Morocco - Souss Groundwater Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 5116 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT IE PORT MOROCCO - SOUSS GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1123-MOR) June 15, 1984 erations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution ad may be sed by recipients only in ie performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS CMV - Centre de Mise en Valeur (Local Development Center) CNCA - Caisse Nationale de Crfdit Agricole (National Agricultural Credit Bank) DRE - Division des Ressources en Eau du Minist&re de 1'Equipement (Division of Water Resources of Ministry of Public Works) MARA - Ministere de 1'Agriculture et de la R&forme Agraire (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform) ONE - Office National d'glectricit& (National Power Company) ORMVASM - Office Rfgional de Mise en Valeur du Souss-Nassa (Regional Office for development of the Souss-Massa) PCR - Project Completion Report FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 1 AGRICULTURAL CROPPING YEAR October 1 - September 30 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Dirham (DH) Currency Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average US$1.00 = 4.20 Intervening Years' Average: 1976 US$1.00 = 3.87 1977 US$1.00 = 4.57 1978 US$1.00 = 4.05 1979 US$1.00 = 3.87 1980 US$1.00 = 3.78 1981 (Completion Year) US$1.00 = 5.00 Weighted Average (for Completion Studies) US$1.00 = 4.12 - OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1123-HOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ................................. i Basic Data Sheet ........................0..................... Highlights ...... o............................................ iii Annex 1: Cable from Government ............... .. ............... ix Annex 2: Letter from ORMVASX ................................. x PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Sumary and Lessons Learned .............................. 1 II. Background ........................................ 5 III. Project Formulation ....................................... 6 IV. Project Implementation ..................................... 8 V. .Project Impact ................o.................*........ 16 VI. Organization and Management ............................... 18 VII. Economic Evaluation ..................................... 25 Annexes Ma IBRD No. 11381 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1123-HOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ********* *** *** *** *** *** *** **.*** *** *** *** *.. 0 .. . Basic Data Sheet ........ o..........o..........o..............o......... i Highlights ..... ............ 0..... 0..... 0-..................... iii 1unex 1: Cable from Government ............................. ix Aunex 2: Letter from ORMVASK ............................... x PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Summary and Lessons Learned .................... .......... 1 II. Background . . ..................... 0 .............. 5 III. Project Formulation ........................................ 6 IV. Project Implementation ................................... 8 V. Project Impact o....... .........................-...... 16 VI. Organization and Management ............................... 18 VII. Economic Evaluation .................................. 25 Annexes Map IBRD No. 11381 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO: SOUSS GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1123-MOR) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Souss Groundwater Project in Morocco, for which Loan 1123-MOR in the amount of US$18.5 million was approved in June 1975. The Loan was fully disbursed and closed in September 1981. The audit report consists of extended highlights prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated April 27, 1983. The PCR was prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Projects Department on the basis of a report submitted by the Regional Agricultural Development Office of Souss-Massa (ORMVASM) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. No country visit was made by Projects Staff for the preparation of the PCR. The highlights were based on reviews of the Appraisal Report (No. 720-MOR) dated April 18, 1975, the President's Report (No. P-1616-MOR) of April 24, 1975, the Loan Agreement dated June 11, 1975 and the PCR. Correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files were reviewed. Bank staff associated with the project were interviewed. An OED mission visited Morocco in July, 1983. The mission held discussions with managers and technicians of the Implementing agency and with senior staff at the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The information obtained during the mission was used to test the validity of the conclusions of the PCR and permitted discussions of project design and Bank/country procedures. On the basis of information obtained from files and in the field, this audit found the PCR factual, comprehensive and insightful. The decision was therefore made to limit the audit to extended highlights instead of the normal audit memorandum. The draft report was sent to the Borrower for comment on January 16, 1984. Comments received from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and from ORMVASM are included as Attachments. The assistance provided by Government and the Project Department Staff in the preparation of the report is gratefully acknowledged. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO: SOUSS GROUNDUATER PROJECT (LOAN 1123-NOR) KE PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as Z of Item Estimate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estimate Total Project Costs (USS million) 39.0 44.5 114 Loan Amount (US$ million) 18.5 18.5 100 Board Approval Date 05/11/75 05/11/75 - Loan Agreement Date - 06/11/75 - Effectiveness Date 09/11/75 09/26/75 - Physical Components Completed Date 12/31/79 03/30/82 - Proportion Completed by above Date - 75 - Cloning Date 06/30/80 09/28/81 - Economic rate of return (Z) 10.0 14.0 - Financial Performance - 'edium - Institutional Performance Good - Agricultural Performance Good - CUMULATIVE D7SURSEMENTS FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FT81 FY82 Appraisal Estimate (USS Million) 3.0 8.0 16.0 18.5 18.5 18.5 Actual (USS Million) 3.0 6.5 9.6 14.3 17.8 18.5 Actual as Z of appraisal (2) 100 81 60 77 96 100 Date of Final Disbursement: September 28, 1981 MISSION DATA month/ No. of andays Specializations Performance Types of Mission Year Persons in Field Represented /c Rating /d Trend /e Problems If Appraisal 04/75 4 90 a, e, eg - -- Supervision I 07/75 1 5 eg 1 2 Supervision II 01/76 2 3 a, eg 2 2 MT Supervision III 07/76 2 5 a, eg 1 1 Supervision IV 03/77 2 2 a, eg 2 2 M Supervision V 09/77 2 2 a, eg 2 2 M Supervision VI 01/78 1 3 eg 2 2 MF Supervision VII 07/78 1 3 eg 2 1 F Supervision VIII 01/79 2 3 a, eg 1 2 Supervision IX 12/79 2 5 eg 1 2 F Supervision I 07/80 2 4 e, eg 2 1 F Supervision XI 06/81 2 4 eg 1 1 Supervision XII 11/81 1 4 eg 2 1 F Completion - - - - - 133 mandays Total or 27 manueeks/e OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Kingdom of Morocco Executing Agency (a) Regional Office for Development of the Sousa-Massa (b) National Power Office /f Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Parallel Project None Loan Amount Loan Agreement Date /a a - Agronomist; e - Economist; eg - Engineer 7b 1 - Problem-free; 2- Moderate Problems; 3 - Major Problems 7c- 1 - Improving; 2 - Stationary; 3 - Deteriorating 7d M - Managerial; T - Technical; P - Political; F * Financial; 0 - Other 7 5 Mandays - 1 man week 7Y Construction of the power supply component - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO: SOUSS GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1123-MOR) HIGHLIGHTS The Souss Groundwater Project aimed at contributing to the Third Development Plan's objectives of increased agricultural production, improved farm income through irrigation development, and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth. To that end the project provided for developing tubewell-fed sprinkler irrigation on a previously unirrigated area of 6,300 ha and for the rehabilitation of the existing gravity irrigation system on 1,000 ha of traditionally-irrigated land. In addition, in order to make the rural environment more conducive to development, the project pro- vided for improving village infrastructure (streets, lights, water supply, schools, health centers, community centers) in nine existing villages and to build such infrastructure in eleven villages to be established under the project. The project was the third Bank Group operation supporting irrigated agriculture in Morocco and the first supporting the use of the deep under- ground water resources available in the southern valleys of Morocco. Increased agricultural production was a central target to be achieved through the introduction of the new crops in the areas newly equipped for sprinkler irrigation and through increased cropping intensity and yields. In relation to its production objective, the project established a basis at the farm level for sustained increase in agricultural production. At the technical level, fundamental changes were introduced in the originally planned cropping pattern in response to farmers' needs and constraints. More commendable among these changes were the emphasis on wheat for the production of nationally needed quality seeds, the shift to dairy cattle for maximizing the value-added of forage crops, and the introduction of vegetables as a high-value cash crop. At the institutional level, ORMVASM is continuing its efforts to transform the "coop&ratives de la R6forme Agraire" into self- sufficient and farmer-run service cooperatives. The cropping intensity reached a satisfactory level of 128% in the areas irrigated in 1981. Yields were high for virtually all crops and were comparable to those estimated at appraisal for full development. However, the start of livestock development was somewhat delayed due to difficulties that cooperative farmers faced in financing construction of stables on their new farms. Present evidence shows that overall projections of agricultural and livestock production at full development will be greater than foreseen at appraisal. The project's incre- mental rate of return (IRR) has been re-estimated at about 14% compared to 10% at appraisal. In relation to its equity objective, the project was successful in terms of providing those who participated in it an opportunity to share in the country's economic growth. In additioa, it contributed to reducing income inequalities among project beneficiaries and private farmers who mo- nopolized the use of irrigation water in the Souss Valley over the past - iv - decade. Both Government and the Bank are well aware of the need to further reduce inequalities and efforts are being made in that direction. The Bank, for example, has recently decided to support a follow-up project aimed at helping farmers with traditional water rights in the Sousa Valley. In addi- tion other operations are being implemented or planned to spread the benefits of agricultural development to a broader section of the farming population within the framework of the Souss Valley Development Master Plan. No major changes were made in the project design and the actual construction achievement was close to appraisal assumptions, except for vil- lage infrastructure which was not, for the most part, completed. Completion of project works was delayed about 30 months by budgetary constraints, late completion of the detailed design, and delays in works for the laying of irrigation pipes. The combined effects of delays in construction and increases in quantities of the major irrigation civil works contributed to a cost overrun of 14%. The addition of booster pumping stations, unforeseen at appraisal added also to increased costs.1/ The overrun would have been higher if project works originally included were all totally implemented. The objective of establishing basic village infrastructure for eleven new villages and rehabilitating the infrastructure of nine existing villages was not achieved for at least two reasons. First, ORMVASM, which was given primary responsibility for overall project implementation, was given no control over the implementation of this component, nor did the formal coordinating mechanism established through which ORMVASM could have had an effective input in decisions made by the Ministry of Urbanization, Environment, Housing and Tourism in relation to this component, operate effi- ciently. Second, the village infrastructure component was not well prepared and the implementing agency was not made aware at the design/appraisal stage of the magnitude and nature of the work required. As a result, this project component became an appendix to the work program of the Ministry of Urbaniz- ation rather than part of that program with an agreed level of priority attached to it. In relation to this component, both ORMVASM and the Bank made commendable efforts in defining alternative ways for helping farmers establish some housing and livestock facilities convenient to their fields. Moreover, it is now recognized that the concept of a village as proposed at appraisal is not the most effective way of serving farmers. As an alterna- tive, ORMVASM is presently encouraging and assisting farmers in planning fa- cilities which meet their needs, and in building them with the help of credit if necessary or through cooperative action.2/ 1/ OREVASM comments that the use of an intermediate booster station was decided on to avoid large-scale installations in the tubewells and to allow for flexibility of operation. 2/ ORMVASM points out that because of the problems encountered in other departments in carrying out the village program, it was finally decided to observe the Agrarian Reform's provisions, namely to build a farming village around each cooperative. Construction is self-financed by the plot holders and infrastructure is financed by the Government. -- The shortfall in the realization of the village infrastructure com- ponent was, in this audit's view, of lesser importance compared to improve- ments in other project components initiated by ORMVASM and supported by the Bank. Such improvements included (i) introduction of vegetables as a high- value cash crop in the cropping pattern, (ii) increased empl-asis on wheat (for the production of quality seeds) in the crop rotation and the addition of a seed processing facility, (iii) establishment of milk collection centers, a milk processing plant and a feed production unit in support of the livestock activities initiated under the project, and (iv) the shif, in em- phasis in the livestock component from sheep to cattle in response to lack of grazing. These interventions, which required financial and manpower resources beyond those provided for under the project, testify to the high quality of ORMVASM's managerial and technical staff and to the support this project was given by the central and regional Governments in recognition of its role in the development of the Souss Valley. Concerning Government-Bank consultations on procurement matters, the PCR concluded that "ORMVASM sometimes failed to comply with the loan con- ditions regarding procurement. Bidding documents and evaluation reports were not always sent to the Bank on time for prior review and OR4VASM repeatedly tried to convince the Bank to accept local competitive bidding for contracts which were supposed to go to international competitive bidding according to the loan agreement" (PCR, para. 6.05). Difficulties seem to have arisen because, according to ORMVASM, procurement decisions were, following local administrative traditions, subject to prior clearance by the Government before being submitted to the Bank for concurrence. Since Government deci- sions on such matters could be difficult to reverse, ORMVASM's explanation could imply that the Bank may find itself precluded from ensuring that funds are utilized in line with the legal agreement and left with the only option of not disbursing on the items in question. However, it is worth noting that despite these procedural difficulties, the Bank and ORMVASM managed to imple- ment the project according to the legal agreement, including stipulations relating to the use of international competitive bidding. This issue was raised in the context of other projects in Morocco. Therefore, it would be worthwhile for the Bank to seek Government agreement on standard procedures for project implementing units to follow in seeking joint Government/Bank concurrence with procurement decisions. This would facilitate the task of agencies such as ORMVASM and would facilitate the task of those Bank staff involved in project supervision. 