Argentina - Economic Recovery and growth trade

 66409 Department Discussion Paper All.GENTIRA: ECONOMIC RECOVEllY AND CllOwm 'l'IADE (Background Paper 3) December 1987 Latin .America and the Caribbean Country Operations Department IV Discussion Papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They present preltminary and unpolished results of country analysis or research that is circulated to encourage discussion and comment; citation and the use of such a paper should take account of its provisional character. The findings. interpretations. and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank. to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.  GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS MCRE Asociacion Argentina de Con­ Argentine Association of sorcios Nacionales de Expe­ Regional Experimental Con­ rimentacion Agricola sortia ADMIRA Asociacion Metalurgica Argentina Argentine Metallurgy Association ANA Administracion Nacional de National Customs Administra­ Aduanas tion BAHADE Banco Nacional de Desarrollo National Development Bank BCRA Banco Central de la Republica Central Bank of Argentina Argentina BONAVI Bonos Nacionales de Intereses variable interest rate bonds Variables BONE X Bonos Externos foreign bonds (US dollar­ denominated Government bonds) CEM Country Economic Memorandum CEN Corporacion de Empresas Corporation of National Nacionales Enterprises CEPAL Comision Economica para Economic Commission for Latinoamerica Latin America (ECLA) CD Certificado de Deposito certificate of deposit CGIAR/CGR Consultative Group on Inter­ national Agricultural Research CGT Confederacion General de Trabajo General Confederation of Workers CKD completely knocked down CONADE Consejo Nacional de National Development Desarrollo Council CPI consumer price index CRM Cuenta de Regulacion Monetaria Monetary Regulation Account (Interest Equalization Fund) DGI Direccion General Impositiva General Tax Directorate DIF Deposit Insurance Fund DJAT Declaracion Jurada de temporary admission import Admision Temporaria request DmI Declaracion Jurada de import permit Necesidades de Importacion DNPC Direccion Nacional de National Directorate of Promocion Comercial Commercial Promotion FIEL Fundacion de Investigaciones Latin American Foundation Economicas Latinoamericanas for Economic Research FONAVI Fondo Nacional de Vivienda National Housing Fund FUNDECO Fundacion Economica Economic Foundation GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP gross domestic product GDFI gross domestic fixed investment • IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDB Inter-American Development Bank IFS International Financial Statistics IICA Instituto Interamericano de Inter-American Institute tor Cooperacion Agricola Agricultural Cooperation IMP International Monetary Fund INDEC Instituto Nacional de National Institute for Stat­ Estadistica y Censo istics and Census IHPE Institute Nacional de National Economic Planning Planeamiento Economico Institute INTA Instituto Nacional de National Institute for Agri­ Tecnologia Agropecuaria cultural Technology IVA Impuesto de Valor Agregado value-added tax JNC Junta Nacional de Carnes National Keat Board JNG Junta Nacional de Granos National Grain Board LIBOR London Interbank Offer Rate M&LT medium and long term MCBA Kunicipalidad de la Ciudad de Municipality of the City Buenos Aires of Buenos Aires NADE Nomenclatura Arancelaria de Customs Classification for Exportacion Exports NFS nonfactor services PAN Programa Alimentario Nacional National Food Program PEA Poblacion Economicamente Activa economically active population PRESEX Programas Especiales de Special Export Program (PEX) Exportacion RER real exchange rate BEER real effective exchange rate SIC Standard Industrial Classification SICE Secretaria de Industria y Secretariat of Industry Comercio Exterior and Foreign Trade SIGEP Sindicatura General de General Comptroller of Eapresas Publicas Public Enterprises SITC Standard Industrial . Trade Classification SKD semi-knocked down SKI small and medium-size industry SNESR Servicio Nacional de Economia National lural Economic y Sociologia Rural and Sociological Service TAR Temporary Admission Regime trade policy VA value added VAT value-added tax VNA Valores Nacionales Ajustables indexed national bonds WI wholesale price index YPF Yacimientos Petroliferos state oil company Fiscales  PREFACE This is Background Paper 3 of a series of working notes proposed in conjunction with the Economic Recovery and Growth exercise. There were many contributors. These include the following members of the mission that visited Argentina in April 1986: F. Desmond McCarthy (Mission Chief) Constantino Lluch (Labor/Em~loyment) Claudio Frischtak (Industry) William Tyler (Trade) Alberto Verme (Consultant - Private Investment) Thomas Boyatt (Consultant - Export Marketing) Javier Gonzalez-Fraga (Consultant - Monetary) Maria Claudia Franco (Research Assistant) Harutaka Hamaguchi (Young Professional) Papers were also contributed by Professors M. Connelly, R. Dornbusch, and L. Taylor. The principal counterpart in Argentina was Mr. A. Canitrot, Secretary of Economic Coordination. Since these are working notes they often reflect intermediate stages of thinking before the final report was published. As such they were not subject to rigorous review procedures of the World Bank or the Government of Argentina. I would like to thank Ms. Milagros A. Divino for preparing the draft and processing the report through to publication.  Contents Page No. I. Export Marketing • • • • • • • eo. • • • • • • • • e • • II. Trade and the Trade Policy Environment • • • 0 • • • • • • 15 III. Special Purpose Export Finance Facility • • • • eo. • •• 46  I. EXPORT MARKETING 1.1 This section considers the viability of an export-led growth strategy for Argentina. Can Argentina improve its growth prospects by selling significantly more products in the world market? If so, what products, how can they be marketed, and what can the Government do to facilitate this process? 1.2 It will take more than fiscal incentives and a favorable exchange rate to significantly boost Argentine exports. Many products will need an improvement in overall marketing strategy. This section identifies some approaches that may be helpful. Argentina's Current Export System 1.3 "Outward-Looking vs. Inward-Looking." The major obstacle to an export-led growth strategy in Argentina is the nation's closed economy and desire for economic self-sufficiency. For the last few decades, the Government has taxed exports such as beef and grain in order to generate revenue for infrastructure, military hardware, and state industrial enterprises. Economic policy-makers have built an import-substitutj around Argentina that keeps imports out to protect Argentine manufacturers. For generations, the essence of Argentine trad~ been that if a product is made or can be made in Argentina, J import equivalent out.  - 2 ­ 1.4 These protectionist policies have led to the creation of large and powerful groups with a vested interest in the inward-looking status quoo These groups include industrialists, trade unions, the militar,y, and large government bureaucracies involved in state enterprises. The entire complex is infused with an emotional nationalism that militates againat change. 1.5 The above factors will enormously complicate the Argentine decision-making process as the nation tries to open the economy and move toward an export-led growth strategy. Not only does it seem desirable to open the economy to a freer trade regime, but the whole Argentine way of doing business needs an infusion of fresh ideas. 1.6 The Import System. Argentina's import system is extremely rigid. The policy of prohibiting imports of products that can be made in Argentina dooms export industries to using high-cost, often low-quality inputs manufactured in Argentina. One example will suffice. Argentina's fishing industr,y currently exports about US$150 million annually. These exports could be quadrupled if the fishing industr,y were allowed to import state-of-the-art nets and machinery. Because fish nets and associated machiner,y are made in Argentina, the Argentine fishing industr,y is using out-of-date, high-cost 6quipment, and the countr,y is paying an obvious price. 1.7 Exchange Rates. Argentina's exchange rate has long been erratic and overvalued. In his study, Argentina y Brasil: Dos Estrategias Para La  - 3 - Exportacion, Elvio Baldinelli of the Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas demonstrated the relative stability of Brazil's exchange rates compared to the wild gyrations of Argentina's. He identified this difference as one of the main reasons for the poor pe~formance of Argentine exporters compared to their Brazilian counterparts. 1.8 Gove~ent Export Regimes. The Argentine Government has long provided a variety of fiscal, financial and institutional incentives to stimulate exports. These measures have changed frequently, and have often been flawed in implementation. The Government's recently announced PEX program provides special benefits equal to 15% (plus 5% for new markets) of the f.o.b. value of exports for firms committing themselves to expand exports by a minimum of US$2 million per year. Many other incentives have accumulated over the years, but their implementation has been uneven. 1.9 Marketing Structure and Approach. Typically, the Argentine industrial manufacturer produces goods for a protected local market. When domestic demand declines and producers have excess capacity, they try to sell products manufactured for the Argentine market in external markets about which they often have little or no knowledge. In general, potential Argentine exporters are product-driven rather than market-driven. Problems and Bottlenecks in Argentina's Export System 1.10 Major Problem Areas. Among more than 50 Argentine businessmen with whom the export system was discussed for this analysiS, there was  - 4 ­ virtual unanimity on three major problem areas: (a) The rules of the game for exports must be stabilized. Exchange rate fluctuations have already been noted. In addition, fiscal and financial punishments (export taxes) and rewards (rebates, drawbacks, subsidized financing, etc.) of the export system have changed significantly with every government and almost with every Minister of Economy. For instance, the marketing director of an important home products company said that from 1982 to 1986, governmental regulations for his product varied between a 15% export tax and an 11% rebate. This erratic regulatory policy made pricing his product grotesquely complicated, and the resulting wild pricing swings meant the loss of export customers for his company and a bad reputation for Argentina. Recommendation. Argentine creditors are considering major policy-based lending operations. President Alfonsin has already publicly stressed the need for stabilit,y in the trade system. The lending operations under consideration could provide a vehicle to allow Government officials to put in place a sound and stable export system. (b) The Government's role in the export system must be reduced. B.y Presidential Decree of Dec. 6, 1985, the Government decided to facilitate the paperwork required for exports by concentrating all export license approvals in a single office, the ventanilla unica. Approximately 25 separate bureaucracies were affected,  - 5 ­ and each resisted the decree. At the end of 1986, the issue was still in doubt. Two examples illustrate the problems caused by Argentina's excess bureaucracy. (i) Bureaucracy in the Export Field (Paperwork). The second stage of Plan Austral employs export credits and subsidies to promote Argentina's export performance. But for an exporter to obtain these benefits, his application must go through the following 29 steps: 1. Submit application to the National Directorate for Commercial Promotion; 2. Possible requests for further information by Directorate; 3. Opening of a case file, analysis and evaluation; 4. Preliminary report by Directorate; 5. Report is submitted to the weekly meeting of the subcommittee of the National Fund for Export Promotion of the Advisory Council on Foreign Trade for its op~n~on. Report is considered in the first or second weekly meeting; 6. For loans, information must be provided to the Banco de la Nacion, which then has 25 days to analyze the net worth and financial situation of the applicant; 7. With steps (4), (5), and (6) completed, the Commission of the National Fund for Export Promotion meets and examines the application, which is then approved and signed by the National Directors for Trade Promotion and Exports and by the Undersecretary for Foreign Trade; 8. A draft resolution is prepared; 9. Funds are allotted and registered; 10. Formal processing and submission of draft resolution;  - 6 ­ 11. National Director for Trade Promotion initials the draft resolution; 12. Draft resolution is sent to the Undersecretary for Foreign Trade under cover of memorandum; 13. Review and initialing by Undersecretary; 14. Resolution is signed by the Secretary for Foreign Trade; 15. A new case file is opened with the resolution, and applicant is notified; 16. Resolution is processed, registered and distributed; 17. Resolution is passed to official accounting office; 18. Treasury receives the resolution and may ask for further information; 19. Preparation of Loan/Subsidy Agreement, signature by applicant; 20. Signature of agreement by the Secretary of Foreign Trade; 21. Signed agreement is added to the new (i.e., second) case file; 22. File passes through accounting and allotment procedures; 23. File returns to official accounting office for final control; 24. File is passed to Treasury, where in the case of subsidies, a check is registered and issued. In the case of a loan, the authorization is passed to the Banco de la Nacion for disbursement; 25. In the case of loans, if the amount exceeds the maximum authorized for issuance based solely on the applicant's signature, mortgages or the pledging of other collateral must be prepared, processed and signed; 26. Disbursement of funds; 27. Preparation of accounts by recipient; 28. Presentation of accounts to the Directorate; 29. Final approval of the case file.  - 7 ­ The New Export Promotion Scheme. (ii) The 15% benefit enacted for exports requires the candidate exporter to file an application composed of 11 forms, plus various annexes and supporting documents amounting to 25 pages. The application (see Attachment 1) is complicated s and was strongly and unanimously criticized by the businessmen interviewed for this analysis. In fact, the complexities of the application have intimidated small firms that lack the expertise to complete the forms, effectively preventing them from applying. Large companies that do have the necessary expertise are furious at the time and expense required to complete the application. Recommendation. The Government should obtain consulting assistance to help streamline the implementation of its export promotion policies and programs. Clearly, the emphasis should be on a minimized and simplified role for the Government. Government should aim for a one-page application that requires only a list of the new products (along with volumes and values), plus a coherent plan of how the company intends to proceed. (c) The Port of Buenos Aires should be rationalized. Since much of Argentina's exports flow through the Port of Buenos Aires, facilities there must be improved. The Port is now one of the more expensive in the world. Port costs at Montevideo--just across the river--are estimated to be one-fifth of those at  - 8 ­ Buenos Aires. Yokohama, Bremen, and New York are all significant~ cheaper, as well. . Modern trade patterns strongly suggest that an integrated roll-on/roll-off facility is essential. Recommendation. An assessment is needed to determine how to make the Port of Buenos Aires cheaper and more efficient. Roll-on/roll-off container facilities should be expanded. Consideration should be given to financing alternative ports and fully containerized operations to meet medium- and longer-term needs. Specific Problems and Bottlenecks 1.11 In addition to the problem areas discussed above, Argentine businessmen also mentioned the following obstacles to improved exports: (a) The Exchange Rate. A number of studies have emphasized the importance of a realistic exchange rate for exporters. A realistic rate could be established through a wide variety of trade and foreign exchange regimes.