achieve targets and objectives which essenti-lly required a strong, longer-term commitment and a slower implementation schedule. The design also did not take adequate account of the importance of management capacities and capabilities, organizational stability, and Government regulations and procedures. 7. The project was designed to focus over a five year period, on manpower and infrastructure requirements of DPI. The model used was one which was fairly current, and relied on bringing in qualified expatriates to fill key positions until natiorals, who were to be trained, returned to take over. The Department was to recruit 136 national(18 Sc. Officers,3 Econ.) and 24 expatriate staff(20 Sc. Officers,4 Econ.). Total projec costs over the four and a half years of implementation was estimated at USD 24.3 million and salaries and allowances for staff accounted for about 422 of total project costs reflecting the dominant service nature of the project. In terms of the Loan (USD 14.1 million), USD 6.2 million (44z) was allocated for contract staff salaries and allowances. a. In order to reduce project complexity, a deliberate attempt was made during appraisal to focus the project on DPI and proposed components involving other Departments were excluded. Within DPI, the existing structure was used and implementation was carried out by the relevant Branches but a Project Coordinator was to ensure integration and proper linkages between the various components. This arrangement subsequently proved to be unsatisfactory because the Department's management and administrative capability to plan, implement tnd monitor project activities was inadequate and the project coordinator's role was ineffective due to frequent changes and a lack of administrative support.  9. Although the heavy administrative burden of recruiting large numbers of expatriate and local staff and factors such as salary incentives and housing were recognized as obstacles to recruitment of suitable staff. yet all the expatriate staff and 80% of the local staff were scheduled to be recruited in the first two and a half years of project implementation. Ihile GOPNG recognized the administrative problems in the public service and had established an Administrative Improvement Program, it was also recognized that improvements could only be brought about gradually. In terms of the project,however, governiment had agreed in principle to avail itself of the services of recruitment agencies to overcome some of the obstacles and to examine incentives on an individual basis to attract highly qualified foreign personnel. However, subsequent results show that these agreements in princip !e were not effectively translated into practice and the recruitment targets proved to be highly unrealistic. 10. The project design had focussed more on tangibles like staff numbers, fellowships and infrastructure, with little emphasis on the adequacy of management and administrative capability of the DPI in terms of the systems, operating procedures, and skills to undertake, even in the short term, effective implementation of project activities. DPI's original proposals had contained !n-service training for technical as well as management training but provisions for management training were excluded from the final project design with the expectation that the Administrative College would accommodate DPI's requirements. This did not occur and only after the mid-term review and with the establishment of TTU and the provision of the team of advisers in 1986187, was action taken to try to rectify some of the management and administrative weaknesses. 11. In retrospect, it can also be said that it is highly improbable that the project design was suited for the stated objectives even if the staffing exercise had, in fact, been successfully carried out. Experience from other countries casts serious doubts on the feasibility of sustaining an institutional development effort based on recruiting large numbers of expatriate staff for a relatively short period of time and on the expectation that local staff would on their return from training during that period, be in a position to effectively fill positions which require both technical expertise and experience and be able to carry an on-going program at the same intensity and level of sophistication. One of the essential requirements for such institutional building efforts to succeed is a longer term commitment (15 - 20 years?) to a sustained effort by both the Borrower and the Donor agency which in the case of this particular project was not evident in its design. Project Implementation 12. The project, as designed, stands or falls on the success achieved in implementation of the two core activities of staff recruitment and training under the fellowships program. In view of the importance of these activities the project implementation schedule called for the implementation and completion of the staff recruitment and fellowships programs within the first two and a half years. This proved to be overly optimistic and the project failed to achieve the set targets even over the full 5-year project period. 13. Although it was recognized from the start that the successful implementation of such a program would require considerable input of specialized staff, and a careful timing of budgeting, staff recruitment and other administrative procedures, and Government had in principle agreed to  avail itself of the services of professional recsuitment agents in order to overcome some of these obstacles, in the end it was the inability to plan,coordinate and execute in a timely manner that contributed to the s'ow rate of implementation.Progress on the fellowships program was only marginally better. Initially the Department preferred to use bilateral grant funds which became available during this period. However, even with subsequent use of project funds the planned fellowships targets and objectives were not achieved largely because of inadequate DPI planning and execution of the program. Factors which affected implementation weres (a) DPI management capacity and capability; (b) Departmental reorganizatin; (c) government recruitment policy, regulations and procedures; (d) frequent changes in DPI senior management staff. (a) DPI management capability - Despite the fact that PSC had approved creation of 75 national and 22 expatriate positions in 1984, the DPI was able to fill only a few of these positions. Within DPI, the inability of t'. --anagement Services Branch to tackle staff recruitment and . act that some Branch