Romania - Flood Recovery Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCAuL USE ONLY RePor No. 4936 PROJECT COUPLETION REPORT ROMnUAA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (Loan 1169-RO) February 13, 1984 Projects Department Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region document ha a restricted dlbut. mi may be used by ecipiets ady in de pefornue of dh eofficld dutis. Is cotems my *m odherse be isdosed withou Woid Bak aho&ulv.  LIST OF ANNEXES Annex 1 - Project Cost Breakdown Annex 2 - Project Financing Annex 3 - List of Procurement Contracts Annex 4 - Scbedule of Disbursemiuts Aonex 5 - Value of Production of Selected Agricultural Units Affected by the Flood for tbe Period 1973-1977 Aonex 6 - Equipment Procured for the Flood Warning System Annex 7 - List of Rebabilitation of Irrigation, Drainage, and Flood Protection Works Map 1 - IBRD No. 17249 PCR: Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Works Map 2 - IBRD No. 17250 PCR: Automatic System for Hydro-Meteorological Flood Warning ABBREVIATIONS BAFI - Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry CAP - Cooperative for Agricultural Production DELIF - Directorate for Exploitation of Land Reclamation Works DGEIFCA - Economic General Directorate for Land Reclamation and Agricultural Construction IB - Investment Bank IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB - International Competitive Bidding IDR - Institute of Design and Researcb of the National Water Council DMH - Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology MAFI - Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry NWC - National Water Council SMA - Station for Agricultural Macbinery TCIF - Construction Trust for Land Reclamation Woz-ks  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (Loan 1169-RO) COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ........................... .............)...... ( BASIC DAl& SHEET ...........;(i HIGHILIGETS .................................... o...... ........... MUi) I. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ...................... I A. Introduction ..... ..... ... , l B. Project Background and Formulation ............1 C. Project Objectives and Descrip:ioo ........ 2 D. Implementation Arrangements .................... 3 II. PROJECT IMPLENENIATION ....... ......... . ... ............. 3 A. Loan Negotiation and Effectiveness ....... o ....... 3 B. Project Implementation .................... . .. ..**. 3 C. Project Cost aud Financing ........ .......... 5 D. Allocation of Loan Proceeds ..... .................... 7 E. Procurement ......................................... 7 F. Disbursements ... * ............. .... .......... * ** 8 G. Compliance witb Loan Covenants ...................... 9 III. OPERATING PERFORMANCE . ...................... 9 IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE ............................... 9 A. Tbe Borrower. 9 B. The Beneficiaries .................. *.. ...... ...... 10 V. ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND EVALUATION ........................ 11 - VI. BANK'S ROLE AND PERFORMANCE ... ....... ........ 12 VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED ....................... 13 Attachment I - Borrower's comments 1.................... 15 Annexes Maps I Ibs document has a restrcd distnbution sad may be used by recpients only in the performance of | their official duties Its contents may not otberwise be dicosed without World Bank authonizatio  (i) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1169-RO) PREF4CE This is a Completion Report of the Flood Recovery Project in Romania, for which Ioan 1169-RO, in the amount of US$40.0 million was approved on November 4, 1975. The Loan was closed on December 31, 1981, after a delay of 36 months. The final disbursement was made on January 26, 1981, and the full loan amount was disbursed. This is one of two complementary loans made of an emergency nature as the result of floods in Romania during July 1975. The Project Performance Audit Report (No. 3229) for the industrial and transportation components (Loan 1170-RO for US$2O million to the Investment Bank) was issued on December 29, 1980. This Project Completion Report was prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region following a mission to Romania in March 1983 and is based in part on a draft completion report prepared by the Borrower (Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry) and a review of the Appraisal Report (No. 876a-RO), the President's Report (No. P-1699-RO), the Loan and Guarantee Agreements dated November 12, 1975, together with a review of correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files, minutes of the Board's discussions, and interviews with Bank staff who have been associated with the project. The draft report was sent to the Borrower on October 25, 1983, for comments. The comments received have been reproduced as Attachment I. The project has not been subjected to an audit by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).  (ii) ROYIkIA EUAOD REDOVERY PRoJECr LUAN 11b9-RI) PROJECT CUWHLETION REPOkr BASIC DATA SHEET TME PROJECr DATA Appra5saL Actual or Actual ms compared to Item Estimate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estiate Total Project Costa (US$ mllion) 121.7 127.1 104Z Loan Amount (USS million) 40.0 40.0 _ OO% Date Board Approval Nov. 4. 1975 Nov. 1975 Date Effectlveieses Dec. 2. 1975 Dec. 1975 DLte Pbysical CoWponents Completed-Land Reclamation Dec. 31. 1978 Dcc. 31. 1976 24 moa. anticipation -Agricultural Cr. Dec. 31. 1978 Dec. 31. 1976 24 wos. anticipation -Flood Warning System Dec. 31, 1978 Dec. 31. 1981 36 mos. delay Closing Date June 30. 1979 Dee 31. 1980 18 mos. delay Ecoanomic Rate of Return (C) NA NA Financial Rate of Return (Z) NA NA Institutional Performance adenuate Agronomic Performance NA NA KMmber of Direct Beneficiaries NA 1.370 CMDJLATIVE DISBURSEMEXTS Dee 76 Dec 77 Dec 78 Dec 79 Dec 80 Dec 81 Appraisal estimate (3S$ mSllion) 27.0 60.0 - - - _ Actual, (us$ million) 36.4 36 .6 36.9 38.1 39.1 40.0 Actual as Z of estilate 135 92 92 95 98 100 Date of final disbursement Jan. 26. 1981 Principal repaid -o (mo./day/yr.) (US$ million) 08/31/83 4.6 YISSION DATA Date No. of Nandays Specializationa Performance Types of :ission (no.dyr.) Persons In Field epresnnte4ta j L Proble_Jd Identification none Preparation none Appraisal 7/75 5 105 Subtotal 105 Supervision 1 10/75 6 63 a.b.c.d I I _ Supervision 2 2/76 2 7 d.b I I Supervision 3 4176 2 26 d,e - Supervision 4 5/76 1 3 a.e L I _ Supervision 5 11/76 2 6 d.b I 2 Supervision 6 8177 4 2 b.d.a.e 1 2 - Supervision 7 _/78 2 4 b.c 1 2 Supervision 8 12/78 2 6 d.b I 2 - Supervisiong 12/79 2 12 d.& 1 2_______ T__ Subtotal 155 Total 260 OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry (BAFT) Executing 4ency Bank for Agriculrure and Food Industrv. National Water Coun&ll Tnnrirure of Meterology and Sydrology Name of Currency (abbreviation) Let (Lei) Cbrrency Exchange Rate: Apprasall Year Average 8S$ 1.00 - 20 asi Interveanig Years Average 8SS 1.00 - 20 Lei Completion Year Average U5 1.00 - 18 Lei Jollow-oa Project: unm o loan/Credit Number Loan/Credit Amount (USS million) Date Board Approval a 4 - agriculturist; b - agricultural economist; c - finnsucil ea*lyst; d - technical specialist; e - gencral l - problem-free or minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; and 3 - major problems. I - Improving; 2 - stationary; and 3 - deteriorating. r - financial; M - managerlal; T - technical; P - polltical; and 0 - other. RA - Not applicable BEST COPY AVAIUBLE  (iii) ROMANIA FLOOD RECOVERY PROJECT (LOAN 1169-RO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Highlights During July 1975 serious floods caused extensive damage in Romania. This project aimed to provide relief from the flood damage over a three year period. Special measures were taken to speed up appraisal and the loan was approved within four months of the time of the floods. The project included provision of farm credit