India - Second Bombay High Offshore Development Project

Domwsat of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6237 r PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA: SECOND BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1925-IN) June 4, 1986 Energy Department This document has a restActed distributin and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offical duies Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoridtion.  THE WORtLD BANK FOR OMCIAL USE ONL We.ton. DC. 20433 U.S A. Ohkce iW OwttmG.wf June 4, 1986 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India - Second Bombay High Offshore Development Project (Loan 1925-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on India - Second Bombay High Offshore Development Project (Loan 1925)" prepared by the Energy and Industry Staff. Uhder the modified system for project performance auditing, further evaluation of this project bY the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attacbment This document ha a iwatricted distribution and may be esed by rscipwats only in the performance of thein oMWl dutie Its conttnts my not otherwise be discsed without World lank authoriztion.  FOP OMCIAL USE ONLY PROJECT CoULEION REPORT INDIA - SECOND BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1925-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Basic Data Sheet ii Highlights ............................... .................... ........**........ ....... iv ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ............ 1 III IMPLEMENTATION .................................... 2 as Background 2 b. Changes in Project Scope 3 c Implementation Delays 3 d. Achievements of Objectives ............................ S e. Project Costs 5 f Disbursements 6 g. Performance of Consultants 7 h. Performance of Contractors 7 IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE .......... .......................... 8 V ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE e....................* . VI . INSTITUTIONAL PERRFORMANCE ................ 10 a. Background 10 b. Organization and Management 10 c. Project Management ........11 d. Management Information System ......................... 11 e. Staffing and Training 11 f. Conclusion .........12 VII. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE S................ 12 a. Operating Results 12 b. Balance Sheet ......................................... 12 c. Financial Covenants ............... .................... 14 VIII. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK ............... 14 IX. CONCLUSIONS .......... 00000000000000.0.0...... 00000000000015 This document h a ttod distibution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officil dutiea Its contents may not othewis be diclsed without World ank authorztion.  TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. Annexes 1. Project Casts ............ ....e.*eee 17 2. Comparison of Estimated & Actual Project Costs .... 18 3. Balance Sheet ..............., 19 Income Statement **,****..... .... * *.... 21 Sources and Applications of Punds ............... 22 4. DCF Rate of Return .*e.*. ..................*.....** 23 5. Financing Plan .e..o*......o..o* eee*****eeeee 24 ATTACHMENT A - Comments received from the Borrover * **.... 25 MAP - IBRD No. 15183  - i - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA - SECOND BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1925-IN) PREFACE This report presents the results of a performance audit of a Bank loan to finance part of the cost of the development of the Bombay High oil field. The loan was made to the Government and onlent to the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a Government-owned entity. The loan, in the amount of US $400 million, was approved on December 8, 1980, and fully disbursed in April 1984, about 12 months behind schedule, but with 92X of the loan amount being disbursed within the scheduled time. The proceeds of the loan financed the foreign exchange costs of aeven well platforms, one offshore production complex, two production platforms (only the jackets and drilling decks), and pipelines and flowlines. The project, with some modifications in scope, was completed with a delay of approximately one year (mostly for valid reasons), but with a significant saving in capital costs. The target production level of 12 million tons p.a. was reached in March 1982, slightly ahead of schedule. This Project Completion Report was prepared by the Energy Department, and was based on information obtained during project tupervision and from the Appraisal, President's and Svtervision reports, as well as other documents in the project files. The Borrower submitted a completion report containing its views on the project implementation and supplied additional data for the PCR. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this Project Completion Report was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), but the project was not audited by OED staff. Following standard procedures, OED sent copies of the draft report to the Borrower and the Executing Agency. Comments received from the Borrower have been reproduced as Attachment A to the report.  - ii - PROJECT COMPLETION BASIC DATA SHEET INDIA - SECOND BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1925-IN) KEY PROJECT DATA (us $ million) As of 09/85 Original Disbursed Cancelled Repaid Outstanding Loan Amouzt 400.0 400.0 - - 400.0 Cumulative Loan Disbursement FY 1980/81 FY 1981/82 FY 1982/83 FY 1983/84 (i) Planned 105.0 370.0 400.0 - (ii) Actual 6.6 302.0 369.0 400.0 (iii) (ii) as X of (i) 6.3 81.6 92.3 - OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Loan Date Re-estimated Board Approval 12/9/80 12/9/80 Loan Signed 12/11/80 12/11180 Effectiveness 2/24/81 2/24/81 Loan Closing 3/31/84 3/31/84 Date All Physical Components Completed 10/82 5/83 a Total Project Cost (US $ million) 823.2 757.9 Saving (%) - 7.9 Economic Rate of Return (%) Above 100% Above 100% Financial Internal Rate of Returb (Z) 17.35 38.07 Borrower Government of India Executing Agency I Oil & Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) Fiscal Year of Borrower April 1 - March 31 a/ The works still to be completed after June 1983 represent less than 1Z of the total project cost as originally estimated.  -iii - MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date of Year Days Persons weeks Report Appraisal 06/80 15 2 4 07/21/1980 Post Appraisal 09/80 7 2 2 09/11/1980 Total 22 6 Supervision I 04/81 7 3 3 06/08/1981 Supervision II 11/81 14 3 6 12/16/1981 Supervision III 06/82 19 3 8.1 07/21/1982 Supervision IV 03/83 1 2 0.3 04/29/1983 Completion 09/84 9 2 2.6 ----------- Total 50 20.0 - FOLLOW-ON PROJECT(S) South Bassein Offshore Gas Development Project, Loan 2241-IN approved on February 24, 1983, in the amount of US $ 222.3 million. ZOUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency Rupees (Rs) Appraisal Year Average US$1 = Rs. 8.3 Intervening Year's Average US$1 a Rs. 9.6 Completion Year's Average US$1 m Rs. 10.8  - iv - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA - SECOND BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1925-IN) HIGHLIGHTS 1. The loan under review in the amount of US $400 million was to finance part of the cost of Phase IV and the advance action on Phase V of the development of the offshore Bombay High oil field. The Bank had approved an earlier loan of US $150 million in June 1977 towards the Phase III development of the same field (Loan 1473-IN) which was completed in April 1983 (PCR 4139). The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a Government-owned entity, was the beneficiary and implementing agency for the previous as well as the current loan under review. 