3/ A strong feature during project implementation has been the sue- cessful reorganization of land tenure and the establishment of service coop- eratives. Combined land consolidation of private freehold and allotment and distribution of state-owned and collective land were successfully carried out on 86% of the project area; 860 landless laborers, smallholders and collec- tive land rightholders were provided with farm plots and were organized into 14 successfully-run Government sponsored service cooperatives. 3/ In connection with procurement matters, also see ORMVASM's comments on page xii. - vi - The project's already realized and potential benefits would be adversely affected in the near future if maintenance of the irrigation system remained at its present low level. Inade4uate maintenance applies both to the basic irrigation infrastructure and to the on-farm mobile sprinkler equipment. The main reasons appear to be limited budgetary allocations and lack of technical expertise. Although the issue of maintenance of the irri- gation system was repeatedly discussed at length at the preparation, apprai- sal and implementation stages, it nevertheless remained unresolved. The maintenance problem could have been less acute if the irrigation system was less sophisticated and was designed with the expectation of greater farmer participation in its construction and maintenance. For example, one option considered but rejected at the preparation stage was the progressive rather than immediate introduction of sprinkler irrigation. This scenario called for the development, initially, of a basic irrigation infrastructure which would make gravity irrigation immediately less wasteful in terms of water usage while progressively introducing sprinkler irrigation at farmers' request and with the help of agricultural credit. In retrospect, this option would have decreased the project's budgetary requirements and, probably, increased farmers' motivation to contribute to the maintenance of the main irrigation infrastructure. Some Bank staff expressed the opposite opinion that the progressive introduction of sprinkler irrigation would have required investments in land levelling which would become redundant once sprinkler irrigation was introduced. These same staff also doubted whether this alternative would have decreased the project's budgetary requirements. Shortcomings in project design from ORMVASM's point of view4/ in- cluded: (i) despite provisions in the legal agreement, it remains a fact that the project did not provide funds for operation and maintenance of project facilities up to the full development stage, and it made such operation and maintenance subject to fluctuations in Government budget and changing priorities; (ii) the fact that the purpose and terms of reference of the technical assistance were not well defined and emphasis was not put on training of local staff; (iii) the fact that marketing and processing were neglected in project design; and (iv) the fact that the technology selected for the supply of water was unduly automated and sophisticated. ORMVASM's staff suggested that some of these shortcomings could have been corrected if project implementation had started with the necessary detailed studies to confirm or adjust the proposals retained at appraisal. The following points may be of particular interest: - construction of stables and houses by farmers started although no village basic infrastructure (water supply, electricity, roads, schools, health centers, etc.) was established. Other factors such as farmers' cash-flow, and availability and access to credit proved more critical than basic infrastructure in attracting farmers to the selected village sites and motivating them to initiate building on their own (PCR, paras. 4.14-4.16); 4/ See ORMMASM's comments on this subject on page xiv and xv. - vii - - research and training were neglected during implementation due to unclear allocation of responsibilities and low priority attached to those functions in the allocation of funds (PCR, para. 4.17); - altiough water saving was an important consideration in the selee- tion of the sprinkler technique of irrigation, water losses at the farm level remained substantial. The primary reason for such losses is the improper operation of the system at the level of individual farmers' fields. A secondary reason is the corrosion of irrigation pipes in two perimeters. This corrosion phenomenon remains unexplained despite continued attempts by ORMVASM to find the reasons for it using both national and outside expertise. (PCR, para. 6.05);5/ - the "Project Coordination Committee" was not an effective means of getting the numerous agencies involved in this project to work together to ensure smooth implementation of the project (PCR, paras. 6.01, 6.02). In retrospect, both ORMVASM and Project Staff are of the opinion that all executing agencies involved in the project should have been made fully responsible for the implemen- tation of their respective components. This audit concurs with this conclusion; - the significant delays in the start of development of the livestock activities were mainly due to the fact that farmers, particularly cooperative members, who needed on-farm investments as a prerequi- site for their participation in this component did not meet condi- tions of creditworthiness (PCR, paras. 5.05 and 5.06); and - as a result of budgetary constraints at the national level, Govern- ment commitment to provide necessary funds and expertise to main- tain the irrigation system beyond the investment period have not materialized, so far. This raises the question whether productive projects such as this one should be designed to be as dependent on Government budget as the Souss Groundwater project was. 5/ More details on this corrosion phenomenon are also presented by ORKVASM (see page xi) which expresses the viev that to have sent corrosion experts along with the Bank's missions to study the phenomenon on the spot would have helped finding an immediate solution. Annex 1 .Translation of incoming telex Director, OED World Bank Washington, D.C. Telex 204 of March 29, 1984 Text Reference your letter January 16, 1984 concerning the Souss Groundwater Project (Loan 1123-MOR), honor to inform you that conLent of Performance Audit Report raised no particular objection concerning plant production. However, we should have liked a more detailed on-farm development analysis. Regards, Rami Abdellatif, Director of Plant Production Annex 2 Page 1 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUSS MASSA (ORNVASM) BP 21 - Agadir Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director, OED World Bank Washington, D.C. Subject: Comments by this Office on the Project Performance Audit Report - Souss Groundwater Project (Loan 1123-MOR). REF: Your letter of January 16, 1984. Dear Sir: Following your letter of January 16, 1984, I have pleasure in attaching the comments of this Office on the Project Performance Audit Report - Souss Groundwater Project. /s/ Abderrabman EANAN Director, ORMVASM e- -d xAnnex 2 Page 2 I. COMMENTS ON THE PPAR 1. Problems of IM corrosion This problem was noted in 1980. That same year the Office submitted the problem to an approved agency, the Laboratoire Public d'Essais et d'Etudes (LPEE). The findings of this agency were not practical. In 1981, the Office entrusted the study to MARh's experimental irrigation center (Centre des Exprimentations Hydroagricoles - CEHA). which in turn submitted it to the Rabat School of Mining. This School stated that the alloy used did not conform to current standards. At the end of 1981, ORKVASK sent samples to Mr. Busquelet, a member of the World Bank mission, to have them analyzed in Paris. No results have reached us as yet. In 1982, the supplier and manufacturer were informed of the findings of the Rabat School of Kining. They asked for confirmation and for more time to pursue the research. They had the problem studied by the French Corrosion Research Company (Societe d'Etude contre la Corrosion en France - SECCO). The report on this study has been held up for a long time by difficulties in transferring foreign exchange. It has just been received by the Office (February 27, 1984). It appears from this study that the quality of the alloy does indeed conform to standards and that this is not the problem. The corrosion appears to be due to changes in the quality of the water. This is neutral in the static state, but becomes corrosive through the action of carbonic anhydride upon straining and oxygenation. Thus the Office has used all possible means to find a solution to this problem. It is pointed out that final acceptance is even being held up until this dispute can be settled. The World Bank missions have provided assistance in this matter. A way of preventing this delay would have been to have sent corrosion experts along with the missions to study this phenomenon on the spot and come to an immediate solution. 2. No windbreaks were introduced during the early stages of the project: paragraph 4.13 During the first years of the project, priority was given to planting the land, following cropping patterns, and learning irrigation techniques. The windbreak planting program started in 1980 and is still going on. The rate of planting has not been very rapid because the farmers are concentrating on those crops that bring in an immediate cash return. Annex 2 Page 3 3. Procurement In general, the loan conditions regarding procurement procedure were respected, as stated in paragraph 1.09 and paragraph 4.22 (ii). However, with respect to the purchase of agricultural equipment and vehicles (paragraph 4.22 (ii)), we would point out that: 1. Vehicle purchases were effected on the basis of private contracts, at official prices, because, for reasons of efficiency of maintenance, etc., the vehicle fleet of thc. Office is essentially composed of Renaults and Land Rovers. In addition, vehicle imports are subject to taxes that push the prices up. The total cost of these purchases was DH 427,627. 2. The agricultural equipment was purchased under contract in 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1981. Depending on the total amount of each year's contract, two calls for bids were issued locally (1976, 1977, 1980) and two internationally (1978 and 1981). 3. The total amount of these expenditures is less than 2% of the total cost of the contracts financed. 4. Monitoring of water resources (paragraph 1.15). Nonitoring of the water resources has proven extremely difficult and its effectiveness is questionable since the only real water resource is the underground water. But considerable effort has been made to prevent that resource from being overexploited. Provision should also be made for an early start to be made on construction of the Aoulouz Dam, whose principal objective is to correct the water situation. N.B. Replace: ". . . the Directorate of Rural Equipment" by ". . . the Directorate of Water Resources." - Cost recovery (paragraph 1.16) The farmers are currently paying 0.17 Da/m3 (including pumping tax and water price). A major review of the pumping taxes is now being approved for the. 1984/85 crop season. 5. Corrections to tables Page iii - "Cumulative Disbursements" - FY82. Actual/Appraisal: 100 instead of 8.5 Page 10 (8) - Appraisal/Actual: Area served by sprinklers in 1978: 1,849 instead of 4,674 ha. -xiii- Annex 2 Page 4 . 6. Recamendations The Office has no objection to the recommendations. I. DESIGN CHANGES (Paragraph 4.04 and'5.03) 1. Booster station (Station de reprise) The use of an intermediate booster station was decided on to avoid large-scale installations in the tubewells themselves (HKV 150 to 160 m) and to allow for flexibility of operation. 2. Village design Because of the problems encountered in other departments in carrying out the village program, it was finally decided to observe the Agrarian Reform's provisions, namely to build a farming village around each cooperative, each plot allocated measuring 1,000 m2. Construction is self-financed by the plot holders. Infrastructure is financed by the State. At present the AEPs have been completed for the 13 villages. 3. Slow development of forage crops Fields under forage crops (berseem and forage maize) were converted to grain maize, pending the time when the farmers will have acquired the necessary cattle to make economic use of forage crops. - Because of ths drought, cattle imports have slowed down and the cooperatives have been resorting to local purchases. The herd they have now demands the systematic cultivation of forage crops. Thus, starting in the 1983184 crop year, berseem and forage maize are being introduced into the cropping pattern of those cooperatives that already have a large enough herd. 4. Substitution of wheat for beets Most of the areas assigned to beet cultivation are in the traditional irrigation areas that are to be rehabilitated. Installation of the equipment for these areas has just started. It is not possible to anticipate cultivating beets in Souss Amont unless a sugar mill is built in the region, and this depends on development of the traditionally irrigated areas that are to be rehabilitated in Issen, and possibly on reconversion of the irrigated area in Massa. 5. Elimination of almond and citrus trees and planting of olive trees over the entire orchard area The orchard area is very small (0.97 ha per farmer) and does not allow for the planting of three different species. Nor can the available water supply meet the requirements of three species, in particular where citrus trees are concerned. iv - Annex 2 Page 5 Olive trees have been selected partly to help reduce the national olive-oil shortage, and partly because the Souss farmers are very familiar with this crop. III. NEW DIRECTIONS AND ACTIVITIES NOT COVERED BY THE PROJECT 1. Introduction of vegetables The growing of vegetables has been encouraged because of the high returns they generate for the farmers. Moreover, the fact that vegetables are well suited to the Souss region (ecology, farmer temperament) means that it will be possible to meet both the regional and the national demand for fresh produce. 2. Wheat is being grown for selected seed and not for consumption The production of selected seed brings in a greater return than the production of common wheat. In addition, the production of selected seed helps meet the demand for seed in the southern region, indeed throughout the country as a whole. 3. Packing and storage of cereal seed Construction of a 50,000-quintal cereal packing and storage unit. This will allow more economic use to be made of the production. 4. On the stockraising side, a number of investments not covered by the project have been carried out or are in progress, namely: - Milk collection center - Livestock feed production and storage unit - Milk packing and processing unit self-financed by farmers outzide the project. IV. INVESTMENTS NOT COVERED BY THE PROJECT AND NOT CARRIED OUT The project should (? could)* have provided for: 1. Investment in improved use of vegetable production - a packing unit - a cold storage unit to facilitate staggered marketing of perishable produce and to avoid the selling off of produce at low prices. *Translator's note: Part of the verb is missing in the original French. Annex 2 Page 6 2. Financing of project activities until the fall development stage Because of budgetary restrictions, financing would make it possible to meet requirements in terms of network maintenance and farmer extension services. V. REFLECTIONS ON THE SOUSS AMONT PROJECT 1. Limits of the project: 1.1 The loan agreement should provide for financing of the maintenance component until the project reaches the full development stage. The problems encountered are due to the small share of the loan proceeds allocated to this item. 1.2 Technical assistance: Instead of opening a technical assistance line, it would be preferable to specify this assistance in detail, stressing vocational training in specialized establishments (Institutes, Schools, etc.). 