Upper Volta - Urban Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFI('lAl. SE ONLI' Report No. 7032 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURKINA FASO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 766-BUR) December 1, 1987 Western Africa Region tJrban Projects Department This docu.ment has a restricted distribution and may be uised by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents mav not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency = CFAF Franc (CFAF) Year Exchange Rate Appraisal Year Average US$1 = CFAF 245 Intervening Year's Average US$1 = CFAF 303 Completion Year Average US$1 = CFAF 345 ABBREVIATIONS BND - Banque Nationale de Developpement - Haute Volta CCCE - Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique CESAO - Centre d'Etudes Economiques et Sociales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency CNPAR - Centre National de Perfectionnement des Artisans Ruraux FAC - Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration FED - Fonds Europeen de Developpement FONASEN - Fonds National d'Assainissement et Entretien HER - Hydraulique et Equipement Rural KfW - Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau ONE - Office National des Eaux OPEV - Office de Promotion de l'Entreprise Voltaique ORD - Office R6gional de Developpement SACS - Service d'Assistance, Conseil et Soutien UNDP - United Nations Development Program FISCAL YEAR October 1 - September 30  FOR OFrOCAL USE ONLY TH1 WORLD eANK Washington. DC 20433 USA ON,Cc CO D0sdnii-CAW(AI Opetitwm IvEahAImHn December 1, 1987 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUFIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Burk4na Faso Urban Development Project (Credit 766-BUR) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Burkina Faso Urban Development Project (Credit 766-BUR)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoat World Bank authorization.  <A,  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURKINA FASO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 766-BUR) TABTE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface . .................................................... i Basic Data Sheet ................... ii Highlights . ................................................. iv I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1 II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ...... 2 A. Origin and Formulation of the Project .............. 2 B. Appraisal ......................... . . 3 III. IMPLEMENTATION .................... ........... 5 A. Credit Effectiveness and Start-up. . . 5 B. Project Revisions .... . 6 C. Implementation Performance . . . 6 D. Covenants and Reporting . . .......................... 11 E. Procurement .................11..................... ll F. Costs .............. 12 G. Disbursements ...................................... 13 IV. INSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ...... 14 A. Institutional Aspects .. 14 B. Economic Reevaluation ..16 C. Cost Recovery and Affordability ..17 V. CONCLUSIONS ..... ....................................... 18 A. Bank Performance ........................ 18 B. Lessons Learned . ................................... 19 ANNEXES 1. Photographic Record .......................... 21 2. Schedule of Disbursements . .......................... 27 3. Economic Analysis .................................. 29  0 46-10 .Ilole
rl,-
-7
t
? V
 i BURKINA FASO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 766-BUR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE 1. This report presents a completion evaluation of the Urban Development Project financed by Credit 766-BUR for US$8.2 million, which was approved on January 31, 1978. As of July 31, 1986, US$5,635.54 was cancelled from the Credit. 2. The project was slow to start up and experienced a number of delays due to technical and policy problems. By and large, however, the project met its objectives and it can be said that the project has had a significant impact on urban policy and development in Burkina Faso. 3. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this Completion Report was read by the Operations Evaluation Department but was not audited by OED staff. The draft Completion Report was sent to the Borrower for comments; however, none were received.  e(<  ii BURKINA FASO TIRFAN DEVELOPMENI' PROJECT (Cr. 766) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT iASi- OVATA ,SFEET KIFY PROJECT DATA Appraisal. Actual or Item Estimate Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US% million) 10.84 10.82 Underrun Z --- Credit Amount (US$ million) 8.2 8.2 disbursed --- 8.2 Date Physical Components Completed 3/81 3/86 Proportion Completed by Above Date 36% 100Z Proportion of Time Overrun --- 120% Economic Rate of Return 34Z 24 - 322 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revision Est. Actual Frist Mentioni in Files -- -- 3/26/76 Issues Paper 3104/77 * Decision Memorandum -- -- 4/14/77 Negotiations 7/05/77 9/--/77 Board Approval 9/--/77 -- 1/31/78 Credit Agreement Date -- -- 3/16/78 Effectiveness Date 4/31/78 -- 2712779 Closing Date 12/31/81 