Upper Volta - Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 9039 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURKINA FASO SECOND BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1097-UV) OCTOBER 05, 1990 culture Operations Division ,try Department V ca Regional Office ument has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of icial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS MoneLary Unit CFA Franc (CFAF) 1 $US = 300 CFAF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS CNCA Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (agricultural credit bank) CRPA Centre regional de promotion agro-pastorale (regional development authority) ORD Organisme regional de d6veloppement (former designation of CRPAs) PAPEM Points d'appui, de pre-vulgarisation et d'experimentation multilocale (pre-extension testing sites) FISCAL YEAR Government : January 1 - December 31  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. 06k. no Oieetor-C.ehtaI 0oetm d VA ina" October 5, 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Burkina Faso Second Bougouriha Agricultural Development Project (Credit 1097-UV) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled Project Ccmpletion Report on Burkina Paso - Second Bougouriba Agricultural Develop- ment Project (Credit 1097-UV)l prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorizatiori.  BURKINA FASO SECOND BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1097-UV) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Table of Contents Page Preface ...... . ... ...... i Evaluation Summary ........................................ iii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity. 1 2. Background. 1 3. Project Objectives and Description. 2 4. Project Design and Organization. 3 5. Project Implementation Extension Services. 4 Input Supply and Credit Services. 5 Livestock Component .5 Feeder roads. 6 Monitoring and evaluation. 6 6. Project Results. 7 7. Project Sustainability. 9 8. Bank Performance .10 9. Borrower Performance .10 10. Conclusion .10 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 11 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits . . 13 2. Project Timetable ..14 3. Loan Disbursements .15 4. Project Implementation . . 16 5. Project Costs and Financing . .18 Development of Supply Activity .19 6. Project Results. A. Direct Benefits .20 B. Economic Rate of Return .20 C. Financial Impact .24 D. Studies .25 7. Status of Covenants . .26 8. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs .27 B. Missions .27 Map: IBRD 15127 R This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT. BURKINA FASO SECOND BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1097-BUR) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project in Burkina Faso, for which Credit 1097-BUR in the amount of US$ 16 million was approved on January 28, 1981. The Development Credit Agreement became effective on December 4, 1981. The Credit was closed on March 31, 1989, two-and-one-half years behind schedule. An outstanding balance of SDR 2,888,339 (US$ 3.8 million) was cancelled as of November 30, 1989. The PCR was prepared principally by Mr. Celestin Bado of the Bank's Resident Mission in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and by Ms. JoAnne Nickerson who did research on the project's design and results and prepared the relevant tables (Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of the PCR was started during the latter half of 1989, and is based, inter alia on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit Agreement, supervision reports, and correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURKINA FASO SECOND BOUGOURIBA AGRICULTURAL DEVELO)MENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1097-BUR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Project Objectives The Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project, which was identified in 1977 and appraised in February/March 1980, was designed as a follow-up to the first Bougouriba project. It was to consolidate the experiences of the first project, reach a greater number of farmers without increasing the number of extension agents, and increase agricultural and livestock production over a period of five years. The project also stressed the improvement of farming systems under rainfed agriculture and the distribution of agricultural inputs and credit. Animal health activities started under the first project would be followed up, as well as activities geared toward improving livestock practices in the zone. The "Training and Visit' extension system was to be introduced with the help of the project to reorganize the extension agents' work program, improve their technical competence and effectiveness by providing them with better extension delivery techniques and technical messages better adapted to farmers' needs. The project was also to create a supply and credit service to assure a regular supply of inputs and equipment for the region's farmers. In order to maintain its operations without burdening the CRPA financially, the cost of this service was to be financed through a mark-up on agricultural inputs and machinery including veterinary products, in an amount sufficient to cover its total charges. Implementation Experience Initially planned to last five years, project implementation took eight years in the end, which corresponds to the regional average for agricultural projects. Several important modifications were made during the life of the project. The most important were: (i) staff changes especially in the management team of the executing agency, (ii) changes in the structure of the executing agency, (iii) modifications in the extension system. If certain changes in the management team and in the extension system did not ad.