India - Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 8668 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1116-IN) MAY 29, 1990 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department IV Asia Regional Office This document bas a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Cura:ency Equivalent Current Unit Rupees (Rs) Appraisal Year (August 1980) US$ 1.00 Rs 8.40 Intervening Years Axerage (1981-88) US$ 1.00 = Rs 11.42 Completion Year Average (March 1989) US$ 1.00 = Rs 15.50 Fiscal Year (GOI and GOK) April 1 - March 31 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviation AD - Agriculture Department CCA - Cultivable Command Area CIRCLE - A PWD Echelon, controlled by a Superintending Engineer DIVISION - A PWD Echelon, controlled by an Executive Engineer (approximatley four per circle) EPS - Lxecutive Project Summary FAO/CP - FAO Cooperative Programme FD - Forest Department GHATS - Western Mountain Chain GOI - Government of India GOK - Government of Karnatak HA - Hectare IIM - India Institute of Management IIS - India Institute of Science MIW - Minor Irrigation Wing O&M - Operation and Maintenance PANCHAYAT - A Locally Elected Body PWD - Public Works Department R&R -- Resettlement and Rehabilitation TIP - Tank Irrigation Project WARABUNDI - Time based Rotational Water Supply on an Area Proportional Basis  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. DC 20433 USA 0fice of DOrector-C.ral Opefitimns Viation May 29, 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project (Credit 1116-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on India - Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project (Credit 1116-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY KARNATAKA TANKS IRRTCATION PROJECT (Credit 1116-IN) PROJErT COMPLE2TTN RRPORT TARTLE __ CONTENTS PREFACE ............ EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................................... ii Objectives ............................................ ii Implementation Experience ................................ ii Results .............................................. ii Sustainability ......................................... ii Findings and Lessons Learned ............................. iii PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identity ........................................ 1 Background .... ........................................ 1 Project Objectives and Description .......................... 2 Project Design and Organization ............................ 3 Project Implementation ................................... 3 Project Results ......................................... 5 Project Sustainability ....... . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 6 Bank Performance ........ .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . 7 Borrower Performance ....... .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . 7 Project Relationships ....... . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . 8 Consulting and Supporting Services ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Project Documentation and Data ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ...................... 9 PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION ........................................ 11 Table 1 Related Bank Loans and Credits Table 2 Project Timetable Table 3 Schedule of Disbursements Table 4 Project Implementation Table 5A Project Costs Table SB Project Financing Table 6A Direct Benefits Table 6B Economic Impact Table 6C Economic Cost and Renefift St-reArn Table 6D Studies Table 7 Status of Covenants Table 8A Staff Inputs Table 8B Missions Table 9 Details of TIPs Table 10A Distribution of TIPs by Zone Table lOB Distribution of TIPs by Size This document has a restricted distribution and may b. used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisec be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  INDIA KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1116-IN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project for which Credit 11E-IN in the amount of US$54.0 M was approved on March 19, 1981. The credit was closed on March 31, 1989, three years behind schedule. i;: was fully disbursed and the last disbursement was on April 10, 1989. The PCR was prepared by the Agriculture Division of the New Deihi Kesident Mission with assistance from the Agriculture Operations Division in Asia Country Department IV (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). The Borrower completed Part II. Preparation of this PCR was initiated during the Bank's final supervision mission of the project in February 1989 and is based on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Project Agreements, Supervision reports, correspondence and internal memoranda.  - ii - ,1INDIA KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATIO1N PROJE=CT (Credit 1116-IN) PXOJECT COMPLETION RVPORT EVALUATION SUMMIARY Objectives 1. The objective of the project was to improve incomes and relieve poverty in a dry zone of India by improving the efficiency of water use. Secondary objectives wete to improve institutional capacity and to improve farmers' participation so that continuing improvement with irrigation tanks could be expected (para. 5). Implementation Experience 2. While the project made a slow start, implementation proceeded quite well thereafter (para. 12). Problems arose with funding by the State and with the supply of cement (para. 12). Initially design and construction standards were unsatisfactory but they later improved markedly (para. 13). A number of innovative studies and practices were introduced during the project (para. 14). Initially resettlement was not handled well by GOK but, finally, resettling families were treated fairly to the Bank's satisfaction (para. 16). PWD's performance on dam safety did not reach required standards (para. 16). There was, for some time, poor liaison between the Minor Irrigation Wing and the Agriculture Department (para. 17). Results 3. Taken overall the project was successful with respect to physical and institutional aspects and with respect to innovations with long term impact, but it was slow with respect to implementation. Furthermore, increased costs, the initial delays and commodity price reductions substantially reduced the economic rate of return (para. 18). The estimated economic rate of return fell from 20% at appraisal to 4% at compJetion (para. 21). However, the project is expected to have a significant impact on poverty alleviation (para. 22). The Minor Irrigation wing of PWD has gained considerable experience particularly with respect to appraisal and monitoring of projects, dam safety, rotational water supply and catchment stabilization (para. 22). A major contribution of the project has been the initiation of close involvement of beneficiary farmers at all levels of tank management (para. 24). 3 l-nt a l n ahbi I i tv 4. Due to sound design standard the structures are expected to be durable (para. 25), and due to catchment work siltation is expected to be minimized. However, the low economic rate of return raises questions about the economic sustainability which will have to be addressed in future work of this type by utilizing the results of project studies to search for lower cost approaches (para. 25).  - lli - Findings and Lessons Learned 5. The six main lessons learned appear to be the following: (i) More preparation work on establishing the staffing capa'*tities prior to project start-up would have avoided the delays cxperienced. (ii) The substantial supervision input from Bank technical staff (para. 27), combined with an imaginative management, enabled the introduction of a number of innovative technical components (para. 18). (iv) Farmer participation is essential for sound management of small irrigation systems and contact with government staff through a formal three-tier committee system appears to be a useful model (para. 24). (v) Close supervision of the project from a Bank staff field office task force appears to have enabled close contacts at the technical level which had a considerable pay-off ir' termR of flpvihilitv and innovation (paras. 27 and 28). (vi) Technical success does not ensure economic success and review of the changing economics during the implementation period might have triggered more attention to cost reducing strategies (para. 18,.  INZD1A RA1NATAKA TANKS~ TRRTaATION PROJE~CT (Credit 1116-IN) PROJECT COMPtETTON R-ZZk= PART T PROJCT REVTEW FROM RANK'S PERSPCTITVE Project Identity Name: Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project Credit Number: 1116-IN RVP Unit: Asia Region Country: India Sector: Agriculture Subsector: Irrigation Backaround 1. Following Independence, India embarked on an ambitious development program to raise agricultural production to reduce the high level of ruidl poverty, to meet the demands of its rapidly increasing population, and to reduce its dependence on imports. At the time of project formulation (1980/81) some 50% of the population were below the poverty line. Agriculture employed about 70% of the labour force, contributed about 45% of GNP, and was responsible for about 50% of exports. GOI policy was heavily dependent on irrigation development. Due to disappointing implementation and low productivity on many projects, GOI introduced the concept of Command Area Development, whereby focus was put on the lower echelons of irrigation systems with the aim of facilitating organized and equitable water distribution, and the supply of inputs. Karnataka had a population of about 35 M, growing at a rate of about 2.2% per annum. Some 70% of the working population were employed in the agriculture sector, which contributed about 48% to State Domestic Product. However, in spite of an increase in agricultural production higher than the all India average, some 70% of the rural population were still below the poverty line. 2. The Stati ;t A.i-ded -.t^ f_u. di_t!ncL t;loqyicai zones as toliows: a) the Coastal plain (3000 - 3700 mm rainfall) b) the Western Ghats, on vlrth-south (1000 - 6400 mm rainfall) mountain chain c) the Northern Plateau (500 - 900 mm rainfall) d) the Southern Plateau (500 - 750 mm rainfall)  - 2 - The major portion of annual rainfall occurs in the S.W. monsoon from June to October. Due to the unreliability of the monsoon, many areas especially in the plateaux areas suffer frequent droughts. 