12/31/83 12/31/84 06/31/85 12/31/85 12/31/85 CUMJLATIVE DISBURSEMENTS (US$ million) Fiscal Year Actual Appraisal Est. FY 1977 0 1.4 FY 1978 0 4.8 FY 1979 0.9 FY 1980 1.5 7.1 FY 1981 2.2 8.2 FY 1982 2.9 FY 1983 3.8 FY 1984 5.7 FY 1985 6.8 FY 1986 8.2  BURKINA FASO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 766) Mission Data Date No. of No. of Man Specialization Performance Trend Type of Mission Mo./Year Persons Weeks Weeks Represented Rating Problem Identification 2/76 5 2 10 Preparation 4/76 2 1 2 E,e -- -- -- 9/76 3 2 6 E,e,f -- -- -- 12/76 2 1 2 E,e -- -- -- Appraisal 2/77 6 3 18 e,E,A,F,F,s -- Post-Appraisal 7/77 1 1 1 e -- -- -- Pre-Negotistion 7/77 2 1 2 e,E -- -- -- Post-Negotiation 11/77 1 2 2 E -- __ __ Subtotal 12 43 SPN 1 2/78 2 2 4 E,e 2 2 T,O SPN 2 5/78 1 1 1 e 2 2 T,O SPN 3 7/78 3 2 6 E,e,F 2 2 M,O SPN 4 11/78 3 1 3 E,e 2 2 M,O o SPN 5 3/79 1 1 1 e 2 2 M,0 ' SPN 6 5/79 1 1 1 Management Mission 3 3 M,O SPN 7 11/79 4 2 8 A,E,S 3 1 M,O SPN 8 4/80 2 2 4 E,A 3 1 SPN 9 11/80 2 2 4 A,E 1 1 MOP SPN 10 2/81 1 1 1 E 3 1 MOP SPN 11 7/81 2 1 2 A,E 3 2 MPO SPN 12 11/81 2 2 4 A,E 2 2 MF SPN 13 5/82 2 2 3 A,E 2 2 MF SPN 14 9/82 1 1 1 A,E 2 2 MP SPN 15 4/83 2 3 4 E,S,F 1 1 PM SPN 16 10/83 1 2 2 E 1 1 PM SPN 17 2/84 5 2 10 E,A,U,e I 1 PM SPN 18 6/84 5 2 10 E,e,F,F,E 1 2 PM SPN 19 10/84 1 2 2 E,e 2 2 PH SPN 20 6/85 1 2 2 E 2 2 PM SPN 21 9/85 2 1 2 E,A 2 SPN 22 12/85 1 1 1 A 2 A: Architect E: Engineer S: Sociologist F: Financial Analyst e: Economist  iv BURKINA FASO IURBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 766) HIGHLIGHTS 1. The Urban Development Project was conceived as a follow-up and expansion of a successful squatter upgrading project supported by UNDP in Ouagadougou. The project became the Bank's first experience in the country's growing urban sector and one of the early urban development projects in Africa (paras 2.01 - 2.02). 2. The Urban Development Project was supported by a US$8.2 million credit equivalent (Cr. 766-BUR), which was signed in March 1978. The total project cost of US$10.82 million equivalent provided for squatter upgrading, sites and services, water supply distribution, construction loans, social services and community facilities, and technical assistance to municipalities and the central government (paras 2.04 - 2.05). 3. The project was slow to start up and suffered delays due to disagreements on standards as well as to other technical and managerial problems. This resulted in the closing date of December 1981, being revised on fcur occasions, until it was finally achieved on December 31, 1985 (paras 3.02 - 3.04). 4. A number of revisions took place during the life of the project: while the water supply, construction loans and community facilities components were only partially completed, the number of upgraded plots and sites and services was greater than projected; the technical assistance components were probably the least successful (paras 3.09 - 3.17). 5. Given the variations of the FCFA vis a vis the dollar over the life of the project, the actual project costs came to FCFA 3.26 billion or US$10.2 million. A total of US$8,194,364 of the IDA credit wes disbursed, and only US$5,635 were cancelled at the end of the project (paras 3.20 - 3.21). 6. For the components that were completed, the economic reevaluation demonstrated a slightly higher agregate ERR than that estimated at appraisal (paras 4.06 - 4.10). In spite of its delays and shortcomings, the project by and large met its objectives, and has had a significant positive impact on the country's urban policies. A second urban project is currently under preparation.  -OM> ."I V  - 1 - BURKINA FASO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT COf1PLETTON REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 101 At the time of the preparation of the Upper Volta Urban Development Project in 1976, Burkina Paso, as it is now known, was one of the least developed and most rural countries, with less than 9% of its population living in urban areas and a per capita CNP of US$110. Despite its predominantly rural character, the country had experienced a sustained, rapid urban growth since inclependence in 1960, of about 5% per year. Periodic droughts and slow growth at the rural economy contributed to the capital of Ouagadougou growing at about 7% per annum, compared to the country's yearly population increase of 2.3%. About 80% of the urban labor force worked outside the formal sector and had household incomes averaging CFAF 10,000 or US$40 a month. Underemployment, illiteracy and poor health were the rule in the squatter settlements that began to surround the commercial and residential centers of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. These settlements were characterized by very low densities (40-90 persons/ hectare) and a total lack of any urban infrastructure or services. Of 58 standpipes in Ouagadougou at the time, only four were in the squatter areas although these accounted for more than half the city's population. 