-ersely affect the project, the abolition of the ORDs in May 1986 did have a demobilizing effect on the personnel responsible for project execution because of the uncertainties brought on their futures. The CRPAs, which replaced the ORDs, were not established until 1987.  - iv - Project execution brought out once again the difficulty of having several distinct services work together on the same program. The most obvious case is the ORD and the Livestock Service which share the same technical ministry, but nevertheless have great difficulty coordinating their field operations. Project Results The overall economic rate of return has been re-estimated at 18? as compared to 23Z at appraisal. The project's quantitative objectives concerning production and the number of farmers reached by extension were not fully met. This was essentially due to: (i) the droughts in the first and third years of project implementation; (ii) the poor quality of the region's initial prcduction statistics which led to the establishment of unrealistic quantitative objectives; (iii) insufficient consideration and/or poor knowledge of the project area's sociology on the part of the extension staff; and (iv) the extension agents' initial inexperience and generally low level of expertise. Nevertheless the project fostered the start-up of a dialogue with Government at the macro-economic level on the abolition of fertilizer subsidies. Regarding human resources the project helped put into place a more experienced extension team, even though some weaknesses remain which could ultimately be eliminated. It also fostered progress in intensive production system technologies (animal traction and fertilizer use). Concerning the conservation of renewable natural resources the project contributed to the farmers' awareness of the process of desertification, and launched two modest reforestation (trees and fruit trees) and water conservation programs which created a demand for such works beyond the CRPA's capacity to deliver. As a result, the private sector embarked on the dissemination of fruit tree seedlings. Sustainability The sustainability of a project, understood in the sense of the executing agency's ability to ensure, through its own resources, the continuation of activities initiated by the project, was not achieved, but nor was it a project objective. The extension activities for farmers in the project zone will continue to be financed by state funds under the Agricultural Support Services Project (Cr. 1979-BUR). Lessons Learned One lesson to be learned from the Bougouriba II Project is that a good understanding of an area's sociology is a prerequisite for designing an effective extension program and for establishing project objectives. Another lesson to be learned is that efficient cooperation among several government services in the field is difficult, even when precise institutional arrangements have been designed at appraisal, when those services belong to the same technical ministry, and when they address the same target groups.  BURKINA FASO SECOND BOUGOURIBA AGRICUilAJRAL DEVELOPMF.NT PROJECT (CREDIt. 1097-UV) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Name of project: Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project Credit No.: 1097-BUR Region: Africa Country: Burkina Faso Sector: Agriculture 2. Background 2.01 Burkina Faso is one of the world's poorest countries. The country covers an area of 274,000 km2, lying between the Sahelian region to the north and the Sudano-Guinean region to the south. Average precipitation varies from less than 300 mm in the north to 1,000 - 1,200 mm in the south. Burkina Faso's economic development is centered on agriculture, which employs 80-90X of the population and accounted for about 30Z of GDP in 1989 and a high percentage of export revenues. The government's agricultural development strategy has emphasized food security. To this end, the following policies have been implemented: Ca) development of rainfed agriculture through the dissemination of modern farming practices; (b) integration of cropping and livestock activities; 'c) resettlement of areas in the Volta river valley freed from riverblindness by people from the overpopulated central plateau; (d) development of irrigated crops to mitigate the detrimental effects of climatic fluctuations; (e) support for the establishment of precooperative farmer organizations, the Groupements Villageois. 2.02 Implementation of these various actions was the responsibility of the Ministry of Rural Development (subsequently split into three autonomous ministerial departments: Agriculture and Livestock, Water, and Rural Cooperative Action). The institutions specifically responsible for field- level implementation of agricultural development policy are the public agencies known until 1986 as Regional Development Organizations (ORDs). In 1987 they were abolished and restructured as Regional Centers for Agro- pastoral Production (CRPA). They cover all parts of the country, except in the areas newly freed from riverblindness, which are managed by the Volta Valleys Authority; the latter is also being restructured. Each ORD/CRPA is responsible, in the area it serves, for:  - disseminating new farming practices developed by agronomic research; - encouraging the formation of farmer organizations and providing supervision and training for their members in cooperative procedures; - supplying plowing equipment, vehicles and farm inputs to farmers for cash purchase or on credit. - monitoring the progress of each cropping season and producing statistics. 