to 1,300 farms which had suffered flood damage, and reclamation and rehabilitation of flood control, irrigation and drainage works. It also included a small component for the installation of a new flood warning system. The Romanian authorities executed the project diligently and efficiently. The main components for farm credit and rehabilitation of flood control, irrigation and drainage works were completed well ahead of schedule. However, the small flood warning component was delayed considerably due to technical design problems and procurement delays. Due to the emergency nature of this project, no attempt was made to assess the economic rate of return either at appraisal or at project completion. Some of the other lessons learned and points of interest are as follows: - many procurement problems were encountered with this project, primarily because of the difficulty experienced in reconciling Government's normal procurement procedures with those expected by the Bank; - the flood warning system proposed for the project was innovative and technologically complex. It was unrealistic to expect that this could be completed quickly under an emergency aid project; - the lack of an adequate monitoring and evaluation system made it difficult to assess progress with project implementation, the performance of project components, and project impact.  I. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION A. Introduction 1.01 During the first 10 days of July 1975, serious floods caused extensive physical damage in Romania. Immediately after the floods, the Romanian Government began an urgent and comprehensive flood recovery program and requested the Bank's assistance for its financing. A mission visited Romania in the last part of July 1975 and reviewed with the Government its measures for flood recovery. The project was then formulated on the basis of the mission's findings, and on November 4, 1975, less than four months after the floods, the Board of Directors approved two complementary loans for this Flood Recovery Project (Report No. P-1699-RO, dated October 22, 1975); a US$40 million loan to the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry (BAFI) for the agricultural component and a US$20 million loan to the Investment Bank (IB) for the industrial and transportation components. The industrial and transportation components have been completed in May 1978 and the agricultural component on December 31, 1981. This report conceros the US$40 million loan to BAFI for the implementation of the agricultural component. B. Project Background and Formulation 1.02 While Romania has experienced a series of floods in the recent past, the 1975 floods were more widespread and caused more serious economic damage than earlier floods. The floods dealt a serious blow to the economy. About 1.1 million hectares of agricultural land (10% of total cultivated area) were flooded. Of these, 55Z were used to grow cereals, 27% fodder and pasture, 4% vegetables and potatoes, 3% sugar beets and the balance oilseeds, fruits and other crops. The floods, excessive ground moisture, and hail resulted in losses of 75-90% of the planned production of crops in the affected areas. Furthermore, about 190,000 head of livestock and 3 million poultry were drowned, 6,500 ha of tree crops were permanently destroyed, 18,000 tons of stored cereals valued at about Lei 20 million (US$1.0 million) and about Lei 100 million (USt5 million) worth of livestock products were lost. Damages to farm buildings and equipment are estimated at about Lei 530 million. About 30% of the flooded areas and the livestock and poultry drowned were owned by the State Agricultural Enterprises and the balance by the Agricultural Cooperatives. These losses cost the economy an estimated Lei 7.7 billion (US$384 million). In addition, about 250 industrial enterprises and housing and community facilities were damaged in 1,300 villages and 65 towns, some 2,600 km of rail network (24Z of Romania's network) and about 3,400 km of national roads (25% of Romania's network) were affected. The total losses excluding extensive damage to housing and social facilities were quantified by the July 1975 mission at about US$790 million, and were split about evenly between production (including crops) and asset losses. The production loss represented 2.4 percent of 1974 national income and the asset loss 6.2 percent of 1974 gross domestic investment. 1.03 The Romanian Government took immediate measures to correct the problems caused by the flood. While supporting and guiding the efforts of the population to protect and save life and property, it also issued appeals to potential international and bilateral sources for assistance to supplement local efforts. The Bank was one of the first foreign agencies to respond to the Romanian appeal. Upon its arrival in Romania on July 21, some 10 days  after the Government request for Bank Assistance, the six man interdisciplinary Bank Mission began surveyinR the extent of flood damage. It then concentrated on evaluating the needs of key sectors of the economy and defining a potential Bank project to support the Government Flood Recovery Program. Two Romanian agencies-the Investment Bank and the Bank for Agricultural and Food Industry--both already familiar with the Bank, assisted io the Bank mission's work. The Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry had received two Bank loans - Loan 1082-RO Irrigation Project (1975) and Loan 1083-RO Agriculture and Credit Project (1975). The Investment Bank had been the borrower for tbree previous loans: Loan 1020-RO Fertilizer Project (1974), Loan 1027-RO Special Steel Project (1975), and Loan 1028-RO Thermal Power Project (1975). This prior familiarization and the higb priority granted by the Romanian leadership to the Bank assistance mission facilitated the Bank work and the identification of potential problems. After tbe mission's return to Washington, the proposed loan was quickly processed in order to maximize the Bank's effectiveness in assisting Romania's flood recovery efforts. Negotiations were initiated with the Romanian authorities on September 16, 1975, within six weeks of the mission's return to beadnuarters. 1.04 Two special considerations due to specific concerns expressed by the Government arose during the formulation of the project. First, in order to minimize the adverse impact of the flood on Romania's trade balance, the Romanian authorities did not want the project to finance primarily imports of equipment. The Government initially wanted the loan proceeds to be distributed mainly against local expenditures for rehabilitation works and use only part of the loan for agriculture and transportation rehabilitation euuipment. Second, the Romanian autborities initially did not want the Bank-financed enuipment to be procured under international competitive bidding but only under Romanian procedures, reportedly to minimize procurement delays. During project formulation and subsecuent lengthy negotiations, these issues were substantially accommodated within the Bank's established policy of financing foreign exchange requirements. In addition, the principles under which international competitive bidding would be used for a substantial amount of procurement under the Project without delaying implementation were agreed upon, as well as the modalities for procurement of Bank-financed eauipment under international shopping. These issues are addressed in detail in Section II.E (Procurement). C. Project Objectives and Description 1.05 The US$40 million loan to BAFI was to finance the agricultural component of the project and included several elements of the Government's flood rebabilitation program in the sector to be executed in the sbort-medium term. The agricultural component of the project consisted of (i) credit extended to about 1,300 farms wbich bave sustained serious flood losses. It included urgently needed rehabilitation and investments on flood-damaged farms which would otherwise have to be deferred as a result of the floods; (ii) the project also included a land reclamation component c9nsistiog of rehabilitation of damaged flood control, irrigation and drainage works at 259 different locations; and (iii) the installation of specialized flood warning eguipment at 45 remote sensing stations, 4 data collection and control regional centers, and I central data processing center.  -3- D. Implementation Arrangements 1.06 The borrowing agency--BAFI--bad the overall responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the project's components. BAFI also bad the responsibility for carrying out the agricultural credit component. The rehabilitation of flood control, irrigation, and drainage works was carried out by the National Water Council through the Special Hydro-technical Works Trust. The Trust implemented the major works wbile the local district units (wbich are also under the Trust's jurisdiction) undertook the smaller construction works. Upon completion these works were operated and maintained by the Water Authority of each river basin. The third component--the flood warning system-was implemented by the Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology. Upon completion, the Institute began tbe $traiing of specialized staff for banding over the operation of the remote stations and control centers to the local Water Autbority Agency. -The central coordinating and control center in Bucharest remains under the direction of the Institute. Overall procurement arraogements were handled by the Foreign Trade Organization - Romagrimex, while tender documents, technical specifications, and bid evaluatioo were prepared by the Institute of Design of the National Water Council and by the Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology. II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Loan Negotiations and Effectiveness 2.01 During negotiations the only major issue concerned the procurement arrangements to be followed under the loan. The Romanian authorities initially were reluctant to accept that equipment for the project be procured under ICB. However, procurement procedures acceptable to the Bank were agreed upon. These set forth the type of equipment to be procured under ICB and determined that equipment for the flood warning system should be procured through limited international tendering due to its highly specialized nature and the need for compatibility. 2.02 No special condition had to be met for loan effectiveness. The loan became effective on December 2, 1975, about 3 weeks after loan signing. B. Project Implementation 2.03 The three project components were expected to be completed by end-December 1978. The land reclamation component and the agricultural credit component were actually completed 2 full years ahead of scbedule, by the end of December 1976, while the flood warning system suffered great delays and was completed only by the end of December 1981, three years behind schedule. It was due to the considerable delay in the implementation of this component that the loan closing date was extended by 18 montbs from June 30, 1979 to December 31, 1980. Land Reclamation Component 2.04 Pbysical implementation of this component was faster than expected. The rehabilitation of irrigation, drainage and soil erosion control works was completed for an area totaling 132,000 ba and flood control works (canals and dykes) were rebuilt over a total extension of 140 km. The construction eouipment for carrying out these works was procured under ICB and was supplied  -4- in a timely fashion to the specialized construction organizations responsible for the works. All together, 259 subprojects have been completed in 20 different river basins. Agricultural Credit Component 2.05 The implementation of the credit component was also carried out expeditiously and was completed by December 1976, 24 mooths abead of scbedule. This component financed rebabilitation works and viable investments (including livestock, construction of facilities, agricultural machinery) in state-farms and cooperatives wbose crop and livestock production had suffered losses in excess of 20% of their planned production targets in 1975. The subprojects financed include 130 state farms, 1,170 cooperatives, and 73 food industry units. 2.06 An issue concerning the composition of subprojects and related Bank disbursements arose during the initial phase of implementation. Withdrawal applications submitted by BAFI for the period August 1975 through February 1976 included subprojects wbich totalled far more than the US$100 million that the Bank agreed to assist in financing (Para. 5, Scbedule I of the Loan Agreement). In addition, the data supplied by BAWI on the forms supporting the witbdrawal requests included investments made prior to the August 1, 1975 date established for Bank financing in the Loan Agreement. The Bank withbeld reimbursement in February 1976 to clarify the issue with BAFI. As a result of several meetings, BAFI prepared a detailed breakdown of investment subprojects to be included in the US$100 million limit, which met the criteria established in the Loan Agreement. No furtber problems occurred in the implementation of the credit component. Flood Warning System Component 2.07 This component included specialized sensing devices, radio traosmission and relay systems and otber related equipment whicb was installed at remote stations and data collection centers of a regional flood warning system. 2.08 This regional system would be tbe first stage of the overall national program for flood warning, and it would cover the upper river basins and mountainous areas of the Arges, Buzau and Siret basins. This part of the flood warning program was financed by the loan and was approved by the government as late as November 1979, after more than 2 years of detailed design preparation and testing and almost 4 years after the loan became effective. 2.09 The system includes 45 remote sensing stations, out of which 23 hydromoteorological stations transmitting data on water level, rainfall and air temperature; 18 meteorological stations measuring rainfall and temperature; 4 complex meteorological stations which, in addition to the above parameters, also measure wiod velocity, pressure, and solarimetric characteristics. 2.10 In addition, there are 4 regional cootrol and collection centers located in Suceava, Bacau, Buzau, and Pitesti, which collect data from their subsystems and transmit them to the main center in Bucbarest.  -5- 2.11 Compared to the appraisal estimates, there were 25 hydromoteorological stations and 2 regional control and collection centers less than foreseen. This was due to the fact that at appraisal the design was not yet finalized and the tentatively estimated costs for the imported equipment were substantially lower than the actual costs. 2.12 The warning system also included a computer system and related equipment for an automatic data processing ceoter in Bucharest. This center collects and processes the data from the regional centers and prepares daily forecasts and flood monitoring reports. 2.13 Construction of the facilities began in 1977 and was completed in late 1981, three years later than the appraisal estimate. 2.14 The delay was due to several factors; (a) the difficulties and delays experienced by the Institute of Desigo and Research in the preparation of designs and specifications for such an innovative and bigbly complex system, especially in view of the limited local expertise on such systems and of the technical requirements for making compatible the equipment supplied by a large number of different manufacturers; (b) the related prolonged test requirements prior to installation; (c) the procurement problems wbich substantially delayed the awarding of contracts for the equipment (para. 2.27); {d) the logistic difficulties for the construction of the remote sensing stations located at bigb altitude sites, accessible by helicopter only during 2-3 months of the year. 2.15 The system started partial operations in 1981 and was working at full capability in March 1983. C. Project Cost and Financing 2.16 According to the information provided by BAFI, the actual total cost of the project was close to the appraisal estimate--US$127.1 million compared to US$121.7 million, or +4.4%. 