1.02 Building upon a successful squatter upgrading project supported by UNDP, this project became the Bank's first experience in the country's urban sector and one of the early urban development projects in Africa. At the time of Board presentation, the Bank Group's contribution to the development of the country consisted of 15 IDA projects totalling US$89.4 million. Most of these projects were related to agricultural and rural development following a strategy dict .ed by the extreme poverty of the country and the need to raise productivity in agriculture and livestock, on which the bulk of the population depended for a livelihood. In addition, there were a few projects developing basic infrastructure necessary to the economv, such as road construction and upgrading and telecommunications. 1.03 The Urban Development Project was supported by US$8.2 million equivalent (Cr. 766-BUR), which was signed March 16, 1978. The project was slow to start up, as evidenced by the effectiveness date of 12/2/79, and took much longer to implement than originallv estimated with the closing date of 12/81 being revised on four occasions until it was finally achieved on 12/31/85. These delays were due to disagreements on standards and other technical and managerial problems as well as to continued political unrest until the present regime came to power in August of 1983. Nevertheless, the objectives of the project were met by and large and it can be said that the project has had a significant impact on urban policy and development in Burkina Faso. I'his project completion report has been prepared on the basis of:  (a) visitq to the field and interviews with local officials; (b) quarterly reports and draft project completion reports prepared bv consultants to the project unit; (c lock dvcuments including the appraisal report, loan documents, qupervision reports and others; and (d) interviews with Bank officials involved with the project. II. PR0O.llC'' I1D)=TIFICATlON, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. Origin and Formulation of the Project 2'01 Tn 1973, with the assistance of the UNDP, the government naunched a three-year experimental program to improve the living conditions of p or urban houseliolds in Cissin, one of Ouagadougou's older squatter settlemaents. This effort succeeded in upgrading some eight hectares of land inhabited by 266 families and provided 600 serviced plots. It demonstrated the feasibility of providing low-cost infrastructure and housing through self-help and community participation. Legalized tenure stimulated private investment and neighborhood participation although financial aspects susch as cost recovery for infrastructure and recovery of loans for housing improvements were less than satisfactory. In November 1975, the Ministrv of Public Works convened an international conference to evaluate the Cissin experience and to determine its applicability on a larger scale. On the basis of this evaluation the government adopted the Cissin concept as the cornerstone of Its policy for upgrading squatter areas. 2.02 Following a reniiest bv the Minister of Public WTorks at the end of 1975, a Bank identification/preparation mission took place in February 1976. The mission recognized that the government's policy towards the urban sector based or, the "Cissin Experience was one of the most realistic and enlightened that the Bank has vet encountered" and a project building directly of that experience, which would require a relatively short preparation period was identified. In order to address the problem of em'iloyment it was proposed to closelv link the project to a DFC project which was pre-arpraised at the time of the identification preparation mission. Tn addition, the proposed project would also build upon the efforts of UN agencies such as UNICEF and WHO in the field of social services, and of CESAO and Canadian assistance in the development of neighborhood savings and loans cooperatives called "caisses populaires". 2,03 Preparation of the project was characterized by a great degree of coordination withn the DFC project, regarding urban employment, and of enordination with UN agenieies, concerning the urban and social services There were visits back and forth between TYNDP and Bank staff, and a UNCHS member participated in preparation and appraisal missions. For a while the idea of a single, integrated DEC/Urban project was pursued, in spite of the complexity of such an enterprise and the differences in the level of preparation of the two projects. Eventually, the Artisan, Small, and  - 3 - Medium Enterprise Project was appraised separately, although the two projects remained closely linked and mutually supportive. The Government requested a US$100,000 advance from the Project Preparation Facility for aerial photographv, preliminarv layouts for sites and services and squatter upgrading areas (12 man-months) and a studv for the extension of water distribution systems. Two more preparation missions followed the identification/preparation mission during 1976. The appraisal misslon took place ir February of 1977. B. Appraisal 2.04 The project as described in the staff appraisal report was as follows: (a) Upgrading: Provision of basic urban infrastructure including water