Decentralization and educational bureaucracies

一 、令 &:，二 gaA � � � � � � � $ �о' $�° С{ Э � и т�F Ф � � � � � Ф �.� . � � �и � Dи ��� �. ������. ����.� � �� R � Ф � �°:а� Ф v � �� Ф � ��'�� �.��� . � � Ф Ф . �.��_ . � Ф W � у�� �7 � �` ABSTRACT Several IAC countries have implemented various models of educational decentralization reforms intended to correct deficiencies inherent in large centrally managed organizations (such as Ministries of Education) and improve the quality and equity of services provided. After more than one decade of reforms, there is not yet sufficient empirical evidence to ascertain whether the decentralization models introduced by several IAC countries have: (i) adequately corrected bureaucratic deficiencies; (ii) effectively fostered an improvement in the quality and equity of education; and (iii) whether they are cost-effective interventions. This note explains the organizational deficiencies decentralization has attempted to correct in the large bureaucracies managing educational systems in LAC. Two models of decentralization - the Chilean and the Mexican case - are succinctly presented to illustrate model variations. Since the World Bank is currently addressing this issue in proposed lending operations in IAC; more regional studies on this subject are deemed desirable. Further understanding of this complex topic could guide more appropriate design and implementation strategies. The recommended analytically work ought to compare the educational characteristics before and after the decentralization process in terms of. equity, quality, student flow efficiency, educational inputs, educational management, empowerment of diverse school stakeholders, and cost-effectiveness of the reform. 4 a 9 6 m i - 1- Enrollment and bureaucratic growth explosion Important investments made in the educational sector by developing and higher income oil exporting countries since the mid-sixties, fueled a student population growth explosion. According to UNESCO's statistics, primary enrollments in these countries went from 298 million to 485 million students between 1965 and 1985; an average annual increase of 2.5%. To meet the demands of the growing student population, additional human resources and educational inputs were constantly fed into the educational system. Bureaucracies managing the educational system, and providing the necessary leadership and resources, also experienced significant increases in size. Based on a strong tradition of power concentration, they adhered to a centrally managerial style. However, the educational systems simply became too large and complex to manage with the traditional centralized concepts and practices. Slow-moving, inefficient educational bureaucracies (Ministries of Education), did not undertake the necessary measures to enhance the quality of services provided or to reduce educational inequalities in poverty stricken areas. Consequently, thirty years later there is evidence that, as each developing country provides more children with schooling, completion rates at the primary level remain low, and cognitive achievements and problem solving skills continue to be poorly developed among primary graduates. To make it worse, the economic crisis of the eighties weakened educational bureaucracies and demoralized its civil servants. Deficiencies of centrally-managed large scale organizations According to management theory, large centrally managed organizations are generally affected by some, or all, of the following five deficienciesM: a) the means of the organization overtake, with time, priority over the ends, and 1/ Ackoff, R., Creating the Corporate Future., John Wiley & Sons, 1981. Argyris, C. and Schon, D., Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness, Jossey-Bass, 1974. Argyris, C. and Schon, D., Organizational Learning. A Theory of Action Perspective, Addisson-Wesley Publishing Co., 1978. Oliver, W., Organization Theory. Oxford University Press, 1990. Mitzenberg, H., On Management. Free Press, 1989. -2- become the focus of the behavior of the organization as a whole; b) the organizations tend to become less flexible and less capable of adapting to changing social, technological, scientific and economic conditions, or to learn from experience; c) there is a lack of adequate coordination (horizontal communication) among units at the same hierarchical level. Instead of communicating and cooperating to attain a common organizational end, they compete for organizational power, thus blocking lines of communication; d) there is deficient integration (vertical communication) within the organization. The top of the organization seldom knows what happens at the base (and vice versa) and executive orders are seldom carried out at the base in the intended fashion; and e) the organization, and the units within, seek survival instead of pursuing the objectives for which they were created. Educational ends are forgotten: means take over Ministries of Education are not immune from the above deficiencies. Empirical evidence shows that high level decision makers in the Ministries spend a good deal of their time in labor (teacher) and union related matters and/or in paternalism and patronage activities (means), not in direct actions to enhance quality and reduce inequities of the educational services provided (ends). Many educational policies and strategies are designed specifically so that they do not upset teacher unions and/or different stakeholders holding real political power. Educational managers as firefighters Large numbers of lower level units within the Ministry of Education have to report directly to one specific high level manager. In this situation, the managers are overburdened&. Consequently, managers focus on routine tasks and decisions with very short time horizons, thus precluding any move toward broader prospective planning. A lack of innovation means that traditional managerial styles are maintained within the organization. Daily routine and overburdening makes managers behave like firefighters, trying to cope with immediate problems rather than creative, visionary, and prospective strategists. 2/ Miller, G. A., 'The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information", Psychological Review. 