heads saw the need to deal directly with the PSC, indicates weaknesses in the system. The basic capability to administer and monitor a recruitment program was insufficiently developed and the importance of this practical and essential function appears to have been under estimated in the initial planning of ;:he project. In fact, no provision was made to improve and strengthen management services. A stronger Management Services Branct. with appropriate procedures in place, together with a continuousl) serving, experienced Project Coordinator with strong direction and support from Senior Management, could have played a constructive role in bringing about a more coordinated and forceful resolution of implementation issues. The potential effects of any corrective actions taken were blunted by the lack of persistent and continuous emphasis due to frequent changes in senior management. Not until 1987 was a concerted effort made to obtain the services of professional recruiting agencies and to organize serious attempts at improving management skills and systems. (b) Departmental reorganization - At the time of appraisal in 1982, the Government was already const1dering change: in the DPI organizational structure. At appraisal these changes were considered important but not essential for the success of the project. During implementation, however, it was found that delays and uncertainties in the finalization and approval of the proposed modified structure had a strong bearing on the recruitment of staff as justification and evaluation of each staff position was based on its relevancy and fit in the Departmental structure. Positions unless immediately filled, had to be re-evaluated with each subsequent change of structure which in the case of DPI continued into late 1987. The continuous reorganization created an environment which affected DPI staff moral' and brought about a focus on immediate or short term goals at the expense of longer term more permanent goals. (c) Government regulations and procedures - The establishment and filling of each new position was a lengthy process requiring coordination and continuous, persistent effort, particularly on the part of DPI. It involved actions and approvals by DPI, Department of Finance and the Public Services Commission (PSC). Despite the fact that a number of positions had been created few were filled due largely to delays in DP: but also in PSC. Lack of  -6- suitable housing, unattractive salaries, Government policy on 'localisation' of posts and frequent imposition of a 'moratorium" on recruitment, were additional factors. In order to overcome some of the constraints and: delays in recruitment, the Depa;tment, in 1987, contracted the UNDPIOPE management services to provide a team of five expatriate advisors to assist the newly created Investment Division, Planning and Programming Division, and the Crop Research Division, and at the request of the Government the Loan closing date was extended a year to enable the team reasonable time for operation. td) Frequent senior management changes - Invariably, frequent changes of senior staff, particularly in leadership positions, contribute to a blurring of project objectives, changed emphasis, and a loss in implementation momentum. DPI experienced a number of such staff changes during the project years including those at the Secretary (3), Project Coordinator (5 - including 1 year without a coordinator), and Branch Head levels. The position of Director, Crop Research, was never substantially filled as intended until 1988 and then only for a year. Project Results 14. In line with the design of the project the emphasis during implementation was on staff numbers recruited and fellowships awarded.It had been acknowledged that since the project was designed as a "soft ware' project it would not be possible to measure the success of the project in terms of increased competence and efficiency of the Department. In terms of the specific quantitative implementation indicators agreed to at appraisal, except for infrastructure, the targets have not been fully achieved and it could, therefore, be surmised that the objective of the project has not been fully achieved. The project implementation schedule expected all 24 expatriate staff and at least 109 national staff to be on board before 1986 but by early 1986 only 15 expatriate and 78 national positions had been created of which only 10 and 33 positions respectively were substantially filled. Due to delayed processing, unattractive terms and conditions of service, the ability of the project to recruit qualified, experienced expatriates was also considerably reduced. The position as of mid-1989 was 16 expatriate and 74 national positions filled in addition to the four expatriate advisers that were provided under the UNDPIOPE management services agreement. The targets set at appraisal, therefore, proved to be highly optimistic. 15. The fellowships component, which was to assist in upgrading the competence of national staff and to enable them to gradually take over full responsibilities for DPI programs, was also not able to meet the targets set at appraisal. Of the 58 fellowships planned to be implemented by 1986 only 12 had been awarded. While available data tends to indicate that a total of 87 staff were awarded fellowships from al', sources, most of these were for short-term courses or seminars. Of these 20 were from the Crop Research Division and 25 from the Education and Training Division. Only two of the research fellt-dships were for a Masters program, the rest were for short-term courses. 