Somalia - Technical Assistance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7274 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 821-SO) June 6, 1988 Institutional Development, Training and Technical Assistance Division Eastern & Southern Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and tay be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Somali Shilling (So.Sh.) - 100 cents US$1 = So.Sh. 90 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 USA. Oihe nd owt.cSEVCEW Opffatuwe EvIIUIMt^n June 6, 1988 MEMDRANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Somalia - First Technical Assistance Project (Credit 821-SO) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Somalia - First Technical Assistance Project (Credit 821-SO)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance l ~~~~~of their official duties Its contents rnay not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authonzstion.  FOR OFFICIJ, USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLEION REPORT SOMALIA - FIRST rECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 821-SO) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ........................ i BASIC DATA SHEET .................i HIGHLIGHTS ........................iv I. INTRODUCTION .................... 1 II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION ........... 2 Background 2 Project Identification .......................... 3 Objectives 4 III. DESIGN, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 5 Design .... 5 Organization and Procedure 6 Processes 6 Disbursements 7 IV. EVALUATION .................... 8 Justification .... 8 Objectives ........................... 8 Design ....................................*** 10 Implementation ........ *... ...........1.......* 11 Evaluation of Sub-Projects ....................... 15 Terms of Reference ...... ........... .. ... . 16 Implementation .*.. ............................ 17 Supervision ......*....................... 18 V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE ........... 19 Suggestions for the Future ....................... 21 VI. POSTCRIPT ......23 ANNEXES I. Summary Issues/Problems Relating to 281-SO Project Implementation and Management II. Sub-Projects Financed Under Credit 821-SO III. Description and Evaluation of Sub-Projects This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 821-SO) PREFACE This report presents an evaluation of Credit 821-SO to the Govern- ment of Somalia. The Credit was approved in June 1978 and declared effective in August 1979. Disbursements were closed in December 1984. The PCR was prepared by the Bank's Africa Regional Office on the basis of information available in Washington. The report presents a factual review of the Government's use of the credit proceeds and of its efforts to achieve the objectives of the Credit. In accordance with the revised project performance reporting procedures this report has been read in the Operations Evaluation Depart- ment (OED) but the project was not audited by OED staff. The draft Completion Report was sent to the Borrower for comments; however, none were received.  - ii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 821-SO) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation current estimate Total project cost (US$ million) 3.8 3.8 Underrun or overrun (Z) * Credit amount (US$ millions) 3.0 3.0 Disbursed 2.65 Cancelled .35 Repaid 0.0 Outstanding 2.65 Date physical components completed N/A Proportion completed by above date NIA 2 of time underrun or overrun N/A Economic rate of return N/A Financial performance N/A Institutional performance Unsatisfactory * Project was neither scaled up nor down. OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Revisions Actual or estimate First mention in f;.les or timetable 02/23/1976 Government's application 02/23/1976 Negotiations 04/19/1978 Board approval 06/06/1978 Credit agreement date 06/30/1978 Effectiveness date 08/01/1979 Closing date 12/01/1981 06/30/1983 12/31/1984 Borrower Somali Democratic Republic Executing Agency Ministry of National Planning Fiscal year of Borrower January 1 to December 31 Follow-on project name N/A  - iii - MISSION DATA Month, No. of No. of Date Sent by Year weeks persons of Report Identificatior Progrems 02/76 1 02/23/76 Pre-Appraisal Programs 08/77 1 08/16177 Appraisal Programs 11/77 12106177 Supervision I Program 09/79 1 1 10/12/79 Supervision II Programs 09180 1.5 1 10/24/80 Supervision III Programs 10181 1.5 1 10/22/81 Supervisinn IV Programs 03/83 .5 1 04/02/83 Completion EAPIT 11/86 9 2  - iv - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA - FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 851-SO) HIGHLIGHTS 1. A shift in Somalia's economic policy in 1976 began . transition from a centralized economy to a more open economic system and opened the way for a considerable increase in capital inflows. (Paras. 2.3 and 2.4) 2. However, Somalia faced major absorptive capacity problems because of deficienc'e. in infrastructure, institutions and manpower. Too few projects were available for financing, many train-ad and educated Soimalis had emigrated and the war with Ethiopia strained financial and management resources. (Para 2.5) 3. The Project was designed as a line of credit to finance 'high priority studies and other projects of technical assistance .... designed to assist in the planning and implementation of its (Somalia's) program of economic development'. The project description was amended in 1982, on the initiative of IDA, to allow the use of credit funds for 'technical assistance designed to assist ...... in macro-economic management". (Paras. 2.6 - 2.8) 4. Apart from financing a program of project preparation studies, the project aimed at expanding the capacity of Somalia's institutions to execute preinvestment work; this included training programs for staff in line ministries and agencies. (Para 2.9) 5. The Technical Department of the Ministry of National Planning, assisted by a UNDF financed Planning Team, had primary responsibility for implementing the Project. A Project Review Committee, consisting of Somali officials and the Bank and UNDP Resident Representatives, was charged wIth 'general supervision of the projcct'. A central feature was tha appointment of an expatriate Senior Project Adviser to assist the Director of the Technical Department. Later, a Senior Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Finance was added to assist in macro-economic management. (Paran. 2.10 - 2.13) 6. Sub-projects to be financed were to be of high priority and approved by the Project Review Committee. The Credit would finance Lp to 83 percent of the cost of the study. However, the exact roles of the different entities involved in project implementation were not clearly defined. There was also considerable flexibility in the use of project funds, which ir turn required a high level of coordination. (Paras 3.1 - 3.8) 7. The Project was well justified tPara. 4.1) but its objectives were never clearly spelled out (Para. 4.2). Nevertheless, and despite serious delays, the Project ultimately financed useful sub-projects, some of whicL were pursued through financing from IDA or other sources. It is not clear, however, if all sub-projects were of high priority (Para. 4.3). The Project achieved little in terms of institution building despite the evidence of  institutional weaknesses; this failure was mainly attributable to the performance of the Senior Project Adviser who did not carry out his training responsibilities (Paras. 4.5 and b.6). 8. The design of the Project did not identify the tasks and roles to be performed with sufficient clarity. Nor did it take account of the fragility and weakness of Somali institutions or the lack of indigenous manpower capabilities which were, in addition, being continuously eroded by the decline in the real value of civil service salaries. As a result the design placed heavy responsibilities on the Senior Project Adviser which he lacked the experience to carry out effectively. (Paras 4.7 - 4.10) 9. Design problems resulted in apparent confusion during project implementation. Brotracted debates and problems arose, particularly with respect to the priority of different sub-projects, terms of reference for consultants and the selection of the consultants. Manpower problems, such as the replacement of the Director of the Technical Department three times in the first two years of the Project, and the general malaise in the civil service, added to the delays and omissions and made the institutional arrangements, including the Project Review Committee, difficult to implement. (Paras. 4.11 - 4.15) 10. The key to the success of the Project was the performance of the two Senior Advisers. Agreement on the appointment of the Senior Project Adviser was reached after one year of discussion. However, the Government changed its mind at the last minute and proposed a candidatq who, in the judgement of IDA, was inappropriately qualified and experienced. IDA nevertheless agreed in the interest of getting the project under way. The Adviser's lack of experience did, however, prevent him from performing his tasks adequately especially with regard to training, which remained almost totally unaccomplished. As a result much of the Adviser's responsibility for project implementation fell on IDA which ultimately managed the project. (Para. 4.17) The Senior Economic Advisor also faced severe problems; he resigned after four months citing ill health and lack of cooperation from the Ministry of Fiance. The evidence suggests that he was unable to adapt to the difficult working and living conditions on Somalia. The Adviser as ultimately replaced, but there is little relevant material to substantiate his performance although his work has been consistently praised by Ministry officials. (Para. 4.18) 11. All sub-projects financed under the Project, with one ecception, facilitated IDA financed projects either in progress or proposed. As preinvestment activity it was successful, but in terms of its secondary objective, strengthening Somali project preparation capacity, it was not. All studies were carried out by foreign consultants without local participation and TORs never included any training component. For this and other reasons the institutional development process never occur.ed. (Para. 4.20) 12. Sub-project implementation also encountered problems. Proposed terms of reference were subject to minor or wholesale changes and additions recommended or suggested by IDA. (Paras. 4.22 and 4.23) Lack of understanding of the Bank's consultant selection procedures and processes led to delays and disputes (Paras. 4.24 - 4.26). There was confusion and lack of definition of supervision responsibilities both on the Government side (Para. 4.27) and withir the Bank (Para. 4.29).  - vi - 13. Somali authorities were not much better equipped to handle project prepazation activities at the end of the Project than before, but an array of useful studies, surveys and technical assistance projects had been carried out. Whether all the sub-projects were of high priority is not clear, although those involved agreed that they were. The Project would, however, been totally ineffective without constant assistance from IDA in every aspect of implementation, in some cases to the point of imposition of IDA views, i.e. in sub-project selection. These problems are traceable to the project design which was simply transposed from a previous Credit to Sudan for similar purposes, the only difference being the inclusicn in the design of the position of Senior Project Adviser in place of a Project Preparation Unit. (Para. 5.1) 14. The objective of strengthening of project preparation capabilities through training was essentially ignored or disregarded or may have been unfeasible. This failure was due to the ineffectiveness of the Senior Project Adviser, inadequate provision for training in TORs, lack of a training survey and a training plan and the inattention of IDA to institutional development objectives and training. Inevitably IDA ended up with much too great responsibility for the administration of the project -- and its outcome. (Para. 5.2) 15. For the future it is suggested that institutions do not transfer as easily as hardware and that the design, therefore, take local circumstances explicitly into account, that the general project objectives be complemented by more specific design, especially with regards to training components (Para. 5.4). Coordination problems should be avoided through clear allocation of responsibility and accountability both within the Bank and the Government, including clear specification of the roles to be played by the different actors (Paras. 5.5 and 5.6). The consultant selection process should be the subject of a comprehensive training program geared towards project preparation %Para. 5.7). 16. Following a request for a secend credit to finance additional studies IDA insisted that it could not make available a line of credit for studies without a strong institutional development component. It also concluded, on the basis of the findings of several missions, that key areas in this respect were, (i) aid coordination and development planning, (ii) economic management, and (iii) preject preparation. The Ministry of National Planning, for its part, had concluded, however, that it did not need further assistance in improving the planning system from either IDA or any other source of external assistance; the Government and IDA, therefore, agreed that there was no basis for further negotiations. (Para. 6.1)  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA-FIRST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 821-SO) I. Introduction 1.1 This Project Completion Report (PCR, provides a desk analysis of the First Technical Assistance Credit extended by the IDA to Somalia. The PCR will refer to the Technical Assistance project and sub-projects to be carried out thereunder supported by Credit 821-SO. This credit for US$3.0 million was approved by the IDA on June 6, 1978, signed on June 30, 1978 and became effective on December 31, 1978. It was originally scheduled for closing on December 1, 1981, but was extended thrs.e times for a total of 37 months: first to June 30, 1983, second to June 29, 1984, and finally to December 31, 1984. An undisbursed balance of US$348,989.33 was cancelled by July 1985. The total cost of the project was estimated at US$3.8 million of which US$0.8 million were to be counterpart funds provided by the Government of Somalia. 1.2 The project was designed to help finance project preparation studies that would lead to high priority projects which had the potential for being financed by external funding sources. The project al.so sought to augment the capacity of Somali institutions to manage pre-investment work. An important component of this project was the appointment of a Senior Project Advisor who would supervise, assist and coordinate efforts to achieve project objectives. In .7une 1982, the Association agreed to amend the appropriate sections in the Credit AgreerAent to enable the Ministry of Finance to receive assistance in macro-economic management. 1.3 In anticipation of a full commlcment of proJect funde under this Credit, Somali authorities requested, in 1983, for further technical assistance in the form of a new credit. After a number of missions by Bank staff, the project was appraised in January 1984, a President's Report for a Development Administration (Second Technical Assistance) Project for a proposed US$3 million to Somalia was prepared and negotiated in the field in early 19M5. While the project objectives incorporated a number of goals set forth in the c edit under analysis, its major emphasis was on institutional built ng in key ministries and agencies. The Government of Somalia. however, - . not agree to this new project concept and the project was dropped from the lending program later that year. 1.4 The preparation of this PCR was seriously constrained by a lack of: a) evidence, with limited exceptions, of a systematic reporting system on the monitoring or supervision of sub-projects under preparation throughout the project period; and  -2- b) basic documents relating to sub-projects that are vital to any assessment of the effectiveness of this project. 