Somalia - Fourth Highway Project

Document of LE The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. P-3452-SO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT IN AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO US$23 MILLION TO THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC FOR A FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT January 26, 1983 TIis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performnce of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Somali Shilling (So.Sh.) So.Sh. 1.00 = US$ 0.0656 US$1.00 So.Sh. 15.2271/ WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 meter (m) 3.28 feet (ft.) 1 kilometer (km.) = 0.62 miles (mi.) 1 square kilometer (km2)= 0.386 square miles (sq. mi.) 1 metric ton (ton) = 2,204 pounds (lbs.) ABBREVIATIONS AF - Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development AfDF - African Development Fund CED - Civil Engineering Department ERR - Economic Rate of Return FED - European Development Fund FYDP - Five Year Development Plan GDP - Gross Domestic Product IDB - Islamic Development Bank IMF - International Monetary Fund MMTP - Ministry of Marine Transport and Ports MNP - Ministry of National Planning MPW - Ministry of Public Works MT - Ministry of Transport NTA - National Transport Agency OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries SA - Somali Airlines SNU - Somali National University SSAL - Somali Shipping Agency and Line TYDP - Three Year Development Plan UNDP - United Nations Development Program GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 1/ Since July 1, 1982.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S O M A L I A PROPOSED FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDIT AND PROJECT SUMMARY Borrower: Somali Democratic Republic Beneficiary: Civil Engineering Department (CED) under the Ministry of Public Works Amount: SDR 21.4 million (US$ 23.0 million equivalent) Terms: Standard Project Description: The project would consist of: (a) strengthening and improving the Afgoi-Baidoa road (216 km.), and related supervision; (b) consultants services for a countrywide road maintenance study and technical assistance to CED; and (c) urgent road maintenance works. Project Benefits and Risks: The Project would reduce transport costs on a major artery in south-central Somalia, the Afgoi-Baidoa road, which connects Mogadishu--principal port and capital city--with Baidoa, the administrative capital of the Bay Region which has a vast agricultural potential. It would also protect past capital investments by extending the road's service life. In addition, the Project would assist the Borrower in improving its road maintenance planning, organization and operations. Recruitment and retention of sufficient and qualified local staff is, however, a problem in Somalia and poses a risk to the institution building objective of the project. This risk is mitigated by the technical assistance component included in the project, which would help identify possible sources for recruiting additional staff, draw up and implement training programs, and design incentives for retention of staff. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Cost Estimates: US$ Million Local Foreign Total 1. Strengthening and improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa Road 5.04 24.63 29.67 2. Supervision of (1) 0.12 1.08 1.20 3. Road Maintenance Study 0.04 0.36 0.40 4. Technical Assistance to CED 0.14 1.24 1.38 5. Assistance for Urgent Road Maintenance Needs 0.05 0.45 0.50 Base Cost 5.39 27.76 33.15 6. Contingencies (a) Physical (10%) on items 1-4 0.53 2.73 3.26 (b) Pricel/ on items 1-4 2.71 4.68 7.39 Sub-total (6) 3.24 7.41 10.65 Total Project Cost 8.63 35.17 43.80 Total Project Cost Excl. Taxes 8.37 35.17 43.54 Financing Plan US $ Million Local Foreign Total IDA - 23.0 23.0 Arab Fund 4.1 12.2 16.3 Gove rnme nt 4.2 - 4.2 Total 8.3 35.2 43.5 Estimated Disbursements _ US $ Million FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 IDA FY Annual 2.3 3.2 8.0 8.0 1.5 Cumulative 2.3 5.5 13.5 21.5 23.0 Estimated Rate of Return: 17 percent Staff Appraisal Report: Report No. 3604-SO of January 6, 1983 Map: IBRD No. 15924R 1/ Expected price increases (%) 1983 1984 1985 1986 Local 25.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 Foreign 8.0 7.5 7.0 7.0  INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC FOR A FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT 1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed credit to the Somali Democratic Republic for SDR 21.4 million (US$23.0 million equivalent) on standard IDA terms to help finance a Fourth Highway project. Additional financing for the project will be obtained on concessionary terms from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in the amount of US$16.3 million equivalent. PART I - THE ECONOMY 2. A Memorandum on the Economy of Somalia (Report No. 3284-SO) was distributed to the Executive Directors in March 1981. The report of a mission which carried out an Agricultural Sector Review was distributed to the Executive Directors in June 1981. In April-May 1982 there was an economic updating mission whose report is under preparation; its findings are reflected below. 3. The Somali Democratic Republic gained independence in 1960 and the present Government came into power in 1969. Under a new constitution adopted in 1979, elections for a People's Assembly were held in December 1979. The Assembly appointed General Siad Barre as President in January 1980. The country is still affected by hostilities in the border area in the Ogaden. During 1980, intensified war activities in the Ogaden caused a large influx of refugees; by the end of 1980, there were over one million refugees in camps. At the end of September 1981, the number of refugees in camps was estimated at around 700,000. 