3. Irrigation tanks are mainly found in the southern Indian States of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and also in Sri Lanka. Tney may range from below 10 ha to over 1500 ha. An irrigation tank is a sma-1 reservoir, comprising an earth bund and a simple ungated spillway, Simple outlet sluices supply the small commands immediately downstream, normally in unlined canals. In the dry zones, the tanks intercep. the ephemeral run off from small gullies during the monsoon, and this is utilized as supplemental supply in the kharif season, and in a year of good rainfall to irrigate a short season rabi crop. In the dry zones away from perennial rivers, tanks provide the only source of water, and in addition to irrigation supply to their commands, they provide improved seepage to groundwater for irrigation by pumping. 4. In the State, tanks have tr.ditionally been operated informally by the beneficiaries, with a government employee controlling the supply at the dam in the larger tankF. This ad hoc management has led in many cases to inequitable water allocation. Tank maintenance is by the Irrigation Wing of the Public Works Department for those over 200 ha, but below this size they are the responsibility of the Zilla Panchayats (local elected bodies). In general, maintenance is minimal due to wide dispersion and lack of funds. Project Objectives and Desr --,on 5. The project objective was to construct a number of new irrigation tanks in those areas where large surface water development was not feasible to increase the efficiency of water resources use, and to relieve poverty in the dry zones'. Secondary objectives consisted of improving GOK's capability to prepare, appraise, design, construct and operate tank irrigation projects (TIPs), to increase farmers' participation, and to expand the State hydro-meteorological facilities. 6. Project components are detailed in Table 4, Part III. These are summarized as: a) The construction of about 120 - 160 TIP's with an aggregate command area of some 25,000 ha cultivable command area (CCA); b) the establishment of rainfall, stream-gauging and agro-climatic stations in representative locations in the State; c) the development of a computer assisted runoff model based on regional rainfall and catchment characteristics to improve yield estimates of TIPs; d) the study and subsequent introduction of water users' groups for TIP management; and e) the study of water charges with recommendations for their enhancement. 7. Technical criteria indicated that TIPs should generally be between 20 ha to 2000 ha command. Each would have an earthfill embankment, an ungated masonry/concrete spillway, one or more outlet sluices, and a lined canal system down to 8 ha level. Thereafter earth channels would deliver to individual farms. It was GOK policy to follow a size distribution of one third 20 ha to 100 ha; one  - 3 - third 100 ha to 200 ha, and the balance 200 ha to 2000 ha. In order to bring maximum contribution to poverty alleviation, some 65% of TIPs would be in Lhc dty zones and 29% in transitional zonco. Table lOA, rart III indicates the tentative regional distribution by area of project TIPs. Table lOB indicates a more detailed size distribution. 8. Project cost estimates at appraisal are given in Table bA, Part III. Total project cost, including price and physical contingencies, was estimated at Rs. 650.0 M (Us$ 77.4 M). A weighted average cost for TIP construction was estimated at Rs. 21,300/ha, almost double the costs (at 1980 prices) for major and medium schemes. Project Design and Organization 9. The project as conceived was very pertinent to the national, State and sectoral requirements. It was positively defined, both in terms of in3titutional and technical parameters. Having been prepared and apprdised in concert with GOK, there was tull agreement and understanding of the project objectives. The project was not innovative with respect to physical components at appraisal, but this was changed during execution. What was innovative was the introduction of computerized yield estimation studies by analytical means rather than the inaccurate empirical Strange's formula, and the introduction of farmers' participation in formal committees in the management and operation of TIPs. Both responded to perceived weakness in TIP design and operation. The water charges study was appropriate for full recovery of 0 & M costs. 10. The project appears to have been well researched, prepared, and anpraised. The SAR is detailed, concise and clear, and gave positive guidance to both GOK project staff and Bank supervisions. The institutional strengthenina included under the project made for efficient selection, appraisal and monitoring of project TIPs. Pro 1ect Implementation 11. The project made a very slow start, due mainly to GOK's inability to provide adequate trained technical staffl, and to very serious delays in the formation of the many newly created organizations under the project. Table 3, Part III shows the record of disbursements, and it is noted that significant expenditure did not occur before mid 1983, some two years after effectiveness. Indeed, by September 1982, only four TIPs had actually commenced construction, five were approved, and only 21 appraised. 