63, pp 81-97 (1956). -3- Horizontal communication blockade When highly placed decision makers in centrally managed organizations are confronted with large and complex problems or tasks, there is a tendency to break the tasks down into solvable parts, so that each piece is solved relatively independently. The outputs of these separate efforts are assembled into a "solution" of the whole. Unfortunately, the sum of the best solutions obtained separately is not necessarily the best solution of the whole. Awareness of this conflict is worsened by the widespread lack of coordination among different units in the organizational network, many of which perceive this partial solution process as a unique opportunity for advancement and power enrichment. Units will, in general, not share information and, if possible, obstruct any initiative undertaken by others. Vertical communication roadblocks Different hierarchical levels in the Ministry of Education makes integration in centrally managed organizations a very difficult task. Many educational policy decisions are implemented without considering the real teaching and learning process that takes place in the classroom. Consequently, policies seldom result in the intended outcomes. Ghost teachers and civil servants Educational organizations, and the units within, develop an immunity to any externally perceived or imposed change. If a unit correctly perceives a diminishing need for its services, and if it is to preserve itself intact, it will create the impression that it is essential. This is done by making unnecessary work appear relevant. Thus, we commonly find inflated payrolls with "ghost teachers" and Ministries bloated with more employees than necessary. This situation is further exacerbated by paternalistic and patronage activities practiced in some social sectors and also by the lack of productive employment opportunities in a given country. The inefficiency costs could represent an important percentage of the already limited national education fiscal budgets. In Mexico, for instance, a very conservative estimate puts the federally paid "ghost" teachers or misallocated teaching force for preschool, primary and secondary education, at 50,000 teachers (7.8% of the total). The estimated annual waste amounts to approximately US$112 million; but it may be as much as twice this. Managerial alternatives To improve these deficiencies, countries such as Chile, M6xico, and Colombia, have initiated administrative decentralization reforms. -4- The underlying theoretical hypothesis and driving force of the radical structural reforms has been that, by transferring responsibilities and resources to smaller geo-political units, the respective administrative segments would: (i) flatten their organizational charts, become more responsive to interested stakeholders, and respond faster and more effectively to client needs; and (ii) improve their internal coordination, adapt faster to change, and learn more expediently from experiences. Moreover, interested stakeholders will be better empowered to demand from authorities a more effective and timely institutional service. The long term effect, the theory says, is an eventual strengthening of institutional capacity to implement sectoral policies and strategies. This should increase efficiency and enhance the quality of services provided. The educational decentralization models and implementation strategies undertaken by LAC countries take on a variety of forms, depending on the specific national context (table 1). Chile, for example, under a regime that blocked any teacher union resistance to change, transferred during 1980 and 1981 pre-primary, primary, and secondary schools to the municipalities; vocational secondary schools to private non-profit organizations created by associations of employers; and encouraged, through a subsidy payment per student, private individuals and NGO's to create tuition-free schools. Resources allocated to each municipality for teachers salaries and other operating costs are based on average monthly student attendance. This replaces the old system of budgeting by historical fiscal trends. The municipalities became completely autonomous in administering the schools, including the hiring and firing of teachers, and maintenance of school buildings (table 2). M6xico, on the other hand, with a very strong and politically empowered teachers union, implemented a more limited decentralization process focusing on specific aspects of planning, administrative and operative functions. The central level retained key decision making attributes such as resource allocation, policy setting and evaluation (see table 3 and box 1). Other LAC countries, such as Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil, have formulated their own designs and implementation strategies. The World Bank's involvement The World Bank has pursued an interest in these issues. Proposed educational lending operations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, address these issues. However, there empirical evidence is surfacing showing that educational decentralization efforts may have fallen somewhat short of stated expectations. Education quality, for example, has not improved significantly. Also, by granting more autonomy and responsibility for resource mobilization and allocation to lower hierarchical units - be it the -5- municipalities in Chile, or the Provincias in Argentina - organizational integration has been almost severed, and educational sector policies and mandates often ignored. In many cases inequities have worsened as lower organizational units have invested most of their limited resources in urban areas where they achieve more political visibility and where local elites have more lobbying capacities. Consequently, rural end ethnic schools may be lagging further behind their urban counterparts. Improvement of educational quality and equity, and strengthening of institutional capacity, are still the dominating sectoral policy issues of all LAC countries that have adopted decentralization reform measures. In short, to date, empirical evidence in LAC does not support claims that decentralization has reversed the deficiencies of traditional educational bureaucracies. The challenge More regional studies on this subject are clearly desirable if we are to better understand this complex topic and extract feasible recommendations on appropriate decentralization strategies. Regional studies should mainly focus on: (i) the historical, political, social and economic context of a given decentralization process; (ii) the model adopted by a particular LAC country and its implementation strategy; (iii) expected and unexpected outcomes; and (iv) conclusions regarding potential models to exploit and emulate in the region, as well as blind alleys to avoid. For the educational sector in particular, regional studies on decentralization should analytically compare the educational situation before and after the decentralization in terms of equity, quality, student