2.03 The aim of the Second Bougouriba Agricultural Development Project, which followed the first project (July 1975 - June 1981), was to enable the farmers of this high-potential agricultural region to increase their incomes. It was intended to raise the per capita income range of US$314-871 to US$513-l,467 by project completion, and bring the inhabitants of this region up to a level well above the national per capita average (US$180 at the start of the project). 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.01 The Second Bougouriba Project included the following elements: (a) expansion of the existing Training and Visit (T & V) system to cover the entire ORD area; (b) creation of a service within the ORD responsible for training staff to meet extension service needs; (c) creation of an input supply and credit service responsible for centralizing and managing equipment and inputs supplies; (d) provision of a line of credit for the purchase of equipment and inputs; (e) support to the animal health services, and initiation of a farmstead tree plantation program for fruit and firewood produc ion; (f) institutional support to the ORD in the form of technical assistance and office construction; (g) creation of a monitoring and evaluation un3.t. 3.02 The resources made available under the Project were intended to enable the CRPA, over a five-year period, to consolidate the achievements of the first project and to increase crop and livestock production. The project aimed to increase the number of farmers receiving extension services from  13,000 to 22,000 without actually increasing the number of extension agents. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01 The second Bougouriba project was based on the same model as that used for the' agricultural development projects carried out in the areas served by the Volta Noire and Hauts-Bassins ORDs (now the CRPAs of Mouhoun and Hauts-Bassins), namely the West Volta Agricultural Development Project (Credit 706-UV) carried out in the two regions in 1977-83, and th,- two follow-up projects which were carried out in both CRPAs (Credits 1284 and 1285). The project was prepared with assistance from consultants (SATEC, France), but was couipletely redesigned at appraisal because of poor data quality. A huge quantity of statistics had been collected by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit under the first Bougouriba Project, but were neither pro''ssed nor used for managerial purposes. The main thrust of the project was 0o: - reorganize and strengthen the agricultural extension services to make them more efficient; - suggest priority messages to be disseminated among farmers (crop farmers and herders); - establish a line of credit to allow farmers to purchase needed equipment and inputs; - establish a monitoring unit responsible for measuring project impact; - carry out an applied research program to test technical innovations developed by national research before passing them on to farmers. 4.02 This classic design for a rural development project has proved its worth in the regions bordering on the Black Volta and Hauts Bassins, situated to the north and north-west of the project area, respectively, and in ecologically similar or slightly less favorable areas. All these regions are served by identical institutions both for extension services (CRPA) and product marketing, and credit. Consequently, given the availability of natural resources and technologies proven in similar or less favorable regions, and the experience gained from the first project, one can say, in retrospect, that: (i) the project design was adequate, (ii) the roles of the implementing agencies were clearly defined and, since the services expected from them were exactly in line with their established functions, there should have been no coordination problems between them.  5. Project Implementation 5.01 Although originally scheduled to start on June 5, 1981, the project did not actually begin until six months later on December 4, 1981. Nine months elapsed between the signing of the Credit Agreement and project effectiveness; this correspoads to the average (8.5 months) for agreements signed in Burkina Faso between 1978 and 1982. 5.02 Overall, aside from the various delays that occurred in the procurement of goods and services (vehicles, consulting services), the project activitiec were carried out as planned: establishment of an extension system, preparation and implementation of the training program for extension agents, supply of equipment and inputs for cash or credit. Extension services 5.03 The type of extension service planned was similar to the Training and Visit (T & V) syctem, with the following differences: (a) the extension agent addressed all the farmers, without making any distinction as to their initial level of production or technical knowledge; (b) the concept of contact farmers (paysan-contact) and follow-up farmers (paysan de suivi) was not systematically applied; (c) there were no subject matter specialists. 