1.5 The contents of this PCR are presented under five major headings with appropriate sub-topics, tables and annexes. The main headings consist of: I. Introduction, II. Project Description, III. Design, Processes and Procedures for _I__ementation, IV. Evaluation, and VO ConcIusions and Lessons for the Future. II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION Background 2.1 Somalia is one of the poorest of the Bank's member countries. It is classified by the United Nations as one of the least developed countries. Its per capita income in 1976 was estimated to be only about US$110. In 1960, when it became independent, adult literacy rates were only 2 percent, but by 1977 had reached a remarkable 60 percent. Unfortunately it remains stagnant to date. About two thirds of the population lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic life. A large majority of this population observe the Moslem faith. Herding and sttbsistence farming are the major occupations of the people. Hence livestock and agriculture constituted the basis for the post-independence Somali development strategy. 2.2 In addition to the above characteristics of its milieu, Somalia also experienced influences from external sources. The Somali Democratic Republic was formed in 1960 by a merger of the former Italian Trust Territory of Somalia and the British Protectorate of Somaliland. Following a decade of parliamentary rule, the Government was taken over by the military in 1969. T! ---e Revolutionary Council became the highest policy-making body until mid-19/o, when it was abolished and a political party-the Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party-became the key political institution. During this period the assistance provided by the Soviet Union was especially significant. Various state enterprises (such as the Chisimaio Meat Factory and the Las Koreh Fish Factory) were organized with Soviet assistance and had full-time Soviet technicians serving. The Planning Commission (now the Ministry of National Planning), which was the primary institution responsible for development strategy, also had key Soviet personnel serving during this period. 2.3 Somalia's transition after 1976, from a centralized economy towards a more open economic system, laid the foundation for a considerable increase in capital flows from various exterral sources. According to OECD figures, total annual flows to Somalia from official technical cooperation grants alone rose rapidly after 1976 and doubled between 1976 and 1979, at the inception of which period this project was conceived. Further increases in capital inflows into Somalia from multi-lateral, industrialized and oil-producing countries are evident after 1979.  -3 - 2.4 In general, the post independence development strategy initiated after 1960 indicates a high level of investment in Somalia, representing about 35-40 percent of the GDP. Public investment alone doubled from about US$50 million to US$100 million per annum in nominal terms between 1973 and 1976. The transition in economic policy anticipated that these levels of public sector investment would be sustained or grow and that there would be a corresponding increase in capital inflows commensurate with the needs and opportunities existing. 2.5 While the prospects for project financing based on increased external funds were therefore promising after 1977, Somalia's basic problem centered around its absorptive capacity. Fundamental problems were evident in deficiencies prevailing in infrastructure, institutions and trained manpower. The following factors contributed to the deficiencies: i) There were too few projects identified, in preparation or in the pipeline, corresponding to project-tied funds available for immediate investment. In simple economic terms, while there was a ready "supply" of potential investable funds, there were "demand" constraints placed on project generation. ii) The large exodus of trained and educated Somalis to neighboring oil-rich countries to take up better employment created significant manpower shortages in key institutions, diminishing their capability to generate, manage, supervise and implement develonment projects. It also created a significant problem in the management of the economy as a whole. iii) The departure of the Soviet advisors after 1976 due to changes in policy added further to the management problems of key Somali institutions. iv) The Ogaden war with neighboring Ethiopia tended to direct resources and policies away from other pressing national priorities. Project Identification 2.6 The process of project identification and design was initiated in September 1975 pursuant to discussions between a visiting high-level Somali delegation and World Bank project staff. Further correspondence and discussions between Somali officials and Bank staff concentrated on the possibility of establishing an IDA project preparation unit to be sited in a central authority or ministry, in line with a similar unit established in the Sudan. 2.7 Because identification of projects for funding was considered somewhat imperative, the project in its final form anticipated the extension of a standard IDA Technical Assistance Credit. It was to be disbursed primarily among sub-projects that could lead directly to project  -4- financing. A President's Report on the project was presented to the Board in May 1978 based on the above premise. The Development Credit Agreement signed on June 30, 1978, however, described the project in terms of execution 'of high-priority studies and other projects of technical assistance including suitable training courses, designed to assist the Borrower in the planning and implementation of its programs of economic development." Hence, the project was described in much broader and general terms in the Credit Agreement than it was in the President's Report. 2.8 As a result of recommendations made by a Technical Assistance mission which visited Somalia in December 1981 and subsequent discussions between concerned Bank and Somali officials, it was concluded that technical assistance could also be utilized effectively for broad-range macro-ecoromic management in Somalia. Specific reference was made to the exist!sg lack of a coherent or realistic macro-economic framework that took into account resource availabilities and feasible levels of investments. It was observed in this regard that commitments for public sector project financing had been made without due attention to implementation, economic viability and debt-servicing consequences. With the mutual consent of both parties,-the Association agreed in July 1982 to amend Article 3.01(a) of the Credit Agreement so that it would enable the Somali government to carry out "projects of t'chnical assistance designed to assist the borrower in macro-economic management ...." The provision was to complement the original Article 3.01(a)(ii), that provided as stated earlier for the Government to conduct "high-priority studies and other projects of technical assistance. in=cuding suitable training courses. Objectives 2.9 The main objective of the Credit, as stated in the President's Report, was to finance "a program of project preparation studies..." and "in expanding the capacity of Somalia's institution's to execute pre-investment work." The criteria to be applied in the selection of these studies had to be that "they have a high priority in relation to the Government's development objectives and a high expectation of being financed within a short time." The Credit Agreement, as noted however, kept theqe objectives fairly broad. Considerable emphasis was also given to institution building in line ministries and agencies responsible for the planning and implementation of economic development programs in Somalia. In this regard a series of appropriate training programs were to be conceived and implemented by a Senior Project Advisor.- As a result it was assumed that the project would assist in establishing an expanded body of expertise in project selection and preparation in Somali official and private institutions. 2.10 The primary obligation of implementing and achieving the objectives of the project rested with the Technical bepartment of the Ministry of National Planning. The Ministry of National Planning (formerly the State Planning Commission) consisted of four departments: Planning, Technical, Coordination and Statistics. The Technical Department was responsible for micro-economic aspects of plenning and included as its main  -5- function project preparation. A five-man UNDP Planning Team, consisting of an Irrigation Engineer, a Livestock Specialist, an Agronomist, an Agricultural Economist and a Civil Engineer was, at the initiation of this credit, already assisting the Technical Department in project preparation. 2.11 The Credit Agreement also included the establishment of a Project Review Committee that consisted of ap-opriate Somali officials, as well as the UNDP and the Bank Group resident representatives. The committee, according to the Credit Agreement was responsible for "general supervision over the carrying out of the project." 2.12 Since many of the institutional arrangements-were only loosely defined, central _o the realization of the above project objectives was the appointment of a "duly qualified, experienced and competent advisor" (Senior Project Advisor), to the Director of the Technical Department. 2.13 To meet the shortcomings of the Ministry of Finance as stated above and to achieve the objectives of effective macro-economic management, it was later decided by both parties to appoint a Senior Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance. This expert was to advise the Minister and Director General on a broad range of institutional and policy issues, including the establishment of a Public Investment Review Unit. He also had the responsibility for reviewing the resource constrained Public Investment Program, for micro-level financial analysis of projects and for assessing the performance of public enterprise. In addition, he would advise on how the flow of information, consultation and policy coordination among macro managers could be strengthened. III. DESIGN, PROCESSES & PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION Design 3.1 The sub-projectsl/ to be financed .- the US$3.0 million Credit were not identified as parE of the project preparation. It was indicated that they could have their origins in any sector, but had to be high-priority and had to be approved for financing by the Project Review Committee. It was also assumed that these sub-projects would not be in the form of basic studies but would be at a fairly advanced stage of the project preparation process. Once sub-projects were selected, the IDA credit would finance up to 83 percent of their cost and the Government would contribute the remaining 17 percent including administrative costs of the project institutions. 3.2 A duly qualified and experienced Senior Project Advisor was to coordinate, assist and advise the Technical Department of the Ministry of National Planning, in all aspects of implementation of the project. Pursuant to the amendment incorporated in July 1982, a similar role was to be served by the Senior Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, on macro-economic management. 1/ The terms "sub-project", "project", "studies' have often been loosely and alternatively used-creating serious confusion in the project document. In this analysis, when the term 'sub-project" is used it could also include a study or survey financed by the Credit.  -6- Organization and Procedure 3.3 It is not quite clear from the relevant project documents what exact roles were to be performed by the above constituent project elements. In general, the institutional and procedural framework was set up as follows. 3.4 As stated before, responsibility for implementing the project rested primarily with the Technical Department of the Ministry of National Planning (State Planning Commission). The Technical Department would continue to be responsible for identifying and preparing pre-investment studies. The Director of the Technical Department would be assisted in this task by the five-man UNDP team, the full-time expatriate Senior Project Advisor, staff from planning units in operating ministries and agencies on a part-time basis, and by short-term consultants as and when required. The Senior Project Advisor was also responsible for training of Somali staff in addition to supervision of project preparation work. 3.5 When a sub-project was tentatively selected, a working party was to be established under the chairmanship of the Director of the Technical Department. The working party would also include staff of the Technical Department and technicians from relevant ministries and agencies. Where specific expertise was required, consultants would be employed by the working party. The working party would be responsible for analyzing sub-projects in terms of economic priority and technical and financial feasibility, defining the need for additional analysis and a schedule for the execution of the work, preparing terms of reference for necessary studies and arriving at agreements with the relevant ministries for the supervision of the executing agency or firm. Where a pre-investment study was an integral part of a sub-project that had already been earmarked for final investment by an external funding agency, the latter was to be informed of the preparatory work being undertaken by the working party. 3.6 The Project Review Committee would coordinate pre-investment activities and exercise general supervision over implementation of the project as a whole. The Committee was also responsible for approving the allocation of funds from the Credit once sub-projects had been selected for funding. It would also approve selection of consultants and conclude contracts with them. The Project Review Committee consisted of senior officials from the State Planning Commission, a senior-official of the Ministry of Finance, a senior official of the Somali Development Bank, the Resident Representative of the Bank Group, the Resident Representative of the UNDP and such senior officials of the operating ministries and agencies as were appropriate, depending on the project under consideration. Processes 3.7 Because of the broad and general nature of the project objectives, there was considerable flexibility provided for the Government to cater to the immediate priorities that could be identified. This also  -7- meant an anticipation of a high level of coordination between the various constituent elements, described above, responsible for project identification, preparation, implementation, monitoring and supervision. Based on the available documentation, it is understood that, ideally the process of sub-project implementation was envisaged to be as follows. 3.8 A project idea or plan would be identified by a Planning Unit/Team in a line ministry or agency. A project preparatory team would be appointed by the Technical Department to prepare the project for financing with the aid and assistance of the UNDP Team and the Project Advisor. The Techniral Department would select a project from among the many projects or proposals and a special working party would be established under the chairmanship of the Director of the Technical Department, to further prepare the sub-project/study for investment. The working party would prepare the sub-project/study for implementation and make suitable arrangements with the related ministry or agency to ensure supervision and coordination. Once a sub-project or study had gone through this process it would be sent to the Project Review Committee, which would authorize funds for the carrying out of a sub-project (that would ultimately result in preparing a project for investment e.g. The Northern Rangelands) or study which might be required to prepare the final project for investment (e.g. Afgoi-Baidoa Road Survey). Once authorization was acquired from the ProjecL Review Committae, and the IDA has approved the sub-project, the Technical Department could ask for proposals to carry out the sub-project or study. When the Technical Department (always with the assistance of the Senior Project Advisor) had selected a consultant, it would submit its choice for approval by IDA following which the sub-project/study would be ready for implementation by the chosen consultant. Disbursements 3.8 Tt.e Credit would finance up to 83 percent of the cost of consultancy services for any one sub-project and 17 percent of such costs would be borne by the Somali Government. 