4. Somalia is a large country with a 3,000 kilometer coastline; its varied topography includes a hot and arid coastal plain, rugged mountains and plateaus, and lowlands of varying fertility and rainfall. Only 13 percent of the land is said to be arable but, with water the limiting constraint, only a small fraction of this potentially-arable land is, in fact, cultivated. About 60 percent of the total population of approximately 4.6 million (not including refugees) are nomads and semi-nomads who depend on livestock for their livelihood; about 20 percent are farmers cultivating land along the Juba and Shebelli rivers and in the higher-rainfall Bay and North-west regions; the rest are engaged in non-agricultural occupations. The existence of several minerals has been confirmed, but their exploration is still in an early stage, and the commercial viability of production remains to be proved. In the absence of other known resources, Somalia-s prospects depend upon agricultural and livestock development, where progress will depend upon careful management of the scarce land and water resources.  5. Apart from the traditional export of livestock, commercial agriculture is centered mainly on the production and export of bananas (in which foreign concession holders are still important) and the production of sugar for the domestic market. Expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors is limited by the small size of the domestic market, poor infrastructure, and the shortage of capital and entrepreneural experience. Bank staff estimate that about 70 percent of the population live at or near the subsistence level (equivalent to about US$200-250 per family of five). Social services are still very inadequate. Per capita income, which was provisionally estimated at US$280 in 1981, has probably remained stagnant in real terms over the past six years. Development Strategy 6. Since the revolution in 1969, the Government has adhered to a program of "scientific socialism" whose stated objectives are egalitarianism and social justice, development through the public sector, nationalization of certain foreign enterprises, and the formation of cooperatives. The Government has maintained that there is scope for private initiative, and some privately financed projects have been implemented. But the main emphasis has been given to development of the public sector. Public ownership and management have expanded both through nationalizations and through the creation of new public enterprises. The parastatal sector now includes about 45 autonomous agencies which have eliminated private enterprises in wholesale trade and banking and which dominate manufacturing. The 1974-78 development plan and the 1979-81 development plan were essentially public investment programs that allowed for only a few small private ventures. Although the plans have provided a needed impetus to investment, they have not played a major role in the allocative process. Despite the Government's initial intentions, industry and infrastructure, especially transport and communications, have received more public investment than agriculture. At the same time, public enterprises have operated without firm Government control, owing largely to weak management and inadequate monitoring. While the current Five-Year Development Plan (1982-86) follows the pattern of previous plans, there are some indications that the Government has begun, particularly in the past year or so, to exhibit a greater tolerance of private sector commercial activity in the rural areas. 7. Somalia has made some progress in meeting certain basic needs. A program of literacy and primary education has had noticeable results, and an effective system of food distribution has been established. In other respects, however, the record in the social sectors has been less impressive, particularly in water supply, sanitation, and health, where services have frequently been biased in favor of the urban population. Moreover, there are indications that there has been a trend towards increasing income differentiation within the rural sector. 8. The Government's major development goals include self-sufficiency in foodgrains, the partial substitution of other agricultural imports (oils, sugar, cotton), and improvement of the lot of the traditional nomadic herdsmen through settlement programs and improvements in livestock production and marketing facilities. The current emphasis on irrigated agriculture is meant to make the country less dependent on its erratic  rainfall and to assure more stable and predictable increases in output. However, rainfed agriculture, which provides a livelihood for the largest number of farm families, is also being assisted. Improvements in livestock production and marketing are being promoted, together with projects aiming at the rangeland rehabilitation. The Government's industrial development policy places emphasis on the processing of domestic raw materials such as cotton, edible oils, milk and sugar, to substitute for imports. Past Performance and Main Issues 9. Available indicators on production suggest that between 1972 and 1980, real GDP increased by about 2.8 percent a year. In the face of a population growth rate of 2.4 percent, this led to a near stagnation in per capita income. In the commodity producing sectors, the growth was only one percent a year on average, while in the services sector it was 6.8 percent, reflecting to a large extent increased Government employment. Within the sectors, the annual growth was 2.7 percent in livestock, minus 3 percent in crop production, and minus 0.8 percent in industry. In 1981, however, good weather was the main factor accounting for a substantial increase in value added by the crop sector. 10. Crop production was particularly disappointing in the 1970s. The output of food and industrial crops stagnated between 1972 to 1980, and there was a severe drop in banana and sugar cane production. The decline in banana production is of particular concern because of the importance of banana exports as a generator of foreign exchange. A critical factor in the poor performance of the crop subsector was the Government's failure to provide adequate price incentives to producers. Other factors were: farmers' inadequate financial resources and limited access to productive inputs; the inadequacy of extension services; the lack of vital infrastructure; the inadequacy of public resources devoted to agriculture vis-a-vis other sectors; and institutional problems which stemmed from the poor performance and lack of coordination among the many Government and parastatal agencies involved in the sector. In the industrial sector, where agro-industries predominate, growth has been hampered by the low level of agricultural output as well as by the institutional problems besetting the public enterprises. 