Argentina - Fourth Highway Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFRCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 8211 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1384-AR) DECEMBER 11, 1989 Infrastructure Division Country Department IV Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROECT COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1503-AR) Glossary of Abbreviations and Currency Terms EDI - Economic Development Institute DNTP - National Directorate for Transport PlAnning NTP - National Transport Plan PPD - Projects Policy Department SVP - Senior Vice President UNDP - United Nations Development Programime Currencies $mn - Peso (Moneda Nacional) Sley - Peso Ley $a - New Peso (Peso Argentino) A - Austral GOVEMNT OF ARGENTINA FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31  FOR OmCIL UR MOLY THE WORLD SANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Oft. of OcwGbnheral Opafatin' EWII6Nif December 11, 1989 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Argentina Fourth Highway Project (Loan 1384-AR) Attached, for information is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Argentina Fourth Highway Project (Loan 1384-AR)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed partly by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted disttibution and may be usod by ocipients only In the performance I of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Dank autloriat_on.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1503-AR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Pane No. PREFACE & PREAMBLE......... i EVALUATION SUMMARY ..... PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ... A. Project Identity .............................. .1 B. Background....... 1 C. Project Objectives and Description .........2 D. Project Design and Organization . . . ..2 E. Project Implementation.. ... 3 F. Project Results and Impact. ... .. . 5 G. Project Sustainability ........ 7 B. Bank Performance ............ I. Borrower Petformance ........... . .... . ....9 J. Project Relationship . ...... 9 K. Consu'.ting Services ...... ............. . . ...... . .9 L. Project Documentation and Data ......10 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORREwER'S PERSPECTIVE ............U L 1 PART IIIs STATISTICAL INFORMATION ........ ....... ..e ....*. . 12 1. Related Bank Loans ......... . ..... ...... ....... 12 2. Project Timetable .................. .. . 13 3. Loan Disbursements ..................... ........ ......... .14 4. Project Implementation . . .* ...... .... . ... 14 5. Project Cost and Financing .l... . ..... .. . ......... 15 6. Status of Loan Covenants. ............. .... . . .. 17 7. Use of Bank Resources..... ..... . .. 18 TABLES 1. Basic Data Concerning Road Programs. 20 2. Causes of Major Delays and Cost Overruns .25 3. Economic Reevaluation of the Project .........28 4. Revisions and Amendmente tu the Loan Agreement ..............33 MAP IBRD 21540  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1511 -.9R PREFACE & PREAMBLE Preface This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Fourth Highway Project in Argentina, for which Loan 1384-AR in the amount of US$105.0 million was approved cn March 22, 1977. The loan was closed on December 31, 1985, four years behind schedule. US$0.3 million was cancelled during the course of the project. The last disbursement was on February 20, 1987, fourteen months after loan closing, due to the delay in documenting disbursement adjustments to historic exchange rates. The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division of the Latin America and the Caribbean Office (Preface & Preamble, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). On September 15, 1989, the Bank sent the Borrower Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II by November 3, 1989, but no reply was received. The preparation of this PCR was started two years after completion of the project in January 1989. The PCR is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan Agreement; supervision reports; a civil works suz-ary report prepared for the Borrower by the coordinating consultant for project civil works; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; internsl Bank memoranda; and additional data obtained from the Borrower by the Bank highway mission in March/April 1989. Preamble The project became effective December 13, 1977 and the final disbursement was made February 20, 1987. During this time, Argentina went through periods of very high inflation. The renomination of the currency at various dates shown below indicate the order of magnitude of the problem. January 1, 1970 1 $ley = 100 $mn June 1, 1983 1 $a - 10,000 $ley June 14, 1985 1 A = 1,000 $a The exchange rate for the same dates show: January 1, 1970 1 $ley = US$ 0.26 June 1, 1983 1 $a = US$ 0.12 June 14, 1985 1 A = US$ 1.35 The difficulty both for the contractors and for Vialidad (the National Highway Department) of executing a road improvement program in the turbulent and unsteady macro-economic climate, with the associated  - ii - budgeting complexities, is evident throughout the project. While the full impact on the project cannot be measured precisely, the project files document that the inflation caused several contractors to fail. It is also significant to bear in mind that the Bank's former policy of disbursing at the exchange rate of the day-of-disbursement as opposed to the rate on which payment had actually been made by Vialidad, consistently reduced the Bank's contribution to civil works in real terms and aggravated Vialldad's problems in funding the works in a timely fashion throughout most of the project. Although recommended by Bank supervision mi-sions in 1983, not until 1986 was any adjustment for underpayment of the Bank's nominal percentage contribution actually made. In 1986 and 1987 the Bank reimbursed over US$17.0 million to compensate for accumulated under- contribution to project costs. The project's role in promoting disbursement policy change within the Bank to that of using the rate of exchange on the date on which payment was made by the executing agency, was truly significant. Finally, throughout this report, the US$ equivalent costs of civil works have been calculated by converting the value of work performed (or billed) during any month by the exchange rate of the last day of such month. This ignores numerous distortions introduced by the normal delays in actually effecting payments to contractors, late payments by Vialidad or delayed settlement of claims. In aggregate, however, it is felt to result in representative cost figures upon which economic re-evaluation can reasonably be based.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT .ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1503-AR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives Project objectives were: (a) improving 1,285 km of earth or gravel (925 km) and already paved (360 km) roads, mostly serving agricultural export traffic, and/or international connections, to adequate paved standards (para. 1.3); (b) improving national transport planning by establishing a National Directorate for Sectorial Planning (DNTP) and training staff during its preparation of a National Transport plan (NTP); and (c) conducting studies in three priority areas, namelyt (i) Regional Agricultural Development, (ii) Pavement Overlay need determination, and (iii) Traffic Safety (para. 1.4). Dur4ng the project, substitvtion of a few project roads added about 240 km of road length, also added were flood damage repairs (mostly to bridges) while thd Agricultural study was deleted (para. 1.5). Implementation Experience The start of project roadworks was delayed almost two years due to all of Vialidad's budget being needed for ongoing road works (para. 1.9) and final project completion was delayed five years. Completion dates and costs of many civil works sub-projects were delayed and changed by numerous design changes during construction, unusually heavy rains and frequent changes from railroad to road transport of aggregates over long distances. Inflation also played an important role leading to time consuming, negotiated unit-price increases and some contractor failures resulting in drawn out litigation and retendering (para. 1.10). Implementation of the institutional components, except the Agricultural study, was successful despite delayed contracting of technical assistance (paras. 