12. Once the project gained momentum in earlv 1983 it proceeded steadily. It was, however, beset in its later years by severe State funding constraints, which were responsible mainly for the need to extend the closing date by three years. With full funding support, it is considered that only a two year extension would have been required. Another constraint which arose at intervals was the shortage of cement supplies, which was partly due to the 'levy' system of supply to governments at lower cost than to the public. This system has now been abolished. 13. The technical staff of the Minor Irrigation Wing (MIW) of the Public Works 1/ Government argues that there was no inadequacy of trained staff and that delays were due mainly to time taken to do surveys, studies, land acquisition. etc.  - 4 - and construction standards were not to the desired levels, but following considerable FAO/CP and Bank technical assistance, these improved markedly, demonstrating the willinqness of the engineeLs to modify their practices. A major problem was the practice of PWD to rotate its staff between irrigation, buildings, and road winqs, such that none was specialized. Partly due to Bank representation, this policy was amended during the course of the nroject, such that those staff opting for irrigation were not rotated to other branches. Standards subsequently improved. 14. A positive and imaginative management permitted the introduction of additional studies and practices during the course of the project. These included: a} The use of vetiver (khus) grass in catchment erosion control; b) the model testing of an unconventional spillway weir; c) the testing on one TIP of a new precast channel system; d) the introduction of the north Indian designs of outlet and control structures; e) the introduction of the north Indian system of warabundi (time based rotational water supply on an area proportional basis); f) the use of gabions (rock baskets) for earth slope protection; and g) the introduction of a further study to permit rapid computer based flood prediction using an improved computation system. 15. Studies carried out under the project are listed and described in Table 6D of Part III. The most successful was that carried out by Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Bangalore on the system of committees for tank management and operation. The study of catchment yield carried out by Anna University, Madras, was incomplete, therefore, at the suggestion of the Bank, a proposal to continue the study with the Indian Institute of Science (IIS), Bangalore is under consideration. The recently introduced flood study has been awarded to Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay, and is progressing satisfactorily. 16. Resettlement and rehabilitation (R & R) of families displaced was only significant on two TIPs. For a conside. )le period, successive Bank missions reported adversely on GOK's processing uf resettlement and compensation practices, but finally the families were fairly treated to the Bank's satisfaction. With respect to dam safety PWD's performance failed to reach the required standards. Designs of dams were scrutinized by the Dam Review Panel (DRP) but cor?liance with this condition was delayed. in addition, the compliance reporLs by PWD M.W circles were invariably very delayed (up to two years), and were not always responsive. Following Bank representations, this was partly corrected in the latter period of the project. 17. Construction standards and quality control were variable. Although two quality control divisions were especially created, Bank missions reported adversely on quality of construction, especially on canal systems. A further major failing over much of the project period was the very poor liaison between MIW and the Agriculture Department (AD). (This point is disputed by GOK.) This was subsequently improved following persistent Bank representations. Staffing  was subsequently improved following persistent Bank representations. Staffing constraints in the AD extension services persisted throughout. The association of Forest Department (PD) however in catchmient stabilization was very positive. Proiect Results 18. Taker, overall, the project may be considered quite successful with respect to physical and institutional aspects and with respect to innovations with long term impact, but slow with respect to implementation. Furthermore, increased costs, delays in implementation and comnmodity price reductions substantially reduced the economic rate of return. It would have been useful to have probed the economics at an earlier stage during implementation. This might have triggered a search for lower cost, more selective approaches. 