flow efficiency, educational inputs, educational management, stakeholders empowerment and cost-effectiveness. Administrative reforms do not mean eliminating all rules and regulations, leaving schools adrift in a situation of total autonomy and chaos. Neither does it mean total central oppression and obstruction to self-imposed creativity. The challenge is to find the balance between the extremes, to carefully delineate and distribute authority and responsibility throughout the educational system, and ensure an efficient and effective use of human, material and financial resources at each level of the organizational network. The ultimate goal should be to improve student achievement and problem solving skills, and legitimate the empowerment of teachers, students and their parents. -6- TABLE L THE CHILEAN AND MEXICAN DECENTRAIJZATION MODELS FUNCTIONS CHILEAN MODEL MEICAN MODEL Educational policy Central (Ministy of Public Education - Central (Ministry of Education - SEP) MINEDUC) Financial resources mobilization Subvention based on educational level Budget based on historical fiscal and average monthly student trends. Financial resources allocated by attendance. Financial resources central government to SEP's State allocated by central government to the Delegations municipalities Sources of funding Mostly, federal budget transfers to Federal budget transfers to SEPs State municipalities, complemented with Delegations municipal revenues Curriculum development Central. One curriculum for the entire Central. One curriculum for the entire country. Teachers allowed to make country, but complemented with minor changes regional and ethnic teaching materials for corresponding regions Teachers hiring and firing Municipalities Combined procedures between center and SEP's State Delegations. Teachers union greatly influences outcomes Teachers salaries Municipalities and private subsidized National scale fixed by central and paid schools government and negotiated with unions. Allows for regional and hard working conditions salary differences Pre-service and in-service teacher Universities Special teacher training schools training and upgrading (Escuelas Normales), operated by SEP's State Delegations, State governments and the private sector Teatbooks Designed, published and distributed by Designed by SEP and published and the private sector (contracted distributed, free of charge, by SEP's publishing houses) to the municipalities parastate agency CONALITEG and provided free of charge to students Supervision Decentralized at the provincial level Decentralized at the State level Student certification Municipalities and schools SEP's State Delegations School calendar setting MINEDUC SEP Information system Gathered by the municipalities and Gathered by SEP's State Delegations MINEDUC's provincial agencies. In- and integrated by SEP tegrated by MINEDUC School building Municipalities with fungible resources State representations of parastate from municipal investment fund pro- building agency (CAPFCE) in com- vided by the central government pliance with SEP's State Delegations, through the Ministry of Interior under broad regulations specified by SEP's building parastate agency CAPFCE and SEP. There is PTA involvement, specially in rural areas School maintenance Municipalities PTA, SEP's State Delegations and CAPFCE state representation TABLE 2. THE CHILEAN EDUCATIONAL SYSIEM BEFORE AND AFTER DECENTRALIZATION FUNCTION BEFORE AFTER Educational policy Central (Ministry of Education Central (Ministry of Education - MINEDUC) MINEDUC) Financial resources mobilization Budget based on fiscal historic trends. Subwention based on educational level and Financial resources allocated by central average monthly student attendance. government to MINEDUC Financial resources allocated by central' government to the municipalities Mostly, federal budget transfers to Sources of funding Central government municipalities, complemented with municipal revenues Central. One curriculum for the entire country. Teachers allowed to make minor Curriculum development Central. One curriculum for the entire changes country Teachers hiring and firing Municipalities MINEDUC Teachers salaries Set by the municipalities and private Set by MINEDUC subsidized and paid schools Pre-service and in-service training and up- Special teacher training schools (Escuelas Universities grading Normales) and universities Designed, published and distributed by the Tetbooks privatesector (contracted publishing hous- Designed, published and distributed, free es) to the schools, and provided free of of charge, by the private sector (contracted charge to students publishing houses) to the schools Supervision Decentralized at the provincial level Decentralized at the provincial level Student certification MINEDUC Municipalities and schools School calendar setting MINEDUC MINEDUC Information system MINEDUC with information gathered by Gathered by the municipalities and the provincial level MINEDUC's provincial agencies. Integrated by MINEDUC School building and maintenance MINEDUCs building agency (Sociedad Municipalities with fungible resources Constructora de Establecimientos from municipal investment fund provided Escolats) with resources allocated bycen- by the central government through the tral government Ministry of Interior -8- TABLE 3. THE MEXICAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM BEFORE AND AFTER DECENTRALIZATION FUNCTION BEFORE AFTER Educational policy Central (Ministry of Public Education - Central (SEP) SEP) Financial resources mobilization Budget based on fiscal historic trends. Budget based on historical fiscal trends. Financial resources allocated by central Financial resources allocated by central government to SEP government to SEP's State Delegations Central government Sources of funding Central government Central. One curriculum for the entire Curriculum development Central. One curriculum for the entire country, but complemented with regional country and ethnic teaching materials for corresponding regions Teachers hiring and firing Combined procedures between center and SEP's State Delegations. Teachers union SEP with unions approval greatly influences outcomes National scale fixed by central government Teachers salaries and negotiated with unions. Allows for regional and hard working conditions Central government after negotiated with salary differences teachers union Pre-service and in-service training and up- Special teacher training schools (Escuelas Special teacher training schools (Escuelas grading Normales) managed by SEP. 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