1.12 and 1.13). Preparation of the NTP was heavily supported by the Bank, who provided qualified staff and devoted considerable supervision mission backup to DNTP (para. 1.23). The civil works and consultant studies, once started, were by and large well managed by Vialidad (para. 1.25). Preparation of the NTP suffered some set-backs due to organization weaknesses (para. 1.8) and difficulty in coordinating the six consulting contracts involved (para. 1.28). The Bank was sometimes slow in responding to assist with critical implementation problems due to difficulties in adapting its procedures to respond to unstable macro-economic country conditions (para. 1.22), in particular, Bank disbursements for civil works were about 202 below the Loan's nominal percentage during most of the project, increasing local fund  - iv - requirements (para. 1.18). This was due to the effect of local inflation on the exchange rate used by the Bank at the time disbursements were made, generally several months after the Government effected actual payments to contractors. Not until late in the project did the Bank agree to *adjustment" for disbursements, calculated from "Historic Exchange* rates (para. 1.22). Results The project's specific physical goals were actually exceeded at an acceptable cost (para. 1.11). An economic reevaluation of most of the civil w.rks (over 80Z of project cost) gave a weighted project ERR of 22Z (versus 23Z at appraisal) with sub-project ERRs of 6.2Z to 62.3Z (only one lower than the 1OZ opportunity cost of capital at appraisal)(para. 1.16). Traffic growth rates in the project area, however, were substantially lower than estimated at appraisal, reflecting less economic growth than had been anticipated (para. 1.15). The NTP was a significant success in improving planning and policy formulation. The DNTP was abie to provide technical back-up on major transport investment issues. Most important was the training (including some by EDI) of many transport professionals (para. 1.12). Both the Traffic Safety Study and Pavement Overlay Study were satisfactorily completed and the latter was expanded to develop a total Road-Needs determination methodology (para. 1.13). Sustainability As long as maintenance funding and management remain satisfactory, the useful life and economic benefits of road improvements should be fully realized. Improvements in road needs planning, maintenance management, traffic counting and economic evaluation have been institutionalized within Vialidad, but current macro-economic instability with austerity driven budget restrictions pose some threat to maintaining Vialidad's organizational, technical and management quality (para. 1.19). Political changes have led to the disappearance of DNTP, its functions subsumed under other modal offices, however, some of the models it developed are still being used and upgraded and the country has a trained cadre of transport specialists to draw on (para. 1.20). Findings and Lessons The lessons which could be drawn from the project appear already largely incorporated in the subsequent Bank financed project and reflected in Vialidad's performance thereunder. These include improved quality of detailed engineering and updating of old plans; review of Vialidad's total commitments during programming and budgeting; greater flexibility in substituting for works which run into physical or administrative delays (program approach)(para. 1.22); and the establishment of special accounts in Bank loans with provision for disbursements calculated at conversion rates of the date of payment.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1503-AR) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Proiect Identity 1.1 Project Name Fourth Highway Project Loan Number 1384-AR Loan Amount US$105.0 million (US$0.3 million cancelled) Co-Financing None Total Project Cost at Appraisal US$345.1 million Actual Project Cost US$396.7 million RVP Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region Country Argentina Sector Transport Subsector Highways B. Background 1.2 The policies which had been pursued over the 1973-1975 period had left Argentina's transport sector in a state of disarray. Ineffective sector management, overstaffing, inadequate maintenance, and excessive subsidization were among the legacies that a new Government had to try to resolve. In addition, Argentina had been slow in developing effective institutions and policies for transport planning and coordination. The new Government, which had come to power in March 1976, had been primarily occupied with immediate macro-economic problems but had, however, indicated a number of policies which had direct implications for the transport sectort (a) restricting public investment to high priority projects; (b) restoring the financial integrity of state-owned agencies; (c) developing exports; and (d) opening up new areas for agricultural development. At the time of appraisal, the Government and the Bank agreed on a follow-on highway project for the sector to improve transport export services and access to areas with agricultural export potential. The Government also placed high priority on creating international road connections with Brazil, Bolivia and Chile and on diverting traffic from Buenos Aires. The core of the project was to be a road betterment program which had previously been identified and prepared during the Second Highway Project and updated under the Third, then updated several times, but delayed thtee times before the final appraisal in 1976. The delays reflected the Bank's concern over macro-economic issues, particularly the country's fiscal situation which, with inadequate pricing of public services and poorly  - 2 - conceived investment programs, the Bank felt could lead to serious inflation. In 1976 the Bank felt the new Government would follow adequate macro-economic policies and agreed to additional lending. C. Prolect Obiectives and DescriPtion 1.3 The Road Betterment Program (total length 1,285 km - Table 1), had as its main objective improving existing roads linking agriculture areas with ports. It consisted of: (i) paving and improving 14 earth or gravel road sections totaling about 925 km; (ii) repaving and improving four sections of paved highways totalling about 324 km; and (iii) upgrading two highway sections (about 36 km) from two-lane to four-lane. 1.4 The Bank, also concerned with the institutional aspects of transport planning and policy in Argentina, provided funds in both the First and Second Highway Projects for improving the administrative, planning and design capabilities of Vialidad and local consultants. The Third Highway Project contained a covenant requiring adequate staffing of the Sectoral Planning Office in the Secretariat for Transport and Public Works, but no action was taken by the Government during 1973 through 1976. The Bank's persistence led the new Government, in 1976, to establish the National Directorate for Sectoral Planning to improve national transport planning, and the project provided funds for a National Transport Plan. It also provided funds for a Regional Agricultural Development Study; a Pavement Overlay Study; and a Traffic Safety Program. 1.5 The Loan Agreement was revised and amended ten times (Table 4). Of these chenges, two affected the project description. That of June 29, 1981 deleted three road sections with a total length of 138 km and added 380 km of roadworks while that of August 29, 1983 added emergency (flood damaged) bridge works and an unspecified length of associated road repairs. The former of the amendments also deleted the Regional Agricultural Development Study, the only significant change in project objectives. D. Project Design and Organization 1.6 Only 355 km of the 1,285 km originally identified in 1972 were carried over to the project finally appraised in 1976, due to the Bank's insistence that all the roads be export-orieuted. The concept was supported by the Government, but Vialidad may have wished to include more of tae road sections from the original list for which designs had already beer. prepared. The rapid preparation of additional road designs coupled with the use of old' detailed engineering, without adequate updating for changes which had occurred during the elapsed interval, resulted in design inadequacies which affected project execution and cost. Vialidad also tended to push for higher geometrical and pavement design standards than the Bank considered justifiable. This led to an unusually specific definition of roads and standards being included in the Loan Agreement, which eventually complicated Loan administration (pars. 1.30). The scope and scale of the project was appropriate in light of its objectives, but its timing ignored the large backlog of ongoing works contracted before 1976 (including some US$30.0 million unused loan funds from the Second and Third Highway Loans). In view of the ensuing delay, the project appraisal could have been delayed by at least one year.  1.7 The roles and responsibilities of the agencies were clearly defined. Both the Pavement Overlay Study, intended to review the pavement maintenance and rehabilitation needs o' the expanding paved network, and a Traffic Safety program, intended to focus on solutions to the problems causing an inordinate number of traffic deaths, were executed under Vialidad supervision, who understood and agreed with the need for and underlying concepts of the studies. The Regional Agricultural Development Study, however, which was placed under the National Directorate of Regional Economy, was of questionable design and the Bank's concept was not shared throughout the Government. It was eventually deleted from the project. 