3.9 The following table summarizes the project's costs and financing arrangement:  -8- Foreign Local Total U.S.$ '000- Project Costs Consultancy Sercices 3,000 600 3,600 Administrative Costs - 200 200 3,000 800 3,800 Financing IDA 3,000 79 Government 800 21 3,000 800 100 3.10 Disbursement of the US$3 million Credit based on the above conditions were estimated to be as follows: FY79 FY80 FY81 U.S.$ '000 1.0 1.1 0.9 IV. EVALUATION Justificatlon 4.1 From the perspective of the availability of external funds for project finance, the Credit made available for high priority project preparation studies, was both timely and vital in meeting the developmental goals set forth by the Government of Somalia. That it also sought to enhance institutional and manpower capabilities in'Somalia, particularly in the field of generating projects, through such methods as training programs, provided adequate justification for this Credit. It was argued with credible cause though that the UNDP Planning Team was already engaged in assisting the Technical Department in preparation of projects and that the IDA credit would therefore only serve as a duplication of effort. Since the UNDP Teams had barely initiated its work program and had not yet proven to be effective in its operations, it was, however, concluded that the Credit could be designed around the work of the UNDP Team, and that it would, therefore, supplement and complement the Team's work. Objectives 4.2 From the basic documents relating to the project, it is evident that the objectives were never clearly defined. While the President's Report called for the financing of a "program of project preparation studies" of high priority, the Credit Agreement was much broader in scope and intent when it referred to "high priority studies and other projects of  -9 - technical assistance". Again, while the President's Report referred to training programs that would 'assist in expanding the capacity of Somalia's institutions to execute pre-investment work", the Credit Agreement only stipulated a requirement of "suitable training courses". 4.3 Despite (or thanks to) the imprecision of its objectives and an extension of its implementation period by nearly 37 months, the project financed useful sub-projects, some of which were pursued further by the IDA and other sources of external funding (see Annex III). The project when it was closed in July 1985 had yielded eight important sub-projects (the Afgoi-Baidoa Road Study, the Cotton Lands Development Study, Northern Rangelands Project, North West Agricultural Project (test drilling), AgricultreInputs Study, Mogadishu Harbour Subsidence Study, Juba Valley Interim Storage Study, and the Quelea Bird Surveys). From the vantage point, therefore, of financing project preparation leading to investments, the project may have achieved its objective. Whether the sub-projects were all of a high priority nature is not clear from available documentation. 4.4 But even the objective of sub-project preparation was not achieved without serious impediments and delays. The high incidence of delays in implementing the project as a whole and in generating, preparing, supervising and implementing the component sub-projects can be ascribed to a number of reasons, chief among which were: a. the lack of a well structured or basic institutional framework, and even where it existed the deep seated malaise that was observed within these institutions; b. the delay in the appointment of the expatriate Senior Project Advisor and the subsequent appointment of an unsuitable candidate; c. the weakness of the preparatory stages of sub-projects often reflected in unacceptable or poor terms of reference (TORs); d. inordinate delays in identifying, selecting and supervising consultants; and e. indecision and disagreement between project staff of the Bank and the borrower as to the degree of priority of a sub-project or its viability. The above problems among others will be discussed in more detail, where appropriate, below. 4.5 At the same time it is quite striking that this project achieved so little in terms of insticution building in light of overwhelming  - 10 - evidence of weak institutions and lack of skilled indigenous personnel. This contributed to increasing delays in achieving the objectives of speedy preparation and implementation of the project and its component sub-projects. 4.6 A major reason for this failure can be attributed to the performance of the expatriate Senior Project Advisor, whose task it was to carry out the training component of the project as it was incorporated under the terms of the Credit Agreement and TOR of the Advisor. There is no evidence that this responsibility was ever seriously undertaken by the Advisor. Design 4.7 In circumstances where the administrative and institutional framework was fairly well developed and was complemented by skilled personnel the project objectives may have been realized without much difficulty. However, in an environment devoid of these basic factors, the machinery set up for implementation of the project was bound to experience difficulties, as it indeed did. The design assumed a high degree of coordination between and among the various ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of National Planning, the Technical Department of the Ministry of National Planning, the expatriate Senior Project Advisor, the UNDP team, the various teams set up for sub-project implementation, foreign consultants, the Project Review Committee, the Regional Mission and World Bank/IDA staff. In short, the design did not clearly identify or define the tasks or roles to be performed by each of the units responsible for execution at each stage of the project. 4.8 The project was also designed at a time when Somalia had entered a transitionary phase in its development strategy. Sufficient evidence was available to indicate that Somali institutions were not stable enough to meet the challenging demands of a new economic regime. Constant problems were observed in internal management, accounting and auditing. Foreign debt servicing and budgeting, for instance, had emermed as serious problems. Management of foreign consultants, from preparation of appropriate TORs to institutional capabilities of negotiating and consummating contracts, payments, disbursements and procurement all had become formidable tasks for Somali public institutions. 4.9 The design also did not take into consideration the lack of indigenous manpower capabilities to implement the project. Somalia had experienced during this period serious shortages in managerial, technical and skilled personnel. This was caused for the most part by the availability of better opportunities for these categories of personnel in neighboring oil producing countries, and to a lesser extent by  - 11 - the departure of Soviet officials from key managerial and technical posts in the Somali public sector. In addition there occurred an increasingly severe erosion of the real value of salaries in the public sector to the point where, by 1985, the monthly salary of even senior officials would only cover their expenses for a few days. The existing personnel, therefore, lacked appropriate skills, were inexperienced and had a sense of indifference towards their work and responsibilities because of a lack of incentives to produce results. Whatever little progress was achieved was due largely to the dedication of a few responsible individuals, in the higher echelons of Government. 4.10 Given the above constraints, the very heavy responsibilities cast on the Senior Project Advisor within the project framework was over ambitious and impractical. When a candidate who lacked the required experience was finally appointed to the post, it only added to the existing problems. Implementation 4.11 Processes and Procedures. As stated earlier, the high degree of cooperation and coordination that was required of the numerous actors involved in the project never occurred, resulting in serious delays in implementation. The lack of a clear or cohesive definition of the objectives and of the exact scop,e of work to be carried out by the different elements responsible for project implementation and how this impacted adversely on the process of implementation of the project as a whole, is evident from the apparent confusion that followed. For instance, the Technical Department under the supervision of its Director General, the Senior Project Advisor, the UNDP team and officials drawn from appropriate sector ministries were all responsible for preparing sub-project proposals that had potential for financing under the Credit. Likewise, sub-project identification, implementation and determining their priority was the responsibility of the Technical Department, the Senior Project Advisor and the Project Review Committee. This latter Committee consisted of a number of members drawn from diverse Somali ministries and agencies and the World Bank and UNDP Resident Representatives. The Committee met on an ad hoc basis and was responsible for final approval of sub-project stud4es for financing by the Credit. It was also responsible for the selection of foreign consultants. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for seeking budgetary appropriations to meet the logistics requirements and the local costs of the project. 4.12 At'the time of the first supervision mission in October 1980, the Technical Department with the apparent assistance of the UNDP Team, had identified 22 possible sub-projects, but only one-the Afgoi Baidoa Road Study--was advanced enough to be funded by the Credit. This study as well as the se-.en other sub-projects which were ultimately completed under the Credit by July 1985 were (with the exception of the Quelea Bird Surveys, the Cotton Lands Rehabilitation Project, and the Juba ValleY Interim Storage Project) either funded further (see annex III for individual project surveys) by Bank/IDA and other external agencies within larger projects (e.g., Afgoi Baidoa Road under the IV Somalia Highway Project) or were incorporated as important contributions to sectoral studies (e.g., Arclt Input Studies within the Somalia Agriculture Sector Study 1986. Another Msub-project (North-West Agriculture  - 12 - Development-Test Drilling), was a component of a study being carried out under an on-going project-the North-West Agriculture Development Project - Phase I, being funded by a separate IDA Credit. The only sub-project which however, met all the design and conceptual requirements of the Credit, was the Northern Rangelands Project Preparation sub-project. 4.13 In the preparation of the above sub-projects, however, endless and protracted debate and problems arose, particularly with regard to priorities and Terms of Reference (Quelea Birds, and Agriculture Inputs, Cotton Lands), and selection of foreign consultants kalmost all projects). This was in large measure due to the inappropriate or insufficient design of the sub-project and the cumbersome processes involved in selection of consultants. In particular, the project design did not specify: a. at what stage of preparation a particular sub-project was qualified to be financed by the Credit. The fact that basic studies were to be avoided may have caused serious confusion. Even so, tbe Quelea Bird Surveys and the Cotton Lands Project appeared to be nothing but basic (or sector) scudies; b. who or which units determined the priority of the sub-project to be ultimately financed by the Credit. (The Technical Department? The Project Review Committee? The UNDP Team? The World Bank? Key officials of sector ministries? The Senior Project Advisor?) Was a consesus of all required? This is not obvious either, since in determining the priority of the Quelea Bird Survey, the Vice Minister of Agriculture playea a decisive role; and c. the responsibility for determination of appropriate consultants. (Was it the role of the Technical Department? Project Review Committee? The Senior Project Advisor or concerned ministries or agencies? or The Project Review Committee?) 4.14 The delays and omissions encountered in the process of implementation due to manpower constraints cannot be over emphasized. A significant example of this particular dilemma can be observed by the fact that within two years from the credit being effective (between 1978-80) the Director of the Te_.tnical Department (the key individual of the Department responsible for the overall implementation of the project) was replaced three times. Even then, the appointee was considered inexperienced, though capable. The result, therefore, as observed in the general supervision report of October 24, 1980 was that such action "deprived the Technical Department of continuity of management and dynamism which are essential for the speedy implementation of the project." The report also obsarved that the delays caused were attributable to the general malaise prevailing within the Somali public service. Purthermore, there is no evidence that  - 13 - the elaborate procadures for establishing working parties under the chairmanship of the Director of the Technical Department for sub-project preparatory work ever occurred, or whether in fact the working parties ever existed or functioned. So a process which had been designed to provide exposure, participation and on-the-job training for local officials in important pre-investment work did not work. Moreover, every one of the sub-projects completed were implemented exclusively by foreign consultants and there is no evidence of local participation. It was also evident that the UNDP Team which had a substantial task in the preparation of sub-projects was having difficulties. Under the terms of the Credit Agreement, the borrower had to ensure that any vacancy among the five members of the UNDP team had to be filled immediately. The delay in appointing someone to the vacant post of Agricultural Economist (the post fell vacant in late 1979 and the appointment was only made in late 1980), delayed to a great extent the project preparation process and the effectiveness of the Credit. The supervision report observed in this regard that "it seemed that project preparation work in the Technical Department would require greater integration with the UNDP team." Later supervision missions visiting Somalia at various stages of the project also confirmed the difficulties encountered by the UNDP Team, and particularly poor coordination with local staff. 4.15 The other key state organization-the Ministry of Finance-also experienced difficulties in meeting :ts obligations under the Credit. Serious delays were noted particularly in the Ministry's approval of local cost requirements for sub-projects (e.g., when China Export Corporation stopped test drilling under the North West Agriculture Prnoet)and for logistics and administrative requirements (e.g., In meeting -t e needs of both the Project Advisor and the Economic Advisor). 4.15 The Project Review Committee which had a number of important tasks to perform under the Credit met consistently at the inception of the project, but as the project progressed, it met less frequently or not at all. Even on occasions when the Committee did meet, it appears that key officials, such as the Bank Group Resident Representative, seldom attended. The result was that approval of sub-projects and consultants and the general supervision of the project in its entirety became the responsibility of World Bank staff at Headquarters or Nairobi. This too led to delays in project implementation.  - 14 - 4.17 Advisors. The successful outcome of the project depended heavily on the role and performance of the Senior Project Advisor, and, after 1982, of the Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance in meeting the objective of macro-economic management. The Senior Project Advisor's per'crmance was pivotal to the project because he was mandated for in the Credit Agreement and the effectiveness of the Credit itself was dependent upon a suitable appointment. The Advisor's TOR were comprehensive and covered all aspects of the project including advisory services and assistance to the State Planning Covmission (later the Ministry of National Planning); identification, preparation and appraisal of sub-project proposals, ranking of sub-project oroposals in accordance with priorities set in terms of Government objectives, policies and targets, supervision of sub-project preparation, advise on the recruitment of consultants, preparation of bidding documents and monitoring of the activities of sub-project consultants, training Somali counterparts on the job, and setting up and coordinating working parties envisaged for sub-project preparation. Quite literally, therefore, the entire task of overseeing the implementation of the project rested with the Senior Project Advisor because of the exceptionally wide responsibilities bestowed on him. Both the Somali Government and IDA found difficulties in identifying an appropriate candidate. A suitable candidate was finally identified after the passage of nearly one year and was mutually acceptable to the Government and IDA. However, just before tn. appointment was made, the Government changed its mind and proposed another candidate, who, in the judgment of ;DA, was inappropriately qualified and experienced to undertake the post. But upon the insistance of the Somali Government and in the interest of the Credit becoming effective without further delay, the Bank acquiesced. Because the advisor had little or no project experience and had not been involved in any aspect of project preparation, selection of consultants or identification of priorities, he could not perform his tasks adequately. Especially regrettable is the fact that the duty to train Somali counterparts remained almost totally unaccomplished. During the tenure of the Advisor, only one report (Ne-ember 26, 1980) on the status of the project as a whole, and the sub-projects was submitted. This was an extremely brief, sketchy account from which not much could be gathered, on the progress of the project and the sub-projects. It is noted, however, that the Advisor was also constrained by a lack of logistical support and inadequate staff, The overall result was that t'-e Advisor placed hea"y reliance on IDA in order to perform his duties and ultimately, it was Bank staff that managed the project. To have expected IDA to also fulfill the training requirements would have been to ask too much and would have rendered the entire project concept meaningless. inevitably, this all important requirement remained without completion. 4.18 The problems associated with the Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, appointed in September 1982 as a result of amendments to the Credit Agreement, were of a different nature. The Senior Economic Advisor's major function was to advise the Minister and D'rector General of  - 15 - the Ministry of Finance on a broad range of institutional and policy issues, including establishment of a Public Investment Review Unit, review of the Public Investment Program, micro-lev31 financial analysis of projects, assessment of public enterprise performance and other duties. In January 1983, only four months after his appointment, the Senior Economic Advisor tendered his resignation citing stress related ill health, and a lack of cooperation from within the Ministry, other than from the MYnister himself. Evidence suggests that the Economic Advisor was unable to adapt to the difficult conditions prevailing in Somalia. Some important observations made by the Advisor with reference to working conditions point to the inherent and serious problems within Somali institutions chat has been constantly raised in this report. He observed that he could not fit into a weak organizational structure, and that there were hardly any trained economists in the Ministry with whom he could initiate a serious economic work program. Nevertheless a tentative proposal regarding economic work in the Ministry of Finance was submitted by the Advisor. The proposal called for, among other things, the strengtheniag of the Economic Research Unit within the Ministry and carrying out of ad hoc reviews of important economic 'programs", such as the external debt profile of Somalia. In this latter task he particularly called for the use of available Somali experts (drawn from the University and other agencies) on a consultancy basis with competitive salaries to provide appropriate incentives. The performance of the siccessor as Advisor to the Ministry is difficult to evaluate in the absence of relevant material relating to the duties the Advisor had undertaken, but senior officials of the Ministry consistently expressed satisfaction with his work. Evaluation of Sub-Projects (See Annex for individual project assessments). 4.19 The sub-projects financed under the project are an array of studies, surveys, and a drilling activity, that, with a single exception (the Northern Rangelands Sub-Project) facilitated IDA financed projects already in progress (test-drilling) or proposed The Afgoi-Baidoa Road Survey led to the Somalia IV Highway Project; The North-West Agriculture Development - Test Drilling (Part of the consultant's Report) led to the North-West Agriculture Development Project - Phase II; and the Mogadishu Harbor Subsidence Study led to the Somalia Port Modernization Project. The three projects had IDA and cofinanced fundings for a total sum of US$69.9 million. Two external agencies--the International Fund for Agriculture and Development (US$7.0 million) and the European Economic-Community (US$5.4 million)- provided cofinancing for the North-West Agriculture D3velopment Project - Phase II, and the Arab fund provided about US$16.3 million in cofinancing the IV Highway Project. Of the remaining subprojects, the Agriculture Inputs Survey contributed significantly to the Somalia Agriculture Sector Study and the Quelea Bird SuLveys, contributed directly to control activities taking place simultaneously, during seasons when the surveys were being carried out. The remaining two studiez The Cotton Lands Rehabilitation Study and the Juba Valley Interim Storage - Prefeasibility Study could not generate further investment.  - 16 - 4.20 Beyond the objective of preparing projects for further investments, which was reasonably achieved, the secondary objective of strengthening the institutions in their project preparation capabilities seems to have gone unaccomplished. Part of the reason for this was because, the TORs never incorporated a training component, nor was there any provision that enabled the participation of local units or personnel - assuming such were available. The only sub-project which conscioasly called for the participation and inclusion of local personnel was the Quelea Bird Surveys. Here the TOR, on the insistence of the Bank, included the participation of the local communities :rnd the Bird Control Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture. Evidence indicates that the surveys particularly helped the latter in control activities, although the surveys themselv'es were carried out; by a foreign consultant exclusively. Another major reason for this failure was that, most sub-projects (except, Juba Valley Interim Storage, and the Northern Rangelands) were either surveys or studies or a "iardware- activity (Test Drilling), carried out by independent contractors or consultants. Overall, however, it is difficult to conclude that institutional development .n terms of improved local capabilities to undertake project preparation activities had taken place, particularly in view of the fact that all the svb-projects were contracted exclusively to foreign consultants. In additior, because the Senior Project Advisor failed completely in the task of providing training courses in project preparation, one has to conclude that the institutional development process never occurred. Terms of Reference 4.21 With the single exception of the Northern Rangelands sub-project, terms of reference for which were aimed at project preparation for further investments, the TOR's for the sub-projects were prepared to facilitate studies and surveys to be undertaken by consultants. In the case of North-West Agriculture Development (Test Drilling) Sub-Project, TOR's were not prepared because the Bank agreed to an exception from the normal procedures. While the test drilling was to be funded by the Credit, the sub-project was an integral part of a feasibility study and technical assistance effort provided by consultants under the North-West Agricultural Development Phase I Project funded by another IDA Credit (Credit 635-SO). In the case of the Juba Valley Interim Storage Sub-Project too, an exception is noted because the TOR for a prefeasibility study were prepared by the Bank and transmitted to the Technical Department. 4.22 With the exception of the Afgoi-Baidoa Rcad Survey Sub-Project, the TOR of every one of the sub-projects were subject to minor or wholesale changes or additions recommended or suggested by the Bank. The sub-project that encountered the most serious changes was the Cotton Lands Rehabilitation and Development Sub-Project, for which the Bank suggested strongly that the TOR for the sub-project should be specificlY designed for a feasibility study rather than project preparation. This was agreed to, but the TOR aimed at a historical approach and was much more a reflection of the need for an exhaustive study of the cotton industry in Somalia than a feasibility study. As there was also a dispute within the Bank itself about the viability of this study, even the reformulated TOR did not  - 17 - produce a feasibility study that warranted ir investment. In the case of the Agriculture Input Survey the Bank s ad a combination of two separate TORs an Agriculture Inputs Survey and an Agriculture Cooperative Study. The revised and more comprehensive TOR were accepted and the survey was completed on this basis. At first, the completed survey was to lead the financing of an Agriculture Rehabilitation Program, but later, the findings of the survey were incorporated into the Agriculture Sector Study which was completed recently by the Bank. An effective contribution was made by the Bank in suggesting revisions for the Quelea Bird Surveys, TOR to include the participation of the local population and ground personnel in the plant protection and bird control units. It appears that these changes did help in the local ground and air control and performance. In the case of the Mogadishu Harbor Subsidence (and the Investigation of Armorlayer of the Breakwater) Sub-Project, the Bank suggested a more detailed breakdown of the responsibilities of the consultants in the TOR. In the Northern Rangelands Development Project Phase II case the Bank suggested substantial additions to the TOR by recommenaing the inclusion of an Economist/Financial Analyst in the team of specialists and expanding the scope of evaluation of Phase I though more explicit references in the TOR. 4.23 A summary evaluction of the TORs as a whole reflects a lack of attention to detail, vagueness and excessively broad objectives to be achieved, lack of acknowledgment of the importance of sub-projects in terms of national priorities, and the viability of a sub-project. It could be concluded, therefore, that in the project preparation process, the various units responsible lacked the required skills, which was especially evident in the preparation of TORs. Striking also is the fact that the UNDP team had not made any positive impact on this process. The result was that the Bank (Headquarters and Regional Mission) had to be heavily involved in tne preparation of appropriate TORs and, again, the institutional objective of the TA Credit was not accomplished. Implementation 4.24 Recruiting and Contracting Consultants: The choice and contracting of consultants for Bank funded projects lies with the Borrower. While this seems easy enough, (though some argue that this is not a usual function of government), unleds the Borrower is aware of the processes and procedures that have to be used in the selection of consultants, they become cumbersome, complex and time-consuming. With a few exceptions (Northern Rangelands, Harbor Subsidence) most sub-projects experienced serious delays because of a lack of familiarity with these processes. 4.24 In three of the sub-projects (Northern Rangelands, Quelea Surveys and North-West Agriculture Development), the TORs were releasea eit er Dy the Technical Department or by the responsible ministry/agency to prospective consultants, and in one-- the Quelea Bird Surveys-the Ministry  - 18 - of Agriculture signed the contract before IDA authorization. In every one of these cases IDA had tG warn the Borrower of the departure from the agreed procedure. Nevertheless, in the case of the Juba Valley Interim Storage Sub-Project IDA did not appear to mind that the contract entered into between the Ministry of Jube Valley Development and the foreign consultant did not have its prior approval; this resulted in serious questions being raised by the Ministry of Finance. 4.26 In the final analysis the process of selection of consultants forms an integral part of sub-project preparation itself, and if the sub-project preparation process is weak, difficulties in selection of consultants will necessarily follow as in the Afgoi-Baidoa Road Surveys, Cotton Lands Rehabilitation and the Agriculture Inputs Study. Where the study was specific as to its needs (The Mogadishu Harbor Subsidence) or where the Bank, at the request of the Borrower, actively assisted by submitting lists of appropriate consultants (The Agriculture Inputs, Mogadishu Harbor Subsidence) a difficult and time-consuming process became less constraining. This all suggests that the Bank missed an opportunity to hel, the Government to improve its procedures for design and approval of studies as well as for selecting and hiring consultants. It is not clear however, whether Government wanted help in these matters. Supervision 4.27 A lack of definition of the roles to be played by the various elements responsible for project management was generic also to the supervision of the various sub-projects. Because related ministries and agencies had some degree of supervision responsibility over a sub-project, unless there was close communication between them, implementation snags emerged. This was evident after the completion of Phase III of the Quelea Bird Surveys when the Ministry of Planning (Technical Department) recommended a suspension of the surveys, because the client ministry-the Ministry of Agriculture-failed to convince the Technical Department of the effectiveness of the surveys. In another subproject-The Juba Valley Interim Storage - the Ministry of Finance lodged a protest with IDA regarding disbursements requested by the Technical Department, because normal procedures for project implementation had not been used and the waivers authorized by IDA had not been communicated to the Ministry of Finance by the Technical Department. 4.28 In general, the performance of the consultants were found to be acceptable. One of the reports (Agriculture Inputs Survey) raised a number of issues, but was found to be useTul. Anotther (Cotton Lands Rehabilitation) was assessed by the IDA to contain too many basic ommissions to warrant any further consideration. Two reports, (the Afgoi-Baidoa Road; Mogadishu Harbor Subsidence) contributed significantlytowards two major IDA funded proJects. Performance of other consultants or contractors (N.W. Agricultural Development Project Drilling, and Quelea Birds) led directly to ongoing activities in their respective  - 19 - areas. The consultant's project preparation work was a useful input Phase II of the Northern Rangelands Project. 