1.3 The project has omitted the processing of agricultural products, in particular as regards agroindustry. 2. Constraints from within 2.1 There are no linkages to transmit information among the pumping stations or to the command posts (headquarters, subdivision). 2.2 Monitoring of water resources: Material resources are needed for enforcement of the new provisions governing groundwater pumping in Souss (issued September 9, 1981). Moreover, the drought that has prevailed for several years in the region makes it difficult to monitor the pumping. 2.3 Initiation of the farmers in good management of on-farm equipment and better water use. To achieve this goal, widespread extension programs need to be implemented over a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the increase in the projected water price is a factor that will contribute to this initiation. 2.4 More flexible cropping patterns The use of more flexible cropping patterns will enable the farmers to choose their crops while respecting agronomic constraints (rotation), techniques (network size, MMI, etc.), taking account of nation-wide production priorities. 3. Constraints from outside 3.1 Delays in contract approval. 3.2 Budgetary restrictions have delayed project execution. V xvi Annex 2 Page 7 3.3 Delays in releasing funds have led to delays in payments to contractors and consequently held up the work. 3.4 Cumbersome procedures in procuring urgently needed supplies for day-to-day operation of the network (maintenance, repairs, equipment, etc.). 4. Lessons to be drawn from the project 4.1 To avoid errors of estimation, no work should be started until the feasibility and detailed engineering studies have been carried out. 4.2 The marketing and selling of agricultural productions need to be better studied; these aspects are crucial to the success of the project. a* - xvii - KINGDOM OF MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER PROJECT (LOAN 1123-MOR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT April 27, 1983 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED Summary 1.01 Background. The Souss Groundwater Irrigation Project was appraised in 1974, and a US 18.5 million loan for the project was signed in 1975. The project was successfully completed in 1982. The closing date was extended from June 30, 1980 to September 28, 1981 to allow project completion. The loan was fully disbursed before the revised closing date. 1.02 The project was designed to support the Government's commitment to ensure a rational development of the use of the limited water resources available in the Southern valleys of Morocco. It was the first part of a Water Master Plan prepared for the Souss Valley. It aimed at (i) developing modern groundwater irrigation from the existing large underexploited aquifer in the upstream valley; (ii) restoring the water rights of farmers in traditionally irrigated areas by substituting groundwater for decreasing surface irrigation resources; and (iii) producing import substituting products, reducing underemployment, improving rural income, and stimulating shift from traditional irrigation methods to modern techniques. The project was formulated with the assistance of FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program using the results of feasibility studies prepared by consultants. 1.03 Formulation. At appraisal, the project provided for irrigating twelve separated sectors totaling about 7,300 ha. It included (i) land consolidation of the existing private freeholdings and land distribution of the existing collective and state land in the project area; (ii) construction of sprinkler irrigation systems for about 6,300 ha; (iii) rehabilitation of the existing surface distribution system for about 1,000 ha; (iv) construction of major unclassified gravel-surfaced farm access roads; (v) provision of village infrastructure;. (vi) strengthening of ORMVASM to manage the project; and (vii) technical assistance. The major issues at appraisal were cost recovery, land tenure reorganization and monitoring of water resources. Responsibility for project implemention rested with Ci) Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MARA) for the detailed designs and tender documents; (ii) Regional Development Office of the Souss-Massa (ORMVASM) for the irrigation, drainage, and farm road systems; (iii) The National Power Company (ONE) for the construction of connecting power lines; and (iv) Ministry of Urbanization for construction of village infrastructure (para. 6.1). 1.04 Design. Two minor changes in the project design were made during implementation. The first change was for the design of the pumping stations and aimed at assuring greater flexibility in operating the water supply systems. Additional pumps were added between the pumps submerged in the tubewells and the pipe distribution systems. The second change was for the design of the rural villages. Irstead of full-scale villages, equipped with all social and economic facilities, rural centers weia created around the cooperative centers established under the project (para. 4.04). -2- 1.05 Construction Targets. Actual construction achievement was close to the proposals made at appraisal, except for: (i) planting of windbreaks. No windbreaks were introduced in the project area. It was probably unrealistic to expect an introduction of windbreaks at an early stage of project development since most farmers still live far from their land and cannot thus assume a proper protection of the new plants from animals; (ii) equipping villages. No infrastructure was constructed except water supply for three villages. There was no need to establish this infrastructure during the project period mainly because the settlement of farmers around the new cooperative centers started on a large basis only in 1981 (para. 4.11); and (iii) extending the existing Research and Training Facilities. The budgetary constraints encountered during the 1977-80 austerity plan prevented ORMVASM from investing in such an operation which was not considered essential for assuring a good start of irrigation. 1.06 Construction Period. Construction of the irrigation system was completed in 1982, about 30 months after the original completion date of December 31, 1979, specified in the Loan Agreement. This delay was mainly due to the 1978-80 budgetary constraints, the delay in the completion of the detailed designs which were not prepared at appraisal, the change in the design of the pumping systems and more particularly, the delay which occurred in works for the laying of pipes (para. 4.03). 1.07 Land Tenure Reorganization. Land consolidation of private freeholdings and land distribution of collective and state-owned land was successfully carried out as foreseen at appraisal. It was successfully integrated with the layout of the irrigation distribution system. Although it was always launched in time for the execution of works, it was sometimes delayed during the last phase of implementation (transfer of.plots to the selected allottees, selection of new allottees to replace those who abandoned their plots, etc.). Fifty-eight percent of the project area was distributed to 860 beneficiaries who were organized into 14 Agrarian Reform Service Cooperatives. The private land in the modern sector was consolidated. As a result of the land tenure reorganization, the number of holdings was increased by 160%; small farmers are now more predominant (about 90% of the farm units are less than 5 ha.); fragmentation has been nearly eliminated and more viable holdings have been established (paras. 4.05-4.08). 1.08 Costs and Procurement. Actual project costs were 14% above appraisal estimates in dollar terms. The overrun would have been higher if project works originally included were all completed. The overrun was mostly due to increases in quantities of the major project irrigation civil works mainly for pipe networks, pumping stations, power supply, and land clearings (para. 4.16). 1.09 Goods and services were procured under 82 contracts, of which 55 were financed by the Bank loan and the others totally by the Government. The value of works, which went to ICB, represented 86% of the total value of all contracts. All contracts were awarded according to the procurement procedure specified in the Loan Agreement except for power lines for which ORMVASM aegotiated contracts valued at US$3.6 million, with ONE the only company empowered to design, and supervise construction, operation and maintenance of power lines in Morocco. Although not recognized as such at the time, this should be viewed as a misprocurement since the Loan Agreement stipulated that ONE and not ORMVASM should be the project executing agency for the project power supply works. Under such circumstances, contracts for thes.e works -3- should have been awarded by ONE under ICB as provided in the normal procurement procedures specified in the Loan Agreement. The Bank's prior review limit of US$40,000 for all project works and goods was low. It led to a review by the Bank of about 60% of the contracts or about 95% of the value of the contrac..-. No foreign contractors bid for any of the project civil works that were put out to International bidding. This has been the case in most Bank-financed agricultural projects in Morocco (para. 4.18). 1.10 Agricultural Impact. Agricultural develop-sent has made an excellent start. After one to three years of irrigation, depending on the sector, the cropping intensity reached a very satisfactory level of 128% in 1981. Fundamental and sustainable changes have been introduced in the cropping pattern since crops, which normally characterize dry farming in low rainfed areas such as Souss, have been totally abandoned by farmers. Yields were high for virtually all crops and were very close to the appraisal targets. All crops foreseen at appraisal have been actually introduced except citrus, almonds and berseem. Vegetables, which were not foreseen at appraisal, have been widely cultivated. The growth of cultivation of forage crops is progressing at a slower rate than the other crops (9% of the area in 1980-81), the appraisal targets being 19%. This is normal since livestock development started on a large scale only in 1981, after a long stagnation caused by difficulties that farmers faced in starting the construction of stables (para. 5.1-5.30. 1.11 The successful performance in crop production can be attributed to Ci) valuable management assistance and provision of technical packages by ORMVASM to the cooperatives; ii) rapid adoption of new irrigation techniques by farmers; (iii) the large-scale use of improved seed varieties for the major crops; (iv) profitable faragate prices, which have increased at a higher r4te than most input prices; and (v) the predominance of small farms (para. 5.4). 1.12 According to new projections made by the Bank during the preparation of the present report, cropping intensity will be 135% at full development, as foreseen at appraisal. The main changes that are now foreseen, as compared to the appraisal projections are: (i) the introduction of vegetables, which would cover almost the same proportion of the crLpped area as in 1981 (20%); (ii) a slight reduction in the proportion of cereals (80% instead of 89%); (iii) the elimination of almond trees since olive are more adapted to the Souss conditions than almond; and (iv) higher crop production, mainly due to the introduction of vegetables and to slightly higher yields for the other crops. The new projections seem reasonable in view of the results achieved in 1981. Full development would be reached in 1986 for cereal and vegetable production and in 1993 for orchards, as expected at appraisal (five years and twelve years, respectively after project construction). However, full development for forage crops and livestock development will not be achieved in 1986, five years after project construction as foreseen at appraisal but more likely in 1989 (para. 5.01). 1.13 Organization and Management. ORMVASM's performance in managing the project was rather mixed. On one hand, ORMVASM was successful in effectively carrying out the land tenure reorganization, in keeping an exceptional continuity at the high management level, in quickly building up capable engineering staff who succeeded in implementing works of high engineering standards, in establishing successful cooperatives and in introducing new technological packages for major crops. On the other hand, ORMVASM, as well as MARA, were somewhat deficient and slow in preparing the project detailed -4- studies, in replacing the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform plots who abandoned their plots and in resolving problems created by the corrosion of irrigation pipes (para. 6.12). In addition, ORMVASM sometimes failed to comply with some of the loan conditions regarding procurement (para. 6.05). The project coordination ccmmittee was established but was largely inoperative, although the ;resent project is an example of a project for which good coordination was essential for its implementation because of the large number of agencies which were supposed to be involved in execution of its social and physical infrastructure components (para. 6.1). 1.14 Operation and Maintenance. Although highly qualified staff was assigned at the level of ORMVASM and project headquarters, the O&M Divisien suffered from a shortage of capable staff at the field level and a lack of budgetary funds to meet maintenance needs. Maintenance problems were exacerbated by corrosion of the irrigation aluminum pipes, which appeared early after the start of irrigation and more widespread since then. A litigation is ongoing between ORMVASM and the Supplier to settle this issue (para. 6.12). 1.15 Monitoring of Water Resources. The provisions of the Loan Agreement regarding monitoring of water resources were only partially enforced. No exact inventory of surface and groundwater was carried out. This inventory turned out to be extremely difficult to perform because of the large number of wells in Souss (more than 13,000). However, the level of the Sousa aquifer has been closely monitored through a dense network of piezometers. In addition, a Government decree, issued in September 1981, provided for prior approval by ORMVASM and DRE of all new pumpings exceeding 40 m3/day and defined the procedures for monitoring pumping (pares. 6.14-6.15). 1.16 Cost Recovery. The cost recovery levels currently being achieved are in default of Section 4.09 of the Loan Agreement which requires recovery from. the beneficiaries of 100% of 0&M and a reasonable portion of the actual costs. The basic water charges of 0.029 DH/m3 established in 1969 were increased to 0.058 DR/m3 (+100%) in June 1980. Overall charges are still insufficient to cover actual 0&M costs. In addition a supplementary charge of 0.05 DH/m3 is applied for pumping. These charges (0.108 DH/m3) represented only 452 of actual operation, maintenance and energy costs in 1981. The collection rate of water charges was satisfactory (97% in 1979 and 82% in 1980). Given the exemption provided by the Agricultural Investment Code (para. 6.19), only 20% of the project area is liable for payment of a land betterment levy to repay capital costs. On the basis of the current level of the betterment levy (1500 DH/ha.), applied with the exemption specified in the Investment Code, the total recovery of capital costs will be about 1% of total capital costs. 1.17 Economic Evaluation. The economic rate of return of the project has been recalculated to be about 14% compared to 102 envisaged at appraisal, the improvement being mainly the result of higher yields for most crops, the introduction of vegetables which generate higher returns per he than the other crops, and higher annual increase rates of production early after the start of irrigation. The higher cropping intensity being achieved will have a favorable effect on underemployment. The total economic cost of the project in 1982 prices was about DH 151.7.million. 