Ghana - Volta Agricultural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 8765 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GHANA VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1009-GH) JUNE 18, 1990 Agriculture Operations Division Western Africa Department Africa Regional Office TIs document has a restited dbutio anl may be used by oly I the o Of thei offiefil dutese Its content may uu othewise be dcledWouddBn uhd.lu  GLOSSARY OF A3B1EVIATIONS ASRP Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project BPP Bovine Pleurisy Programme CIDA Canadian International Development Association CFO Chief of Field Operations CRI Crop Research Institute CSIR Commission for Social and Industrial Research FASCOM (VR) Farmers Services Company (Volta Region) FAO Food and Agricultural Organization FSC Farmers Services Centre GOO Government of Ghana GIMPA Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration IDA International Development Association IDA (Ghana) Irrigation Development Authority IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IITA International Institute for Tropical Agriculture MOA Ministry of Agriculture M&E Monitoring and Evaluation ODA Overseas Development Administration PPMED Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (MOA) RAC Regional Agricultural Co-ordinator RMWA Resident Mission to West Africa REVIEW In-Depth Review Mission (IDA/IFAD) SAR Staff Appraisal Report T&V Training and Visit System UST (Kumasi) University of Science and Technology VORADEC Volta Regional Agriculture Development Executive Committee VORADEP Volta Region Agricultural Development Project  FOR OFFCAL UR OLY THE WORtL DANK Washmgtou, D.C. 20433 USA. Oht. d DOmtor-G.tut O0*Mm twiglm June 18. 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOzS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Ghana - Volta Region Atricultural Develoyment Pro4ect (Credit 1009-GH) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Ghana - Volta Region Agricultural Development Project (Credit 1009-GH)" prepared by the Government of Ghana, with an overview memorandum prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operatiors Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a retrictd distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oMicia duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wodd Dank authrntion.  FOR OFFCiL US ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1009-GH) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface .......................... ........................... i Basic Data Sheet .ii Evaluation Summary. iv IDA OVERVIEN OF THE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT .ix PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. 1 II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. 2 IIT. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .. ............................... 10 IV. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE .19 V. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT .26 VI. ECONOfIC RATE OF RETURN ................ 31 VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT .35 VIII. SPECIAL ISSUES .43 TABLES COST AND BENEFIT TABLES: 1. Administration .................. , . , . . 49 2. Land Use Planning .50 3. Agricultural Research .51 4. Roads Program .52 5. Boreholes/Water Supply .53 6. Extension Services .54 7. FASCOM. 55 8. Livestock Activities .56 9. Fisheries Development .........................., 57 10. VORADEP .58 1. Rate of Return, Data and Assumptions. 59 2. Research and Extension .64 3. Input Supply .''.. ''.... '.. 81 4. Livestock and Fisheries ............................,. 94 5. Rural Infrastructure .99 6. Monitoring and Evaluation .117 ATTACHMENT I - Comments from the Ministry of Agriculture .119 MAPS 1. IBRD Map 12798R 2. IBRD I(ap 12802 3. IBRD Map 12805 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of ther official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GHANA VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1009-G0l PREF-ACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Volta Region Agricultural Development Project in Ghana, for which Credit 1009-GH in the amount of US$29.5 million was approved on April 22, 1980. The loan was closed on December 31, 1988, three years behind schedule after cancellation of US$0.7 million. The last disbursement was in June 1989. The PCR consists of a main report prepared by the Government of Ghana, supplemented by an Overview prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division of the Western Africa Department, Africa Regional Office. The PCR is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Credit Agreement; supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and t1he Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda. This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and IFAD for comments and they are attached to the Report (Attachment I).  - ii- GHANA VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Ci.rdlt 1009-GHA) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as Estimate Estimated X of Project Cost (Cadis million) 137.1 975.6 712X Project Cost (US$ million) 40.7 43.8 90X Credit Amount (U8} million) 29.6 28.8 06X Date of Board Approval 04/22/80 Date of Effectiveness 03/31/81 Closing Date 12/31/85 12/31/88 Economic Rate of Return (X) 16 16 1OOX Number of Direct 8eneficiarios 60,000 90,000 1S6X (farm households) Cumulative Disbursements FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY8S FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) 4.8 13.1 20.2 24.7 29.5 Actual (US$ in) 0.1 0.7 3.2 4.0 6.7 / 7.8 14.4 17.5 28.8 Actual as X of Estimate 2.1 6.3 15.8 16.9 22.7 Date of Final Disbursement (arous d June, 30, 1989) STAFF INPUTS (Staff Weeks) FYM7 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY8S FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 Prappraisal 40* Appraisal 34- Negotiations 8* Supervision 3.4 9.2 17.6 31.S 10.5 6.9 10.6 7.9 2.0 TOTAL *Thes are estimates. Actual date are not available. 1/Sourco: Supervision Report of 7/3/89  - iii- MISSION DATA Darte Number of Mondays Specielizations Performance Trend Types of Mission (mo/yr) Persons in Fi-ld Represented c/ Rating cl Problems / Identification ?/V6 1 6 a _ _ _ Preappraleal 1-2/77 6 150 a,b,c - - - ApprAisal 1-2/79 8 170 a,b,d,-,t,g _ - - Supervision 1 12/80 1 3 * 2 1 0 Supervision 2 4/81 2 14 *,b 1 2 0 Supervision 3 7-8/81 1 7 b 2 2 O,1 Supervision 4 12/81 1 6 a 2 2 M,F Supervision 6 7/82 2 10 *,- 2 2 P,l Supervision 8 2/83 4 52 a,b,-,h 2 2 M,P Supervision 7 C/88 2 14 *,h 2 3 M,0 Supervision 8 2/84 4 44 *,o,f,i 3 2 M,O,F Supervision 9 10/84 2 14 a,o 3 2 M,F,O Supervision 10 4/86 1 4 a 3 1 M,F,O Supervision 11 11/86 2 12 a,. q 3 S Supervision 12 9/88 2 S a,* 3 3 Supervision 13 4/87 2 18 a,0 2 2 Supervision 14 11/8? 1 6 2 2 Supervision 15 11/88 1 S * 2 2 o/a r Agriculturist, b = Economist, c ^ Livestock Specialist, d = Extension Specialist, f = Engineer, 9 a Loan Officer, h = Operations Assistant, I = Fisheries Specialist. b/l - problem free or minor problem; 2 moderate problms; 3 = major probims. c/i 1 improving; 2 = stationary. iff f Financial; M = Management; T = Technical; 0 a Othtr; P = Politica.i ;,No data available. V/New Form 690 in use that shows rating for ovorall status (year 198S). OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower - Republic of Ghana Executing Agency - Volta Region Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and Farmers' Servi;es Company (Volta Region) (FASCOI - VR) Fiscal Year of Borrower - January 1 - December 31 - July 1 - June 30 (before 1983) CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) - Cedi (C) Appraisal Year Average - US11.00 2 C2.75 Intervening Y-ors Average - Cl.1(19?7); C1.S2(1978); C2.79 (1979-1982); C3.45 (1983); C12.0S (1984); C64.1 (1985); C89.3 (1988); C149.2S (1987); Completion Year Average (1988) - C1?8.57  - iv - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1009-GH) Evaluation Summary Introduction 1. This is the eighth lending operation for the development of Ghana's Agricultural Sector. The Volta Region Project followed in concept and design the Upper Region agricultural development project financed by the IDA in 1976. The project included agricultural services, input supplies, rural infrastructure and training components. Objectives 2. In the late seventies, the Government of Ghana (GOG) introduced policy changes, (e.g., reduction of fertilization subsidies and increase in producer prices for cocoa), decentralized agricultural development planning and implementation, and reaffirmed the importance of smallholder development. In support of these changes, the project sought to increase agricultural production, farm incomes and welfare, particularly of the smallholders in the Volta Region, thtough the provision of a basic agricultural services package, concentrating primarily on major field crops. About 60,000 farm families each cultiviting about 2.1 ha farm on the average were to be directly benefitted from the project. The project includeds improved extension services, credit and training for farmers; livestock and fisheries development; the construction of 65 farm service centers for the distribution of farm inputs, staff housing and project offices; construction and improvement of about 650 km of access and feeder roads; rural water supply; strengthening of the MOA's Regional Office; and consultant services. Implementation Experiences 3. The pxoject was expected to be completed in five years in i985, but it took three more years to complete. The project start-up was very slow -- it was effective in March 1981, but it was not until a year later that most of the key staff, including the international staff, were recruited. The position of the Civil Engineer was not filled until March 1982, and this contributed to the poor implementation of the Civil Works component during the first three years. The project period coincided with a period of political changes and serious economic and budgetary difficulties. Adverse weather conditions during 1983-84 also hindered the prog-ess of the project. During the early years, adequate and timely release of Government funds and fertilizer allocation for the project posed problems. In addition, staff inadequacies and low morale, lack of clear definition of some components (e.g. livestock and fisheries) and inadequate working arrangements with agencies in other sectors (e.g. Ghana Water  - v - Supply Company and Ghana Highway Authority) for the water and road components resulted in project performance in the first three years well below expectations at appraisal. 