16. No specific impact indicators were developed during appraisal. A general assessment for each of the major components is as follows:  (a) The Crop Research Division was established but it has not had a substantive Director. In the absence of a research program and direction, the proposed network of testing stations in collabora- tion with the extension services was not established. In 1987/88 the consultant research adviser provided under the UNDP management services agreement, formulated a research program for the division but implementation of this program has been slow because of shortages of staff, particularly local scientific staff. (b) The Four Regional Extension Advisor posts were not filled as proposed under a strengthened Information Section. Only in the papt year have formal Memorandum of Understanding been concluded with six provinces under which the national DPI would assist the provinces. The agricultural adviser, in the collaboration with the Planning division of DPI, has been conducting training courses in agricultural planning for provincial staff. (c) The Planning, Economics and Statistical sections of the Planning, Economics and Marketing branch have generally fared better than other parts of the Department. Some of the proposed staff were recruited, and advisers provided under the UNDP/OPE services agreement. An agricultural development policy paper and a medium- term development strategy has been prepared. A number of smallholder projects have been formulated which also served to train local staff. A number of Memorandum of Understanding with Provinces have been concluded which fonm the basis for assistance and cooperation between the national DPI and the Provinces. With asststance of the advisers a Management Information System has been established for the Department. (d) The expected output from the crop development section in terms of being able to initiate and implement 1-2 new export crops projects per year did not materialize since the expatriate and local staff to strengthen the capacity of the section were not recruited. During this period only two project proposals were prepared, using outside assistance. Adviser assistance provided under the project through the UNDP/OPE services agreement helped finalize three smallholder development projects and gave on-the-job training on project preparation to a team of local staff. (e) The Transitional Training Unit was able to cover a range of activities as planned but fell behind schedule due to delays in obtaining the full complement of international and national staff and the unforeseen diversion of resources to assist in the development of the Government's new Resource Management System. For those client departments and provinces with which the team was assigned to work, organizational analysis and training was carried out.particularly with DPI and the four provinces of E. Sepik, Southern Highlands, N. Solomons, and Milne Bay. While the response from the clients indicated that TTU's services have contributed to meeting some of their skill-development needs, actual improvements in management and planning are as yet difficult to substantiate. Proiect Sustainability 17. In retrospect, the project as originally designed was not sustainable since it focused on strengthening the DPI in terms of staff numbers and infraittructure without adequate provision for establishment and improvement of management systems. However, this weakness was recognized  -8 in the last two years of the project period and attempts were made to rectify the situation. Whether the limited and fragile planning and project preparation capacity built up thus far and the systems and processes introduced in the last couple of years of the project, can be effectively maintained would depend on the Government being able to stabilize and consolidate the DPI organization and leadership and create an environment which provides adequate incentives for the organization to function effectively and to continue to undertake institutional improvements. Towards this end a strong, long term commitment of the Government and Donor agencies is important. Bank Performance 18. Simplifying the project design by restricting project activities to DPI and the decision in 1986/87 to support the team of advisers and the TTU under the project was a sound decision. However, at appraisal, the importance of DPI's administrative and management capacity and capability, recruitment procedures, Government policy on 'localization' of posts, terms and conditions of service, particularly on recruitment of experienced expatriate staff, to project implementation was underestimated. Under these circumstances the decision to cover a number of major Branches, instead of focussing on one or two key ones with clearly identified programs and objectives to be achieved, also turned out to be overly ambitious. The presence of experienced expatriate officers in key positions at the time of appraisal may have provided some measure of confidence but the departure of these officers during the first two project years proved such confidence to have been misplaced. The Bank also underestimated the possible effects of the reorganization of DPI on project implementation and staff morale. 19. In parallel with the DPI, the Bank too experienced a lack of continuity in staff involved in the project. In the Division directly responsible for the project, there were changes in Divisional managers(3) and staff supervising the project (4) with changes occurring in the second and fourth years. After the first year n.one of the managers or staff involved in supervision had participated in the preparation or appraisal of the project. In the six years of implementation, the Bank spent 57 staff weeks on project supervision. This represents an average of 9 staff weeks per year, a relatively low figure for an important operation involving a key Government department in a young country. There was little continuity of staff or an appropriate mix, supervising the project which contributed to a lack of continued focus and failure to forcefully emphasize the identified need for urgent strengthening of DPI's management capability. Reluctance, generally, on the part of the Bank during this period to get involved in "institutional development' also contributed to the lack of forceful action. In retrospect, greater emphasis during supervision on institutional/management issues through closer involvement and a more appropriate mix of staff expertise could have benefitted project implementation. A more forceful resolution of issues, particularly policies, procedures and processes affecting staff recruitment and management of the Department, could probably have been achieved early in the project implementation period. 20. The main lessons from this project are: (a) in institution building projects it is important to take into consideration the political, cultural, and bureaucratic environment in which the project is to be implemented. However, since it is not always possible to accurately forecast political/bureaucratic changes, project design should allow for tighter supervision, both by the Bank and Government, to enable adjustments  during implementation; (b) an evaluation of the management capability of the institution to be strengthened in terms of leadership, organizational structure, skills, and systems is just as important as the more tangible aspects such as staff numbers and infrastructure; (c) the size and scope of activities should be geared to the capacity and capability of the institu- tion (and country) to manage these activities; (d) planning of project supervision should allcw for continuity, adequate frequency and an appro- priate mix of staff; (e) since institution building is a long-term process, a strong, long-term commitment is necessary from a Borrower and Donor. 