4.29 Delays and communication problems also arose because of the lack of clarity about this division of supervision responsibilities between Bank Headquarters and the Regional Mission in Africa (RMEA). In the Cotton Lands Rehabilitation Study the Regional Mission questioned the viability of the sub-project and was surprised when Headquarters authorized the study under the revised TOR. When responsibility for supervision of the Ag_iculture Inputs Study was transferred to RMEA, delays occured because the Borrower continued to transmit TORs for consultants to Headquarters for authorization. Moreover, it should be noted that the Programs Division was responsible for the project l'ntil 1983, when it was taken over by the Institutional Development, Technical Assistance ana Training Division (EAPIT) in the Project Department. The high turnover rate of staff in the Programs Division (at least four different Loan officers and three different Resident Representatives oversaw the Project during the period concerned as well as in RMEA also affected supervision of the Project. Overall, a characteristic common to the implementation of this project as a whole was that no single authority or person was responsible for the supervision of the entire project or the coordination of sub-projects. Under the present arrangements EAPIT is now responsible for such coordination. V. Conclusions and Suggestions for the Future 5.1 If viewed from the broad objective (as stated in the President's Report) of assisting Somali agencies, both official and private, to improve their capabilities in project preparation, the Credit hid very limited success* Somali authorities were not much better equipped to handle such tasks at the time ef project completion than they were before the Credit was made. On the other hand, if the criterion of success is based on the narrower objectives of funding high priority studies and other projects of technical assistance, the Credit achieved its purpose because it funded an array of useful studies, surveys and technical assistance projects. Whether these were of a high priority or not could not be ascertained, though they were so considered by the various parties that had to agree to the studies to be financed. In one case, the Quelea Birds Surveys which was considered by the Technical Department to be of high priority when it was first proposed, it was concluded by the same Department to be inappropriate for further funding, and the surveys were discontinued after Phase III. The Cotton Lands Rehabilitation Study was not only questioned in relation to its priority but also regarding its viability - though ultimately it was authorized. In two cases, the North-West Agriculture Development Project Test Drilling, and the Juba Valley Interim Storage sub-projects, procedures directly relating to the project were not follbwed because of Eank authorized exemptions. There is a fine line between Bahk assistance and Bank imposition. These sub-projects may indicate that IDA's view of sub-project priority was considered more important than adherence to agreed procedures for its determination. It should be recognized, however, that the Credit itself would have been totally ineffective had it not been for IDA's constant assistance in every aspect of project execution. The origins of the problems encountered in this project can be without doubt traced back to the feasibility of its entire design,  - 20 - which, unfortunately, seems to have been simply transposed from a previous Credit granted to Sudan for similar purposes (Credit 614-SU). The only differences were that a Senior Project Advisor and, later, a Macro-Economic Advisor-were accommodated within the design in place of an Project Preparation Unit which performed similar functions in Sudan to those of the Senior Project Adviser. These exceptions did not make the design less complex, but in fact, only added to the problems. Without direction and control, the preparation of TORs for sub-projects and selection of consultants became formidable and time consuming tasks. 5.2 With so many objectives to achieve (project preparation, high-priority studies, technical assistance projects and macro-economic management) one objective which was essentially ignored or disregarded or may have turned out to be unfeasible, was the most important one; the strengthening of project preparation capabilities through training. The failure of this task can be attributed to the following factors: a) the ineffectiveness of the Senior Project Advisor in carrying out this responsibility. b) inadequate provisions for training components in TOR's of the sub-projects; c) lack of a survey of training needs and lack of preparation of a training plan; and d) inattention of IDA-Headquarters and RMEA-towards institutional development objectives and the training component while the Project was in the process of being implemented; In particular, considerable strides might have been made by clearly stating the categories and numbers of personnel to be trainee within a specified time frame in the Technical Department and in the ministries/agencies responsible for specific sub-projects (now a standard requirement in the Bank). It may, of course, be that there were no trainable cadre of personnel in the ministries or agencies, in which case the training component was unfeasible. However, assuming that there was a basic cadre of trainable personnel, then, in light of the weaknesses within the Somali Public Service, it may have been prudent to-design the credit entirely around this training function. However, by transposing (blue printing) a TA designed for another country, as seems to have been the case, there was present the inherent danger of inappropriateness in  - 21 - relation to local conditions. The overall results indicate that this was indeed the case. Inevitably, IDA ended up with a much too great responsibility for the administration and implementation of the project -- and its outcome. Suggestions for the Future 5.3 Design. In hindsight it is comparatively easy to pin-point the flaws of a project that has been completed. It is quite likely that the project was primarily intended to finance studies; in fact, it was seen as an alternative to overuse of the PPF which had just been created. In that sense, the project achieved its objective. Given the prevailing circumstances it may also have been a difficult task to obtain workable institutional arrangements and a detailed agreement with Somali authorities as later experienced under the aborted second project. Moreover, the institutional success of the project depended to a very large extent on the operational efficiency of institutions and personnel that were already considered to be ineffective from the very inception. 5.4 The institutional design issue is also a reminder that institutions do not as easily transfer from one country to another as does "hard-ware". Essentially, in a project dealing with the human factor, it is imperative that the project design is derived from local circumstances such as the levels of institutional capacities and capabilities, their structure and evolution, processes and procedures of operation, the levels of education of decision makers, the institutional "culture" and behavior and the linkages between the various ministries and public sector agencies. These differ from country to country and the approach in designing TA will have to be varied accordingly. This would mean the designer working very closely with recipient officials in determining the factors that can best be utilized and targeting TA at: a) developing skills that are not present; and b) building on skills that are available, but are weak. By comparing policy areas and functional areas in a given ministry or agency one may be able to determine where skill gaps are present. TA could be targetted at developing skills where gaps are identified. An example might be that a ministry official is able to collate a-list of consultants, but may not have the skills to select, process or enter into a contract with a consultant. In such a case a training component might build on what is pres. ntly known. On the other hand, the whole process of consultant selection may be a mystery in which case all the necessary skills need to be acquired. In the case of Somalia therefore, the broad generalities of the project objectives should be avoided or at least complemented by more a specific design. Moreover, a clear ranking of the project priorities should be provided among the many objectives of the Project.  - 22 - Even in terms of any one function, it is important to clearly define and describe (perhaps in annexes) every component of the function that has to be addressed. For example, in a training function, one could specify the categories of personnel to be trained, the number that would be trained, types of training to be provided, period of training and how trainees are to be selected. It ought to be made clear who is responsible for training and the nature of the training program (a curriculum for "on the job" training, workshops, etc.) and the incentives that might follow after training is completed. In the case of studies or projects of high priority, they ought to be identified and if possible specified along sectoral and priority lines that have already been incorporated in national development plans. 5.5 Coordination/Supervision. The involvement of too many parties both within the Government and within the Bank in imnlementing the project will create confusion and a single source or individual responsible for coordination or accountable for the project and the sub-projects should be identified. Coordination is vital not merely to monitor the progress of the project but also to control it. The recipient should give a clear mandate to one agency or organization to manage the project to th2 exclusion of others. Within the Bank it is expected that the newly created independent Technical Assistance units will provide greater continuity in management, supervision, control and coordination of TA projects. They should also be able to complement the impact of TA projects through sector work-such as the Technical Cooperation Assessment mission carried out jointly by UNDP and the Bank in Somalia. 5.6 Covperation/Communication. As in the coordination function, an underlying assumption for a successful TA Project is adequate cooperation of and among the different agencies of the recipient and between program, project and the regional mission staff of the Bank. While it is admitted that competing interests can always cut into cooperation; the resulting adverse impact can be minimized by a prior understanding of the parameters within which these elements operate and an adherence to well laid out procedures. Project design and subsequent amendments should specify the roles of the various parties concerned, and the agreements reached. 5.7 Consultants/Advisors. Perhaps the single most troublesome area in a TA Project is the complex, protracted and burdensome procedures for selecting and contracting consultants -and advisors. It can also be the most sensitive and delicate of tasks, since when the recipient has responsibility for selecting the consultant and the Bank has the power of acquiescing with the decision or rejecting it. The system of selection of consultants remains a major administrative burden for the borrowers from identification, preparation of TORs, releasing of TORs, selection of the consultant, and various Bank authorizations. There is admittedly no easy way to simplify this time consuming process, except to recommend that the whole process of selecting consultants be the subject of a comprehensive training program geared towards project preparation.  - 23 - 5.8 The problems that have emerged from this project are many and they cut across the whole spectrum of project management. They are nothing new at this point, and were addressed by the Bank as part of its policy work on Technical Assistance. What they demonstrate, nevertheless, is that there may never have been something like a single TA project consisting of a "Study Fund", that could be prepared and appraised in a few weeks and succeed. Any project that introduces a new structure within Government must be designed, appraised and monitored like any other project. IV. Postscript 6.1 As the First Technical Assistance Project was nearing completion the Government requested a second credit to finance additional studies. Because of the lack of success of the First Technical Assistance Project in building local capacity even in the field of project preparation IDA -insisted that a line of credit for studies without a strong institutional development component would not be acceptable. Based on the findings of a series of missions, including the joint UNDP/Bank Technical Cooperation Assessment Mission, IDA concluded that the key areas were aid coordination and development planning, economic management as well.as project preparation. In April 1985 IDA sent a team to Somalia to negotiate a credit of US$ 3.0 million for these purposes. The Ministry of National Planning, however, had concluded that it did not need further assistance in improving the planning system from either IDA or any other source of external assistance. Under the curcumstances the Government and IDA agreed that there was no basis for further negotiation of the proposed project which was dropped from IDA's lending program.  - 24 - Arxfex 1 SUMAH OF ISSLES/PR S REIRaAT( TO TA 281-SO PROJ= OEErON AND MAME HROJFCr CONEN OBLEPS/ISSUES UTUM. I.. ffe Preident's Report 1. Design azr objectives 1. Inadequate familiarity wLth L-i.gemxus trsn6posed f ram similar aiMinxStrative structure capacities craeit eKtended to Sudar. ard capabilities with reference LO project managmaet and Iplamntatior. 2. Credit Agreerit 1. Project objectives too i. Lack of urderstwdirg by the borror lowwly drafted axI too as to the exact xrpose of the Credit. general. riconsistent with AL1aF flexibility reassary co make the project objectives ir. project responsive to rns as th2y the President's Report arose. e.g. Preparation ard trairirg comets. 2. Too mny objectives to be 2. Partial fulfilnt of project |chiev8i in too short a preparatimn objective. periaod. N!xfUlfilnt of train:frg objective. 3. he Bark/IIM 1. Wak coordination betwen 1. Serious delays in project (a) Program Prgi , Sector, Regioral implementation. (b) Sectois Missiou, Resident mission (c) Regioral Mission EA officials in supervision (d) Resident Mission and nement of project. 2. High turn-or of staff. 2. Ccfiusn1x in the borrower regapxLirg reportirg funCtios. 3. I tconsistency in directions 3. Break in continuity in project to the borrower regardirg eangelent. Delays in project prnoedural aspects e.g. Impl"onrtatirx. authorization of mib-=uitracts, selection of ccnsultants etc. 4. Ibcn dstency with 4. Cnfusimon in borrmwer regarding its reference to project role in imleimetaion of project, and objectives. urndrstadirg of project objectives. 5. Misuderstandirgs betwem Monk and Borrower. 2. Ihe Borrowr. 1. The Tedwdal 1- Lack of skiLled personel 1. Oelays in project preparation, Dept. Offnltry at with aequae aperlemoe in Ppl_st ard lnpimttIM. 1t1ia, Plnar) the pcojecc eycle.  - 25 - 2. Ihe Minstry of 2. Pborly prepared ToRs. 2. Project objectives faUed to be Finance. achieved. 3. Line Ministries 3. Lack of coordination 3. Waste of resources which the borrower Ageies ultimately has to pay back. responsible 'for sub-projects. 4. Inadequate counicatlo or identification of priorities in keeping with nationa poicy. 5. Inadequate understandirg of proJect objectives. 6. Lick of lcgistLcal and local financial support. 3. The UNIP Project 1. Lack of cordimnation with 1. Pcorly prepared TCP1s. Prepmation Unit. local staff. 2. Inadequate recognitiom of 2. Dblays in subproject preparation and local Des and priorities. the project itself. 3. Project objectives not aheved - particularly in institutional building and training in preparatimn of projects for furtber funding. 4. Senior Project Advisor 1. TIalequately qualified and 1. Tnability to perform his siperiencad In project responsibilities. related activities. 2. Too many responsibilities. 2. Delays In sub-project preparation, 2n)lmpentation and supervision. 3. Project objectives not achdeved - particularly the trainirg fuCtion. 4. Waste of resources.  - 26 - 5. Maczo-Ecutc dvior. (Fint Apoilet) 1. Inability to adopt to a 1. Inability to perfo res iblities. diffimlt stti. 2. Ilablity to pini the 2. Prmture 1.patin from ciiti. mppot ci local. rce!pt. 3. Project objectives no added. 3. Inalequate local w-pomr and logstical atzport. 4. Delas in project inaemeatati m. 5. Weste of resol cas.  - 27 - 'ANE II StUB-Ffi1]ECm FfW3 UNiE 3 CREDrr 821-SOk CNrRACr DM ND. SUB-OEct NAME (U.S. $) July 7, 1980 1 Afgoi hidos Rod Study 288,819.26 Jan 25, 1982 2 CDttccl LosR ebabLltatic and Dev. (Phase 1) 112,176.00 April. 1981 3 Nbrthemn Razgelsadas Dev. Project Phame II 92,433.27 Dee. 1980/Feb 1982 4 NoIrth West Agiculture Dev. Project 743,089.23 Jan 1983May 1984 5 ftigadishu Harbor Subskidm Study inve gsticaC and Azmoiayer stlxz' 173,958.65 Mar. 1982/Oct. 1982 6 Qzelea Eird Surveys, Phase I-IV 432,586.23 Jure 1983/July 1984 Feb. 21, 1983 7 Agriclture Inpwuts Survey 252,0Q0. Sept. 26, 1984 8 Juba Valley Interim Storage Pre-feasibUiity Study 191,590.47 Total disbzrsed 2,286,653.11 Total cm^lled July 1985 348,989.33 Total Credit Ekxluding Advisors 2,635,642.44 Salary of Senior Project Advisor as at February 7, 1986 276,839.23 Salary of Mfcrro-Ee. Advisor 87,518.33 Total Credit 3,000,000.00 * NDte that these figue have bm caputed from disbjset figres. in smeral, project accamtirg reflect a total disarray. e, d aes in the figures my be posible.  - 28 - Annex III Page 1 of 22 DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF SUB-PROJECTS Due to serious disarray and discrepancies in accounting and auditing of sub-projects only clear commitments or disbursements made towards sub-projects will be indicated here. An uncommitted undisbursed amount of US$ 348,989.33 out of a total of USS 3.0 million was cancelled in July 1985. Sub-project u'o. 1 Title: Afgoi-Baidoa Road Study Government Agency Involved: Ministry of Public Works Consultant Contract Signed: July 7, 1980 Proiect Cnmpleted: February 1981 Project Cost: US$ 288,819.26 Follow-up Investment: Support of Credit 1324-SO, approved in March 1983, for US$ 43.5 million for the Somalia Fourth Highway Project. Of the total project cost IDA contributed US$ 23.0 million or 53% of total project cost, the Arab Fund (about US$ 16.3 million or 37%) and the Government (about US$ 4.2 million or 10% net taxes and duties). Background/Objectives 1.1 The Afgoi-Baidoa Road (216 km) forms part of a main artery connecting Baidoa with Mogadishu, the Capital of Somalia. The road was constructed in 1971 with the assistance of the International Development Association and the European Development Fund. The pavement was originally designed for seven years and needed strengthening. Apart from a slightly rolling section near Baidoa, the road traverses mostly flat terrain. The condition of the road was generally satisfactory. However, undulations, pot holes and cracking of the surface were found in about the first 100 km. from Afgoi; the pavement in the black cotton s6il area between Bur Acaba and Baidoa had suffered extensive cracking. Since its construction, the road pavement had not _eceived any resealing. 1.2 The objective of the study was to assess the strength of the existing pavement and to undertake detailed engineering for strengthening and improving the road. The consultants would perform all engineering work, economic studies, field investigations and related work as required, to attain these objectives. 1.3 Some delay was experienced before the sub-project got started in ascertaining whether an outstanding dispute relating to payments on a contract between a German Contractor and the Government of Somalia for previous work done on the Afgoi-Baidoa Road had been settled. Once this was resolved, there was no doubt as to the importance of the sub-project  Annex III - 29 - Page 2 of 22 and its feasibility. The only other delay experienced was in the selection of an appropriate consultant to carry out the studies and the detailed engineering work. Implementation 1.4 The consultants, completed their assigned task in February 1981 and the report was submitted to coincid( with IDA's appraisal mission for the Fourth Highway Project. 1.5 The report included a technical as well as economic evaluation and detailed engineering designs for strengthening and improving the road. Under this study the road was divided into six sections on the basis of traffic volumes and into seventeen sub-sections of similar physical characteristics on the basis of surface condition, pavement deflection, road drainage and construction details. In considering pavement strengthening and improvement alternatives, the consultants identified two possible solutions, one for a service life of 10 years and the other for a service life of 20 years. Based on their technical and economic evaluation, the consultants concluded, and the Government and IDA (with some reservation about construction costs) agreed, that the preferred solution was for a service life of 20 years. Evaluation 1.6 Of she six sub-projects financed under SO-821 this was one of the more successful. There is no evidence that the TORs of the study had to be substantially reformulated. The consultants that were selected (although with some delay) performed exceptionally well and their report and recommendations as mentioned earlier we-e incorporated directly into the Fourth Somalia Highway Project upon the completion of theirwork. (The Fourth Highway Project (approx. cost US$43.5 million) was completed in 1985 but experienced serious delays because contractors had not received payments from the Government of Somalia which had in turn defaulted on other loan repayments to the co-financier of the project-the Arab Fund.) The only other comment thet can be made in relation to this sub-project under Credit 821-SO is the fact that the TOR did not indicate the priority of this project in terms of its national and economic feasibility.  Annex III - 30 - Page 3 of 22 Sub-project No. 2 Title: Cotton Lands Rehabilitation and Development (Phase I) Project Review Committee Approval: November 1980 Government Agency: Somalia Textiles (SOMALTEX) Consultant Contract Signed: January 25, 1982 Project Completed: August 1982 Project Cost: USS 112,176.00 Follow-up Investment: None Background/Objectives 1.1 From as far back as 1920, Somalia had produced and carried out a successful export trade in quality cotton. This cotton was grown on lands alongside the banks of Juba and Shabelli rivers. But since 1950 cultivable acreagss and cotton yields in Somalia had continued to decline. With the establishment of textile mills and the increasing demand for textiles, shortages of cotton and constraints on supplies were acutely felt. It was also recognized that inspite of numerous potential resources in Somalia, the country had depended heavily on a single cash crop-bananas. Cotton and its bi-products such as cotton seed oil and cake were assumed to have excellent export potential. 1.2 The principal project idea envisaged by the Somali Government would lead to the promotion of irrigated and rainfed cotton cultivation with the primary objective of achieving self-sufficiency and the secondary objective of exporting ereess cotton. In leading towards this project the Government wished to carry out studies that would investigate the feasibility of rehabilitating past and present irrigated cotton production sites and illustrate the difficulties associated with cotton production under rainfed conditions. The studies which would form part of this sub-project was considered to be of paramount importance. 1.3 The study to be implemented was designed to carry out the following objectives: a) Define the best development scheme for the promotion of irrigated and rainfed cotton production in conjunction with other cash and food crops. It was to include definite recommendations regarding total acreages to be cultivated under irrigated and rainfed conditions and managerial and technical assistance requirements to ensure production to reach self-sufficiency and export levels. bY Investigation of the feasibility of rehabilitating cotton lands that were irrigated in tne past at Jamama and Mahadlah.  Annex III Page 4 of 22 - 31 - c) In-depth evaluation of the managerial and technical operations of agricultural development presently followed in the Balaad Irrigation Project and provide recommendations for improvement. d) Study the feasibility of rehabilitating some of the present ginning factories and provide the best plans for the most profitable mode of processing the raw seed cotton crop obtained. 1.4 These objectives as appearing in the TOR and the TOR as a whole were completely reformulated upon proposals made by the Bank in April 1981. IDA drew a distinction between project feasibility and project preparation and suggested strongly that the TOR should be specific to a feasibility study. Project preparation and detailed design, the Bank felt, should only be carried out after agreement between the Government and IDA based on the findings and recommendations of the feasibility study. The Bank, therefore, proposed a cancellation of the original invitation sent to consultants for proposals and requested another draft TOR that incorporated fundamental criteria for cotton production such as, history of cotton production, geology, topography, varieties and cultivation practices, transport, ginning, marketing, pricing, investment levels, economic feasibility in terms of competing food crops, institutional arrangements and research and development capabilities among other considerations. 1.5 During the same time (April 1981), a Bank specialist on the subject determined that, both in terms of the feasibility of rainfed as well as upland cultivation of cotton, the sub-project did not merit study. The specialist suggested, however, that cotton production could be carried out successfully, but at a cost. He concluded that success would ultimately depend on effective pest control, crop establishment over short periods, and utilization of a heavy pre-irrigation system that would retain adequate moisture for plants to emerge. To accomplish this he averred that waters from an already over-tapped Shabelli river had to be utilized. He concluded that this study would have absolutely no utility. 1.6 With acceptance by the Government of Somalia to restrict the sub-project to a feasibility study and upon preparation of new TOR in June 1981, IDA agreed to fund the study as Phase I under the Credit. In a,ugust 1981, the Proposal Review Committee selected the consultant firm to carry out the study. In September 1981, the Bank's Regional Mission questioned again the feasibility of this study. The regional office concurred with the conclusions of the specialist (April 1981) and added several other reasons for this view such as the absence of a comprehensive irrigation policy, water rights laws and an international water treaty (the Shabelli river waters were shared by Somalia and Ethiopia).  Annex III Page 5 of 22 - 32 _ Implementation 1.7 Notwithstanding the above reservations, the reformulated study was agreed upon and in January 1982 (nearly two years after the sub-project was first approved by the Project Review Committee) the contract for the study was signed by the consultants and the Covernment of Somalia; the study was completed and transmitted to IDA and the Technical Department of the Ministry of National Planning, Somalia in Tuly 1982. The Report included a technical analysis of where cotton had been, is being and could be grown in Somalia. It also provided information about the yields of seed cotton that were presently being obtained under rainfed (about 200 kg/ha) and irrigated conditions (400 kg/ha). Existing production, which was mainly based on rainfed farming, according to the Report, amounted to 950 metric tons annually while the raw material needs of the only textile plant amounted to 11,500 metric tons. To achieve self-si'fficiency, the report prescribed a doubling of yields under rainfed production and an expansion of irrigated cultivation from 500 to 4,400 ha while at the same time increasing yields from 400 kg/ha to more than 2,000 kg/ha. 1.8 The IDA review, however, raised some fundamental problems not addressed in the report. (a) The comparative advantage of irrigated cotton production over irrigated food crop and export production of e.g. bananas at realistic yields as well as costs of production using economic prices would need to be established; (b) Furthermore the level of investment and the time it would take to improve the services (extension, crop protection, input supply, credit) and the irrigation facilities (rehabilitation and modernization) that would be required to achieve such yields in private farming, would need to be spelt out clearly. For instance, the review doubted seriously whether any commitment of water could be obtained from the Shabelli river, even though the Report indicated that there should be adequate water in most years. (c) If the intention was that the expansion of irrigated cotton production would come wholly or partly from State farms, there was a need to identify which farms, the managerial constraints and the investment (machinery as well as irrigation works) were required. IDA in November 1982, determined that any further work on this project would depend on obtaining answers to the above considerations and the project did not proceed further.  Annex III Page 6 of 22 - 33 - Evaluation 1.9 Everything that could possibly be wrong from conceptual errors to pre-implementation and implementation problems could be identified with this sub-project. a) The fact that IDA required a feasibility study as opposed to a project preparation study was a fundamental departure from the whole sub-project objective. b) That the study was agreed to, inspite of the negative conclusions reached by a Bank specialist (para. 1.5) prior to sub-project implementation and further objections raised by the regional mission (j 1.6), indicates acquiescence by IDA to a sub-proje oncept that it felt was highly dubious. c) The findings of the IDA review (para. 1.8) of the study only confirmed the points raised by the Bank specialist before the sub-project was approved. Although the review raised more micro-level questions that needed to be answered, fundamentally the issues remained the same, indicating that the study was a waste of resources. Fundamental errors in procedure were noted when proposals were sent out to foreign consultants before IDA authorization. This may have been due to the Borrowers unfamiliarity with Bank procedures.  Annex III - 34 - Page 7 of 22 Sub-project No. 3 Title: Northern Rangelands Development Project Phase II Project Review Committee Approval: November 1980. Government Agency Involved: National Range Agency Consultant Contract Signed: April 1981 Project Completed: April 1982 Project Cost: Approx. US$92,433.27 Follow-up Investment: Known to be the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (no details available). Background/Objectives 1.1 The Northern Rangelands Development Project was conceived as an integral part of the Drought Rehabilitation Program designed to minimize the adverse impact on inhabitants living in areas that were affected by the drought of 1973-74. The overall objective of the Program was aimed at arresting the deterioration of grazing lands caused by decades of over-stocking, unplanned stock water development and cyclical droughts. The methods proposed to achieve this were incorporated under Phase I of the Project which was initiated in 1976 and funded by the Kuweit Fund for Arab Economic Development. These included the establishment of grazing reserves, water points, fodder production units and better veterinary care and training aspects. 1.2 Phase II was called for to ensure the continuity and progress achieved in Phase I and to implement the recommendations of a review mission that initially called for a second phase. The primary aim of Phase II was to prepare an appropriate project document that would incorporate the ways in which the overall objectives of the project could be achieved by utilizing the infrastructure already established and the experience gained from Phase I. The project document envisaged under Phase II was to be drawn by a team consisting of a Range Manager, Livestock Specialist, and a Socio-Economic Specialist. 1.3 Quite in contrast with the Cotton Lands Rehabilitation project, the project concept was easily approved by IDA, on the basis that Phase II would enable the Bank to gain an insight into the performance of the project during Phase I and lead to the formulation of a sound Phase II project preparation document, based on this assessment. The Bank, however, suggested in February 1981 that besides the three specialists proposed for the task, an Economist/Financial Analyst should also be engaged, since cost effectiveness, economic return and financial implications were also important to judge the feasibility of the project. This would raise the manpower requirement from 9 man-months to perhaps 12 man-months and would tend to raise the cost of the studies from US$75,000 - US$100,000. The Bank also suggested the need for more explicit references in TORs to: (i) the activities to be evaluated in each field! (ii) the criteria on which such evaluation would be made.  