2.17 However, when broken down by component, there are significant differences between appraisal and actual costsz -33Z for the land reclamation component, +400% for the flood warning system, and +2% for the credit component, as shown below.  -6- 2.18 Investment Costs by Components (Lei Million) Investment Costs Project Components Estimated Actual Variation (Lei) (Z) A. Land reclamation works 288 193 -95 (-33) B. Flood warning system 40 200 +160 (+400) C. Agricultural credit 2,106 2,148 +42 (+2) TOTAL (Lei million) 2,434 2,541 +107 (+4.4) (US$ million) 121.7 127.1 +5.4 (.4.4) 2.19 The major source of the cost variation was the substantially underestimated cost of the flood warning system component due to a more sophisticated design than envisaged at appraisal and a decrease in the cost of the land reclamation component, while the credit component remained relatively unchanged. Since the flood warning equipment was mainly imported, whereas a Substantial share of the land reclamation component coosisted of local costs, the Romanian autborities preferred to allocate scarce foreign exchange (from IBRD funds) to the former. In retrospect, this appears to have beeo an appropriate decision. 2.20 The foreign exchange component based on actual subproject costs is estimated at US$55 million or 432 of the total investment cost, compared to 162 estimated at appraisal. This discrepancy was due to the underestimation at appraisal of the foreign exchange cost of the land reclamation and credit components. 2.21 A detailed project cost breakdown is shown in Annex 1. Project Financing 2.22 Of the total project cost, the IBRD loan amounted to Lei 793 million (312), BAFI loans totalled Lei 1,696 million (672) and beneficiary equity funds Lei 52 million (22). The detailed financing plan is given io Aonex 2. The financing plan at appraisal did not differentiate between the industrial and agricultural components, hence it is not possible to compare it witb the actual financing of the individual agricultural component. However, the appraisal evaluation did indicate that about US$5.3 million or 52 of tbe agricultural component would be finasced by the beneficiaries. In fact, only 2X of the total agricultural component cost was fioanced by beneficiaries (about US$2.6 million). The main reason for this difference is that the farms tended to allocate their available funds to maintain the level of investmeots envisaged in the overall 1976-1980 plan and relied oo a larger share of BAFI and IBRD loans to finance the reconstruction and rebabilitation works.  -7- D. Allocation of Loan Proceeds 2.23 During implementation, the allocation of the loan proceeds to the project components was not cbanged from the originally planned as shown below: Allocation of Loan Proceeds Appraisal Category Estimate Actual - - - - US$ '000 - -- Eauipment and spare parts for Part A of the Project (Irrigation Drainage and Flood Control) 7,200 7,200 Equipment for Part B of the Project (Flood Warning Sys -em) 1,800 2,800 Disbursements under BAFI - loans (Agricultural Credit) 30,000 30,000 Unallocated 1,000 TOTAL 40,000 40,000 2.24 The initially unallocated amount of US$1 million was reallocated on July 1979 to the flood warning system component, since there was an increased need for funds for this component due to the original underestimation of its cost. E. Procurement 2.25 Total procurement contracts awarded under the loan amounted to US$9.9 million, in line with the amount envisaged at appraisal. Construction equipment for the land reclamation works valued at US$7.1 million was procured togetber with the eauipment for the Giurgui-Razmiresti project. A list of procurement contracts awarded is attached in Aonex 3, including the equipuent for the Flood Warning System, valued at US$2.8 million. Eouipment for Land Reclamation Works 2.26 There were procurement problems initially wben Romagrimex elected to pre-aualify potential equipment suppliers and issued tender documents witbout prior Bank approval. This issue was subsenuently resolved by rebidding and no further problems arose. The eauipmeot reauired for this component-scrapers,- draglines, bulldozers, graders, and dump trucks--was bulked and included in the ICB for the Giurgui Razmiresti Project. Bids were opened in April 1976; all contracts, valued at US$6.8 million were awarded to Romanian firms in May/June 1976. Loaders, compaction rollers, and concrete mixers in the amount of US$0.3 million were purchased under local procedures in accordance with Schedule 4 of the Loan Agreement.  - 8- Equipment for Flood Warning System 2.27 International bidding took place in January 1977, but tbe contract award was finalized only by April 1978. This delay was due to deviations from the techaical specifications by all nine bidding firms. Technical clarification discussions were necessary, wbicb resulted in new bidding. Bid evaluation proved technically difficult due to a lack of familiarity with performance features of the various alternatives offered and the difficulty in ensuring tecbnical compatibility between the equipment of different manufacturers. Two major contracts totalling US$0.9 million were awarded to foreign firms and one to a Romanian company amounting to US$1.9 million. Procurement of special sensors for measuring sunlight, humidity, and water content of snow was undertaken tbrougb Ioternational Sbopping. 2.28 The considerable delay in bid evaluation and contract awarding was the major factor determining the postponement of tbe project completion by over two years. 2.29 This experience indicated that had this eauipment been procured as a complete system package, as initially proposed by the Bank but rejected by the Romanians, many of these problems could bave been avoided and the bidding procedure and contract awarding expedited. 2.30 Another factor to be noted is that tbe Bank's project was a partial component of the overall Romanian Flood Recovery Program. The implementation of the overall Program by the ministries and enterprises was to be parallel but somewbat different in its procurement aspects from the Bank project coordinated by BAFI, wbicb followed procurement procedures agreed upon during negotiations. The difference in procurement procedures between the Bank financed and non-Bank financed items led to misunderstandings and difficulties during project implementation. F. Disbursements 2.31 The loan was disbursed completely by the end of January 1981, 18 montbs later than foreseen. In the first year, $36.4 million were disbursed, exceeding the projected disbursement schedule due to rapid implementation of priority investments under the agricultural credit component. This probably reflects the expediency with whicb Romanian agencies tend to carry out formal directives referring to the implementation of priority policies. The balance of $3.6 million was disbursed tbroughout January 1981 for equipment for the flood warning system ($2.8 million) and $0.8 million for construction eauipment for land reclamation works. The delay in loan witbdrawals was caused by the delay of the bid awarding for the flood warning equipment. The loan proceeds were disbursed in accordance witb the allocation set forth by the loan agreement. The scbedule of disbursements is sbown in Annex 4. 2.32 The loan was initially expected to be closed by June 30, 1979. The closing date was first extended to December 31, 1979, and later to December 31, 1980, as a result of the problems that occurred in the implementation of the automated flood warning system.  -9-. G. Compliance with Loan Covenants 2.33 Despite initial difficulties with procurement, all the covenants agreed in the loan documents were complied with. III. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 3.01 The flood recovery program undertaken within the framework of this project made a substantial positive impact . 