4. In early 1984, an IDA/IFAD mission was requested by the GOG to make an In-Depth Review of the situation. The major revisions proposed by the mission were accepted by the GOG. These included increase in the target group to 90,000 farm households and addition of a *semi-improved' category of farm practices within a higher target area. Input supply was to be offered to all farmers in the Region, and extension staff was to be increased. The infrastructure and the livestock programs were modified in the light of project experience and reassessment of needs. These changes and the replacement of the expatriate staff by a team recruited through a consulting firm revitalized the project and gave it a new momentum. With greater availability of fertilizers and other inputs and availability of Government budgetary funds for the project, implementation greatly improved in the later years. 5. The PCR points out that evaluation of the projects' financia'. history in terms of appraisal expectations is difficult due to the changes in the mix of activities following the 1984 in-depth review, delays in implementation in early years, and major variations in the exchange rate and domestic inflation. In general terms, however, the actual monetary expenses denominated in cedis have been much greater than envisaged, due to domestik inflation, and in dollar terms these have been more than offset by the decline in the value of the cedi. Government contribution was basically available, except in the early years when, partly due to the general economic situation and partly due to difficulties in the release of capital funds in Accra, there were shortfalls. Consequently, the contractors were unwilling to undertake VORADEP works, and the project funded some expenditures through the operation oGf a local account. In general, loan and local funds were efficiently administered, and budgeting and reporting functions were satisfactory, except in the case of PASCOM where performance varied considerably from one year to the next. Delays, however, occurred with the auditing of accounts by the locally appointed auditors, due to pressure of work. The PCR concludes that the project represented a considerable degree of decentralization of financial autonomy, which appeared workable. 6. The organizational and management performance was generally satisfactory. A degree of structural flexibility was allowed to meet changing needs. The PCR, however, mentioned that the IDA/IFAD supervisory missions dealt more with the Project Management; VORADEC, the Committee responsible at the regional level for overseeing the project, and the policy makers at the ministerial level in Accra had less direct exposure to the recomiendations of the missions which apparently lost useful leverage. Review of the Supervision Reports and Aides Memoire, however, show that the missions had regularly met with the concerned ministers and senior officials on policy and other major issues affecting the project, and that at least one mission attended an emergency meeting of the VORADEC. It was appropriate for the missions, however, to let the Project Manager formally deal with the higher echelons, particularly at the Regional level, to lay the foundations for effective management capacity, cosuunication and problem resolution procedures.  - vi - 7. Within the crop development program, the Adaptive Research Component was successful in realizing its main objectives. Useful collaboration concerning on-farm trials with the Ghana Grain Development Board for maize led to recommendations on the best variety suited for the project area; the Research Department started prodicing these varieties of seed maize for sales to farmers. The extension and training part of the project achieved impressive results, especially since the introduction of a unified T&V System. This enabled the project to increase the target population by fifty percent and attain a more favorable extension worker/farmer ratio around 1:500 (1:900 pre-project). Home extension, incorporated with the main extension service, achieved substantial results through its programs focussing on women and youth. The input supply through FASCOH, a new organization, has been erratic due to operational difficulties, particularly transport, timely availability of fertilizer and sufficient seeds, and conflict between the intention to let FASCOM operate as a commercial company and the Government's control of input prices and procurement. The divergence between target and actuals of sales of fertilizer and improved seeds was quite marked. This was partly due to supply problems and timing; SAR estimates of fertilizer usage and crop areas may also have been optimistic. GOG is now committed to privatization of fertilizer sales and removal of subsidy. 