21. Action being taken by Government and the Donors, indicate a recognition of lessons learnt. The Bank's Agricultural Assessment Review, 1988, highlighted the need for major emphasis by Donors on institutional and human resource development on a long-term involvement basis - particularly with reference to research and extension in DPI. The New' Zealand Government's recent review of extension services is likely to be followed by a longer-term assistance program for strengthening these services. The UNDP funded institutional development programs, the FAO human resources study, the ADB program Loan which includes institutional measures, and the Bank's Absorptive capacity study, are all indicative of the recognition of these lessons. Borrower Performance 22. The Borrower had placed high priority on strengthening the DPI during the identification, preparation, and appraisal of the project but this priority, viewed from the Banks perspective, changed during implementation both in terms of urgency and the time frame over which the various activities, other than those related to infrastructure, were to be executed. This change could be ascribed to the frequent changes in DPI leadership, the continuous issue of departmental reorganization, and effects of GOPNG policies and procedures on recruitment, which led to a preoccupation, at least in the first three to four years, with immediate, short term objectives rather than an active commitment to longer term institution building objectives. In the absence of adequate and appropriate management tools, monitoring and coordination of departmental programs and activities posed serious difficulties and little was done to try and rectify the situation until 1987. Monitoring of project related activities was weak and reliable data was difficult to obtain. This posed difficulties to DPI management, Bank supervision missions and to Government appointed auditors who had to prepare financial statements. Consultants 22. The Advisors provided under the GovernmentlUNDP management services agreement made useful, but limited ccntributions. Delays in finalizing DPI's reorganizations, opposition to the advisers from some department staff, inadequate, poor counterpart staff assignments, contributed to their short-comings in performance. The concept and expectation that advisers undertake both specific tasks and also provide training to counterparts was, overall, not successful and points to the need to review carefully such arrangements in the future.  -10 - Proiect Documentation and Data 23. The project design and implementation schedule called for the recruitment of relatively large numbers of staff. Information and assurances were given during negotiations on impending key appointments, and imminent finalization of reorganization of DPI, but no specific covenants were included in the legal agreement on these aspects. 24. Had such specific covenants been included as a method of highlighting essential activities, and had the Bank sought compliance, it is likely that the outcome would have been an enforced, early review of the management capability of DPI and the Government's recruitment regulations and procedures resulting, in all probability, in improved project design and implementation. 25. Due to inadequate project coordination and monitoring, data was not readily available for the various activities. This points to the need to ensure adequate and relevant management capability.  - 11 - PART II. PROJECT REVIEW PROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Introduction 1. This part of the Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP) Completion Report, will focus on the following areast (a) project design and formulation; (b) implementation problems; (c) achievements on objectives; and (d) sustainability. The lessons which had been learnt from the implementation of the ASSP are also delineated. Project Formulation and Design 2. The ASSP was basically designed as a 'Software' Project to provide sufficient infrastructure and skilled personnel to the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL)--(then DPI). The basic justification of ASSP was that the provision of relevant Support Services to the agricultural sector was a sufficient condition for a sustainable development in the agricultural sector. There is little information to show that ASSP was created in response to government priorities, as established in official development plarn. The ASSP was designed as a project of separate component programs. In contrast to a situation in which a department forecasts a crisis to occur some time and puts up a unified project to cope with it, the concept of the Agricultural Support Services project emerged in response to a tree crop survey research. As the organization responsible, DAL (then DPI) was in fact not at all well prepared to implement the ASSP. There were severe limits of time available for DAL to prepare and submit a remedial project in which all the thirteen components could be carried out. Understandably this contributed to a situa- tion in which the thirteen proposed components were carried out independently instead of being implemented by a simple coordinating office. Actually, the lack of coordination did not disrupt any of the project components because they were not functionally interrelated, and the completion of one project component was not a pre-requisite for commencing another. Any one or all of the components were to make a positive contribution in serving to strengthen the capacity in DAL. They delays in the implementation of the individual com- ponents served to increase the investment cost of ASSP. 3. On the whole, the concept and rationale for the design of ASSP were good and innovative. However, a major flaw of the design was that it was not integrative and ccmprehensive. It appears that no feasibility analysis was done to determine whether the management capacity in DPI would be adequate to handle the complex dimensions of the ASSP for implementation. The conse- quences of this oversight were that unattainable and unrealistic targets were set for ASSP.  - 12 - 4. Furthermore, even though ASSP was formulated and designed with con- siderable inputs from the hierarchy of DPI, some principal agencies, viz., Department of Personnel Management (Public Services Commission), Department of Works and Housing, Department of Foreign Affairs, which had to play active roles in the recruitment of staff, approval 3f visa authorizations, and provi- sion of housing tor staff were less involved in the design and preparation of the project. 5. More importantly, the design of organizational arrangements for the execution of the ASSP were inadequately considered. The functional matrix relationship which was designed for the coordination and implementation of the components of ASSP were not clearly defined. The coordination arrangement in fact was incongruous with the line-function organizational structure which existed in DPI. This contributed to the weak coordination and linkages among the components of ASSP. 6. In addition, the monitoring and reporting on the activities of the ASSP were not adequate. The requirement for the Project Coordinator to report directly on a quarterly basis to the Department of Finance and Planning while he had no authority to monitor the ASSP components was a gross mistake. The fact that Department of Finance is too remote from the activities of ASSP to fully know what went wrong or right contributed to the poor project control and monitoring. 7. Moreover, the ASSP was designed as a short term project with a planning horizon of for four and a half years. The project designers failed to realize that most institutional development projects take more than 10 years to get to the full development stage. With thia oversight in the time scale of the project no follow-up projects were designed to ensure continuity in training and reinforcement on gained capacities. Project Implementation: Results and Problems 8. The project formally spanned four and a half years from July 1983 to December 1987. From the beginning to the end, the project failed to meet major deadlines. No project component was finished on schedule, (refer to Tables 1 and 2) and cumulative time overruns so exceeded the deadlines. This prompted the Government of Papua New Guinea to reduce the loan by 5 million kina and also to extend the project period to June 1989. 9. At appraisal, ASSP was planned to recruit 138 national officers and 24 expatriate officers at an estimated cost of US$24.3 million. With due cog- nizance that the success of the project would be dependent on the ability to hire staff into positions in the early stages of the project, it was planned that 80X of the target for both expatriate and national staff would have been in post by 1985. It had not been possible to recruit the number of skilled staff as planned. For example, by the end of 1985, 43Z and 5O0 of the planned targets for the recruitment of expatriate and national staff respectively, had been achieved. By the end of the planned completion date of ASSP, (i.e., December 1987), 63% and 531 of the targets for expatriate and national staff respectively had been hired under the ASSP (see Table 3). One of the basic objectives of implementation of ASSP was that it would lead to an 182 increase in DAL's annual recurrent budgetary allocations. An examination of Table 4  - 13 - shows that during the period 1984 to 1987. when ASSP was being implemented, the net gain in recurrent budgetary allocations by DAL was 1.87X. The alloca- tion of resources to the whole agricultural sector did decline during the life cycle of ASSP; the share of agriculture in the total National budget remained between 7-92 and did decline in real terms during that period (i.e., 1984 to 1987). This evidence supports the view that the ASSP did not lead to any in- crease in the recurrent budget allocations to DAL during the project's life. Institutional development may not have been a government priority. 10. In addition, the utilization of the loans proceeded at a slower pace than anticipated. By the end of the planrr'd completion date (December 1987); only 25.6Z of the loans have been utilized; even when the project period was further extended to June 1989, 912 of the funds was spent. Achievements of ASSP to date have been dismal. The extension of the project period from December 1987 to June 1989 did not achieve any significant improvement in the loan utilization rate. i1. The causes of the low achievements on the planned targets were many. These included: (a) lengthy delays in the recruitment of both national and expatriate staff; (b) a freeze on the recruitment of staff by the government; (c) unattractive conditions of employment to attract suitable candidates for ASSP positions; (d) inflexible manpower ceilings within which the project had to operate; Ce) changes and discontinuities in project marnagement due to reorganiza- tion of the DAL during the project period; (f) lack of support and commitment by DAL Executive to the ASSP; (g) inadequate management capacity to handle the complexity and work load of ASSP. 12. Bureaucratic Procedures in Recruitment. Lengthy recruitment proce- dures which had to be followed by the incumbent candidates contributed to the slow rate at which staff recruitment proceeded under the ASSP. For instance, it took between 9 months to 24 months for candidates selected for ASSP posi- tions to be issued with visas and tickets. In addition overseas staff arriving in PNG hLad to stay in hotels for three to six months before suitable housing was provided. The delays led to loss of good candidates for some of the positions. 13. Freeze on Staff Recruitment. Basically, the ASSP project sought to strengthen capacities in DAL by recruiting skilled staff. The irony of the situation is that during the implementation of ASSP the Government of Papua New Guinea imposed a freeze on the recruitment of personnel into the public  - 14 - service. This policy fundamentally rendered the A&sSP redundant because skilled personnel could not be recruited. 14. Unattractiveness of Service Conditions. This factor accounted for the inability to fill ASSP positions. The Public Service Commission's Employment and Service conditions which prevailed during the implementation of ASSP were not attractive enough to attract skilled professional staff for the ASSP positions. As a result most of the potential candidates declined to accept their appointments. 