1.8 The National Transport Plan (NTP) was executed by the newly established National Directorate of Sectoral Planning [later, the National Directorate for Transport Planning (DNTP)l under the Under-Secretariat of Transport, supported by foreign consultants. It relied heavily on training local staff and local consultants to produce a practical transport policy document with related programs which was the most innovative feature of the project. It was a major undertaking whose size was warranted considering the major infrastructure investments and disinvestments being contemplated in ports and railways. The concept of the NTP had significant strengths: (i) it was a locally generated idea supported by earmarked local funds and staffed with a good cadre of young, talented professionals who were highly motivated; (ii) the development of the plan was expected to be a major contributor to training and data gathering rather than simply the preparation of a "planu; and (iii) the plan was to be policy oriented and not simply a physical investment document. The organization adopted for the work, however, had significant weaknesses: (i) the contractual make-up for the plan (six separate study contracts) was difficult to coordinate and resulted in conflicts, delays and excess costs; (ii) the simultaneous start of all contracts, in particular that of the modelling contract, was inappropriate (by the time the issues were identified and the data collected, the funds had been spent); and (iii) the comprehensive transport modelling was at the limit of the state of the art, too complex and virtually impossible to achieve. E. Project Implementation Road Betterment Program 1.9 The start of the project civil works was delayed almost two years beyond the appraisal estimate as the Vialidad budget, although sizeable =n the context of the Government's policy of restraining public expenditures, was insufficient to permit it to start the Road Betterment program until the needs of its ongoing works program were met. If it had obtained an increase of its total funding, there is a serious question whether or not the local contracting industry could have absorbed the added work. Tendering (scheduled for the second quarter of 1977) did not begin until June 1978 and continued through 1979. The first contract (scheduled for the third quarter of 1977) was signed in June 1979. 1.10 Numerous design changes during construction and adverse weather conditions played significant roles in changing sub-project costs and in delaying completion of the Roads Betterment Program (Table 2). In addition to numerous pavement design changes, inadequate information regarding quarries and ground water levels, major changes in volumes of earthworks, and substantial additions to culverts and drainage measures (in some cases  - 4 - due to actual experience on the job sites during the heavy rains) all contributed to delays and sometimes to rescission of contracts due to work- volume changes. The inability of the railroad to transport ard deliver aggregates, which had then to be moved by road over long distances, frequently contributed to increased costs. During the February to October 1982 period, more delay resulted when Vialidad ordered the contractors to reduce the pace of works, owing to the budgetary limits imposed on it by the Government. Inflation also played an important role; it not only caused time-consuming, negotiated increases in unit prices, but also some of the works were stopped because the contractors went broke (sometimes due to serious underbidding, but in other cases due to the d.fference in parity between the peso and the dollar which affected contractors who had bought foreign equipment and could not meet their foreign payment obligations). These contract failures led to litigation and delayed retendering until the cases had been settled. The final payment for works by the Bank was in February 1987, some five years later than estimated. 1.11 The total Road Betterment Cost (civil works including contingencies) at appraisal was estimated at US$319.3 million.1 The final cost of all the civil works in which the Bank participated came to US$368.6 million, as shown in Table 1 and summarized below: Length (km) Cost MUSO zillion eaulvalent Estimated Final X C!:;qg Estiated Final X Chance Loan Agreement 1,285.0 319.8 Deleted (June 1981) 186.0 49.a _ Subtotal 1,147.0 1,302.7 .13.5 270.0 294.1 +..9 Added (June 1981) 880.0 860.7 -5.0 48.* . 58.0 4.6 Subtotal 1,527.0 1,668.4 .5.0 818.6 847.1 .6.9 Flood damage works n.n. n.j. 21.5 21.6 CIVIL WORKS TOTAL 1,627.0 1,668.4 +8.9 840.8 868.6 +..8 Supervision 16.0 18.4 BETTERIETS TOTAL 1,627.0 1,6683.4 860.8 887.0 48.6 * Includes about 28t (average) contingenie". Although per kilometer costs, including contingencies, generally remained about the same, the variation on some projects proved quite large. In general, contract bids tended to average only about 502-55Z of final cost. National Transport Plan (NTP) 1.12 The NTP was a very significant success in terms of planning and policy formulation although some of its conceptual problems were only resolved late in the project by focussing on a limited number of 1/ Includes, pro-rata, US$71.2 million of the total US$77.0 million in contingencies.  - 5 - commodities and specific passenger corridors. In common with many planning agencies, the DNTP suffered from some resentment and lack of cooperation of the modal agencies. Moreover, the NTP was prepared in a period of frequent changes in the military regime so that the Directorate was often facing political challenges to its existence. The Bank had to intervene after each palitical change to explain the rationale for the DNTP which had, nonetheless, to keep responding to changing political ideologies. The NTP was, however, able to provide technical back-up to officials in order to fight major political battles over transport investment, especially in ports and railways. Most important was the training of many professionals (including 20 whose training was prepared and supervised by EDI). Vialidad Institutional Studies 1.13 A contract was negotiated by Vialidad with a consortium of three Argentine firms for a nine month traffic safety study. Bank supervision missions encouraged attention to specific goals which would be cost effective without depending too much on changes in legislature and/or customs or habits. A draft final report was presented in March 1980. The PavemeLt Overlay Study started almost a year behind schedule (September 1978). With Bank agreement, Vialidad increased the scope of the consultants' work to preparing and applying a total needs study methodology for the entire national network. The stud, was satisfactor4lly completed in 1984. F. Project Results and Impact 1.14 In physical terms, the project's specific goals of road betterment was actually exceeded (para. 1.11) at an acceptable cost, in micro-economic terms. However, traffic figures in the project area (para. 1.15) were substantially below those estimated at appraisal. In institutional terms, the National Transport Plan met its reporting and training objectives and has had a positive impact on the sector growth and policies by providing a cadre of trained transport planners and economists. It also provided a substantial data base and computer models from which to analyze both new projects and national policy. The methodology developed during the Road Needs Study was used in the preparation of the Fifth Highway Sector Project and led to the development of a rGad information system which was subsequently established in the Maintenance Department within Vialidad. From the Traffic Safety study, the collection of traffic accident statistics (including causes), is still in the course of being implemented and expanded by DN7 with provincial cooperation. 