3.02 The construction trusts made considerable efforts to rehabilitate flood damaged irrigation, drainage, and flood control works in a timely fashion. Operational conditions have reached normal levels within 6 to 9 months on average, a relatively short period considering the extent of the damages. A detailed list of the rehabilitation works indicating the location and the starting and completion dates is shown in Annex 7. 3.03 The 1,300 state and cooperative farm units which have benefitted from subloans under the project have been able to achieve a fast recovery. On average, those farms reached in 1976 a production level of 88B of the level prior to the floods, a relevant indication that the flood impact had been basically overcome. In 1977, about 90Z of the farms already surpassed the pre-flood level of production. 3.04 Partial operation of the flood warning system started in 1981, while the remainder of the system was being completed and specialized staff trained. At the end of the first quarter of 1983, the whole system became operational. Except for normal debugging and adjustments during operation startup, the system is operating satisfactorily. IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE A. The Borrower - Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry (BAFI) 4.01 For this project, BAFI was in charge of (i) coordinating the Bank related project activities with the different ministries and enterprises; (ii) collecting information and reporting it to the Bank for monitoring project implementation; (iii) ensuring adherence by other agencies to procurement procedures and centralizing disbursements requests; and (iv) carrying out the Agricultural Credit component of the project. 4.02 BAFI had a limited role in the design and implementation of the project since within the Romanian system the responsibility for this was assigned to specialized agencies, however it did have direct responsibility for the credit component 11. 4.03 In carrying out the implementation of the credit component, BAFI had difficulties in the identification of agricultural subprojects and in 1/ The Borrower contends that it controlled the physical implementation of subprojects, but in the Bank's assessment its role was more limited to coordinating and monitoring functions while the implementing agencies had the actual responsibility for carrying out the specific subprojects.  - 10 - providing appropriate information on subproject implementation. BAFI purely passed on the loan proceeds to the enterprises but was not responsible for the implementation and supervision. Data supplied by the Romanians in the reporting forms made it difficult to know precisely the total amount of BAFI Loans committed against Bank's disbursements. At a certain stage, withdrawal applications submitted by BAFI referred to more than the US100 million in on-farm investments (set out in the Loan Agreement, Para. 4, Schedule 1) which the Bank agreed to assist in financing. Disbursements had to be withheld and a lengthy discussion took place to clarify the issue. BAFI prepared a revised, detailed list of subprojects which met the criteria established in the Loan Agreement and which was agreed upon by the Bank, and disbursements were subsequently resumed. 4.04 Notwithstanding these initial problems in subloan definition, BAEI's overall performance in implementing the Agricultural Credit Component was generally satisfactory. Over 4,500 subloans were made to investors who had suffered losses in excess of 20% of their respective annual production target planned for 1975. 4.05 There were procurement problems initially when Romagrimex elected to pre-qualify potential equipment suppliers and issued tender documents without Bank prior approval. The lack of compliance with procurement requirements stem mostly from the fact that Romanian procurement procedures are sometimes in conflict with the Bank's guidelines (para. 2.26). 4.06 BAFI performance in coordinating the project implementation with various agencies involved was generally satisfactory having in view that BAFI had only limited control over investment implementation and project supervision of other agencies in charge of actual project design and imp lementation. B. The Beneficiaries 4.07 MAFI and NWC had the overall responsibility for the physical project implementation through the various farm units, water authority agencies and other enterprises which directly benefitted from the project and carried out the subproject implementation. The supervision of project implementation was under the responsibility of the General Directorate for Agriculture and Food Industry (under MAFI) and the General Directorate for Water Management (under NWC) in each district. MAFI and NWC provided the investment planning and the project design through their specialized Institutes. 4.08 The direct beneficiaries included state farms, cooperative farms, food industry enterprises, heavy equipment enterprises for land reclamation works, State Mechanization Units, local Water Authority agencies and the Meteorological and Hydrological Institute. These various organizations carried out their implementation responsibilities with diligence and effort. The rehabilitation of all the irrigation, drainage and flood control works was completed by December 1976-2 years ahead of schedule (para. 2.03). The total amount allocated for agricultural credit was efficiently and expeditiously utilized, also 2 years ahead of schedule (para. 2.03). Only the implementation of the flood warning system suffered considerable delay due to the procurement, technical and logistical problems discussed in paras. 2.07 through 2.16.  - 11 - V. ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND EVALUATION 5.01 Due to the emergency nature of the project and the large number of organizations involved, it was not possible to perform detailed financial and economical analyses in appraising the project. For the same reason, the project formulation did not provide for specific economic and financial yardsticks to measure the performance of BAFI and the different organizations as they implemented the project. It was not feasible to estimate incremental benefits, even in aggregate terms, due to the difficulties in obtaining data from the large number of project units and beneficiaries; the difficulty in assessing the 'without project' case; and the difficulty in measuring the impact of the rehabilitation of flood control works and of the flood warning system. 5.02 Although due to the unique nature of the project no economic rate of return has been calculated, it is clear that the successful implementation of the overall Flood Recovery Program and of this project did have a major positive impact on the Romanian economy. If calculated, the economic return for the agricultural component of the Recovery Program should be very high, because of the large sunk costs of facilities which could not be fully utilized and the high incremental benefits of putting them back into use. The impact of the recovery efforts cau be appreciated by the fact that, in spite of direct losses which for production alone amounted to about 2.4% of the national income and for fixed assets totalled about 6.2% of gross domestic investment, Romania did achieve a 9.8% overall ecooomic growth in 1975. In particular, the gross agricultural production in 1975 increased by about 3% in spite of the damages caused by the flood, and by about 14% in 1976 making up for the lower increase in 1975 and basically reaching the original plan target. Thus, the flood impact was substantially reduced and normal production levels resumed. 5.03 At the level of individual farm units, quick production recovery was achieved through the timely availability of funds for rehabilitation. Although production levels in 1975 were below 1974, these units achieved in 1976, on average, similar production levels to those prior to the flood snd in 1977 surpassed that level. 