15. Inflexibility in Manpower Ceilings. Related to the problems result- ing from the ban on recruitment into the public service was the ruling that all ASSP positions had to be either created or reclassified and approved with- in the manpower ceilings allocated for the Department of Agriculture and Livestock. The manpower ceilings set for DAL and for the whole PNG Public Service from 1985 to 1987 are shown in Table 5. An examination of Table 5 shows that DAL's manpower was cut by 29? (National ceiling by 26? and overseas ceiling by 50). For the whole Government's public service, the manpower ceilings for overseas recruitment was cut by 29? as compared with a 1S cut for the National staff recruitment. The large cuts in the overseas ceilings for the whole Public Service indic&ted the importance accorded to the localiza- tion policy by the Government. The diminished emphasis on overseas recruit- ment as a government policy thus conflicted with the concept of ASSP which sought to increase DAL's capacity partly through the recruitment of contract staff from overseas.  Table 1: IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE PROJECT PERIOD: JULY 1983 - JUNE 1989 Total 2nd planned at semester Completion Dates appraisal 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 P A P A P A P A P A P A P A Recruitment & Hiring of Staff (No. of Staff) Expatriate 24 4 0 15 6 5 6 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 National 136 4 0 68 33 37 26 13 12 14 1 0 2 0 0 Civil Works (No. of Units) Crop Research Component Insect Stone 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 Electrification of Water Supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Office & Laboratory Buildings 0 0 0 00 0 1 00 0 3 0 0 0 0 Machinery Shed 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Water Reticulation System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 Green Houses - Propagation & Trials 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 High Covenant Houses 7 00 0 1 0 6 0 4 0 4 0 2 0 0 Low Covenant Houses 6 0 0 00 00 0 16 0 8 0 2 0 0 Middle Covenant Houses 38 0 0 8 0 15 0 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 Agricultural Education & Training Components Conversioia of Science Classroom to Science Laboratory 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Dormitory 1 0 0 10 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 Audio Visual Storeroom 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 Office Complex 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Ablution Block 1 0 0 1 0 00 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Laundry Block 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 Upgrading of Existing Dormitories 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Upgrading of PMTP Facilities 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Table 1: cont'd Total 2nd planned at semester Completion Dates appraisal 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19&3 1989 P A P A P A P A P A P A P A Livestock Services Component Security Laboratory for Infections Diseases 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Dangerous Chemical Store 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Low Covenant Houses for Animal Diseases Surveillance 9 0 0 2 0 4 2 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 1 Upgrading Existing Low Covenant Houses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Transit Staff Housing 0 Consultancies Ja (manmonth) Including CSIRO Program 155 0 6 40 4? 60 40 55 36 0 60 0 60 0 48 Fellowships (No. of Fellow) Short-term Courses (3-8 months) 21 0 0 10 11 0 0 0 0 Long-term Courses (12-30 months) 37 7 0 15 15 15 0 0 0 Crop Research Reports Summary Reports on Crop Research Activities for periods 1973-77 and 1978-82 311331/5 30/6 NS 3016 NS 3016 NS 30/6 NS 3016 US 3016 NS Annual Report June 30 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. U.S. U.S. P = Planned Target /a Figures reported for actual number of consultancy A = Actual Achievement manmonths procured include those provided under the N.S. - Not Submitted monitoring and evaluation component of ASSP which were not specified in the  - 17 - Table 2s THE TIME FRAME OF PROJECT COMPONENTS Scheduled Actual Time Starting Date completion completion overrun/ Project Component Scheduled Actual date date lags Recruitment & 1983 1984 1987 Not completed 2 years Hiring of Staff u) to date Civil Works 1983 1984 1987 Not completed 2 years up to date Consultants 1983 1983 1986 Not completed 3 years up to date Fellowships 1984 1984 1985 Ongoing 4 years Table 3: ASSP STAFFING POSITION AS Ar DECEMBER 31, 1987 Subcomponent Number Planned at Appraisal Actual Number in Post of ASSP N 0 Total N 0 Total Coordination 0 0 0 2 1 3 Planning/Economics 15 6 21 9 3 12 Livestock Services 9 1 10 3 0 3 Ag. Education & Training 27 4 31 5 2 7 Agric. Development 4 3 8 2 0 2 Agriculture Quarantine 13 0 13 2 0 2 Agriculture Land Use 22 2 24 8 1 9 Crop Research 45 8 53 6 2 8 Total 136 24 160 37 9 46 Sources ASSP Annual Report January - December (1987)  - 18 - Table 4: ALLOCATION OF NATIONAL FUNDS TO AGRICULTURE. 1984-87 K million Z of total 1984 1985 1986 1987 1984 1985 1986 1987 Recurrent Budget DAL 8.9 9.9 9.4 10.0 24.6 23.8 25.5 25.4 Provinces 12.4 13.6 11.6 I1.a 34.2 33.3 31.5 30.0 Total 21.4 23.7 21.0 21.8 58.8 57.1 57.0 55.4 Nat. Exp. Plan DAL 9.9 11.7 9.7 11.3 27.3 28.2 28.7 28.8 Provinces 0.6 1.6 1.2 2.2 1.7 3.8 5.6 5.6 Total 10.5 13.3 10.9 13.5 29.0 32.0 34.3 34.4 Capital Works 2.2 4.0 3.9 3.5 6.1 9.6 10.6 8.9 Capital Subscriptions 2.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 6.1 1.2 2.7 1.3 Total Allocation to agriculture 36.2 41.5 36.8 39.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Allocation to agricul- tur in constant (1981) prices 29.3; 31.0 26.1 28.4 Allocation to agricul- ture as Z of budget 8.2 9.3 7.2 7.5 Sources World Bank (1988), PNG Agricultural Assessment Review.  - 19 - Table S GOVERNMENT MANPOWER CEILINGS, 1985-87 Percent 1985 1986 1987 change DAL National 1,200 958 889 -26 Oversess 204 141 102 -S0 Total 1,404 1 099 991 -29 Whole Government National 48,446 47,305 47,901 -1 Overseas 3,115 2,625 2,198 -29 Total 51,561 49,930 50,099 -3 Sources Budget Document No. 2, 1987. 16. The policy on manpower ceilings in essence meant that positions which were created or reclassified for the purpose of the ASSP did not provide additional manpower resources but rather reduced the number of positions available to DAL. This situation made it difficult for DAL to get additional replacement positions to cater for those positions which had to be sacrificed for ASSP posts. The consequence was a serious shortage of staff for some non- ASSP positions as well as for the appointment of counterpart positions for the ASSP-funded positions. 