5.04 These changes were made in view of (a) the homogeneity and low technical level of farmers in the project area, and (b) the extension workers' initial inexperience. The new system was introduced gradually, and by the end of the third year it had become operational throughout the area served by the CRPA. This system was adjusted in Year 6 of the project to serve as a rtest' for efforts to restructure and revitalize extension at the national level. Thus: - the concept of subject matter specialist was introduced to provide extension workers with continuing training and assistance; - contacts were established with the national agricultural research agency not only to test technologies at the Points d'Appui de Prevulgarisation et d'Experimentation Multilocales (PAPEMs) but also with a view to providing specialized training for the subject matter specialists; - extension subsectore were aligned to the region's administrative subdivisions and transformed into departmental agricultural services, their number increasing from 20 to 24;  - 5 - - livestock experts were added to the extension service staff to train extension workers and farmers in animal husbandry and health care. 5.05 The new system was tested during three crop years (from Year 6 through Year 8 of the project). The results being satisfactory in the Bougouriba CRPA and other CRPAs, the system was adopted for the nationwide Agricultural Services Project (Credit 1979-BUR), and was further adjusted as follows: (a) the training is carried out not on the farmer's own land but on a community demonstratior. plot; (b) the concept of contact farmers or follow-up farmers was eliminated; (c) farmers are addressed in groups, either through the village association when it exists in the village, or if it does not, an ad hoc group is formed on a voluntary basis. Input Supply and Credit Services 5.06 The ORD/CRPA office responsible for supplying inputs and farm equipment was established in 1983, and has been operating on a regular basis since then. Accounts for this activity have been kept separate from the ORD/CRPA accounts and have shown consistently improving positive net results. 5.07 The products supplied include fertilizer, phytosanitary products, selected seed, veterinary products and supplies for horticultural farmers - the first two items (fertilizers and pesticides) accounting for more than 502 of sales. In this context, it should be noted that after the ORD/CRPA were restructured in 1987, they were no longer legally entitled to deal with input supplies, thus depriving the project executing agency of one of its income-generating activities. Livestock Component 5.08 Under the project, a small-scale program was developed to improve animal husbandry, including genetic improvement. The actions undertaken not only involved cattle but also small ruminants, swine and poultry. The focus was on improved livestock feed and animal traction. 5.09 The program animal production improvement got off to a tentative start, for lack of livestock personnel in the extension service staff until the sixth year of the project (1986-87 crop year). The project did begin a few forage crop trials; farmers were encouraged to collect harvest residue for use in supplementing animal feed and to carry out manure production tests.  5.10 The project also provided for the vaccination of all cattle over six months old for three consecutive years, followed by a program to vaccinate only young calves aged six months to two years against rinderpest and pleuropneumonia. Vaccination coverage rates were as follows during this three-year period, compared to the 902 target rate for each of these diseases: Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Rinderpest 63 44 74 Pleuropneumonia 44 44 50 5.11 After a slow start, the livestock unit attempted to catcl up over the next few years. The annual vaccination rates, which were to have dropped to 352 for both diseases during the subsequent period, actually increased, as shown below: Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Rinderpest 42 45 51 43 46 Pleuropneumonia 37 43 39 42 45 5.12 No improved health measures were taken for swine. Poultry vaccination, one of the project's innovations, actually began in year 1, but failed to meet the tatget (3,000 units against 7,000) and did not progress much during the life cif the project. Feeder Roads 5.13 Although no formal road-building component was included in the Second Bougouriba Project, a road-building component was successfully carried out under the first Bougouriba Project, then transferred to the Fourth Highway Project, which did not become effective immediately, resulting in improper maintenance of existing roads. This problem was raised by Bank missions in 1982, twice in 1985, and in 1986; the lack of good roads created major marketing difficulties, and therefore discouraged farmers from increasing production further. Monitoring and Evaluation 5.14 A monitoring and evaluation unit was established under the Project, but no steps were taken to hire the technical expertise required to help it develop the data collection and processing methodology. This proved a significant handicap for the unit, which could only produce statistics on crop year performance. The entire study component, including studies of farmers' incomes, herd ownership structure and systems, project impact, etc.,  was simply ignored by the Project management. This obviously makes it very difficult to evaluate the impact of the project; only the additional agricultural production can be taken into account because there are no data on the effects of the project on livestock, forestry, farmer income, etc. 6. Project Results 6.01 The basic project documents (appraisal report and working papers) show that the targeted increases in production were to result from the adoption of simple farming practices (seed dressing, high density row seeding, two weedings and hoeings, moderate use of mineral fertilizer). The technological changes were purposely kept at a modest level in order to take account of the very low level of farmer expertise in the region as a whole, the need for a very gradual approach, and the time needed for the new methods to produce any demonstration effect. 