supply, drainage and earth roads to approximately 11,000 plots in existing squatter neighborhoods, covering 432 hectares in Ouagadougou (7,000 plots) and Bobo-Dioulasso (4,000 plots); (b) Sites and Services: Preparation and servicing of about 1,100 new plots, a planned residential area covering 50 hectares adjacent to the upgraded neighborhood in Bobo-Dioulasso. A pilot site and service area for 100 families will be developed in Gaoua; (c) Water Supply Distribution: In addition to the upgraded neighborhoods and sites and services area, water supplv will be provided to some 20,000 persons living in three other squatter neighborhoods in Ouagadougou; (d) Cnrnstruction Loans: Financing of loans for housing improvements and start-up construction; (e) Social Services and Community Facilities: Rehabilitation of 65 schools and 17 dispensaries in both cities; construction of neighborhood community centers, and markets, a pilot community development project to finance experiments in community education, public health and women's activities; and purchase of insecticide, spraying pumps, and a small truck for insecticide spraying in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. (f) Assistance to the Municipalities: (i) technical assistance for: - training maintenance workers; - improving management and tax collection procedures; - reorganization of technical services; and - expansion of housing offices; (ii) equipment: - garbage trucks for the Municipality of Ouagadougou; - tools for vehicle repair, carpentry, metal works, and  - 4- conetruction; and -~ ehicles and equipment for municipal housing offices. (iiI) relhabilitation of the Ouagadougou municipal garage for r.iilltenance vehicles; and [ix)8 tfart-up costs for garbage collection in Ouagadougou and in.ecticide spraying and municipal housing offices in both cities for t7wo Nyears. IJ) Assistance to the Department of Town Planning: (i') technical assistance for project execution; (ii) consultant services for feasibility study and detailed engineering and design of the project, and preparation of a second project during project implementation; (iii) start-up costs of the Project Unit within the Department of l'rbanism for three years, from 1978 to 1980; and (ix') purchase of equipment, supplies, and vehicles; and (h) Monitoring and Evaluation: Local cov'sultant services for sample surveys and case studies of the perfo.-mance of project components during and after project execution. 2.03 The total project cost was estimated at US$10.4 million. IDA's contributioni of US$ 8.2 million would cover 100% of the foreign exchange costs (US$6.0 million) and 71% of local cost. Funds for sq dtter upgrading sites and services and other civil works would be relent by the Government to the miunicipalities at 6% interest for 17 years with a 5-year grace perind during which no interest would accrue. Funds for school and clinic rehabilitation, the public hygiene program and technical assistance would be passed on to the municipality as grants. Funds for technical assistance to tie project unit and for the pilot community development fund would also be pto,ided as granits. Overall responsibility for project execution would lie with a project unit established in the Department of Urbanism of the Ministry of P'ublic horks. T'he municipalities, however, would be responsible for their respective components, as would the National Water Office. Coordination 'or pro4ect execution would be assured through an Interministerial Coordinating Committee. The project brief recognized that "formidable personnel and resource constraints, coupled with the weakness of executing agencies, emphasized the high risk nature of this project". This assessment turned out to be quite accurate,  -5- J T. 7NP! FME TATION A. Credit Effectiveness and Start-up 3.(1 The Credit Agreement was signed on March 16, 197/8. The special conditions f'or effectiveness included two articles: (a) signature of financing agreements regarding on-lending terms with the municipalities of Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou, the water authority (ONE) and the sanitation maintenance authority (FONASEN), for the execution of their respective project components; and (b) the issuance of legal opinions establishing that the above subsidiarv agreements had been ratified, executed, and were legally binding. 3.02 The date for effectiveness specified in the credit agreement of June 30, 1978 was revised several times. The signature of financing agreements and then the issuance of legal opinions, both suffered delays. The delays resulted from a slowdown of the decision making process due to the lengthy change-over from military to civilian rule, as well as from unfamiliaritv with the complex, cross-sectoral process. The credit finally became effective on February 2, 1979. 