1.18 Audit. The Bank was given the 1979 and 1980 financial statements of GRMVASM and the project's accounts, certified by the accounting officer, a -5- Ministry of Finance officer in charge of making ORMVASM payments and keeping ORMVASM's accounts. Since the certified accounts were not then audited by a senior Finance Ministry Official, the Borrower was in default with the Loan Agreement's provisions on audit. Major Lessons Learned and Recommendations 1.19 Major lessons which can be learned from the project for improving the design of future irrigation projects are that it is desirable: (i) to combine, to the extent practicable, all tasks regarding construction, operation and maintenance of the systems and agricultural development, under the same responsible agency (para. 6.3); (ii) for projects involving high staadard engineering like the present project, to have the detailed design carried out for a reasonable proportion of the project area before project appraisal (para.4.02). A Bank Operational Manual Statement (OMS 2.28) has subsequently been published to recommend this; (iii) to assess in advance all physical, social and legal implications of land tenure reorganization on the implementation of some related components of the project, such as village development, construction of farm hous-s, on-farm investments, etc. (paras. 4.05-4.06 and 4.11-4.13); (iv) to assure that farmers can have the required guarantees for obtaining bank credit, whenever the project includes on-farm investments (par3. 5.05); (v) to take particular care in assessing, during appraisal, components which require prior assent of farmers (in this case windbreaks) (para. 4.10); (vi) to give, to the extent possible, responsibility to farmers for operating and maintaining the irrigation infrastructure, this responsibility being provided within a well desigid system of guidance, incentives to good performance and penalties for irresponsibility (para. 6.09); and (vii) to obtain a specific commitment from the borrower to allocate the funds and to provide the technical staff needed for efficient maintenance of the irrigation system (para. 6.11). II. BACKGROUND 2.01 The project was designed to support the Government's commitment to ensure a rational development of the use of the limited water resources available in the southern valleys of Morocco in a manner that spread the benefits across a broad social spectrum. The project is the first part of a Water Master Plan prepared for the Souss Valley. The Master Plan included the development in the Upper Souss Valley where the project is located, of 6,300 ha of partly dry farmed but mainly range land into modern irrigated -6- agriculture and the rehabilitation of 17,000 ha of traditionally surface irrigated agriculture. The project covers all the 6,300 he to be modernized and about 1,000 ha out of the area to be rehabilitated. Groundwater supply vs selected because of the existence of a large underexploited aquifer, and the gradual disappearance of resurgences in the Souse River following a rapid increase in private pumping in the Valley. The Small and Medium Scale Irrigation Project, appraised in May 1982, provides for the rehabilitation of a second slice of about 10,000 ha of traditionally irrigated land. 2.02 The project area is located in the upstream of the Souse Valley in southern Morocco, east of the town of Taroudant. The climate is Mediterranean with both dry summers and moderately cool winters. Rainfall averages 246 mm, 70Z of which falls between November and February, limiting dry farming to barley and wheat and resulting in very low yields. The valley is endowed with major groundwater resources and adequate soils. Modern irrigation based on wells and tubewells has grown rapidly through private investments during the last decade. This has resulted in a reduction of surface water resources and has seriously hampered the development of traditional irrigation mainly based on springs and water resurgences. This explains the Government's decision to restore the rights of farmers in the traditional areas by substituting groundwater for surface supply irrigation. Sprinkler irrigation was proposed during project preparation to be introduced in the new perimeters because soils are light textured with high infiltration rates and relatively low moisture retention capacity. Before the project, collective and state-forest land accounted for 57% of the project area and private freehold for 43%. Private farms were small and highly fragmented and farmers lived in small traditional areas ("Douars"), scattered over the country side. Unemployment was low, but most people were underemployed. 2.03 The Government's policy in the agricultural sector has consistently favored investments in the irrigation subsector. This policy has been supported by comprehensive legislation which has provided a valuable framework for promotion of the rational use of water, land and human resources within the irrigation sector. Of particular interest are the following laws: (i) the land consolidation law of 1962, which provides a procedure for consolidation of existing fragmented holdings and for land registration; (ii) the Agricultural Investment Code of 1969 which, within the irrigated areas, provides for transforming collective ownership into joint or private ownership, sets up the legal provisions for cost recovery, limits land fragmentation by imposing a minimum of 5 ha for each holding resulting from a subdivision, and provides guidelines for organizing Government technical and financial assistance for development of crop and animal production; and (iii) the Land Reform legislation of 1972 which sets out the conditions governing the distribution of state-owned land to small holders and landless laborers. III. PROJECT FORMULA1ION 3.01 Preparation. In 1967, the Government decided to prepare a Master Plan for the development of the Sousa Valley, the main co3cern being to ensure a rational development of the use of the existing limited water resources. Under two phases of a study financed by UNDP between 1968 and 1974, the FAO and the consulting firms SCET International and GERSAR prepared the Master Plan and feasibility studies for first stage investment projects. The project was based on these feasibility studies and was appraised in 1976. The appraisal included all the components proposed in the feasibility.studies. -7- 3.02 Obje:tives. The project aimed at contributing to the main objectives of the 1973-77 Third Development Plan which were to improve the trade balance of agricultural products, increase the contribution of the agricultural sector to economic growth, raise farm income through irrigation and improve rural income distribution through land reform and a better balance of Government sepport to farmers. Thus, it aimed at Oroducing import substtuting products such as milk and meat, implementing land consolidation and distribution and providing village infrastructure, which primarily benefited small farmers, reducing underemployment, improving rural income, and stimulating a shift from traditional irrigation methods to modern techniques. 3.03 At appraisal, the project provided for irrigating twelve separated perimeters having a total net area of about 7,300 ha. Nine of these perimeters, which consisted of about 6,300 ha of rangeland and dry farmland were to be equipped for sprinkler irrigation. The selection of sprinkler irrigation was made because of the moisture characteristics of the soil, and because sprinkler irrigation proved more economically viable than surface irrigation. The three other perimeters, consisting of about 1,000 ha traditionally irrigated land, were to be rehabilitated by providing an adequate groundwater supply and an improved main gravity distribution network. 3.04 Components. The project included the following components: (i) land consolidation of the existing 2,450 ha private holdings and distribution of the existing 3,850 ha collective and forest-state land; ( ii) introduction of new irrigation systems in 6,30U ha by clearing land, the construction and the equipping of new tubewells with submerged electric pumps and pressure regulating facilities, the installation of pumps and equipment for existing wells, the placement of buried asbestos cement pipe distribution systems and mobile sprinkler equipment; (iii) rehabilitation of the existing gravity distribution system on 1,000 ha by improving existing concrete and earth channels and constructing additional precast concrete elevated open channels; (iv) the construction of open drains to intercept surface runoff from adjacent areas; (v) the construction of 150 km of gravel surfaced farm access roads; (vi) the provision of village infrastructure by establishing basic infrastructure (water supply, public lighting, asphalt-paved roads, health centers, schools and community centers) for 11 new villages and improving the infrastructure of 9 existing villages; (vii) the strengthening of ORMVASM to manage the project by establishing project headquarters in Taroudant, three development centers (CKVs).I and seven collection centers, the expansion of an 1/ CMV = Centre de Mise en Valeur -8- existing training center, the procurement of equipment and vehicles, and the recuitment of consultants; and (viii) agricultural credit 3.05 Issues. The major issues at appraisal were cost recovery, land tenure reorganization and monitoring of water resources. As for cost recovery, the Government agreed at Negotiations to promptly levy and collect water charges from the start of irrigation, and thereafter review them, in order to recover from such charges and from the betterment levy, all actual operating and maintenance costs of the project and a reasonable portion of the actual capital cost, taking into account the beneficiaries' incentives and capacity to pay. As for land tenure reorganization, the Government agreed to transfer the tribal land into land jointly-owned by tribal right-holders, to distribute state-forest land to private smallholders, to consolidate private land in the new irrigated area and to complete this reorganization in time for the physical execution of the project. Regarding water resources monitoring, the Government agreed to continue monitoring surface water flows and groundwater levels, to undertake an inventory of diverted or extracted water and to control the issuance of pumping permits in the Upper Souse Valley. IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Implementation Schedule and Delays 4.01 The project got off to a good start in 1976 and 1977 but progress in implementation subsequently slowed down. As a result, project irrigation works were completed in 1982, about 27 months after the completion date of Dec. 31, 1979, specified in the Loan Agreement. The actual cummulative area equipped for irrigation, compared with the appraisal projections progressed as follows: Area Area served served Actual Area by the Area by the as Z served by gravity served by gravity of Year sprinklers system Total' sprinklers system Total Appraisal 1977 808 - 808 0 - 0 0 1978 1,849 - 1,849 0 - 0 0 1979 4,674 - 4,674 1,849 - 1,849 40 1980 6,260 1,000 7,260 3,019' 1,110 4,129 57 1981 - - - 4,962 1,110 6,072 84 1982 - - - 6,123 1,110 7,233 100 4.02 The major reasons which caused this long'delay include; (i) budgetary constraints, experienced during the 1978-80 Austerity Development Plan, which seriously slowed down execution of works in 1978 and then in 1980; (ii) a delay in the completion by MARA of detailed designs and tender documents; (iii) a change in the design of the pumping system which necessitated the revision of the tender documents of the electromechanical equipment (para. 4.04) ; and (iv) a delay in works for the placement of irrigation pipes. -9- 4.03 The delay in the installation of pipes was the main factor which caused serious delay in project construction. As agreed at appraisal, one contract was signed in 1976 for laying pipes in all the project sectors. Works were expected to be completed in 1978. They were actually completed in 1980, about two years behind schedule as a result of the contractor's illness and subsequent financial problems. In addition, the quantities of works turned out to be much higher than those estimated by MARA and ORMVASM and included in the tender documents. The result was that the original amount of the contract was overrun by 30% for works performed only in 68% of the project area. Consequently, ORMVASM signed another contract for works in the remaining area, in 1980, one year after the project was expected to be completed. Design Changes 4.04 Two major changes in the project design were proposed by ORMVASM and accepted by the Bank. The first change was for the design of the pumping stations. At appraisal, it was foreseen that pumps submerged in the tubewells would directly feed the distribution network. Instead, the selected solution was that each set of tubewell pumps discharges into a small central storage reservoir, from which a second set of booster pumps pump into the distribution network. This solution was found to be more appropriate because it leaves greater flexibility for operation and maintenance and is less dependent on the proper functioning of sophisticated automatic pressure regulating equipment. The second change was made in the design of the rural villages. Instead of full scale villages equipped with all social and economic facilities as foreseen at appraisal, rural centers were created around the cooperative centers established under the project. These centers were intended to primarily serve the members of the new cooperatives because many full villages already exist in the project area to serve the private farmers. This solution was found more realistic and more adapted to the social situation in the project area. No other infrastructure than the cooperative buildings and water supply have been established. Small plots for housing were marked out and allocated to the cooperative members (para. 4.12). 4.05 The sprinkler irrigation system design includes pumps which are submerged in the tubewells and feed an underground asbestos cement pipe network. Typical submerged pumps have a capacity of 65 1/s and a total dynamic head of 112 m which can later be replaced by 122 m head units requiring 110 kw motors. Pressure tanks installed between pumps and pipe network protect against water hammer. Pneumatically-operated switches provide automatic operation of the pumps and protection is included to insure no more than four start-ups per pump per hour. A standard discharge of 65 1/s per well would result in a drawdown of 20 m. A 15-30 m operative screen depth has been installed to keep entrance velocity through the screen at a low level. 4.06 The groundwater level before the project varied between 15-40 m, depending on location. For the duration of the project, the lowering of the groundwater table was expected to amount to about 10 m in 40 years, reaching however a maximum of 25 m for 6 wells. Geohydrological considerations suggest typical depths of wells of about 80-90 m. Well fields consist of one to four units, depending on the area to be served, the normal pattern being triangular with 1,100 m sides. This spacing reduces mutual drawdown to an acceptable level. - 10 - 4.07 The distribution system consists of buried asbestos cement pipes, terminating in hydrants for mobile sprinkler equipment. These hydrants, equipped with two fixed discharge outlets, serve two separate blocks of 7.8 ha each. Each outlet has a continuous discharge capacity of 6.7 1/s (or 0.86 1/s/ha) and a discharge pressure of 3.5 atmospheres. Mobile equipment downstream of the hydrants consists of one central feeder line and two moving laterals. A 12 m x 12 m sprinkler pattern was selected to minimize wind disturbance. Reorganization of-Land Tenure 4.08 ORMVASM proceeded quite effectively in reorganizing land tenure in the project area. This reorganization was the first experience in Morocco which combined land consolidation of private freehold, allotment and distribution of state-owned land and collective land and limitation of the size of the allocated plots to a ceiling of 5 ha, regardless of how much land the collective land rightholders had owned before. Finally, it was successfully integrated into the layout of the distribution system. The layout adopted in the new irrigated area is known as "trame B", which has been successfully applied for more than 20 years in Morocco for both gravity and sprinkler irrigation..11 However, this reorganization was a long process which involved several technical and legal procedukes. It required the enforcement of three different sets of laws (para. 2.3) and continuous coordination between different bodies at the local, regional and central level (ORVASM, MARA, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, representatives of farmers, etc.). 