Annex III Page 8 of 22 - 35 - In March 1981, the Bank made the Borrower understand that it did not mind doing preparatory work for Phase II so long as it was clear to the Borrower that the Bank was not committed to finance the follow-up Phase II project itself. More specific details were also enumerated as to what should be included in the TORs of the Preparation Mission. In this regard, the Bank particularly requested an evaluation of performance of Phase I and the impact on both Government policies and development of technologies suitable for better management of natural resources to be included in the TORs. A cost benefit analysis of each of the project components with particular emphasis on livestock exports through Berbera, was also called for. IDA emphasized the need to include an Economist/Financial Analyst in the Team and required that the IDA should review and approve the budget and the final TOR and the contract itself before signing the latter with an appropriate consultant. Implementation 1.4 In April 1981, the Proposal Review Committee selected the consultants to carry out the sub-project and agreed to abide by IDA's suggestions. IDA approved the consultants and due to some delays in communication the final approval came only in May with the proviso that the suggestions made by IDA would have to be incorporated in the consultants TOR. The consultant agreed to implement IDA's suggested proposals at no extra cost and final approval was granted in July 1981. 1.5 Very little information is available with regard to implementaton of this sub-project, since July 198i. A report subr. 'ted by the Ministry of National Planning, however, states that the appraisal study began in September 1981, and the draft final report was submitted by the consultant in April 1982. The report states further that the final report was reviewed by various concerned parties in Somalia, the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Development and FAO headquarters in Rome. According to a general supervision report of the IDA dated April 1983, the final report was yet to be submitted to the Bankl (However, senior project officials in the Bank are of the view that the Kuwait Fund for Arab Development had taken over Phase II, after the project documents had! been prepared by the team). Evaluation 1.6 Despite additions and emphasis placed on certain aspects of the TOR that required reformulations, the sub-project as a whole fitted idea:ly to the conceptual requirements of the IDA credit. There was also no protracted debate as to selection of an appropriate consultant or the final appointment, although again, the Borrower sent out bids for propoasals before final authorization from IDA. 1.7 It is a regreted that no follow-up information is available about this sub-project because this sub-project in its preparation (e.g. the role of each of the specialists in the Project preparation mission, was simple and well defined) and execution was designed in accordance with Credit objectives. No definitive information is available as to follow up investments or the present status of the project, except reports that the project is being funded by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Development.  Annex III Page 9 of 22 - 36 - Sub-project No. 4 Title: North-West Region Agricultural Development Project (Test Drilling) (NWAD) Government Agency Involved: Ministry of Agriculture Consultant Coutracts Signed: December 1980, and after a change of consultant, February 1982 Project Completed: March 1983 Project Cost: US$743,089.23 Follow-up Investment: This sub-project became an integral part of the North-West Agriculture Development Project, Phase I (Credit 635-SO), as a component of the feasibility study being carried out by the consultants for preparation of Phase II of the Project. The Project was appraised in November 1984. The Credit (1538-SO) was signed on February 25, 1985 for US$ 10.6 million, with cofinancing from the International Fund for Agriculture and Development - US$ 7.0 million and the European Economic Community - US$ 5.4 for a total of US$ 23.0 million. Background/Objectives 1.1 This sub-project was an exception to the normal procedural rules applicable to sub-projects to be financed out of the Credit. At the time test-drilling was required, a consultant firm was undertaking an important feasibility study and providing technical assistance for the North-West Region Agricultural Development Project (Phase I). The feasibility study and technical assistance was to contribute towards Phase II of the project and had the following objectives. a) To raise agricultural production in the rainfed cultivation area with a view to reducing the cereal deficit in the region, taking into account, however, the overriding need to check the rapid deterioration of soil resources by erosion. b) To reduce soil erosion and rainfall run off by extending existing and proposed soil and water conservation measures into additional areas where they can be justified economically. c) To provide support for the development of amall private farms practicing irrigation, with a view to increasing the production of fruit and vegetables. Increased production would meet the present deficit in the region, with possibly a surplus-available for export. d) To provide technical assistance in the implementation of medium-sized schemes which are beyond the technical capabilities of the farmers, as well as material and technical support to the small farms, representing the greatest number which already practise irrigation using individual wells.  Annex III Page 10 of 22 - 37 - 1.2 The purpose of the drilling program was to achieve objective (d) above. recause of the time and financial constraints experienced under the main project, it was agreed in November 1980, that the drilling program would be financed out of the Technical Assistance Credit. A contractor who was already in Somalia was immediately identified as a potential candidate to undertake the drilliug to avoid any further delays and supervision was to be carried out by the consultant doing the feasibility study. The IDA therefore authorized a direct contract to be signed for the drilling program. In April 1981, the contract was signed. Implementation 1.3 The work to be performed by the contractor consisted of executing a) 16 to 24 exploratory boreholes of which some or all will be equipped with biezometers. These boreholes will be drilled in alluvium and fractured bedrock and should not be more that 50 meters deep. b) 6 to 10 test wells in the jurassic formations ano on the sedimentary plateaus. These boreholes should not be more than about 100 meters deep. Diameters will be chosen so as to enable the execution of pumping tests. The boreholes and test wells were to be drilled all over the North-West region according to accepted specifications. By October 1981, however, serious problems had arisen between the contractor and the project management staff and no drilling had t-iken place. When the IDA supervision mission visited Somalia, it was informed that the contractors had declared bankruptcy and their assets and liabilities had been taken over by &nother firm. The new firm had no interest in assuming the contract and the advance was repaid to Credit 821-SO. Because of additional time which would be spent in decision making concerning selection of a new drilling contractor or in putting into effect the technical alternatives proposed by the consultant that would have resulted in an inevitable extension of the feasibility study itself and a revision of costs, the mission recommended that the search for an alterna.tive drilling compaLy be limited to local shopping or competitive bidding advertized locally according to procedures acceptable to IDA. 1.4 The search for a drilling contractor resumed and in January 1982, CVs of one firm were transmitted by the Ministry of Planning for IDA's consideration. The ministry also tentatively selected a firm to execute the drilling. In February 1982 IDA expressed no objection and the consultants made the necessary adjustments in its reporting program to enable the drilling to take place. The drilling program actually began only in August 1982, and according to supervison missions overseeing the Northwest Agricultural Development Project, the contractor was executing  Annex III Page 11 of 22 - 38 - the drilling program satisfactorily and well within the budget. It only suspended work when payments due were not honored by the local authorities, causing some delays. The drilling program was completed by the contractors in March 1983, and the consultantssubmitted its final report in November 1983. The report was transmitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and the IDA subsequently. its findings and contributions played a valuable role in the design and consequent appraisal of Phase II of the North-West Agricultural Project which is currently being implemented. Evaluation 1.5 In every respect this sub-project was a departure from the normal procedures under which funding was extended under the Credit. The degree to which convincing criteria were expressed by North-West Agriculture Development Project (NWAD) officials, the Bank and the borrower to obtain fundings from the Credit on a priority basis is not quite clear. In the absence of a TOR, it appears that when the NWAD project required the drilling to be done and its own funds were depleted, the only avenue was to obtain uncommitted funds from the Credit (which indeed at that time (1980) had committed funds for only a few projects). 1.6 The default of its contractual obligations by the original contractors was a severe set-back for the project and the consultant. In a sense, this was not attributable to any fault of the borrower or Ba-k staff, although quick examination of the contractor's profile may have prevented this outcome. The sub-project however was redeemed by the above average performance of the second contractor, which led to the satisfactory report presented by the consultant its resulting contribution to Phase II cf the NWAD Project.  Annex III Page 12 of 22 - 39 - Sub-Project No.5 Title: i. Mogadishu Harbor Subsidence Study ii. Investibation of Armorlayer o Brreakwater - Mogadishu Deep Water Harbor Project Review Committee Approval: For Subsidence Study: November 1980 For Armorlayer Investigation: Oct. 1983 Government Agency Involved: Ministry of Public Works/Somali Post Authority Consultant Contract Signed: Sub3itence Study - September 1981 Armorlayer Investigation - January 1984 Project Completed: January 1983 (Subsidence study) May 1984 (Armorlayer investigation) Project Cost: US$140,469.16 (Subsidence Study), US$33,484 (Armorlayer) : Total - US$173,958.65 Follow-up Investment: Both reports and recommendations herein to be adopted in Proposed Port Modernization Project (Yellow Cover Staff Appraisal Report stage). Recommended financing by IDA US$22.1 million and Covernment US$1.8 million. Background/Objectives 1.1 The new deep-water harbor in Mogadishu was completed in October 1977. Following the completion, subsidence of part of the reclaimed land behind the port, began to occur adjacent to the line of the breakwater. Despite some remedial measures subsidence had continued particularly during the season when winds from the South-East were fairly strong. This became a serious concern for the Somali Port Authority and IDA itself, (which partly funded the construction of the harbor) because continuous build-up of subsidence may reduce considerably the longevity of the structure. The Port Autherity was particularly anxious to discover remedial measures to identify the causes of subsidence and discover the most appropriate construction technique to prevent further subsidence and for the repair of damages already existing. A study was therefore required to address this problem. 1.2 The subsidence study to be carried out by an appropriate consultant would include the following areas. i) The history of the subsidence problem. - ii) A review of documentation such as construction plans, and surveys. iii) Site investigation and surveys. iv) Major findings which would recommend alternative methods that are also cost effective. (The armorlayer investigation was carried out as a result of the findings in this study).  Annex III -40- Page 13 of 22 1.3 The Bank agreed with the sub-project idea but felt that it was necessary for the borrower to spell out in more detail the tasks of the consultants and the services to be provided by them as well as services to be provided by the Port Authority. These adjustments were made to the TORs and the Government identified four consultants that could carry out the study, in March 1981. In April 1981 sector officials of the Bank advised the Planning Ministry on appropriate criteria that should be used to determine the most qualified consultant to undertake the task. IDA guidelines were also transmitted to the Ministry for this purpose. In August 1981, the Proposal Review Committee selected a firm to undertake the study and. IDA agreed with the selection. 1.5 In July 1983, two joint inspections of the breakwater were made by the consultants with the Somali Ports Authority, and by a letter of  Annex III Page 14 of 22 - 41 - Sub-Project No.6 Title: Quelea Bird Surveys. Phases I, II, III, IV Government Agency Involved: Ministry of Agricultn.e Consultant Contract Signed: Phases I (March 13, 1982), II (October 23, 1982), III (June 19, 1983), IV (July 1984) Projects Completed: Phases I (June/July 1982), II (January 1983), III (August 1983), IV (July 1984) Project Cost: US$432,586.23 Follow-up Investment: Not designed for follow-up investment Background/Objectives 1.1 Because of mass-scale destructioc of cereals by Quelea birds (one of the most destructive pests in Somalia) and the very limited success of Somali authorities in controlling or eliminating them, the Government of Somalia decided to use aerial surveys of Quelea bird breeding grounds in order to destroy them before every crop season. The lack of good roads and inaccessibility to areas infested by the birds, particularly during the rainy season, made it impossible for ground survey teams to locate Quellea bird breeding grounds and destroy them before the birds could cause heavy losses to cereal crops. Hence aerial surveys by helicopter was identified as the most effectove way to locate the breeding grounds speedily. 1.2 The objectives of the sub-project were two fold; a) Study of Quelea migration, nesting and breeding habits for the purposes of designing improved methods of bird population control. b) Improved crop protection in the country through improved techniques for the control of Quelea damage to crops and to advise and train if concerned officials on these techniques. 1.3 The Bank expressed reservations about the project from the very Inception. It communicated to the Technical Department in February 1981 that the Bank anticipated a) insurmountable logistical hurdles in utilizing a helicopter effectively in rural areas and b) that the data gathered would be more sophisticated than could be made use of in the present state of communication, technology, data processing and dissemination of technical information in Somalia. The Bank therefore suggested recourse to more traditional methods of collecting data and information with maximum use of the local population.  Annex III - 42 - Page 15 of 22 1.4 A very convincing response was offered in April 1981 by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture as to the efficiency of the helicopter surveys in controlling Quelea birds, and he cited in support the ongoing FAO/UNDP Quelea research program as well as the successful programs carried out in the neighboring countries of Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Somalia according to him was the only country not using this system despite serious crop damage. IDA accepted this explanation but requested the information cited by the Deputy Minister and also recommended that the survey methods be linked to a control strategy that involved field personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture. Meanwhile the TORs for the survey had already been released before IDA authorization. 1.5 Once positive informaton was received fror the FAO and the successful programs carried out in Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia, IDA agreed to the surveys, but emphasized that funds be used only for the survey and not for spraying. IDA also requested the submission of an acceptable program on how the results of the survey would be used for control purposes; and also how the government intended to mobilize the local population and ground personnel of the plant protection unit and involve them in the program. Finally the IDA required assurances from the Government that there would be an adequate supply of fuel for the operation. 