8. The livestock and fisheries developments were vaguely specified in the SAR and little progress was made in the first two years. After the organizatioual and technical changes following the 1984 Review, implementation of both these items registered major improvements, though relatively less for the fisheries compone:st. Coverage of cattle by anti- rinderpest vaccination increased from 69 percent in 1984 to nearly 90 percent in 1985-86, and with the completion of 12 dips in 1987, the dipping program target was reached. In fisheries, overall fish pond construction and stocking in commercial and household sectors was satisfactory. Following two consultants' studies under the project, a pilo*: project was zecommended for determining the feasibility of brackish warer aquaculture. On the infrastructural side, ach.evement was mixed. With the completion of the expanded road program, better access and communications wil. benefit the farming population. The building program was very much delayed with attainment of about 83 percent of middlelsenior level staff housing and 15 percent of junior staff housing. The office building program (50 percent achievement) has improved working conditions and the 34 village FSCs will improve input distribution. The project has drilled 246 successful wells which account for about one-third of all wells currently in the Region (78 percent of wells in the Northern Zone). The program has contributed to health and welfare through improved rural water supply. The SAR proposals for the irrigstion component was over-optimistic, since a long time is required for planning and design of irrigation systems. The project achievement has been data collection and design of 7 pilot irrigation schemes, against a target of completion of 10 such schemes during the project period. Results 9. At appraisal, the main direct benefits of the project were expected to be derived from crop yield increases. Reliable data on yield  - vii - increases with or without the project were, however, not collected. Based on sample survey by the monitoring and evaluation department in 1986, it appears that for maize for which the estimates are reasonably firm, significant yield improvement resulted fL3m fertilizer application. The 1986 survey showed maize yield well above the appraisal estimate. This can be attributed to the concentration of the extension services on maize component of the crop program and its success. The best estimates for other crops under the project appear favorable when compared with Appraisal yields. The project experience demonstrated the contribution of certain cultural practices in generating increases in yields over and above that obtained by improved seed and fertilizer application. 10. The PCR estimates the benefits derived from the crop development program. The largest single source of benefit arises from incremental maize production. Additional benefits are estimated for several componente e.g., roads, boreholes, FASCOM,, livestock and fisheries development. The project is estimated to have a 16 percent internal economic rate of return, which is the same as the rate of return calculated at appraisal in 1980. The returns well exceed the real opportunity cost of capital. However, the PCR points out that the nature cf benefits realized is different from those projected at appraisal, both with regard to the extent of benefits from the crop development program, and to the range of returns from other components. Sustainability 11. The project sustainab.lity involves the question of whether the improved agricult'tral productivity, farm incomes and the rural infrastructure would be maintained and enhanced in future years. In order to ensure continued focus on overall developments in the region, VORADEC, the overseeing inter-agency committee for the project, may need to be maintained. A composite approach to budgeting in the Region will also be essential as returns from crop development depend upon investments continuing to be made in extension as well as in rural infrastructure. The financial and administrative responsibilities regarding feeders roads. boreholes and water supply maintenance are in the process of being handed over to the respective sector authorities, which presently have the financial and technical resources to sustain them. For the critical constraints to agricultural development-research, extension services and collection and management o. _nformation for planning, and policy making, a provision of $1.2 million of external financing has been made for the Volta Region under the IDA financed Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Project for three years. This would ensure continued funding for activities which have shown good results, until VORADEP becomes fully integrated into the Government's overall extension, research and M&E Systems. Finding and Lesslons 12. Some of the main lessons to be learned from the VORADEP experience are: (a) Detailed institutional and staffing arrangements for the execution and coordination of area development projects should be worked out at Appraisal-Negotiations stage;  - viii - (b) A mid-term project review is essential for all projects. Its timing. particularly for a large multi-purpose regional developuent project, is to be judiciously determined- (c) For coverage by extension services and impact on production, it should be recognized that the farmers will adopt improved cultural practices and make input application at varying speeds and at different levels; this is important to the setting of realistic targets in the first place; and (d) It is difficult, if not impossible, for the government to operate even semi-autonomous services (e.g. input supply), simultaneously based on commercial and development considerations which often do not coincide.  - ix - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GHANA VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1009-GH) IDA Overview of the Project Completion Report 1. The Completion Report was prepared by consultants for the Government of Ghana (GOG) for the Volta Region Agricultural Development Project (VORADEP), covering the period 1981-88. The report is in one volume and includes six annexes covering various aspects of the project. The main report provides a good overall coverage of the project, is well structured, compares achievements in each section with the expectations of the staff appraisal report and offers an analysis of lessons learned for each major component. Taking into account the limitatior. of data, the annexes covering all the components are well prepared. Since adequate coverage of project performance is provided in the PCR, this overview will focus on those areas which impinge upon future preparation and execution of agricultural projects in Ghana. These include the project design and organization; implementation experience and project review; extension and input supply; IDA and Borrower performance; and project sustainability and future development. From these areas, some lessons will be drawn for future IDA projects in the country. Proiect Design and Organization 2. In the late seventies, GOG started to accord higher priority to agriculture and by 1980, it accounted for about 8 percent of the total budget, compared to only 3 percent in 1971. GOG policy changbs at the same time, recognized the key role of smallholders, allowed increase in producer prices for cocoa and a beginning was made to reduce fertilizer subsidies. Measures were also initiated to decentralize agricultural development planning and implementation. The project, seeking to support these policy changes, was prepared by the Bank's Regional Mission for West Africa. It was designed on the pattern of a similar IDA financed regional agricultural development project in the Upper Region of Ghana. The project was *-ased on the premises that the technology to be applied for agricultural improvements was si.ple and well tested under local conditions, and with extension work and input availability, the adoption rate of the farmers would be high. Also, the Ministry of Agriculture's Regional Office staffing was adequate for project implementation, and coordination with other related Government Agencies (e.g. Ghana Water Supply Company and the Ghana Highway Authority) could easily be ensured. Expatriate staff and consultants would be needed, however, in selected disciplines within the project management. For input procurement and distribution, a new Farmers'  -x - Services Company (FASCOM) was to be set up in the Region, as was done for the project in the Upper Region. The project was to be Jointly financed by the IDA, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Government and Banking institution. 3. The traditional part of the project design was the concept of area development with a variety of components as diverse as crop development, livestock and fisheries, irrigation and water supply. roads and houses, nutrition extension, and training. Having the project organization sttuctured within the Regional administrative framework (which the Appraisal Mission considered adequate), and taking into account the operational experience of the on-going regional project the mission was sanguine about its implementation. The Mission's confidence was also founded on the fact that the proposed technology was simple and would not require major changes in the traditional farming system and institutions. 4. The inevitable question that arises in respect of the project concept and design is whether the project should have concentrated on a few and more directly related items. Undoubtedly, a diverse project, partly depending on agencies in other sectors, imposes demanding management and coordination responsibilities on the project entity. In addition to the reasons in the previous paragraph, the IDA's decision to support an area development project resulted froms (a) obvious Government desire to improve the income and welfare of the Volta Region farm population, particularly the smallholders. This could more easily be attempted through an integrated approach; (b) replication of Upper-Region project designlorganization. It is possible that political and regional pressures on the Government would have precluded a more focussed and limited agricultural project; (c) the project as designed would be more in line with the Government's decentralization initiatives, including establishment of the inter-agency Volta Region Agricultural Development Committee (VORADEP), mainly a policy based committee, to oversee the project. 