4.09 Although it was always launched in time for the execution of works, land tenure reorganization was sometimes delayed during the last phase of implementation resulting in delays in the start of irrigation in some sectors. The main reasons are that (i) many beneficiaries left their plots. In mid-1982, 188 lots totalling about 914 ha were abandoned. Some of the beneficiaries failed to comply with the farming conditions imposed by Agrarian Reform legislation and consequently had their land expropriated by the Government. Others preferred, for personal reasons, to return to their original villages and lands, generally located far from the project area; and (ii) the Provincial Authorities ofAgadir discontinued in mid-1982 the distribution of land in the Oulad Abdallah sector because of a disagreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Interior on the size of the plots. The Ministry of the Interior found that a plot of 5 ha, established by the Agricultural Investment Cbde, was too small to generate an income sufficient to substantially improve the well-being of farmers in the Souse area. They maintained that the net annual income per family should be DH18,000 a year (about US$480 per capita) and that the size of the plots should, therefore, be 10 ba. Finally, it was agried that the size of the abandoned plots will be 6.80 ha for the state-land and 5.80 ha for collective land. 4.10 Prior to the project, of the total of 7,233 ha, 1842 ha (25%) were state-forest land, and 2357 ha (33%) collective land. The remaining 3,034 ha 1/ The characteristics and the advantages of the "trame B" layout are fully described and illustrated in the Morocco Doukkala I PPAR dated December 8, 1982. - 11 - (42Z) were private freehold including all the 1,110 ha irrigated traditionally, rehabilitated but not consolidated under the project. State and collective land was distributed to 860 landless laborers, small holders or collective land rightholders, who were organized into 14 Agrarian Reform Cooperatives (para. 4.12). The 1,924 ha private land owned by 533 holders in the new irrigated area was successfully consolidated. A comparison of land tenureA/ before and after reorganization is shown in the follcwing table: Area Landowners Holdings Farm Units and Co-owners Tha) (Nb) (Nb) (Nb) Average (ha) 1. Before Reorganization - Collective Land 2,357 n.a n.a. 0 a/ - - State-Forest Land 1,842 1 1 0 - - Private Freehold 1,924 1,949 533 533 3.6 Total 6,123 1,950 534 533 - 2. After Reorganization - Private Freehold 6,123 3,669 1,393 1,393 4.4 a! Based on data regarding only the modern sector (6,123 ha) 4.11 Farm size distribution after consolidation is characterized by the predominance of small farms: 89Z of farm units are less than 5 ha and only 1% are more than 20 ha. Appraisal target figures are different from the actual distribution, because they were based on preliminary results of land distribution surveys made during feasibility studies. Although the average farm size is almost the same, the proportion of small farms is actually much higher than foreseen at appraisal. Completion Target (at Appraisal) Actual Results /a Farm Area Average Farm Area Average Range of Size Units Size Units Size (ha) (Z) (%) (ha) (%) (Z) (ha) 0-5 67 55 3.6 89 69 3.4 5-10 ) 9 13 6.4 10-20 ) 33 45 6.0 1 3 14.6 Above 20 ) 1 15 70.3 Total 100 100 4.0 100 100 4.6 /a This includes only the modern irrigated area since no data has been made available by ORMVASM regarding the traditional sector. 1/ No farm units since collective land was grazed as rangeland by the rightholders. - 12 - Project Works 4.12 Although they were completed far behind schedule (para. 4.01), works necessary for immediate irrigation and prompt operation of the new schemes were successfully carried out according to the appraisal expectations. Most of-the irrigation, drainage, and road systems were built as foreseen at appraisal. Project headquarters in Taroudant and three development field centers (CMVs) were established and were operational before the start of irrigation. The seven milk collection centers foreseen at appraisal were gradually established to meet the increasing demand for milk marketing in the project area. However, other works, which were not essentiel for the start of irrigation, were not undertaken as expected at appraisal. They are related to windbreaks, village infrastructure, research and training facilities and technical assistance. 4.13 Windbreaks. At appraisal, it was envisaged that windbreaks would be planted by farmers on their own farms and that ORMVASM would deliver planting material to them and would also plant windbreaks along access roads. Actually, no windbreaks were introduced into the project area either by ORMVASM or by farmers. Indeed, despite the fact that farmers in Souss are used to tree cropping (olives, citrus), it was probably overly optimistic to expect an introduction of windbreaks at an early stage of project development. The main reasons are that: i) farmers have devoted their efforts primarily to successfully introducing new irrigated crops; (ii) most farmers still live far from their land, in particular the new beneficiaries of Land Agrarian Reform lots. They cannot assure a proper control of the growth of the new windbreaks; (iii) animals still represent a danger for young windbreak plants since they are mostly kept out of the stables; and (iv) development of windbreaks is generally a long process. The experience has shown that efforts made by Government in Morocco and elsewhere ir North Africa to speed up adoption of windbreak by farmers have failed. This has been clearly the case in Doukkala (see PCR Doukkala I) and in Massa, an irrigation perimeter located in the Souss Valley where wind velocities are higher than in the project area, making windbreaks essential for protecting crops from excessive evapotranspiration and for irrigation infrastructure from deposit of sand. 4.14 Village Infrastructure. The project provided for equipping 11 new villages and rehabilitating infrastructure for 9 existing villages by establishing water supply, public lighting, access roads, health centers, schools and community centers. No such works,were performed and the execution of this component was constantly one of the major issues highlighted by the Bank supervision missions. As mentioned above in para. 4.05, the concept of full villages established under the project was abandoned. Given the scarcity of budgetary funds, the Government decided to limit,infrastructure on a priority basis to few existing villages, selected as being the main development centers ("chef s-lieux") rather than to build it in other existing or in new villages. No "chef-lieu" exist in the project area. 4.15 An alternative solution, was found. It consisted of using the 14 cooperative centers constructed under the project as nucleuses around which full-scale villages would be progressively developed in the future. Actually, aLl the cooperative centers were fully constructed, each of them including a wirehouse-garage, a workshop, two offices and a manager's house. A village was been delimited close to each cooperative center. Plots of 1,000 m2 each were marked out and allocated to cooperative members for the construction of - 13 - hcuses, stables and warehouses. Water supply was inrroduced in three cooperatives. This new formula made a good start after a stagnation of more than two years. Construction started in all villages in 1981 when farmers started to receive credit from CNCA to construct stables and houses. 4.16 Three major lessons can be drawn from this experience on village infrastruct:re. First, that two to three years after te start of irrigation are generally required before farmers' income is increased enough to allow them to start saving for construction of houses and stables. Second, construction of houses and other buildings is such a long process that it is unrealistic to think that it can be completed during the project construction period. Thus, construction of infrastructure during this period is often useless. Third, in Souss, construction of stables and houses started although no infrastructure was established. This shows that construction of infrastructure in new villages is not always the determining factor to attract farmers to these villages; other factors, such as self-financing capacity, guarantees required by Bank to lend credit, are generally more critical. 4.17 Research and Training Facilities. The project provided for extending and equipping the existing demonstration and training farm operated by ORMVASM to carry out applied field experiments and provide training to farmers, extension agents, and cooperative managers. The only work undertaken was the placement of drip irrigation on 4 ha. This system was not commissioned and no use was made of this center for training or applied research purposes. The main reasons are that the supplier failed to complete works as specified in the contract and, above all, that the budgetary constraints prevented ORMVASM from investing in such an operation, which would have required funds not only for investment for extending and equipping the building but also for operating costs (which are not covered by the project). These funds would have been totally subsidized by Government since they are not recovered from farmers. 4.18 Technical Assistauce. Electromechanical consultants were engaged, as foreseen at appraisal, to assist in engineering design, preparation of tender documents, supervision of works and commissioning the electromechanical equipment. However, other consultants should have been employed to review and assist in supervision of studies and irrigation works other than those regarding electromechanical equipment. Such consultants would have helped speed up the preparation of the detailed studies and, consequently, project implementation. At appraisal, studies were only at the feasibility level, soil maps were at a semi-detailed scale (1/10,000), surveys for land topography and consolidation were under way and pumping tests were carried out on only 10 wells. In retrospect, it would have been advantageous for ORMVASM to hire consultants to assist in finalizing the design of the irrigation systems, which were rather sophisticated (para. 4.04); and for supervising works because the project schemes are relatively small, numerous and scattered throughout the project area making supervision of works rather difficult. Costs and Procurement 4.19 Costs. The total cost of the project (excluding credit) at completion was US$44.6 million compared with US$39.0 million estimated at appraisal (Annex 3), an overrun of 14%. The average weighted exchange rate of the US dollar during project implementation was slightly lower than at appraisal (4.12 DH instead of 4.20 DH). If the appreciation of the DH is corrected for and the exchange rate is used, the actual project cost would have an overrun of 17%. The overrun would have been higher if project works - 14 - originally included were all completed ( ara. 4.04) and if credit provided by CNCA to farmers was taken into account.1y If the costs of those items of work which were part of the appraisal estimate but were not undertaken are separated out, the cost overrun would be as high as 43%. The overrun was mostly due to increases in the quantities of the major project irrigation civil works including buried pipe networks, the pumping station drainage, power supply and- land clearing. Part of the increase in quantities occurred because estimates of quantities were based on preliminary insufficient data in the feasibility studies. The remaining cost overruns were due to price increases mostly as a result of delays in construction (para. 4.01). 4.20 The total cost of irrigation development, excluding the cost of the administrative and social infrastructure and on-farm investments, was about US$40.7 million in current prices. The Unit cost per hectare is, therefore, US$5,600 in current prices, or about US$ 7,300 in 1982 prices. This is quite high, largely because of the combination of two sophisticated systems for pumping water from deep tubewells and for distributing water under high pressure. 4.21 Procurement. Goods and services for the project were procured in 82 contracts, of which 55 were financed by the Bank loan and the others totally by the Government. These contracts were undertaken for works which were performed before the effectiveness or after the closing of the Bank loan (preliminary studies, well drilling for pumping tests, water supply for CMVs, etc.) or for works which were not originally included in the project but proved to be necessary later on (milk collection centers, veterinary centers, etc.). Their total value represents only 7% of the actual project costs. The breakdown of the contracts, financed by the Bank loan, according to their size, the procurement procedure, and the type of goods and services is as follows: Value and Number of contracts Nb of Contracts in Range Contract Price in Range Civil Equipment Studies Total Range ICB LP'A Total Works & Consultants --USmillion- - - (US$ million) --- Value Nb Value Nb Value Nb Above 5.0 1 - 1 8.3 (1) 8.3 2.0 - 5.0 5 1 6 16.8 (5) 3.2 (1) - 20.0 1.0 - 2.0 2 - 2 2.3 (2) - 2.3 0.04 - 1.00 13 10 23 7.7 (17) 1.2 (5) - 8.9 Below 0.04 2 21 23 0.05 (3) 1.7 (17) 0.13 (3) 1.9 Total: Number 23 32 55 35.2 6.1 0.1 41.4 Value 35.7 5.7 41.4 35.2 6.1 0.1 41.4 /a Local procedure 4.22 The conclusions that can be drawn from this table are that: (i) The total value of contracts which went to ICB is US$35.7 million, representing 86% of the total value of all awarded contracts and 140% of the value of contracts ex3ected to go to ICB at appraisal; I/ No data regarding Credit has been made available by ORM1ASM. - 15 - (iii All contracts were awarded according to the procurement procedure specified in the Loan Agreement, except for power lines. For these, two contracts were negociated with ONE, the only public company empowered to design, supervise and operate main power lines in Morocco; (iii) About one third of the contracts were below the US$40,000 threshhold of ICB and were awarded according to Local Competitive Bidding. Their total amount exceeded the US$250,000 limit specified in the Loan Agreement. They were mainly for vehicles and farm machinery equipment. A review of their contracts indicates that insufficient effort was made by ORMVASM to group contracts for ICB. In some cases grouping should have been possible. This would have increased the total valued contracts going to ICB even above the achieved high figure of 86%. (iv) The limit in the Loan Agreement (US$40,000) for prior review by the Bank resulted in the Bank reviewing 58% of the contracts and 15.5Z of the value of the contracts. An increase in the prior review to US$1.0 million would have resulted in a reduction of the percentage value of contracts covered to 74% but it would also have reduced the prior review from 46 to 9 contracts, saving substantial time in tendering procedures and Bank review without, however, affecting procurement procedures adversely; and (v) No foreign contractors bid for any of the project civil works. This has been the case in most Bank-financed agricultural projects in Morocco. As highlighted in the Sebou I and Doukkala I PCR, it is reasonable to raise the limit for ICB to, at least, US$1.0 million for civil works for future projects of this type in Morocco. A limit of US$1.5 million was approved for the Small and Medium Scale Irrigation project approval by the Board in March 1983. Disbursereuts 4.23 The total amount of the US$18.5 million loan was disbursed. The Closing Date was extended from June 30, 1980 to September 28, 1981 to allow project completion. Only US$14.3 million (77%) were disbursed at the original date. In addition, the allocation of the loan amount to the different disbursement categories was amended in 1980 to take into account the increase in expenditures for civil works (para. 4.16). A comparison of the actual disbursement schedule and that projected at appraisal is shown in Annex 4. A comparison of projected and actual disbursements by category is shown below: As Planned As Revised Category Item at Appraisal in 1980 Actual US$ million ---------- I.