~/ Recommendation. The Government should be encouraged to articulate its exchange rate policy as clearly as possible to 1/ See Rhee, Y.W., "A Framework for Export Policies and Administration: Lessons from the East Asian Experience". Series on Industry and Finance, Vol. 10, World Bank, 1984.  - 9 ­ reduce uncertainty. This would be a positive step towards stabilizing the rules of the game. (b) The Import System. Argentina's import system is one of the most restrictive in the world and needs to be substantially liberalized. If Argentina is to have a successful export-led economic policy, exporters must have access to imported raw materials, intermediate inputs such as machinery, technical advice, and capital goods that generate value-added exports. Recommendation. The Government should establish automatic import licenses to allow exporters to bring in the raw materials, intermediate materials and machinery they need to manufacture products for export (the fishing industry is a case in point). Ideally, these imported goods should have a duty exemption, but in any case, they should be obtainable competitively with a drawback system. Import regimes of this nature were critical in the establishment of successful export-led growth in East Asia. (c) Governmental Export Promotion Policies. Government export­ promotion programs often fail because they are inefficient and corrupt, or because they are so obviously a disguised subsidy that they are attacked by the importing country. In the East Asian experience, a system of pre-export financing based on the  - 10 ­ export letter of credit with an automatic rediscounting mechanism was most effectiveo This system avoids the problem of checking quantities. In any case, any export promotion system should be automatic (the benefits are automatic and not dependent upon the benevolence of a bureaucrat), universal (all exporters have access), and administratively straightforward (procedures are simple ). Recommendation. The Government should gradually eliminate export taxes, rebate indirect taxes on exports (GATT-acceptable), and establish a pre-export financing system that meets the criteria discussed above. (d) Marketing Orientation and Activity. Given the monopolistic/ oligopolistic nature of many Argentine manufacturers, the typical Argentine industrialist has concentrated on production rather than marketing. As in all such market-protected situations, the result is products that are often below world quality standards and above world price levels. This production orientation should be changed. If Argentina is to compete in international markets, and iLdeed depend upon exports to advance economic growth, the nation must develop products that meet or exceed international quality standards at or below international price levels. The beginning of this process is to understand that product development must be driven by what the international consumer desires and expects. This  - 11 ­ will be a dramatic change in orientation for most Argentine manufacturers and processors, and it will require a knowledge of consumer preferences in major international markets--at least those in North America and Europe. Obtaining such knowledge is expensive and difficult, and this is an area where the Government could contribute significantly. As an illustrative example of the need to understand foreign markets, there is the case of an Argentine manufacturer of tt ceramic tile. "Company X decided to sell its products in the US market, beginning with the New York metropolitan area. Having made this decision, Company X did not simply try to market products already being produced for the Argentine market. Instead, the company spent several hundred thousand dollars analyzing the needs and quality expectations of the North American market. Company X learned a series of very important facts about the market, the ignorance of anyone of which would have doomed the exporter to failure. First, Company X learned that North American consumers wanted a totally different color range than those in Argentina. By testing the market, the company learned which colors to use and changed its ink coloring capability. Second, the company learned that to sell basic tile in the US, a manufacturer had to supply an ancillary range of accessories (flat facings, curved facings, etc.). And third, Company X discovered that the moisture content of tiles for the US market would have to be significantly lower than for the Argentine market due to the greater extremes in temperature in  • - 12 ­ the US. These details graphically illustrate the fundamental point that export success requires an intimate knowledge of the markets the candidate exporter wants to penetrate. This is an area of weakness in Argentina that could be strengthened by consultant 8dsistance. 1.12 Many of the foregoing recommendations require the Government to change current policies, alter current programs, and/or dramatically change the bureaucratic status quo. No one should underestimate the political sensitivity and difficulty of such tasks. The highest degree of tact and diplomacy will be necessary to effect some of these changes. The changes are, however, critical to the success of an export-driven growth strategy. An Export Action Program 1.13 In addition to recommendations involving existing policies, several new programs could facilitate an export-led growth strategy for Argentina. These include the following: (a) Fund and organize a basic export survey. In a number of countries, lenders provide loan packages that include a small component to lund surveys of local economies and local companies to determine export potential. But undertaking such surveys after loans are approved is putting the cart before the horse. A consulting group composed of active exporters should be sent to Argentina to survey the country's productive capacity and recommend which sectors have significant export potential.  - 13 ­ (b) Fund and organize sectoral export analyses. Once an initial review has established the broad outlines of export potential, individual companies in established export sectors should be surveyed to determine which have export potential, and what they need to do to realize this potential. This technical assistance, which again should be provided by experienced exporters, is critical to the overall success of the program, and it is an area where an agency such as the World Bank can make a direct and immediate contribution. (c) Establish and administer a revolving fund for loans to Argentine exporters for market information and developmental activity in targeted export markets. To avoid adding yet another government bureaucracy to Argentina's export system, this fund should be administered by an independent agency, preferably under the aegis of an external, non-Governmental entity. As the case of Company X demonstrates, market studies and other developmental activity will be the crucial first step in increasing exports. (d) Rationalized countertrade regulations. Argentina's current countertrade system is confused. It is not clear whether the Ministr,r of Commerce or the Central Bank is in charge. Argentina needs a functioning countertrade system to compete with neighbors like Brazil. It would be useful for a consultant to analyze the situation and recommend how to improve it. (e) Prevent the establishment of a Government trading company. Currently, YFF, the state oil company, has an affiliated trading  - 14 ­ company for goods and services connected to the petroleum industry. Any proposal that the Government organize a government-owned and operated trading company should be examined closely. An official Argentine trading company would inject politics and bureaucracy further into the export system, and would compete unfairly with private sector trading companies. It would also cost taxpayers money, and would generally complicate a scene that is already complicated enough. At a time when international financial institutions are recommending the privatization of government commercial enterprises to reduce Argentina's fiscal deficit, it is not prudent to establish yet another governmental commercial enterprise.  - 15 ­ II. TRADE AND THE TRADE POLICY ENVIRONMENT Export Performance 2.1 Argentina's export performance was poor during the early to mid-1980s. During the 1970s, exports rose from US$1.8 billion (1970) to US$7.8 billion (1979), while imports climbed from US$1.7 billion (1970) to US$6.7 billion (1979). During the import splurge of 1980 and 1981, import levels were US$10.5 and US$9.4 billion, respectively. By 1985, imports had been compressed to US$3.8 billion, while exports totaled US$8.4 billion. The trade surplus necessary to help service the external debt under the deteriorated international commercial bank lending environment has been generated not through export expansion, but instead through import reduction which was produced mainly by income contraction and import restrictions. In fact, as indicated in Table 1, exports have stagnated. When adjustment is made for US dollar inflation, the deterioration in exports is even more dramatic. Industrial exports have paralleled the overall poor export performance. Despite significant growth until the late 1970s, in the early 1980s industrial exports began a period of decline. Exports continue to be marginal for virtually all manufacturing firms; at the end of 1986, exports accounted for less than 10% of industrial output. 2.2 There are several reasons for the stagnation of Argentine exports, among them a precipitous drop in world market prices for Argentina's major export commodities. Between 1981 and 1985 the real declines in international prices for soybeans, sorghum, wheat, and corn  - 16 ­ were 25%, 32%, 46%, and 24%, respectively. These four commodities account for over one-third of Argentina's exports. Table 1: EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUPS, SELECTED YEARS, 1970-85 (US$ milli ons ) Primary Agro-based Industrial Total Year Products Products Products Exports 1970 683 877 205 1,773 1975 1 ,436 878 628 2,961 1980 3,194 2,951 1,788 8,021 1981 4,162 2.886 2,091 9,143 1982 3,033 2,487 2,106 7,624 1983 3,810 2,639 1 ,386 7,836 1984 3,771 2,868 1,468 8,107 1985 /a 3,684 2,492 2,220 8,396 /a Preliminary estimates. Source: INDEC, Secretaria de Comercio, and BCRA. 2.3 On the domestic front there are a number of problems.~ First, the highly unstable macroeconomic policy environment has imposed additional risks on exporters. For example, the erratic nature of Argentine exchange 31 An exploratory econometric analysis was undertaken using quarterly data for the period 1970-85 to examine the determinants of Argentine industrial exports. Ordinary least squares were used to estimate an export supply function for industrial products. The analysis provided evidence suggesting that: (a) the temporary admissions scheme for export production was significant in expanding exports; and (b) poor domestic demand conditions have encouraged producers to seek out export markets. The exchange rate variable was not statistically significant. There are several possible explanations for this, including an inappropriate implicit specification of the lag structure, unevenness of exchange rate expectations, and the failure of the analysis to incorporate export subsidy information into the effective exchange rate variable.  - 17 ­ rate policy has convinced producers that export activity and investment for export production are highly and inherently risky.3/ Overall, there seem to be no clearly defined rules of the game regarding economic policies in general, and export policies in particular. This lack of policy definition has resulted in very high uncertainty for economic actors, and has in turn impeded export growth. 4 / 2.4 Second, the economic policies pursued by the Government discriminate against export activity. Problems for exporters include the exchange rate policy, the trade policy regime, and even the special export incentive programs intended to offset the discrimination against other economic policies. Without policy changes to reduce such discrimination, sustained export growth, particularly of manufactured products, is unlikely to occur. Many producers see current government policies as evidence of a lack of serious commitment on the part of the Government to expand exports. Exchange Rate Policy 2.5 The exchange rate constitutes one of the most important prices in an economy such as Argentina's. It represents the relative price of tradeable goods versus non-tradeables, and a real currency depreciation For a discussion of this policy instability, see Julio J. Nogues, "The Nature of Argentina's Policy Reforms during 1976-81 If, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 765, January 1986. A common sentiment expressed by the managers of industrial firms is the negative impact of policy instability on their firms' exports. One manager of a large manufactured product exporting firm stressed that the most important thing the government could do would be to establish stable and uniformly applied rules of the game.  - 18 ­ signifies an increase in the relative prices of tradables, including both exportable and import-competing products. Structural adjustment of an economy to less attractive international economic circumstances, along with their concomitant balance of payments difficulties, generallY involves such an increase in the relative price of tradables. 2.6 The exchange rate ranks high in importance as a policy instrument for the promotion of exports. The level of the exchange rate not only determines the competitiveness of exports, but also gives producers the simplest and clearest signal of the gains to be made through exporting. Other policy measures, such as export subsidies, are less immediate in their appeal. Experiences in a number of countries suggest that exporters respond more vigorously and more promptly to exchange rate changes than to other equally remunerative combinations of policy incentives. Furthermore, export subsidies, even if designed to offset any exchange rate overvaluation or fiscal discrimination, invite retaliation by trading partners.~ Third, nominal and real exchange rates are a fairly flexible policy instrument. In the context of macroeconomic policies, the real value of the exchange rate can be adjusted, through frequent nominal changes if necessary, to provide the desired real remuneration to exporters. During the pre-Plan Austral period of high inflation, however, changes of more than 1000% in nominal levels were needed to achieve 100% shifts in real levels. 21 Since Argentina is now a signatory of the GATT Subsidies Code, such retaliation is more likely to occur, and more likelY to be detrimental should it occur.  - 19 ­ 2.7 One way to evaluate the conduct of exchange rate policy is to examine the behavior of the real effective· exchange rate (REER) over time. This rate is in essence a purchasing power parity rate (for a discussion of the methodology and data and a presentation of the estimates, see Attachment 2). It is a measure of how the purchasing power of Argentina's currency has changed over time in relation to the purchasing power of the currencies of Argentina's trading partners. For instance, when Argentina inflates more rapidly than the rest of the world, Argentina's exporters will find their costs rising more rapidly than the prices they can charge customers; their margins become squeezed. If the exporters raise their product prices in line with their costs they lose competitiveness. Either way there is a disincentive to exporting. Changing the exchange rate can restore exporter's margins. The REER also indicates, therefore, the degree to which Argentina's devaluations against the dollar (and, at the same time, the currency fluctuations of Argentina's trading partners against the dollar) have compensated for the difference between Argentina's inflation rate andthose of its trading partners. The REER index employs export weights based on Argentina's export markets. In essence, the index shows the relative movement over time of the value of the Argentina's currency against the country's major trading partners' currencies weighted by their shares in Argentina's exports after the effects of differential inflation rates are taken into account. An increase in the index indicates a real currency appreciation, while a fall indicates a real depreciation.  - 20 ­ 2.8 The REER index, as estimated quarterly, is presented in Figure and Attachment 3.~./ The index shows that one of the major characteristics of Argentina exchange rate policy has been its volatility. The REER has fluctuated enormously, perhaps more than in any other country during the same period. The nominal exchange rate, pegged against the US dollar, remained fixed from mid-1971 until 1975. During this period, because of higher inflation in Argentina than in its trading partners, Argentina's export competitiveness eroded gradually but substantially. This erosion was followed by a major exchange rate adjustment in early 1976. In the late 1970s, exchange rate policy was a major part of the effort to contain inflation and reduce inflationary expectations. The effect of this policy was to bring about a dramatic real currency appreciation and to undermine Argentina's export competitiveness. Between the end of 1977 and the end of 1980, the REER appreciated by close to 55%. This approach was unsustainable, and eventually the exchange rate regime collapsed. A subsequent and substantial adjustment had to be made in the real rate. 2.9 The REER level at the end of 1985 did not appear to be wildly out of line relative to the level prevailing in the early 1970s. Whether the level at the end of 1986 was appropriate is another question. Given Argentina's debt service problem and the need to adj~st the economy to the changed international economic circumstances, it would appear that a higher ~ Although the REER is computed with a trade-weighted basket of currencies, a simpler procedure, involving only the US dollar and US inflation in comparison with Argentine inflation, was also employed. This estimate is the US dollar inflation adjusted real exchange rate (RER). Its movements closely approximate those of the REER. See Attachment 3.  -21­ Figure 1 .A, R: C~ E r-., JTIr·'J./J.. R:EA.L EFF " "'TE F.:./-.J" 1 :;;!O 110 1CO 9(,) dO -­ 4() :;:; ~1=: 1 -- I 11:1 -1 I ,~.t -t-rr"t-r··r~ ,-,..·T'I·,-r-r·'r-r·"\---r'...,...."f"'-r...... T-..... r~ •• I ' ,-r-r.,.....,.,...~~ i • f ' i i i .-. i , • t , ~ 70 71 72 7~ 74 75 7e 77 76 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 1']'7'::'-- 1 ~'Joe.5 F!!EEF'!: Ef'( QUu.~S o f'~J::J~ .. -Fif.. ~ F'EER-·C:,;;rnlTl.  - 22 ­ REER (i.e., a more appreciated currency) would not be economically desirable.21 If the Government were to promote exports more aggressively and dismantle some existing restrictive trade policies, a lower REER would be warranted. The trade policy reforms necessary for more effective and sustained export expansion would impl~( a real depreciation. Trade Policy Regime 2.10 Argentina's trade policy regime effectively restricts trade flows, creates distortions for resource allocation across tradeable goods sectors, discriminates for domestic sales against exports, and further contributes to economic waste by rewarding rent-seeking behavior. 2.11 Greatly simplified, Argentina's trade policy regime consists of import restrictions, and export taxes and subsidies. Import restrictions are elaborate and nontransparent, and are applied with a strong discretionary component. Restrictions include tariffs, tariff exemptions, and, most importantly, highly restrictive quantitative limits on imports. 2.12 Tariff protection is relatively moderate. Prior to Plan Austral, which increased de facto tariff rates by an additional 10%, ad valoreum II Between the June 1985 announcement of Plan Austral and April 1986, the nominal exchange rate was fixed despite domestic inflation of over 40%. Fortunately, the REER did not undergo a concomitant appreciation, in great part due to the weakening of the US dollar against third country currencies.  - 23 ­ tariff rates ranged up to 48%.8/ Yet, virtually all tariff items (99%) carried a top rate of 38%, and nearly half of the items charged had tariffs of 25% or less. An import weighted average of tariffs for the first six months of 1985 covering those products not receiving tariff exemptions was 19.6% (see Table 2)~' A disproportionate share of total tariff revenue is collected on high tariff items. For the first six months of 1985, only 14.4% of imports paid tariffs of 38% or more but these imports generated 43.4% of all tariff revenues (for a frequency distribution of imports and tariff collections according to tariff rates, see Attachment 4). Despite Argentina's relatively moderate tariff levels, many imported products are exempted from tariffs altogether by industrial promotion schemes adminis­ tered by the Government. In the first half of 1985, 34% of all imports were exempted. As a result, the average realized tariff rate computed for all imports was only 12.9% (see Table 2). The tariff exemptions created an estimated US$130 million tax revenue loss for the first six months of 1985. Despite that revenue loss, tariff exemptions have grown, reflecting in part the arbitrary nature of the system. In 1981 the average realized tariff rate (tariff collections divided by total imports) was 19%. In­ creasing tariff exemptions, coupled with the decline of overall imports, have further exacerbated the fiscal situation of the Government, which is heavily dependent upon indirect taxes levied on trade flows. 2.13 In mid-1982, import limits were intensified in an attempt to cope with the balance of payments crisis. These direct controls have since been 8/ For an analysis of the tariff system, see World Bank, "Argentina: Strategies toward Industrial and Export Development", Report No. 58416-AR, September 30, 1985.  -24­ ; . Table 2: ," REALIZED TRADE TAXES AND SUBSIDIES AND AN',n-EXPORT BIASES. BY PRODUCT CATEGORY (Jan.-June] 985) Ave. Ave. Net Ave. Ave. Nominal Export Ex&:)ort Ex&:)ort Realized Nominal Anti-Ex&:)or Tax Subsidy Subsidy Tari-F-F Tari·H Bias Rate Rate Rate Ratell Rate/2 Rate/3 Sec. Oescri&:)tion ( y,,) ( '1. ) (%) ( 7..) (7. ) ( %) o Mu,e. &c Samp les 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.0 3.0 1 Animal Products 4.5 2.7 -1.8 7.4 9.4 11.2, 2 Vegetable Products 20.1 0.3 -19.8 4.3 10.4 30.2 '3 Misc. Animal &c Veg. 14.2 0.0 -14.2 10.9 13.9 28.0 4 Food Ind. Products S.e 0.7 -7.9 4.6 5.2 13. 1 5 Mineral Products ~8.1 0.1 -SS.O 10.8 17.2 75.3 e Chemical Products 1.9 1.8 0.0 7.4 12.9 13.0 7 PlastiC Goods 1.0 3.3 2.3 20.9 22.e 20.3 9 Leather Products 12.2 0.4 -11.9 10.8 22.3 34.2 9 Wood Products 2.1 2.8 O.e 16.2 le.e 16.0 10 Pul&:) &c Pa&:)er Prod. 1.0 2.9 1.9 le.6 20.8 19.0 11 Textiles &c Apparel 12.5 5.2 -7.2 20.1 2e.4 33.e 12 Shoes &c Other App. 4.4 O. 1 -4.3 13.7 26.4 30.7 13 Nonmet. Min. Prod. 0.8 3.5 2.7 18.4 27.0 24.3 14 Jewelry 20.3 0.0 -20.3 11.9 22.2 42.6 15 Metallurgical PrOd. O.e e.9 e.3 14.e 20.e 1.4.3 le Machinery &c Engines 0.7 3.4 2.7 12.S 22.0 19.2 17 Trans&:)ort Machinery 0.3 . 5.2 5.0 20.7 27.9 22.8 1S Precision Equi&:)ment 1.2 3.1 1.9 13.e 14.7 12.8 1.9 Wea&:)ons 0.0 4. 1 4. 1 33.e 38.2 34. 1 20 Misc. Manu~acturing 0.3 2.9 2.5 20.7 23.2 20.7 21 Art Objects 3.9 0.0 -3.9 0.0 51.7 55.6 SUMMARY: Ag. &c Agr. Indus. 0.4 -1.6.5 4.9 8.e 25.1 Industry (ex. Agro) 3.4 -9.6 13.2 19.4 28.9 of which: Capital Goods 0.5 4.3 3.8 16.S 24.4 20.6 Total 16.0 1.1 -14.9 12.9 19.6 34.4 . Notes: 11 The average reallzed tari~f rate is defLned and estimated as import tax collections divided by the value of imports. 21 The averageno;inal tarif~ rate is calculated as the average realized tariff rate~ except that tari~f exempted imports are excluded. 31 The nomlnal anti-export bias rate, expressed as a percentage of FOB value, is equal to the average nominal tariff minus the net export subsidy rate. Source: Computed from INDEC information. See tables in attachment for a greater disaggregation.  - 25 ­ consolidated, and they now constitute the core of the the Argentine import restriction and protection system.9/ All imports are now subject to prior permit. Importers must obtain an import authorization called a"Declaracion Jurada de Necesidades de Importacion" (DJNI). For goods not produced in the country (about 5,500 tariff positions out of 11,000), the DJNI is issued automatically 48 hours after an application is submitted. Issuing the DJNI takes four steps in two different locations: (i) the application is received at the Secretariat of Industry and Foreign Trade (SICE); (ii) the data is entered into a computer data base; (iii) the data is processed in a computer located in another location (the Ministry of Social Welfare) where both inputs and outputs must be entered manually; and (iv) the DJNI is handed over to the importer, back at the SICE. 2.14 Once imports are authorized under DJNI, tariff protection for these goods is moderate because the ad valorem rates currently applicable are still the ones set at the time of the 1979 reforms: tariff rates ranging from 0% to 38%, with only about 1% of imports paying higher duties. In mid-1985, these rates were augmented 10% by a temporary surtax imposed as part of Plan Austral. Import data for the first six months of 1985 (before the surtax was imposed) show that 34% of Argentina's imports entered the country duty free; another 31% of imports paid duty at a rate of 10% or lower; 12% of imports paid between 10% and 20%; and the remainder paid higher rates (including 14.4% of imports which paid 38% or higher). Overall, the ratio between tax collections and imports for that period indicates an average collected rate of 12.9%, excluding the surtax. 21 The nature of the import regime is specified in Decree 4030 of December 1984. A detailed analysis is provided in World Bank, "Argentina: Strategies toward Industrial and Export Development", Ope cit., pp. 81-86.  - 26 ­ 2.15 The remaining 5,500 tariff positions--covering mostly imports in competition with local production--are subject to discretionary authorizations that result in further protection of imports. For about 4,500 tariff positions, the import permit applications are referred to producers' associations to determine whether there is local production available that could satisfY the needs of the potential buyer. As a rule, the producers' associations approve the issuance of import permits only if domestic production is not available; price competitiveness is not a dominant consideration. As a consequence of this cumbersome, costly system of prior consultations, actual protection for local producers is indeterminate. Although the formal decision to authorize competitive imports is made by the SleE, this agency seldom if ever rejects the producers associations' recommendations. Finally, about 1,000 tariff positions are subject to prior approval on the basis of public health considerations or compliance with international agreements. 2.16 Although the elimination of the system of prior consultations with the producers' associations was part of the lMF stand-by agreement, the Government could not implement the elimination, and the lMF Board waived this condition when it released the last tranche of the stand-by. A gradual transition to automatic DJNl probably would have allowed the Government to advance in the trade regime area, reducing at least part of the distortion built into the system. 2.17 The import licensing system in effect disallows competitive imports for a wide range of products, and protection for domestic production and sales is considerable. Domestic prices for such products  - 27 ­ are not constrained by international prices; they are determined by the interplay of domestic market forces as tempered by price controls. Since markets in Argentina are relatively small and commonly highly concentrated among a few producers, product prices and production costs are frequently high, and product quality poor.~/ 2.18 On the other side of the trade equation, Argentina's exports are also restricted by an elaborate system of licenses, permissions and taxes. The export licensing system uses selective export prohibitions, along with taxes, to keep down the domestic prices for agricultural goods. The export procedures are in themselves complex and involved for all products, frequently requiring export authorizations from a number of different government institutions. 2.19 Exports are also impeded by fiscal measures. Export taxes are levied on a wide range of products, and are highly concentrated on agricultural products. Table 2 presents data on realized export taxes and subsidies. In the first half of 1985, the average realized tax rate on the exports of agricultural and agro-industrial products was 16.9%. Under Plan Austral, export tax rates were raised by another 8%. Since then, however, steps have been taken to reduce such taxes, particularly for agricultural products. 2.20 Export taxes are only partially offset by a system of tax incentives and subsidies. Manufactured exports are exempt from the final production stage of indirect taxes. Moreover, an explicit fiscal subsidy lQ/ An analysis of an unrepresentative sample of manufactured products revealed implicit tariffs, based upon domestic and international price comparisons, ranging from 25% to 200%.  - 28 ­ has been provided to compensate producers for the payment of indirect taxes on previous stages of production. These subsidy rates have varied over time and by product. At the end of 1986, owing to governmental budgetary constraints, they were practically nonexistent. When the subsidies were in effect during the first half of 1985, the realized export subsidy rate for industrial exports was 3.4%. Because of the magnitude of export taxation (13%), these subsidies were not sufficient to offset export taxes (see Table 2). In the aggregate, net export taxes for all exported products amounted to 14.8% of the FOB value of those exports. Reform of the Temporary Admission Regime 2.21 Temporary admission regimes (TAR) allow export industries to obtain imported inputs at international prices. Thus, they reduce the anti-export bias introduced by protectionist policies and increase the international competitiveness of exports. If the TAR is automatic and covers all types of inputs, exporters will operate in a simulated free trade regime. Argentina's TAR is deficient on several counts, and its value as an export promotion instrument is quite limited. Several reforms would make it more valuable while moving exporters towards free trade status. The major deficiencies of Argentina's TAR are: (i) inadequate administrative procedures; (ii) lack of automaticity; (iii) limited coverage of inputs; (iv) lack of provisions for indirect exporters; (v) lack of provisions for the replacement of stocks of non-duty-free imported inputs used to produce exports; and (Vi) lack of applicability to capital goods.  - 29 ­ 2.22 Coverage and Automaticity. Argentina's TAR is highly restrictive. It applies only to inputs that cannot be supplied domestically, or where the price of domestic supplies exceeds by roughJY 30% or more the c.i.f. price of the imported good. These restrictions have injected a strong protectionist element into the temporary admission system, neutralizing a good portion of its export promotion value. Furthermore, the restrictions generate a case-by-case review of DJAT (Declaracion Jurada de Admision Temporaria--a TAR import request) applications, which causes delays. The applications are reviewed by a Government committee that publicizes them, and may be obliged to review the complaints of affected domestic producers. Protectionist considerations often prevail; standards for admission or rejection are not explicit. For example, the 30% preference margin mentioned above has not been written in any law or statute. In practice, DJAT applications are hotly contested by producers who try to force exporters to use domestically produced inputs (even if uncompetitive or of inadequate quality) in an attempt to piggyback on the exporter's profits. Contentious, lengthy meetings are the rule rather than the exception when these matters are discussed, and the public officials are often put in the position of being judges, all of which contributes significantly to the above-mentioned delays. 