5. While the project concept and design was consistent with the Government's and the IDA"s strategy at the time, the organizational and staffing arrangements could have been better designed. The project was presented to the IDA's Board on the basis of Government's assurance of making satisfactory institutional arrangements for the execution of items involving agencies outside the MOA (e.g. GWSC, GHA, and PWD). Implementation experience later showed that delays in defining and agreeing on respective roles hampered the progress of the project. It would have been more prudent to get these arrangements worked out in detail at the time of appraisalinegotiations or at least before the Board presentation. The livestock and the fisheries components were not clearly worked out, and the irrigation component was over-ambitious within the time-frame. Until the 1984 modifications to the project, the progress in these components was poor. On the staffing issue, the confidence of the Appraisal Mission with regard to the MOA Regional Office strength for project implementation was not justified because of the skill and experience mix required for the project. Throughout the project implementation period, the supervision missions highlighted the over-staffing of the MOA at lower levels and shortage of competent and experienced staff at the Senior levels, with obvious deleterious effect on the project's progress. The Credit's effectiveness conditions included the appointment of the Chief of Field  - xi - Operations and a permanent Regional Agricultural Coordinator; the position of the Civil Engineer in the project was not a condition of effectiveness. Since delays in construction of expatriate and project staff housing. offices and service centers until later years of the project was a major problem affecting the efficiency and morale of both the expatriate and local staff, the Civil Engineer's availability from the beginning of the project was critical. It would have allowed timely planning, design and tendering of the housing and other construction items, and obviatad the cost increases and the prolonged debate on what type of housing was to be constructed (more traditional or the pre-fabricated wooden houses). 6. In retrospect, the design and organization of the project had the advantages of simplicity, tradition and Government support. However, during the appraisalinegotiation stage, some of the components were not clearly defined, and some of the detailed but critical implementation arrangements were not adequately dealt witb. These shortcomings adversely affected the project's execution. Implementation Experience and Froject Review 7. The project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1985, with disbursements completed by June 30, 1986. However, the project continued until December 31, 1988, with disbursements continuing until June, 1989. The long, but not unusual, delay in the execution of such a project in a country at Ghana's stage of development was mainly due to staffing problems (expatriate and local), delays by other agencies in undertaking the water and road components, financing problems involving release of budgetary funds and foreign exchange availability, and erratic and insufficient procurement and distribution of fertilizer and other inputs. Political changes and some uncertainty about continued commitment to the project, serious economic and budgetary difficulties, and adverse weather conditions (1983-84) also hindered the progress of the project. 8. The local staffing and other agency problems have been mentioned previously. The expatriate staff in the Project Unit created special problems of relationship and team-work. Undoubtedly, they were needed for the positions they were recruited for, as suitably qualified Ghanians were not available. An impression is created that the four experts, recruited individually, were operating in separate compartments at their own speed and with scant regard for the role and direction of the (Ghanian) Project Manager. The expatriate staff were generally unhappy about housing and goods availability issues, and the local staff of the salaries and benefits, including import privileges, of the expatriate staff. The IDA missions could have exercised their supervisory and good office roles more energetically in the early stages with a view to resolving the issue. Instead, the matter was allowed to drag on. The missions also were sometimes, perhaps unfairly, drawn into this relationship problem. Considerable uncertainly persisted with regard to the responsibility and tenure of the expatriate staff, and a good part of the project management problems and lack of direction may be ascribed to this problem. Not surprisingly, contracts of these individuals were not extended and a new team of experts, recruited through a consulting firm, was put in place in 1985. The coherence of this expatriate team, the general overseeing of their role by the consulting firm and greatly improved work relationships,  -xii - particularly with the Project Manager, led to expeditious implemeniation of the project in the later years. The question that ALLses in tts respect is whether it would have been wiser in the first i-nit 1 an recruitment through a consulting firm. At lea-t