1.6 The Ministry of Agriculture gave them assurances and the Technical Department made the appropriate adjustments in the Terms of Reference in July 1981 incorporating the changes requested by IDA. 1.7 Further delays were experienced because of a lack of coordination on the details of the study; IDA wanted nation-wide surveys as opposed to selected areas, and when the Ministry of Agriculture accomodated this request with an increase in the budget, IDA sought clarification. After these misunderstandings were cleared IDA approved the contract which had alredy been signed between the Ministry and a contractor with a warning that IDA authorization should have been obtained before signing the contract. The contract was signed only on March 13, 1982. Implementation 1.8 Once the contract was signed, the survey (Phase I) was carried out effectively. A draft contract agreement for Phase-II for November '82-January'83 survey was signed and submitted in October 1982. IDA had no objection to the contract but suggested that the contractor prepare a complete technical report on the findings of both phases of the survey, and submit it to IDA, as soon as it was completed. This Phase II was also implemented. 1.9 Upon completion of Phase I, the Ministry of Agriculture submitted a report summarizing the findings of this phase. The report indicated that the helicopter work had substantially improved the efficiency of the Somali bird control program. It had enabled the aerial spraying of breeding areas and thus the destruction of Quelea breeding had been successfully carried out before extensive damage to crops could result.  Annex III Page 16 of 22 - 43 - 1.10 Amidst delays relating to payment of the contractors the Ministry of Agriculture requested 200-250 helicopters flying hours for June-September 1983, and November '83-January '84. In March 1983, the contractor submitted a technical report on Phases I and II that reiterated the conclusions of the Ministry of Agriculture. In April 1983, IDA authorized the June-September'83 (Phase III) survey, and requested a preliminary report detailing results, cost efficiency, impact and suitability of alternative control and survey methods. IDA stated further that the decision to finance the November 1983-January 1984 survey would be based on this Phase III. The contract was signed in June 1983 for phase III, and this phase was also implemented. Consequently, a further request was made by the Ministry of Agriculture in November 1983 for continuation of the program through phase IV for about 70 flying hours. IDA initially approved the request, but noted that since little was known about past performance, the ministry should discuss with the Director General of Planning and the regional mission how best Lo monitor the progress of the project. At this point, the Director General too concurred with IDA's views that the Ministry of Planning had not received any reports explaining the usefulness of the surveys of the previous three seasons. Since substantial funds had already been spent in the Quelea programs, the Director General proposed that the programs be suspended until the usefulness of the previous phases had been established. Further attempts were made to rekindle interest in the surveys due te pressure from Ministry of Agriculture. Finally, in July 1984, IDA agreed to allocate US$48,000 for the July-September 1984 season (Phase IV), subject to review of quotations and the draft contract. The contract was duly signed and the survey was carried out. Evaluation 1.11 The early delays for the start up of this sub-project were due to two reasons. First, IDA questioned its feasibility and was convinced of it only after acquiring expert informaton from outside sources. Second the Terms of Reference also had to be clarified. It appeared from the inception that the Bank had no rasident expertise on the subject and was hesitant to fund the various phases during each season. 1.12 By its very nature implementation of the sub-project was time consuming because of the seasonal application of the surveys. While the Bank did complain about the lack of reviews of the comleted surveys, it was apparent that some impact had been made since the Ministry of Agriculture forcefully sought funds from the Credit for surveys every season. 1.13 The sub-project during its latter stages reflected a lack of coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Agriculture, which communicated directly with IDA during pre-survey negotiations. The Ministry of Planning was for the most part left out of the process. When the Ministry of Planning, therefore, recommended a suspension of the surveys in November 1983, it not only indicated a lack of coordination and cooperation between the two ministries  Annex III - 44 - Page 17 of 22 but also indicated a lack of priority that was attached to the sub-project by the Planning Ministry, which itself had proposed the sub-project in the first place in November 1980. 1.14 There is no evidence that a formal project on Quelea control had emerged out of the surveys. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that the surveys were productive in aiding local ccntrolling activities that were simultaneously carried out.  AuneS 11. Page 18 of 22 - 45 - Sub-Project No. 7 Title: Agriculture Inputs Survey Project Approval By the Technical Department: December 27, 1981 Government Agency: Ministry of Agriculture Consultant Contract Signed: February 21, 1983 Project Completed: December 1983 Project Cost: US$252,000 Background/Objectives 1.1 This particular sub-project was orginally conceived as two separate studies: i) Agriculture Input Supply and Services and; ii) Study and upgrading of the performance of the agriculture cooperatives. The objective of the first study was aimed at the improvement of the capacity and quality of services rendered by the Farm Machinery and Agricultural Services Organization (ONAT) so that this organization could better serve the interests of the agriculture industry throughout the country. The method of achieving this goal was in the consolidation of ONAT to provide substantial amounts of agricultural machinery and implements, adequate supplies of spare parts and agricultural materials, improvement of means of transport available to ONAT, establishment of workshops, offices and stores and technical training of staff. The objective of the second study was aimed at gauging the performance of the agricultural cooperatives in the country and identify the constraints affecting their performance. The study would recommend ways for better organization and modernization of agricultural production in the country so that farmers would benefit from the advantages associated with large-scale enterprises for the production and marketing of farm inputs, the provision of credit and extension service and the use of heavy farm machinery and equipment, farm income would increase, and there would be more efficient utilization of agricultural resources. These two sub-projects were combined to constitute a single study upon the recommendations of IDA. 1.2 Upon examination of the separate TORs, IDA, in February 1982, endorsed the need for a comprehensive study for Agricultural Input Supply. IDA, however, suggested that the study should address fundamental strategies/issues affecting the concerned services in general, and the needs of various projects, currently being implemented in Somalia, including Agricultural Extension, the Bay Region and the North-West Agriculture development projects. IDA suggested further that it would  Annex III -46- Page 19 of 22 be prudent at this stage to design a study which would identify choices and alternatives as to how the servlces could be delivered to the farming communities. IDA recommended in the circumstances that thie TORs should be combined and comprehensive TOR be prepared to address the status of these services in the country, the role of the private sector, the needs of various projects and zones and the suitability of alternative choices e.g. to strengthen existing or establish new servfces in the foreseeable future. IDA thereafter referred the Ministry of Planning, to the Regional Mission in Nairobi regarding the implementation of the sub-project. 1.3 The draft comprehensive TOR (combining both studies) were submitted to IDA in July 1982, after delays that occurred due to the confusion of coordination between the Borrower, Bank Headquarters and the Regional Mission. The main objective of the revised TOR was to formulate and evaluate alternative proposals for improving the supply and distribution of agricutlural inputs, tools, machinery, equipment and spare parts, and veterinary and livestock supplies needed at the farm level. A comprehensive breakdown of terms of reference was also included for the prospective consultant. The study envisioned a nation-wide approach but required analyses and proposals to focus on Somalia's most productive agricultural regions. In this regard the work outline recommended the inclusion of analysis into the following areas: a) Farm machinery and implements; b) Agricultural and veterinary supplies and materials; and c) The organization and management of existing services. Part II of the study was to address prices, logistics, institutional and policy questions, financial issues, including the options available and outlines of and terms of reference for feasibility studies to be carried out prior to making investment decisions. 1.4 In July 1982, IDA assisted at the request of the Government of Somalia by supplying a possible list of consultants that could undertake the study. But there were considerable delays in hirng the appropriate consultant and it was not until December 1982 that a firm was selected by the Technical Department to undertake the study. IDA concurred with the decision and permitted the Technical Department to negotiate with the selected firm. In February 1983, the contract was finally signed. Implementation 1.5 Minor delays were experienced by the consultants in initiating the project because of the delayed appointment of the livestock specialist to the team. However, the study was started in March/April 1983, and an interim report entitled, Agricultural Inputs and Services Study was submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and IDA for their review in June 1983. A draft final report was submitted in December 1983.  Annex III Page 20 of 22 -47- 1.6 The findings of the consultants generated a number of important issues, among which the main one was the suggestion that agricultural inputs had declined sharply in Somalia. This was attributed primarily to the lack of foreign exchange. This suggestion was seriously qustioned in November 1983 by Bank staff who felt that reduced imports of Inputs did not indicate a shortage of these inputs in Somalia, since there was evidence of considerable mismanagement, underutilization of existing supplies, inefficiencies in input marketing and distribution. 1.7 This issue was considered to be of major concern because if the conclusions of the consultant could be affirmed it would support the case for the Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (ARP) largely to finance import of inputs, which IDA was considering. If, however, the conclusions could not be confirmed, then the ARP would have to be seriously reconsidered. In order to resolve this issue a special mission was sent to Somalia. Among the many recommendations made by the mission, it was suggested that there was a need for selective input support, but that before a project could be considered a more detailed study would be needed of specific input requirements. It was pointed out in this context that the consultant's projections had short-comings because they were based on government estimates and not on detailed field studies of input requirements. 1.8 The final report was to be further reviewed by a Somali/IDA meeting and an Agriculture Sector Review Mission. Considerable debate, however, was stimulated within Bank ss:aff and regional staff in relation to the exact scope of a future agriculture inputs project in Somalia. It appears finally that the Agriculture Rehabilitation Project did not materialize. Instead the findings of the consultant on agriculture inputs and related issues have been incorporated in the Somalia Agriculture Sector Review, which was recently concluded. Evaluation 1.9 Pre-implementation problems again related to agreement on TOR. In this case two separate TOR were reformulated into one. This of course resulted in delays. Further delays were also experienced because of communication and coordination problems between the borrower, IDA Headquarters and the Regional Mission that was entrusted with the general supervision of the sub-project. 2.0 While it was agreed that the consultant's report had a few shortcomings, and a lack of in-depth analyses in certain areas, it was agreed nevertheless that the report did help to identify important factors that initially contributed to a project idea (Agriculture Rehabilitation Project) and then towards the Agriculture Sector Review of Somalia (1986).  Annex III Page 21 of 22 - 48 - Sub-Project No.8 Title: Juba Valley Interim Storage Pre-Feasibility Study Government Agency Involved: Ministry of Juba Valley Development Consultant Contract Signed: September 26, 1984 Project Completed: September 1985 Project Cost: US$191,590.47 Follow-up Investment: The study found that an Interim Storage Project in the Juba Valley would not be economically viable. Background/Objectives 1.1 This sub-project was also generated unconventionally, and was a result of a Bank mission to Somalia in April/May 1983, to review the Juba Valley Development Program. One of the missions findings was that, due to existing and projected water shortages in the Juba Valley during the dry season, and the time that it would take for the proposed Bardhere Dam to come on stream, even under the most optimistic assumptions, there was an urgent need to consider an initial interim storage project in the Juba River. The government reluctantly agreed to the mission's recommendation as part of a general agreement about the approach to the Bardhere Dam project reached with the donor community during a meeting of the Consultati%e Group for Somalia in October, 1983. 1.2 The objective of the sub-project was to execute a prcfeasibility study for an Interim Storage Project in the Juba Valley. The Bank prepared and agreed with the Government (primarily the Ministry of Juba Valley Development) the terms of reference and a shortlist of consulting firms; the contract with a consultant firm was signed in September 1984. Although IDA does not appear to have reviewed the contract before signature it did not object and confirmed that the study could be financed out of the Credit. Implementation 1.3 The study got underway immediately, but problems arose with respect to disbursements because of what appears to have been poor communications between the Ministry of National Planning and the Ministry of Juba Valley Development. The Somali Ministry of National Planning lodged a protest with IDA stating that they were surprised to receive a disbursement request out of a credit without prior knowledge of the contract. The Ministry wanted all projects under the Credit to be in accordance with agreed procedure. 1.4 The interim report of the consultants stated that one of the options was the building of off-stream reservoir but the final report did not provide adequate grounds for an Interim Storage Project in the Juba Valley.  Annex III Page 22 of 22 - 49 - Evaluation 1.5 - Given that the study was, in a sense, a condition laid down by the donor community for their further consideration of the Bardhere Dam project, which was and Is c';nsidered by the Somali Government as the corner stone of their development strategy, and was therefore urgent, the Government showed good faith in carrying out the study. Against this background, it is not surprising that there was less complete coordination and cooperation among operational ministries. Ultimately the findings of the study vindicated the Government's position that the Bardhere Dam project is the only viable solution for the development of the Juba Valley.