17. DAL's Reorgarization. In terms of the objectives of strengthening institutional capacity in DAL, there have been three institutional reorganiza- tions of the Department of Agriculture and Livestock since the inception of the project in 1983 to 1988. These reorganizations culminated into the followings some ASSP positions which were identified at appraisal were either abolished, reclassified, or not created or transferred to other Divisio..;s in DAL or other Departments, e.g., Fisheries. These three reorganizations dis- oriented staff in the DAL and disrupted continuity in achievements which in the long run demoralized the staff. 18. Lack of Adequate Support and ComMitment by DAL Executives. Lack of adequate support and commitment by DAL Executive has been cited as one of the contributing factors which negatively affected the effectiveness of ASSP. For example, the position of Project Coordinator was never filled by a permanent appointee after the contract of an expatriate Project Coordinator expired. Three Project Coordinators were consecutively appointed in acting capacities on an ad hoc basis. These Coordinators had no administrative authority to coordinate effectively with the Component Managers. For instance, one of the Coordinators who acted longest in the post was on Clerk Class 6 according to the Directors of Divisions in the DAL hierarchy who report to the Secretary. Under this situation, the Component Managers felt reluctant to report to a Coordinator who in practice was their subordinate. This partly contributed to the delays in the submission of expenditure reports on ASSP components and  - 20 - this often led to the inability of the ASSP coordinating office to submit timely disbursement claims to the World Bank. 19. Inadequacy of Management Capacita. Moreover, the project designers failed to gauge correctly whether the available management and coordination capacity within DAL would be adequate enough to implement ASSP. The low loan utilization levels, delays in submitting disbursement claims, the weak intra Divisional and interdepartmental linkages, indicate that the management capa- city in DAL was at best inadequate to ensure smooth implementation of ASSP. Sustainability of Project Achievements 20. Crop Research. In terms of the objectives that ASSP would improve institutional capacity of DAL so that it can provide efficient agricultural services to the province, there is a paucity of evidence to indicate any significant transference of technical skills to the provinces or strengthening of institutional capacity in DAL as a direct consequence of ASSP. However, in a survey of opinions on the development of capacity in Crop Research as result of the ASSP, over 502 of respondents indicated that the hiring of consultants have helped to give leadership and direction in crop research. 21. The extent to which capacity in research was increased by ASSP is, however, not easily discernible. The fact that only 202 of the total number of researchers who were to be trained under ASSP were actually trained illXs- trates the degree to which ASSP was unable to fully utilize its resources to increase capacity for crop research. This evidence also supports the views expressed by respondents that the gains in research capacity is ephemeral because National researchers had not been adequately trained to ensure con- tinuing in research. The ephemeral nature of the capacity gains in research may be exemplified by the inability of the Crop Research DIvision to publish any annual reports since 1986 after departure of the author/consultant of the 1983 annual report which was published in 1986. 22. Agricultural Planning, Economics, Monitoring and Evaluation. The impact of ASSP in developing staff capabilities in agricultural planning in both DAL and provincial DPIs have been imperceptible even though training through workshops were conducted in agricultural planning in all the provinces. The training vas ad hoc, lacked continuity and coverage in respect to spread to the provinces. However, an important achievement of the ASSP was the development of a sustainable capacity in monitoring and evaluation in DAL. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU) was significantly strengthened with consultancy services provided under the ASSP. The MEU of DAL continues to produce DAL's quarterly reports after the departure of Monitoring and Evaluation consultants provided under ASSP. 23. Consultancy Services. Some of the major priorities of ASSP included: the use of consultants to work with counterparts in order to trans- fer experience and skills which can be used after the departure of consul- tants. These were to be accomplished through timely recruitment of skilled overseas staff to ASSP funded positions within the first two years of the project life with the assistance of consultancv firms. The recruitment of skilled personnel by the consultancy firm has been slow and untimely even though some consultants were recruited to provide in-house training in agri-  - 21 - cultural planning, project preparation, monitoring and evaluation and in crop research. 24. The effectiveness of the services provided by consultants have been mixed. In a survey of opinion on the effectiveness of consultants over 702 of respondents indicated that most of the consultants were operationally ineffec- tive and contributed little to i.ncrease technical capacities in DAL. However, exceptional mentions of the effectiveness of consultants in the monitoring and evaluation as well as in crop research were made. 25. The ineffectiveness of the consultants have been attributed to the following: (a) high turnover and discontinuity in consultancy services. Consul- tants did not stay long in positions to provide any meaningful and significant inputs in training and transfer of technical skills; (b) the employer (Department of Agriculture and Livestock) did not fully utilize the abilities of consultants. DAL did not indicate clearly to whom the consultants reported directly, no definite job descrip- tions and specific tasks were given to consultants, rather consul- tants were used to accomplish tasks on an ad hoc basis in a classic 'crisis management" style. (c) difficulties which were encountered in appointing counterpart staff for consultants. It is interesting to note that up to date no coun- terpart staff have been identified for full attachment to ASSP con- sultAnts due to compliance to government policy on manpower ceilings; (d) delays in bureaucratic procedures to recruit overseas and national staff. especially in the issue of visas, housing and selection of applicants. (e) friction and antagonism between the consultants and some national staff. Some national officers did not get on well with some of the Consultants. This generated an environment of anxiety, rejection and negativism which were not conducive to the efficient performance of the consultants. Lessons and Recommendations for the Future 26. The success of the training component of ASSP, in terms of the degree of its impact especially on increasing staff productivity and efficiency has been rather limited. 