6.02 Despite the c. .e taken to keep targets low, results were still disappointing. The following table shows the discrepancies between actual and estimated figures. This might mean that the rate of farmer acceptance of the new methods was still overestimated at the time of project preparation and appraisal. Year 1 Year 8 Targeted Actual Targeted Actual Achievement rate No. of farmers 13,000 13,427 22,000 17,627 80 Cereals production(T) 33,000 28,000 46,500 46,300 lO00 Cotton production(T) 5,000 4,178 9,000 7,500 83 Groundnut prod.(T) 2,900 2,417 6,100 3,402 56 Root Crops production (T) 6,000 2,417 9,500 2,767 29 Fertilizer (T) 700 801 2,000 1,173 59 6.03 The data used at appraisal for setting the target figures were probably unreliable, with the exception of the number of farmcrs reached by the first project, the level of cotton production and the volume of fertilizer used. This resulted in overoptimistic production forecasts. 6.04 In order to evaluate the overall project results, however, it must first be kept in mind that the project area has a very solid and rigid type of social organization in which the individual does not have the right to distinguish himself from the group, which is strictly governed by its own law. As a result, advice to individual farmers to increase production was hampered by the group's pressure to maintain homogeneity. Secondly, it must be remembered that the extension service was not installed until the first project was under way, and that the extension systems underwent considerable changes in the course of these two projects, calling for progressive adaptation on the part of the personnel concerned. Thirdly, the experience  level of the extension agents differed widely. Although most were from the region, the program was not designed to take into account the region's sociology; the opposite approach would have possibly resulted in much greater farmer acceptance of the innovations proposed. It would have required identifying decision-making centers, obtaining their confidence, convincing them of the efficiency of the methods proposed, etc. These factors help explain why many of the quantitative targets were not met. 6.05 Economic Rate of Return. The economic rate of return has been re- estimated at 182 over twenty years, as compared to 23Z at appraisal. No separate calculations to re-estimate the ERR of the agriculture and livestock components were undertaken because of the lack of data on livestock and forestry. The above-mentioned constraints, the severe droughts in the first and third years of project implementation and a lesser one in the sixth year, and the farmers' lower-than-expected rate of adoption of recommended technologies all explain why the economic rate of return is lower than the appraisal estimate. Furthermore, there were major cost overruns (more than 20Z) on expenditures for agricultural training and headquarters, and lesser overruns (less than 2OZ) on the monitoring and evaluation component. No further droughts were assumed beyond the project implementation period; the production was valued at border prices and a shadow rate CFAF 500/manday was used for incremental labor. Details are given in Part III, Section 6(B). 6.06 The project has had a significant impact in several areas, however. At the macroeconomic level, the project served as the starting point for a dialogue with the government on abolition of the fertilizer subsidy. While the project, as prepared, was not the best instrument for conducting such a dialogue it nevertheless provided an opportunity for making the government aware of the dangers inherent Ln uncontrolled expansion of input subsidies. The process of reducing the subsidy on imported chemical fertilizers was later implemented within the framework of the Fertilizer Project (Cr 1550 BUR). 6.07 With respect to human resources, the project was to cover the training needs of extension agents, farmer representatives, and livestock and forestry staff, the aim being to integrate livestock and forestry themes into the workprogram of the extension agents. Experiences and materials were to be drawn largely from the West Volta Project. The project gave the CRPA an experienced training team, thanks to the T & V system. Improvements are, of course, possible and advisable, particularly in terms of an approach that is sensitive to the local sociological environment 1 and more tailored to the existing social organization, and the use of R & D and monitoring and evaluation to orient the development process. 6.08 The project also served as a vehicle for the launching of nationwide activities, such as (i) the functional literacy program for farmers; (ii) the Pilot Program for the Strengthening of Extension Services; and (iii) monitoring of the technical know-how of the farmers through 1 See Aide-memoire, para 5 from the June 1987 mission.  