(a) Civil works for power supply 1.2 1.4 1.4 (b) Civil works for village infrastructure 2.0 2.0 0.0 (c) Other Civil Works 5".6 6.9 9.0 II. Equipment 7.0 7.0 8.1 III. Consultants' services 0.2 0.2 0.02 IV. Unallocated 2.5 1.0 - Total 18.5 18.5 18.5 - 16 - V. PROJECT IMPACT Agricultural Impact 5.01 Crop Production. Agricultural development made a good start over the first three years of irrigation (1978-79 to 1980-81) for which data were made available by ORMVASM1/. Average yields were high for virtually all crops; cropping intensity increased significantly and reached a very satisfactory level of 128% during the third cropping year. These developments are most noticeable in the land distributed under Agrarian Reform Law where the cropping intensity was as high as 131%. Fundamental and sustainable changes have been introduced in the cropping pattern since barley, pulses, fallow and grazing, which usually characterize dry farming in low rainfed areas such as Souss, have been abandoned by farmers. 5.02 In light of experience to date, certain changes from appraisal assumptions regarding cropping patterns have already taken place and these changes are likely to be kept in the future. A comparison between the 1980-81./ and future cropping patterns, yields and production is included in Annex 5 and summarized below: Cropping Year Projections at 1980-81 Full Development (Actual) (At Appraisal) Crops Area Yield Area Yield (ha) (%) (t/ha) (ha) ((t/ha) Cereals 3,227 73 3.3 5,590 65 3.5 Pulses - - - 560 7 1.8 Vegetables 644 14 33.7 - - - Forages 294 6 64.0 1,290 15 54.5 Fruit Trees 302 7 n.a /a 1,150 13 4.7 Total Cropped Area 4,467 100 - 8,590 100 - Total Equipped Area 3,524 - - 6,300 - - Cropping Intensity 128% - - 136% - - /a No production was made since the new planted trees were 1 to 3 years old. 5.03 Comparing these developments with those projected at appraisal for full development, it is to be noted that (i) all crops foreseen at appraisal were actually introduced except citrus and almond trees and berseem. According to the cropping rotation recommended by ORMVASM (Annex 7), fruit trees were supposed to be planted collectively by cooperative members within 1/ No data are available in the ORMVASM's completion report regarding agricultural development in the traditional sectors. 2/ The ORMWASM's completion report issued in April 1982 refers to the 1980-81 season during which 3,524 ha were equipped in the modern sector and were, therefore, ready for irrigation at the beginning of the season. - 17 - common plots, of which one was allocated to each cooperative. Farmers were very reluctant to collectively cultivate in these common plots and did not show any interest to give the care required for growing young trees. As a result ORMVASM prefered to start planting by introducing olive trees which are hardier than almonds or citrus; (ii) contrary to the appraisal expectations, vegetables including potatoes, water melons and carrots, were widely cultivated. It was a mistake that vegetables were not foreseen at appraisal for full development because farmers in Souss are traditionally known to be among the finest vegetable growers in the country, because vegetables generate higher returns than most of other crops and because an expanding tourist market exist in Agadir; (iii) cultivation of forage crops, mainly alfalfa, is progressing at a lower rate than the other crops (6% of the cropped area), the appraisal target being 15%. However, this is normal since the development of fodder crop is usually related to the development of livestock which has to be preceded by on-farm investments for construction of stables and purchase of animals; and (iv) yields achieved were high; they almost equaled those expected at full development. 5.04 The successful performance in crop production can be attributed to Ci) valuable management assistance and provision of technical packages by ORMVASM to the cooperatives (para. 6.13), whose land represents about two-third of the project area. Technical packages include a very close control of crop rotation, application of specific farming techniques, the supply of a wide range of inputs and services, and provision and supervision of credit; (ii) rapid adoption of new irrigation techniques including the use of sprinkler irrigation which we know from experience, often contributes to a more efficient use of water and a more rapid increase in cropping intensity than with gravity irrigation; (iii) the widespread use of improved seed varieties for the major crops (high yielding varieties for wheat, alfalfa, potato, water melon and hybrid varieties for maize); and (iv) profitable farm gate prices which increased at a higher rate than input prices mainly for maize, alfalfa and vegetables. 5.05 Animal Production. The start in the development of livestock was delayed due to the difficulties that cooperative farmers faced in building stables on their new plots close to their cultivable land, during the early years of irrigation. Among these difficulties were Ci) the delay in the distribution of housing plots to farmers although the cultivable plots were distributed right at the start of irrigation. The allocation of housing plots to most farmers took place only at the beginning of 1981, three years after the first sectors were operational. This period was spent by MARA and ORMVASM in deciding whether the housing plots should be located around the existing cooperative centers or within new rural villages; (ii) the fact that farmers' income did not increase enough to allow them to save for construction of houses and stables; and (iii) CNCA decided not to lend cooperative farmers medium-term credits before their cooperatives were legally established or at least working satisfactorily and generating profits. 5.06 After these problems were overcome in 1981, construction of stables started at almost all village sites. The last Bank supervision mission which visited Morocco in October 1981, found construction progress impressive in the three villages it visited. This recent development was the first real step towards promotion of new productive livestock along the direction set up at appraisal. As a result, dairy production and lamb fattening are now taking - 18 - hold significantly in the project area. At the end of 1981, 500 pure-bred cows, 50 cross-bred cows, and 1,500 cross-bred ewes were counted. It was estimated that 200,000 liters of milk, representing about 12% of the total production of milk in the project area, were marketed through the milk collection centers constructed under the project. Irrigation Adoptian Rates 5.07 Adoption of irrigation by farmers was projected at appraisal to be rapid because of the existing tradition of irrigation in the area, the legendary dynamism of the Souss Population and because no alternative could be offered by rainfed agriculture in the project area. At appraisal, maximum yields were expected to be reached in a five-year period after project construction with exception of orchards, which were expected to reach full production in year 12. The cropping intensity was projected to be 136% at full development. Experience to date shows that these targets are likely to be achieved (except for forage crops, para. 5.3) since cropping intensity was averaging 128% in 1981, one to three years after the start of irrigation depending on the sector. VI. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT Coordination between Project Executing Agencies 6.01 The present project is an example of a project for which good coordination was important for overall success of both infrastructure and social components since as many as five public bodies of four different ministries were supposed to be directly involved in project execution: - ORMVASM of Ministry of Agriculture for the construction, O&M of the irrigation works, and for agriculture development; - ONE and DRE of Ministry of Public Works for the construction of connecting power lines and for supervision of construction of tubewells; - Ministry of Urbanization, Environment, Housing and Tourism for the construction of village infrastructure, including schools and health centers; - Ministry of the Interior for the final selection of beneficiaries of land under Agrarian Reform Law. 6.02 A Project Coordination Committee, chaired by the Governor of the Province of Agadir and including local representatives of these agencies, was established before loan effectiveness with the primary responsibility for ensuring adequate coordination between participants. It was agreed that this Committee would meet not less than once every three months. In practice, the committee was reportedly convened only three times during early project implementation and was inactive later on when the project started to face issues needing immediate intervention. The committee could have taken action to ensure a more rapid implementation of works, prompt solutions for village infrastructure problems (paras. 4.11-4.13), quicker response of local authorities in selecting beneficiaries of Agrarian Reform plots and for helping ORMVASM in controling pumping from the Souss valley aquifer. - 19 - Organization for Project Implementation 6.03 As expected at appraisal, ORMVASM was made the primary executing agency with responsibility for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation schemes and for agricultural development. ORMVASM was restructured and strengthened satisfactorily as suggested at appraisal. ORMVASM set up and staffed, promptly after the start of the project, subregiqnal headquarters in Taroudant and three local development centers (CMVs)17. It is worth noting that, contrary to organization of field offices in other Regional Irrigation Authorities elsewhere in Morocco, the subregional office established under the project has not only responsibility for construction but also for operation and maintenance of the systems and agricultural development. The head of this office reports directly to ORMVASM Director and receives technical support from the various central offices. Consultants assisted the Office in detailed design, procurement and installation and commissioning of electromechanical equipment. No consultants were provided for technical assistance in other works. 6.04 ORMVASM's performance in managing the project was rather mixed. The most striking positive factors in the organization's success were (i) the successful completion of the complex program of combined land distribution and land consolidation; (ii) continuity in senior management. Unlike many of the public departments and agencies in Morocco, the Office benefited from having the same Director since the initiation of the project in 1975; (iii) quick build-up of capable engineering staff, at the higher level of responsibilities; (iv) the great success in establishing, managing and promoting fourteen cooperatives; and (v) the successful introduction of new technological packages for cultivating major crops. 6.05 However, ORMVASM and MARA were somewhat slow and deficient in carrying out the project detailed studies. ORMVASM could have been more successful in helping resolve some issues that the project faced during its implementation, mainly for allocation of the Agrarian Reform plots, in selecting candidates for the plots, in replacing the beneficiaries who abandoned their plots, in finding the new formula for establishing rural centers around the cooperative centers, and in analyzing and resolving problems created by the corrosion of irrigation pipes (para. 6.12). In addition, ORMVASM sometimes failed to comply with the loan conditions regarding procurement. Bidding documents and evaluation reports were nat always sent to the Bank on time for prior ieview and ORMVASM repeatedly tried to press the Bank to accept LCB for contracts which were supposed to go ICB, according to the Loan Agreement. Finally, the significant efforts which were made by the Office to help develop cooperatives resulted, to some extent, in the neglect of the monitoring and the development of agricultural production of the private farmers, in particular Lhose located in the traditional areas. 6.06 Except for the National Power Company (ONE), which adequately performed electrical line works and Directorate of Water Resources (DRE), which played an essential role in supervising contractors' works for tubewell drilling, the other project executing agencies were totally deficient in 1/ CMV - Centre de Mise en Valeur - 20 - taking responsibility for their respective tasks. All permanent attempts by bank supervision missions to convince Ministry of Urbanization, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education officials to start design and construction of infrastructure in new project villages failed and no schools or health centers were built as foreseen at appraisal. Operation and MainLenance 6.07 Although highly qualified staff was assigned at the level of ORMVASM and project Headquarters, the O&M Division suffered from a shortage of capable staff at the field level and from a lack of budgetary funds to meet maintenance needs. 6.08 The irrigation system is well adapted to the requirements of large areas irrigated through tubevells. Depending on the nominal discharge capacity of individual tubewells, each sector is served by a pattern of one to four wells from which water is pumped into a common reservoir and is then repumped into the sector distribution systems. Nevertheless, 20 scattered pumping stations were necessary to irrigate the 9 modern project sectors. The large number of wells and pumping stations represent a real bottleneck for operation and future maintenance because of the lack of budget funds and incentives to attract qualified technical personnel to the field to operate all these facilities. In order to overcome these constraints, ORMVASM considered developing a rather sophisticated solution consisting of installing a network of telecontrol system which will feed data on the performance of pumps, equalizing reservoirs, hydraulic pressure in the pipe networks etc., to a control center at project headquaters. The execution of this program has been postponed because of lack of budget funds. A simpler and cheaper system of two-way radio for direct communication between the pumping stations, the CMVs and the project headquaters, would be sufficient to enable rapid information feedback and response to changing water supply and demand in the project area between 0&M staff. Such a system was esti.blished by ORMVAD and is working satisfactorily in the area of the Doukkala I project-1. 6.09 On-Farm Water Distribution. Operation of the system downstream of the hydrants allows water allocation by farmers themselves under ORMVASM guidelines without any operational interference by the Office, except in case of litigation. As foreseen at appraisal, farmers were given initial mobile sprinkler equipment and have been made responsible for its repair or replacement. Irrigation within the blocks is organized by farmers themselves who take turns in the use of mobile laterals (see layout in Annex 6). Contrary to the recommendations of the SAR, farmers have not been organized in water users' associations although farmers of each block selected among themselves a representative to whom ORMVASM formally delivered the mobile equipment to be used by all the block members. 6.10 The system was designed so that water can be automatically distributed to farmers on a demand basis. All irrigation sectors were equipped with level sensing control devices enabling automatic "on demand" water supply according to the discharge and to pressure registered at the hydrant level. This technique, however, has been temporarily abandoned 1/ See PCR of Doukkala I Irrigation project dated June 4, 1982 - 21 - because: (i) adequate conservation of groundwater resources is sought by ORMASH which, instead, is delivering water on the basis of pre-established water rotation plans between farmers; and (ii) corrosion of hydrants and aluminum pipes resulted in the deterioration of the fixed-discharge devices in some hydrants and in inadequate functioning of pressure tanks. 6.11 ORMVASM is responsible for repair and maintenance of the irrigation, drainage and unclassified road systems. Farmers are responsible for repair and replacement of sprinkler mobile equipment. Budgetary allocations have been inadequate to meet the needs of proper maintenance, and ORMVASM had no choice but to focus on essential maintenance works. The allocation of adequate sums in the future and a better cost recovery policy will be key factors for protecting the project investment from deterioration. Maintenance of unclassified roads, which are essential for access of traders into the szattered project areas and transportation of project outputs, needs to be given more attention by ORMVASM, in the future. The maintenance of unclassified roads has been a serious problem all over Morocco because MARA has emphasized construction to the detriment of repair and maintenance which is often either non-existent or inadequate. 