'While this may be traced back to struc- tural and institutional problems in the Department of Agriculture and Livestock and the whole structure of the Papua New Guinea Public Service, this report intends to highlight on a number of ways in which both the Wo-ld Bank and the Government of Papua New Guinea may improve their performance to ensure that future projects achieve their intended objectives. 27. Institutional Constraints and Framework,. Preparation of institu- tional strengthening projects like ASSP should start by an analysis of  - 22 - constraints on institutional development. Using development plans and govern- ment efforts in the institutional development and what is needed to assist them in securing their gains. In particular, estimates of future manpower needs in the DAL should be assessed in light of possible policy changes. It should then be possible to make a reasonable forecast of manpower requirements and the need if any, for new types of training. The project proposal should then be related to the outcome of the above analysis. It should be determined whether the proposed project correctly identifies priority need for trained manpower and whether the project proposal actually addresses itself to the major deficiencies in the existing Department of Agriculture and Livestock. 28. Proiect Obiectives, Effects and Impacts. A basic deficiency of the ASSP was that the project objectives, effects and impacts were not specific. The project objectives were not clearly analyzed for each of the components to indicate what are to be achieved. Effects and impact of the ASSP were not clearly outlined in the project document. These essential linkages between inputs, outputs, effects and impact should be carefully identified and speci- fied as part of the project preparation exercise. Qualitative and quantita- tive indicators relevant to the project should be provided in the project document to ensure appropriate monitoring and evaluation of the project com- ponents. 29. Project Inputs: Consultancy and Fellowship. The training inputs provided under ASSP depended primarily on the recruitment of expatriate per- sonnel and award fellowships to National Officers. The delays in providing training the ineffectiveness of consultants suggest the following for the future. (a) Better Definition of Consultants AssiRnments. Most of the Consul- tants were contracted under the ASSP, this was not possible either because National staff were unavailable or the National staff were not trained. In addition, the consultants were given tasks on an ad hoc basis that precluded any effort by the consultants to train National staff. It is important to clearly spell out the job descriptions of consultants and also the amount of time and effort to be devoted by consultants to training of counterparts. These should be explicitly spelt out to ensure that the achievement of training of staff and transfer of technical skills take place simul- taneously. (b) Provide Guidelines on Appropriate Trainins Courses. In the case of ASSP, the number of manmonths expended on seminars and short-term courses were more than on long-term postgraduate courses. The value and benefits of some of the short course in increasing staff efficiency and productivity were doubtful. It appears that short courses, seminars, conferences were a more popular choice than the long-term postgraduate courses. This bias can be traced to the fact that no definite guidelines on the type of course to be attended by ASSP trainees were explicitly spelled out in the project documents. The World Bank, in fact, on an occasion rejected reimbursement claims in respect of expenditures incurred on short courses, seminars. The claims which were for training costs were considered  - 23 - to be inappropriate for disbursement under ASSP. Guidelines should be provided on types of courses in future projects. (c) Time Frame of ASSP. It has been realized that institutional development projects which are training oriented take longer periods to achieve their impacts yet projects such which are designed to achieve comprehensive changes in skill and transfer of technical knowledge are planned only with a short term time perspective. It should be recognized that institution building projects may span over one to two decades before the planned improvement institutional capacities may be realized. It is important that a long-term pers- pective is adopted from the onset at the project design stage. 30. Policy Environment of Proiject. All development efforts carried out in a country will, of course, be affected by the policies adopted by its government. Therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that when the projects are proposed, the institutions to implement them will also exist. It may be noted that governments may express their best of intentions in their policies but these may not be matched by a corresponding institutional capacity for implementation. Policies on staff recruitment, visa authorizations, housing and remunerations should be streamlined to facilitate prompt recruitment of expatriate and national officers.  - 24 - PART III STATISTICAL DATA Table 1 Project Timetable Date Date Date Item Planned Revised Actual - Identification (Issues Paper) (09182) (09/82) - Preparation/Pre-appraisal (04/82) - Appraisal Mission 08/82 06/82 - Loan/Credit Negotiations 03/83 - Board Approval 05183 - LoanlCredit Signature 07/83 - Loan/Credit Closing 06188 06/89 06/89 - Loan/Credit Completion 06/88 06/89 06/89 Comments: (Issues raises at each stage of project cycle)  - 25 - Table 2 Loan/Credit Disbursement Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Appraisal Estimate 1.8 4.9 8.8 12.0 14.1 0.0 0.0 Actual 0.1 0.6 1.4 2.2 5.8 7.7 8.41 Actual as X of Estimate 52 122 162 182 412 54Z 602 Date of Final Disbursement November 22, 1989 (1) Cancellations: $5.6 million in September 1987, due to slow implementation and exchange rate changes. $0.06 million at date of Loan account closure.  - 26 - Table 3 Proiect Implementation