2. The main objective of Phases IV and V (Advance Action) was to reach a production rate of 240,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD) by mid-1982 through primary development of the southern and central areas of the Bombay High field, and involved development drilling, construction of offshore platforms and production facilities, laying of subsea pipelines and flowlines and expansion of onshore terminal facilities (PCR paras. 2.02 and 3.03-3.04). Other important objectives were the provision of technical assistance to ONGC to help ensure efficient project implementation and improvement in its technical capabilities in project management, the timely introduction of reservoir pressure maintenance through water injection to maximize the ultimate oil recovery, the strengthening of the financial position of ONGC through adequate prices for its oil and gas production as well as through prudent financial practices, and finally, to increase ONGC's use of the international financial markets to raise funds for the financing of its large investment program and thereby decrease ONGC's dependence on Government equity and loan contributions (PCR para. 2.03). 3. The project was successfully implemented and the objectives met. ONGC achieved slightly ahead of schedule its main target which was to reacL. a production rate of 240,000 BOPD by mid-1982 (PCR paras. 3.02 and 3.12). However implementation delays ranging from four months to one year were experienced in the construction of offshore production facilities, onshore terminal facilities and well drilling due to changes in project scope, problems in the project management of a foreign contractor, drilling difficulties and shortage of offshore drilling units (PCR paras. 3.05-3.11). Many of the causes of the delay were beyond ONGC's control, while the rather tight schedule and the difficulties inherent in planning construction activities around an 8-month window between monsoons should be appreciated. Despite these difficulties, the project was completed with a saving of US $65.3 million in capital costs mainly due to better project management and higher use of local resources (PCR paras. 3.13-3.17). 4. The speed with which the project was conceived and implemented had a significant effect on the Indian economy at a critical time immediately following the oil price "shock" of 1979. The oil production target of 240,000  - v - BD which was reached in March 1982, (of which 100,000 BD was contributed by the Bombay High 1T Project), represented foreign exchange savings of about $3 billion annually; and although OPEC prices have fallen 201 since 1982, the current oil production of 400,000 BD from Bombay High is worth $4.2 billion per year in foreign exchange savings (PCR para. 5.03). In addition, the project accelerated ONGC's move away from reliance on the government for external financing. Under the previous Bombay High I project, ONGC borrowed for the first time from foreign commercial Banks - raising about US $50 million to help finance the phase III development of Bombay High. During the implementation of the project under review (Bombay High II) foreign borrowings increased about 20 times. Specifically, during the period 1981-1984 ONGC borrowed on its own account $965 million from a variety of sources and negotiated $100 million of suppliers credit in addition to the loans from the Bank (PCR para. S.04). Institutional objectives were also essentially achieved. As a result of a higher-than-expected petroleum production coupled with higher prices for oil, gas and LPG, autho-ized by the Government, ONGC's financial performance and prospects improved dramatically (PCR paras. 7.01- 7.03). ONGC made substantial progress in the areas of organization and project management throughout project implementation (PCR paras. 6.04-6.11). S. Due to both the higher productivity of wells drilled under the project and higher petroleum prices, the recalculated financial rate of return of the project is significantly higher than the original estimate. In addition, the project facilitated the transfer of technology with respect to sophisticated oil and gas installations, including the eata^^;shment of domestic capability in the construction and installation of offshore production facilities, ax.%' in reservoir development and management. From the sectoral perspective, the project furthered the Bank's policy dialogue with the Government on energy, especially, the development and utilization of offshore gas reserves. 6. In analyzing the project experience, the PCR stresses the expediency of making recourse to "turnkey contracts" for project components which are on the critical path, provided the project entity is assisted by an experienced engineering group (PCR para. 9.04), and the importance of planning and providing for reservoir pressure maintenance during primary development (PCR para. 9.03). The report also highlights the importance of-the rapid and flexible response of the Bank in supporting the development of the Bombay High oil field which enabled the Government and ONCC to quickly bring this major resource to the production stage. Without the oil production from Bombay High, the oil import bill would have severely affected the Indian economy.  * 1 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA - SECOND BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1925-IN) I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 On December 8, 1980, the Executive Directors approved a US $ 400 million loan to India, to finance part of the cost of Phase rv and advance action on Phase V of the development of the Bombay High field. The Bank had given an earlier loan of US $ 150 million for the third phase of the field's development (Loan No. 1473-IN). 1.02 The Bombay High field, which is the largest oil field in India, was discovered in 1974. It is located some 160 km west-northwest of Bombay in the Indian Ocean at an average water depth of 80 m. Oil production from the field ztarted in May 1976, and the field was developed in successive stages. At the completion of the Phase III program in March 1981, tLe field had reached a production potential of 140,000 BOPD. The target of the Phases IV and V (advance action) was to reach a production capacity of 240,000 BOPD by mid- 1982 by developing the hitherto mndeveloped central and southern sections of the field. This target was reached at the end of March 1982, slightly ahead of schedule. 1.03 The development of the Bombay High field is still continuing and the Phase V program is under implementation. The plan to reach a sustainable production target of 340,000 BOPD by the mid-e4ghties has been accomplished, and the water injection program designed to increase the field's recoverable reserves is under implementation. As a result the Bombay High field will remain the most important domestic source of petroleum accounting for about 551 of the country' oil production during the next ten years. 1.04 The Bank's involvement in India's petroleum sub-sector has been a continuous one. Beside the two Bombay High offshore development loans (Loans Nos. 1473-IN and 1925-IN), the Bank has approved three more loans involving the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC): one for exploration (Loan No. 2205-IN approved on October 19, 1982), one for offshore gas development (Loan No. 2241-IN approved on February 24, 1983) and one for onshore development (secondary recovery and development of heavy oil) including some exploration of deep horizons (Loan No. 2403-IN approved on March 29, 1984). 