participation in the preparation and execution of a survey. 6.09 With respect to renewab'le natural resource management, the project started a program to alert farmers to the dangers of desertification. This action led to the launching, on a small scale, of a progran. to build water-erosion control structures, and plant trees. The program has been so successful that this activity is being continued in the northern part of the project area with very little support from the extension service, the farmers being trained to build erosion control structures themselves. Furthermore, the demand for seedlings increased beyond the CRPA's capacity to deliver. As a result, the private sector became involved in the distribution of fruit tree seedlings. 7. Project Sustainability 7.01 The two Bougouriba projects helped to establish the Bougouriba ORD (which later became the South-West CRPA) and make it operational. Although the CRPA is an "Etablissement Public a Caractere Industriel et Commercial", it is obvious that such an institution will never become self-financing because the services it provides are not sold. It would not be feasible to ask the direct beneficiaries to pay for the extension services they receive. Hence the question of the CRPA's profitability should not arise. From this standpoint, it goes without saying that for as long as extension cervices are provided free of charge the State will have to continue to finance the extension structure out of its own budget or with external aid. Attention should be paid to the efficiency of the system and the appropriateness of its recommendations to farmers to overcome problems on their farms. This improvement in the farmers' technical level can be measured by how well they are equipped and by the extension messages they have adopted. 7.02 Examination of the rates of adoption of the innovative methods suggested by the extension services shows an encouraging trend. Progress is slow, however, and corrective measures must be taken to ensure that any extension system that is set up is better able to listen to the farmers, understand their constraints, and help them find appropriate solutions. To this end, the following steps need to be taken: (a) a socioeconomic study should be conducted to identify the various types of social organizations existing in the project area and suggest different kinds of approaches tailored to the systems already in place; (b) the entire extension system (village-level workers, section chiefs, subject matter specialists, etc.) should be trained in application of these approaches. Unless this social variable is taken into account, the pace of farming system modernization will continue to be slow.  - 10 - 8. Bank Performance 8.01 The supervision missions focused mainly on the agricultural component of the project, an area in which the results were fairly good on the whole. The other components, namely forestry and livestock, were somewhat neglected, but their performance indicators were reported. However, the presence of cattle on most farms in the region made it desirable to place importance on obtaining better knowledge about the herd and its management in order to identify possible methods of improvement. 9. Borrower Performance 9.01 Overall, the government's performance was adequate in meeting its obligations throughout the life of the project. (a) Except for the 1983/84 and 1987/88 cropping seasons, the project did receive the financial contribution the State was required to pay the executing agency to enable it to operate normally; (b) A sufficient number of government workers was maintained. It should be pointed out in this respect that the Bougouriba project has had some good-caliber staff who have shown imagination and adaptability (in such areas as launching the literacy program, adaptation and testing of the new extension system); (c) The project enabled the government to start the process of reducing the subsidy on imported mineral fertilizer. This process was continued within the framework of the Fertilizer Project (Cr.1550-BUR), until the subsidy was completely phased out. 10. Conclusion 10.01 In conclusion, the project may be regarded as having successfully set up an extension system capable of providing effective assistance in improving livestock and crop production, provided that the social constraints identified in the region are addressed. The extension system should adapt to these constraints, otherwise there will be no real communication between farmers and extension agents, with the former losing interest and the latter becoming discouraged. The system should work through the village or through groups to aim at increasing the groups' overall production rather than improving individual performance.  - :1. - PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE - The ORD of Bougouriba presently named CRPA of South-West was the principal executing agency of the SECOND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT OF BOUGOURIBA (PDAB). The PDAB was financed by IDA for SDR 12,450,000 for investments and SDR 1,200,000 from the Burkina government for recurrent costs: Credit Agreement No. 1097 BUR. - After study and analysis of the report (Parts I and III) by the different departments of the project executing agency, we approve the main ideas of the document. With respect to the pertinence of the constraints mentioned, the lessons to be drawn, and the conclusions, we do not have any particular comments. However, we will make the following observations: I Constraints linked to the non-achievement of objectives: 1.1. Extension The number of farmers reached was to have increased from 13,000 to 22,000 in Year 5 with a staff maintained at a 100 extension agents (220 farmer per extension agent) - During the project execution, there was a gradual reduction of staff ( 94 staff members in A 8) - The number of farmers anticipated per staff member, though modest, did not take into consideration the level of expertise of the region's farmers. - The provision of services to farmers' associations ( Cooperative and literacy training) was not initially envisaged under the project. 