3.03 Some of these problems of internal communications carried over into the start-up of the project and new ones developed, resulting in further slippages with regard to the implementation schedule. One of the most serious problems that arose was the Minister of Public Works rejection of infrastructure standards agreed upon at appraisal for upgrading, in favor of higher standards; he also refused to agree to changes, in what was seen bv the Bank, as inadequate management of the project unit. The Mnister's public disavowal of the agreements resulted in a lack of enthusiasm of other executing agencies about their participation in the project, and a confusion and loss of momentum by the consultants that had recentlv been contracted to undertake detailed engineering and begin the technical assistance. 3.04 Thus, bv March 1979, the estimated project costs had increased from US$10.8 million to U7S$12.5, largely due to the delays, and disbursements stood at US$0.14 million instead of US$4.0 million estimated at appraisal. Bank staff and the Minister of Public Works were deadlocked and, at the request of Programs, the project was declared a prob:em project in April 1979. High level compromises involving Bank management, that led to a series of project revisions, were arrived at bv the end of thc year.  -6- h. Project Revisions l o! A nunbler of revisions were introduced to the project largely as a result of in?stitutional problems and disagreements on upgrading standards PW pll-ey issues. Tnitiallv, the squatter upgrading component rm.a into difficulties when the Minister of Public Works, as mentioned above, objected to the infrastruicture standards agreed upon during negotiations, -i:d particularly to those concerning the circulation and storm drainage network- The Minister favored wider roads in a standard grid pattern over the "soft" upgrading with a narrower primarily pedestrian network devised to minimize the demolition of Pxisting dwellings. After extensive discussions and delays, it was agreed to proceed with the upgrading of the Cissin neighborhood in Ouagadougou, (200 ha) as with Sonsoribougou in Bobo-Dioulasso (132 ha). Eventually the project undertook an extension of Son,soribougou (110 ha) that had been started by the municipal government on its onm. The Zogona Gulley channelization, as well as the upgrading of the surrounding squatter settlements (100 ha) was dropped in 1981, however, when the Government reclassified the area as an administrative zone for the future extension of the university. 3.06 The funds made available by the reduction of the squatter upgrading component were proposed to be reallocated to increase the sites and services component. Thus, in 1982 a sites and services project was proposed in Ouagadougou to relocate the larger number of families resulting frord the more radical upgrading scheme adopted in Cissin. The 78 ha site was located near the squatter upgrading area and was eventually extended by another 600 ha. Similarly, the Bobo-Dioulasso sites and services component was also increased from an initial 50-65 ha. The 100 unit sites and scrvices in Caoua was completed and not extended. 3.0, Two other components were dropped in the course of project implementation, for different reasons. The water supply component which proposed :o extend existing distribution networks to some 20,000 families in the low-income neighborhoods of Tampouy, Tanghin, and Hambadallaye, had been included in the project on the assumption that the city's production uf witer would be increased by 1981. IWhen this was not accomplished by the untional water authority (ONE), it was decided to exclude the component due to insuifficient water supply. The decision also reflected differences on standards and on the method for preparing detailed engineering. The home construction loans component, which was intended to support the upgrading and sites and services activities was dropped from the project, within the conitext of the policv disagreements between the Bank and the Government. The Government's position was that recovery of the loans would be too difficult and politicallY sensitive. C, Implementation Pcrformance 3o0 Project implementation was estimated at the time of appraisal to tak-e about 3.5 years. The schedule was designed to maintain the momentum of site preparation activities that were underway. By December 1977, the site plan for Cissin had been completed and consultants for the detailed  - 7 - engineering had been recrujited. Th is wa s a I hbeing financed by a ]1']F advance of UIS$300,000. In retrospect. tht proposed schedule seems somewhat ambitious as artual implementation took closer to 0.6 vears. At the end of the initially estimated implementation perind. only a little over a quarter of the credit (L'S$2.2 million), had been disbursed, mainlv for consultants and equipment. Project implementation improved after the first closing date extension, and permitted the subsequent e),ten ions of the H using date. These extensions were also justified in order to concludle the various components that were being executed. The overall extension of the credit also resulred in the 9lmost totaj disbursement of the credit. Physical Components 3.09 Aside from projecr revisions and delays in implementation mentioned above, the phvsical components at least partially met their objectives. The balance for the sites and services and squatter upgrading components is positive. For the reasons explained above, the number of units upgraded in squatter settlements slightlv decreased, but the number of sites and services utnits was considerably augmented. Thus, the total number of units for both components was 25% greater thian estimated at appraisal, going from a projected 8,096 to 11,831 units actually built. This was achieved by the re-allocation of funds between the two components, following the project revisions and by the transfer of resources from the two other physical components mentioned above (see actual vs. estimated project costs, para 3.20). The actual vs. estimated number of units and areas developed for the sites and services and upgrading components by city are shown in Table 3.1. 3.10 On the other hand, the social services and communitv facilities was onlv partially completed: while the 60 schools and 17 dispensaries in both cities were largely rehabilitated, the neighborhood community centers and markets were not built. The latter were intended to be built under the last extension of the credit. The project available funds were substantiallv diminished by the Thanges in the currency rates however, and it was decided to emplov these resources in the improvement and completion of the shelter-related components. As stated, the water supply distribution and home improvement loans were dropped from the project and the development impact of these components was therefore not realized.  - Table 3.1 Sites and Services and Squatter LUpgrading Appraisal Estimates vs. Actual Construction Ouagadougou Boho-Dioulasso Gaoua Total units Ila. units ha. units ha. units ha. Upgrading proposed 4700 317 3080 132 7780 449 actual 3891 20)3 3457 235 - -- 7348 438 Sites & Se rvic es proposed -- -- 1126 50 100 5 1126 55 actual 3365 180 1018 66 100 5 4483 251 3.11 As mentioned above, design standards for squatter upgrading and sites and services was an issue that led to disagreements between IDA and the Government. The original proposal envisaged a demolition of no more than 10% of existing dwellings, with a road network of narrow streets adapted to the organic layout of the settlements. The government argued for a regular, orthogonal layout with wide boulevards which would require substantial demolition. The compromise arrived at after lengthy negotiations had residential land use coefficients of 51% (low) to 64% (reasonable) compared to the average 68% proposed at appraisal, but also fewer and wider roads of up to 20m and 25m sections. This involved excessive demolition of existing dwellings, which were easily enough rebuilt, but also the destruction of over one hundred large trees which are not in abundance. Table 3.2 shows the land use coefficients for all the subprojects lot sizes averaged about 375m2, as opposed to 300m2 envisaged at appraisal.  -9- Table 3.2 Land l'se Coefiicients Residential Rnads Community Total Facilities Ouagadoutgou Sites and Services 62.77 31.17 6.2% 100% Upgrading 64.17 25.47 10.5% 100% Bobo-Dioulasso Sites and Services 61.57 33.87 4.77 100% UTpgrading 57.57 33.57 10.1%< 100% 3.12 Another issue that affected the projects in both cities was the poor design of storm drainage. There were two types of design problems that resulted in damage to infrastructure that required fairly extensive repairs. In the upgrading and sites and services in Bobo-Dioulasso and in the upgrading in Ouagadougou the design of the storm drainage systems responded exclusively to the project site requirements without taking into account the larger area or catchmn-nt basins they were located in. In the case of Ouagadougou, the relatively flat project site was repeatedly flooded until the drainage sYstem sections were enlarged to allow for faster evacuation. In the case of Bobo-Dioulasso the newly 'irbanized project areas increased the flow of storm waters downstream chat resulted in the flooding and damaging of the older, densely populated Colma neighborhood. 3.13 The second proolem in both cities, involved testing an idea (of the designer/builder) that turned out to be a rather bad one. This was to cut the storm drainage channels, in areas with a hard laterite surface, direct]y in the sandstone without the concrete or masonrv surfacing that is applied in parts where the earth was softer. This short-cut in the name of economy, resulted in severe erosion of the channels and even the roads that run along in some parts and threatened culverts, bridges and other works as well. In consequence, fairlv extensive repairs had to he undertaken, diverting funds from other project components that were intended to be completed during the last phase of the project, such as the community facilities. Non-Physical Components 3.14 Of the non-physical components onlv the proposed monitoring and evaluation was not carried out. This component intended to engage local consultant services for sample surveys and case studies of the performance of project components during and after project execution. This was due  - To - f St to tlhe dL Lnys i the injl I emet-It ion of the she)ter sub-project whICh l ed to the p)ostppciement t of Lhe component, and then to the lack of ecntlius)a