6.12 Maintenance problems were exacerbated by an unusual incident involving corrosion of part of the irrigation equipment, mainly the on-farm a-uminum pipes. A survey carried out by ORHVASM in 1981 showed that about 4% of the aluminium irrigation pipes as well as devices in the pressure tanks and hydrants had been damaged. While no additional precise information was given in the April 1982 ORMVASM Completion Report, damage has reportedly been more largely widespread since then, adversely affecting on-farm water use efficiency. At the request of the Bank, a chemical analysis of the irrigation water at different locations of the semi-mobile pipes (central feeder lines) and the mobile pipes (moving laterals) was undertaken. The analysis has not determined the exact origin of this phenomenon but concluded that the chemical composition of water must have contributed to the spread of corrosion..!/ In addition, the Bank many times urged ORMVASM to have a metallurgic composition of samples of corroded pipes analyzed by an independent laboratory. Corrosion may have resulted from a too high percentage of impurities in the aluminum alloy, creating electrolysis effects and corrosion under certain conditions. ORMVASM was somewhat slow in tackling this issue: no such a mineralogic analysis was reportedly carried out and a litigation is still ongoing between ORMVASM and the Supplier. 6.13 The 1976 contract for the supply and the placement of the aluminum pipes stipulates that the contractor should carry out whatever analysis necessary to assure that the supplied equipment will resist to any corrosion which could result from the quality of the irrigation water. The contractor did not perform any chemical or mineralogical analysis of the water or the pipes and is apparently responsible for these damages. 1/ According to the study, the pumped groundwater has a relatively high proportion of soluble calcium bicarbonate and a pH of about 7.3. Under reduced pressure, a carbonic gas is released resulting in a precipitation of calcium bicarbonate and thus in an increase of the pH (up to 8.3 for the water stagnating in the semi-mobile pipes where corrosion has been noticed to be the highest). Such a high pH can cause corrosion if certain impurities are present in the aluminum. - 22 - Farmers' Service Cooperatives 6.14 The establishment of successful service cooperatives was undoubtedly one of the major achievements of OR14VASM in implementing the project. Fourteen Government-sponsored service cooperatives grouping 860 collective land rightholders and state land beneficiaries were established. Each cooperative includes a reasonable number of members (ranging from 8 to 105 members each and averaging 60). Cooperatives were equipped under the project with offices, workshops and warehouses. They are being closely managed by ORMVASK, which assigned technical agents for most of the cooperatives (one for administrative and financial management and one for technical assistance). The development of these cooperatives has been rapid and successful. They have built up effective farm machinery services (28 tractors, 3 combines and about 130 farm accessory units were purchased through credit by 1981). Credit has also been borrowed for construction of stables, purchase of selected cows, plantations and crop inputs. The recovery rate of CNCA loans has reportedly been high and most of cooperatives have positive financial results. Monitoring of Water Resources 6.15 The provisions of the Loan Agreement regarding monitoring of wacer resources have been only partially enforced. The borrower was requested to: (i) carry out, before the start of irrigation, an inventory of surface water derivation and groundwater extraction in the Upper Souss Valley; (ii) limit the issuance of pumping permits to a cumulative maximum of ten million m3 per year; and (iii) give priority in issuing any new pumping permits to farmers undertaking rehabilitation of existing traditional irrigation systems. No exact inventory of surface and groundwater was carried out because it turned out to be extremely difficult to perform using conventional survey tools based on farmers' responses because of the very high number of wells (more than 13,000). However, the Water Resources Division (DRE) closely monitored the level of the Souss aquifer through a dense network of piezometers. In addition, a mathematical model analyzing data registered through these piezometers has demonstrated that aquifer levels are evolving as foreseen in the Souss Water Master Plan carried out in 1973. The groundwater table lowering has been between 5 m and 15 m, depending on locations. 6.16 In view of the enormous unplanned growth of private pumping in the valley over the past decade, however, a step has been made towards introducing controls to safeguard the aquifer and existing investments in the future. To do this, a government decree, issued in September 1981 provided for prior approval by ORMVASM and DRE of all new pumps exceeding 40 m3/day capacity and defined the procedures for monitoring pumping. In addition, monitoring of new irrigation using satellite sensing is being introduced. Cost Recovery and Water Charges' Collection 6.17 Farmers are meant to participate in project costs through a volumetric water charge and a direct capital repayment, in accordance with the provision of 1969 Agricultural Investment Code. According to the Code, farmers' contribution is recovered through: (i) a volumetric water charge covering the cost of operation and maintenance and the amortization of the irrigation networks external to the farm; (ii) a supplementary water charge covering the energy cost of energy where it is done; and (iii) a fixed land - 23 - betterment levy of DR 1,500 per ha implicitly covering the other irrigation investments up to 40% of the actual capital costs, and applied with an exemption for the first five ha of holdings not exceeding 20 ha. 6.18 The Loan Agreement requires prompt billing and collection of water charges and provides for a periodic review of the basic wat(r charge and the supplementary pumping charge with the objective to recover from such charges and from the betterment levy, all actual operation and maintenance costs and a reasonable portion of the actual capital cost, taking into account the beneficiaries incentives and capacity to pay (see para. 6.16 of the Doukkala I PCR). 6.19 The basic water charge of 0.029 DR/m:3 established in 1968 was doubled to 0.058 DR/m3 in September 1980 and was planned to be applied gradually over a three-year period. The new rate will thus be fully due in 1983. Although no pumping charge has been provided by current legislation covering for the project perimeter, ORMVASM took the initiative to levy, in the Souss area, the same pumping charge of 0.05 DR/m3 which was decreed for the adjacent perimeter of Massa. Given the substantial increase in electricity prices (0.125 DR/kwh appraisal to 0.375 DH/kwh in 1982) and the requirements of the scattered project systems for O&M, these charges have turned out to be insufficient to cover 0& expenditures. On the basis of actual data, O&M costs were estimated in 1980 at 0.24 DR/=3, representing 222% of total current water charges. Power costs represent 83% of total expenditure (0.20 DR/m3). To safeguard its investments, the Government should encourage ORMVASM to manage the new systems by enforcing the Investment Code provisions which provide for a full recovery of energy costs from farmers. 6.20 Recent information regarding amounts invoiced and actually paid indicates that the recovery rate of water charges has been satisfactory; it was 97% in 1979 and 82% in 1980. ORMVASM can be commended for this good performance since ORMVASM has fewer persuasive means than other similar offices to pressure farmers to pay their annual invoices. In most Office areas in Morocco, water charges are deducted from contractual industrial crops' revenues prior to the payment to farmers. Since no industrial crops are cultivated in the project area and since water is paid annually after it is used, the achieved collection rate of water charges in the project area can be considered as very satisfactory. 6.21 The land betterment levy was to be due in 1982 for the first irrigated sectors since a grace period of three years is allowed by the Code before it is levied. Given the predoninance of small farms of less than 5 ha and the exemptions provided by the Investment Code (para. 6.17), only 1,225 ha 1/ (or 20% of the project area) -Irc liable for the payment of the land betterment levy. On the basis of the current level of the betterment levy (1,500 DR/ha), applied with the exemption specified in the Investment Code, the total recovery of capital costs will be about 1% of total capital costs. As mentioned above, current level of water charges represent about 45% of actual operation, maintenane and energy costs. The cost recovery levels 1/ This is relz'ted t-o the modern sector, since no farm distribution data was given in the tZMVASM completion report for the traditional sector. - 24 - currently being achieved are in default of Section 4.09 of the Loan Agreement which requires for recovery from the beneficiaries of 10OZ of O&M and a reasonable portion of the actual capital costs. Extension, Input Supply and Services 6.22 ORMVASM staff was particularly dynamic in providing effective assistance to farmers. This assistance had two characteristics; first, it was focussed on supply of input and services and second, it was provided mainly to cooperative members to the detriment of private farmers, in particular those of the traditional sectors. ORMVASM helps cooperatives in obtaining credit from CNCA and in procuring all inputs and farm machinery services. Since cooperatives are managed by ORMVASM, the type and the quantity of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides and the period of their application are pre-determined by the Office staff. In addition, as provided by the Investment Code, ORMVASM is responsible for enforcing a specific crop rotation scheme for farms. This scheme is shown in Annex 7. The Office staff determine inputs and services according to the crops included in the rotation plan and closely supervise actual rotation of crops at the farm level. Supervision of crop rotation is greatly facilitated by the subdivision of the consolidated land according to the "trame B" layout (para. 6.09). ORMVASM was also responsible for supervising special program such as planting olive trees in the cooperative common land, introducing pure-bred in-calf heifers, and purchasing farm machinery equipment for cooperatives. On one hand, all these services undoubtedly contributed to the excellent start of agricultural development occured in the project area but on the other hand, they required large staffing and high recurrent costs which increased ORWASM's financial dependency on Government subsidies. It was expected at appraisal that farmers would be prepared to take over the management of their cooperatives within a period of three to five years. This is unlikely to take place so soon. However, ORMVASM's work load should be progressively lightened by encouraging farmers towards more self-discipline and awareness of new technology. Consultants 6.23 Consultants provided valuable assistance to ORMVASM in carrying out engineering design and assisting in preparation of tender documents, supervising of works and assisting in start-up of electromechanical equipment. In view of the problems encountered in the operation of pumping stations and distribution systems caused by corrosion, contracts with these consultants were extended by ORMVASM although not financed under the project. The employment of other consultants specialized in civil engineering and irrigation would have helped speed up preparation of final studies, and possibly reduce the delay experienced in the project implementation. Audit 6.24 The Loan Agreement provided that: i) ORMVASM'a yearly accounts and financial statements be audited by independent auditors acceptable to the Bank; and (ii) OEWASM furnish to the Bank certified copies of the audited financial statements and the auditors' reports. The Bank was given the 1979 and 1980 financial statements for ORMVASM and the project's accounts, certified by the accounting officer. The officer has his office in ORMVASM, reviews the contracts, makes all ORMVASM payments, and keeps ORMVASM's - 25 - accounts. He reports to the Ministry of Finance on ORMVASM comitments and expenditures and overall execution of the offices capital and current accounts budgets. The establishment and the certification of such accounts by the accounting officer was considered by the Bank as a satisfactory procedure as far as it went; however, since these accounts were not then audited by a senior Finai.ce Ministry Official, the Borrower was in default with the Loan Agreement's provisions on audit. Bank Performance 6.25 This was the Bank's second major irrigation project in Morocco, following the FY69 Sebou I irrigation project (the FY65 Sidi Slimane project was a rehabilitation project of local importance). It was also one of the most sophisticated irrigation projects ever implemented in Morocco since (i) its infrastructure components involved the construction of numerous, scattered deep wells from where water is pumped and then delivered into high pressure sprinkler distribution systems; and (ii) its social components included combined land consolidation of private freehold and allotment and distribution of state-owned and collective land. Although studies were only at the feasibility level, the Bank appraisal team was able to put together a coherent and a technically viable project. Actual construction achievement was close to the proposals made at appraisal and only minor changes in the project design were made during implementation. 6.26 The Bank has enjoyed excellent cooperation and succeeded in establishing a constructive dialogue with the project authority. In addition, project implementation was monitored closely by the Bank which fielded about 12 supervision missions in the six and a half years implementation period. Two supervision missions were fielded each year since project appraisal. The staff involved were of senior-level, encompassing a full range of expertise including one irrigation engineer, one rural engineer, one agronomist and one economist (see Basic Data Sheet, page ii). The project Bank's administration file shows that the Bank took necessary steps to assist the borrower each time an issue was raised during implementation. This was particularly the case when corrosion of the irrigation aluminum pipes appeared (para. 6.12): the Bank helped ORMVASM and MARA diagnosing the corrosion phenomenon and repeatedly urged them to speed up carrying out the chemical and mineralogical analyses of the corroded pipes. 6.27 The appraisal assumptions regarding project cropping pattern can now, in retrospect be seen to have been too conservative in two ways: (i) vegetables were not included in the cropping pattern full development target but have proven to be important crops; and (ii) yield estimate for most crops (para. 7.3). In 1981, vegetables were grown on about 20% of the area put under irrigation and actual yields closely approached the "with project" yields assumed at appraisal. VII. ECONOMIC EVALUATION 7.01 Production. The SAR assumed that without the project, production would continue to be limited (i) in the sectors where irrigation were introduced, to dry-land cultivation of barley, pulses and olives and production of milk and meat based on grazing, all at low and stagnant levels of yields and outputs; and (ii) in the irrigated sectors which were - 26 - rehabilitated, to irrigated cultivation of wheat, maize, pulses, alfalfa, and fruit trees and production of milk and meat based partly on grazing and partly on the use of irrigated forage crops, all at higher levels of yields and output than in the other sectors. 