5.04 In addition, the incremental funds for the r covery program enabled the program of sectoral investments to be maintainedl,, thus contributing indirectly to the expansion of the productive assets base. 5.05 Another long term benefit of the Flood Recovery Project derives from the technologically advanced flood warning system and flood prevention measures which should reduce the loss to the economy of any possible similar calamity in the future. The flood warning system includes monitoring stations upstream on the rivers to regularly report water levels to factories, farm units and cities downstream. The authorities have also set up organizational arrangements to deal with future emergency situations. In terms of flood prevention measures, the authorities took advantage of the experience learned from the 1975 flood and have completed flood protection works--dikes, reservoirs, modified river courses and water intakes around factories. These should help minimize the economic disruption in the event of another flood. 1/ Lei 15.3 billion in 1974, Lei 17.6 billion in 1975, and Lei 19.8 billion in 1976.  - 12 - 5.06 In summary, although they are difficult to assess quantitatively, the economic impacts of the Flood Recovery Program were positive since (a) Romania's economic growth kept its sustained pace in 1976 in spite of the dramatic damages of the flood, and (b) the country was equipped with an elaborate and effective flood warning and flood prevention system. VI. BANK'S ROLE AND PERFORMANCE Project Objectives and Formulation 6.01 The Bank has traditionally assisted the economic development of its member countries by financing "classical" investment projects. It has not financed many reconstruction projects. Accordingly, its organizational and operational set ups were not designed for emergency operations and do not easily permit handling of disaster recovery projects. An issue is whether the Bank should lend for disaster recovery projects or whether it should restrict its operations to projects which can be thoroughly prepared, appraised, and supervised. The experience on this project shows that with appropriate flexibility it is feasible for the Bank to respond and meet reconstruction needs. However, in this as in other cases, implementation usually takes mueb longer than expected, and initial estimates of works required are not always reliable. 6.02 In view of the emergeacy character of this project and of the diversity of works to be performed under the Romanian Flood Recovery Program, the Bank had very limited impact on the design and implementation of the project. However, it should be considered that the Bank's project was set up within a broader national flood recovery program which included a comprehensive strategy for recovering the losses and rehabilitating the sector's productive base. 6.03 The project formulation within this context was therefore deemed appropriate in view of tbe Bank's objectives in participating in the overall flood recovery program; to support and finance specific components of the Recovery program, to maintain a direct link between the rehabilitation of the flood damage and the goods and enterprises financed by the Bank, and to ensure that procurement procedures acceptable to the Bank were used for Bank-financed items. Whether the Bank should have had more control over investment selection and project design was not an issue, since the Government recovery program clearly included high priority rehabilitation investments, which bad been reviewed by the Bank. Project Processing 6.04 The Bank was effective in quickly processing this loan, as called for by the emergency nature of the project. The Loan was approved by the Board of Directors on November 4, 1975, only 3-1/2 months after appraisal. This was followed by, and contributed to, a very fast implementation of the rebabilitation of the land reclamation works and of the agricultural credit component.  - 13 - Implementation and Supervision 6.05 During the implementation years, nine supervision missions visited Romania. Except for the Flood Warning System, the other components were implemented ahead of schedule. Supervision missions reported to the Borrover the Bank's concern about the delay in the Flood Warning Component, however, the Borrower had no leverage to speed up implementation. 6.06 The frequency of supervision missions was appropriate for the project. Due to the nature of the problems faced during project implementation, more supervision would not have contributed significantly to the efficiency of implementation while consuming more staff time. VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED Overall Assessment 7.01 The Romanian authorities managed the National Flood Recovery Program diligently and efficiently. This program had major positive impacts on Romania's economic performance in 1975 and 1976. The Bank project, which was designed to support and finance specific parts of this Flood Recovery Program, faced mainly procurement related difficulties. These were only partially due to the nature of the project and its design and were related to problems commonly faced by other ongoing projects in Romania. The criteria for evaluating the performance of the loan should be whether there was a good reconstruction program and whether the implementation of the program was efficient. In view of the recovery results achieved, the performance was satisfactory. Lessons to be Learned 7.02 The following lessons emerge from the experience of this project. (a) the considerable problems faced by the flood warning system caused a significant delay in the project implementatioin, which had a too long duration for a project of an emergency character. We believe that innovative and technologically complex components should not be recommended for projects of an emergency nature, but included in future projects related to the particular sector in question; (b) the project would have benefitted if performance indicators had been established to monitor directly project implementation, instead of - obtaining indirectly limited documentary information through BAFI. The lack of a monitoring and evaluation system made it more difficult to measure the implementation progress and performance of project components; (c) one of the main factors which contributed to the problems, which is also encountered by the Bank in some of its other operations, is BAEI's lack of control over other government agencies in charge of actual project design, procurement and implementation. This stresses the importance of more direct Bank contacts, irrespective of who the actual Borrower is, with the Romanian agencies responsible for the implementation of projects.  - 14 - (d) the majority of issues this project faced were procurement related. The difference in Romanian and Bank procurement procedures was a major factor. Under their normal procedures for procurement of imported equipment, the agency responsible for procurement resorts to lengthy technical and commercial negotiations simultaneously with a number of selected bidders. Even after the selection of a successful bidder, the decision is subject to review by the Ministry of Foreign Trade who can either veto the decision or ask the agency to renegotiate. For the Flood Warning System Component, considerable delay has resulted in procuring the equipment. This was due to the system's innovative character and its specialized nature and complexity. Another problem was that the implementing agency responsible for the technical features of the equipment being procured had little concern about procurement procedures and the implications of not following the Loan Agreement and Bank Guidelines for Procurement. In subsequent projects, Romanian authorities have endeavored to follow procurement procedures acceptable to the Bank. 7.03 In particular, the following points should be taken into consideration: (a) an adequate organizational set up for handling procurement matters has to be defined, and clear lines of responsibility assigned and agreed upon by the Bank before loan effectivenessA'; (b) emphasis should be placed in ensuring that staff experienced in handling Bank procurement matters is assigned--or if not available, trained--to the specific agencies to be involved in project procurement issues; Cc) if innovative and/or technologically complex components are included, the status of design preparation has to be sufficiently advanced prior to loan approval in order not to cause subsequent delays in project implementation; (d) in addition, for a complex system it may be preferable to have the components procured as a complete package to minimize problems related to compatibility of design, specifications, and operation of many subcomponents supplied by different manufacturers. 