1.05 This report is based on the completion report prepared by ONGC and the findings of a mission which visited India in September 1984. II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.01 In March 1980 the Government of India requested the Bank's financial assistance for further development of the Bombay High field. In June 1980, a Bank petroleum mission visited India for the appraisal of the project consisting of the Phase IV and the advance action on Phase V of ONGC's Bombay High development plan. This was followed by a post-appraisal mission in September 1980.  - 2 - 2.02 The preparation of the project was based on the reservoir and conceptual field development studies prepared by ONGC's consultants and the cost and implementation results of the Phase III development plan. The main objectives of the project were to complete the primary development of the southern and central areas of the Bombay High field to achieve a plateau pro- duction potential of 240,000 BOPD by mid-1982. The project was defined to iiLclude the following principal components: (a) a development drilling program comprising the drilling and completion of sixty four development wells; (b) construction of offshore production faciliLies including fifteen well platforms, one 180,000-BOPD capacity processing platform, one living quarters platform to accommodate 124 workers and approximately 133 km of subsea flow lines varying in diameter from 8" to 20"; (c) expansion of shore facilities by the addition of 60,000 m3 of tankage and 90,000-BOPD of crude stabilization facilities including utilities; (d) extension of tho existing telemetry and telecontrol system to cover the whole of the Bombay High field; and (e) engineering and technical services for the preparation of detailed designs, the supervision of construction and assistance to ONGC in project management. 2.03 As the consultants' reservoir study indicated that the ultimate recovery of oil from the Bombay High field could be increased by 8% and 151, in 20 and 30 years, respectively, by water injection, the Bank sought to be assured that ONCC would introduce an adequate and timely water injectirn program in accordance with the results of reservoir studies. Furthermore the analysis o_ ONCC's financial prospects indicated that its financial performance would deteriorate after 1983 because the relatively low price it received for its oil (US $7.80/Bbl equivalent) did not provide sufficient profits to undertake a normal, much less accelerated, development and exploration program envisaged for the remainder of the 1980's. As a result, it was requested by the Bank and agreed by GOI that crude oil and gas prices received by ONGC would be revised from time to time in a way to permit ONGC to meet its operating expensea and earn a rate of return on its invested capital sufficient to meet its debt-service requirements, maintain adequate working capital, and finance a substantial portion of its proposed investment program. III. IMPLEMENTATION a. Background 3.01 ONGC was responsible for the implementation of the Project through its Bombay Offshore Project (BOP) organization with the assistance of international and local consultants and contractors. Because of the tight implementation schedule, ONCC has awarded turnkey contracts for offshore production facilities on the basis of basic designs prepared by its engineering consultant. Development wells have been drilled using both ONGC's and contract drilling rigs. The expansion of the shore facilities has been entrusted to local contractors with local consultants acting as project managers. The exte;usion of the telemetry and telecontrol system has been done on a force account basis under the supervision of ONCC's TITAN project team.  -3 - 3.02 Despite the very tight implementation schedule, the offshore construction and installation procieded relatively smoothly and essentially on schedule. The average delay experierced in platform construction and installation compared to th-e original implementation schedule was about 42 days. Considering the logistic problems involved and the difficulty in planning construction activities around an annual eight-month "window" between monsoons, this is a commerdable achievement. However, there were major delays in well drilling and shore facilities expansion (paras. 3.07, 3.11). Nevertheless, ONGC was able to achieve its target production of 12 million tons of oil per annum from the Bombay High field in March 1982, slightly ahead of schedule. b. Changes in Project Scope 3.03 With the exception of the addition of two production platforms to the Phase V portion (Advance Action), the scope of the Bank project remained unchanged (para. 3.04). In February 1981, ONGC submitted to GOI a proposal to accelerate the development of Bombay High and adjacent oil fields to reach a production level of 19 million tons per annum by 1984/85, against the Five- year Plan objective of 13.2 million tons in that same year. As a result of a detailed engineering and system analysis cerried out _y its engineering consultant, it also prop sed to expand the onshore production facilities in Uran by adding 240,000 m of oil st1rage tanks, two trains of crude stabilizes, one new LPC plant and 4 captive power plant, instead of only 60,000 m of oil storage and one crude stabilizer originally planned. ONGC discussed these changes with the BaJk in March 1981. The Bank did not object to the proposed additions. Howevert, they were not incorporated into the Bank project since (i) the major portion of the extra units to be added were required to accommodate the expected production from other fields in the Bombay offshore area; and (ii) the additional units were part of ONCC's continuing developmen program in offshore Bombay and, as such, were not an integral part of the .'hase IV and Phase V (Advance Action) development of the Bombay High field covered by the Bank project. 3.04 In March 1983, the Government requestea that the scope of the Bank project be enlarged by the addition of two 100,000-BOPD production platforms (SHD and NQD) to the Phase V portion (Advance Action) of the development of Bombay High. As these two platforms were needed urgently to efficiently handle the higher-than-expected oil and gas production from the field, the Bank agreed to include the SHD and NQD platforms in the Bank project and the Loan Agreement was amended accordingly in June 1983. c. Implementation Delays 3.05 With the exception of slight damage suffered by the jacket of the SD platform which was quickly repaired, the construction and installation of the offshore production facilities proceeded smoothly and essentially on schedule (para. 3.02). However there were important delays in well drilling, hook-up, testing and commissioning of the Bombay High South Process Complex (BHS) and the expansion of shore facilities. Also, a major blow out was experienced in drilling one of the project wells (SJ-5), somewhat tarnishing the hitherto exceptional safety record of the Bombay High development program (paras. 3.09- 3.10).  -4 - 3.06 The BHS platform complex was fabricated and installed on schedule on March 31, 1982. However, the hook-up, testing and commissioning activities could not be completed until October 6, 1982, causing a delay of about four months compared to the appraisal schedule. The major reason for the delay was less-than-optimum planning by the lead contractor, which is evidenced by the difficulties encountered in accommoeating the 340 technicians working on hook- up and commissioning in offshore Bombay during the monsoon season. The BuS complex, consisting of one large process platform, one living quarters platform and one flare tripod, is a major construction work requiring the inputs 3f suveral contractors and the procurement of materials and equipment from different countries. Given the difficulties of working offshore during the monsoon season and the very 8jght implementation schedule (17 months from contract award to commissioning)- , the four-month delay in commissioning the BHS complex is not excessive. 3.07 The drilling of the development wells on five well platforms has been completed essentially on schedule. However, the completion of drilling activities on the remaining ten well platforms have been delayed from 90 to 330 days compared to the appraisal schedule. The reasons for the delays are as follows: (i) during implementation ONGC has followed a deliberate policy of delaying the drilling of those wells which could not be put on production immediately upon completion because of lack of connection to the process platforms, vhile at the time of appraisal it was assumed that a well platform would be drilled immediately after installation; (ii) in some cases, the drilling rigs working on project wells had to be diverted to working over other Bombay High wells before completing all the wells on the original platform; this caused delays in drilling and completing all the wells on a given platform; and (iii) in keeping up with its accelerated development program (para. 3.03), ONGC vastly expanded its offshore drilling activities starting in late 1981 and experienced rig availability problems because of late delivery of one of its offshore drilling units (Sagar Pragati) and the damage sustained by another ONGC drilling unit in the SJ platform blow-out (paras. 3.09-3.10). 3.08 It should be emphasized, however, that the delays in completing drilling activities on individual well platforms did not materially affect the benefits expected from the project, since ONGC reached its production target on schedule by making maximum use of available resources and judiciously re- ordering its drilling schedule. Under comparable conditions any other prudent operator would probably act similarly. 3.09 On the other hand the blow-out which occurred on the SJ-5 well was a major incident. While being deepened to explore the productive potential of the basal sands which lit below the main producing zones of the Bombay High field, the well blew out in the night of July 30, 1982. Despite immediate intervention by ONGC staff, the well could not be brought under control; the drilling crew of 74 was evacuated and immediate action was taken by ONC to control and limit the damage, including the mobilization of the world's foremost blow-out control and firo ighting experts. In the morning of 1/ This tight schedule was necessary in order to complete the BHS complex before the onset of the 1982 monsoon.  -5 - August 2, 1982, the well caught fire; however the fire died out by itself in three days. The team of experts was successful in capping the well and bringing it under complete control by September 30, 1982. As a result of the blow-out and ensuing fire, ONGC's drilling unit Sagar Vikas suffered extensive damage, the well No. SJ-5 had to be re-drilled, and the damaged main deck and helideck of the platform had to be removed and replaced. As the well blew out mainly gas, no recognizable environmental damage resulted. Total losses were assessed at US $58.6 million, which, being fully covered by ONGC's insurance policies, have since been collected by the operator. 3.10 The inquiry conducted by the Indian authorities did not uncover gross neglect or lack of diligence on the part of ONCC or its staff. The blow-out was attributed to an operational error of the drilling crew. In retrospect all blow-outs are preventable; nonetheless they keep occurring. Despite all the advances in pressure prediction and drilling techniques and blow-out prevention equipment, even the most successful operators and drilling contractors are not immune to blow-outs. 3.11 Because of the major changes in project scope (para. 3.03) the shore facilities had to be re-engineered to optimize the design and operation of the entire complex. As a result, construction activities lastud until May 1985. Although there is an apparent delay of 35 months compared to the appraisal estilmate, this should not be taken at face value, since the expansion program presently under implementationlts radically different from the program on which the appraisal was based. d. Achievements of Objectives 3.12 ONGC achieved its target of increasing crude oil production from Bombay High to 240,000 BOPD in March 1982 slightly ahead of schedule. The primary development of the central and southern portions of the Bombay High field can be considered as completed, and the oil production is currently running at 400,000 BOPD which is about 73% higher than the appraisal estimate. Currently, the well platforms included in the Bank project are supplying 180,000 BOPD and 4.5 million m3/day of gas, which are approximately 76% and 180X, respectively, higher than the appraisal estimate. (However, due to insufficient compressor capacity at present, only 60% of the produced gas is actually marketed, the rest being flared in the field. Additional com- pressor capacity is being installed which should eliminate any significant flaring by the end of 1986). e. Project Costs 3.13 The project was completed with a cost underrun of US$ 65.3 million equivalent (7.9X) compared to the appraisal estimate. Actual and estimated costs are compared in Annex 1. Annex 2 compares the total actual costs of major project components with their estimated costs plus the prorated contingencies. 1/ The crude stabilization unit and the tanks included in the original project scope were completed in May 1983, with a delay of approximately one year.  -6- 3.14 The cost comparison in Annex 2 shows significant variances in almost all items. With the exception of well drilling, expansion of Uran facilities and reservoir consultancy, the actual costs of all items were below those es- timated at the time of appraisal, including assigned physical and price con- tingencies. The reasons for variances are explained in the following para- graphs. 3.15 Well drilling costs were 66.8X higher due to (i) the general increase in ONCC's operating costs; (ii) the appreciation of the US $ on which prices of oil field services are based from Rs 8.4 used for appraisal to Rs 10.8 in mid-1983; (iii) the costly blow-out in well No. SJ-5 (paras. 3.09-3.10); and (iv) ONGC's frequent shifting of offshore drilling units from one platform to another in order to optimize the build-up of oil production (paras. 3.07- 3.08). This practice has resulted in extra mobilization and demobilization costs (e.g. the wells on the SF platform were drilled in three successive phases using three different offshore drilling units at an average cost of Rs 53.9 million per well, while the average cost of a well on the SS platform drilled in one rig move was Rs 19.0 million). 