2.23 The TAR should be automatic, and its coverage should be broader. Eut this should be done gradually, since it would open up the economy to foreign competition. Although this opening would be limited, it would still likely generate widespread resistance among local producers who currently face low and declining sales levels. Also, still fresh in prOducers' memories is a fully automatic TAR that was included in the 1979-81 experiment and became a source of legal contraband.  - 30 ­ 2.24 Indirect Exporters. Argentina's TAR cannot be used by indirect exporters, since regulations explicitly forbid the transfer of goods imported temporarily. Some exporters circumvent this prohibition by importing via the TAR and passing on the inputs to a supplier. Customs considers this illegal. Extending the TAR to indirect exporters would make exports more competitive internationally, in turn fostering backward linkages in production, raising the quality of inputs, and inducing the development of a more export-oriented manufacturing sector. Those producers already using the system would. avoid the legal risks they currently face. 2.25 Replacement of Stocks of Imported Inputs. Generally, a TAR can be used only by a producer who at the time of importing inputs knows that he will be exporting. Thus, the exporter must have a firm export order or, alternatively, he must have a steady, predictable, flow of exports. Such a feature builds a bias into the system, discriminating against small and medium-scale enterprises and first-time exporters. 2.26 Capital Goods. Argentine customs laws do not permit the tempor­ ar,y admission of capital goods unless they are re-exported. The re-export of capital goods embodied in goods produced for export is not allowed. Including capital goods in the TAR is not likely to have any significant impact. Many imported capital goods enter the countr,y duty free, irrespective of whether they are to be sold domestically or used to produce for export. This duty-free entry occurs via the industrial promotion regime, which grants exemptions of import taxes on capital goods, income tax holidays, and exemptions from the value added tax. Furthermore,  - 31 ­ the Government's limited supervision capacity, coupled with the virtual impossibility of insuring that capital goods are used only to produce for export, could convert the temporary admission of capital goods into a virtual free-for-all, eroding the public image of the broader TAR and jeopardizing its survival. Further, the subsector that produces capital goods needs special restructuring measures, and the Government intends to design an action program to do this. It is recommended that the TAR not include capital goods for the time being. After the Government launches its restructuring program for capital goods and reforms its various systems of investment incentives, the merits of including capital goods in the TAR should be reviewed. Simplification of Import and Export Procedures 2.27 The World Bank's 1985 report, "Argentina: Strategies Towards Export and Industrial Development," identified the complexity of export procedures as an important factor affecting the country's export performance. The Government concurs with this judgment and intend~ to initiate a program of reforms with strong private sector support. However, the actual course of events indicates that bureaucratic resistance to change is stronger than initially anticipated. 2.28 Automatic TAR Import Requests. Automatic TAR import requests (DJNIs) take 48 hours to issue. This is not a significant bottleneck, but reducing it could be a signal to the private sector of the Government's determination to make the TAR system automatic. For importers in good standing, Customs has established a simplified import procedure to clear  - 32 ­ goods from Customs within 48 hours after their arrival. Except for the identification of the goods, all of Customs' verifications are made after the goods enter the country legally. Should Customs find any error or inconsistencies in the documentation submitted, the importer would be subject to stiff penalties, one of whjch is to be denied the possibility of utilizing the simplified import procedure. 2.29 Prior Authorization of Export Shipments. The large number of public agencies involved in issuing prior authorizations of export ship­ ments is a deterrent to export activity, causing delays, introducing uncertainty about shipment dates, and increasing private sector costs. Towards the end of 1985, the Government decided to consolidate all such prior authorizations in a single procedure managed by Customs. A presidential decree instructed the 30 public agencies involved to appoint officials to work in a special area provided by Customs, the ventanilla unica (single window), where exporters could obtain approval from all agencies. Unfortunately, the same decree gave Customs the authority to exempt public agencies from compliance with this rule in special cases. A few days later, Customs issued a regulation exempting all but two of the public agencies involved. Predictably, the private sector complained. The Government reacted strongly, and Customs reversed itself and decreed that a public agency's prior authorization would be automatically granted unless that agency sent a representative promptly. Intervention by a Commercial Bank. Commercial banks must intervene in the documentation of every export shipment, a requirement originally made by the Central Bank to certi~ that exporters made suitable  - 33 ­ arrangements to get paid. Through their intervention, the commercial banks do not guarantee the inflow of foreign exchange. Rather, they are supposed to monitor foreign exchange inflows, and report back to the Central Bank if they detect that an exporter is not surrendering foreign exchange on time and in the established amounts. Until recently, Customs authorized the shipment of exports when the exporter produced the export documentation with a commercial bank certification. This procedure was not an obstacle for exporters. Some cases of fraud were detected, however, when the certificaion was falsified by exporters to avoid surrendering foreign exchange at the official rate. 11/ To guard against those actions, the Central Bank and Customs established an additional control. Commercial banks are now required to confirm their certifications daily by sending a special form to Customs headquarters. Shipment of the goods is authorized only after the exporter displays the certification, which Customs checks against the confirmation sent by the commercial bank. Elimination of Export Taxes 2.31 Export taxes have traditionally been levied as an easy, expedi­ tious way of generating revenues, largely concentrated on agricultural products. Most export taxes on industrial commodities were eliminated in August 1985. The remaining taxes range from 5-10% of the f.o.b. value of exports, while those on petrochemicals range from 30-60% of f.o.b. value. Non-agricultural commodities currently covered by export taxes include 11/ Exporters who cashed in their foreign exchange in the parallel market could get 30-40% more than the official rate before Plan Austral was adopted. Since then, however, the parallel rate has averaged only 10% above the official rate, and towards the beginning of July 1986, the spread had been reduced to 2%.  - 34 ­ fuels, chemicals, leather manufactures, jewelry, and some minerals. A program for reducing export taxes on agricultural commodities has been agreed on with the World Bank. Reduction of export taxes on fuels and chemicals is part of the ongoing discussions related to the Bank's proposed lending in oil and gas. Elimination of export taxes on manufactures is a key element in industrial export growth, and would constitute a clear signal of the direction of the Government's policies. 2.32 The net effects of the Government's trade policies regime are considerable anti-export biases. These biases make the domestic market more attractive and profitable than export production and sales. Evidence of such anti-export biases is presented in Table 2. Lower-range estimates of the anti-export biases for major product groups range from 11% (animal products) to 75% (mineral products).~/ For all traded goods in the ~/ qualifications to these estimates are in order. First, the rates Some are computed on a nominal rather than an effective basis. It would be preferable to have them done on an effective basis, i.e., estimated as a percentage of value added in productive activity. Second, the effects of Argentina's extensive system of nontariff barriers are omitted. To include these effects would require a comprehensive analysis based upon domestic and international price comparisons. Instead, the average nominal tariff has been used as a proxy for protection afforded in the domestic market. Since the nominal tariffs constitute underestimates of protection, the anti-export bias rates presented in Table 2, and Attachment, Table 2, are low estimates. Third, the tax, tariff, and subsidy rates in Table 2 are computed on the basis of collected taxes and tariffs and disbursed subsidies; they are realized rates. In addition to presenting some anomalies in the aggregates, a further downward bias in the anti-export biases exists. For example, to the extent that taxes on either exports or imports are prohibitive for those trade flows, they are omitted from the estimations. Finally, the data presented in Table 2, and Attachment 4, Table 1, are provided according to the trade classification; it would be preferable to have the information organized according to the industrial classification, thereby permitting a more thorough examination of the structure of incentives. For a competent and insightful analysis conducted for 1977, the reader is referred to Julio Berlinsky, Proteccion Arancelaria de Actividades Seleccionadas de la Industria Manufacturera Argentina, Buenos Aires, Ministerio de Economia, 1977.  - 35 ­ aggregate, the nominal, lower-range anti-export bias rate has been estimated at 34%. 2.33 Export taxes are one of the main reasons that Argentine anti-export biases are so high. If Argentina had the ability to affect international price levels for its exported products, the optimal export tax argument would justify such export taxation. But with the possible exception of wheat, this is not the case, and there is no welfare- maximizing economic rationale for Argentine export taxes. Instead, Argentine income and welfare are reduced by these taxes. The rationale for export taxation is primarily fiscal (although historically there may have been a confiscatory element). The Government is heavily dependent on export tax revenues. In the first half of 1985, export tax receipts amounted to approximately US$700 million (see Attachment 5).~ While the reduction of export taxes is highly desirable on economic grounds, alternative sources of fiscal revenues will have to be found if such reductions are to be viable. For 1986 it is estimated that these reductions in trade taxes will result in a fall in revenue of about A 300 million which is equivalent to about US$318 million (at 1986 period average exchange rate). Special Export Incentives Program 2.34 In order to offset anti-export policy biases, successive Argentine governments have intermittently pursued a number of export promotion schemes. In general, these programs are administered in a 11/ By way of comparison, import taxes for the same period totaled US$246 million, and fiscal export subsidy expenditures were US$50 million.  - 36 ­ discretiona~ and frequently discriminatory fashion. Moreover, as a whole they do not overcome the policy bias against exports. There are currently two principal export promotion schemes--the tempora~ admissions regime (TAR) and the recently announced special export incentives system. 2.35 Ideally, the TAR should be able to substantially reduce the anti-export bias for individual producers. The scheme is designed to provide exporters with access to inputs at international prices, i.e-, unrestricted duty free imports of products to be incorporated into the final exported product. Many countries (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Brazil) have used such a aystem to considerable advantage in expanding exports. An effectively-run TAR can short-circuit the detrimental effects of the protection system on inputs for export manufacturing. But because of the way in which the TAR currently operates in Argentina, the country is denied the full benefits of such a system.~1 2.36 A second major governmental program for export promotion is the Special Export Program (Programas Especiales de Exportacion, or PRESEX or PEX) to be administered by the Minist~ of Industry and Commerce. PEX incentives are negotiated individually with applying firms, based upon a firm's incremental exports over a period of up to five years. The scheme is aimed primarily at larger firms, but also allows participation by cooperatives and trading companies. To qualify, a firm's exports must have increased at least US$2 million per year, or US$10 million over a five-year period. The benefit to participating firms is a fiscal reimbursement 111 Between 1978 and 1983 Argentina employed an automatic and unrestricted TAR for export production. Although it evidently functioned reasonably well, it was terminated primarily to protect domestic producers.  - 37 ­ of up to 15% of the f.o.b. value of the increase in the firm's exports. To fund these payments, an amount roughly equivalent to US$60 million was set aside in the 1986 central government budget. 2.37 While it is still too early to assess the results of the PEX program, several effects are likely. First, as with any system based upon incremental exports, substantial distortions are probable. Under PEX, two firms producing and exporting the same product, in the same amount, to the same market, could receive entirely different effective domestic currency remuneration, with the pioneer exporting firm receiving less. Existing exports are not benefitted. The formation of phantom new exporting firms is not inconceivable, and arrangements between previously exporting and nonexporting enterprises to take advantage of the incremental export incentive would not be surprising. There is a risk that existing exports will be supplanted by "new" exports, leaving overall export levels little increased, if any. The natural government response to these sorts of problems may be a counterproductive further tightening of inspection, administrative controls, and bureaucratic requirements. 2.38 A second probable characteristic of the PEX incentives is that they are bound to be highly discretionar.y and nonautomatic. Moreover, the process appears to be a ver.y paper-intensive and bureaucratic one. 1 5/ 12/ To apply for the program, a firm must complete 14 lengthy forms and 4 annexes.  - 38 ­ Because the program has a limited budget, PEX incentives are to be awarded on a case-by-case basis. Just what the criteria are for inclusion in the program is not yet known. For this reason, many firms, especially established exporters, view the program with skepticism. For prospective exporters outside Buenos Aires, the cost of chaperoning their paperwork through the various officials is often prohibitive. 2.39 Third, the PEX program invites retaliation by Argentina's trading partners. Once the program is in place, exports that receive PEX benefits are likely to be subject to countervailing duties in the importing countries. The PEX benefits, while intended to offset discriminatory policy treatment of exports, will be viewed formally and legally as an export subsidy. Since Argentina is not a signatory of the GATT Subsidies Code, it is not necessary for importing countries to show injury in order to apply countervailing duties. Therefore, a response by Argentina's trading partners may be quick and detrimental to all Argentine exporters of the products in question. 2.40 A likely fourth effect of the PEX program is that it may contribute to the uncertainty that prevails regarding overall export  - 39 ­ policy.