7.02 With the project, the SAR envisaged i) a production pattern based entirely on irrigation and including all the "without project" crops and animal products, save barley, plus the introduction of berseem; (ii) achievement of full production in 12 years for fruit trees, 5 years for annual crops and 6 years for livestock; (iii) a sharp increase in cropping intensity from 54% to 135%. The intensity before project is very low because of the existence of non-cropped land devoted to grazing; (iv) achievement of relatively high yields, including substantial increases for the "without project" crops. 7.03 By comparison with the SAR projections and on the basis of agricultural production achieved in 1980-81, the main changes that are now foreseen]! are: Ci) the introduction of vegetables which would cover almost the same proportion of the cropped area as in 1981 (20%); (ii) a light reduction in the proportion of cereals (80% instead of 89Z); (iii) the elimination of almond trees since olive and citrus are more adapted to the Souss condition than almond; (iv) the elimination of pulses which were already eliminated by farmers in all sectors as early as irrigation started; and (v) slightly higher yields for most crops. The new projections seem reasonable in view of the results achieved in 1981. Full development would be reached in 1986 for cereal and vegetable production and in 1993 for orchards, as expected at appraisal (five and twelve years, respectively, after project completion). However, full development for forage crops and livestock will be not achieved in 1986 (five year after project construction) but more likely in 1989. 7.04 As a result of the new assumptions, overall production at.full development is now envisaged to be greater than foreseen at appraisal. The following table compares production "without the project" and at full development under the SAR and PCR projections. Projections of area, yields and production are given in Annex 5. 1/ These revisions were made by the Bank during the preparation of the present report. - 27 - Product ion in Toes Total --------- -------- Incremental Without SAl Full PCR Full SAR - Full Dev. PCR - Full Dev. Full Dev. Project Development Develom.at Without Project Without Project PCR-SAR Crop Production Wheat 660 11,494 12,656 10.834 11,996 1,160 Maize 60 10,675 9,114 10,615 9,054 ( -1.561) Barley 2,112 - - (-2,112) (-2,112) - Pulses 220 1,168 - 948 E-220) (-728) Potato - - 7,225 - - 7,225 Carrots - - 1,"40 - - 1,'4O Watermelon - - 32.535 - - 32,535 melon - - 2,610 - - 2,610 Other Vegetable - - 5,427 - - 5,427 Alfalfa 5,400 56,250 60,760 50,850 55.360 4,510 Berseem - 19,950 23,160 19,950 23,160 3,210 Olives 196 1,980 2,169 1,784 1,973 189 Citrus 1,200 5.060 8,326 4,960 7,126 2,200 Almonds - 940 - 9,40 - (-940) Animal Production Milk 180 3,370 3,370 3,190 3,190 - Lamb Meat 70 3,820 3,820 3,120 3,120 - beef Meat 50 785 7,85 735 735 - Beifers (Units) - 460 4,60 460 460 - 7.05 Prices. Economic prices for the major internationally-traded inputs and outputs were derived from the Bank's projections of world market prices, with adjustments made for freight, handling and processing in Morocco. Non-traded inputs (including labor) and outputs have been valued at their market and farmgate prices adjusted by the appropriate conversion factors.. Project Costs 7.06 The total economic cost of the project in 1982 prices was approximately DR 151.7 million. Actual expenditures have been adjusted by local and international inflation factors to update them to 1982 and taxes have been deducted. Annual 0&M (excluding energy) costs are expected to reach some DH 750/ha at full development, in 1982 prices. Energy costs are expected to reach some DR 1,200/ha in 1982 prices. The replacement costs of initial investment items were calculated on the basis of the same useful life for each major category as was adopted in the SAR. These periods are considered reasonable. The economic cost of labor has been shadow priced at 0.53 for unskilled labor, and 0.71 for skilled labor. Economic Rate of Return 7.07 On the basis of the project costs and benefits discussed above, and a period of 40 years, the economic rate of return of the project is 14.0% (compared with 10.2% at appraisal). The main reasons for the improved rate of return may be recapitulated as (i) higher yields in agriculture production per ha; (ii) introduction of vegetable crops (not foreseen at appraisal) which generate higher returns than the other crops; and (iii) high annual increase rates of production during the early years following the start of irrigation. - 28 - Farm Incomes 7.08 The SAR included two farm modelet one for a typical 5 ha farm in the modern sector and one for a typical 2 ha farm in the traditional sector. During project implementation, it became clear that (i) these two models are indeed representative of most farms in the two sectors. They have been maintained for the PCR farm income analysis; (ii) the PCR includes a third farm model for a farm of 25 ha in the modern sector to reflect more realistically the actual land tenure situation ; (iii) contrary to the SAR assumptions, vegetables have been included in the cropping pattern of all farms and pulses have been excluded; and (iv) it has been considered that livestock development would be based on dairy production of pure-bred cattle in the large farm (25 ha) and on mixed production for meat and milk of crose-bred cattle, the lamb meat production being developed in all farms. 7.09 The table below ahows the estimated financial return expected for each farm model, before and after taxes. The SAR figures for the "without project" case and for full development have been adjusted upward by 91% to allow for domestic inflation between 1975 and 1982 and permit a rough approximate comparison with the PCR models. The table shows that (i) for farm models of 2 ha and 5 ha, the SAR net income projections at full production are about 4 and 9 times higher than the estimated "without project net incomes"; (ii) for these same farm models, PCR projections are about 140% above those of the SAR. This is due to the introduction of vegetables in the cropping pattern; iii) net income per hectare at full development, projected by the PCR is highest (US$1,594/ha) for the 2 ha model and lowest (US$1,069) for the 25 ha model; (iv) the net income per capita at full development projected by the PCR, measured in dollar equivalent., ranges from US$532, a low middle-income level (for the small farm) to US$4,453, a clearly upper-income level (for the larger farm) which is about 7 times the "without project" level; and (v) all net incomes at full development as projected by PCR exceed the Bank's 1982 absolute rural poverty level for Morocco of US$238 per capita. By contrast, per capita income in the "without project" case is only US$152 for the 2 ha model and $30 for the 5 ha model. As noted in the discussion of project benefits, the main.sources of the improvement projected by the PCR over SAR estimates are the introduction of vegetables, the upward revision in expected yields of most crops, and the introduction of dairy production through pure-bred cattle. The PCR farm models are presented in Annex 8. - 29 - Net Cash Return to Farm Models (DR of 1982) 2 ha 5 ha 25 ha Return Before Taxes -Without Project 5,489 4,668 23,720 -SAR Full Development 13,996 29,041 - -PCR Full Development 19,120 41,986 160,318 Return After Taxes -Without Project 5,489 4,668 22,220 -SAR Full Development 13,597 28,088 - -PCR Full Development 18,830 41,304 153,140 -SAR Full Dev. as % of "Without Project" 248% 602% - -PCR Full Dev. as % of "Without Project" 343% 885% 689% -PCR Full Dev. as Z of SAR Full Dev. 138% 147% - Return Before Taxes (US$ of 1982)/a -Without Project 916 778 3,953 -SAR Full Development 2,333 4,840 - -PCR Full Development 3,187 6,983 26,720 -PCR Full Development Per Capita 532 1,164 4,453 -PCR Full Development Per Hectare 1,594 1,397 1,069 /a US$1.00 - 6.00 /b 6 persons per farm unit family. S. Darghouth:mp KINGFMIN 0F iiR0CCI soUBS OIOUNDWATER 9#0JECT PRdkIKCT 0MPI.ATION RE'ORT Implementation Schedule 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 l980 1981 1982 I. Finai Design, SpecificaiìUna, Tenders ------------------- 2. I.aI4 Consoli daton and Topography ------------- 3. iasd Preparat isin, Roada, Uraina ------------------------------ 4. Tubowell Drilling ------------------------- 5l lindergr i e Ntwrk ----------------------- 6. P4Mping stastinn --------------------------- 7. Hnhile SprinkI.r lesipaannt ------ 8. S'iitatin ------------------------------- 9. Hetievisicess dend IkIveo1snt Centere ------------------ 0.Milk coltretiicn Coentet,a ----------- i. Village le eNt rt-etnir -••------------------------- Il. Farm v luI C ie Parihae ---------------------------------------- S en---------------------------------- - 31 - Annex 2 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Project Work Implementation in Quantities PROJECT COMPONENTS Unit At Appraisal Actual I. IRRIGATION WORKS A. Irrigation Works .Land Consolidation and Distribution ha 6,300 6,123 .Private Land ha 2,450 1,924 .State Land ha 2,400 1,842 .Collective Land ha 1,450 2,357 - Land Clearing and Levelling ha 6,300 5,650 - Tubewells u 73 65 - Pipe Distribution System km 116 141 - Repumping Stations u 0 20 - Pumping Stations (for Tradit. Perimeters) u 2 2 - Drainage Ditches km 36 34 - Access Roads km 148 119 - Windbreaks km 788. - - Canals for Traditional Perimeters km 10 14 B. Equipment - Tubewells u 73 65 - Repumping Stations u 0 20 - Pumping Stations for traditional Perimeters u 2 2 - Mobile Irrigation Equipment U 442 430 - Sprinklers u 14,544 14,256 - Hydrants n 404 462 C. Power Lines km 80 104 II. ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE - Project Headquarters u 1 1 - Development Centers U 3 3 - Training Center (CRAFA) u 1 1 - Farm Tractors u - 4 - Vehicles u - 12 - Milk Collection Centers u 7 7 III. VILLAGE INFRASTRUTURE - New Village Centers u 11 14 - Village Rehabilitation u 9 0 - Cooperative Centers u 20 14 * 32 - Annex 3 KINGDOK OF MOROCCO S0USS GROUNDWATER IRRIGATZON PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETEON REPORT Appraisal and Final Cost Estimates /a Actual as Aprisae stimates Actual Z of Appraisal LocaL Foreiga s Local Foreign Total Estimates -- US$ '0 --- - US$ 000 1. Irrigation Network A. Civil Works Land Consolidation and Topography 379 0 379 393 0 393 104 Land Preparation (clearing and levelling) 653 653 1,306 2.290 2.290 4.530 351 Tubewells 1,018 1,297 2,315 1,259 1,603 2,862 124 Underground Pipe Network 1,865 1,004 2,869 4,769 2.578 7.367 257 Pumping Stations 126 68 194 2,590 1,374 3,964 2,043 Open Drains 196 197 393 1,528 1,528 3.056 778 Roads and Windbreaks 500 500 1.000 373 372 745 75 Canals for Traditional Sectors - - - 524 43 1.267 - 3. Equipment Zlectro-mechanical Equipment 1,500 3,500 5,000 2,672 6,236 6,908 176 Mobile Sprinkler Equipment (10 spares) 571 1,333 1,904 1,166 2,721 3,87 204 C. Power Supply 22 W Transmission Lines and Substations 720 1.080 1.800 1.418 2.127 I.M45 297 Subtotal Irrigation Network 7,529 9,633 17,161 19,301 21,272 40,574 236 2. Agricultural Management Subdivision and Development Centers 933 502 1,435 879 474 1,353 94 Farm Machinery 199 465 664 7 15 22 3 orkshop 25 64 92 202 470 672 730 Vehicles 31 72 103 31 73 104 101 Milk Collection Centers - - - 76 176 252 - Subtotal Agricultural Management 1,191 1,104 2,295 1,195 1,208 2,403 205 3. Village Infrastructure Roads 267 267 534 - - - Water Supply 354 190 544 194 105 299 56 Electricity Supply 305 458 763 - - - - Community Centers 481 259 740 705 381 1,059 243 Schools (including teachers' houses) 602 258 860 - - - - Health Centers 115 115 230 - - - - Subtotal Village infrastructure 2,123 1,547 3.670 902 486 1,368 38 4. Farm De.elopment 2.015 0 2,015 - - - - 5. Administration and Consultants ORNVASN (Design, Supervision, Training) 859 0 859 - - - * Consultants 49 139 188 41 116 157 84 Subtotal Administration and Consultants 908 139 1,047 41 116 157 15 Total Basic Cost 13,765 12,422 26,187 21,434 23,008 44,522 170 6. Continencies Physical Contingencies 1,633 1,506 3,139 - - - - Price Contingencies 5,094 - - Total Contingencies 6,727 6,085 12,812 - - - - GRAND TOTAL COST 70j500 l8.LM0 39,000 21 434 23.008 44L522 214 /a Discrepancies due to rounding - 33 - Annex 4 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Accumulated Disbursements Accumulated Disbursement Bank FY and Quarter Actual Appraisal Actual as I Estimate of Appraisal -- US$ Million-- Estimate 1977 September 30, 1976 0 0.6 0 December 31, 1976 0 L.0 0 March 31, 1977 2.0 2.0 100 June 30, 1977 3.0 3.0 100 1978 September 30, 1977 3.8 4.0 95 December 31, 1977 5.3 5.0 106 March 31, 1978 6.5 6.5 100 June 30, 1978 6.5 8.0 81 1979 September 30, 1978 9.6 10.0 96 December 31, 1978 9.6 12.0 80 March 31, 1979 - 16.0 June 30, 1979 - 16.0 - 1980 September 30, 1979 12.1 18.0 67 December 31, 1979 - 18.5 - March 31, 1980 - - - June 30, 1980, (closing date) 14.3 18.5 77 estimated at appraisal) 1981 September 30, 1980 - - - December 31, 1980. March 31, 1981 - - - June 30, 1981 17.8 18.5 96 1982 September 30, 1981 18.5 18.5 100 December 31, 1981 - - - March 31, 1982 June 30, 1982 (1905E) Ase: 5 KINGDON Or MOOCCO PROJECT COWLSTION REfORT SOUSS aRU1MATER IRRIGATION PRoJECT Land Use, Yields and Production Without Project 1978-79 1979-0 1' Area Tield Production Area Yield Production Area Tield Prodectiow . tal twa) 7t= wa-yT! Tx) (t) Cho T1T TEND - TE CEREALS Wheat 550 - 1.2 660 665 44 31 20,210 1.561 46 24 37,692 malse 50 - 1.2 60 422 28 '20 .349 1.320 39 is 23,391 Barley 2,640 - 0.8 2.112 12 1 25 300 152 5 13 1,976 Subtotal 3 0.9 2 8 iW H 0 6380S9 PULSES 250 - 0.9 220 VECBTABLES . Potatoes - - - - 17 1 12 390 245 7 20 4,878 Carrots - - - - 68 4 17 1,140 56 2 10 560 Watermelon - - - - 3 2 38 1,245 216 6 34 7,432 Helon - - - - 76 5 31 2.364 61 2 17 540 Others - - - - 67 4 22 1,450 106 3 25 2.595 Subtotal - 26-1 T 6 5 =_E 20 23 1600, FORAGES Alfalfa 90 60 5,400 139 9 23 3,163 277 a 48 13.134 Bersim - - - - - - . Subtotal 90 0 .40 -9 Y3 31 2 7-7 3 U T FRUIT TREES Olives 220 0.9 196 - - - - 26 9 Citrus 100 12.0 1,200 - -- Almonds - - - Subtotal .20 1,29 TOTAL CROPPED ARSA 3,900 S1 - - 1,499 98 - - .,280 127 - AREA UNDER IRRIGATION 7,300 100 - - 1,522 100 - - 3,376 100 - CROPPING INTENSITY 51 - - - 98 - - / Data made available by ORWASIA is only related to the modern sectors KINGDOM OP HOROCCO 80USS GROUNDWATR tRR10IOOM PROJ9T PROJET COMPLETION REPORT Land Use. Ytelds and Production At Full Developmont At Pull ~nevetcpr4ont 1980-81 (ApPralsal Estimata) (Xotimated Actual) Area Yleld Productron Area Y&eld productton Area Yeld Produetton (h) (% T--) T)T (ha) (Z Ia) (t) (ha) (x) '(i"/) (t 1,764 50 3.2 57,191 3,870 53 3.0 11,494 3,616 50 3.5 12,656 1,463 41 3.5 50,079 2,590 36 4.1 10,675 2,170 30 4.2 9,114 347 10 45 15,709 - · - - 723 10 45 32,535 S- - - - - - - 145 2 .8 2,610 134 4 24 3,199 - - - 217 3 25 5,427 6T4 18 -35 21=711 - - - I 1446 To 4 49235 294 9 61 17,832 810 11 69 56,250 868 12 70 60,760 - - - 570 8 35 19,950 579 8 40 23,160 TI_ 9 i17832 ES . 76200 M4-7 -I E8 89 90 302 9 · - 660 9 3 1,980 723 LO 3 2,169 - - - - 220 3 23 5,060 362 5 23 8,326 - 470 6 2 940 - - - - 3n . 350 .. 6 7.980 l 98 11 0 4,467 127 . - 9,850 135 - - 9,764 135 - - 3,524 100 - - 7,300 100 - 7,233 100 - - 127 - 135 - 135 l 27 m270 370 210 I t- . -- SUGV% 1117 2 i COTTON ___slo_ __ __ _ IImme %~%% %%%% %' %i * Vw,. - 37 - Annex 7 KINGDOX OF MDROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION PROJECT Cropping RotationLi (Gross Farm-Size - 5 ha) Net Area (ha) Cropping Cropping Crops/ Pattern Intensity 10/1 WINTER 3/31 SUMMER 930- Plots Year (Z) UP Alf a 0.39 0.39 (6) (8) Wh1eat 0.875 0.875 (13.25) (18) (Wa getableelon 0.875 0.875 (13.25) (18) Potatbes, etc.) whiat 0.875 1.75 (13.25X2) (36) JJGrain Maize Berseem . Forage 0.875 1.75 (13.25X2) (36) Orchard (Ol3ve, Citrus...) 0.97 0.97 (14.5) (20) TOTAL: 4.86 6.61 (100%) (136%) /1 As advised to farmers by ORMVASM extension service. Land under preparation for the following crop. 。：..．』．.．鐵노 IORD11381(PPA) NOVEMBER1W TO MARRAICECH INGOULT ULOLIZ KINGDOM OF MOROCCO SOUSS GROUNDWATER PROJECT Doukkala Sub-Project Rehabilirored Tfaditionol Arecs Irrigation Development Areas Volley Boundory Dry Strearns IDA OU KA15 Wash Deposits -RSS01 Paved Mcen Roods and Route Numbers Pöved Secondory Roods Bridges N -------- Greve] Roads Urban Aggårnerorions 0 Vi I loges MOUNTAINS _ Conrours in Meters 0 4 8 12 16 20 KILOMETERS 1 0 ~ÅKECH Pm IPPAY ~p 4 b~ ffl faRD 11361. J--¥ 1975. om¥ ?h. O-u~ h» ~ c~ to r~ Ow 7~ W~a~ P 32 Robot OULED BERRML f~ 5~0 MOROCCO ------- .4 rLAIWTIr ea of MOD 0 conory Islands F mM LCG E R l A N MOUNTAINS M A L l 24 32 40 ts MAURITANIA