1/ This has been subsequently achieved. Romagrimex and BAFI, through the experience of other Bank projects, have developed the expertise and established an adequate set up for handling procurement matters.  - 15 - ATTACHMENT I BORROWER' S COMHENTS SACA PENTRU AGRICLLTURA Bucar'leI ..... d . . 'G . INDUSTRIE ALIMENTARA PRE5EDIt.Tn. Mr. Shiv Kapur Operations Evaluation Dept. Dear Mr. Kapur, Ref. to the final project Report "Flood Recovery Project" (loan 1169-RO) We have carefully reviewed the completion Report and have noticed with satisfaction that Bank has reached to favourabile con- clusions concerning to the project implementettion and to its impact on Romanian agriculture. The emergency measures taken by the Govern- ment Authorities and their application in practice have determined the recovery in a short time of the damages caused by the floods and led to the maintenance of initial figures of growth. An important role was played by Bank in its financed project who provided part of the necessary reconstruction funds. I would like to thank on this way to Mr. S.Niaz, the appraisal mission chief who prepared in a shorter period a less common project and was able to find reasonable solutions in matching our working system with the IBRD system. In the report some comments are made which I consider that they are not reflecting accurately the project implementation and the role of some institutions involved in the project. Concerning this we are making the following comments: (a) I consider that too many comments were made on the procurement issue and then it was extented as a common problem to the other projects (parag. 2.29, 7.o2, 7.03). It is to be mentioned that part of thu procurements (2.B mil.S) relating to the flood war- ning system which is characteristically to this system are not found in any other project financed by IBRD in our country; to the other equipment in amount of 7.1 mil.$ there were no problems. Se- condly, I consider that it is better to make a more detailed review and finally to take those decissions which involve money savings rather than rushing and pay more money. The practice which we adopted brought substantial savings which is not a neglectable aspect. I also consider that there is no discrepancy between the Romanian procedure and IBRD guidelines as far as the procurement is concerned (paragraphes 4.o5 and 7.o2). This problem was discussed in detail with IBRD specialistsand all aspects had been clarified. Per- sonally I held discussions with IBRD representatives, then I organi- zed discussions in the Ministry for Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation and finally I considered that there were no .1.  - 16 - problems. That is why I feel that there is no need to tackle some problems already solved which are in fact closed. (b) As far as the Agricultural Bank's (BAPI) role is con- cerned in the project implementation I am surprised by some comments which are not really accurate (paragraph 4.o2). BAPI - as the Guver-- namental Institution grants loans to the beneficiary units ioaording to our lows, it controls the physical implementation and cost invest- ment, credit reimbursment and the technical-economic indicators du- ring the operation period of the project. As the borrower it has as- sumed the responsability for the project implementation and has ac- ted together with the other guvernamental authorities in providing fundsand material resources, in supervisiAg investment implementation and reviewing the economic and financial activity during project life. I believe that after lo years of cooperation with IBRD we should not raise these aspects anymore. If we make reference to the subproject list (paragraph 4.03) I have to point out that BAFI has financed a larger number of subprojects that those included in the loan. Initially BAFI proposed a large number of subprojects so that IBRD together with BAFI had to select the most representative ones in the loan limit of loo mil.$. We cannot consider this being a problem, it is a working technique aspect which is paid more attention than it is necessary. ge) In the report it was not given sufficient attention to the foreign exchange component of the project. At appraisal, the fo- reign exchange component was underestimated (20 mil.$ against 55 mil.$ in the final report) and has affected the bulk of loan. If BAPI had benefited from a larger loan as it was normal and it was sustained during nagocia1ions the efforts of romanian part would have been lower and the volume of investment from different branches would have not diminished. Taking into account the abovementioned comments I consider that the Completion Report is reflecting the reality. My personal be- lief isthat IBRD should pay more attention to those emergency pro- jects and take steps for the appraising technique, payment and con- trol of investment implementation. Yours sincerely, I oil sident .r  - 17 - Annex 1 PROJECT COST (Lei million) Investment Cost Z of Foreign Components Local Foreign Total Exchange A. Land Reclamation Works 75 118 193 61 - construction equipment 50 93 143 65 - repair of pumping stations 25 25 50 50 B. Flood Warning System 74 126 200 63 - remote sensing stations 61 75 13; 55 - data processing center 13 51 64 80 C. Agricultural Credit 1,289 859 2,148 40 - orchards 14 5 19 25 - livestock 270 - 270 - - equipment 324 601 925 65 - pasture improvement 82 20 102 20 - vineyards 27 8 35 25 - storage and plastic greenhouses 13 6 19 30 - livestock: construction and maintenance 268 115 383 30 - other facilities saintenance 67 29 96 30 - repairs of land reclamation works 224 75 299 25 TOTAL (Lei million) 1,438 1,103 2,541 43  - 18 - Annex 2 PROJECT FINANCING (Lei million) IBRD BAFI Beneficiaries' Project Compocents Loans Loans own funds Total Part A (Land Reclamation) 143 50 193 of which: - construction equipment 143 - - 143 - pumping stations maintenance - 50 50 Part B (Flood Warning System) 50 98 52 200 of which; - remote sensing stations 42 98 - 140 - automated data processing center 8 - 52 60 Part C (Agricutural Credit) 600 1,548 - 2,148 of which: - equipment procurement 277 648 925 - rehabilitation works 323 900 - 1,223 TOTAL (Lei million) 793 1,696 52 2,541 (US$ million) 39.7 84.8 2.6 127.1 Share 31% 67% 2X 0OOZ  - 19 - Auoe 3 LTSr OF PFnCUI OONWACXS Actual Eu-inted Value 4ilM) Omtry of Iteu Quantity Quatity _I rW Procedure Ori Part A Equipnt for Land Reclaatiai Work - toracrapers (11 Um) 50 50 45.3 2.22 I.C.B. Razaia - Draglire. (1 r3) (inrluding spare parts) 11 11 14.0 0.70 I.C.B. RMPia - Bulldozers (l50 H.P.) 70 70 52.8 2.64 I.C.B. Raumui - Motorgrader (18D H.P.) 10 10 8.0 0.45 I.C.B. RIaia - Ioders (0.8uP) 10 10 1.9 0.09 Local Ri}lia Procuret - Oactors (6-8 toos) 20 20 2.0 0.10 LJocl Rainia Promwmet - ump Tucks (10 tces) 40 40 16.8 0.84 I.C.B. RoAnsiA - Cocrete mi9ers (40 1) 50 50 2.0 0.10 Local Rma Procuremet Subtotal 142.8 7.14 Part B Reaote Sensing Stations Eauipment - Ralio epnut sensors - - 14.4 0.74 L.C.B. aglaid and spare prts - Batteries, wind sensors, - - 4.3 0.22 I.C.B. France balizes - Autcmated control equipment - - 35.6 1.84 I.C.B. Iuaia Subtotal - - 54.3 2.80 .N& 197.1 9.94 (of ibich 9.6 IM and 0.3 local prouwemt) BEST COP AVAILABLE  - 20 - Annex 4 Schedule of Disbursements Cumulative Disbursement at