~/ The program requires governmental fiscal resources at a time when fiscal constraints are particularly acute, and there is no budgetary provision for such resources beyond 1986. The expected difficulties in administering a program based upon incremental exports, and the likelihood of retaliation from Argentina's trading partners further contribute to export policy uncertainty in general, and doubts about the PEX program in particular. 2.41 In addition to the TAR and the PEX program, there exist a host of other, less significant government programs designed to promote exports. While once important, a number of official export financing and credit incentive schemes have been severely curtailed. Obtaining credit for export production and/or sales does not appear to be an insurmountable problem for exporting firms, but such credit is only available at the very high real market interest rates currently prevailing in Argentina. The Export Finance Unit described in Section III could help address this problem. The Government also has an export marketing and information ~/ discussing the PEX program in Argentina, reference is frequently In made to the reasonably successful BEFIEX program instituted in 1972 in Brazil. There are a number of critical differences between the two programs, however. First, the major benefit enjoyed by firms participating in the BEFIEX program is duty free importation of capital goods and some intermediate inputs. (Imports for export production are unrestricted and duty free as a matter of course under Brazil's equivalent of the TAR.) Second, to the extent that a fiscal export subsidy may still exist under BEFIEX contracts, that subsidy was in place for all exporters across the board at the time the multi-year contract was signed. Furthermore, any remaining subsidization is not based upon incremental exports, as is the case with the PEX program. Third, while there have been conflicts between Brazil and its trading partners concerning the BEFIEX incentives, those conflicts have been attenuated by the fact that Brazil is a signatory of the GATT Subsidies Code.  - 40 ­ service operating through its overseas embassies. While this service is potentially valuable, few firms have reported export sales generated through it. Recommendations and Policy Suggestions 2.42 Expanding exports is absolutely essential if Argentina is to emerge from its economic crisis and resume economic growth and development. A strategy for aggressively expanding exports, as reflected in general terms in the Government's "Guidelines of an Economic Growth Strategy 1985-89," merits further specification and implementation. The overall emphasis of such a strategy should be on increasing export competitiveness and productive efficiency. Doing this will require a major commitment on the part of the Government, and substantial and politically difficult changes in the overall economic policy environment. Without such changes, however, exports are unlikely to undergo any sustained growth, and economic recovery will remain elusive. It might be possible to facilitate such policy changes, and perhaps even build some support for them, if the Government were to announce its commitment to export expansion and indicate a target expansion of, say, 15% annually. In doing so, attention could then be focused on those policy changes necessary to bring about the achievement of the export target. 2.43 The cornerstones of a strategy of export expansion and economic recovery should be: (i) the provision of a stable economic policy environment; (ii) relative price changes to improve Argentina's competitive position in international markets and to provide greater incentives for  - 41 ­ exportables; (iii) reduction of the anti-export biases in present economic policies; and (iv) increased automaticity and transparency in the administration of incentive policies, coupled with procedural simplification and the reduction of governmental red tape. While the policy changes necessary to support export-led economic growth ,are numerous and interrelated, two individual policies stand out as central--an aggressive exchange rate policy, and a viable and smoothly functioning system of temporary admissions for export production. (a) Exchange Rate Policy. In order to spur exports and growth, an aggressive exchange rate policy should be pursued to assure both the relative price relationship necessary to foster tradeable goods production in Argentina, and the competitiveness of Argentine products in world markets. In addition, a stable and competitive real exchange rate is crucial for sustained export growth, and should be a policy objective. In the present context, the Government, at a very minimum, should not permit any further appreciation of the austral. (b) Export Incentive System. There should be several improvements to the current export incentive system, primarily to reduce the existing anti-export biases in economic policies. They are: (i) Reform of the Temporary Admissions Regime (TAR) for Export Production. All restrictions imposed on imported inputs for export production should be removed, perhaps gradually. Such imports should be duty free and unimpeded; the only administrative requirement, subject to subsequent  - 42 ­ verification, should be that the inputs actually be incorporated in the exported production. The system should possess well defined and universal rules and procedures. Thus, it should be fully automatic and in no way subject to discretionary approval on the part of f,Overnment officials. In implementing such a reformed TAR, it may be desirable to proceed on a piecemeal basis, gradually expanding a positive list of permissible imports to include the universe of all p tariff ositions. At some later stage, the reformed system should be extended to indirect exporters, perhaps linked with an export financing system based upon a letter of credit, as is done in Korea. The final policy objective should be a completely free trade regime for export production. (ii) Reduction and Removal of Export Taxes. All export taxes, with the possible exception of the tax on wheat, should eventually be removed. The fiscal impact of these tax reductions could be minimized by initiating a revenue neutral export tax reduction and tariff reform. Also, since domestic food prices would rise as a result of these actions, some targeted food subsidies to low income groups may be desirable from the viewpoint of equity. (iii) Reimbursement of Indirect Taxes for Exports. The remaining indirect taxes embodied in exports should be rebated. To do this, the Government will require a  - 43 ­ better understanding of the magnitude of such remaining taxes paid in previous stages of production, and a convenient, and non-countervailable, mechanism to effect the reimbursement, probably in the form of a tax credit. (iv) Acceleration and Extension of the Ongoing Simplification of Export Procedures. The "sole window" for export authorizations should be fully implemented and the remaining paperwork simplified. (v) Elimination of Export Licensing for Most Products. While procedural simplifications such as the "sole window" approach constitute a considerable improvement, export licensing for nearly all products should eventually be eliminated. A simple export declaration, employed in many countries, could be instituted for statistical purposes, subject to subsequent verification and control. (vi) No expansion of the PEX Export Incentives. The PEX program is likely to encounter numerous economic and administrative difficulties and should not be expanded. (vii) GATT Participation. The Government should weigh the pros and cons of adhering to GATT as a means of more effectively advancing Argentina's international trading interests.  - 44 ­ (c) Reform of System of Import Restriction. Policy changes in the import restriction system could also help reduce the existing anti-export biases in economic policies. In addition, these changes would increase competition and productive efficiency. Four new policies would help bring about a significant and lasting reform of the import restriction system. They are: (i) Reduction of Quantitative Import Restrictions. The list of products requiring prior permit should be dramatically reduced. If this cannot be done in one step, it might be possible first to eliminate the necessar,r consultation procedure with local producers associations. The number of products requiring prior permit should then be continually reduced, in concert with a tariff reform and the passing of those products into the category of automatic import license approval. Eventually it might be possible to eliminate import licensing altogether, except for some very special products. (ii) Reduction of Tariff Exemptions. All tariff exemptions, except those related to the TAR or other export programs, should be e~iminated as part of a more generalized tariff reform. Not only would this make the tariff system more efficient, but tariff revenues would also increase. (iii) Tariff System Reform. The tariff system should be reformed in such a way as to make tariffs the major policy instrument  - 45 ­ for providing domestic market protection. As the use of Annexos I and II are reduced, tariffs for many products should be increased. In doing so, tariff dispersion and tariff averages will increase, at least initially. A suitable tariff range in the initial phase of such a reform might be 10-90%. If properly designed, the revenue impact of this tariff reform could be substantial. Over time, the upper limits of the tariff schedule should be reduced. As experience and confidence with the reform grow, more elaborate timetables and schedules could be formulated and announced. (iv) Modernization of Adversely Affected Sectors. To accompany the suggested trade policy reforms, a comprehensive program of adjustment assistance should be instituted for those firms and workers adversely affected. The adjustment assistance should help firms modernize their plant, re-equip if they can ultimately compete, restructure their assets, and improve their efficiency. 2.44 The policy changes suggested here imply a fundamental change in economic direction and strategy. Not only does this require a major commitment on the part of the Government; it implies substantial technical work as well. To this end it may be desirable to establish a small inter-ministerial working group within the Government, probably under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy, to do the necessary analytical and preparatory work for implementing the desired policy reforms.  - 46 ­ III. SPECIAL PURPOSE EXPORT FINANCE FACILITY A. Objective 3.1 One of the major obstacles to the growth of the Argentine export sector is the lack of adequate financing. A useful scheme for alleviating this problem is the pre-financing export program the Government is currently sponsoring. Consideration, however, needs to be given to the potential impact that additional financing could have on the money supply and, consequently, on inflationary expectations. One possible way of advancing monies to exporters, while at the same time avoiding pressures on monetary policy, would be the creation of a Special Purpose Export Finance Facility (SPEFF). This agency would reside outside Argentina and raise funds in the international capital markets. The principal objectives of the SPEFF are as follows: (a) To assist the Government of Argentina in financing export promotion programs, and to attract the foreign investment and foreign exchange revenue necessary to repay existing indebtedness; (b) To make existing and future export promotion programs more efficient and expedient for the Argentine exporter; and (c) To create-a link between the domestic and international capital markets and the export financing function, so as to increase private sector participation and create the framework for an  - 47 ­ eventual transfer of this responsibility away from the Government. B. Structure 3.2 The central element of the proposed SPEFF would be an independent, special purpose company that raises funds in both the domestic and international capital markets and onlends those funds to Argentine exporters of goods, services and equipment.22! 3.3 These loans will be funded by the issuance of debt securities by the SPEFF in the international capital markets. The type of security will be determined by the term of the underlying loan, as defined by the World Bank and the Argentine exporter's requirements. Since there are likely to be various sources of funds that satisfy particular term requirements, the type of security will also be the one that offers the lowest rate at that time. 3.4 It is conceivable that the securities issued by the SPEFF could be sold on terms approximating those of international credit. The World Bank could choose to back the asset side of the balance sheet. Such a pass-through effect could essentially prove to be true in the markets for the securities because the only effective guarantor of the securities would be the World Bank. While the SPEFF could function as a stand-alone credit, the interposing of the credit of a AAA-rated private financial institution 11/ A similar structure has been employed by the UK for the refinancing of a portion of its rescheduled credit to Brazil.  - - ~ between the SPEFF and the investor would add marketability to the security. Specifically, the securities issued in the international capital markets would be supported by a surety bond to be issued by a AAA-rated private financial institution such as an insurance company. 3.5 To account for the possibility of late payments by exporters on the SPEFF credits, and the delay before disbursement under the World Bank guarantee, the SPEFF structure would include a backstop revolving credit facility. The beneficiary of this facility would be the SPEFF itself, with drawings allowed solely for the purpose of making timely payments on the SPEFF's market obligations, pending receipt of funds from the exporter or receipt of disbursements under the World Bank guarantee. 3.6 The revolving credit facility could also be used to fund initial disbursements of credits granted by the SPEFF pending the issue of securities. Such an alternative would give the SPEFF greater flexibility in both the size of its disbursements and the timing of its security issues. c. Mechanism of the SPEFF Structure 3.7 The following outline assumes, for the sake of illustration, the issuance of floating rate notes by the SPEFF. In practice, any capital market instrument could serve as the underlying security. In this example, the World Bank acts as an export credit agency guaranteeing the Argentine exporter's credit, although this may differ in an actual transaction.  - 49 ­ Basic Elements of the Structure Underlying Security: Floating rate notes issued in the international capital markets by the SPEFF. Surety Bond: Issued by a AAA-rated insurance company in favor of the holders of the floating rate note ("notes"). Loan Agreement: EVidencing onlending of the proceeds of the notes to the Argentine exporter. Guarantee: Evidencing the guarantee by the World Bank of payments under the loan agreement. The structural and legal terms of the guarantee would be tailored to the requirements of the World Bank. Revolving Credit Since payments under the guarantee Facility: are not likely to be made until a specified number of days after the due date for payment under the loan agreement, a revolving credit facility would be arranged to permit timely payment in the event of delayed receipt of payment under the loan agreement. Structure of the SPEFF: The SPEFF would be a limited liability company with a nominal share capital held by an independent and respected trust company. It would be incorporated in the UK (provided the necessary witholdi~ tax clearances are available), Netherlands or other jurisdiction free of withholding taxes. The SPEFF would be limited by its articles of incorporation to the raising of money and its onlending to borrowers under the guarantee of the World Bank. The raising and lending of money would be carried out without any material mismatch as to maturity, interest rates or currency. Under the terms of the guarantee, the SPEFF could  ~ 50 ­ in effect take no actions without the consent of the World Bank. The Terms of the Instruments Floating Rate Notes Principal Amount and The principal amounts repayable and Maturity: their maturities would materially coincide with those under the loan agreement, namely with reference to the export credits being refinanced. Optional Redemption: On any interest payment date, at pare Coupon: A margin over the London Interbank offered rate commensurate with market conditions and the credit standing of the World Bank. Interest will be payable for fixed three-month or six-month periods coincident with those under the loan agreement. Commissions: Flat front-end commissions will be payable, commensurate with market conditions and the credit standing of the World Bank. Security: The question of securing the notes by the loan agreement and guarantee would be for discussion. Covenants: Negative pledge with respect to the SPEFF's total undertaking and assets. Covenant not to amend the guarantee without the consent of the trustee. Covenant to conduct its business as described under "Structure of the SPEFF" above. Events of Default: Payments on notes are covered by payments on the loan agreement, and failing that by the revolving credit facility, which in turn is replaced after 90 days by the guarantee. Accordingly, the definition of events of default  - 51 ­ under the notes will be negotiated with the World Bank. Surety Bond: Terms to match those of the underlying floating rate notes and to provide for paympnt to debt holders in the event of default of the SPEFF on the notes. The cost of the surety bond would be born by the SPEFF and passed on to the exporter in the terms of the loan agreement. Loan Agreement Principal Amount According to the exporter's Maturity: requirements. Optional Redemption: None. Interest Rate: A margin over the London Interbank Offered Rate payable for three-month or six-month periods. Acceleration: The Loan Agreement is subject to acceleration by the SPEFF in the event of failure to pay by the debtor country, subject to prior agreement by the World Bank. Fee and expenses: Arrangement and commitment fees, as well as all legal fees and other expenses pertaining to the loan agreement, the notes and the revolving credit facility, would be for the account of the exporter. Guarantee Amount: The sum of: (a) the total of principal repay­ ments due under the loan agreement; (b) the total of interest payments due under the loan agreement, assuming an interest rate of 25% per annum; and Availability: Until final maturity of the notes.  - 52 ­ (c) the total of interest for 90 days from the due date for payments of any sum, assuming the interest rate of 25% per annum and that the borrower defaults on all payments. In addition, the World Bank will pay any amO~llcs of withholding tax due under the provisions of the notes if the borrower defaults on all payments. The total liability is not reduced until all obligations under the guarantee have been fulfilled. Liability: The liability of the World Bank is not impaired or discharged by reason of the loan agreement becoming invalid or unenforceable for any reason. Fee: Any fee payable to the World Bank would be for the account of the exporter and would be negotiated with the World Bank. Revolving Credit Facility Amount: To be determined. Purpose: To accommodate late payment by the borrower under the loan agreement, or non-payment by the borrower pending payment under the guarantee. Interest: The same rate payable by the World Bank on drawings under the guarantee. Maturity: Drawings will ~ture a specified number of days after the date on which the relevant sum becomes due and payable under the notes, or if earlier, on the date on which payment is made by the borrower.  At tachmen t "1 Page 1 -53­ O. ''16/86 PARA CC~LEUR LOS F'O~fo!lIt.~RIOS DE PRESENT.QCI~JrI - La empre•• SellcJta n te deb~ra presentsr csda Juege ~e Formularies e~ Original Y cUBtro copias. En el caso de tratarse de Grupos de Empresas. Censercics 0 Coc~era- • t1vas de Expcrtaci6n. se deb2re presentar un Juego para 2l Pro;ra~a conJunto V adsmes uno por cads ur.o de Sus 1ntegr~nte5 • ..: ~ El juego de formulorlos deber~ ser ln~eQ:Bdo a maaulne. - Cuando el luger dis:onlble ruera insurlciente p~ra detallar le infor­ macion re~uer1de. se deberan agregar hoj!S fcitecopiadas del Original fol1adas en forma ccrrelativa. - ..... - Les Estado's Conti!bles deberan presentar.:;;! cert! ricldos ;::0:- Ccnt2::lor pubfico. - E1 juegc de formularies dab~ra ~er complet~do unicamente p~r aquella3 empr~ses cuyes ~rc;r~mas ccmprenuan los 012nes i~clu!do~ an 21 J~EX~ I Cy 11~tas compl~m~~tar125) del Decrete 17 6/!E • .. . - ~. -'-' ~  -54­ , p~nCRAMn E~PF.:i~L ~c ~~pcnrA:!~~ At~achmc:..1t 1 Page 2 D. 176 I 86 INSTRUCCIO~:S ?pnTICUL~~~S .- Presentacicn: La rirme del Titular 0 Repre,entante Legal dlbere estar certiflcada par banco 0 Escrlbana pucllca • • ) Se debers canslgnar en _1 cuadro OESCRIPCION DEL PRDGR~HA ESPECIAL DE EXPORTACION el detalle aolicitado de blen~. a exportar durante 1a tata­ llded de eftas que abar~ue el Prog~em8, entrndldo .' est. Gl Hmo como ·sumat.crie de Sase 2 Inc~!'mentC9. b) 1. columna PROOUCTOR aqIGINARIO el ml,me en cuadro deb2ra lntegr~~se unlcament2 cuande el so­ 11citante no sea e1 productor directo de alQuno de las bien!'s a exportar. En ~.1 casa deb~r' tam­ blen integrar el Form. 2 AN~XO • . ­ - Fom. :5 .) 2n e1 cuadra APERTURA ANUAL O~L .P~~GRAMA Y suces1­ vas, 'AND' SI! refiere IS afto del Progrem.:- EJ. AND I, ANO II, etc. - "b) en relac16n al cuadro APERTUR~ ~NUAL O~L PROG~CH~ --' 81 sall~ltahte tendrfi Ie poslbl1ld~d de deflnlr la I' I centldad de PERIC~OS a conslce~ar par cada·a~o de Pro­ grama a los e'ect.o, de la 1lqu1daclon: dz las bene'!­ - cly$ menc1cnedos ~n los incisos a) y b) del ART. 10C del Oec. 175/86. EJ. S1 llena los seis PERIC~05 sa con­ siderare Perlodo 8IHESTR~L. 51 completa cuatro se c~n­ .­ B1derar~ TRIM~STRAL etc. W los efectos de defInlr e1 PERIoea se so11:1ta oue . ;;., ctianda p.xls~~n perlodcs en los cue se hava cecidido"­ - no expol.'t2:" •. se complete con ceros e1 es;:acic cor:res­ pond~ente •. .•c) con el O!:::j!to de cerini:- los c:Jr:1ororr.1so!l ::e e'":::a::o~e _ parac~~a per!oco, los mi5mo~ c=be:r~n expressr!e cis ­ tln~ulendo en:re los valo::es co;rescon~lentr.s a la =aE~ y 81 INCREP~NTO" La rel~cl6n ~ara ca~a pe;~o~~ cntr~ ~~: se e Incre~ento no pOdre dire:l: de 1a prcocrci6n e~~s­ tente entre l~s mlsmcs para el total del ~ru~;s~o. ~~. 3A'iE Si para el total. ;!el Pro;ror.'l<:! r"':il~r.'::::.jr 0 • 2 • C'nt:r.­ ces eSQ rel~ci6n cebc;i v~rl~!c=rse en ~cco~ y c~~~ U~: . de los ?er!ccos. • rorlT\.·.~ !CEH ~nr~ 3; perc GnIc~m~nt~ d~b!r~ ser l~tc~r~~g ~or ~­ qU211as e~,re~a~ 'que sol!cl~en C'l :en~fi=10 ~~!c!~r~l NUEvaS M::r~c;oo 0 REC:';P!.:F!O DE 1'::t:!C.oOO!; P£::;~IDCl!! • •• i  -55- Attachment 1 Page 3 .:: t. ... ..: "'-',~:~...:: .,! zoci6n de1n~U~05 Imp'rt~~os n~c~sarla nar~ ~~~cu=~r el_l-:~­ mente comprom~tldo en el Programs. Pera cada pro~ucto exprcsar l~ c~~~~n~nte \m~~Tt~d8 como ooreentaje del valor rOS. - ;erm. 6 A .) En el primer cuadra de INrO~MACION rISC~L ~CTUQlt RE£~3OL­ 50S ESP£CIAlES 5e rerl~re por Ej. a los otor;.~05 para e~=ar­ ques·rea11zados deade puertos ~atag6nicos. b) en el segundo cuadra de Ir~F"O=!I'IACION nSC~L l1CTUAL. clJanda 18 empresa est' a~~arada por elgun A'glmen de Fromoci6n. oe~ ber' lndicarel Acto Administratlvo particular 'por eX cuel .~8­ clb16 ef beneflcl0. ·' Ferm. 6 e la RlCAU~~CIO~ F"ISCAL INC~£MENrAL a ca1~u12r. est~ rererlda a1 lmp!cto directo. es declr solo e l~ trlcutac16n deven;a­ de. en rorma diracta por la e~~:esa 5011clte~te. - ;orm. 7 a) en el CU!~l:O r.~E:V:'S Ir,'J;:R5Ii:lI~::5 debersn cascrl:;'l:!!!e en rorma resumloe las inverslones prcyectadss para e1 per!cda de vlgencla del Programa. b) En las inverslcnes prcy2ct~d3S no deber' c~nslderarse el gasto en NUEVA T~CNDlOGI~ lnccr~crada, el cual ceber' 1nclu· irse en el cuadra dise~ado a tal erecto •. . c)en el punto· II\VERSIONiS EN a::qUIPO O~ CFlIGEN Ir~PORT~OO del cuadra NUEVAS I~VERSIO~~S, lndloue a1 pa!~ de orlQan del mls­ mo. Form. a consldere H:::SES/Hm~3?E cemo e1 r:sultado de dlvldlr cantlead I\'OTA 1: 1) En rorm 6b art. '0 1nc. c c~:e f1curar a1 m~~to de p~e­ rln~nciac16n sollcltado, ~ue resul~a ~a a~licar lcs ~orce~· tajes de prefinanci~c1!n =ue asign~n 1:5 11sta5 :esoectlve5 de 1. O?RAC - ; a Jos'prccuctos del pr~~r=ma. 2) En form 6b el s~!icitente c;~era anexar los bor:adores de c~lculo utilize~os :Era confe::~~ner el cuadra ee Rec~uccci6n riseal. _... -- ..... -~ .,  -56­ Attachm~nt 1 Page­ '--- 4 Programa Especial De Expor~cion :: NUHlRO ~E 'HOJAI~ NOHut DEL SOLIClrANTE:_~_~~~____- , NUMERO DE R£f£R£NCtA [ NUKElO DE FORMULARIOS DE PR£SENTACICN Jnfcre.c16n del ScUcU:Jnt. ' 1 Z:ll'1lcrlpc16n del Pro;:.t'IIG Esp~clal dlt Capurlollc16... l ApltrLwn A....... l ....cl i"1".o;r .....v.lor :-:.l3 =0: P:ClCI.IC\;O "A!!)',rtwr:J AI"IU&! lid .. ,.oc;:-a... nec...",;;r" C:II :·... rcs::. P'r:U~:. - f~I...OIl ~I! rc:a:iC:¥ 5 I "swooo. p.r. 111 Prodw:e16n - J",~':rt:lel""II. , 6 1"ror... ;! 5" n.cal ClnCl;.,vll "01'•• b y !!) 1"".1"510n1'11 Pr:l,11 ¥=:Pd•• - 1~C'J.s rltcn:;lo;r.. e I-- I--- Ib::aal'cwsloN:' t..cc:l.~ lilt 1 P::,o~r."'¥· I) ~.ttlc:!pa:i6" II" d ~~:':.d:l 1(J -Inror!liu:16n ~o::lrt' Itl _read:l ~, d~'t!n? ('O.,'Ob~;Oc' 11 12 ...,,"t.Ja. I::u:'pa t1 Uv.'" 1111"1# -. Po,1c10.. C':J ..;:urU t1v, ("Of"ll. 12. Y 1211) r"::arcs./Pr~~r ... 1 , CII"dr::, dlt "~.~r1~ ... c16 .. ,. 110 (strl.let..:-. IS.. CC!:~;3 - . ar.do 112 ~v,'Qncc da 1:1 ,...·iOC! =='.6" d. 1:11 :;.pltr.:1:~". lid Proqrl!!'II•• .. t:STC'S .'a:"!1'Ar';UIlS rit.::;5:~M: FlItS£.!1i" "nst: AC(1!;.lIIl:;'::t'O: or: A a I _.:1 r: c:ec:1 0 --- £!\t:ltu~CJ:J tnc!.elc:' :011 tc."u "illS. (.shdlo1:: C::.t'lt4~"'.G Go: 10' :n$ tu~ "r.l'U::tl!~:.~!CM: u: ~ lo "0 II --1 (,lcrc1cioll rlo I C ~!: t.'}!')'S r:O"'~.t:i.: c,rr:-';",':I d U~ t :~O ~:,i·I!~~t. c::I.. ·~rcJ.1I1 1I.~~,,::,1or la re:C'l"'l3 10/:' s... nt... c:i~n. I':C' I (n III cr.:.;, c::: ::i~::..,s " 'Jt' ,,::!­ 0 ~'" C~:.'rt.. !It ::I'=l:le=~ jU"~lIr C:II:~ i . erll C!'l!"\t'!"~t: G'!.!:;t...,! ~ $. ':incu11'l. J .-­ [n .i C'~riC'rer d, Ti tuJ .. r/? ..:;.r"""nt .. na l.e,.. l <I" ]a fire .. c ... yos d.HOS U con5;'S"~::l en 1.. ~r"s"nte. clcl .. ro b~jo ;ur.~~nto aue :00" 1.. jn£or~"cl6n det.l:~c .... n:erle:­ efllce ~. ~". ec!'ae.a d., .•.•.•. ho:., Ie .justa· • 1. r~ll ic.ad 'f que :.. l:.r:. ~Uit reprc~~~tO/~~ 11 ~U. soy ci:~!&r. ~o se 'ncuc~:r~en ~'t~do de f:lr~el •• c~~~:~aQ d. ~IIO$I con:urso ciVll ~l e~~~Qc .. t~ril de .c~e.do:es. ~o te~:c"dc • !. !ech. CIU';.S c.l,:.~le~ et C::!"'~:tct !isc.. ; Y ;",rflvl.'lcn..ll, :-" Que e\':-::>le/C'\J~'fIJc ~O" teo':.S las ?r~~Cr~~Clopes ;~:res~=~~jc~:.s ,-los ~rtr~ulos ~l· ~l 6;- i~cl~slve. del C~~ p!lul0 III ,el ;S~"o de Cc~erejo . .A.s,jei.:e, :.e tc:""':.;:-r~~eto • ~ue C'\':'A1~..,ier :,\vd:.:i:AC;,.5rt t;v'­ S~ ~r~J;\,t.t:. 1:" .-:1! .. no 0 .n codos los ~ate~ aq~r ce~I~~-Jdos, ~~ri i~!::~~do de ~~~.e~i~~o a ~~~ S.~ret~~ra de 4srado. r ~OT u1t~=o c.~Jo ~oti!~e~~o r l :0::. 101 eC~e:es. ~ue 1a ~~ls~d~d e~ ~lrte 0 en 1101 t":.Ii:;~C! c!e. LI i1\;0:--:: .. e10:\ .:r.tlCr;.or:':'el"'ttc ~:.:::..rn5::.ca. s!.:'\\Ci,.ri 1. flil' =in.~i6n del rre~r~=a !s~pej..ll de t~:,ert~~l~~C' de :.3 ~i:~a ~U~ r~~r~tf"to y ~~l .u",cri;:HO, rl:'\u~ci .. r.~c , c·_.11~"'1*t' c:l.'t~e, ee re~l.~*". e. !'cr .. ~.1j"c!~ e:c;. =e~,e. por liS (~1tS.1!cs "~~..ll.1~.J ...  -57­ A1:'tachment 1 PROCRA~!A ESPECIA!.. Of: EXpO"TACION Page ,5 INFORMACION DEL SOtICITASTt· r ltAZON SOCIAL Doadc:ilio Calle t.oe.ali~ad c5d.Postal Tel. "Te 1 e x I CO'2lereial Legal •• de Inscripc:iSn en-el Fiehero d~ !xporcAdores: :' Hdmero de inseripeion en el registro de i~p~rtador- ._ exportador : . ' " I " Mics de antiluedad c:omo ~mportador-exportado~ , , ~_ TIP" Dt £l'!PR.!,g" Empresa Exportadora Empresa produc:tora y exportadora Compaa!. d~ Comereiali:aeioD Intern.eional CODsoreia 0 Cooperativa de £xportac:ion (*) Grupo de Empresas (*) 1 -'-.. -.-'-'---~.,. .- - - --------.---------­ t_r~m_i_t~~~5~.~~_i_=_l_'e_n_:_o_ -Fu.~:~o.n~r_i_O_Q_'c!_..:::~_e_~..:~_1._a__ - Cargo .. : - Hombre Antiguedad -.'­ Personal oeupaJo: .. . .' C*) En estos easos presentar ~dc~is un jueRo de formularios por c:ada int.C)i';rdnl:c • .... .. ­ .. _--­ .. ­  PROGRAMA ESPECIAL DE ExrOR1-AC}_ON f"JRn .... ­ :i,., NOH!RE IlL SOLICITANTEc IIUtU:IIO -I" El P UH EIITt I , tlUHERO DE IIOJA I r-- --1 ,--, L. DESCRIPCION DEL PROGRAHA ESPECIAL DE EXPORTACION Bien ••• Exportar ~lot.l d.l prolr ••• ) _ - _________________ ~ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4 ___ ~ _______________ .------------~ ____ • ______________ ~_-------------~------------------~ 'IODUCTO ,,' I I , I , f .',_:: ITodl.: Produc:tor .. : !lADE I I . \ _, :Prrdo rOB: VOLUH'?! flSlCO l Valor foa : ortlllnarlo () : ,DEStltUCION DEST..I I.i>-lPAlS) 'uoiorio ,UiiTcfid,' cantUa .. ,<.il •• ,U$5) , I 10 cli t • t.,. , • : - : . :' '. .:<\fo.bre de 1& bpru.). --------------~-----------------------------,---------·------7--r-----~----,----~-~----------~-----------,---------------------~I , I I I I , I I ' II I , I ' I I I I , I ' I , I I I I " I 1 I \ I lI ' : :.\ , I \ I , , " . - t I • • ...,~ • 1: • • t t I I .f""!,,;: .. ,. I t , I ' I , " , , , , " I ' , I , I -I , I ' I , I . I I , I I I. I I ., I I I -, I , , , ' I · : , : : \ 1\ ' I I : I I I ' I I , " I I I I " , I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I -I I I \.rI I • • I I • •t I I • ex:> , ' I I I I I I ' I I I : ' : : :: : I I I :: ' \. I I I - _____________ ~-----------------------------~-~-~----- __________L __ L_______ ~ ________________ ~-----------~----. , I ' . I -, 1 . J I ______________ -=__1 • - I ' r I I, I • Total ~xpo~t.cloo •• po~ '~Ol~ ••• , ___________ .!I . I; I I . (A) co.pletar cI.co. eG la hoJ. aGaxa ....... "'''IN '! """""~'F."*:"'t"'." •'" iN"a..... ''''41''.'1 "Ai ..,..,ih"b.,.i ",f1n\'\--rr.'Mt,'!\{M .~~\!l1.Fi1i ,1JN '~IJIf\'.'!(CH·fRi.ink '6Ut; .4~4 . ~ I ,. \J- ..' f . • l . ; • • I . , . fti ,4 : ",."t..II! """*. " • .. I".lI'1st' .i f' >. .:' .'r" .. t d u t. \ 0-0> III M' ()Q 11­ (I) III O\!; .' s (I), ::l M' .....  ..: >r,.t l- , PROGRAMA ESPECIAL DE EXPORTACION . For II. 2 ANr::XO l . NUHERO DE 1I0JA I. i. , p NOH8RE DEL SOLICITANTE: ,I" . /' j NUHERO DE EXPEDIENTE r' L I, , r r" .I INrEGRAR CUANDO LOS DIENES A EXPORtAR NO HAYAN SIOO PRODUCIOOS POR LA EHPRESA SOLICITAN~E. t: ~- : 1 , Nombre del ., t , F~ ~c~ 1, " ~~ ~' i 0~ , _.f..I:2.~I Ctor (Raz60 50£ is1) . t~ • 1. Dato!; J i \- ., , . • , I i '.~ Es Exportador lIabltunll ~.: , ~\ ---~ fxporta en forma directs1 f' < ., i I ~ N- Regiatro Importador/ • I I . ..J .: 1 .~~ Exportador D.N.A Desde cuaodo el productor exporta po r medio del solicitantel " I . I I J 'f'r , ,, . , t .j El prodl.ctor y el 8011citante I \ • , t '. 800 aociedades vlnculadaal I • . t ,. En quI! Climarll8 empre6arias se . I I " I, agrupa Is empreaa productoral \~ f ) • '':;omicll1o de 1. empre •• I I . I '. " ; J ~ • L, :1' . . TeHHono & I ' ~ J~ ',!' . ',~ .:h. . Hombre del'Cerente General, '\ I \ ,; II ~ ,.J ~'1:1i,., '~'l " ", .;'I,f"!!'" "'*'4"fI,"I iIF J: It. ","V'I."""'...... . '?i .....T:.'*'·If!+;pIlA· ... ." .Ip." 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BASE IIIICRE!'!.! BASE I INCREK .. · lASE: I:\Cru:~I.! .----- l -. -1---f--~-,-- .-:~,f" t ---'-------[----r---l-----!-~-[--l----l------·j I . I " I ., " --_.J --_1__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .__ "_ ----.---J~~~--_ L~.___t__ L_l__ _l.,_ ____. _ I , I 1 ._! : I I -----­ TqTAt • .' f "'II) ':. ••••• ::.... = :r;wt:.t:.! •• ,i .l-;;;;~~-l--ll-;;;~~~--.:-;:.::l:.;;~;~~~-~~l-;~;;~;--;-l;~;;~~~--;--l-;;;~;;--~-r--;;;~~--l .' r Ci (' I·· -- l --'!- ~-- '"":-. ­ r ;"lIl: illito.) DE 3 C!\l PC 1011 DZ:;Tltof'l IAS~ ~I t -(-~ t"CREtt ,lASE 'I ttiCREM lASE tHCREK,. I I 'AS~ tIlCUM. liAS! IHCREI11 USE IllC!U:t!1 USE.! ~!lCPl:H,:: -..,...r--r-r--~-r-,-~-r--r-~-;--l I I I I , - - , . - .... 1 0-­ ...... .. I " ,. I • • I '. \ I I " 1 i _J -.'" J ""'*'., ~. • It ~e .. P4. 4 4; an p, p, "'P4 (ii,•• J I \ij.,"',**";,.....,•••" J"" '. ,I 1M. :lvr'''~,p.1I 'II I· 1 ., ' II (r-''''r:'~'w.;;" e • • .,r" .. II I I I L-~ I · TOTAL " ,."flYif.!' ·IW,.... itl'f.. ".!if • ""'."'iF. • '=.c.t: ... ~ •• ~ • ., .. ; 'W 4(''IW"' - " .. ..-- .. --~ I " I 'j " "'1):­ III rt ()Q (0 rt III ('l \O::r' S (0 :;:l .) rt ......  .. -62­ )- J NOMSFIE oE:L. -.' ...... t.tJH£RO 01;; SOLlt.:IT;'~jfE:: AttachmlC.llt 1 Page 10 ! 