3.16 The total cost of offshore production facilities (well platforms, BHS Complex and subsea flowlines and pipelines) was 14.1Z lower due to the fact that, in contrast to the experience of the First Bombay High Offshore Project (Loan No. 1473-IN), there were only few and moderate change orders in practically all contracts (e.g., on the basis of the first Bombay High project, the estimated cost of the BHS Complex was increased by 15% of the quoted prices to account for possible change orders; the actual cost of the change orders was only 72). 3.17 The expansion of the Uran facilities cost 4X more than estimated. The cost of the telemetry and telecontrol was 24.61 lower due to increased use of local resources and lower-than-expected price inflation as a result of the slow-down in investments by the international petroleum industry. The cost of engineering, technical services and project supervision, which was estimated at 10% of the project base cost, was 82.12 lower due to ONGC's heavy reliance on local engineering consultants whose charges are substantially less than those of foreign consultants and to increased involvement of the ONCC staff in the engineering and technical supervision of projects. On the other hand, reservoir consultancy cost 21.21 higher than estimated because ONCC sub- sequently had to pay local taxes imposed on the foreign consultant which was not the case at project appraisal. The amount allocated to customs duties and import taxes was not used as a result of the Government's later decision of exempting the local platform manufacturer from import duties and taxes. Also the proportion of local currency costs (211) was substantially higher than the appraisal estimate (12.3X) mostly due to the fact that the cost of the locally manufactured well platforms was much higher than estimated at appraisal, although still less than the cost of imported platforms. f. Disbursements 3.18 At the time of appraisal, the Bank loan was to finance the foreign exchange cost of six well platforms, BHS Complex and the related undersea pipelines and flowlines. However, as of March, 1982, about US $ 42.0 million of the Bank loan remained uncommitted because (i) change orders had been few and moderate (para. 3.16); and (ii) ONGC had used US $ 15.0 million of US  -7- Eximbank financing for the BHS turbine-generator packages which were originally slated for Bank financing within the overall cost of the BHS Complex. At the request of the GOI, the Bank agreed, in June 1983, to finance one more well platform (SF) already in the original project scope as well as the jackets and drilling decks of two production platforms (SHD and NQD) which had been added to the scope of the project (para. 3.04). 3.19 The table below compares the actual Bank disbursements with the appraisal forecast: Cumulative Loan Disbursements (US $ million) Actual as a Z of IBRD Fiscal Year Actual Appraisal Forecast Appraisal Estimate 1980/81 6.6 105.0 6 1981/82 302.0 370.0 82 1982/83 369.0 400.0 92 1983/84 400.0 - - As the above table indicates the rate of disbursements sas very much slower during the first year but improved substantially and 922 of the loan was dis- bursed by the original closing date. The major reasons for slow disbursement are: (i) delays in finalizing contracts for the BHS Complex and the SQ, SS, ST well platform package by nine and seven months, respectively; (ii) delays in project implementation; and (iii) late amendment of the Loan Agreement enabling the Bank to disburse against the costs of the SP, SHD and NQD platforms (para. 3.18). g. Performance of Consultants 3.20 ONGC employed two foreign consultants and a local engineering firm backed up by three foreign and one local consultant to assist in carrying out the project. In the view of ONGC, the performance of the consultants was wholly satisfactory, and this is also the conclusion of the Bank staff who have supervised the project. h. Performance of Contractors 3.21 With the possible exception of the BHS Complex, all contracts were executed satisfactorily without undue problems. As explained in para. 3.06 above, the testing and commissioning of the critical BHS platform complex was unduly delayed due to difficulties experienced by the lead contractor in planning and coordinating subcontractors. Nevertheless, both ONGC and the lead contractor cooperated in good faith to overcome the difficulties and the work was completed with minimum possible delay.  -8- IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 4.01 All of the project facilities are operating satisfactorily and the housekeeping on them and the care and maintenance of the equipment are good to excellent. Operators are well trained, knowledgeable and alert and appear to be committed to their duties. ONGC is following the established procedures of the petroleum industry in monitoring the performance of the reservoir. The production rates, water cuts, gas/oil ratios and wellhead and bottom-hole pressures are being periodically measured, and reservoir studies are updated on a yearly basis. 4.02 Great emphasis is placed on safety, and the American Petroleum Institute (API) recommended practices are being followed to ensure the safety of personnel and facilities. Emergency equipment are in working order and adequate fire fighting equipment are maintained on multipurpose support vessels assigned to the Bombay High area. A safety engineer and his assistants administer and carry out regular safety drills. 4.03 To prevent pollution, all installations are designed for discharges within international regulations (API or EPA). Adequate stocks of chemical dispersants, oil spill collectors and dispersant spraying equipment are being kept. ONGC has trained a team of officers in charge of spill prevention and control and has developed a reporting and action system to tackle oil spills. It is also closely cooperating with the Indian Coast Guard, Port Authorities, Shipping and Fisheries and National Institute of Oceanography on environmental protection. 4.04 The initial rates of production of wells drilled under the project averaged approximately 3,000 BOPD, or 50Z higher than the appraisal estimate. However, the increase of the producing gas/oil ratios and the local reservoir pressure drops were faster than originally predicted due to the heterogeneous character of the Bombay High reservoir. To cope with the problem, ONGC awarded turnkey contracts for the construction and installation of a central water injection platform and four injection well platforms for the northern section of Bombay High in June 1982. These facilities were put in service in May 1984. In March 1983, the water injection studies for the central and southern portions of Bombay High were completed and contracts were awarded for the fabrication and installation of one water injection platform and five injection well platforms in March 1983. These are expected to be operational in late 1985. V. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 5.01 Probably no other Bank financed project has had such a significant effect on India's economy as the Second Bombay High Project. OPEC prices went up in late 1979 for the second time in the seventies. In current dollars the prevailing average price in 1980 rose to $30.5/barrel versus $18.6 in 1979. This increase brought an urgency to the further development of the Bombay High field. The speed with which the project was conceived and executed in response to this challenge is impressive as are the economic results. As mentioned earlier (para. 3.08) the delays in completing drilling activities on individual well platforms did not materinlly affect the benefits expected from the project, since ONGC reached its production target on schedule. Appraisal and actual/estimated production results can be compared as follows:  -9 - 1980/841/ 1985/89 1990/94 1995/99 Total (1980- 99) Crude Oil (Million tons) Appraisal Estimate 40.3 55.0 48.8 29.7 173.8 Actual/Current Estimate 44.7 79.8 65.6 38.6 228.7 Natural Gas (Million Nm3) Appraisal 3,285.1 4,390.8 3,790.6 2,072.6 13,539.1 Actual/Estimate 3,784.4 16,531.0 15,414.0 9,318.5 45,047.9 LPG (Thousand tons) Appraisal 594.3 982.5 918.0 485.0 2,979.8 Actual/Estimate 703.6 2,501.4 2,620.4 1,484.2 7,309.6 I/ Actual 5.02 Because of the substantial increase in the domestic price of crude oil received by ONGC starting in 1981 and the fact that the Bombay High wells are producing much more oil and gas than was expected at the time of appraisal the financial internal rate of return is up from slightly more than 17X at appraisal to 38% at present (Annex 4). The assumptions made at appraisal and current values can be compared as follows: Appraisal Current Cumulative Oil Production 1980 through 1999 (Million Tons) 173.8 228.7 Cumulative Gas Production 3 1980 through 1999 (Millions NMM) 13,539.1 45,047.9 Cumulative LPG Production 1981 through 1995 (Thousand Tons) 2,979.8 7,309.6 Financial Value of Crude Oil (Rs/Ton3 495 1,382 Financial Value of Natural Gas (Rs/MNM ) 619 1,053 Financial Value of LPG (Rs/Ton)1 1,328 1,830 5.03 In economic terms when Bombay High oil production reached 240,000 BD in March 1982, (100,000 BD from this project), the annual output represented foreign exchange savings of about US $3 billion annually; and although OPEC prices have fallen about 20% since then, the current production of 400,000 BD represents about US $4.2 billion per year of foreign exchange savings.  - 10 - VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE a. Background 6.01 The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) is a Government-owned statutory body created in 1959 by an Act of Parliament to "plan, promote and implement the development of petroleum resources and the production and sale of petroleum products produced by it." ONGC is by far the major producer of petroleum in India, and carries exploration activities on a large scale all over the country; however, it is not involved in downstream activities, such as refining and marketing. 6.02 Until 1973, virtually all of ONGC's activities were concentrated onshore, where it was producing oil and gas in Assam and Gujarat. Following the discovery of oil in Bombay High, the Bombay Offshore Project (BOP) was set up in Bombay to explore for and develop offshore petroleum resources. In the course of these activities, ONGC has developed sufficient expertise in offshore exploration and development through judicious use of consultants, effective recruitment and training practices and actual involvement in all facets of offshore petroleum technology. At the time of appraisal, ONGC was judged to be a technically and administratively competent organization. Its management information system and project management practices were found to be evolving in the right direction. Consequently, no specific institution building measures were incorporated into the project. b. Organization and Management 6.03 The Commission currently consists of a Chairman, six full-time members (Finance, Technical Services, Personnel, Exploration, Operations and Drilling) and two part-lime members representing the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy.' BOP is managed by the Member Operations. The administrative and financial functions (planning, procurement and stores, accounting, personnel, etc.) are centralized in the corporate headquarters at Dehra Dun, along with the main research and development activities. Operational staff are divided among three regional offices (Central, Western and Eastern Regions) and the Bombay Offshore Project. 6.04 The Commission acts very much as a board of directors and is responsible for setting ONGC's policies. While important policy decisions are taken at headquarters and the commission members play an active part in running affairs falling in their areas of responsibility, operational divisions have operational responsibility and the authority to commit funds within their approved budgets. 6.05 During the implementation of the Project, ONGC continued to improve its organizational structure. With ONGC's growth expected to continue into the 1990's, the issue of organizational efficiency has become a serious concern to ONGC and the government as well as the Bank. A major restructuring 1/ As the time of appraisal the Commission had four full-time members (Finance, Materials, Offshore and Onshore) and three part-time members representing the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilizers and the Planning Commission.  - 1I - of ONGC was implemented in 1984 based on the business group or functional approach in which activities would be grouped into similar functions or profit/cost centers rather than by geographical location. In addition there has been a concentration of ONGC resources and efforts in the basic explo- ration and production activities with a reduction in ONGC's own participations in areas such as petroleum transportation, drilling and other technical support services which can be provided by contractors. The Bank has supported this streamlining of ONGC's organization and operations, and continues to exchange ideas with ONGC on specific operational aspects of its organizational framework. c. Project Management 6.06 ONCC follows the practice of appointing project managers for each major project and, in the case of BOP, for each important construction activity, such as the BHS Complex. Project managers are charged with the responsibility of monitoring the progress of their individual projects from planning to commissioning, and are responsible for both contractual and technical aspects. 6.07 Early in 1982, BOP introduced a tighter and more effective system of project monitoring and coordination consisting of (a) weekly, fortnightly and monthly progress reports on each project, and (b) weekly coordination meetings chaired either by the Member Offshore or the General Manager, Engineering and Production, to review outstanding problems. The decision making process at different echelons and their authority over expenditures were also clearly defined. d. Management Information System 6.08 At the time of appraisal, ONGC's management information system consisting of monthly reports covering all its activities and providing the senior management with essential inputs was judged to be satisfactory in general. The only shortcoming identified at the time was the lack of up-to- date financial data. In early-1981 this shortcoming was remedied with the computerization of the accounting system. The periodic project progress reports (para. 6.07) and detailed reports prepared on construction, safety, etc. also add to the effectiveness of ONCC's management information system. e. Staffing and Training 6.09 Between 1980 and 1983 ONGC's staff increased in number from 26,000 to 33,000 (26.9%). Of this increase BOP's share was 2,743 or 39.2% of the total increase, reflecting the very rapid expansion of ONGC's offshore activities. If the daily production is to be taken as a rough indice of the efficiency of staffing, ONGC in 1983 was producing 11.1 BOPD/staff, compared to 7.3 BOPD/staff in 1980. This is a satisfactory development especially since much of the increase was in the number of the technical/managerial and supervisory staff which during the same period grew by 5,632 (80.5% of the total increase). It is, therefore, expected that ONCC will in the near future be able to alleviate the shortage of middle-level managers with sufficient experience and reduce the overload of its senior staff which is still considerable.  - 12 - 6.10 ONGC continued its training efforts throughout project implementation. In this respect, offshore operations were given greater emphasis in view of ONCC's rapidly expanding offshore activities. Personnel were given training by various local institutions (management, finance, engineering and geology) and were also sent abroad (oil companies, laboratories and contractors' facilities) for specialized training. Several courses and seminars were also given in-house to enhance the administrative and managerial capabilities of the staff. f. Conclusion 6.11 Overall, ONGC made substantial progress in the areas of organization and management and institutional strength throughout project implementation. Nevertheless, in view of the continuously expanding scope of its offshore activities and the rapid changes taking place in the international petroleum industry, it will have to continue its institution-building efforts without relapse. VII. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE a. Operating Results 7.01 A comparison of ONGC's financial results with the appraisal forecast appears in Annex 3 of this report. Over the 1980-1985 period accumulated profits have reached Rs28.4 billion versus Rs5.4 billion forecast in the Appraisal Report. Total revenues in the period was on the order of Rsl2l billion against Rs48 billion in the Appraisal Report reflecting the considerable increases in both volumes and prices of hydrocarbons over the appraisal forecasts. b. Balance Sheet 7.02 The estimated and actual balance sheets as of March 31, 1985 can be compared as follows:  - 13 - Balance Sheet as of March 31, 1985 (Rs. Million) Appraisal Estimate Actual ASSETS Current Assets 2,881 37,257 Of which: Cash ( 26) ( 96) Accts. Receivable ( 781) (4,046) Advances ( 190) ( 485) Inventories (1,227) 5,910) Other ( 657) (26,720) Fixed Assets 51,957 60,266 Less: Accum. Depreciation (26,441) ( 31t821) 25,516 28,445 Work in Progress 3,741 12,892 Investments 250 5,276 TOTAL ASSETS 32,388 83,870 LIABILITIES Current Liabilities 3,240 30,615 Of which: Accounts Payable (1,111) (4,988) Current Portion Long Term Debt ( 1,815) (1,909) Others (314) (23,718) Long Term Debt (Gross) 21,344 22,803 Less Current Portion (1,815) (1,909) Net Portion Long Term Debt 19,529 20,894 Equity 9,619 32,361 Of which: Capital (3,429) (3,429) Reserves (5,986) (28,932) Grants (204) - TOTAL LIABILITIES 32,388 83,870 ONGC's balance sheet is strong with a satisfactory current ratio of 1.2 and a debt equity ratio of 39:61.  - 14 - c. Financial Covenants 7.03 As the main external parameters affecting ONGC's financial performance are the prices it receives for oil and gas, the most important financial covenant under the loan required ONGC to carry out on a periodic basis pricing studies with a view to meeting a 15% discounted cash flow (DCF) rate of return target for the project and any subsequent major development in- vestment . At appraisal, the internal rate of return was assessed at 17%, while the latest es,imate yields 38%. The higher return is due to the significantly higher production of hydrocarbons now expected from the project, (oil up 32%, gas 233% and LPG 145%) para. 5.02, coupled with higher producer prices for oil and gas. (Current prices are oil $15.0/Bbl equivalent and gas $87.75 MNM3 equivalent versus $7.80/Bbl and $74.58/MNM respectively at appraisal). VII1. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK 8.01 The Bank's involvement in the Indian petroleum sector started in 1977 and since then, five loans have been made to ONGC totalling about US $1.2 billion. The first two loans were for the development of the Bombay High oilfield. The third loan was for exploration, the fourth for offshore gas development and the fifth was for improving the operations and production from an existing onshore oil province that is experiencing declining output as the reservoir are depleted. In all these operations, the Bank has emphasized some common as well as different objectives. The common thread has been the financial and institutional strengthening of ONGC, in terms of petroleum pricing, mobilization of external finance and technical assistance. However, there were also unique and important objectives under each operation. Under the exploration project the Bank encouraged the Government to offer exploration acreage to foreign oil companies and to assist ONCC implement a reasonable exporation strategy. Under the gas development project, the Bank sought to accelerate the development and use of the substantial discovered gas resources, but which were unutilized, in order to substitute for liquid petroleum products. Finally, under the onshore production improvement project, the Bank sought to introduce improved and modern operating and production methods, as well as encourage the production of the discovered but under-developed heavy oil resources, through technology transfer, technical training and technical assistance. Thus, while ONGC was the beneficiary of all the five Bank petroleum operations in India, the loans cannot be considered as "repeater" projects because they addressed different policy and operational issues as well as involved completely different facets of ONGC's operations. 8.02 Relations between the Bank and COI/ONGC have been good throughout the implementation of the Project. As required, ONGC has sent quarterly progress reports and annual reports on financial performance and prospects and general managerial matters. Because of the extensive use of contractors and consultants which largely contributed to the smooth implementation of the Project and ONGC's competent performance in project management, the Bank's supervision effort has been minimal (8.6 staff-weeks/year during FY 1981- 1983). However, as three more petroleum projects were also prepared during the same period, in addition to one project performance audit on another petroleum project, the Bank's contact with ONGC and the project has been substantially more intensive than suggested by the figure given above. Under  - 15 - an agreement with the OPEC Fund, the Bank staff have also supervised the US $ 30.0 million OPEC Fund Loan. 8.03 Possibly the most significant technical contribution of the Bank took place during project appraisal through the emphasis placed on pressure maintenance in the Bombay High field. The project covenant on timely water injection (para. 2.03) and the Bank staff's constant reminders during implementation have undoubtedly contributed to ONGC's taking timely action on water injection which proved to be critically urgent in view of recent reservoir performance (para. 4.04). ONGC has made very good use of the lessons learned from the First Bombay High Offshore Project, and has unerringly continued implementing institution-building measures without outside prodding. 8.04 ONGC and GOI have confirmed that complying with Bank requirements has not caused particular problems as ONGC's own procedures, in areas such as procurement, are in many respects similar to those of the Bank. Covenants agreed to during negotiations have been complied with. TX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 Overall the project was an unqualified success. It was completed with minimum delay and essentially witbin budget. The production target was reached on schedule and was exceeded by a substantial margin at project com- pletion. In general, the assumptions made at the time of appraisal regarding reserves, well productivities and costs proved to be on the conservative side. On the other hand, the adverse effects of weather (i.e., monsoon) on the construction and well drilling schedules turned out to be underestimated. 