11. Although Somalia has pursued economic planning for well over a decade, the processes of economic planning and investment programming suffer from many weaknesses. The main weaknesses are: that plans have not been formulated in a macro-economic framework; that there has been no mechanism for rigorously assessing resource availabilities; that there is no explicit linkage between the annual budgets and the development plan.; that plans have not set forth well-defined strategies or policies to achieve the stated objectives; and that the monitoring of plan implementation is inadequate. The 1974-78 and 1979-81 development plans both faced difficulties in implementation owing to Somalia's low absorptive capacity and severe domestic resource constraints. Foreign aid financed 67 percent of the total expenditure under the 1979-81 Plan, as compared to 54 percent for the 1974-78 Plan. 12. About 60,000 Somalis have migrated to work in neighboring oil-exporting countries in the Gulf Area. As labor migration has been  - 4 - neither organized nor controlled by the Government, it has led to a severe depletion of Somalia's already small stock of qualified and skilled manpower, thereby weakening institutions and reducing the country's absorptive capacity. The savings of these emigrants are potentially an important resource for the economy, but despite recent adjustment of the exchange rate, only a small proportion of emigrants' savings are remitted, largely through unofficial channels. 13. Until 1977, budgetary policies remained generally conservative insofar as the Government's current revenues exceeded its current expenditures and the Government was in fact maintaining a net credit position with the Central Bank. Following the border conflict of 1977/78, however, there was a great surge in Government expenditures which resulted in large deficits in both the current and overall budgetary balances. During 1978-80, the Government's financial situation deteriorated rapidly, mainly because of the sizeable expansion in expenditures consequent upon the border conflict, the cost of maintaining large numbers of refugees, and the wage bill associated with the Government's policy of guaranteeing employment for secondary school leavers. At the same time, official foreign aid declined. As a result, the Government resorted to heavy borrowing from the banking system (such borrowing was equivalent to 10 percent of GDP in 1979). This, in turn, led to rapid inflation, from 10 percent in 1978 to 24 percent in 1979 and to 59 percent in 1980. Following demand management policies adopted by the Government under an IMF Stand-by Arrangement, the rate of inflation dropped to 44 percent in 1981 and is estimated at 27 percent in the first nine months of 1982. 14. Somalia's balance of payments is characterized by: a very narrow export base in which livestock and banana exports account for over 80 percent of total export earnings; a high share of external trade in GDP, with (recorded) exports in 1978 equivalent to about 10 percent and (recorded) imports equivalent to around 24 percent of GDP; a trade and exchange system characterized until recently by the Somali shilling's linkage to the dollar and by a parallel exchange rate applied to foreign exchange earned by workers abroad as well as by livestock traders who were allowed to under-invoice livestock exports. Somalia has for many years received a large volume of concessionary foreign aid (see para. 17). 15. Official data on Somalia's balance of payments are incomplete and provide a very deficient basis for meaningful analysis of trade and capital movements. It may nevertheless be concluded that Somalia had a reasonably comfortable overall balance of payments position up to the beginning of 1979, at which time its international reserves were equivalent to seven months of (recorded) merchandise imports. Since then, a sharp deterioration has set in. Available data indicate that export developments have in fact been most unfavorable since 1972. Although livestock production has recovered from the drought in 1974/75, recorded exports of live animals (which comprise 70 percent of total merchandise exports) have not yet recovered to pre-drought levels and, as noted above, the drop in banana production led to a decline in banana exports. Meanwhile, recorded imports rose sharply, from $206 million in 1977 to $462 million in 1980. Following restrictive demand management policies under the IMF Stand-by program, imports dropped to $323 million in 1981. However, in 1982,  - 5 - imports rose to an estimated $510 million; about 55 percent of these imports are estimated to be financed by external grants (including food aid for refugees) and loans. 16. Somalia enjoyed a considerable improvement in its terms of trade in the latter half of 1970s owing to high and rising prices for live animals in the Arab countries. However, the stagnation in exports and surge in imports since 1978 resulted in a widening of both current and overall balance of payments deficits. The current account deficits in the years 1979-81 averaged some $240 million, as compared to $110 million in the years 1977-78. Total international reserves, which rose steadily from $31 million in 1972 to $158 million in March 1979, dropped to $15 million at the end of December 1980, and have since declined to $10 million (about one week's imports). 17. The stagnation of export earnings and the low level of domestic savings have rendered Somalia increasingly dependent upon external assistance for the financing of development. After joining the Arab League in 1974, Somalia mounted a major effort to attract funds from the Arab petroleum exporting countries. The large inflows of external capital and transfers from 1975 onwards indicate that the effort has been successful. After 1977, the sources of foreign assistance shifted from the socialist countries (except for the People's Republic of China which maintains a large program) towards Arab bilateral and multilateral institutions and Western countries, several of which have had substantial assistance programs for a number of years. According to OECD data, Somalia's receipt of ODA during the period 1977-1980 averaged $300 million per year, equivalent to some $60 per capita per year. 18. Somalia's public external debt (outstanding and disbursed) as of December 1981 was $907 million, equivalent to eight times the level of recorded exports. Although a large share of the external debt is on fairly soft terms and the debt service ratio up to 1979 remained well below 10 percent, the debt service burden is expected to become much heavier in the near future. This is because in recent years the Government has contracted loans with short maturities; it has also accumulated debt service payments arrears which at the end of March 1982 were estimated at $63 million. The debt service ratio is projected to increase from about 20 percent in 1980 to about 37 percent by 1984. 