1 e:",,"~c;,:E:NTE NI.If'\ER 0 De: HOJA: (.j INSUMOS !1"PORTllOOS ((YClUI005 9IENE5 OE cnpTTAl) Pare cada producto a exportsr consionar pertic1pac16n de insumos importades: , 1) Como % del prec10 ;CJ 2) tn U!S para toeo el Progra ma(base+1 nere mento) . l) En u3S 8610 pora el inc-emento de exo~rtac1ones. ,.) Considersr un1camente lnsumos importados ~lrectamente par el titular del Program•• PRoeucro u~s miles HADE 10 OESCRtPCION ~ Tat-aT eIGITO$ foe Programs !ncrem!~~ '. - .. ~ " . """--( . --' .:. / .' ./ _.. ------.------~~---------------------~__L-__-L_______  Attachment 1 . -63­ Page 11 rona. 6, PROGRAMA ES?2CIAL DE EXPORTr.CrON NOHBR£: OEL SOLICITANT£:: ". NUHERO DE EX~EDrENTe: NUMERO Oe: HruA: lJ.-..____ ACTUAL NAOE1D R ~ E M ea l 5 0 5 OERECHOS De: COMUNC;S ES?ECI'::'I..ES­ [XPORTACION DIGITOS "- " " . - ,. . . .' .­ .­ . - .. - ./ ' / , . . . I , e . . , , ;.. - e - - . . - . e - ­ - - e­ . '. ­ - . a. e' . . : REGIHENES' . DECRETO po~ EL' ~UC: -, 1:. • 3ENt:FICID PRO,.tOCIC~;.:lL;:S 51 NO rUE: OTORG':'OO A LA E ~~q:::s.:l Iri~USTR:AL 0' - ~ - IREG10NAl ISE'CTOq I AL I ~ - - : '0 OTROS 32NEEiICrOS 151 i.e DrC!!.} Bac): Acr::l!li~n Temoorar!a I f12t.es Insumo!! a oreeios !n;c:;"r:co1oneles Dtrcs (~e!!criblr) .' •  -, '" .)" " I " '. '.:~~, ... "i --.... " f!!QGR~~~l:._Q.e: . e:xPc:RT ACTON HOMBRE DEL SOLICITANTE: W)H£RO DE EXPEOtENTE NUHC:RO OE HOJA: I ·1 BENfrrCIOS SOLtCITQOOS O~CqETO 176/66 ARTICUt.O 10 INCISe it) ~( ~ J. " ARTICUL.O '0 INCIse b) =-! So t . :.: ARTICULO '0 INCIse c) : USS ........ (para el tetal dei Programs) ... ARTICULe 12 - descr1.b1r - : • _ _ _ -J - .. . ' -I ­ ;, RECAuDAc:rON F'lSC!lL PFIOOUC:IIJA p::q EL !NC=lE~NTO r::lE EXPCRTp.C:Ior:E:S ?RE'JISTAS E~ EL P=l::!S=..\MA (WFA-erO DIR!C'I'O) " -Expresar por procuc:to y come ~ eel veler fOa ­ ~ .- -. - to R d!gitos ' . . , TRIBUTQ • Gananc1es . - ~ '. Cap1 tales '¢," < Trans(• Oivisas . .- . Cer.IOus ti el-es " SebrE' f'letes . soere P:-ir:las de - . . Segura , Oerec:hos de . ImportaC:icn . Sabre Ensrg!a Electrica '" .. ' .; - Debi tos 8anc:arios • C£I:-gas Sc.-ciales Goere suelc:os y salarios - -. . Otres . TOTAlES I 00> I J II • Estimolldos . ........ . ,. ",  -65­ ,AttaChmen t 1 P 1{ 0 c r",::! A S t S I" r: C 1: At!:: S '0 E EX l' (') R T ,\ C I 0 ~ Page 13 NOH8KE JEL SOLICITA~!t~ ._--_.. _-------­ ---------------------------- MUHERO Dt EXPEOIENTE I~~·--I NUMERO DE HOJA: ~.------'. o NUEVAS I"VEK~!OSES . , Inversiones ProRram~das Miles de liol.>lres I)(\E' Zliio :JI! ... 1 9 •• . 19 •• 19 •• 19 •• 19 •• . , - En equipcs y ~ct1vos r1Jos de . Dr!;Rn Nacional: ,­ ,I . , .­ .'.- ­ ,I - . " - . . - > ­ . . - ,,' " .. . - - .' . Sub t • '. . . En equ1pos de cr1gen Importado . ,. .­ • -. .... .' . . / . .­ . -- . . . . . .. - . •. . - - ... .. ' . ..... - . - -~ :~ .. - j subt., I I Total I I '. Tip~ de Origen IErogacion csti~ad. l~x!~:~nC1~ creJia .su:'s:: Tec:nolo\;la (cais) en ::il.as de USS ,:.a.:. :.,:'" ­ en c1 ;'lars 51 I ~o '. ::,:~, S! ----- 0 :- , . DO . ~ . - . I - . . . -- --. - -- .. -- . .;.. ,-- . ,­  AttaChtn{'ut 1. HOMBRE DEL SOlICITANTE: '-66- Page 14 " .' NUMCRO C£ EXPEOIENTE . '-___J, • REP~RCUStONES LOCALES DEL PROGRAMA 'rMP~CTO HACIA PROVEEOORES LOCALES Deta1lar'les rirma8 prcveedores de insumos corres~ondlentes a los prOductos B Exportar. lncluye us' lS:"lIll.. importante •• 0 bien la& que <:ubr,'ln hasta ,d 75% del valor tocal. Ind1que ~ersonel ocupedo y 11 incr~mento porcentual de ccmp~ns Que re~uer1r' el cu mplimlento de la parte incremental del Progrzma. EMPRESA Pe:I1S(lN,~L ,.I NCR:: ~,:: NT 0 • . OCUPAOO OE COM:=l;:iAS 1 2 - -- .3 It , S 7 .­ . - 8 .­ 9 ." . . 10 11 - eo .. . 12 13 - - ,ft .. 1S . . " Indiesr el Incr~mento de mane de obra -lncluyendo horas extras y nuevos emol:os­ expresada en ~eses/hombre, para el cump11mlanto de los dos prlme~Qs enos del Progr~me. mues Ihombre:1L.._ _ -_~ , Ut1l1zac16n en !l u1 H:no semestre Ut11i:toe16n en e1 ultimo ,mea " Utll1z<!c:i6n prev1zt;:l oar8 e1 primer ana del PrOYl"oHne • " -" - ..­ •• >r ­  Attachment 1 -67­ Page 15 Form 9 PROCRAHA ESPECIAL DE EXPORTACION£S '. HOH~RE DEL SOLICITANTE: _________________________________________ I' "' ) KUKEJtO DE SOLICnUD: '[I..______....L NU~(ERO DE HOJA: J I______ PARTICIPACION EN EL MERCADO " i----------------------..------'.----.---------.--:---------. I EN KILES D'!: A A PRECtOS ~ ARo as: I IOU ll-12-8S : : A~O 84: 1 I' I , ~----------------------------1-------------~----- I 1 , I I I' I ____ ~ IVENTAS TOTALES DE LA E K - : : IEMPRESA (1) 1 1 'I I / I . I I I .- I I I -:_IVENTAS TOTALES DEL SEC- : / : ITOR I (n • - :I I

1 I I I f.,RO 8S' ARo 84 -,- Xe Vte '<I,' :, " Xe Export&ciones to-~les de 1& empresa r::, , - Vte: Vent&5 totales de 1& empresa I I • 1 : EN MILES DE USS : ~ ____________________________ ~ _____________ ~ _________ f ARO 85 ARo 84: ,~ . : I 1.-' I : I : I :EXPORTACION~S TOTALES D E : : ILl. EMPRESA ( 2 ) , 1 I, I 1 I I I I I I I 1 I I IEXPORTACIONES ;'ZL SE~TOR(Z) I I 1 , I I 1 " I I -------------------------------------------~--- ______ I (1) MERCADO LRTtR~O' + EXPOR7AClostS -,., (2) ISCLUYA SOLO LAS PARTIDA~ ARANCELARIAS CONSIDtRADAS EN EL PROCRAM)' " ... --- ~- ." II' _ •• , • . - ' ,,' ~.~ ...  At tachment 1 -68- Page 16' - FORM. '-:fo PROCRAUA ESP·ECtA.L DE EXPORTACION 0 ... HOHIRE DEL SOLICITANTE: NUMERO oe KOJA: L ___­ HUHE1I.O DE SOLIClTUD: ~~===== I..l .... ____-' : INF'ORMAC:YCN ~ODRE: E'L f.1!MC~O~ :»E OESTINO .. ' .) Im~art8clone. de .los palses destl~at8r1os de los productos del Progr3m a par NADE lnclu1da en .1 Pra;rama. Inc1uye pe1ses haste cubrlr e1' 75S, de sus exportaclo ne.s prev1st.as.' - en miles de USS ­ PAIS: - • • • • .. • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 -·----------i-----------i---~-------1-----------i-----------,~----------t------- PlO~UCTO: 19 1.!O=-'. !U.,t>E I - - I I 19~ " 19 I 19: I 19 .. '. I TOTAL .!_ _ _ --L._________L__......__-l ___.___J_________ " 1 . . .-,,,. I " . . '1.tO~ I VolUlllen 'U$5 11/0 1 'UmenI I O$S , lIo1uftleu' 'U$5 /I' I , yo 1 wneftl O$S. I. "olwnen' U$S I I I rvolu:':len; I ____ 1 ''1 I I ----~,---~-------------~-- I. i I , 'I " I I' t. __________ I ~ I --.' _____ .' I _h~~ I II ____ ~ : _____ I ~ : _____ " . ~_ , ll I I I I ' I I ," -I I" I I I I I I I , I I r t , I ' I I I I I I I I 1 I I I ." I I I ~ ," " I I t I I I I I. I I 1 .,1 J. I II ! I I I I I I , _ _ _--:-- _ _ ~ -I I I +- I - : - -...... _ _....._ _.....! _ .I ' I ! ! ' I . I ____ ...:....l_ • "0 PAI~: . ----------~--------- . _ . ... ,"r' ' 'I ! I .. •••••• I 1 .. I I ---- ------ I ----------.----_:-----.----------- I,"------------, ... I " " . . . e' • • • """ : : ••••••••• I 1'- I I .... I I - ' I I I •. I t I I I I I , I , I I I I I

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I I I I I I I I : I I I I I I , " ·)r·· I~' 1F! ,'! I ! ! 1 .! I I t I . I I I I ,_ _- 4 ._ _ _ _ ~_____ • 1 I I I __ - - - " ' - _ I I I . - . . . I ______""' _ _ _ _I_ _ _ _ ~ ___ ~- ___________ "':'"'J .. I I I I I : r : !»AIS: .......... ........ ...... . -------------.-------I-----r-----~------i-------------i------t------l------j------r------l " ., ..I " II· I·" I I I I ! i I I I I I I ., I : ! I ,., I I I : : : : I II I I " I, ! I ! I ! : I I I. I' I I I I l , I I I! I I I I I I ___ ~ I ______ ~ ______ I ! L______ ~  -fq- Attachment 1 ~HUljR AMI.\ t:: ~fJt: U ~Il 'I:. I:. xF' on T At ION Page 17 NOH8RE OEL SOLICITANT!: _... .......- - - - - - - - ­ "iUHERO' OE EXPE:OIENTE : [_ _ _ _ _-_._--J} ~UM(RO OE HOJA: ! ! b) Tendencla mundlel de les prcductcs e expcrtur segwn Programs: PROOUCTO CRe:CIMIE'~Jrc :l:CR::CIr-1I ENTO . ) NAOE 10 OIGITOS MAYOR A '0% ~:Et'lQ~ A 'O~' " '. I L .-,­ .. /' - / I .. I , . , ,; - '. ,. . . - . - . . . ' . . -. - .-­ - - _. -. : .. ' - , -. ,,#' .­ . - ." - j. 1 .. . • •  ... PROCRAMAS -70­ ~srECIALES DE EXPORTAClON " HOMBRE DEL' SOLICITANTt -----~.-.-.--, NUM!RO DE EXPEDIENTE: NUMZRO DE HOJ A: 1'-___-...;1 , . ." .. :. ) ~ ' '/ -, INFOt:HACION SO!RE EL MERCADO DE DESTINO .~ c) R6t1men de 1mportaci6n eD· los palses'de destino de los productes a n~.~rtar seian el programa • .. : . .i / :,G : -----,.------:-r-- -T,.) : CONV::r:tOS ~:-T~;---: 'I" ' • I . .-_____________ ...1 I, ' I ,, c:: :: :..!.b; : I I : !'AUtS , r NA1)t PRODUC':'O 10 d!gitos :::.: 'Col I e: ,g,,, : • : ', • I .:. .... : '2 ~ : I " .... 0 : Ie:.... : I I : ~::-;::-;;: :: :~~.:: ': !! ,~c::a. .... , ._. 1 1 I _' I I ' ... .... ,,,w',,,' "P41 . . . . ' ' ' ' ' ' 11.1 .. ' ... ... II I ""e ,~';.U , I 'I 1 oIJ'C::O'II' 0 I • c::a. I .... I -:' I ~ ... '" we: ' ... 0 I''''' • , I " • ::I I 1.0 II I . ' I i,''' .~ .. 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I , I' I, : 1 : I : I I 1 I I I I I I, 1 1 r I ' I I 1I I I .. - - -- . . - .. _. ----- .... ---- _____________________ ,____ J ______,.:..__ ...!... __ • __ J ____ .t..______ _ •  "L Lacuu,enL .I. , , . to -71­ Page 19 F'orm. 1., PROGRAMA ES~ECIAL ~E Ex=C~Tn~I~~ HOMBRE DEL SClICITANTE: MJMERC DE e:XPe:DI~JTE : [ , ---- ---.--'1 '. Para eompletar este cuedra eva~ue d~ 0 e 4 c~mo ~e eneuentran ccmoett~!,~ ~ente sus productos en relaei6n a los ce sus eo~petiecres 1nt~rn~clcn~:~ To~e en cuente Que: 0 signjries Que su producto ~sta en man1r.icsta C~S.:­ taje; 1, au prc~ucto se encuentra en clerta desventa)s; 2 sw procucto -: t1ene ventaja n1 desventaja en relaci6n a is ccmpet~nela; l SU Dro~~c:: resulta ecnslderablemente mas ventajcsc y ~, su produeto nc tlane eom~: ~ cia. ", - z z e VENTAJAS .... .... u u e we . ::: a: .... a: -. ­ HADe: 10 , ...0 e e:: u .... e:: .... :::. lloJ ;:: I"l: ") e:: c:: w 0 - CttI t::) o- a: .... ::J ctl _w 0 u ...... ,..., u>­ ..J e::u we:: ,:;: u z a: _z 0 .J ::J "., ..J W C roICiITOS . : a: e:: Q. U 1.1. 0 -- w ...J Z ttl c:­ U uo w ..J w In c: :E~ ttlU >­ w:::.. ww 0 ttl ... " ;.. . . , ..' . ­, . . , . .-, - - '. . .' , - , - .. . . , - ~ .. - .. . . - - ."'" . ." - . . . ~UNOfU'lc:rm:: SU EVALU:1CION EN HCJA ANEXA I -- I I I 4 .'.--.~  -72­ Page 20.. Programa Especial De Exportacion NOH9RE OEL SOLICn ANTE: NJf"!ERO DE !oiClJA: --,- - c) Segmentos de Consu~1dores/U~uar1os. , . -. :.. . ""' .. ~:,. .......... --_.__._- • • tti_ •• . .' .... ~ t'" . ' .... d) 01rerenc1ec16n respecto de competldores • .' .. . _. , ' : 3) PCln QUE' CONSIDERA UO. CU-: SU PRODUCT:J G~NAnA MERCADO RESP~-:::TO DE . sus COMPETIDO~ES 7 .-. 4) COMO PROMOCIONA SU PRODUCTO EN EL EXT~RI8R , -;.... ­ ., -_.'... - . ... . ~­  , -73­ PRor.n~Mn ESPEcrnL ~E EXnr,RTt.crnN Attachment 1 Page 21 NOl':SRE DEL SOLIClTAr.TE; Nur~ERO DE ExPEOIENTE NUM~R 0 DE HO.JA: POSICION COMP~rlrIVA 10ENTlr1QUE £N GENeRAL 5 e:~~RESAS DEL ExTE~IC~ ~~~~~CTO ~E LA5 CU~L~S • UO. SE CONSIOERA :O~~ETIDOR • NIl-'.3AE PAIS De: " EIoiPR£SA O~IGEN " 1 - 2 3 . 4 S­ . . .' I . .e:- '" ..' CONOCtr-UC':NTO D~L M~RCMO . . ... 1) HA~REALIZAOO ESTUOIOS OE M~RC~QO 7 I 51 I r INO I ] At-lO [1----1 2) CUALE5 SuN SUS CONCL US I 0:J;:5 S03R E:: ,~ a) E1 temanc del mercadc para suo lInea de prcductas • ./ .. - " ' .,.*'" b) Canales de 01strlbuc16n• . ; ....... " ••• ...... -"""'"1'1- - .-­ ~- -~ .. -- -~.-.~- ".--~ - '~~-''''''''-  : PROGRAMAS ES -74­ CIALES DE EXPORTACION Attachm,,'llt 1 " ~1-:~:1;1 0 L SOLICIT~Nrs:: ,Page 22 I j 1 - E6t~ucturQ c~",to nnuncl~:-c) oc contos cxprcsodQ bn ~. (antes de Imnu~~t~s y anteD de i:;;U:~CS TR::SAJO I~SW~aS c:;r;:as TOTAL t::lCe: OIGITOS CALIFICAOO, NO CALIFlC:~Oa .. " . - • . ~ .- -­ : . " .~ . , . - - - 0 : .. - -- , ," . . '­ :.' .. - ~ - -, :. . ­. .. - 0' - '" - -. - - . " .• . ..• ~:. - - . .. -. - - - GRADO DE ;vaNC~ ~E La ~~so~rn:!:~ ~~ L~S OpalACl:::;N::;S :::C::L r;';O:~'('::'A. -------- :'I..Cl,lc1o:; prcv1os . ....- - ! - - - - - - - - - - - ­ >----1----- - - - - - --- Cnntratos [lrma~oc .: ._----- --- ._------. En cJccuc1U'n  Attachment 1 Page 23 I ,1 ~ ., I N~~~E DEL 50LICIT~NTE: PROGRAM~ -75­ • ESPEClnl DE EXPORT~CTaN F'orm.· 13 . J N~RO DE EXPEOl~NTE NiJMERO Oe: HCI.J~: CANALES Oe: ljI5r~I9UCICN . ...... - - - -' c:a:: z CANAL .... c:a:: c.J - z 0 Q c:a:: 0 c.J..J .. - - a:o 15 c:a:: 2J c:::: c:a:: w ..... ;:e ~~ c.J PAIS Q wc:a:: (fl Q-O 5 c:a:: Oc.J a: .;r _ Q~ c:a:: ~- - ua: - Q I- ::I c:a::..J 2 c::::c:a::U _ _ <'t c:a:: U1 al C:w c:a:: I- c:a::~ Q- 2 'n (fl .c;: u z a: -w o:t n::: c: as 2cz: .... cz: -~ W - a: 0 Wl.., (J')- uc: Co. ! I ' W 0 i'! >- cr ~~ U1 ~ .... -a.. ~ 4: ....... c: .' ~. .... x: c.J1Il 0 trio I.o.W oa: W 002 uu- ~ 0 .- .- - .- I - - ~ . 1 .. - . - 0 . . . - , -".­ . . .. . -- . .- .. ... _. . . - .. -. " ~ .. ,. - . - ',.. . , . --" o· - .. - - - .~ . . .  -76­ Attachment 2 Page 1 ESTIMATION 'OF REAL EXCHANGE RATES 1. In order to better assess the management of Argentine exchange rate policy over time, estimates have been made of real, or purchasing power parity exchange rates for the period 1970-85 on a quarterly basis. Two separate real exchange rate indexes have been computed:, a real, dollar inflation adjusted exchange rate index (RER); and a trade weighted purchasing power parity exchange rate index (REER). Computational Procedure 2. The real dollar inflation adjusted rate index (RER) is computed as: (HER x.WPI l • (1) RER = us ar x 100 , (NER, x WPI ) ar us where HERar : Hominal Exchange Rate Index for Argentina, with the exchange rate expressed as A/US$ ; HERus = Nominal Exchange Rate Index for the US, as expressed in . US$, i.e., equal to 100.0 ; WPl ar = Argentine Wholesale Price Index and WPIus = US Wholesale Price Index. 3. The trade weighted real exchange rate (REER) is estimated as: :.E 1=1 Wi x In b (HER i x WPt~) (HER ar x WPI i ) J x 100 , (2) REER =e where = export weight for Country i in Argentine exports ; = ountry C its Nominal Exchange Rate index, with the currency expressed relative to US$; and WP1l = Country irs Wholesale Price Index. The REER measure includes' the effects of dlffering relative inflations across countries and cross_currency movements, e.g., a depreciation of the US dollar relative to the German mark. For these reasons the REER is considered a somewhat better measure of Argentine export competitiveness than the more narrowly defined real dollar inflation adjusted exchange rate index (RER). An increase (decrease) in either index indicates a real appreciation (depreciation) in Argentina I s currency. • Attachment 2 -77- Page 2 Data 4. The trade weights are based upon the participation of Argentina's total export market countries in Argentina's total exports. The countries composing the basket dre the United States, the Netherlands, Brazil, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The weights were derived from a three-year average, covering 1982-84. 5. The exchange rates used for Argentina were the official rates for commercial transactions and financial transactions averaged over the quarterly time period. Data from the Central Bank of Argentina, lNDEC and FlEL, were used for Argentina, and were complemented with exchange rate and price information from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) file. 6. Wholesale price indexes were used on the grounds that they reflect changes in the prices of tradable goods better than consumer price indexes, which include many nontradables. Estimates 7. The estimates of the real dollar inflation adjusted exchange rate (RER) and the trade weighted purchasing power parity real effective rate (REER) are presented in Attachment Table 1. Figure 1 in the main report text presents a graphic illustration of movements in the REER,  Attachment 1 -78­ REAL EXCHANGE RATE ESTIMATES, 1970-85 (1970 • Ion) ( I) • (4) {S,4 (bl Arg..ntina Unl t ..d Stat ..s A/US. A/US. AlUS. ---------------­ Real E;~ .. Real E;;. Nominal E>:chang.. Exchang.. Rate Whol ..sal .. E,·,change Whol ..sale Rat .. (RERI Rate (f~ER) REER REER Y.. ar Rat.. (0('(' A/US.) I nd.." Financial Comm..rc,al Financial Commercial F'r,...:e Inde>: .....tll' Ind .. >t PrlcII' Inde" Indll'>:' I FinanCial Inde:: 11 Com....... ctal Index/2 Index I::: Financial CommerCial " 1970 01 0 .. 000'350 t) .. f)(u)3S0 92.9 92.8 90.7 100.0 99.3 99.4 98.4 99.0 99.(' 197(. 0:2 0.000"358 0.000358 95 .. 0 9~.1) 95 .. 7 1.00.0 99.7 101.1 101. 1 100.5 10(' .. 5 1970 03 (J .. 0')0400 0 .. (H)t)4t)<~ H·b.1 1('6.1 101.9 )00 .. 0 100.4 95 .. 7 9~.'7 97.() 97.0 1970 04 0 .. ()(It)4t)O 0 .. O(u)4(\I) 1('0.1 1')0.1 111.6 100.1) 1(u).6 1':-4. b 104.6 1 (l-:: .. .2 10-:: .. :: 1971 01 0.00(141)0 0 .. (\()04t_H~1 1')6. I 100. 1 1..... ('1 ..., 100.1) 1')1.8 11 L :. 111. ::; 107.0 1(\'7~(I 1971 Q2 t) .. t)O(l4 1 :; 0.00('41 : 1,:'9.4 I n 9.4 1::0.::' 100. I:' 1~'::. 