the end of year (us$ million) Year Eatiusted Actual December 31, 1976 27.0 36.4 December 31, 1977 40.0 36.6 December 31, 1978 - 36.9 December 31, 1979 - 38.1 December 31, 1980 - 39,1 January 31, 1981 - 40.0  -21 - Annex 5 Value of Production of Selected Agricultural Units Affected by the Flood for the Period 1973-1977 Gross Agricultural Production Value Agricultural River (Lei Million) Unit Basin 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1. Agrocoop Sohatu Dimbovita o.a. 27.2 14.2 24.7 28.0 2. I.I.C.I.P. Condeesti lalomita 17.4 18.2 13.3 17.8 18.9 3. CAP Valea Bnjorului Danube 9.8 10.5 6.5 9.9 11.8 4. CAP Nicolae Balcescu Mostistea 15.4 16.2 11.1 14.9 16.7 5. CAP Fundulea Mostistea 17.8 19.5 13.5 17.1 19.8 6. CAP Nana Arges 22.9 25.7 17.4 22.1 26.5 7. CAP Soldaou Arges 14.7 16.8 11.3 15.4 17.7 8. CAP Crivedia - Racari Crevedia 10.9 11.4 7.4 9.7 12.0 9. CAP Fundeni Mostistea 19.6 20.8 15.7 17.4 18.9 10. CAP Berceni Sabary 14.8 15.7 11.1 14.0 16.7 11. AEICPT Deieni Danube 68.0 74.0 49.7 56.3 78.3 12. CAP Daieni Danube 28.9 32.7 23.4 27.5 33.8 13. CAP Peceneaga Danube 22.7 24.6 14.9 23.5 26.2 14. CAP Fagaras Danube 16.5 18.9 10.7 16.9 20.1 15. CAP Alamor Mures 8.3 9.9 7.5 9.8 10.4 16. CAP Altina Hirtibaciu 9.5 11.6 6.7 9.9 12.8 17. CAP Arpasul De Jos Olt 17.8 18.5 12.6 17.9 20.3 18. CAP Loamnes Tirnava Mare 8.8 9.9 5.1 9.3 10.7 19. CAP Seica Nare Tirnava Mare 12.5 13.3 6.9 11.9 14.2 20. CAP Condeesti Ialomita 17.8 18.1 9.5 16.3 18.7 TOTAL 354.1 413.5 268.5 362.3 432.5  - 22 - Annex 6 Equipment Procured for the Flood Warning Syste3 No. of Units uS$ 1. Equipment Supplied from UK A. Radio Equipment 1. Radio transmissioo-reception equipment 106 479,375 2. Omni direcectional antennas 15 5,570 3. Directional antennas 112 23,800 4. Antenna cable 6,000 a 33,270 5. Installation materials 11,600 6. Maintenance equipment - 52,275 7. Radio testing equipment 5 sets 35,300 8. Spare parts 20,400 661,590 B. Sensors 1. Temperature 54 26,645 2. Pressure 6 11,090 3. Solarmeters - 5 13,290 51,025 Subtotal 712,615 2. Equipment Supplied from France 1. Wind Sensors 5 11,050 2. Zinc-air Batteries 171 99,160 3. Signal lamps 74 112,340 Subtotal 222,550 3. Equipment Supplied from Romania 1. Switcbing computer (Bucbarest) 2 452,000 2. Switcbing computers in regional centers 4 437,000 3. Automatic stations for bydrometeorological data collection 45 575,000 4. Retransmitting equipment 25 20,000 5. Rain sensors 45 152,000 6. Water level sensors 23 56,000 7. Spare parts 168,000 Subtotal 1,860,000 TOTAL 2,795,165  -23 - ANNEX 7 Page 1 of 9 ROMNIA FLOD RECCVEhY PRDJECr Loan 1169-R0 Rebabilitatioo of Irrigatioc, Drainage and Flood Ptotection Wokks Iten No. in Aoex 1 to Date Scbeduled Actual wype of Work River Suppleumotal Work Comletion Completion and L(tD BaSin letter No. 1 Started Date Date (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Irrigation Works 1. Irigatii Cateasca-Peio Arges 11 15.07.1975 29.03.1976 29.03.1976 2. Irigatii Braila-Pbnare- Siret, stasii pompare Dunare 48 01.01.1976 31.05.1976 31.05.1976 3. Irigatii Insula Mare a Brailei Dunare 49 05.08.1975 31.12.1976 31.03.1976 4. Irigatii Topalu-canale Dunare 66 01.11.1975 30.06.1976 31.03.1976 5. Irigatii Sice-canale Dunare 67 01.11.1975 31.06.1976 31.03.1976 6. Irig. Sistret-Nedeia- Jiu-orezarie Jin 83 01.0l.r976 30.06.197b 30.06.1976 7. Irig. Cetate-Galicea- canale Dunare 84 01.10.1975 31.03.1976 30.06.1976 8. Irig. perimetrul Sadova- Corabia Dunare 85 01.12.1975 30.06.1976 31.03.1977 9. Irig. Galatui-Calarasi Dunare 129 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 10. Irig. Giurgiu-Bazinesti zona B Dunare 138 01.01.1976 30.09.1976 30.09.1976 11. Irig. Giurgiu-Razmiresti zooa A+ C Dunare 144 01.01.1976 30.09.1976 30.06.1976 12. Irig. GoStinu-Greaca- Ar%es Arges 139 01.01.1976 30.0o.1976 31.03.1977 13. Irig. Berceni-Vidra Prumisani Dimbovita 140 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.06.1976 14. Irig. Oltenita-Surlari Darobaotu Dunare 143 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 15. Irigatii Mostistea Mostistea 145 01.01.1976 31.03.1976 30.06.1976 16. Irig. Crivinas-inju Mare Dunare 153 01.10.1975 30.06.197b 30.06.1976 17. Irigasii Halinga Dunare 158 01.01.197b 31.03.1976 30.06.1976 18. Irig. Terasa Corabia Olt 168 01.01.1976 31.03.1976 30.06.1976 19. Extind. irig. Stoenesti- Visina Olt 169 01.01.1976 31.03.1976 30.06.1976 20. Aduct. statie paopare Tintareni Prahova 174 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 21. AMut. Draganesti Prabova 175 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.12.1976 22. Auctiune Gorgota Prabova 176 01.08.1975 30.06.1976 30.12.1976 23. Extiod. irig. DThbrava Prabova 184 01.01.1976 31.06.1976 30.06.1976 24. Reammaj. irigatii Dumbrava-Dragaoesti Olt 186 01.08.1975 31.12.1976 31.03.1976 25. Aduct. Iazul Morilor Prabova 188 01.01.1975 31.06.1976 31.06.1976 26. Aduct. Crivoc-Prabova Ciorani Prabova 189 01.01.1976 31.06.1976 31.06.1976 BEST COPY AVAILABLE  -24- AANNEX 7 24 - Page 2 of 9 It NO. in SAem I to Date Scbedulea Actual Type of Work River Supplemotal Woric Cabpletion Conpletuco and Location Basin Letter No. I Started Date Date (1) (T) (3) (4) (5) (6) 27. Aduct. canal Leaot,si derivatii Prahova l90 OL.OL.1976 31.03.1976 30.12.1976 28. Irig. sistem Laslea- Dbmbraveai Mures 207 01.01.1976 31.03.1976 30.09.1976 29. Irig. sisten Seliiber Olt 208 01.01.1976 31.06.1976 30.L2.1976 30. Irigatii Babadag Dunare 221 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 31. Irigatii Sud-Razeln DTnare 222 01.01.1976 01.06.1976 01.06.1976 32. Amenajare camplea lacuri Razelir-Sioae Dbware 223 01.10.1975 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 33. Irig. Seaca-Vinatori- Suhaia (orezarie) Dunare 233 01.08.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 34. Irigatii Terasa Olt-Calmatui Dtoare 234 01.10.1975 30.06.1976 31.03.1976 35. Irigatii Biliesti- Ciorasti Siret 255 30.07.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 Drainage 36. Dese. cap. Pisculu - -erisani Arges 7 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 40.06.1976 37. Irdiguire, desc. Teuz ftres 34 01.01. 1976 30.06.1976 30.06.1976 38. Mures inferior- supra-inaltare dig NW"es 35 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.06.1976 39. IrAig. rw Buza z2a Gradistee-kawovita-dig Buzau 43 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 40. Sistem desec. Buzoel- nord-canale Buzau 40 01.09.1975 31.12.1976 31.03.1976 41. Indit., desec. Namoosa- Maxineoi-coasolidari Siret 47 01.01.1976 30.09.1976 30.06.1976 42. Sistan desec. Buzoel- sud-canale Buzau 50 01.10.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 43. Desecare GaCd-Rupes Tirnave 51 01.07.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 44. Inxdig. Homrodul lare Tiroave 53 25.07.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 45. Desec. Birsa-Vulcaoita, dig Birsa 55 01.07.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 46. Ixdig., regulariz., desecare riul Negru Olt 65 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.09.1976 47. Sisten indig., desecare, irig. Nina-De0j-coooli- dare nal Samos 68 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 31.03.1976 48. Desecari si reprofilari in zona vaii Hajdate Soaes 70 01.01.1976 30.09.1976 30.12.1976 49. Desec. Bistrat-Nedeia- Jiu-cmwsolidari Jiu 80 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 30.06.1976 50. Desec. twrta-Listeava Jiu 81 01.10.1975 30.06.1976 31.03.1977 51. Desec. hirsani-Nisipuri Jlu 82 01.10.1975 31.03.1976 30.12.1976 52. Indig. Potopriastoaca 94 01.10.1975 31.12.1976 31.12.1975 BEST COPY AVAILMLE  - 25 - ANNEX 7 Page 3 of 9 item No. iD Annex I to Date Scheduled Actual Type of Work River Supplemotal Woric Comletzon Ccp41etio and IlcatioD Basin Latter No. 1 Started Dste Date (1) (3) (4) 15) (6) 53. Sistme bidomlior- tiv Ialomita-cmale lalamta 97 01.01.1976 30.06.1976 31.12.1976 54. Indig., deaec. T. Vladimi- rescu-Braniste siret 105 01.01.1976 30.09.1976 30.06.1976 55. Desecare (dligeci Siret 106 16.08.1975 31.12.1975 31.12.1975 56. Desec. zoa tartinesti-