19. In sum, Somalia experienced in the late 1970s and into the early 1980s a deep economic and financial crisis characterized by: stagnation in production and exports; a rapidly rising budget deficit financed through recourse to the banking system; rising inflation; a worsening balance of payments situation; a critical loss of foreign reserves; and a worsening external debt situation. This crisis reflects not only adverse developments in the international economy, but also past and current weaknesses in economic management. Recent Policy Changes 20. The Government has recently realized that corrective policy measures were needed to overcome this crisis. At the beginning of 1980, supported by an IMF Standby, the Government embarked upon a limited  - 6 - stabilization program which served to reduce slightly both total government expenditures and the budgetary deficit. That program lapsed when Somalia was unable to conform to the program's credit and debt ceilings. Beginning in early 1981, the Government began to take more substantial remedial action, and through the course of 1981 and 1982 it proceeded to implement two successive stabilization programs, both supported by IMF Stand-by Arrangements. 21. The core of these programs comprised measures to adjust the exchange rate, impose fiscal and monetary restraint, and to raise producer prices. The Government also decided to review the operations of the public enterprises; as part of this review three public agencies/enterprises were abolished. Policy measures introduced under the June 1981 Stand-by were: introduction of a dual exchange rate, which meant a substantial devaluation of the Somali shilling; a two-fold increase in the producer price for bananas; introduction of a new tax on livestock exports; cutbacks in Government expenditures; improvements in tax collection; and an upward adjustment of the interest rate structure. 22. Following the completion of the 1981/82 program, the Government adopted a new stabilization program in mid-1982, supported by the Fund with a SDR 60 million 18-month Stand-by Arrangement covering the period July 1982-December 1983. Under this arrangement, the exchange rate structure was unified, the Somali shilling was further devalued, and the Somali shilling became pegged to the SDR. The program also provided for the tightening of fiscal and monetary policies and for a further upward adjustment of interest rates. 23. These policy measures have already had some positive impact in terms of effecting Somalia's stabilization objectives and, to a lesser extent, in stimulating commodity production. However, these measures represent only a first stage in the formulation and implementation of a policy agenda which must be directed simultaneously at restoring financial equilibrium, rehabilitating and making fuller use of existing agricultural and industrial productive capacity, and thereby establishing the foundations of long-term growth. PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 24. Since 1965, IDA has made 23 credits totaling US$172.3 million, of which about 30% have been made for transportation development, including construction of three trunk roads and a new deepwater port and associated extensions in Mogadishu. IDA credits were also made for livestock development in FY74, for a development finance company project in FY77, and for education in FY71, FY75, FY78 and FY81. Lending for crop agriculture commenced in FY76 with two credits for a Drought Rehabilitation Project and a North-West Region Agricultural Development Project. Additional credits for Central Rangelands, Agricultural Extension and Training and Bay Region Development projects were approved in FY79 and FY80. Agricultural and livestock credits represent about 35% of total lending. Two credits for development of water supply in Mogadishu were approved in FY78 and FY82 and a technical assistance credit for project preparation in FY78. A credit for promotion of petroleum exploration was approved in FY80. IFC  made its first loan to Somalia in FY81. No Bank loan has been made to Somalia. Annex II contains a summary statement of IDA credits as of November 30, 1982 and notes on the execution of ongoing projects. 25. Performance of ongoing projects has been somewhat weak due mainly to shortage of qualified personnel. As the pace of development continues to rise, absorptive capacity constraints are becoming increasingly evident, especially in the field of agriculture where projects are rather complex and implementation experience is limited. Therefore, in preparing and appraising new projects, particularly close attention is being paid to implementation capacity and the adoption of measures to ease this constraint when necessary. Partially to address this problem, the Government has established a Project Implementation Unit in the Ministry of National Planning which has strengthened the capacity for project implementation by providing monitoring and logistical support to the projects, including assistance in procurement and recruitment of consultants. Difficulties encountered in project implementation are reflected in Somalia-s disbursement performance. The disbursement rate, i.e. actual disbursements during the year as a percentage of the undisbursed balance at the beginning of the year, has declined over recent years from 35.9 percent in FY77 to 16.3 percent in FY80, but has slightly improved in FY81 and FY82. The FY82 disbursement rate was 22.9 percent, as compared with a rate of 23.7 percent for Eastern Africa and 23.9 percent Bank-wide. This negative trend in disbursement performance has been brought to the attention of Government authorities, and efforts are being intensified to help improve it. 26. Somalia's statistical service lacks the capacity to fulfill the data needs of development programs. The Bank's operations have experienced difficulties in obtaining statistical data. We have therefore included funds for strengthening the Central Statistical Department in the Ministry of National Planning under the Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training Project (Credit 905-SO). 