34 of the 78 TIPs have been comoleted in all respects and are yielding some benefits on 16,800 ha, 30 more are in advanced construction, and all will be fully completed by June 1991 when the irrigated area will reach 24,100 ha. In addition to the physical achievements, the following results are evident: a) Water charges were raised genetally in Karnataka on January 1, 1989 based on project study recommendations. b) A three tier TIP committee system has been evolved from project studios, which comprises the Tank Management Committee, the Irrigation Scheduling Committee, and the Sluice Committee. All fully involve the beneficiary farmers, and MIW, AD, Panchayat and Revenue Department, and the results reported are favourable. The system is likely to be extended. c) The model tests on the labyrinth weir (a zig-zag weir design which at lower cost effectively stretches the length of the crest) and subsequent designs indicate large cost savings and significantly improved hydraulic efficiency. d) The trials of plastic and fibre-glass reinforced cement concrete precast channels on one TIP were very promising. e) The use of vetiver grass in catchment stabilization will, with modest cost, reduce the rate of siltation of tanks. 19. Reference to Table 9, Part III indicates the district and zonal distribution of TIPs, with their command areas, stages of completion, cost estimates and completion dates. It is significant, i.i common with many projects in India, that the distribution and micro systems invariably lag behind dam construction. 20. The estimate of final project cost is shown in Table 5A, Part III, from which it is noted that the overall project cost estimate has risen in nominal Rupee terms from Rs. 650 M (US$ 77 M) at appraisal to Rs. 1225 M (US$ 79 M) at full development. In 1989-90 constant rupee prices this represented a 51% real increase. Specific costs for TIP construction from Table 5A indicate an escalation of base costs from Rs. 21,170/ha in 1980 prices at appraisal to Rs. 50,850/ha at present prices. Reasons for cost increases include both price and quantity increases over SAR Projections. 21. Direct benefits emanating from the project are given in Table 6A, Part III. It should be noted that all indicators, except benefitting farm families and increase in employment, are estimated to be as at appraisal. There has been insufficient time since completion of the command areas to obtain reliable yield  - 6 - being less than at appraisal, these two indicators both show significant increases over appraisal estimates. Project economic impact estimates at appraisal and at present are indicated in Table 6B, Part III, supported by Table 6C. Here a dramatic reduction from 20% ERR at appLdisal to below 4% on present estimate is noted. As crop production estimates have not changed much, this reduction is due principally to cost increases, delayed benefits, and fall in commodity prices. 22. The project will, however, have a major impact on poverty alleviation in the drier zones, where the TIPs constructed will provide the main source of extended water supply for both irrigation and domestic purposes. There will be no adverse environmental effects. The MIW has gained considerably by its experience due to the institutional aspects of the project, especially with regard to selection and appraisal of irrigation projects, including economic considerations; monitoring of projects with improved quality control surveillance; dam safety; rotational water supply; and catchment stabilization. The MIW has also been motivated to review and investijate improved and more cost effective technical components. 23. Little was expended under the project for the hydrometeorological aspects. The State hydrology services have absorbed this component under their no-raal activities. 24. A major contribution of the project has been the attempt to ensure involvement of the beneficiary farmers at all levels of tank management and operation through the three-tier committee system. This also has the advantage of bringing the farmers into periodic contact with the MIW, AD, Revenue Department and Panchayats; something which would not occur under the previous arrangement. While evaluations show that this did not work well in all tanks, there are a number of tanks uhere these committees are alread: demonstrating their marked influence on farmer cropping coordination, equity of distribution, solving of disputes, and irrigation efficiency. This model is ready for extrapolation throughout India, not only for TIPs. Finally, due to a project study, GOK has revised water rates to more realistic levels. roje,t Sustainability 25. As the TIPs under the project have been constructed to higher quality standards than those under the normal Panchayat/State program, it is ;inticipated that they will be durable and lasting. In addition, the involvement of Forest Department in the stabilization of their catchments will result in reduced rates of tank siltation, a major cause for reduced production. As spillways have been sized according to improved procedures, and as the embankments have been based on correct soil mechanics principles, the risk of tank breach is much reduced. However, a worrying aspect of the project is the much increased costs per hectare and the impact that has had on the economic rate of return and hence the economic sustainability of tank development. This must signal the need to search for lower cost approaches in the future, with greater selectivity in the structural works. 