1.15 Traffic growth rates, from which benefit growth was estimated, was projected at appraisal to average about 6.OZ (ranging from 3.0Z to 9.OZ) for the twenty sections analysed. For comparison, country-wide 1965-1986 traffic growth (in tons and passenger kilometers) taken from NTP reports is shown below. (millions of ton or passenger kms) 1965 1975 1986 Autos (pass.km) 16,781 26,620 35,385 Buses (pass.km) 11,864 18,636 20,115 Trucks (ton km) 35,953 49,915 48,552  - 6 - Annual Average Growth Rates (country-wide) 1965-75 1965-86 1975-86 Autos 4.7Z 3.62 2.7Z Buses 4.62 2.62 0.7? Trucks 3.4Z 1.5Z -0.3Z For the reevaluated project sections, traffic volumes were obtained from Vialidad's annual traffic surveys. The calculated annual average traffic growth rates (Table 3) range from a low of -5.02 to a high of ll.OZ with the average rate of growth for all project sections at about 0.5Z, substantially lower than the appraisal estimate, but consistent with the 1975-86 values indicated above. In retrospect, the growth rate assumed at appraisal were too optimistic, even considering the results registered in 1965-1975. The traffic figures also suggest that the project's impact on agricultural growth may be debatable. However, the sustained exports of agricultural products and the growing role of private ports in the export trade have certainly been supported by the project and other investments in the road sub-sector. Economic Returns 1.16 The economic reevaluation of the Road Betterment Program which, as at appraisal, represents 972 of the project cost gave a weighted project ERR of 222, slightly lower than that the 232 at appraisal (see Table 3). The individual ERRs ranged from 6.22 to 62.32 with all the sections analyzed, except the Vera-Tostado section, having an ERR higher than 10l (the estimated opportunity cost of capital for Argentina at appraisal). The analysis considered the economic cost of construction, periodic maintenance seals or overlays and the annual maintenance required during the 20-year economic life of road sections. Due to lack of data ons (i) traffic for roads which were transferred to the provinces and (ii) costs of diversions from the bridges, only 832 of the total cost of the Program was reevaluated. Tne benefits calculated in the reevaluation are more conservative than those estimated at appraisal in that only savings in vehicle operating costs and time have been considered. Savings in road maintenance costs or due to reduced road lengths resulting from the road improvements have not been considered. During the economic reevaluation it was established that taxes on construction contracts amounted to about 332 of total costs, whereas at appraisal these were estimated at 452 of contract cost, which might imply that contract prices could have been expected to drop about 102 had all else remained unchanged. 1.17 A major outcome of the reinforcement of the planning capabilities of Vialidad was a comprehensive and reliable data bank for evaluating vehicle operating costs under a wide range of conditions. This is a major improvement over the information used at appraisal and may in part explain why the overall reevaluated ERR is practically the same as at appraisal, even with traffic growths lower than expected.  - 7 - 1.18 The project was less successful in realizing timely resource transfers. Not only was less than 4OZ of the loan disbursed at the time of the original Loan Closing Date, but the Bank's contributions to ongoing roadworks sub-projects were of the order of 202 lower than the Bank's nominal percentage participation, during most of the course of the project, increasing the local fund requirement and complicating the timely payment of contractors. G. Project Sustainability 1.19 The macro-economic and political stability which Argentina is able to achieve will determine the extent to which the full potential benefits of the project are maintained. As long as timely financing for road maintenance is available and good road maintenance management continues, the level of net benefits throughout the economic life of the road improvements would remain acceptable. Improvements in road needs planning, maintenance management, traffic counting, economic evaluation have been institutionalized within Vialidad. Further modernization is being sought. However, with the current macro-economic instability, effective need-based planning, budgeting and work execution has become virtually impossible; moreover, austerity-driven budget restrictions, inability to fill organizational vacancies and retirement of older staff pose a threat to maintaining Vialidad's organizational, tochnical and management quality. This could threaten the full sustainability of the institutional improvements which were fostered under the project. 1.20 Parts of the NTP in which the Bank invested heavily, particularly those quantifying investment or disinvestment costs, have a limited shelf life, as with most such plans. Suggested policy options may be more durable when no action at all has been taken, which is often the case given the political and economic upheavals of the past decade. The models developed are still being used and upgraded, especially with regard to the general analyses of grain movements and to port planning as applied to Bahia Blanca and another Bank project currently under preparation. The NTP final policy document (July 1987), although agreed to in principle with the Bank, has not been implemented and is still under review by the Government. As a technical document, it required political follow-up on high priority areas. Changes in the Government have made this process difficult. The transition to a civilian democracy was, ironically, a significant blow to the DNTP as its staff hired under the military regime were initially mistrusted (although they subsequently returned to high level position in transport). The disappearance of the DNTP office may be the greatest loss as its functions, which have now been subswuied under ither offices, lose the *overall' transport perspective to the competition between the interests of modal agencies. However, the NTP has had a positive impact on the sector by (i) training a cadre of transport planners and economists, who now can provide leadership in sector planning and (ii) by introducing improved planning techniques to local transport institutions. H. Bank Performance 1.21 Macro-economic and political considerations overshadowed project preparation and timing. The decision to finally appraise was based on this being the only project which could be ready for the FY 1976 lending program (while other export oriented projects would have been preferred by the Bank  - 8 - as a final lending operation in Argentina). The resulting insistence on concentrating on agricultural export oriented roads led to extensive changes in the roads which would be included which required more preparation (revision) time than was scheduled by the Bank. Insufficient attention was paid to reviewing the financial and contracting capacity requirements needed to complete the backlog of ongoing works contracts. The appraisal mission wanted a side letter on the Government's policy to encourage agricultural exports and, because of high inflation, on its strategy to adjust the peso to foreign currencies. This was rejected by the Decision Committee Meeting as the Bank felt the new Government had imposed an adequate economic program. 1.22 In general, throughout project implementation, the Bank's operational staff in the field, supported by divisional and departmental management, performed well, supporting the Borrower's executing agencies who were experiencing considerable difficulties due to economic, and at times political, instability. The main weaknesses of the Bank's performance stemmed from difficulties in adapting operational guidelines (with potential precedent-setting implications for Bank operations) to an ongoing project in unstable macro-economic conditions and, as a result, some slow responses to assist critical project specific implementation problems. For example, substitution of road sections (which required changes to the loan amendment) took a very long time. The Government's desire to delete works on three roads and substitute works on two others was noted in a February 6. 