27. We plan to concentrate our future efforts on the country's directly productive sectors, agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and also on education and transportation. While agriculture and livestock offer potential for development, most rural development activities are only in the early stages. Moreover, agricultural development in Somalia is particularly difficult because most of the people in rural areas are nomadic. To increase our knowledge of agriculture in Somalia the Bank Group has recently made a comprehensive review of the sector (para. 2). In addition to these sectors, we plan to support the Government's industrial development efforts (and assist in the formulation of an industrial development policy) through our country economic and sector work and future industrial development finance projects. We also plan to continue assistance to the energy sector. PART III - THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 28. Somalia's transport system comprises about 21,600 km of roads (including about 9,600 km of primary and secondary roads), three principal ports and fifteen airfields, four of which have paved runways. There are  - 8 - no railways, pipelines or inland waterways. Road transport is by far the principal means of internal transport. Although the coverage of the road network is adequate for the country's present needs, the standards and condition of the roads are not satisfactory. 29. Three ports handle all of Somalia's ocean transport: Berbera in the north on the Gulf of Aden, and Mogadishu and Kismayo in the south on the Indian ocean. All of them have sheltered deep water facilities. Mogadishu is the main port, handling most of Somalia's export/import traffic (58% in 1981). The ports of Berbera and Kismayo are mainly for the export of livestock and bananas, respectively. A small port at Merca exported bananas in the past but has been virtually inactive since 1978 as a result of the diversion of banana traffic to the Mogadishu port after the latter was extended and improved in 1977. During the period 1975-80, traffic in the Mogadishu port increased at an annual rate of 14.6%, while that of the Berbera port grew at a moderate rate of 4% and that of the Kismayo port declined at about 4%. 30. Although most of Somalia's international trade is being handled by foreign vessels, about 8% is carried by the Somali Shipping Agency and Line (SSAL), an autonomous parastatal agency under the authority of the Ministry of Marine Transport and Ports (MMTP). In 1980, total freight transported by SSAL was about 105,000 tons, mostly exports of livestock and bananas to the Near East and Italy, respectively. Despite a coastline of about 3,000 km, one of the longest on the continent, coastal shipping has had a very limited significance mainly due to the lack of inter-regional trade suitable for such shipping. However, individual operators with small boats carry some passenger and freight traffic along the northern coast. 31. In view of long distances and inadequate land transport, civil aviation has good potential for development in Somalia. Between 1975 and 1979, internal passenger transport increased by 21% per year and freight by 28% per year, while international passenger traffic at Mogadishu airport increased 24% annually. Somali Airlines (SA) serves eight of the country's fifteen airfields with scheduled domestic flights; Mogadishu and Hargeisa have international airports and two other airports, Kismayo and Berbera, have paved runways. Transport Policy, Planning and Coordination 32. Although the Government has not prepared a long-term strategy for the development of the transport sector, investments realized in the past indicate that it had assigned a high priority to this sector. The Government's broad objectives in the transport sector as enunciated in the most recent development plans are to (i) open new areas for development in order to increase the productive capacity of the economy; (ii) foster economic integration of relatively isolated areas; and (iii) facilitate movement of goods within the country at low cost. Somalia's specific objectives for the road subsector include upgrading of primary and secondary roads, which are mainly earth and gravel to prevent serious traffic interruptions during the rainy season and to reduce vehicle operating costs. 33. Under the Five-Year Development Plan (1974-78), transport investments accounted for about 20% of total planned public investments, or  - 9 - So.Sh. 1,104.7 million (US$175.6 million). However, due to cost overruns caused by implementation delays and inflation, a number of projects were carried over to the following Three-Year Plan (1979-81). Roads and road transport accounted for 71% of the investments in the transport sector, ports and marine transport 26% and civil aviation 3%. The Government financed about 27% of the projects cost; external aid contributed the remaining 73%. In the Three-Year Development Plan (1979-81), about 25% of the total public investments were allocated to the sector, which is in line with the needs of a poorly developed transport infrastructure. 34. The Government of Somalia has recently completed the preparation of the 1982-86 Development Plan. According to the new Plan, out of So.Sh. 16,299 million (US$1,072 million) of planned investments for the whole economy, only 8.3% or So.Sh. 1,349 million is envisaged for the transport sector. This amount represents a substantial reduction of the sector's share from the previous plans and appears to be low for the sector-s needs. The road subsector's share amounts to 65% of the total investments in the sector while ports and civil aviation represent 25% and 10% respectively. 