1.2. Administrative Delays Project effectiveness expected in June 1981 (the beginning of the agricultural season) did not occur until December (end of season) which did not permit field staff to have logistic means for the implementation of year 1 of the project. 1.3. Crop Marketing problems Excluding cotton, the other crops encountered marketing difficulties in the course of the project: cereals: unremunerative official price not taking into consideration the production cost. groundnut: The Price Stabilization Fund requirement for groundnuts to be shelled by the producers was a handicap to the intensification of this crop. 1.4. Input prices The production inputs (fertilisers, pesticides) experienced a price increase in the course of project execution thereby limiting their use because of farmers' low monetary income.  - 12 - 1.5. Livestock Besides animal health, the component for promotion of improved animal production methods did not benefit from investments: breeding stock buying credits, feed storage warehouses, creation of a livestock research center... 1.6. Monitoring and Evaluation The lack of qualified staff reduced this service to the mere collection of statistical data on crop production. The inadequate number of survey staff limited the size of the samples, thereby reducing the data reliability. 1.7. Human Resources - The executive personnel did not undergo the training or recycling courses necessary to optimize their capabilities. The beneficiaries of the training courses or seminars did not always occupy the appropriate position. The social dimension was not always well apprehended. II - Government performance - The government, which was supposed to maintain the 650 Km of the existing feeder roads, to create 650 Km of new feeder roads, and to keep in good condition the 400 Km of national roads, has only partially satisfied this condition. - The national roads have been subject to continuous maintenance, but the feeder roads have deteriorated due to lack of implementation of the road program. - The 650 Km of new roads have not been implemented. - The financial commitments were always honored late, thus generating tremendous cash shortages to the ORD. jealtradbougltempl  - 13 - PART III : STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits Credit Year of Title Purpose Approval Credit 496-UV Increase agricultural First Bougouriba and livestock Ag. Development Project production through improved husbandry techniques May 28, 1974 Credit 1550-BUR Improve fertilizer Fertilizer Project policies and structure of fertilizer use by removing subsidies. Feb. 26, 1985 Credit 1896-BUR Strengthen research Agricultural Research capacity by improving Project research/extension linkages. April 19, 1988 Credit 1979-BUR Improve agricultural Ag. Support Services support services to farmers and herders. Improve functional literacy January 17, 1989 RELATE.WK1/MOUPCR  - 14 - 2. Project Timetable Phase Original date Revised date Actual date Identification 1977 Preparation January 1979 Appraisal mission February 1980 Negotiations November 1980 Approval Jan. 29, 1981 Signature Mar. 6, 1981 Effectiveness Jun. 15, 1981 Dec. 4, 1981 Project completion Mar. 31, 1986 Mar. 31, 1987 Sep. 30, 1988 Credit closing date Sep. 30, 1986 Sep. 30, 1987 Mar. 31, 1989  - 15 - 3. Loan Disbursements _____________________ Disbursements (in $ Million) Credit 1097-BUR Bank Fiscal Year Estimated Actual Actual Z of And Quarter Cumulative Cumulative Estimated 1980/81 1 2 3 4 0.6 0.0 1981/82 1 1.0 0.0 2 2.0 0.09 4.5 3 2.8 0.56 20.0 4 3.6 1.14 31.7 1982/83 1 4.0 1.43 35.8 2 5.2 1.91 36.7 3 5.9 2.30 39.0 4 6.8 2.85 41.9 1983/84 1 7.5 3.32 44.3 2 8.3 3.63 43.7 3 9.0 4.03 44.8 4 9.7 4.29 44.2 1984/85 1 10.0 4.47 44.7 2 11.3 4.76 42.1 3 12.0 4.94 41.2 4 13.0 5.03 38.7 1985/86 1 13.6 5.37 39.5 2 14.5 5.67 39.1 3 15.1 6.06 40.1 4 15.7 6.51 41.5 1986/87 1 15.8 6.78 42.9 2 16.0 7.09 44.3 3 7.38 46.1 4 7.70 48.1 1987/88 1 7.78 48.6 2 7.83 48.9 3 8.28 51.8 4 8.89 55.6 1988/89 1 9.15 57.2 2 9.49 59.3 3 9.67 60.4 4 10.05 62.8 1989/90 1 10.74 67.1 2 10.98 68.6  - 16 - 4. ProJect toplimetotion ________-- ---_________-----_-- _-- --- - -_-_________________-------- ---------- --------- Indicators EutImate Actual Percent achieved ---------------------------------____-___---__--__------__-_--_____---__--------_------------ PRODUCTION (T) PY8 -Cotton 9,000 7,C00 83.8 -Groundnute 6,100 8,402 55.8 -Grain 46,500 4C,800 99.6 -Tuberr 9.500 2,767 29.1 INPUT USE PY7 Fertilizer (tonnee) -Cotton NPK m156 70 46.9 Urea 77 194 251.9 -Cereals NPK 530 202 38.1 Urea 266 as 12.8 -Groundnuts NPK 0 82 Phosphates 167 0 0.0 leprovad Seed -4roundnut. 