26. There are no substantial future management risks in the project; indeed the evidence to date on the new management and operation system indicates continuing improved performance. Only the perceived weakness in the agricultural extension services is considered to be a constraint, GOK his been persistently reminded of its importance, and are teking action in this direct4on.  -.7- Bank Performance 27. Bank activities throughouc the project cycle are shown in detail in Table 8B, and a summaxy of Bank manpower inputs are given in Table 8A, Part III. From the former, it is noted that the Bank and FAO/CP gave above normal technical support to the farmers' organization studies and to technical training of the engineers in system design. What is less evident from this table is thc additional large input from Bank engineers of technical advice which resulted in MIW carrying out trials on improved (and experimental) hydraulic structures and linings, and the commissioning of additional hydrological studies. 28. Although Bank supervision/technical assistance missions paid above average attention to system operation, institutions, water management and engineering, a major criticism is the almost total lack of agricultural supervision between Credit effectiveness in May 1981 and early 1985, when the supervision task force concept was introduced in New Delhi Office. Thereafter it received its just recognition, and exposed many weaknesses in agricultural support services which are now being addressed. The Bank was also less than attentive to R & R in the early years of project implementation and to the economic issues later on. Due to the imprecise hydrology component, the Bank supervisions were somewhat complacent over this aspect. 29. A major lesson to be learned from this project is that in India, where irrigation projects are invariably under the direction cf State Irrigation Departments which are construction oriented, which contain limited staff with specialist design expertise or exposure to the latest techniques, and which are reluctant to employ specialist consultants, technical assistance by Bank specialists can play a very important role in improving project designs and operation. Without such input here, the project would have been another standard development project without advancing into new achievements. Experience has shown elsewhere in India that to specify such innovations in the project is not sufficient to ensure their acceptance and development; rather constant and persistent monitoring and representation to governments are also required. 30. In summary, the Bank performed well at most stages of the project cycle with the exception of the quite serious weaknesses raised in para 28 above, and generally utilized its staff, consultants, and FAO/CP in a balanced and effective manner. Staff supervision inputs were high, but with a statewide, dispersed project of this nature this was inevitable. Borrower Performance 31. The initial period of project execution indicated that MIW was not prepared institutionally or in staff establishment to mobilize and operate the many newly created organizations for planning, appraisal, quality control and monitoring of TIPs. It was not until mid 1983, some two years after effectiveness, that these organizations became effective. Staffing deficiencies, especially at Assistant and Junior Engineer levels however persisted over much of the project period. The PWD had traditionally rotated its engineers between its various wings, resulting in lack of specialist expertise. This was particularly evident with respect to hydraulic designs and TIP layouts. Although FAO/CP and Bank specialists gave numerous training sessions, the over rapid rotation of the recipients reduced the effectiveness of the exercise. Later, after GOK had agreed to permit staff to serve continuously in a particular wing, this problem was largely resolved.  - 8 - 32. There were, earlier on, certain weaknesses in GOK's performance pertaining to R & R, dam safety, and poor liaison between hIW and AD with respect to extension. These shortcomings were later rectified following Bank representations, although AD's capacity does not appear to have improved. Other failings by GOK which adversely affected project implementation were the severe financial restrictions of 1987/88, and failure to procure adequate quantities of cement at intervals. GOK was in default of covenants under Section 3.02 (farmers' organization) and 3.03 (water charges) even after they were rescheduled to September 30, 1987 and December 31, 1987 respectively, but were subsequently brought into compliance. Audited accounts for several years were submitted late to the Bank. 33. Having pointed out the weaknesses in borrower performance, it must be stated that overall, following the initial mobilization problems and delays, MIW demonstrated a very professional and positive approach to the project. Project management was strong and decisive, and