35. Four ministries are involved in the transport sector: (i) the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), through its Civil Engineering Department (CED), is responsible for planning, constructing, and maintaining roads and constructing ports and airports; (ii) the Ministry of Transport (MT) is responsible for road transport including vehicle registration and for civil aviation through its Civil Aviation Department; (III) the Ministry of Marine Transport and Ports (MMTP) is responsible for port operations and, through the Somali Shipping Agency and Line (SSAL), for marine transport; and (iv) the Ministry of National Planning (MNP) for general planning of the sector and for monitoring project implementation. Despite the dispersion of transport responsibilities among these four ministries, intermodal coordination is not a major issue. There is no railway nor are there any plans for one, and the limited coastal shipping is not likely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future to compete with road transport. The Highway Subsector 36. Network. Of the 21,600 km of roads in the country, 2,460 km are paved, 570 km are gravelled and the rest are earth roads and tracks. In terms of administrative classification, the lengths of primary, secondary and rural/feeder roads are about 4,300 km, 5,300 km and 12,000 km. respectively. The coverage of the network is adequate for the country's present needs but the standards and condition of the roads are not satisfactory. Low standard roads prevail, although there has been considerable road upgrading since 1971; the paved roads increased from about 900 km in 1971 to 2,460 km in 1981. 37. Vehicle Fleet. Available data on fleet composition, age and condition indicate that there were about 15,600 privately owned vehicles and a fleet of 2,900 government vehicles (excluding the military) in 1980, yielding a national total of about 18,500 motor vehicles. The composition of the vehicle fleet shows that pickups and vans constitute the largest category, 34%; passenger cars, 28%; medium and heavy trucks, 26%; and light  - 10 - trucks and taxis, 12%. There are no vehicle manufacturers in Somalia; Italy is the principal source of supply. 38. Traffic Growth. Reliable data on road traffic in Somalia are not available. Nevertheless, some indications of traffic growth could be obtained from data on fuel consumption. Between 1974 and 1979 average annual gasoline consumption increased by 12% and diesel fuel by 2.9%, nearly all consumed by motor vehicles. On the basis of the annual growth rate of fuel consumption, as well as the production of and demand for goods in Somalia and available data from occasional traffic counts, the average annual growth rate of traffic is estimated at about 5%. 39. Road Transport Industry. Freight transport is carried out by private truckers who own about 4,000 trucks, and by the National Transport Agency (NTA), a parastatal company established in 1978. Although the Government seems to encourage the growth of the industry, modest economic activity of the private sector, poor road conditions, shortage of spare parts and fuel, and seasonal demand for freight transport services render profitability low, thereby inhibiting growth of the industry. Although there are official tariffs, they are not always enforced, and most of transport services between transporters and customers are settled by mutual agreement. Commercial operations in the private sector are small-scale, comprising mainly single owner/operators with very few having more than five trucks. They provide almost all the transport services demanded by the private sector and partially cater to the needs of the public sector especially for services off the main trunk routes and for those which necessitate smaller and lighter vehicles. NTA, with a fleet of about 290 trucks, operates under the authority of the Ministry of Transport and primarily serves the Goverrnment-s needs. NTA handles about 25% of the country's freight transport demand, while the private sector handles the balance. Passenger transport is provided only by the private sector. Given the relatively high demand for passenger transport, especially in and around the larger towns, the operations are commercially viable. 40. Administration. The Civil Engineering Department (CED), under the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), is responsible for planning, building and maintaining all roads, and constructing ports and airports, which are maintained by other Government organizations. It has six divisions (Planning and Design, Construction, Maintenance, Materials Laboratory, Equipment and Administration) and sixteen regional road maintenance sections. The regional road maintenance sections, while receiving technical support from CED, operate under the administrative control of regional directors who report to MPW. CED has three main workshops at Hargeisa, Mogadishu and Kismayo, set up under the First Highway Project (Credit No. 74-SO) which handle major repairs for vehicles and equipment; regional workshops take care of minor repairs and routine servicing. 41. The shortage of qualified staff has adversely affected CED's operations. The technical assistance team financed by the Arab Fund under the ongoing Third Highway Project is assisting CED to alleviate staffing shortage and to provide on-the-job training to Somali technicians. However, training is generally hindered by the low level of skills. The technical assistance component included in the proposed project would help assess the manpower needs of the CED, identify sources for recruiting  - 11 - additional staff, and draw up and implement suitable training programs (para. 53). 42. Road User Revenue/Road Expenditures. Road users contribute to Government revenues through taxes and duties levied on fuel, lubricants, imported vehicles and spare parts, as well as vehicle registration and inspection fees and license fees. Tax on gasoline is one of the highest in Eastern Africa, and there are no subsidies of retail fuel prices. Over the period 1975-1979, annual revenues from fuel taxes and duties increased by over 7% and averaged nearly So.Sh. 130 million per year, while the Government's annual average contribution to road construction and maintenance was estimated at about So.Sh. 48 million for the same period. 43. Construction. Major road and bridge construction works are generally undertaken by foreign contractors and supervised by consultants. Contracts are let out on unit-price basis, following suitable prequalification and tendering procedures. Apart from a few small contractors capable of carrying out minor road or culvert works, no local highway construction industry exists in Somalia. CED itself carries out some rehabilitation/reconstruction works on roads. 