9.02 At the time of appraisal it was recognized that the major project risk was the possibility that the Bombay High Field may not live up to expectations. Although the field's oil reserves proved to be about 36Z higher than estimated at appraisal, the performance of the reservoir and the attainment of a final recovery of the order of 26% still remains to be seen. So far the production rate from the Bombay High field has been continuously on the rise, and the future performance of the reservoir under stabilized production levels is predicated solely on mathematical reservoir simulation. Given the heterogeneity of the reservoir, actual production performance data for the next two to three years are needed to ascertain the effectiveness of the development strategy on which the project was based. 9.03 The observation regarding the necessity of reservoir pressure maintenance in the Bombay High field proved to be correct. Currently ONGC is in the process of implementing the initial phase of a water injection scheme (para. 4.04). ONGC's future efforts will have to concentrate on improving the water injection process in order to achieve maximum recovery under stabilized production rates and minimum operating costs. ONGC will also have to start investigating the potential application of the more advanced enhanced oil recovery processes in Bombay High, since these processes normally take a long time from conception to actual implementation. The Bank which has accumulated substantial experience in enhanced oil recovery projects could assist ONGC's efforts in this area.  - 16 - 9.04 The project accelerated ONGC's move away from reliance on the government for external financing. During PY1977-80 ONCC borrowed about $453 million including $150 million from the Bank (Bombay High I), $50 million on the Eurodollar market and $14 million from the OPEC fund (onlent to ONCC by GOI). However, slightly over one-half of the borrowings (US $239 million equivalent) were either directly from the Government or from the Oil Industry Development Board, a Govcrnment agency. During FY 1981-84 when this Project was under implementation, ONCC, on their own account borrowed $965 million from a variety of sources including $630 million from the Eurodollar market, $44 million from Singapore's Export Credit Investment Corporation, $19 million from US EXIM, $78 million from Korea EXIM, $20 million from Bankers Trust, $69 million in French Francs (BNP), $23 million equivalent in Deutsche Marks and $34 million in Yen. In addition, during the same period ONGC negotiated suppliers credits totalling about $100 million from Japan, Norway and France. ONGC's borrowing from the Government (and government agencies) during this period (FY1981-84) was only about US $197 million equivalent, consider- ably less than the amounts borrowed during FY1977-80. Thus, the Bank's ob- jective of diversifying ONGC's borrowing sources and decreasing its reliance on government financial support have been achieved. ONGC's reputation is now established. Although private capital is still difficult to attract for high risk exploration ventures, petroleum development projects, particularly off- shore, in India, are generally attractive to private as well as public finan- cing. Also, private borrowings have been easier to secure where a major por- tion of the project costs is covered by World Bank loans. 9.05 Finally, the experience of the First and Second Bombay High projects have shown that entrusting the construction of project components which are on the critical path to contractors on the basis of "turnkey contracts" including detailed engineering, procurement, installation and commissioning could pro- mote timely project implementation without unnecessarily increasing project costs. However, in order to receive the full benefits of such an arrangement, the project entity must be assisted by an experienced engineering group as was the case of ONGCC and there should be effective planning, coordination and monitoring of the various activities.  SECOND aIs= olgmI P&MIXTr 1841U0 sWLUO 3303 Am*XSAL 3T~3ATA Coet la Will". _ / Cst is lno.e.od S DoMllo Cost la IKlllon _.946 Cost I1 lbo,mea 11 D1012 L1Cal fosgoa Total tocl 1prei. Totel tal PoresP 11oa local Pb ora 11ta A. DS"lopseut Drilling 1. Vlle 52.06 571.06 62S.12 6,19 67,983 74,181 522.38 653.41 1,37S.79 55.72 69.834 125,621 2. .11 Plutfoe SP 1280 - 114.00 114.00 - 13,571 133S7t - 91.48 03.46 - 11.022 11.022 wl 02/81 _ 114.00 114.00 13,S71 3,71 - 93.48 91.48 _ 11.022 11.022 SD 0,881 - 114.00 114.00 - 13,S71 13.571 - 91.4* 91.48 - 9.895 9.895 Ss 12/81 71.11 31.96 03.07 8.466 3,805 12.271 79.27 36.52 115.79 8.574 3.950 12,524 81 *0/8i 71.11 31.9f 30.07 8,446 S,805 12,271 79.39 36.79 116.18 8.587 3.980 12.567 813 03/82 77.46 28.98 106.44 9,221 3,450 12,673 74.88 27.27 102.15 8.100 2.949 11,049 Si 01/83 77.46 28.98 106.4 9,221 3,450 12,672 75.95 43.64 139.59 7,911 4.546 12.451 58 12/81 - 221.61 221.61 - 26,382 24,382 - 174.17 174.17 - 38.839 8,839 SR 01/82 - 221.61 221.61 - 26,382 26,382 - 174.18 174.18 - 18,841 18,841 Sp 12181 221.61 221.61 - 26 2382 2- 74.17 114.17 - 18.859 1J3j Sub Total 349.20 1,499.77 2,048.97 41,572 202,352 243,924 831.7 1.5-4.59 2,426.46 88,954 175.722 262.676 a. nfmtgutnre 1. P _roei ?latgotm ns UIuS q*wrt.ro PlatoCuo - 1,759.90 1,759.90 - 209,512 209.512 - 1,631.24 3,631.24 - 173.0o6 173,046 06t82 2. l4ensle 8S To 0dL 4 C_ s._ - 488.86 48.86 - 58.1W 5S.3I8 - 239.91 239.91 _ 25.950 25.990 S9b. nloe Lin". 171.10 J71jQ - 20.36S 20.36S - 170.10 170.10 _ 18.399 L9 Sub Total - 659.96 645.96 - 78,567 78.s67 - 410.01 410.01 - ".3, 44,9t 3- Cud* Terminal PSeIlites 7. 56.50 236.27 21,163 6,964 28,127 3Is.90 - S35.90 29.250 - 29,250 4. Tolee_try 4 Taleaco22.l 25.40 4.76 n.16 3.024 5,547 S,WI 44.00 72.80 70.J0 4,444 2.037 6,441 " C. XMimerings Swrice 6 Speuvion 55.24 422.49 477.73 6,576 50.297 s6,673 110.32 5AO 11S.92 10,794 S8 i1s365 . erweir tnsuItaacy - 232.20 232.20 - 27,663 27,643 - 345.07 345.87 - ".S32 33.502 2. t oe tt 23,28 - 23.28 2,773 - 2,7- - - - Total ant _hase Xv 650.89 4,8793 5,510.47 75,106 580.902 656,006 1,305.89 4.038.71 5,344.60 133.4 42.225 560.669 Pll V (yad e ti..) A. Dswlo It DrillIn 1. Vc1 31.75 260.13 291.88 3,780 30,963 34,746 209.52 337.98 547.50 21,327 34.747 56.074 2. .11 Piatiotw 53 03/82 - 224.87 224.87 26.770 26.770 147.43 - 141.43 35,947 - 15,947 IQ 11/82 - 224.87 224.87 _ 26,770 26, 770 - 281.41 281l.4 - 29,314 29,314 8S 11/82 - 224.87 224.87 - 26,770 26,7o - 281.41 281.41 29.314 25.314 St 02/l2 82.4 23A67 106.21 9.826 2,818 22,"44 - 180.23 18.3 - 19,495 19,495 ST 12/82 82.54 23.47 106.21 9.826 2.818 12644 - 283.42 281.42 - 29.324 ".33 Sub Total 1964S 982.08 1,178.91 23,432 116,914 140,344 356.95 1,362.45 13719.40 3,274 142.184 79.458 *. nlrastmte Saba" neo LTse - 97.77 97.77 - 1336, 11,639 - 156.43 156.41 - 16,295 16,295 C. _ g neariess *ch. Sevice. rOject Suprvis 19.68 107.99 127.67 2,343 12.856 15.199 15.30 .2 16.32 1,435 76 1.511 Total cost P_a V 216.51 1,187.84 1,404.55 25,775 141,409 167,38 372.45 3,519.70 1,9s2.15 38,709 159,555 197.264 an" Pro"ct Coat 6067.42 j 8g2 , 722, fl3J M '