the Minor Irrigation Committee and other organizations functioned efficiently. A major strength of this management was to encourage and develop new technical and institutional ideas, such that the project is now a model for TIP development in India. Monitoring and reporting became well developed and comprehensive. At final Bank supervision, the project was awarded a '1' rating in all four indicators, a rare event in Indian projects. Project Relationships 34. Throughout preparation, appraisal and supervision, the officials of GOK and its concerned organizations were invariably most cooperative towards Bank missions, and excellent rslations prevailed throughout, even at those times when Bank had perforce to make critical comments on their performance. This was always accepted pragmatically in the spirit in which they were made. Due to this, it was possible to maintain a constructive dialogue, which was in large measure responsible for the project's substantial measure of success. Consulting and Supporting Services 35. The project was unusual in the large number of consultants it utilized for the studies pertaining to farmers' organizations, water charges, catchment yield, and floods. All were well conducted, although the hydrological studies are continuing. All construction was by contractors, which were generally adequate with respect to dam construction, but inadequate in canal construction. More recently the rate of canal construction has been increased. Project Documentation and Data 36. The conditionality was weak in the following respects: a) No legal covenant was included to ensure the fair and prompt treatment of displaced persons from the TIP reservoir areas. b) No mention was made of the requirement for agricultural supporting services to assist the TIPs, nor for conservation measures in the catchments. In other respects, the conditionality was adequate.  - 9 - 37. The SAR was well written, and presented the project and its components adequately for project execution and to guide Bank supervisions. GOK cooperated fully and promptly with data provision for FCR preparation, although there was considerable delay in finalizing their Part II of che PCR. i ARZ I T P(OJ_T RWVTRW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPPECTTVR! 38. The adequacy of the factual information contained in Part III of the PCR is confirmed. 39. Bank's performance during the evolution and implementation of the project was quite frequent, timely and appreciable. The designs introduced by the Bank as against the standard Minor Irrigation (M.I.) designs are aimed at greater efficiency in water delivery and management and evolving safer appropriate designs ensuring stability of the structures. The model studies conducted under the guidance of the Bank were quite useful in arriving at the details of hydrology, discharge characteristics in each of the agro-climate zones distributed throughout the State of Karnataka, particularly for M.I. Tanks with small catchment areas. The system of warabundi suggested for distribution of water through a system of micro-networks scientifically evolved to benefit the tail-end farmers, and for equitable distribution, is commendable. 40. The design of hydraulic stru';tures such as ungated semi-modular outlets for equitable distribution with proportionate distributors will be helpful for the farmers' participation in management of water depending upon the crop pattern. 41. The visit of the Bank missions to the tank irrigation projects, in helping the field staff to maintain the standards of construction, was a most important guiding factor. The lessons learned on these projects, especially after the pilot project studies, were helpful in implementing the other M.I. projects and also future projects to come. 42. The technical innovations and approaches with new technical inputs initiated by the Bank were quite exemplary and the follow-up action taken thereon by the Bank in implementing the same during every visit have helped the field staff to implement them successfully to the satisfaction of the Bank, who also expressed appreciation in several field reports to Government. 43. The innovative technical inputs that have made the tank irrigation projects quite successful are: i) construction of ungated semi-modular outlets; the introduction of such a structure has not only saved the disorders in manual operation but also controlled timely quantum distribution up to the last point under the farmers' own managing agency.  - 10 - ii) construction of proportional distributories. iii) construction of tail clusters. iv) construction of special turnouts for feeding water to reach every survey number in the block. v) the fibre-glass lining, laybrinth weir, overshot gates, and gabion, have been taken up as an experimental study and the behaviors of the same will be studied further. 44. The relationship between the Bank and borrower was quite cordial, educating and guiding in successful implementation of the project from inception to the closing date. 45. The IDA was the sole assisting agency for the project and there were no other cofinanciers.  - 1i - STATTRTTCTr A NTFORMj