44. Maintenance. Although CED is responsible for the maintenance of the road network, actual field operations are carried out under the administrative control of the regional directors. The quality and quantity of work performed by the regional organizations is unsatisfactory. Much of the road maintenance equipment is in need of repair, and there are no regular programs for routine maintenance. Staff shortages prevent CED headquarters from overseeing maintenance operations. The quality of all roads has deteriorated: paved roads have not been resealed and have developed potholes and surface cracks; maintenance of gravel/earth roads has been neglected and most gravel roads have reverted to dirt roads. The proposed project will help finance a countrywide road maintenance study to review the current situation and make recommendations for improving road maintenance planning, organization and operations (para. 53). Previous Bank Group Lending in the Highway Subsector 45. IDA support for the road subsector has had two major goals, namely, the completion of a basic system of trunk roads and building up of an effective institution for highway planning, design, construction and maintenance. The First Highway Project (Credit 74-SO of US$6.2 million in March 1965) cofinanced by IDA, the European Development Fund (FED) and UNDP comprised construction of the Afgoi-Baidoa Road (216 km), purchase of road maintenance and workshop equipment, construction of an office building and technical assistance to CED. In order to keep costs within available funds, Government, FED and IDA decided that the pavement be designed for a service life of seven years using staged construction. Bids received for road construction were US$2.8 million more than the appraisal estimate of US$8 million which led to a supplementary credit (Credit 123-SO) of US$2.3 million in June 1968. Road construction was completed in March 1971. Traffic on the road has been greater than what was estimated at appraisal, resulting in an economic rate of return of 13-15%. The Project Performance Audit Report (No. 2391, March 1, 1979) concluded that the project-s objectives have been largely achieved, namely the road has facilitated  - 12 - agricultural development In the project area and promoted social and economic cohesion. The road has, however, reached the end of its economic life and is in need of strengthening and improvement. 46. The Second Highway Project (Credit 295-SO of US$9.6 million in March 1972) was cofinanced by IDA and the African Development Bank, and included the construction of the Hargeisa-Berbera road (158 km), a feasibility study and detailed engineering for the Hargeisa-Borama road with a link to Tug Wajale, and technical assistance to update the 1966 Transport Study. Road construction was completed in May 1975. The Project Performance Audit Report (No. 2391, March 1, 1979) concluded that the project has achieved its objectives; the road has allowed the trucking of livestock, the major export commodity, from market to the port, and the 1978 Transport Survey, a component of the project, helped the Government prepare the road program under the 1979-1981 Development Plan. 47. The Third Highway Project (Credit 699-SO of US$7.0 million in June 1977), cofinanced by IDA, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AF), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Fund (AfDF), comprises the construction of the Hargeisa-Borama Road with a link to Tug Wajale (132 km), an extension of the paved road westward from Hargeisa to Berbera, a feasibility study and detailed engineering of the Dinsor-Bardere-Gelib road, and strengthening of the CED through provision of technical assistance, training and workshop equipment. Construction works on the road started in November 1978, but came to a standstill in August 1980 following an air raid in the project area. Only 56 km of road from Hargeisa had been completed. At the contractor-s request, the Government terminated his contract as of December 27, 1980. The Government has proposed inviting bids from other contractors (local or foreign) operating in Somalia to complete the road. Since the road has been completed to a point 13 km short of a large town, Nabadid, the Association agreed to continue participating in completing the road up to Nabadid using the balance of uncommitted funds (about US$2 million) for civil works. The Association has, however, decided not to participate in completing the remaining sections, Nabadid-Borama (44 km.) and Nabadid-Tug Wajale (19 km.), in view of the very low rate of return estimated at about 6%, which is mainly due to the sharp decline in traffic and economic activity and high increase in construction costs, resulting from the difficult situation in the area. PART IV - THE PROJECT 48. A report entitled "Staff Appraisal Report, Fourth Highway Project, Somali Democratic Republic" (Report No. 3604-SO, dated January 6, 1983) is being distributed separately to the Executive Directors. A Credit and Project Summary appears at the beginning of this report and a Supplementary Project Data Sheet is given in Annex III. A map (IBRD No. 15924R) of the proposed project area is attached. The project was prepared by the Government with the assistance of consultants, and appraised by an IDA mission in May 1981. Negotiations were held in Washington from December 13 to 16, 1982. The Somali delegation was led by H.E. Ahmed Habib Ahmed, Minister of Juba Valley Development.  - 13 - Project Objectives and Description 49. The main objectives of the proposed project are to reduce transport costs on a major artery in south-central Somalia, the Afgoi-Baidoa road, and to protect past capital investment by extending the road-s service life. The project would also assist the borrower in improving its road maintenance planning, organization and operations. It would consist of: (a) strengthening and improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa road (216 km.), and related supervision; (b) consultancy services for: (i) a countrywide road maintenance study; and (ii) technical assistance to the Civil Engineering Department; and (c) assistance for urgent road maintenance needs. (a) Strengthening and Improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa Road 50. The Afgoi-Baidoa road, which forms part of a major artery connecting Baidoa in South-Central Somalia with Mogadishu, was constructed in 1971 with the assistance of FED and IDA under the First Highway Project. The road pavement was originally designed for a service life of seven years using staged construction. Although traffic has developed more than what the road was designed to carry, it has held up well and retained its camber and profile except in sections where it crosses poor soils. In such sections, the road has poor riding quality and the surface is badly rutted and cracked. The road, which has not been resealed since its construction, shows signs of distress; it has reached the end of its economic life and needs to be strengthened and improved. 