1 115.b 115.b 110,(; 11(1. I) 1971 03 0 .. 000492 1).000474 130.4 1=5.~ 148.1 100 .. 0 103.9 109.3 11'3.5 lo5~q 1971 D4 (\~ O(H)79S t) .. (1)(-5(*0 2')8" 3 1::2.6 159.6 lr)O .. !) 10::.9 n.7 115.8 76.6 1')5 .. f) 1972 QI Os tltJ('958 0 .. 0(10500 254 .. 0 13:.6 ::'): .. :: .... ..,....... iliff 100 .. t:. 106.0 75.1 143.8 7b.4 121)" 4 1972 Q2 O .. OOf)ge~ I) .. (J(lf)5(H) :261.6 1:::2.b ..;..J_ .. ..J 100.0 1')7. 1 93.0 le3.7 91.9 131. 8 1972 03 0.000996 O~t)00500 264.:: 132.6 2e.2 .. 9 1(") .. 0 109.7 91.5 182.4 89.0 144.2 1972 04 ').000998 O.OOO'!:iI)O :264.7 n2.b 289.3 1r)f).O 1':>9.8 99.2 199.0 93.5 151. 7 1973 01 O. (-0')998 0 .. 1)005('(1 2b4.7 132.b 33:' .. 0 10(1.0 115. I 109.: 217.9 1('"::.5 lb8'(­ 1973 02 O. (JI)0998 O. 0')(''5(1(1 264.7 1:::.6 38') •.: 100 .. 0 12~:'. i 119.0 2':7.6 99.4 15~,,1 1973 Q3 0.000998 O~00050U 264.7 t::2. b 383.9 1 elf) .. t) 1:25.0 115 .. 5 :31)~5 95.5 154.9 1973 D4 f). 000998 0 .. t)(JOSOO 2b4.7 13:.b :'85 .. 7 11}0 .. 0 12b.7 115 .. (. :::9.,~ 99 •. 0 16('. b 1974 Qj O .. lH}0998 ').0005')0 264.7 1'3: .. 6 390.4 100 .. 0 13~ .. 1 1(19~ :! 217.9 93.1 151 .. (I 1974 Q2 0.000999 ').000500 264.7 132.b 418 •.3 100 .. (~ 139.9 11:.9 :25 .. 4 95.9 155.b 1974 03 0.000999 0 . . 00(;500 264.7 1.32 .. 0 459 .. 7 1 ()I). t) 149.9 115.9 231. 4 100 .. : 162.b .1974 D4 0.000999 t) .. 000500 264.7 132.6 510 .. 7 1 (H). 0 155 .. 1 124.4 248·.3 1('::.6 16b.5 1975 Q1 O. ('011b9 0.000607 :1(} .. 0 17b.8 6:(' .. :. 100.0 155.1 1':'7'.0 226.2 103.1 152 .. : 1975 Q2 0.001926 ,) .. 001444 511 .. (1 383.1 824.1 100 .. (, 150.b 103. (, 1:::7.4 88.7 1('8.5 1975 03 0.003970 1).003144 1053 .. 1 834.0 1594.9 100 .. 0 160.0 94.7 119.5 98.9 1(14 ... 5 1975 04 0.005189 0.003715 137b.3 985.5 :::164.4 100 .. 0 1 b 1.7 97.3 1313.. 8 89.9 11::.4 1970 01 0.011889 O.(j2:?5~6 3153.6 5993 . . 5 4020.4 100 .. 0 16:2.!:i 79.5 41. 3 77.8 49.b 1970 02 0,,024975 0.0:24975 6624.7 6024.7 7414.1 100.0 164.9 b7.9 67 .. 9 b9.7 09.7 1970 03 0.0::5106 O.t)Z511)6 6659.5 b~S9~5 8935e3 10;). t) 167.0 90.::; 80.3 77.') 77 .. 0 1976 Q4 0.1)25886 0.0:5887 68bb.4 696b.5 1('803. :: 100 .. 0 168.4 93.4 9:,.4 94.3 84.:: 1977 Ql 0 .. 0:306'39 ~).030e38 8126.9 8126.9 13880.5 100 .. 0 17:2.0 99.:::: 99.3 98.b 88.6 1977 D2 0 .. 036539 0 . . Q36539 9692.0 9092.1} 1639b.l 1 (If)" (, 176.2 96.0 96.0 86.::: 8b.: 1977 Q3 0.043000 0.0430(n) 114C15.8 11405.8 20487.7 1 (H)G U 176 .. ~ 101.8 101.8 89.5 89.5 1977 D4 O.(t~::'779 !}.05"3779 14265.1 142b5.1 :::6994.4 1 (H) .. (1 179.6 If16. Cl 1('6.') 89.3 89.3 1978 QI 0.005063 ('. t)oSbo': 17417.: 17417., .3:::434 .. 5 u 1t)(J. 182.8 10~ .. O 10:i.(' 86.7 8b.7 1978 02 ().076905 o. i)769(l5 :1)399* 1 20399 .. 1 4:280.5 10u"l) 188.4 110.0 110.0 91.3 91..3 1978 03 -) .. 082588 (1.08::588 .219(lQ.5 :1900 .. 5 50870.0 l(H) .. I) 191. 7, 1:1. 4 121.4 94.9 94.9 1978 04 o. ~)937t)O (,)" 093700 :::4854. I :4854. 1 b4091.8 100.1) P';'~. 7 133.0 133.0 99.9 99.9 1979 121 0.108548 O. 1<:'8548 :B792~5 2879.2.5 8::;330.3 1 f)t) .. tJ :O~ .. 8 141. (. 141.0 10b.0 10b.0 1979 02 0.124157 0.1:4157 J~9~'3"O 3:29'3.'3 .. (J 103774.3 1 (u) .. (I: :21)9 .. 9­ 150 .. 1 150.e 1 111. 9 111. 9 1979 03 O. 140088 <). 1 41)(.88 ::1158.5 37159.5 13679:.• :: 100 .. I} :216.5 170.1) 170.0 1979 Q4 119.8 119.8 0.155161 1).15~He1 41156.8 41150.8 15':'853 .. 5 11:~O. (, :24.1 lb6.8 166.8 198(' ;) I 119.3 118.3 0.1'08887 0.108887 44797.5 44797.5 171798. : 100~ I; 234.4 Ib3.b 163.b 120 .. 0 l:?O .. O 1980 Q::: 0.180090 0.180091:> 4 7Gl''30. f) 479:'.1). I) 190797.8 10(,. I) 171.b 171. b 119.2 119. ::: 198" 0:: ').18903" i_I .. 189(1-:6 5 1)14::.1 5014:.1 ::'::14:"b 1(10" 179.3 179.3 I) 12b.7 l:b.7 191:lu C14 0.196b04 ,). 19"1:>1:>4 5=IQ5~4 5~105.4 :45775 .. 8 luO.1) 18b.7 18b.7 l:::b.7 136.7 1981 tH o~ ::::01(,9 o. ':::'::(11()9 58384.3 58384.3 :::09420.9 li)Oau 259.0 177. I 177. I 137.1 1:::7.1 1"81 02 () .. 374028 f). 357~79 99:'71~' .. ~ 9471:>8.9 :,5441:~ 4 10') .. ,) '::05~9 1::::4. 1 140.6 120 .. 3 1:24.4 1'1>;;1 03 1.) .. '713739 '.'.51 ::-441 189·::':() .. 0 130 I 'f 1. 3 4977::~.~ II."). (J ::oa~ <) 98.1 1::;0.4 1981 (.04 94.7 119.2 ·j.985073 (J. 081)48(1 :01451.8 18,)498.0 63:641. :; 10t)~ I) 267.8 90.4 130.9 1982 01 87 .. 0 112.8" 1. ('291:>41 1.029,,41 :T3114.4 ::73114.4 838549.8 1(u) .. 1.1 ~7('. 1 113.7 113.7 198':' D" 105 .. 6 105.b 1.3b7437 1.::07437 ::0::715 .. 3 :~:'15.: 1041960~f:1 1 (H) .. 0 -:71) .. 5 It:lb .. :: IOb.2 198.: 0', 102.3 102.:: :;" S(H)80(, 2.448791 1(//)8109 .. 8 649546. 7 1770:0:. 1 (10. tJ ::7':: .. (' 04.8 11)0.5 198::' L!4 73.1 99 .. 5 ~. til?:: 198 3.9~993: 11:1:710&.: 104:395.7 =58e77~ .. 1 100 .. (J 9:.7 91 '3 90.8 99.9 19H-:-, t)1 5,,8'53898 5.85=899 15S:75B.~ 155:~58.: 3716931)~6 1 (U} ~ I.' 87.9 97.9 8b.7 9b.7 198::. Q2 7.E!:288::1 7.928e21 :010010.3 ::07661CI.:;' 4949:;94 .. (' 1 (H). (t 87.3 87.3 86.6 86.b 1983 I). I') .. 761:' 10.7 0 1= =S544b5 .. 1 ~854465.1 7549b93.Y 100 0 9-5.q 95.9 95",1 9~ .. 1 1983 Q4 17.81bb 17.8166 4725897.4 47:::5897.4 1:5710~1 1()f)~ I) 90.0 96.0 9b.9 96.8 1994 01 27.8391 ='.8381 7:841:0.: 7394120.2 19258489 1(J(J.U :80.::: 93 .. 0 93.,1) q~.:! 9:.2 • 1984 0:: 41.1800 41. 18UO 1(.9::::077 10923077 ::1998882 100.0 :282 .. 1 11)3 .. 9 103 .. 8 102.e 10: .. 6 1984 03 09,.::(1) oq .. ::::(11) 1838'7:08 18387:69 53599187 100.0 .281 .. 5 l(),:'~ b 103,,6 11)0 .. 5 106 .. 5 1984 04 133 .. ::1:'-::: 1::3.:1::: :'5::::510:: 89504019 10Cl.C. 281.1 90. 1 90.1 98.4 98.4 1985 C'1 .249 .. 98f)~) :::49.980(. b6:('7,,92 b6307b9:! 15850:6:4 100.. (I" ':80~ 1 85.3 85 .. 3 94.1 94.1 1985 0:: 552.83:::: 140b40141 14bb40141 :5:;981::':­ 100 .. 0 280.4 8b.6 90." 9:.8 9:::.8 1995 03 80 1 ~ 1)1)1)0 801. 0(1(11) :;1~460844 ::124b0844 4782:::1817 100.0 :78.'3 80.9 8C•• 9 8'!.~:; 87- .. 5 1995 04 8t) 1 • (H)I)O 801. (tI)(.,:. :12466844 21241:>b944 491)112788 11)0.0 :::80.6 8~.2 8:.: 81.3 8t.} Notes: .'1 Thll' real dollar-,nflatlc>n ddJusted e;:change ..... t .. lnde:: is, IS computed "5: '­ See tll'>:t for estimation p .. ocedun,. An Incr .... sll' ,n RER and REER .nd.ces .ndlcates a raal appreCIatIon. Sources: Computed fro,~ In~ormatlon TrOff, the Interna.tl0nal F.nancial StatistiCS, the Central eanf' o~ ArgentIna. FIEL, .nd INOEC.  -79­ Attachment 4 DISTaIBUTION OF IMPORTS AND REALIZED TARIFF COLLECTIONS BY TARIFF LEVEL (JANUARY - JUNE 1985) ~ Nominal Share of ImEorts (') Share of ImEort Duties Collected Tariff Cumulative Cumulative Level Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution .~ 34.0' 34.0' 0 0 °' 0.0' 1-9' 6.2 40.2 2.8 Z.8 10' Z5.1 65.3 19.5 22.3 11-20' 11.7 71.1 15.5 37.8 21-30' "'.5 81.6 8.3 Cf.6. 1 .' 31-37' "'.0 85.6 10.5 56.6 38" 13 .1 98.7 38.8 95.4­ ~ Greater than 38' 1.3 100.()$ "'.6 100.OS Source: Estimdted from information supplied by INOEC • .,-.-"1"""'".-_. -, "----:,,.- -'" . -:--- 7--- ... ,  -80­ Attachment 5 . Page 1 REAt%ZED TRADE TAXES AND.SUBSIDIES.ANB ANTI~EXPORT • BIASES. BY PRODUCT CATEGORY (JANUARY..;.JUNE 1985) , AVI. NitAVI.Avl. AVI. Nalinal , Exports Export Export Rulizld MOlinu Aati-&part el~ort Ex~ort Export Tu .Subsidy Subsidy Tariff hriH Biu Sec.th. __ 0 ~aaaaa= Ducriptioa a Risc •• SilPles AustrillS US. (000) •• •••••••• , 111 (000) 428 ..... _-_.._-----... !I,orts US.(OOO) 12S Tues SuGsidiis Ratl A (0001 . A (000) (1) 0.0 Rit. It) 0.0 Ritt (1) Rattil Ratei2 Ritli3 11) 0.1i (1J (1) 0.0 '""".",'''aa:an-==-.U. . i 0.0 0.2 1.0 i I • 3.0 .­ , 1 1 Livi Aninh 1162 2ns 2294 140.3 9.1 12.1 O.S -11.3 5.S 5.7 16.9 1 2 R,at 50622 114304 813 1669.3 507.3 1.;; 1.0 -2.3 7.9 7.9 10.2 1 3 Fisla %7625 69S95 3601 909.8 1928.2 2.9 7.0 4.0 7.1 8.2 4.2 , 1 4 Dilry Products 9020 21750 2318 1167.1 0.5 14.0 0.0 -14.0 10.0 16.3 30.4 1 5 Bristle lLas 2706 966 177·0 0.0 14.9 0.0 -14.9 6.7 7.0 21.9 2 6 Tubercl,s, flow,rs 1 4 243 3.1 0.0 19.0 0.0 -19.0 17.8 17.8 l6.9 .. 7 Pr:lduCl 11518 31894 1163· 713.4 3.9 6.2 0.0 -6.2 9.5 9.5 15.7 " 2 8 Fruits 40145 17m 11341 404.9 26S2.5 1.0 6.6 5.6 7.2 7.1 2.1 2 9 Coffel, t!i, spices 10031 26116 31Q.44 1565.0 0.0 15.6 0.0 -15.6 0.5 10.9 2b.S 2 10 Car!ils b611817 16Z2S50 114 1341)09.2 23.1 20.1 0.0 -20.1 1.9 5.1 25.9 2 11 Flour 3009 11622 290 311.9 0.0 10.4 0.0 -10.4 19.5 19.5 29.8 2 12 Setds, ail Sttds 2l11S7 362082 4897 ~b621.2 0.0 24.5 0.0 -24.5 8.7 S.1 33.2 2 13 Rllin, rueber 4 13 55112 0.1 0.1 3.9 3.6 -0.2 12.6 11.1 13.9 2 14 Dsier, baICoo, raff 15 44 713 2.6 0.9 17.7 5.9 -U.8 10.4 10.5 22.2 J IS Dil, qreasl 217243 50141.l6 2944 32344.3 0.0 14.2 0.0 -14.2 10.9 13.8 28.0 4 16 Cillntd qats 31550 76797 27 S12.8 152.9 I.S O.S -1.3 S.8 9.S 10.1 4 11 Sugar, tandies 5325 13149 534 288.6 0.1 5.4 0.0 -5.4 14.9 11.2 22.& 4 IS Citla 9 30 21436 0.2 0.0 2.1 0.0 -2.0 5.1 16.2 18.2 4 19 Putry, c:raciers 17J 389 l12 5.7 0.1 .. . .J.1. 0.1 ·3.1 8.9 ' 10.8 14.0 20 C1Rned vegetables 12742 2S404 l490 tSl.3 960.0 1.2 7.5 6.3 22.2 22.3 16.0 " 4 21 C1Rned extritts 292 S69 1088 b.9 IS.0 2.4 5.1 2. a, 15.4 24.5 21.8 4 22 ~lcohol, vineqar 4056 10826 7371 3i.l 91.1 0.1 2.2 1.3 10.l 10.l 9.0 4 23 C1Rald tl aun 911179 246n3 19711 11084.4 1.1 11.5 0.0 ·11.5 9.2 9.2 20.7 24 Tab.u:::o 14830 lO161 13l :059.7 0.0 ll.9 0.0 -13.9 13.8 19.9 32.1 " 5 5 25 Silt, sulphur, etc. Z6 ftltallurgic lineral 1~6 1929 3496 5699 12139 28122 130.9 150.2 34.3 39.1 9.4 7.9 " ., '".1. 2.0 -b.2 -5.8 10.9 2.6 15.1 111.8 21.3 22.6 5 27 Rineral Tuels 6!S6U IID98 205089 39879.8 0.0 60.a 0.0 -00.8 11.9 17.4 n.2. 0 28 Chllita! ele.lnt! n80 18196 S0674 35.3 267.4 O.S 'S.7 3.2 6.1 16.S U.S :: 29 Chet. OrganiC Ilel. 211&04 13n9 192049 2r.1.8 384.1 0.9 1.4 0.6 5.6 9,6 9.1 0 30 P~ar.aceutical gaad t967 4962 21m 2S.0 48.4 1.5 2.5 1, I) 12.6 30.7 2'1.7 II 31 Fertilizers 56 111 3S~2 2.9 0.4 4.9 0.7 ~4.2 2.7 9.4 13.6 0 32 Paints, dyes, et~. 32&4 20576 18212 50l.3 20.9 0.1 0.3 -s.s 19.8 19.5 25.4 6 .!.: ~oSl.tits, ~erTWIes 1459 4404 32SS n.2 0.0 5.3 0.0 -5.3 24.5 29.3 34.6 6 34 Soaps 192 548 :;,,17 2.3 7.5 1.2 ;.9 2.7 21. 2 22.1 19.4 b 35 Slue, caseIn 1!43 2771 5766 as.4 S.O 7.l 'l.4 -0.9 ll.7 17.0 24.4 b !O Explouves . U6 &9B 14Q4 0.0 9.0 G.O 4.0 4.0 ZO.l 2S.S 24.S 6 r7 Pllatagrlll~y ~ 38 Other Chetieals lS47 2943 8007 8270 l~a49 &801S 24.G 1.9 124. q 107.2 0.7 u.l ~.S 3.6 ... 2.3 ..1 ..... 20.4 9.6 20.5 15.0 17.7 tl.7 7 li Plastics 7405 17231 10918 10.1 27S.4 0.3 ~.7 3.4 21.6 23.6 10.2 7 40 Rubber products 7465 16116 Z66-J9 12:.8 216.4 1.7 2.9 1.2 19.0 ' 19.9 19.r a 41 Saddlery 4m4 123323 72 0484.8 7.9 13.1 0.0 -13.1 12.0 12.0 ... ZS· 8 42 ~eatner goadS 2164 5353 ;03 ~0.4 0.7 2.8 o.a -Z.8 2.8 3a.0 40.7 a 41 Furs 2b40 6000 21S 81.9 IS5.9 3.1 7.0 l.11 21.6 11 •.1 17.0 9 44 ~aod 401 U60 1S913 B.9 12.9 1.9 2.a 0.9 t6. b 17.l 16.2 '1 45 Cork products 4 7 1470 1.0 0.0 22.7 0.0 -22.7 12.1 12.1 34.8 9 40 Slra. products 0 0 - 19 :).0 0.0 IS.2 0.0 -IS.2 lO.O lO.O 48.2 10 47 Pulp 4762 10263 ~811 . 13.9 143.0 1.6 l.O 1.5 17.1 11.2 lS.7 to 48 Ptptr products 1526 3910 :4843 a.6 ~3.7 O.b 3.5 3.0 11.1 22.8 19.5 09-,1\a.,· -~-- -- -"- ;-;,:::---- .. -~-~~!-.--.,~".". -.', - ,. -- - ... - -. - --,," , --- - ' -r .. ~;··'-.--~·"-~~; -~ --'---;-:""'<"'- '--, -"-~-:-, '. ...  -81­ 4 ... Attachment 5 Page 2 -:; ·~ ; REALIZED TRADE ~AXES AND. SUBSI~IES AND ANTI-EXPORT 1 BIASES. BY PRODUCT CATEGORY ~JANUARY-JUNE 1985) ; .. b •. Av •• lI.t Ay•• Av•• Nauul " Export Expart Ezpart Rulind 1C0linil· AIti-Export Exparts uport Export Tu .Si&Illid, SlllIsid, TuiH TutH -SiH i ! AllstrdlS USJ [Illorts Tun SlllIlidin R.h R.h R.t. Rit.il RlhJ2 Rthil ______...=== _ _....______..-=_ _ _ _ _m S,c.Ol. (000) rOOO) USJ(ooO) A1000) A (000) III II) D.scr i pti all _............___-=s_us._ II) III II) ." 9•• 18. t 16.1 10 49 Printing • 6rlpbici 3022 7911 4530 14.B 74.9 O.S 2.S 2.0 11 SO Silk products 0 0 11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.6 21.6 21.6 ~ 11 51 Synthetic t.ltilts 297 690 m4 0.8 ll.& O.l 10.7 10.S 2lI.6 33.5 23.1 11 52 ".t.1lic teltiles 0 0 13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 lO.l 30.1 lO.l 11 53 .oal products 409S3 126714 634 am.7 34S4.0 IB.6 7.4 -11.2 4•• 18.1 29.3 11 S4 Linen products 0 0 S40 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.7 24.7 24.7 11 ~ Cottall teltiles 42680 45n4 126S 155.D 172.2 0.7 0.8 0.1 15.9 20.1 20.0 11 56 ather syntbehc to 304 728 14449 2.Z 39.7 0.7 13.1 12.3 23.9 27.2 14.9 11 57 Nltural fibre to. 0 1 3200 0.0 0.0 19.9 0.0 -19.9 10.l 10.l ~0.2 .. 11 5& Cupets as 208 412 0.0 3.4 0.0 4.0 4.0 &.2 lll.l l2.' 11 59 Felt 1&9 4~ 3893 O.l 6.9 0.2 3.6 3.5 27.0 29.4 26.0 11 00 Knittin~ qoods 264 '56 865 5.2 7.7 2.0 2.9 0.9 9.4 ~.2 35.3 11 61 .'Ivin, qoodl 127 3S9 l728 0.1 4.3 0.1 3.4 l.4 2.5 22.0 18•• 11 62 Othlr ,,"win, toads 51S ~402 l34 1.2 20.2 0.2 3.9 l.7 20.5 38.0 l4.3 11 63 R.,s 0 0 292 0.0 0.0 20.l 0.0 -ZO.3 ~.2 ~.2 4S.S 12 64 SIIaes 303 670 659 ll•• 0.1 4.5 0.0 -4.4 ll.8 :7.1 31 •• 12- &5 Hits 3 B 4t 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.9 3.6 tl.4 15.1 U.S 12 &0 UlICnlhs 2 8 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0 0 1.0 12 67 Futller ~oods 3 7 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0 0 I~O -, II OS Stan. ~oads 304 788 4002 B.l 0.5 2.1 0.2 -2.5 22.1 10.4 n.9 1l 69 teratic! '19 294 6767 0.8 2.9 O.B 1.0 2.1 8.6 24.4 22.2 .. 1l 70 Shll 902 2086 5650 1.4 u.a 0.1 4.6 4.5 26.5 27.2 22.7 14 71 Jell.Iry 52 134 l490 10.5 0.0 20.3 0.0 -20.3 Il. :r 13.l 31.6 , 14 72 Cains 0 0 ll1017 0.0 0.0 0.0 C.O 0.0 11.9 22.5 22.5 · 15 n Cut iran ~070 1l~500 21155 249.5 2905.2 0.5 5.l 4.9 2.7 29.0 24.1 15 74 COIIpar ~1 99l 2U6 1.4 14.1 0.1 3.2 2.9 9.1 12.S 9.6 15 ~ !Ucill 1 ... 3153 0.0 0.0 0.0 2•• 2.6 29.1 34.6 32.0 I! 16 ~Iulinul !98So '" 5l1COil 417 227.9 2l70.0 1.1 12.0 10.9 to.7 10.7 -0.1 t5 i7 !llqnllllla i) 0 3l 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 :8.1 le.l :s 7B Llld 0 0 102 0.0 0.0 0.0 O.? 0.1) ~.2 35.2 35.2 15 7'11 Zinc 3L3 :079 :349 0.0 64.9 Ii. ~ 8.0 B.O 5.0 19.5 11.8 1: t10 Tin iI 0 2807 D.O 0.0 0.0 2.: ." ... " 12.1 lS.6 13.~ :5 at Dther letil s 0 0 12964 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.3 32.7 12.7 15 a2 Taals 1743 jil7 3070 11.4 62.1 0.7 1.6 2.3 D.S 36.0 31.2 · . 15 Sl ather .tt"l ;aads 16 84 ~i'hlnery • Fixture 3'" . 4 34642 il17 75974 35Q833 101S4O 0.8 299.7 12.7 1148.6 0.2 O.S 1.9 3.1 1.7 Z.S 14.6 13.0 19.; :1.7 15.7 19.2 16 85 fticbintryJEnqines 12:r7 u77 }391 21.3 364.1 0.2 l.9 ---3.7 4.S 38.0 l4.1 17 B6 Transport lichln.s 194 591 112889 0.) 7.1 0.0 1.7 1.7 26.7 311.1 32.6 17 87 ~utclobiles l Trlct 14606 ~65Q9 ~426 110.1 505.1 o.a 1.5 2.0 4.2 12.9 10.2 17 B8 ~ir Transport Equip 114 1~8 lases 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 10.l 10.1 17 B9 ftartti •• Transp. 3164l 109380 526S8 0.0 1918.1 0.0 6.1 6.1 14.2 . 16.' 10.8 18 90 ?rlcision Equip. 191B ~549 m61 21.9 00.7 1.1 3.: 2.0 12.4 12.8 10.S :B 91 ~.tch" 69 195 11112 1.0 1.3 1.4 2.0 0.0 14.7 16..... 16.0 18 92 ~11Cll tnstrUl.nts S8 11~ 126 1.4 1.0 2.S 1.7 -0.8 14.2 16.3 t7.1 19 93 ~Iipons l AIlIlRIt. 148 341 JS6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 4.1 ~.6 ~.2 . l4.1 20 94 Dther Furni tun APP 20l 475 753 o.~ 5.7 0.2 2.8 2.6 1.5 ll.9 11.3 :0 'S Carvld goods ~4 97 2:6 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 ~1.5 n.b l7.l :sa. a ZO 96 3r1.11hn - B 14 5075 0.4 0.0 S.o 0.0 -5.6 15.8 17.8 2l.4 20 f7 Tays 106 Z47 17U Q.2 3.7 0.2 1.5 l.l 34.4 ~.2 . 31.9  -82­ Attachment 5 Page 3 REALIZED TRADE TAXES AND SUBSIDIES AND ANTI-EXPORT BIASES, BY PRODUCT CATEGORY (JANUARY-JUNE 1985) Aft. A¥t. _It A¥I. A¥I_ _ 111 • uports upart uport uport Rillinc Molinll ~i-£xport upart u,art Tu .Subsidy Suisidy T.riH Tififf atu Austral" US. !lports TUH SubsidiH btl Rite RI~' RIt.!1 Rltlll btl/3 . \ _I.'... hscript~01I 1000' . (000) .......s:a.aa.._ _..__ 1151(000) A 1000' A1000' .........._......._-=--aa__.. III (1) n.) ­ III ......... (1) S 1"1 _ _ _ • (1J .. ZO 91 "isc. ftanufltturia, 146 m 0.0 2.1 0.0 l.a 3.8 19.6 19.& 1S•• 21 99 Art QbjtCts " 24 52 o ,0.9 0.0 3.9 0.0 -3.9 0.0 0.0 l.9 " .. - TOTAl.' ....- _------ .- ... 1891061 4373159 1903971 302169.6 21609.5 16.0, 1.1 ~ -- - ­ -14.8 12.9 19.6 34.4 lot." 11 Thl IVlraql fllHnet tift ff fltl is difillid md Istiuted II illlcrt tu collections dhidtd by tbl ¥Ilul af illlarts. 21 Thl IYlraq' ~OIill.l tififf flte is :Ilcullted IS tnl IYlr.,1 f,aLizlC tariff fit" IICtpt that tififf lI",ttd i.perts if...cluded. 31 Tht ftelin,l mti-t.part bill rat,. ,.prilled a, • percent"t af FOB ¥Ilul. is lQ&ll to tht 1¥1r.,t lIalinlL tififf tinul tht ntt ..part subsidy ritl. SaurCl' Catputed fra. ,lNDEC infcr..ti~n.