120 28.0 28.J -Cereals 120 0.4 0.8 -Paddy 21 1.0 4.8 Cotton Insecticides ('000 1) -High volume - 26.08 -uV - 43.97 Thioral ('000 sachet 26g) - 28.60 Acricide ('000 sachet 260g) 107 0.1 0.1 Actllic ('000 sachet 60g) 620 1.20 0.1 ANIMAL TRACTION -Oxen (pairs) 292 869 126.4 -Equipment Ploughs 846 837 97.7 Weeders S85 830 98.6 Rldgere 842 322 94.2 Carts 58 125 215.6 EXTENSION SERVICE _________________ -No of agents 100 101 101.0 -No. forser roachod (PY8) 22,000 17,627 80.1 FORESTRY (NA) Area replanted 76 287 682.7 Fruit tram 0 17 Anti-erosion site. 100 42 42.0  - 17 - LIVESTOCK (X vaccinated) -Rinderpest 56 67 191.4 -Cattle pn-umonio a5 a6 185.7 -Anthr2x (bacterial) 26 15 60.0 -Anthrax (nymptomatic) 46 a8 80.0 -Pasteurel se 46 69 158.3 -Psotse provent. ('000 treated) 50 1l1 232.0 CIVIL WORKS -Housing Head Seod Sectlon 1 0 0 SCA Chloe and agente a8 64 168 Other housing 10 6 60 'logomente lntendantsa -Village Stores 118 87 74 -Training Rooms 1 1 100 -Wells 7 7 100 -Livestock Component Livestock poests 4 a 76 Vaccination parks 16 16 1co Water pointe 6 4 80 Housing for extension 10 16 150 staff or vacecintors Repair* Osous house 1,0002 0 0 Livestock posts 1,765 0 0 Vaccination parks 49 49 100 -Forestry ('000 CFAF) Store at Oaoua 7 .2 700 0 0 Financing 1,000 060 65 Well-deepening 26 88 132 VEHICLES -Station wagons 10 6 s0 -Pick-up 44 26 69 -Truck* 1 I lO0 -Motocyclee 82 46 150 -Mobylettes 17 16 94 3 Appraisal estimtes revised aft- *xtension of closing date.  - 18 - 5. Project Costs and Financing A. Project Costs Est Act A/E Est Act A/E --(US$ in)-- (Z) --(CFAF m)-- (Z) Agricultural Extension 4.9 4.0 81 1030 1383 134 Training and Extension Methods 0.9 0.7 77 184 247 134 Supply Service 2.1 1.0 48 441 334 76 Oxen, Equipment, Inputs 3.7 2.3 62 772 822 106 Livestock 1.4 0.7 50 294 257 97 Tree Planting 0.4 0.3 75 74 95 128 Headquarters 3.7 3.2 86 772 1129 146 Monitoring and Studies 0.5 0.3 60 110 97 88 Total 17.5 12.5 71 3678 4364 119 Note: From CFAF 210/$1 at appraisal, the average rate over the disbursement period rose to CFAF 350. Thus while project costs in local currency increased by 20Z, project costs in dollars fell by 30Z. B. Project Financing Est Act A/E Est Act A/E --(US$ n)-- (Z) --(CFAF m)-- (2) IDA 16.0 10.1 63 3360 3542 105 Government 1.5 2.4 160 315 822 261 Total 17.5 12.5 71 3675 4364 119  - 19 - Development of Supply Activity Gross margin on sales: Total profit Costs Net profit FY Cash Credit margin Gross total 83/84 82 12? 10,449,119 4,257,990 6,191,129 84/85 8? lOX 11,186,016 9,478,041 1,707,975 85/86 8? 102 18,092,959 3,962,831 14,130,128 86/87 82 10? 32,038,655 7,510,651 24,528,004 87/88 8? 10 41,264,727 7,267,137 32,997,590 88/89 8? 10l Total  - 20 - 6. Project Results A. Direct Benefits Appraisal Estir te at Indicators Estimate Closing Date No. of farmers reached by extension 22,000 17,600 Cereals output 46,500 46,300 Cotton output 9,000 7,500 Groundnut output 6,100 3,400 Root Crops output 9,500 2,800 Fertilizer use 2,000 1,200 Note also: Established a complete and efficient extension system for the CRPA, and served as a vehicle for launching national-wide activities such as (i) functional literacy, (ii) the Pilot Program for the Strengthening of Extension Services (OTRVA), and (iii) Monitoring of the the technical level of farmers through the participation in the preparation and execution of a survey. Opened up a dialogue with Government on the abolition of fertilizer subsidies. (Carried out through the Fertilizer Project (Cr. 1550-BUR)) With respect to renewable natural resource management, started a program to alert farmers to the dangers of desertification. B. Economic Impact Appraisal Estimated Estimate Actual Overall Economic Rate of Return 23Z 18? See attached pages for details (For further explanation, see para 6.05)  COUTS TOTAUhl W PRWET In franrs ci a) Annie I annee 2 ann4e 3 nnoe 4 annee 5 annee 6 annOe 7 annee 0 anntr 9 annie 11 ml ttouIs 'I routes de dessertes " lUI,*3*,I3* 3s,eee,eot 6U,3O,3l3 52,33I,98I 45,8l1,lU 19,3hl,31t 10,I13,3II 11,311,11183 19,oil,1 19,113,l, I agriculture f 159,995,399 236,261,124 183,825,191 169,647,219 ibs,?I5,645 158,955,951 133,476,118 151,561,439 53,523,463 53,523,498 feri.r icn s 3,471,560 .1,flqS,791 4,?84,744 11,777,1?7 q,er7,701 54,147,945 34,199,453 46,738,759 15,461,42J 15,4 A,431 rpp-vilip-aeont 7 1,S1,341 41,126,99R 39,168,783 62,542,769 26,834,933 21,445,481 29,164,611 42,197,156 42,197,156 4',197,156 bo eaent '' 9,611,951 11,452,371 12,453,514 12,732,319 12,473,742 12,462,999 11,962,954 13,s99,161 4,666,389 1,555,463 lg,895,317 162,535,355 113,632,719 136,429,737 I55,275,519 96,816,708 142,121,275 174,316,471 59,l35,4?3 59,115,191 I"'} , ,, A 1v4';97 1,14Q1,11?8 IR,n!9,WP 9,571,491 13,13l,848 124,32,399 9,579,934 11,852,571 v,951,857 i,Mp,F57 , nt% 7 ,64e,11,131 75,76l,NS0 67,123,I8I 5B,AR8,1PI 71,1Pl,Sfl1 132,721,331 93,53,1131 97,41,339 9116113q 1 eu84F,ref ' *,n d oeuvre add. 27,e11,188 1l4,leealRe 2511,00e,11 325,110,11I 4I1,3PI,I3I 411,313,111 40I, IN, IN 413,l81,8l8 433,1lI,88 423,098,313 CIOUTS TOI4UI 481,t 5,167 b 17,5I ,949 749,1,23, 837,e75,719 95',59U,744 894,933,563 E4I,9242,245 5s,P4B,063 686,643,79? 5 3,529,Pb6 C, PRODUITS ( 6,0a1ps 11 61,239,131 59s,I63,l33 76,253,KN 1,47208,5,8I3 9872,073,83 413,322,331 1,416,194,811 793,19l,P3e P28,580,1rs 618,595,fPI ' oton ' 31,142,111 154,180,11S 16,456,e13 391,2917,333 87,492,1eo 52,81s,1te 17,876,1U 51,325,113 36,975,310 37,845,313 rRODlIlIS TO01AU 97 P,2 01,938 747,168,31r 92,709,00D 1,812,142,313 989,565,1P1 456,122,333 1,433,971,9" 843,215,081 865,555,338 857,441,133 BENEFICES " 1389,124,163) 18,148,5I (656,414,313) 975,166,291 33,971,256 I1t8,778,5d31 592,147,755 1110,633,8631 178,914,238 173,918,134 C SI--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -