Colombia - Third Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIUL USE ONLY Report No. 4931 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 920-C) February 10, 1984 Projects Department Latin Ablerica and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted dstibution nd may be ued by recipients only in the perfornmance or their official duties. Its c"tents m o ohrwise be dWosed withot World Bank anthori2tin.  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Glossary ACPO - Popular Cultural Action (Accion Cultural Popular) CASD = Amdliary Centers for Educational Services (Centros Auxiliares de Servicios Docentes) FONADE = National Fund for Development Projects (Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo) ICA = Colombian Agrarian Institute (Instituto Colombiano Agrario) ICB = International Competitive Bidding ICCE. = Colombian Institute for School Construction (Instituto Colombiano de Construcciones Escolares) ICFES = Colombian Institute for the Development of Higher Education (Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la Educaci6n Superior) INCORA = Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria) IZIEM = National Institute of Secondary Education (Instituto Nacional de Educacion Media) MOE = Ministry of Education SENA = National Apprenticeship Service (Servicio Naclonal de Aprendizaje) UINDP = United Nations Development Program This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of | I their official duties Its contents may not otherwise be disdosed without World Bank authorization.  COLOMBIA LOAN 920-CO THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE . . ..................................... i) PROJECT DATA SHEET ... ................ . (ii-v) HIGHLIGHTS ............... ... (vi-vii) I. INTRODUCTION ...................- ... ... 1 II. PROJECT- BACKGROUND ....... .......................1....... Educational Development Strategy . . 1 Project Generation ............................ . .... 1 Project Objectives and Content ..................... 3 Modification of Project Content ........... ... 5 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .... ......... .................... 7 Overview ......................................... 7 Project Management ................................. 8 Sites .............................................. 10 Design and Supervision of Schools . ............... .. 10 Supervision (Civil Works) ..... ..................... 11 Civil1 Works ....... ................................. 11 Contractors ..... ... 12 Furniture and Equipment ..... ................... 12 Maintenance ....... ................................. 13 Technical Assistance ...... ......................... 14 Special Covenants ...... ............................ 16 Bank Performance ...... ............................. 17 IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCES ............................. 18 Project Costs ...................................... 18 Use of Loan Proceeds ............................... 20  TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. V. OPERATION OF PROJECr INSTITUTIONS .................... .. 21 Overview ........................................... 21 Attainment of Educational Objectives .............. . 21 The Common Facilities Centers Program .... .......... 23 The Purpose of the Common Facilities Centers .. 24 Administration of the Common Facilities Centers 24 Curriculum of the Common Facilities Centers ... 25 The Common Facilities Centers Students ........ 26 The Teachers of the Common Facilities Centers.. 26 The Program of The Rural Development Centers ....... 27 The Purpose of the Rural Development Centers ....... 27 Operating Costs .......... ... ....................... 28 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ................... 29 ANNEX 1 - Implementation Schedule ..... ..................... 35 ANNEX 2 - Actual and Estimated Disbursements ............... 36 ANNEX 3 - Estimated and Actual Project Costs .............. 37 ANNEX 4 - Compliance with Loan Conditions .............. ... 38 AINEX 5 - Means on Selected Achievement Scores and Socio- demographic Variables for Common Facilities Center Students and for Non Common Facilities Center Students Enrolled in Four Courses of Study. 43 ATTACEMENT I - Comments from the Borrower .... ................ 45 This report is based on the findings of a completion mission that visited Colombia in July, 1982. The mission consisted of Messrs. R. Ruiz-Esparza (General Educator), E. Vergara (Architect), M. Botti (Economist, UNESCO) and H. Baritsch (Technical Educator, UNESCO)).  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 920-CO) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Third Education Project in Colombia, for which Loan 920-CO was approved in the amount of US$21.2 million on July 19, 1973. The original Closing Date was June 30, 1977; the last disbursement was made on August 16, 1982. The remaining balance in the Loan Account in the amount of US$2,143,786 was cancelled on August 13, 1982. The Completion Report was prepared by the Latin American and Carib- bean Regional Office following a mission to Colombia. The PCR is based on the findings of the completion mission; reports and other documents in the Bank's files that relate to this project including the Appraisal Report (No. 1292a-CO) dated July 5, 1973; the record of the Board discussion of this project on July 17,1973; and the Loan Agreement (920-CO) dated July 19, 1973. The project experience has been discussed with Bank staff associated with the Project. The Operations Evaluation Department decided not to audit the project and sent copies of the draft PCR to the Government in July 1983. An English translation of the comments received from the Government is reproduced as Attachment I.  - ii - COLOMBIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 920-CO) Project Data A. The Loan Appralsal Estiwate Actual Total Project Cost (US$ million) 33.5 29.3 Overrun - -12% Loan Amount (US$ million) 21.2 19.05 Amount Disbursed (US$ million) 21.2 19.05 Amount Cancelled (US$ million) n.a. 2.14 Date Physical Component Completed 12/76 6/82 Proportion Completed by Original Completion Date 105% 30% Interest Rate 7.25% 7.25% Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) Fiscal Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Estimated 0.86 10.0 19.4 21.2 - - - - - Actual 0.10 3.6 6.5 8.0 8.8 9.5 10.8 13.6 19.0 Actual/ Estimated (X) 12 36 33 37 41 45 51 64 90* * Includes US$1.7 million charged as interest.  - iii - B. Chronology of Events Loan Agreement Revisions Actual First Mention in File 1/14/72 Government Application 3/21/72 Negotiations 5/18/73 Board Approval 7/17/73 Loan Agreement Date 7/19/73 7/19/73 Effective Date 1/20/74 1/20/74 Closing Date 6/30/77 12/31/79 12/31/81 3/31/82 3/31/82 Borrower Republic of Colombia Executing Agency Ministry of Education Follow-on Project Education IV (US$15 million) C. Currency Exchange Rate Name of Currency: Peso (Col) Appraisal Year US$1.00 = Col$ 22.50 Intervening Years (Average) US$1.00 = Col$ 40.00 Completion Year US$1.00 = Col$ 63.30 Fiscal Year = January 1 - December 31 D. Mission Data Month No. of No. of Staff Report Type of Mission Sent by Year Days a/ Persons b/ Weeks Date Reconnaissance Bank 1/72 13 3(A,B,C) 7.8 4/28/72 Preparation Reconnaissance Bank 7/72 5 2(B,C) 2.0 9/29/72 Pre-Appraisal Appraisal Bank 11/72 30 5(A,B,C,D,E) 30.0 6/11/72 TOTAL 39.8 a/ Actual work in the field b/ A - Architect, B - Educator, C - Economist, D - Technical Educator, E - Agricultural Educator.  - iv - Month/ No. of No. of Staff- Report Mission Data Sent by Year Days a/ Persons b/ Weeks Date Type of Mission Total Supervision I Bank 2/74 2 1(C) 0.4 3/29/74 2 Bank 10/74 3 1(A) 0.6 1/24/75 3 Bank 10/75 c/ 2 3(A,B,C) 1.2 12/16/75 4 Bank 3/76 3 1(A) 0.6 4/08/76 5 Bank 3/76 d/ 6 2(B,C) 2.4 4/30/76 6 Bank 9/76 5 2(B,B) 2.0 10/18/76 7 Bank 11/76 24 2(A,B) 9.6 12/16/76 8 Bank 2/77 4 2(A) 1.6 2/25/77 9 Bank 4/77 4 1(B) 0.8 5/31/77 10 Bank 3/78 3 1(B) 0.6 5/15/78 11 Bank 11/78 4 2(A,B) 1.6 12/18/78 12 Bank 2/79 2 2(A) 0.4 3/15/79 13 Bank 3/79 4 1(B) 0.8 4/17/79 14 Bank 2/79 5 1(A) 1.0 4/27/82 15 Bank 7/79 12 2(B,B) 4.8 9/04/79 16 Bank 11/79 3 1(A) 0.6 2/08/80 17 Bank 5/80 6 1(B) 1.2 6/30/80 18 Bank 11/80 1 1(B) 0.2 12/11/80 19 Bank 9/81 9 1(A) 1.8 11/6/81 20 Bank 3/82 5 1(B) 1.0 3/26/82 Sub-Total: 33.2 Completion Bank 6/82 15 4(A,B,C,D) 12.0 TOTAL 45.2 a/ Actual work in the field. b/ A - Architect, B - Educator, C- Economist, D - Technical Educator, E - Agricultural Educator. c/ One year gap due to reluctance of Government to receive Bank missions. During that year, the Government was planning educational reform measures and contemplating modifications in the project. d/ This was a speciai mission to discuss the Government's proposal to modify the project.  1~~~~~~~~~~~~ E. Allocation of Loan Proceeds (US$) Original Revision Revision Actual Category Allocation (4-6-77) (12-7-81) Disbursement I. Furniture and 9,800,000 10,500,000 10,695,285 10,314,664.90 Equipment II. Project Adminis- 4,400,000 5,000,000 7,725,513 5,975,635.79 tration, Profes- sional Services (other than under Category IV) and Civil Works (other than under Category III) III. Civil Works for 350,000 350,000 320,000 309,291.58 Rural Development Services' Centers IV. Technical Assis- 1,050,000 632,000 632,000 631,999.21 tance ACPO Contract V. Preparation of Proj- 30,000 27,421.25 ect Completion Report (Added (12/7/81) VI. Interest and other 1,600,000 2,000,000 1,797,202 1,797,201.23 Charges VII. Unallocated 4,000,000 2,718,000 - 0 - - 0 - Amount disbursed 19,056,213.96 Cancelled 2,143,786.04 TOTAL 21,200,000 21,200,000 21,200,000 21,200,000.00  COLOMBIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 920-CO) Highlights A Loan of US$21.1 million equivalent to assist in financing the Third Education Project in Colombia was approved and signed on July 19, 1973. Total project costs were estimated at US$33.5 million. The project included the building and equipping of 20 Common Facilities Centers, 13 Rural Development Centers, the expansion of one rural Development Services Center at Las Gaviotas, technical assistance and a teacher training program. Its main objective concentrated on the improvement and expansion of diversified secondary education in medium-sized cities and rural areas. Other objectives included the improvement of training for technical education teachers, preparing education sector studies to strengthen the capacity for educational planning and strengthening rural development capability by improving the facilities of the Las Gaviotas Rural Development Services Center. The project has been completed after undergoing significant changes during the implementation process in 1977 and less significant modifications in 1981. Completion was delayed by almost five years. The Loan was not completely disbursed, and a remaining loan balance of US$2.1 million was cancelled. Total project costs amounted to US$29.3 million which is 12X below the appraisal estimate of US$33.5 million owing to reductions in project scope. implementation was delayed by: (a) significant policy changes enacted into law by a new government that assumed power within eight months after the date of effectiveness and which suspended implementation for almost two years while the policy changes were being processed; (b) periodic shortages of counterpart funds; and (c) weak project management. In 1977 the government proposed modification in project scope which the Bank eventually accepted. As a result of these modifications the structures of the Common Facilities Centers and Rural Development Centers were altered, the sector studies were deleted, and the teacher training program was reduced. These changes did not result in obtaining a greater degree of support for the project on the part of the government, and in 1978 the government proposed to cancel a significant portion of tne project. Before the proposal was resolved a new government assumed office and committed itself to implement the project. The changes that were effected in 1981 reduced the number of Common Facilities Centers from 23 to 20 and deleted the rural satellite schools that were associated with the 13 Rural Development Centers.  - vii - The experience of implementing this project points out the importance of the following matters: (a) The risk of implementation delays when a government's educational priorities change (paras. 6.01 and 6.04). (b) The need for flexibility in project content and objectives so that changes can be accommodated during implementation (para. 6.06). Cc) The need to synchronize technical assistance, teacher training and equipment procurement with construction; when construction is delayed, they should be rescheduled (paras. 6.06, 6.08 and 6.16). (d) The difficulty in giving proper attention (either by the Government or the Bank) to the implementation of components outside the main focus of the project (paras. 6.07 and 6.09). The main finding is that the project has succeeded in establishing the Common Facilities Centers as a viable alternative for extending diversified education in urban areas. It appears that the centralized workshops and science laboratories do provide a less costly way to supply diversified secondary education in areas where large new secondary schools are not feasible. The Rural Development Centers have not met with success because of policy changes that have been made during the implementation period and weak management of this component.  I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 This Project Completion Report (PCR) is based on the findings of a completion mission that visited Colombia from June 29 to July 17, 1982. The mission consisted of four members who together used a total of 52 staff/days in the field. 1.02 A PCR was prepared by a private consultant contracted for that purpose by the Borrower between March and June, 1982. However, that PCR was found unacceptable by the Borrower on the grounds that it was too critical of the project implementation process. The Bank's PCR was, therefore, prepared without the benefit of ;4 Borrower prepared PCR. II. PROJECT BACKGROUND Educational Development Strategy 2.01 The Government's strategy for educational development in the late 1960s ascribed a high priority to reforming secondary education through the Introduction and extension of a diversified curriculum. 1/ That priority led the Government to seek, and obtain, the Bank's financial7assistance for the First and Second Education Projects. Those two projects produced 19 diversified secondary schools (INEMs, Institutos Nacionales de Educacion Media) between 1970-1975. Since those schools were located in the larger cities, the Government saw the need to take the next step in fulfillment of its policy by extending diversified secondary education to existing schools in medium-sized cities and, through new schools, to rural areas. 2.02 This educational strategy also sought to bring about a greater integration of the five-year primary cycle with the lower four-year cycle of diversified secondary education. 2/ By effecting such an integration the Covernment sought to increase the length of basic education for all children from five to nine years. Project Generation 2.03 Project development progressed from the first reconnaissance mission to Board approval in 18 months. In January 1972, a Bank reconnaissance mission visited Colombia in response to the Government's 1/ Diversified secondary education, which is synonymous with comprehensive secondary education, integrates practical and academic subjects into a balanced general education program that prepares students for a broad range of possibilities in employment and further training. 2/ The Colombian pre-university system of education consisted of 5 years of primary (grades 1-5) and 6 years of the secondary education which was divided into 4 years of a basic cycle and 2 years of an upper cycle.  -2- expressed interest in a Third Education Project. 3/ The Government's initial request for Bank assistance included: (a) fifty Common Facilities Centers (Centros Auxiliares de Servicios Docentes, CASDs) to extend diversified secondary education to urban centers; (b) thirty rural comprehensive schools to extend diversified education to rural areas; (c) improvement of the quality and supply of technical education teachers; and (d) faculty training and other needs in post-secondary and higher education. 2.04 Through the first reconnaissance mission the Bank and the Borrower agreed to: (a) continue supporting the reform of secondary education through the third project; and (b) prepare a project consisting of 50 Common Facilities Centers, 10 comprehensive rural schools, expansion of technical teacher trailing, and technical assistance. The Bank decided to limit itself to secondary education because that was the only level of education where the Government was actively implementing reform, and the third project was seen as a follow-up to the previous two Bank-financed projects. 2.05 Project preparation was to be accomplished between January and June of 1972 by a task force of the Ministry of Education (MOE), but that work wa not completed until the arrival of the appraisal mission in November 1972. The delay in preparation was caused by changes in high level personnel of the MOE including the Minister, and ineffective coordination among the various agencies that would participate in the project. During preparation the MDE reduced the number of Common Facilities Centers from 50 to 25 and increased the number of rural schools from 10 to 13. This overall reduction was made to keep the project within available financial resources. 2.06 When the project was appraised in November, the number of Common Facilities Centers was reduced from 25 to 24 because one of the proposed Centers (Arauca) was of uneconomic size and could not be justified. Also, two new components were added: (a) the extension of the Rural Development Services Center of Las Gaviotas; and 3/ At that time Colombia was implementing two consecutive Bank-financed secondary education projects under Loans 552-CO-and 679-CO with the aim of implementing the first phase of a reform of secondary education.  (b) assistance to conduct a sector survey and a series of sector studies. The appraisal also established that, as a condition of effectiveness, the Borrower would submit to the Bank a detailed plan for implementing the technical teachers training program. 2.07 Negotiations were held in May 1973, followed by Board approval in July. However, it was not until January 9, 1974, that the loan became effective because the Colombian institute responsible for preparing the teacher training implementation plan had difficulty in getting technical assistance for the task. The institute also had difficulty in organizing the task force that ultimately developed the plan. Project Objectives and Content 2.08 The project started with five general objectives that were to assist the Government to: (a) implement its pollcy of extending diversified secondary education by constructing, equipping and furnishing: Wi) 24 common facilities centers (grades 6-11); (ii) 13 rural :omprehensive schools (grades 6-9); and (b) establish a training program at four regional centers for 2,000 technical teachers; Cc) improve the provision of services for rural development by extending the Rural Development Services' Center of Las Gaviotas and linking Las Gaviotas with three satellite centers that would be established in the Las Gaviotas area; (d) assist in conducting an educational sector survey and specific sector studies to help the MOE with future educational planning; and (e) provide technical assistance to carry out those project components listed under (b) and (c) above. 2.09 Xlrhile the main thrust of the project was on the improvement of educational quality and opportunity, the new facilities also provided additional enrollment capacity as shown in the table that follows:  -4- Project School Enrollment Capacity Additional Boarding Grades Number Enrollment Places Common Facilities Centers 6-11 24 108,900 a/ I0- Rural Comprehensive Schools 6-9 13 7,000 1,700 Rural Development Services' Center 1-5 1 500 300 Technical Teacher Training Centers Post- 4 900 -0- Secondary 42 117,280 2,000 a/ This figure represented the total number of students that the centers would serve, but 69,500 of those students were already enrolled in satellite schools. The remaining 39,400 were supposed to be new places made available at the satellite schools by the part-time attendance of students at the Common Facilities Centers. 2 .10 The 24 Common Facilities Centers were to provide workshops, laboratories and student counseling services on a part-time basis to students from surrounding satellite schools that lacked such services. Each Center was to serve from two to six satellite secondary schools and the enrollments would be from 2,100 to 5,700 students. This was aimed at increasing the national preparation of secondary students in diversified education from 4% to 15% by 1980. 2.11 The 13 Rural Comprehensive Schools were to be part of 39 such schools that the Government intended to create throughout the country in order to extend diversified secondary education to the rural areas. These schools were to cover only the first four years (grades 6-9) of the regular six-year secondary program because the relatively small number of secondary students in the rural areas did not justify establishing schools with the diversified upper cycle (grades 10-11). The vocational orientation at these schools were to be in agriculture, and serve as focal points for rural development by offering a variety of services and training programs in adult education, community leadership, adult agricultural production, health and sanitation. In addition, the schools were intended to promote the improvement of primary education in their respective zones of influence by providing satellite schools with supervision, material assistance and in-service teacher training. 2.12 Since the Common Facilities Centers and the rural comprehensive schools would require vocational teachers when the supply of such teachers was practically non-existent, the project provided supplementary equipment to carry out a training program for 2,000 teachers of industrial and other vocational subjects. The program was to be planned and coordinated by the Colombian Institute for the Development of Higher Education (ICFES) and implemented through a coordinated effort involving four regional universities, technical schools, polytechnical institutes, and the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA). This program was to serve various types of diversified secondary schools, not just the project schools.  - 5 - 2.13 The project provided for the extension of facilities at the Rural Development Center of Las Gaviotas and the establishment of three satellite centers in that area. Las Gaviotas and its three satellites were to provide agricultural, educational, health, general supply and communication services to an estimated 1,100 to 2,000 families that were settling in an area of about 50,000 Km. Las Gaviotas was also meant to conduct research and experimentation in various aspects of rural development with an emphasis on appropriate technology. 2.14 The sector survey that was included in the project was designed to assist the Government to evaluate the status of its educational system and formulate policies and priorities for its future development. Sector studies were included in the project with the aim of helping to identify areas that would merit future Bank lending. Those areas included manpower needs, assessment of the INEM programs, and production of simple equipment and other learning materials. 2.15 Technical assistance for the project provided for 40 staff-years of specialists which were to be provided through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at an estimated cost of US$1.5 million. This assistance was to be directed at strengthening educational administration, educational planning, vorational supervision, industrial and agricultural instruction, and developing programs for rural comprehensive schools and technical teacher training. A non--governmental Colombian agency, Accion Cultural Popular (ACPO), was designated to organize and supervise the educational extension service of the rural comprehensive schools and to train its personnel. Lastly, an evaluation of the project was to be based in part on a tracer system that would involve the students of the project schools and a representative group of students from traditional secondary schools. Modification of Project Content 2.16 Project content underwent significant modification during implementation due to changes in educational policies and priorities and financial constraints. These modifications took place in 1977 and 1981 and are outlined in the table that follows:  Changes in Project Content Content at First Second and Appraisal Revision 1977 Final Revision 1981 (No change in (No change in Loan Amount) Loan Amount) (a) 24 Common Facilities 23 Centers 20 Centers (grades Centers (grades 6-11) (grades 10-11) 10-11) for 11,970 for 20,000 student for 14,250 student places to places to serve student places serve 130 existing 91 existing schools. to serve 150 schools. (The existing schools. Government stated its intention to build the 3 remain- ing Centers with its own resources. (b) 13 Rural Comprehensive 13 Rural Development 13 Rural Devel- School (grades 6-9) Centers for 2,600 opment Centers for 7,000 student places. student places (grades converted to 1-5 with conversion grades 6-9 under- to 6-9 to be done way with most gradually), satellite schools already at system of 96 new 6-8. Satellite primary schools, 462 system was de- extension units for leted. 348 existing primary schools, 117 teachers' houses. (c) Training for 2,000 Training for 2,000 No change. technical teachers technical teachers through ICFES in 4 through training regional centers. agency of MOE. (d) Expansion of existing No change in Loan Expansion of Las Rural Development Agreement but by 1979 Gaviotas, satel- Services Center of Las Borrower expressed lite centers Gaviotas and establis- intention to discard deleted. ment of three satellite two of the satellite centers (para. 2.13). centers. (e) Preparation of a sector Deleted. No change. survey and three sector studies under ICFES and MOE. (f) Technical assistance No change with regard No change. provided by ACPO to to ACPO. organize and super- vise an education extension service and train personnel of that service. Sector survey and No change. Although not men- studies were deleted tioned in Loan Agree- from the technical ment UNDP was to pro- assistance plan. vide 40 staff-years of technical assistance.  -7- 2.17 The project content revisions made in 1977 were mDtivated by educational reform legislation enacted in December 1975 and January 1976. That legislation (Law 43, and Decree-Laws 102, 088 and 089) restructured the MOE and several autonomous educational entities, decentralized educational administration, revised the system of educational finance, restructured primary and secondary educational levels and revised their curricula. The new structure for pre-university education became: Pre-School - for children under six years of age Basic - Grades 1-9 Middle Vocational - Grades 10-11 Intermediate Professional - Grades 12-13 (post-secondary) 2.18 The size of each of the 13 Rural Comprehensive Schools was reduced and the Centers were converted to Rural Develoment Centers serving as primary schools centers, because in those areas primary education opportunities were considered so limited that they would not provide sufficient graduates for the originally proposed secondary schools. It was agreed, however, that when primary demands were met, the schools cou'! be converted or extended for use as lower secondary schools. At the time of appraisal it was foreseen that the student catchment area would have to be large for each school, and dormitory and transportation facilities were planned accordingly. By 1977, however, the Government had changed its position on this matter and wanted smaller primary schools to serve smaller catchment areas without dormitory and transportation facilities. 2.19 As regards the revision of the teacher training program, ICFES withdrew from its commitment to the project because of financial constraints. The MOE agreed to absorb this part of the program. ICFES also withdrew from its commitment to the sector survey and sector studies and these were deleted from the project. The reasons for this included: the new Government did not think the studies merited a high priority and financial constraints. 2.20 All of the changes made in project content in 1981 were based on financial constraints affecting the Borrower. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Overview 3.01 The project required 8.75 years for completion instead of the original estimate of 4 years. Implementation delays were primarily caused by: (a) significant policy changes enacted into law by a new govenment that suspended project implementation for almost two years on the grounds that project content was not consistent with newly determined priorities; (b) periodic shortages of counterpart funds; and (c) weak project.  3.02 Within eight months after the loan had become effective a newly elected Government assumed power and implementation, which had been slow from the start, slowed dowa even more due to changes in the top level personnel in agencies associated with the project. During its first 18 months in office the Government enacted educational reform measures (para. 2.17) which altered previously established priorities. This led the Government to suspend implementation in mid-1975 until the project could be modified. Agreement on project revision was reached between the Bank and the Government in 1977. By that time (1977) only 36% of the Loan had been disbursed. 3.03 Implementation continued at a slow pace and in May 1978 (three months before its term was to expire) the Government requested the Bank to agree to a sharp reduction in the scope of the project (deleting all but 8 of the Common Facilities Centers) and the cancellation of the balance of the Loan (estimated at US$12.3 million) on the grounds that the project was not consistent with priorities and development strategies of the Government. This matter went unresolved until December 1978, four months after a new Government came into office, when the Government withdrew its request for cancellation and agreed to proceed with implementation but asked for, and received, an extension of the Closing Date to December 31, 1981. Between 1978 and 1981 project implementation improved significantly, but delays were encountered periodically due to shortages of counterpart funds and weak management. However, by 1980 it became clear that financial constraints would keep the Government from completing all components by the Closing Date, but a formal request to reduce project scope was not submitted to the Bank until July 1981. Agreement on the requested reduction of the project was reached, and the closing date was extended a third time to March 31, 1982, by which time project completion was accomplished. Project Management 3.04 The Instituto Colombiano de Construcciones Escolares (ICCE) is a semi-autonomous agency of the MOE. It has a staff of 917 employees and maintains 26 regional offices located throughout the country. Its mission is to plan and manage the national programs for school construction and the procurement of school furniture and equipment. In 1969 the agency was chosen to implement the First Education Project financed by the Bank and later it also served as the PIU for the Second Education Project. ICCE's overall implementation performance for the two projects was generally good. 3.05 In recognition of its past project implementation experience, the Government, in agreement with the Bank, designated ICCE as the executing agency for most of the project. Bowever, contrary to the appraisal mission's recommendation that ICCE be the only agency responsible for the administration, coordination and supervision of the entire project (SAR para. 6.01), the Loan Agreement placed under ACPO the component related to the education extension service (to be guided and supervised by the MOE), and designated the Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo (FONADE) to supervise the preparation of the sector studies. 3.06 During the first year of project implementation (1973/74), ICCE and the MOE were effective in getting the project started, but for the rest of the project's life (1974-1982) management was weak for the following reasons:  (a) Implementation responsibility and authority was concentrated in the office of ICCE's Director General, but he and his top level managers were unable to concentrate properly on the Bank's project which represented only about 15% of ICCE's total budget for capital investment in the period 1976-82. In short, throughout mDst of the implementation period the project did not receive the high priority attention from ICCE that had been expected by the Bank. The Bank's efforts to improve this situation were successful for short periods of time, but a lasting resolution of this issue was not achieved. (b) Staff turnover during the nine-year implementation period resulted in changing the director general four times, and caused instability among key staff members. (c) In 1976, ICCE's pedagogical group was disbanded and tne MOE took almost a year to establish separate units to guide the implementation of the educational programs for the Common Facility Centers and Rural Development Centers. Those units were finally given legal status in 1979 but their coordination with ICCE was consistently weak. (d) Financial constraints of the Borrower made it difficult for the Ministry of Finance to provide counterpart funds on time. 4/ Since this was a matter of priorities, the Government was ill-advised in not giving the project the financial support that had been promised because it jeopardized the success of the project and the investment that it represented. 3.07 Project coordination between ICCE and the other agencies that shared implementation responsibilites was consistently weak throughout the life of the project. 5/ The Bank's recommendations to ICCE and the MOE for strengthening coordination were not followed. Those recommendations included alternatives such as creating a coordinating committee or assigning specific coordination functions to key staff members. In 1976, when the MOE was reorganized and ICCE's pedagogical group was abolished, project coordination between ICCE and the MOE became even weaker as ICCE's management insisted that it had no authority over the staff of the MOE that was eventually assigned to work on the educational components. In addition to hindering implementation, this lack of effective project coordination also created problems in the process of reporting project progress to the Bank. Progress reports to the Bank were consistently late and incomplete from 1975 onward. 3.08 Most managerial problems could have been substantially reduced by concentrating project implementation under a small coordinating office, working exclusively for the project, and being responsible for the administration of project funds independently of ICCE's experience in implementing the previous two projets. In retrospect, it is evident that the experience factors was offset by such things as changes in top level personnel, a project that required more coordination than the previous two projects, and organizational changes within the MOE and ICCE. To this must be added the lack of solid support for the project manifested by the Government during most of the period 1975-78, which led to a Government request for project cancellation. That request was eventually withdrawn after a new Government came to office and presided over the implementation of 4/ The Borrower agreed with this (see Attachment I, para. 2). 5/ The Borrower acknowledged that coordination was faulty (see Attachment I, para. 3).  - 10 - most of the project from 1978 to 1982, but even during that period ICCE's management of the project showed the weakness already cited. Sites 3.09 By July 1973 practically all sites for Common Facilities Centers and Rural Development Centers had been selected; however, the 1976 revision of the project required the selection of four new sites for Common Facilities Centers that replaced original locations included in the SAR. Selection of towns and neighborhoods included in the project was accomplished at an early stage because a substantial number of poor urban areas lacking secondary school services had been identified during project preparation. However, good sites within those urban areas were difficult to find due to: (a) legal limitations which preclude ICCE from buying land; and (b) financial constraints of donors (departmental or municipal governments) that provided poor sites that generally created problems; for example: (i) the poor quality of soils in Cartagena and Sincelejo required unusual and costly reinforcement to foundations and structural support of floors at ground level; (ii) suburbs poorly served by public transport and access roads in bad condition (Fanja, Pasto, Quibd'o); and (iii) suburbs with public security risks (Medellin, Ibague and Villavicencio). 3.10 Although in future projects, site-related problems would be minimized owing to the current Bank policy which requires readiness for project Implementation at the time of appraisal, the quality of sites should be assured by including site acquisition in the cost of the project, so the Government would be prepared to meet all necessary expenditures. Design and Supervision of Schools 3.11 During implementation of the First and Second Education Projects ICCE strengthened its architectural office by 1972 and enough manpower for undertaking the preparation of the third project, including the design of all 24 Common Facilities Centers and 13 Rural Development Centers. Designs fully prepared in 1973/74 were discarded in 1976 following the project revision, and a second set of designs was prepared in 1978-80. Designs met the educational purposes for which they were envisaged; pre-vocational occupation orientation for the Common Facilities Centers and secondary education for the Rural Development Centers. 3.12 Schedules of accommodation for the Rural Centers were drastically reduced in the 1976 revision. The reduction was beneficial because designs which are based on a modular system became more simple and coherent with the current educational structure. This modest approach has proven to be good. There are two large and complex non-project Rural Development Centers (similar to those originally included in the project) that have been plagued with problems, including critical levels of underutilization. Most project  - 11 - Rural Centers would require to be expanded soon, but size of expansions should be regulated by school mapping (para. 3.11). 3.13 In regard to the Common Facilities Centers, designs reflect little or no improvement on what was prepared for INEMs under projects I and II. The reasons for this situation are mainly: (a) most benefits from direct experience of previous projects have been lost due to staff turnover (para. 3.06); and (b) poor client/architect communication between the MOE and ICCE, particularly after the elimination of ICCE's pedagogical division. There were problems of inconsistency between schedules of accommodation (revised by ICCE) and curricula designed by the MOE reflecting poor coordination between the MOE and ICCE. For example, in the construction of the first group of eight Common Facilities Centers, ICCE included working areas for carpentry, while the HOE was excluding carpentry from the curriculum. However, it was possible to resolve this and similar problems because the design of buildings was flexible enough to allow for the economic conversion of facilities for current curriculum requirements. Supervision (Civil Works) 3.14 ICCE's supervision of construction works operates at five levels, two staff positions in the field (a field engineer/architect and a regional manager) and three in Bogota headquarters (a division chief, an assistant director for construction and the director general). Although staff functions and responsiblities at each level are clearly defined, most divisions of the field staff are actually designated at higher levels, undermining authority of field staff who tend to approach issues with extreme caution. This weakness appears at all levels, so the owner/contractor relationship is not effective enough to maintain performance of contractors within good quality standards. In sum, supervision of civil works was less than effective and resulted in the development of various problems (para. 3.17). Civil Works 3.15 As specified in the Loan Agreement, the Borrower initially called for International Competitive Bidding (ICB) to award construction contracts, but there was only a minimal response from Colombian firms of any consequence and none from foreign firms. To remedy this, ICCE decided to use a revised version of the official local bidding procedures for the project instead of setting up a separate bidding method based exclusively on Bank guidelines. The main aspects of the revised bidding procedures were: (a) pre-qualification requirements on the basis of financial, legal and gross volume of productivity standards which generally yielded a group of 80 firms out of about 300 contractors; and (b) bid evaluation included the comparison of each bid with an official estimate (as required in local bidding). Generally, about 5OZ of bids were rejected because they failed to satisfy all conditions.  - 12 - Contrisetors 3.16 Although ICCE was unable to provide timely financing of its construction program, constructors were generally cooperative in continuing to carry out the terms of their contracts. However, construction workmanship was generally mediocre, due in part to the weakness of ICCE's supervision program and/or inadequate specifications. In the Common Facilities Centers, the mission observed the construction problems that follow: (a) rainwater seepage in 50% of the walls that have a northern exposure, because joints in the brickwork are not water-tight; (b) in Ibague, roof gutters receiving rainwater from two cotr,;rg5ng levels leak due to faulty workmanship; (c) in Cali, tile roofing is defective and rainwater leaks into 30% of the rooms; (d) in Medellin, one of the structural columns is out of line; and (e) in Sabanalarga, the lowered windows of the auditorium are bending and falling out. ICCE is attempting to have the contractors repair all known cases of defective workmanship before the liability periods expire, but its cumbersome procedures for dealing with such matters are time-consuming and often ineffective. Furniture and Equipment 3.17 The procurement of furniture encountered only minor problems, and the quality of that furniture is generally good. However, the procurement of equipment bad major problems that developed at an early stage of project implementation. These problems were mainly due to the poor coordination between the MOE and ICCE, the decision to purchase over half of the equipment when school construction had barely begun, and underestimating the complexity of storing so much equipment. 3.18 Taking into account the ill-timed and deficient supply of equipment for the INEMs under two previous projects, at the time of project appraisal the Borrower and the Bank recognized the need to strengthen the procurement unit in ICCE. Therefore, steps were taken to upgrade the position of the procurement officer to the level of an assistant director and to provide additional staff. This move did little to improve procurement for the project, however, because the procurement unit handled the national procurement program for ICCE and the project was only a part of that program. 3.19 The first package of equipment to be procured was for the implementation of the Teacher Training Program. Actions regarding this matter were closely monitored by the Bank, which on several occasions urged ICCE to accelerate procurement of that equipment. ICCE responded by preparing architectural designs and equipment lists for all 24 Common Facilities Centers and proposed the procurement of about 60% of the equipment  - 13 - for both programs and Rural.Secondary Schools. ICCE also proposed plans for starting the Common Facilities Centers construction program, and the Bank accepted both proposal. 3.20 In late 1974 when the Borrower began to consider revising the project, counterpart funds were sharply reduced and implementation slowed down. This coincided with the adoption of Government regulations which ended ICCE's privilege of import tax exemptions. Also, by 1975 educational reform measures were being taken that would alter the organization of the Common Facilities Centers and Rural Centers. These unforeseen developments had the following adverse effects on the first phase of equipment procurement: (a) most of the equipment arrived at the port of Barranquilla in 1976, where it remained for almost a year because ICCE did not have the funds to pay the required taxes and customs fees; (b) while in customs, the equipment suffered from corrosion and pilferage and ICCE reported that the loss was estimated at 2U, however, the loss is suspected of having been higher (about 5%). A more accurate review of the losses was hindered by incomplete inventory records; and xc) about 10% of the equipment procured was no longer needed in the Common Facilities Centers by 1976 because of the curricular and school organizational changes that had been effected by the Government's reform measures. Eventually, that equipment was distributed to the satellite schools of the Common Facilities Centers where it is being well used. Altogether, it is estimated that about 10% of the funds spent on the first equipment procurement may be considered as wasted. 3.21 In 1981, ICCE determined the balance of equipment and consumable materials required for the 20 Secondary Centers and 13 Rural Primary Centers as well as the equipment surplus available for distribution to schools associated with the Common Facilities Centers. Procurement of this second phase, amounting to US$3.2 million, was carried out within the last four months of project implementation and most of the equipment had arrived by July 1982. Delivery to the schools was expected to be completed by September 1982. Maintenance 3.22 The Colombian educational system has very limited resources for the maintenance of physical plant and equipment. Most preventive and routine maintenance is under the responsibility of each institution, which is allocated a relatively small amount of funds for maintenance in its annual budget. In 1982 the 11 Common Facilities Centers that are in operation received a total allocation of US$78,600 for maintenance, which represents 15% of the total annual budget per school. Furniture and equipment of project institutions has not required major maintenance because most of it has only had two or three years of use. Service to equipment carried out under contract has proved to be successful (as in the case of Medelln where classroom typewriters, that on the average have a weekly use of 50 hours, are serviced regularly by contractors and remain in good condition). Buildings  - 14 - of project institutions are new and do not require maintenance now. However, in a few years the need for maintenance is expected to increase substantially because inflation has resulted in the selection of more economical specifications, which reduced the initial cost but will accelerate maintenance expenditures. For example, wall paint in the last group of Common Facilities Centers to be built is not of the washable type and will require replacement about 50Z sooner (5-6 years) than it would take for better quality wall paint. Expeditious maintenance during the liability period is an unresolved problem. The MOE should undertake a study in order to determine the real cost of maintenance of physical facilities and take action for implementing it. It is well to point out that on the average most equipment installed in project schools should be replaced in less than ten years. The Borrower has no provisions for making such replacements possible because the necessary financial resources are simply not available. Technical Assistance 3.23 Technical assistance for project implementation consisted of two parts: (a) assistance provided by the UNDP for strengthening educational administration and planning, staff training; and (b) assistance provided by ACPO to organize and supervise extension service for the rural schools and train its personnel. The UNDP in Colombia agreed to absorb a portion of the technical assistance requirements of the project in its Country Program for the period 1972-76. The total UNDP allocation to the education sector was about US$6.0 million for the four year period, of which about US$1.5 million was designated to cover the cost of 40 staff-years of technical assistance and related equipment for the project. UNESCO served as the executing agency for the program for the entire sector which initially consisted of 11 subprograms in 1973, but was reduced to 8 subprograms in 1975 due to financial constraints. However, only about half of those subprograms offered technical assistance related to the project. A summary of the project related subprograms as revised in 1975 and implemented by 1976 follows.  - 15 - UNESCO-UNDP Technical Assistance Project Related Program (1975/76) (USS '000) Project Subprogram Revised (1975) Implemented Objective Title Cost S-Months Cost S-Months Strengthen Admin. Administration 455.5 99.3 141.4 25.3 and Planning and Planning of Education Develop syllabi Education Research 250.0 42.0 207.0 42.0 for industrial/ agriculture subjects Develop programs "Concentraciones 675.0 95.4 704.8 189.7 for rural second- de desarrollo ary schools rural' Organize vocation- Human Resources 1,590.0 391.0 1,185.9 267.0 al educ. super- Development visory service and develop curricula for technical teacher training TOTAL 4 subprograms 2,970.5 627.7 2,239.1 482.0 (40.1 Staff- Yrs.) 3.24 The technical assistance program outlined above also benefited non-project schools, i.e., INEM schools of the first and second education projects, other rural development centers (about 26), secondary agricultural institutes, other technical schools, polythechnic institutes and the MOE. Due to the lack of data, It is not possible to quantify the specific amount of that technical assistance that went directly to the various elements of the project. 3.25 Although the implementation of this technical assistance program was generally successful, little evidence remalns to indleate that It had any significant effect on the project ltself. This was due to the fact that its implementation coincided with the period when project implementation was either progressing slowly (1974) or was suspended by the Covernment (197511976). Thus the project, which actually did not start making headvay until 1978/1979, could not garner the desired benefits fro, that portion of the technical assistance program.  - 16 - 3.26 The same fate befell the second part of the technical assistance program which involved ACPO, a non-governmental agency of Colombia, contracted by the MOE in October 1973 to render specific services to the Rural Development Centers. Between 1973 and 1976, ACPO fulfilled its contract by: (a) providing 149 courses for 'campesinos" on health, agriculture and rural community development; (b) giving rural community leadership training to 448 -campesinos- at ACPO's headquarters in Sutatenza; (c) acquiring and equipping three mobile units (ACPO-mobiles) that visited about 383 rural communities touching about 75,000 persons with instructional programs covering health, sanitation, community development, farming and domestic science; and Cd) providing 15,000 hours of radio instruction for rural dwellers through Radio Sutatenza, AC20's powerful radio network. 3.27 Had project implementation progressed according to the appraised schedule, ACPO's technical assistance program would have greatly benefited the Rural Development Centers. However, in 1976 when ACPO completed its contract none of the project schools had been completed; thus the effects of the program simply vanished. ACPO tried to extend its contract when it became clear in 1976 that the construction of the rural comprehensive schools was seriously behind schedule, but the MOE refused the extension because by that time the Government's policy toward non-governmental agencies involved in Government projects had changed. Special Covenants 3.28 The Loan Agreement covenants that received less than full compliance are listed below. A detailed listing of compliance with covenants is shown in Annex 4. (a) Section 3.01(b)(i)-Design, construct, furnish and equip 20 Common Facilities Centers. Almost all of the Centers were completed, but one was only balf done by the Closing Date. The reason for this was the unusually long time required to acquire a site for the Center in Cartagena. (b) Section 3.01(b)(iv)-Conduct a Technical Teacher Training Program for about 2,000 technical teachers. The Technical Teacher Training Program was not implemented as originally planned. It was carried out before the schools were constructed and staff was appointed, thus its value to the schools is questionable. A more modest program was subsequently carried out for teachers as the schools opened. Cc) Section 3.05(a)-The Borrower shall appoint qualified directors for the Common Facilities Centers and the Rural Development Centers at least six months before the Centers open. Although qualified persons are being appointed to the project schools in al-I cases,  - 17 - their appointment is usually not made six months prior to the opening of the given center. The main reason for this is that the MOE usually lacks the necessary funds to make the appointments with much lead-time. (d) Section 4.03(b)-The Borrower shall maintain adequate insurance on buildings and facilities of the project. Insurance policies covering the buildings and facilities have not been acquired. Financial constraints and the lack of regulations related to insurance for school premises are the reasons for non-compliance. (e) Section 4.05-Close relationship shall be established between Rural Development Centers and INCORA, ICA, SENA, and other development agencies. Close relationships were never established between each Rural Development Center and INCORA, ICA, SENA, ACPO and other agencies of the Borrower. Those relationships have been weak and sporadic at best. (f) Section 4.07-Establish and maintain a Vocational Education Supervisory Service. The vocational education extension service was established as a function of the supervisory section of the HOE, but with the reorganization of the MOE in 1976 the service lost its identity and its functions were sub-divided into the two supervisory sections that manage the programs for the INEM schools and the Common Facilities Centers. 3.29 The Bank should remind the Borrower about the need to comply with those covenants for which compliance is still possible, i.e., completion of the Cartagena Center, finding a way to provide basic insurance coverage on buildings, and strengthening vocational supervision for the Common Facilities Centers. Bank Performance 3.30 The Bank was prompt in developing the project from identification to Board approval (18) months. During its implementation the project was visited by a total of 20 supervision missions representing 33.2 staff-weeks of effort. Almost alU of the missions (19) were staffed by either educators, architects or both and their frequency was at least two missions per year except in 1975 and 1981. 6/ There was good continuity of staff involvement, 6/ In 1975 only one supervision mission was carried out because the Borrower was not prepared to receive other missions that were proposed by the Bank. This was during the period when the Government had suspended implementation. In 1981 there was only one supervision mission in September; but that was considered sufficient since the project was nearing its closing date.  - 18 - as the same architect served the project from 1974 to its completion, one educator from 1975 to 1979 and a second educator from 1979 to completion. 3.31 The Bank was consistently flexible in dealing with practically all problem areas associated with the implementation of the project. Its flexibility was most evident on two occasions (1977 and 1981) when the Government proposed modifications to the project which the Bank generally accepted. The Bank should have insisted in the early years of implementation (1974/75) that the technical assistance program involving ACPO and the UNDP be phased so that it would be in harmony with the opening of the first schools. As it was, those agencies provided their assistance When none of the schools were ready for operation. In retrospect, the Bank might have looked more critically at the Government's 1977 proposal for modifying the project with a reappraisal that would have assessed the country's financial capacity to finance its share of project costs. IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCES Project Costs 4.01 The final cost of the project was US$29.3 million, which is 12% below the appraisal estimate of US$33.5 million. A comparison between estimated and actual costs by category including Bank/Borrower participation is given in the table that follows.  - 19 - Estimated and Actual Costs in USS Borrower's Category of Appraisal Bank's Contri- Actual Dif- Expenditure Estimate Contribution bution Cost ference X I. Furniture 13,630,000 10,314,665 609,348 10,924,013 +2,705,987 +20 and Equipment II. Project 17,691,000 5,975,636 11,184,603 17,160,238 - 530,762 -03 Adminis- tration, Profes- sional Services III. Civil 597,000 309,292 107,279 416,571 - 180,429 -30 Works for Rural Devel- opment Ser- vices Center IV. Technical 1,631,000 631,999 157,999 789,999 - 841,001 -51 Assistance V. Preparation 30,000 27,421 0 27,421 - 2,579 -08 of PCR (added 12/81) TOTAL 33,579,000 17,259,013 12,059,229 29,318,242 -4,230,758 -12 58.9% 41.1% 4.02 The factors that contributed to the -12% difference between total estimated costs are: (a) the reduction in the number of Common Facilities Centers from 24 to 20; (b) the reduction of the size of the 13 Rural Development Centers; (c) the elimination of the 96 new primary schools and 462 extension units which constituted the satellite network for the Rural Development Centers; and (d) the use of only half (49%) of the estimated amount for technical assistance with the deletion of the sector survey and sector studies, which accounted for almost US$0.5 million of unused funds while another US$0.2 million was left unused in the technical assistance plan for the Rural Development Centers.  - 20 - 4.03 Had all of these elements been implemented, as originally planned, there would have been high cost overruns as shown by the table that follows: Estimated Costs if Project had been Implemented as Originally Designed (in US$'000) Cost per Differ- Appraisal Original ence Category Assumptions Estimate Plan X I. Furniture 15% increase to cover 13,630 15,674 + 15 and Equipment inflationary increase II. Project Admin. Tocal common facilities 17,691 36,185 + 104.5 Civil Works center construction would have been 163,020 m2 at US$163/m2 and total rural centers' construc- tion would have been 53,539 m2 at US$170/m2 III. Civil Works Rough estimate on cost 597 1,194 + 100 for Rural increase for 3 satellite Devel. Serv- centers ices Center IV. Technical As- No change 1,631 1,631 0 sistance V. PCR Prepara- No change 30 27 - 08 ration TOTALS 33,579 54,711 + 163 4.04 The costs for furniture and equipment exceeded the appraisal estimate by 202 and civil works (Category II) was only 3X under the appraisal estimate despite the significant reduction of the construction component. In these two cases the cost increases were due to the inflationary pattern that started climbing sharply in 1973 (the project was appraised shortly before the 1973 oil crises). The severity of cost escalation in Colombian construction can be seen between December 1972 and May 1982 when the cost per square meter of construction increased 800%. 4.05 In the other two major categories (III-IV) costs fell considerably below the appraisal estimates because of the reductions in project scope brought about by the project revisions in 1977 and 1981. Use of Loan Proceeds 4.06 Annex 2 shows the appraised and actual disbursement schedule for the proceeds of the Loan. It can be seen that by the Bank's FY77 when the project should have been completed according to appraisal estimates, only 36%  - 21 - of the Loan had been disbursed. There was only one change in the percentage of disbursement during the life of the project. That change was agreed upon when the project was revised in 1977, and the rate of disbursement for Category II (civil works) was increased from 30 to 35%. 4.07 The end result was that US$2.1 million of the US$21.2 million Loan was unused by the Borrower and cancelled by the Bank. V. OPERATION OF PROJECT INSTITUTIONS Overview 5.01 Policy changes and educational reform measures that took place within the first two years of project implementation resulted in significant changes to the project schools in 1977. The structure of the Common Facilities Centers was changed by reducing the number of grade levels from six to two and some of the subject areas were eliminated. The Rural Development Centers were affected more drastically as they were converted from secondary rural schools to primary schools that were supposed to have an extensive network of satellite schools. This change also caused the reduction of the size of these schools. There was a further complication for the Rural Development Centers by the uncoordinated manner in which ACPO implemented its training and rural organization program (para. 3.27). In a subsequent reduction of the scope of the project in 1981, three of the 23 Common Facilities Centers were eliminated and the Rural Development Centers were converted once again to rural lower cycle secondary schools, and their satellite network was eliminated. The Las Gaviotas component was carried out except for the three satellite centers that were eliminated in 1981. Only four of the Common Facilities Centers have been in operation for more than a year while seven others are in their first year of operation. Eight recently completed Common Facilities Centers will open before the end of 1982 and one was still under construction when the project closed and will now be completed, at the Borrower's expense, by December 1982. Attainment of Educational Objectives 5.02 The project's broad educational objective of extending diversified secondary education to medium-sized cities and rural areas is in the process of being met by the Common Facilities Centers. AtLa