1979 Supervision report, but not until Juno 29, 1981 was a legal amendment prepared and finally signed. As the project wore on, it became relatively easier to increase the Bank's nominal percent participation and to include emergency work, but the approval of disbursement recalculation at *Historical' conversion exchange rates was again slow in forthcoming. The May 12, 1983 supervision report recommended that the Loan Administration Department be invited to respond to the suggestion to disburse at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of payments by the executing agency. The Fourth Highway Project undoubtedly played its share in demonstrating the need for such changes. The Region's support for Vialidad's request to be reimbursed the difference between what they h3d actually received and what they would have received, calculated on the basis of 'Historical Exchange' rates, in a similar manner to that then being used in new projects, provoked the formulation of policy by PPD regarding the conditions under which the new conversion exchange rates policy would apply. However, not until early 1987 was the last 'adjustment' disbursement actually made. In spite of what now appears to have been very serious financial problems, at no time was the project rated worse than a '2' by the several teams of Bank staff who supervised the project, since it was accepted that (i) the financial problem was consistent with macro-economic objectives of restraining government spending, and (ii) Vialidad was performing admirably (compared to severe implementation and contractual problems during the 1973-76 period) in managing the execution of the backlog of pre-1976 contracts. The lessons of experience from this project were generally reflected in the next Highway Sector Loan, 2229-AR. 1.23 Support by the Bank for the NTP was excellent, utilizing most of the supervision mission's efforts during the first two years. Qualified Bank staff were, in addition, provided to assist the NTP and to organize the NTP's management. Without the substantial Bank staff inputs to the NTP, there is some question that it would ever have produced the quality data and policy papers it did.  -9- I. Borrower Performance 1.24 Many of the project's civil works problems stemmed from weakness in the project preparation stages for which Vialidad must share responsibility. Who prepared the detailed engineering is not well documented in project files, but there are clear indications that the importance of more detailed soils and drainage design investigations and of the need to 'update" old designs before inviting bids were not well appreciated. It is also not clear to what extent pavement design changes may have been due to the supervisory consultant's differing from the project designs. Vialidad would do well to adopt the policy that design and construction supervision be performed by the same firm, or should, in any event, have had the selected supervisory consulting firms review the designs prior to inviting bids. The subsequent Bank financed project has not had the same problems. Vialidad (and the Government) should also have paid more attention, at the time of negotiations, to the backlog of road contracts and the financial requirements for completing them (para. 1.6). It appears that later Vialidad projects have benefitted from project experience regarding the quality of detailed engineering and the need to review, more thoroughly, Vialidad's total work program. 1.25 The Road Betterment Program, once started, was by and large well- managed. The only real notes of management problems were: (i) in some cases, an apparent lack of support from Vialidad for supervising consulrants when these were disputing cost-increase claims of contractors, and (ii) delays experienced in getting contracts rebid, which reflects fundamental problems in contract procedures and law, common to many South American countries. 1.26 The Borrower failed to engage consulants for the NTP, the Pavement-Overlay study and the Traffic Safety Program within the time periods specified. The delays in hiring consultants for the NTP were due to the Compra Argentina* law which had to be dealt with before the needed foreign consultants could be hired, but the other two studies could have been started on schedule. J. Proiect RelationshiR 1.27 The project period covered eight years during which both the Bank's Project Officers and the Administrator General for Vialidad changed several times, also the responsible under-Secretary at least once. Some delays in processing documents due to these changes are evident in the project files, however, these were minor and, with few exceptions, the relationship between the Bank and Vialidad appears good. The relationship between the Bank and the Director of the NTP was also good and was fostered by the Bank's intensive direct technical assistance. K. Consulting Services 1.28 Consulting services for the Road Needs and Transport Safety studies were slow starting but were satisfactorily concluded. For the NTP, six major contracts were awarded. Major problems (all resolved satisfactorily) occurred in Contracts V (Coordination - to formulate policy) and VI (Systems - to develop the computer models). Both  - 10 - experieaced serious delays in receipt of data. There were also other minor problems which were adequately addressed, as the comments on the Phase I report were positive. 1.29 Vialidad prequalified consulting firms for construction supervision with one "lead, firm also selected for coordination of reporting. The services appear to have been well performed (no criticism is documented in the project files), though their role in *design changesa is not clear. L. Prolect Documentation and Data 1.30 The very specific list of roads and related technical data included in Exhibit A of Schedule 2 of the Loan Agreement was drafted specifically to give supervision missions leverage in maintaining the design standards agreed to at appraisal. However, it became apparent during supervision that it included too much technical detail and became impractical to enforce and modify in detail during project implementation. Sub-projects which ran into contractual problems or contractor failures were tied up in lengthy legal and administrative procedures before the remaining works could be rebid. In retrospect a list of roads in a supplemental letter, with a provision in the Loan Agreement for possible revision, subject to agreement by both parties, would have been preferable. 1.31 The Staff Appraisal Report provided the basis for framing the Legal documents and provided the take-off point for drawing up detailed terms of reference for consulting services. Given the eventual duration of the project, the changes in Bank supervision teams, several internal Bank management reorganizations, changes of Government and in the Borrower's managers, the SAR also provided 'institutional memory' concerning the project origins. 1.32 The data relevant to the NTP is well documented. The data regarding the Pavement Overlay and the Traffic Overlay Studies are less well documented. The data regarding the civil works is considerably more complicated as a result of the impact of inflation. The coordinating "supervision consultants' fortunately prepared a remarkably comprehensive summary report on Road Betterment civil works, through the end of 1985, but there is scant information on emergency flood repairs. It would be useful if the project quarterly reports had listed disbursements, and the date of each disbursement. From the data available, it is difficult to assess the final cost of the works and also the actual portion paid by the Bank.  - 11 - PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Following old procedures for preparation of Project Completion Reports (PCR), the Borrower engaged a coordinating consultant for supervision services on project financed civil works who, inter alia, in early 1986 prepared a summary report on civil works sub-projects through the end of 1985. The Borrower also provided up-dated traffic count data on most sub-projects from the regular annual traffic count program (on National Roads). The observations of the consultant's report were essentially those sumarized in paragraphs 1.10 and 1.11 of Part I of this report. The economic reevaluation of the project civil works was prepared by Bank staff from the data provided by the Borrower including improved vehicle operating cost data (para. 1.17, Part I). Observations on the Institutional Studies reflect views obtained by later Bank missions from local staff of the Borrower and some participating local consultants, as well as through consultation with Bank staff who were engaged on the project, in addition to documents and reports in the Bank's files. 2. OED also invited the Borrower on September 15, 1989, to summarize its views about the project, in accordance with the Bank's Guidelines for Preparing Project Completior Reports, dated June 1989. However, no reply was received.  - 12 - rROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1503-AR) PART III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans YEAR OF LOAN TITLE PURPOSE APPROVAL STATUS COMMENTS First Highway Support improvement of 2,600 1061 Completed Shortages of local funds and other, Proj ct km of national highwayas lessr, problemx led to reduction Loan 288-AR provislon of consulting In work scope to 1900 km which was services and procusr_ment of *uessfully complted. road construction equipment. Second Highway Support upgrading and paving 1969 Compled Shortage of local funds; shortage Project of 790 km of national of equipmnt and spares; inadequate Loan 619-AR highways; consulting services detailed engineering; polltical for engineering supervision, instability; and abnormal weather future project preparation, led to delays In civil works. highway management and Project amnded to use surplus transport coordination; and funds. Exe pt In area of transport equipment for future project coordination project was preparation. successfully completed. Third Highway Support improvement, paving, 1971 Completed Shortage of local funds; Import Project repaving, and construction of restriction on equipment and Loan 734-AR 1,128 km of national and *pares; diversion of road user provincial roads; consulting revenues from Vialidad to general sorvices for engineerlag budget caused payment delaya to supervision, future projet contractors up to one year; preparation, and update political instability; and other national highway survey. problem. caused project completion to be delayed by five years. The projict's physical componenta were successfully completed. Highway Sector Sector Loan to promote and 1983 In The national roads program Is Project assist the effective Progress esentially complete and the Loan 2296-AR implementation of a serle of provincial road program Is due to programs and plan4 developed be completed in 1989. under the Fourth Highway Project. First Railway Assist In renovation and 1971 Completed US127. million (82.71) cane lled Project lmprovwemnt of the railway. because the Bank and Government Loan 788-AR could not agree on solutions to a number of Implementation Issues. Second Railway Suppor_ the strengthening of 1979 Completed US829.7 million (30.98) cancelled Proj et the Railway System by becaus of Institutional Loan 1877-AR redl_ nsioning, lnadequacles aggravated by rehabilitation and political and economic problems nationalization. during the moat critical yeara of the projoet. Bahia Blanco I Facilitate grain exports 188 In After a slow strt, the project Is Port Project through rehabilitation and Progreas progressing satisfactorily. Loan 280S-AR modernization of exieting Infrastructure, upgrade of silo safety and institutional lmprovemonte.  - 13 - 2. Proiect Timetable Date Date Date Item Planned Revised Actual - Identification During Second Higbway Project - Preparation During Second and Third Jan 26, 1972 1/ Bigbway Projects May 31. 1972 (Update) Oct 12. 1972 21 (Update) Apr 15. 1975 3/ (Update) - Appraisal Missions May 24. 1976 July 6. 1976 (Reappraisal) - Loan Negotiations Sep. 1975 Nov 25. 1975 Nov 25-26. 1975 Dec 13. 1976 Feb 7, 1977 Feb 3-11. 1977 3 Board Approval Jan 27. 1977 Mar 15. 1977 Mar 22. 1977 Mar 22. 1977 3 Loan Signature May 16. 1977 3 Loan Effectiveness Sep 12. 1977 Oct 12. 1977 Nov 12. 1977 Dec 12. 1977 Dec 30. 1977 Dec 13. 1977 - Loan closing Jun 30. 1981 Jun 30. 1983 Jun 30, 1984 Dec 31, 1985 - Loan Coupletion Feb 20, 1987 41 (Final payment) 1/ Main issues were (i) Institutional, (ii) prizing policy. and (iii) investment strategy. 2! Delayed due to economic conditions in the country. 3R Restarted as FY76 project, but delayed when Bank questioned Argentinals ability to manage its short-tem debt problem. 4I Fourteen mnnths after loan closing due to the delay in obtainlng disbursemnt adjustments to historic exchange rates.  - 14 - S. Loan Disbursements Cumulative Eatmated *nd Acual Exnmndture and Olbursements CUS millaw) fY 9 FY 80 FY 81 FY 82 FY 8 FY 84 FY IS FY 6 FY 87 Appraisal Estimat 24.4 65.- 101.2 106.0 Actual - Lean Funds Us 1/ 0.1 1.8 20.7 44.4 54.8 65.6 77.0 n2.0 98.1 104.7 - (Bank Disbursemnts) (0.1) (0.6) (n.*.) (n.e.) (48.7) (n.e.) (70.1) (79.1) (n.*.) (104.7)2/ Actual/Etimated (5) 0.4 2.8 20.6 42.8 61.7 62.7 78.8 79.9 901.5 6.7 Date of First Dlibursement October 2J. 19076/ February 16, 19794/ Initial Loan Closing Date Juno 80, 1661 First Extension Loan Clo in. Date June 80, 198 Second Extension Loan Closing Date June J0, 1984 Third Extension Lean Closing Date Decembr 81, 19865 Date of Lat Disbur_emnt February 20, 1967 1/ Loan sounte use by fiscal year end (in Argentina) based on Vial idad records. Acual disburesemnts logged by 55-106 when compred to yer end values shown In som supervision reports. 2/ USS300,O00 cancelled. 8/ Date of f I rst fIed ithdrawal application, procedure III. 4/ Date of first filed telex indicattng disbursement. 4. Project Implementation This Was a road improvement, paving and repaving project with an institution building component focussing on strengthening sector management and planning. The appraisal did not establish specific indicators such as physical annual targets.  5. Project Cost and Financing A. Project Costs (US$ '000's) Appraisal Estimate Actual Local Foreign Total Bank Local Foreign Total Bank Currency Currency Participation Z Currency Currency Participation 1 Road Betterment Program a. Civil Works 161.2 86.9 248.1 74.4 30 239.59 129.01 368.60 95.75 26 b. Supervision 7.4 5.0 12.4 3.7 30 11.11 7.32 18.43 4.55 25 Sub-Total 168.6 91.9 260.5 78.1 30 250.70 136.33 387.03 100.30 26 Regional Agricultural Development Study Consulting Services 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.3 45 0 0 0 0 National Transport Plan Consulting Services 2.4 3.6 6.0 2.7 45 3.20 4.80 8.00 3.60 45 Pavement Overlay Study a. Consulting Services 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.15 45 0.38 0.58 0.96 0.48 45 b. Equipment - 0.3 0.3 0.30 100 0 0 0 0 Sub-Total 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.45 ,a 0.38 0.58 0.96 0.48 Traffic Safety Program Consulting Services 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.15 45 0.27 0.41 0.68 0.32 45 Base Cost 171.6 96.5 268.1 81.7 30 254.55 142.12 396.67 104.70 26 Contingencies a. Physical 16.9 9.2 26.1 7.8 30 0 0 0 0 b. Price 32.6 18.3 50.9 15.5 30 0 0 0 0 Sub-Total 49.5 27.5 77.0 23.3 30 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 221.1 124.0 345.1 105.0 30 254.55 142.12 396.67 104.70 26 1/ Assumes the ratio between foreign and local in US$ equivalent at time of Appraisal held throughout project period.  B. Proiect Financing Planned Source (Loan Agreement) Final (USS '000) 2 (US$ '000) X IBRD Civil Works 74,400.0 30 95,750.0 26 Equipment for Pavement Overlay Study 300.0 100 f.e. 0 Supervision 3,700.0 30 4,550.0 25 Regional Agricultural Development Study 300.0 45 0 National Transport Plan 2,700.0 45 3,600.0 45 Sectoral Study Program 300.0 45 800.0 45 Unallocated 23,300.0 -- Subtotal 105,000.0 30 104,700.0 26 Co-financins Institutions -- -- -- -- Other External Sources 1/ -- -- 208.0 -- Domestic Financing Civil Works 173,700.0 70 272,850.0 74 Supervision 8,700.0 70 13,880.0 75 Re3ional Agricultural Development Study 400.0 55 0 National Transport Plan 3,300.0 55 4,400.0 55 Sectoral Study Program 300.0 55 840.0 55 Unallocated 53,700.0 --__ Subtotal 240,000.0 70 291,970.0 74 Grand Total 345,100.0 396,878.0 Technical Assistance to the NTP financed by the UNDP with the Bank as Executing Agency.  - 17- 6. Status of Loan Covenant. Deadline for Covenant Subject CowDliance status Section 2.04 Closing Date June 30. 1981 December 31, 1985 Section 3.02 Employment of November 16, February, 1980 Consultants 1977 except for Regional Agricultural Study Section 3.03(i) Part'cipation of As required No specific mention age'iies and public in Supervision entt.?rises in Reports but the National Transport fact the plan was Plan produced indicates adequate participa- tion. Section 3.03(ii) Furnish short-term January 31, No mention, but a plan (1978-1979) 1978 Phase I report was on transport sector released (with Bank needs coments) July 31, 1981. Section 3.03(iii) Exchange views on Views were exchanged program of action but results for execution of not specifically recommendations for available in files. National Transport Plan. Section 3.07 Road design to be in As required Generally complied accordance with with Exhibit A to Schedule 2 and Schedule 5 in Loan Agreement. Section 4.03 Maintenance of high- As required No mention of way system highway main- tenance. Section 4.03 Enforcement of June 30, 1978 Vehicle weight vehicle weights control program was regulations. started. Section 4.04(i) Inventory of provin- December 31, Supervision report cial primary road 1978 of February 1980 system notes complete, but no actual date given. Section 4.04(ui) Inventory of provin- December 31, No mention cial secondary road 1980 system. Section 5.03 Section 12.04 of the September 12, December 13, 1977 General Conditions 1977 (Effective date)  7. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff In2uts Stage of Project Plannedl/ Final Cycle o Field Hg'l Field Comments (Staff weeks) Through Appraisal n.a. 26 23 Parts of supervision missions on Second and Third Highway projects. Appraisal through n.a. 18 - Board Presentation Board Approval n.a. 18 14 through Effectiveness Supervision and PCR n.a. 174 90 Most supervision missions through TOTAL 236 127 1981 were limited to Supervision of National Transport Plan 1; Planned staff inputs not available -I The time spent at Headquarters is approximate a. MIssions Legend - Special zation *bbrsvistionst EG a Enginer EC a Eeoneomlt AG a Agronomist FIN a Financial Analys6 TS a Technical Suwort CONS a Consultant Stags of Month/ No. of Daye In Speclization Perfornce Types of Problems ProJoct Cycle Yar Prsona Feld Rorsted R,tino (see *ootnot4M) Through Appraiusl 1/72 a 18 EG EC EC 1 2 0/72 1 10 EC 8 12/72 1 - EC 5/78 2 4 EG EC 4/76 8 12 EC EC EC 1 4 7/76 4 21 EC EC ECE 3 5 Board Approval 5/77 1 7 EC 6 7 through Effectlvenes n /77 2 4 EC EC 1 (12a/n1 ) 6/77 1 7 EC 1 8/77 8 14 EC ECG 7 10/77 1 5 10 2 6 2/78 a 18 EC EC Ed O Superloion 5/78 8 5 EC E0 EC 2 8 8/78 a 4 EC EC CONS 10/70 2 2 AC CONS  - 19 - Stag. of month/ No. of Days In Specialization Performance Prolect Cycle V..r Persons Field ReDresented Rating TV.. of Problms Supervision, 12/17 2 10 EQ EC 2 6 continued 2/79 1 10 EC 2 6 3/79 1 2 AG 4/79 1 7 EC 6/79 1 8 EC 2 6 7/79 1 8 AG 8/79 1 4 EQ 2 6 8 10/79 1 4 EC 11/79 7 14 EQ-8 EC-4 7 12/79 1 6 EQ 2 6 6 8/80 1 EC 4/80 1 a EC 4/80 1 20 EC 9/80 2 20 EC EC 7 12/80 4 4 EQ EC FIN CPS 6 1/81 2 2 EG EC 2 2/61 1 11 EC 5/81 6 11 EC-2 E- FIN 7 6/61 2 2 EG EC 2 6 10/81 2 2 EC EC 6 12/61 1 7 TS 8/62 2 2 Ea EC 2 6 12/82 2 2 EC EC 6 8/8B 2 2 EC EC 2 6 9 7/63 1 2 EC 9/68 8 8 EC EC EG 2 6 8/84 2 10 EC EC 2 9 10 7/84 2 5 EC EC 2 11/84 1 12 EC 2 8 6 11 5/86 1 1S EQ 2 10 3/86 1 18 EQ 11 7/86 2 16 EC EC 9 11 11/86 2 5 EC EC 2 10 11 1/ Buy Argentin- law and hiring of foreign consultants. 7/ NVP adeinistrativo and/or technical I/ Reed for sectoral development office. probleis. 3/ Requested chanes In project composition. 6/ Managerial. 4/ Price adjustmnt clauss for civil works contracte. 9/ Disbursement at historic rates. 6/ Government macro-economic policies. 10/ Completion schedule. 6/ Financial (local funding). 11/ Development Impact.  ARCGD'NA PROJCST CODPLETION REGAT FOURH HIGWAY PROJET Basic Oats Concerning Rod Plogra_s L94TH COST OF THE PROJECT COST PER 104. Kt SURFACE (US$S EZVALENT) OVER/ ORIO. (tSi ESJIALM T) 0vE/ ------- ------ -------- ----------- -- ----------------- ------------------- tlNOER) CtSTR INTH PRN -_------ - --- -- ---- (ttPOE PtlJ. IM ROUTE at pro- cn- Appral. Contract Final CDMTR. PERIOW VER/ ACCPTCE AP1 FDiAL APPtSL. W4. NO. NO. PROVDICE FRt4 - TO *p"P. lsrvd. apr. po_ed structed Eatimate 1/ Price Cost RATIO NEW'S (130) OATE ESTIH.I CIFT RATIO ROAD uElTTMEr PROOMW 1 4.24 187 SantIgo LoveIlla-Limito can 32.0 34.1 Earth A.C. A.C. 4.471.86 2.318.290 6,047,43 2.61 24 6 06/06/32 1I9,744 177.359 1.27 del Eatero Tuce_m 2 4.31 191 Buenm Aire S lto-Chcabuco 41.0 40.6 Earth A.C. 6.454.,32 3,483.12 7,821,637 157.43 192.651 1.22 M 8 - KM 20 (17.0) A.C. (1.37.220) (3,5090.54) 2.88 24 1 10/23/81 t206.43S) It4 20 - IW 48.6 (23.6) A.C. (2,105.906) (4.812.183) 2.05 24 6 03/11/32 (182.720) 3 4.S7 30 La Rioja La RioJo-Saxan 88.0 38.0 Earth D.S.T. O.S.T. 6.2m.6110 1.914,20 6.170.627 3.22 24 31 07/17/64 150,762 176.,04 1.17 4 4.32 206 8e_e Aireo Seladillo-8oller 130.0 97.6 Earth A.C. 21.757.328 8.e09.860 17.272.920 167.366 176.976 1.06 0 O -1 913 (33.0) A.C. (4.2sti.734) (5,985.903) 1.89 2A 14 04/20/8 (171.026) 0 1M4 3S - lMG 70 (80.0) A.C. (4,056,359) (5,037,636) 1.24 24 12 0/229f3 (167.927) KM 70 - lMG 102.6 (32.6) A.C. (524.207) (6.249.181) 11.92 24 26 111./0/63 (191.69) lO 102.6 - lC4 130 ((27.4))2/12/ n.S. ((0.052.372)) ((3,29.205))6/ n.s. n.s. n.s. na.. n.s. 5 4.35 o1 Forages Intorsecion R.N.95 43.0 43.3 Earth A.C. A.C. 7.629,606 3.S81.216 lo.m,292 3.12 24 39 OS29/3 U2,.054 24.370 1.34 Eatenl5ato del Caoeo 6 4.6 S/N Cordob Ealsa R.N.20- 4.0 4/ D.S.T. A.C. 4,607.006 1,151.730 EwslIm R.r. W 7 4.10b 14 isilone. Campo Grands-Ooe ds May, 35.0 35.0 Earth A.C. 10.045.060 4,766.150 9.478.699 267.002 270.81,9 0.94 C.0r.-Alatibule, dWl (19.9) A.C. (2,449.064) (3.573.816) 2.19 30 33 02/05/85 (270.041) Valls l Aristobulo-ns de Mayo (15.1) A.C. (2.317.066) (4,105,683) 1.77 30 33 02/OS/6S (271.91*) * i- 8 4.14 146 San Luis Sao Lwis-Candalar;a 160.0 192.3 Gravel A.C. 22.067.7at 8.703.013 20.057.771 137.923 104,38t 0.76 0 San Lu;&-La Bri". (52.7) T.S.T. (2,189.274) (6,988.966) 3.19 30 13 07/29/83 (132.668) Las io;-Pts. de (52.6) T.S.T. (2,410.660) (5.036,249) 2.06 30 13 06/24/83 (95.O) Is Q,.brada Pt*. Qu-brada-Q.;.is (65.4) T.S.T. (3.101.036) (6.057.443) 1.95 30 21 02/06/84 (92.621) Quinea-Cand.laris (21.6) n.a. (994.023) (1.975,113) 1.99 18 0 07/19/85 (91.866)  LUMN coSr OF THE PROJcT COST PER 14. Km SURFACE (UN E0UIVALUF) OV/ ORIC. (USt E.UIVALBET) OVER/ - __ - - --- --------- - -_ - ----------- ------- n R M . MNTs QRVN ----- - - (OD PR0J. IBRD RmE et at pro- con- Av-t cmtract Finl CWtR. FERIIW Oa/ ACNCE APRL FIAL AletSL. NO. iNO iNO PilVINCE FRO" - TO appr. iaprvd. appr. poed structod Eati. * 1/ Price Cost RATIO lW4t (ILEf OATE ESTDM I1 COST RATIO 9 4.2 226 Owwn. Alr.. Corlte ToJedor4nOoral 6.O 65.6 Eaert A.C. 9.119.68 4,487,410 11.227.704 Im.177 170.635 1.23 VI heag. Carlo. TJeder-M 84 (34.0) A.C. (2.400,123) (6,2200218) 2.59 24 0 09/09/1 (12.947) 1 84-0rl. VII ll-. (81.8) A.C. (2.087.27) (8.007,.79) 2.48 24 17 08/08l/3 (157.471) 10 4.27 90 Foaoaa Vil& J4 213-Riecho El 32.0 82.0 Earth A.C. A.C. 4.989.,2 2.673,11t 11.29.041 4.42 8o 14 07/06/6 18.923 J70.120 2.8? 21 4.47 S/N SW Jua Cilrc nva Sla 1o OJun y 21.0 17.9 O.S.T. AC. 24.306s.860 22.708.844 2,X6854.904 1,157,541 11.320. 1.14 Acm.s. (4-la.. dIvIdad hI way) Sacci. It (12.6) (17.731,568)(15.118.7S8/ 0.86 22 02 6/01/U ((1,194.744))/ Saccion III (8.8) A.C. (4.976,779) (6.840.240 ) 1.72 80 2 10/29/2 (1.611.867) 12 4.48 147 anJdoz, Le Vall-LU;an 16.0 262.9 O.S.?. 0S.T. 24.315.600 88.978,746 42.023.148 105.711 189.848 1.61 Sao J"k*. La Tranca-Econ (28.0) A.C. (2.704.730) (3.213,041) 1.19 1i 4 09/80/6 (114.751) iS Soni Lat 0040- 0120) La Trance-Ean (29.8) A.C. (3,805.159) (4.822,550) 1.31 18 7 11/10/62 (146.6527 (1 28 - 016 7.8) Le Chnnarlents-U (25.2) A.C. (1.914.082) (1.910.446) 1.00 24 1 11/10/62 (75.611) Trance Lujan-Lawm Blanco* (43.3) O.S.T. (2.988.242) (6.174.0v7) 2.10 24 11 01/07/88 (142.586) Lam. 81anc,a-La (58.3) D.S.T. (2.074. 16) (3.889,249) 1.65 24 14 05/30/63 (65.653) Chaari ant. El Aparo-Encon (63.9) O.S.T. (19,277.834) (19.873,673) 1.03 24 0 06/01/85 (311.012) La Va0o-EI Aparo (14.7) O.S.T. (1.792.564) (2.690,109) 1.50 n.a. n.a. 12/20/82 (183.000) 13 4.10 14 HIsaon., L.ondro N. Aln-w0bor. 28.0 34.8 Earth A.C. A.C. 8,9800.93 38.82,725 8,062,273 2.28 30 31 02/05/88 213.605 230.812 1.06 14 4.86 7 Nemquen EmpaI R.N. 237-Lago 72.0 4/ Earth A.C. 19.937.152 276.905 lb 0 00 E p jotDi 15 4.45 S/N Santa F. Vara-Toetado 123.0 158.1 Earth D.S.T. 18.677,458 13.378.908 60.818.223 151.849 3e3.417 2.S2 0 Empal.. R.N.98-04 43 (42.7) A.C. (3.261.680) (17,506.021) 5.37 24 26.5 12/31/63 (410.024) KM 43-Log.C.dol Tigr. (45.3) A.C. (4.504.674) (20.S40.730) 4.56 24 12 02/23/83 (453.438) Lso.C.dIl Tior.-V.,& (35.0) A.C. (2.746,120) (10,813.870) 3.94 24 16 07/06/63 (306d.68) Est.La Prmaara-Trtado (35.1) A.C. (2,668.452) (11.735.593) 4.10 24 12 12/23/e2 (334.917)  LiHT COST OF THE PROJET COST PER tO. 1,04 SURFACE (US. EQIVALET) OVER/ Okl. (C6M EQZUIVALENT) OVER/ .--_-_______-- _--------------- - ---- ---- -------------------------------- - NER) COWrR. 10417{S PROVS ------- --________( PROJ. Il ROUTE i at pro- con- Appral. Contract Final COITR. PERIOD OVER/ AC E APPRSL FINAL APPROL. NO. Ni. NO. PROViDC FRMi - TO *ppr. itprvd. appr. ped streesd Esti3;t. 1/ Pr,ce Cost RATIO NS'fl ((PR OAT! 65181.I/ COST RATIO 16 4.72 P3O/ Salto Cpl. Ollercu-Luis Burel. 9;.0 87.5 D.S.T. O.S.T. 14.31S.424 9.444.063 12.128.174 1O,0377 157.468 1.05 PS Coronel 0llo.a-Lee (40.1) n.m. (4.964.42) (4,66,4.32) 0.94 18 t n.m. (104.461)8/ ia3 i teen LeJ Laite-Liul Bur.la (47.4) T.S.T. (4,479.141) (7,463,844) 1.67 24 23.8 11/10/8 (157,465) 17 4.41 S/N Tucumn EmpoiI R.N.310O-plm 15.0 13.8 D.S.T. A.C. 13,8g9.200 12,648.224 14.767.639 901.260 1.06611.70 1.19 R.N.9 (4-lan, divided higls,) Eapailm R.301-Conal (6.1) A.C. (4.671.444) (3.694.6731) 1.23 12 1i 09/3a/2 (966.373) Son Cejetno C. Sam Coreteno-Avdl. (7.7) A.C. (7,973.760) (O.12.766) 1.11 24 25.3 07/11/04 ($.149.322) Oobernrado del Caapo 14 4.21 16 Salts El Tunal-Eapal m R.N.34 66.0 84.2 Oravel A.C. 8.727.744 1S4.273 El Tonal-El bipon (34.2) A.C. (2.5886.49) (3.66.638) 1.34 24 16 07/331/3 11,.030 0.84 4 El calpon-El Sord. 2/ 12/ n.e. ((1.667.109)) ((489.772))S/ n.s. n.a. .e. n.. n.a. El 8ordo-Em. R.N.34 2/ 12 n.a. ((1.774.940)) ((1.88.477))4/ n.m. n.e. n.e. n.s. n.m. 19 4.38 9 Cordob Cordcba-Erp.la R.N.60 62.0 4/ D.S.T. A.C. 14.S1.312 231.473 20 4.11 129 Corrlentes Paso de Ie Libre.- 63.0 77.7 Oaval A.C. 7.6t.736 10.483.288 1t.4S7.124 119.313 172.93 1.45 Yap." 50 29-Emp. R.40 (43.3) A.C. (5,633.593) (6.727,778) 1.19 24 24.5 07/17/S4 (158.376) proreevm 1S7- (34.4) A.C. (4.829.692) (6.709,349) 1.39 24 6 12/03/82 (195,089) Progrealv 34.558 TOTAL AT APPRAISAL 1288.0 240,097,232 1930,70 Road. deleted (Jun. 1981 - 1. *14. *19) (U1.0) (38,395,472) SU3-TOTAL CONSTRCTED 1147.0 302.7 09,2DI.760 149,587,045 294,.090.63 1.97 2,.390 232.925 1.28 fD I l- 0 I%l1  LtWXI COST OF 1) POJECT COST Pot 104. ii SJ4IFACE (UNEZ IVALW OVWtA CRIO. om. EWJAL[Nr# VM/ _____ _-____________ ------------------------------ (team NOR. MNns PameL -------- ) PRDJ. 55R ROlV at at pro- Cmn- Approl. Contract Final WAR. RIOD OVER/ ACFINCE AL FNAL APRRSL. NO. NO. N. R5VDIC PRt - TO appr.81 loprvd. eppr. Pse'd strauctd EsimI. 6/ Price Cost RATIO 0OOl (IW* DATVE ES1.O/ COST RATIO A68 TO PROMM 7/ (ROilPce ProJect A&"re S. 14. mU d 19) 21 4.94 1MD Rio Ceerto-Gerl. DOhea, 73.0 68.4 A.C. A.C. 4,600,000 4,213,952 5,92.840 1.42 is 1 02/15/62 6s,758 94,886 22 4.98 186 arl. OsIwaa-V. hris 68.0 68.0 A.C. A.C. 4,400,000 3,842.877 5,891,613 1.87 la 1. ov004/62 69.641 68,551 28 4.98 34 Rorio-Lmcio V. Lope 54.0 as.0 A.C. A.C. .65,000 4.054,161 8.872.970 1.15 is U0 05/20/a 170.16 142.817 24 4.96 15 Loe Verilee-Sn 74.0 61.2 A.C. A.C. 7,700.000 3,607.094 6.195,200 1.72 is 15 06/10/68 1Ids4.0 102.09 Fruncleco -- 4.90/ 84 Sumnhmlem-Untlegs del 156.0 140.1 10/ A.C. A.C. 13.400.000 20.ess.7s7 S0,06.7874 1.44 is 4 07/01/6 9/ 113.=16 214.U6, 4.92 Err 4 .90/ 34 Swnbulee-curapeyti (70.7) A.C. A.C. (n.m.) (12,885,474) (15,457.10)0 1.25 (n.e.) (..) (m.) (21.0 4.91 -- 4.91/ 34 Cuamti-Lite con (69.4) A.C. A.C. (n.m.) (..328) (14.600,62) 1.71 (n.m.) (n..) "nm) (210.67) W 4,92 Sentiegp del Eetero Subtotal added 860.0 6SO.7 30,100,000 37.274,861 524999.866 1.42 100.258 146,96 GRQ TOTAL 1827.0 16681.4 247,801,760 18(t671,eat 347.090i64 1.866 161.958 206.66a SST . Single Surface Ahpilt Trertawt lST * Oiuble Surfsce Asgolt Tremert lST * Triple Surface Ahepit Teteent AC * Asphaltic Concrete 00 0' (I-' (S, 8-*  LB<tN COST OF TM PR0J:T COST Pot MM. MM SUIRFACE (WI EIVALvn OVERS ORI. (VW EQUOIVALET) OVt/ _--- - ----- _ - ------ ---------------- ---- ------ ---- ---- (NeR COR. NWm6 PR .VP ------ _______ (team PROJ. II IIIOU E at at pro. con- Appral. Contrat Final COMMR. PtI00 OVER/ ACN ACE. FINAL APPL. O. Na. No. PROVIE FR4 - TO appe. lprwd. eppr. posed structed EstiCte Price Cost RATIO "mm (UO) DATE STDA. COST RATIO RML CAIA ROADS 11/ 12 C0o. eratw-DBrazo Largo 151,000 n.m. 09/0/. 12 S _goetume-Cibs 2.401.000 n.m. 12//4 .. 12 Sagostume-Cela 1,667.000 12/81/1t4 12 Sagoebuse-Calbe, 4.244,000 n.e. U884 n.. 12 Paros, Daa i-Celbaa 102,000 ".a. U1W/ .*.. 12 Paean r "CeIbse 881,000 n.e. 01/1/4 e.g. 12 Paenno Ouega-Cal bas 748.000 nt.m. 12/3/1/U A.S. 12 Pt.. S/Arreyo Gnd. 100,000 n.r. 12/311/4 n.6. I66 Santa Fe-Lm auerdis 3.603,000 n.m. 01/1/14 n.e. US ~~~~Sante Fe-La Guardia 5.148,000 n.m. 02/26/4 nm Sate FAtrecedar 5 Oi O .000 n.a. 0/80/3 o . de Octubre ISO Pti. S/Leame Sqtubel 1.942,000 n.a. 06/0/ n.m Subtotel 21.494.000 21.494.000 13/ TOTAL 206.365S66 Sl68.24.546 FilMOESs 1/ Appraieal ootlmtee (in Necrd 1977 pricos) do oDt includ* cotingoncise or ampervimion. 9/ Fioal Accaptenc frm Vial lidd records. 2/ Work stopped. 10/ Te* sectione Suncheles-O _nieste. oni9otelMrai Iais. and Moroi al-Limit. Santiao del Eatero / Wor In prre. were regrouped into Sunchalee-Curupsyti and Curupayti-Limlte Sentiago del Eatero. 4/ Proetct deleted f ro program -y aemd_unt to the Loe Agre"ment dated A" 29. 1981. 11/ Added to the program by amedmet to the Loan Agreemet dated Auguet 29. 196. b 8 8/ Coet throub No,dbsr/Dacedbor 1965. 12/ Transferred to Fifth Highewa Project (Loan 2296-AR). 008 ( 6/ Cost through work otoppa. 13/ Violidad's records for flood dag"d rode appro.imete tea total contract price, but te eD 7/ Added to the proga by amendment to the Loan Agreemnt dated June 29. 1981. final coate by ection ore rot evailable. _ 8/ A reported February 11, 190.  FROJECT COLEIN REPoRr FOtlrrH HIGAY PR0JT CAGUE OF I4JMR DELAYS AM COST OVER1 OVE SL WEAYS ---------- ----- --- -----------____------________________----- LS4OTI4 P13~T IENl CORDI- H4EWO 10 OVER Oam DDI- TINS D6SF- VIALIDD OF ----------------- (<NDI8) (LOO) TIGAL NOT FICIENT FDP I- DAMET UDATIED NATIALS FROJ. IIM ROUTE at CStROCr CSETRACT VOUIE FM- A-U OP- C.L WIMT- UIIT R RAIL M AVOE NO. N6. NO. FROVINE FROP - TO .pr. i urvd. PRICE POtIOD OF WM SEE FROS86 hT PFROIA5 ATIONS PRICES TO RAD MAflTER ROAD 8EfREr PROAN 1 4.24 157 Santiago Levell *-Limit cem 32.0 34.1 2.61 a X X del Estero Tucum 2 4.31 191 8Oinoe Air.. Salto-Chme&o 41.0 40.6 11 a - 1K 20 (17.0) 2.8 1 X X 19 20 - lOG 46.6 (25.6) 2.06 6 X X 3 4.87 J8 La RioJm Le RMeoJ-Saxn 88.0 85.0 3.22 31 X X X X X 4 4.32 20S Buenos Aire. Sali.dIlo-9olivoir 130.0 97.6 .40 - 60 as (35.0) 1.S9 14 X X o as - 1 70 (80.0) 1.24 U2 X X X 1 70 - 1 102.6 (32.6) 11.92 26 X X X X X NM 102.6 - 10 0D ((97.4))11/2 o 4.38 81 Forms" Znatr.ecion R.N.9W- 43.0 43.3 8.12 89 X X X X X X Et6elalao del Comp I * 4.6 S/N Corioba Emalm R.N.20- 4.0 (Deleted fro Progrea) Empal_ R.P.SS 7 4.10b 14 Miclones Caomp Orwnd-Os do Mayo 38.0 35.0 C.Or.-Arlstolmlo del (19.9) 2.19 33 X X X X Val l Arietobulo-Oos do Nyo (18.1) 1.77 33 X X X X X 8 4.14 146 Son Luis Son Lul-Condelpria 160.0 192.3 Son Luis-Us Brin n (82.7) 8.19 13 X X iJ Oriess-Pta. do (82.6) 2.08 13 X X Is hebruds Pta. 4bebredm-iuin-e (65.4) 1.9S 21 X X Qdinow-Condelaret (21.6) 1.99 0 IV 5 9 4.2 226 9.... Aires Corlo. Tejedor- ral 6i6.0 65.8 0Q0 VI I Iowa Carlos Tojedo@r-N 34 (34.0) 2.59 0 1H 34-01. VillIsae (31.8) 2.45 17 X X X  CAUSES OVERN DELAVS ----- -- --------------------------- -------- ----- Wm CHANC LtN0TH PEtC8WT t@E114 COb- HAULAGE R OVER OVR AWt- TIMN WF- VXALID OF --- - - --- - ---- PAM (QJ4 TIONAL NOT FICIENT FIN04- BMW UIPDATED IMTWILS PO. t RFOUTE at CONTRACT C4fRACT VOWM PORE- ACCESS E0UIP- CIAL LDlrT- WIT Fh RUL ADVERSE N. N. N. PROYVCE PRM - TO appr. itprvd. PRICE PEIOD OF WM SBE PRt3 UENT 15 PROU ATIONS PRICES TO ROOD WAFATH 10 4.47 90 Foa Vil 1 218-Iacho El S2.0 82.0 4.42 14 X X X bale" 11 4.47 SIN San Juan Clecunvalacicn S.Juan y 21.0 17.9 Ace.... (4-lane dlvidad hilh.y) Scielan II (12.6ka) (12.6) 0.8S S2 X X Sacclan III (5.8) 1.72 2 X 12 4.46 147 tand., La Vall_-ujan 164.0 262.9 San Juan, A La Tronce-San (26.0) 1.19 4 X X Son Laisl 0t 0 - NH 21) La Tnanca-Encen (29.5) 1.81 7 X X X (M4 2 - M 37.5) La Chan; ento-La (25.2) 1.00 1 X Tranca Luaan-Lama Blanca* (48.8) 2.10 11 X X X Lea seanlaa-u (W8.8) 1.65 14 X X X X Ch nnertcn El Apero-san (s.s9) 1.06 0 X X X La Va Il-EI Aparo (14.7) 1.80 n.n. X 18 4.10. 14 ti-lenen Lndro N. Alm-lOberm 28.0 84.6 2.28 81 X X X X X X X 14 4.86 7 Nauqwn Eu--tm R.N. 2S7-LaD 72.0 (Daletad from Prograo) Eus-Jo 16 4.45 S/N Santa Fa Vaua-Toatudo 2S.0 186.1 Esaim R.N.96104 48 (42.7) 5.87 26.5 X X X X M04 484-ag.C.del Tigre (45.8) 4.56 12 X X X Lag.C.d*l Tlgre-Vora (85.0) 8.94 16 X X X X Est.La Pelara-Testede (35.1) 4.10 12 X X X X X 16 4.72 P30/ Salts Cpl. 01 .r.ow-L.A. Burela 94.0 87.8 Ps Coronl Oflarow-La. (40.1) 5 X X X LaJIta Lojitaa-Lula Burals (47.4) 1.67 2S.S X X X 17 4.41 SN Tucuman E*w . R.N.S10-Eapalso 15.0 13.8 R.N.9 ON cr F4-lno divided htay) .Apalaa R.-Cenal (6.1) 1.26 16 X X San Cayatano N C. Son Cowotano-Avda. (7.7) 1.11 25.5 X Ph Cobernador del Cape*,  CAUSES OVERB DELYS - ------- -- - -------'-- -------- ---------- -------------------- LBCT PE14 MOtS WOI- tl 11 OVER mOVB ADDI- TICNS SF- VIALIDAD OF -- - - --------- - "MQ (OBM TIONAL NOT FICIT FINAN- UDtr VTED) I4ATERIlS PRDJ. I ROUTE at CONTRACT COWRACT AOUB IR- ACCESS P- CIAL, LDIIT- 1*4T FRl4 RAIL ADBtSE NO. NO. NO. PROYVNCE FRO - TO n ppr. Imprvd. PRICE PEtIOD OF WM SEEN PRODLI NW PROBL ATID1 PRtICE5 T1 ROMD EATI2 18 4.21 18 Salte El Tunal-Empalm R.N.34 65.0 34.2 El Tunal-EI Calpon (34.2) 1.34 16 X El GIpo-EI Bard. 1/ 2/ V B9rdr-ESp. R.N.34 1/ 2/ 19 4.38 9 Cordota Corda-Eapale R.N.60 62.0 (Deleted from Prorp-) 20 4.11 129 Corrientoe Paso de Io Libre_ 63.0 77.7 101 29-Ep R.40 (43.3) 1. 19 24.3 K X X X X Proeesive 1J7- (34.4) 1.39 6 X X Progrelve W4.56U TTAL AT A;ASAL *0 OF laHU COESTNJCX 1.147.0 1.302.? A0ED TO PROWAI (Replaced Project Numbrs 6. 14. Wd 19) 21 4.94 138 Rio Cuarto-SrI. Dehex 73.0 6/ 63.4 1.42 1 22 4.98 166 orl. DehAz-V. Marie 63.0 8/ 63.0 1.87 1.5 X 23 4.93 34 Rearlo-Lucio V. Lopez 34.0 t/ 33.0 1.1 i 10 X X X 24 4.96 156 La. VaruI IISan 74.0 8/ 61.2 1.72 1S X X X Francisco - 4.90/ 34 Sunchalne-Santiago del 236.0 R/ 140.1 10/ 1.4 4 K X 4.92 Estero SurnhAle-Curupmyti (70.7) n.*. n.a. Curupayti-Liite con (69.3) n.m. n.m. Santiagp del Estero Flood Dumped Roads No Date Ava labl Subtotals added 380.0 360.7 GRAND TOTAL 1527.0 1663.4 ForNOTE 00 1/ Work stopped. 2/ Transferred to Fifth Highway Project (Loan 229-AR).  T0K OSITIWb W 30U1c com.1Mtu U liE FOLnt H rCA tPRM Let