51. The consulting firm of Halcrow International Partnership carried out a technical and economic evaluation study including detailed engineering for strengthening and improvement of the road. The study started in September 1980 and was completed in June 1981. In considering pavement strengthening and improvement alternatives, the consultants identified two possible solutions, one for a service life of 10 years and the other for a service life of 20 years. Based on their technical and economic evaluation, the consultants proposed, and the Government and IDA agreed, to strengthen and improve the road for a service life of 20 years. In addition to pavement strengthening, the road shoulders would be widened and reconstructed and drainage improved along the whole road. The design standards adopted for the road are in accordance with Somalia-s primary road standards. The Association also agreed with the Government s proposal to engage the above consultants for construction supervision.  - 14 - (b) Countrywide Road Maintenance Study 52. Road maintenance organization in the country-s sixteen regional road maintenance sections is inadequate. There is a lack of trained manpower and there are no organized crews to carry out road maintenance. The workshops lack facilities for servicing and day-to-day repair of road maintenance equipment. There has also been a decline in the funds allocated for road maintenance. Present allocations are far below what is required. Based on data from CED, the allocation for 1981 was So.Sh. 7.3 million, and the amount allocated for 1982, So.Sh. 5.3 million, is far short of the So.Sh. 20 million requested by CED. The Government, however, has recently confirmed that the 1983 budget included an allocation of So.Sh. 20 million for road maintenance. 53. The proposed project will help finance a countrywide road maintenance study to review the current situation and to make recommendations for improving road maintenance planning, organization, and operations. The study would, among other things, make recommendations for establishing road maintenance training units along primary roads (including the Afgoi-Baidoa road) to facilitate training of the road maintenance staff. The study would also propose a five-year comprehensive road rehabilitation and maintenance program including a time schedule for its implementation and requirement of staff, funds, materials, equipment, workshop facilities, etc., which could form the basis for future assistance to the sector. During negotiations, agreement was reached with the Government that: (a) the findings and recommendations of the road maintenance study be reviewed with the Association, and, within six months upon completion of this study, a plan of action to implement the recommendations of the study be prepared and submitted to the Association for its approval (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 3.06); (b) pending recommendations of the countrywide road maintenance study on the recurrent funds required, the budgetary allocation for road maintenance for 1984 will be at least So.Sh. 20 million in 1983 prices (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 4.03(b)); (c) by September 1 of each year up to and including 1987, the Government shall review with the Association the budgetary requirements and the proposed budgetary allocation for road maintenance for the following budget year (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 4.03(c)); and (d) the Government shall not divert road maintenance staff and equipment to other uses (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 4.04). (c) Technical Assistance to CED 54. The technical assistance components included in the First and Third Highway Projects have helped initiate effective road maintenance operations; however, their success in institution-building has been rather limited. This has been partly due to the transfer of trained personnel to other agencies and the departure of staff for neighboring oil-rich countries offering higher salaries. An increase in the number of regions from eight to sixteen in 1973 has also weakened the organization, adversely affecting CED operations, particularly road maintenance. Continued attention to manpower availability and staff training is, therefore, necessary. The proposed project will provide technical assistance and training using local institutions. In the short term, apart from providing  - 15 - some technical assistance to aid CED in improving road maintenance operations and in drawing and implementing training programs for staff, the Government has agreed to assign every year to CED, from 1983 until the completion of the project, newly graduated civil engineers from the Somali National University, so that CED will employ at least ten additional civil engineers by the completion of the project (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 4.02). For the longer term, the country-wide road maintenance study included in the project will review the present road maintenance organization and make recommendations for its improvement including staffing requirements, overall training needs, design of incentives for efficient performance of staff at various levels and any technical assistance that might be required for implementing the findings of the study. 55. The technical assistance component included in the project would require a total of about 180 man-months and would comprise a road maintenance engineer (team leader), a design/construction engineer, a road maintenance superintendent, two workshop superintendents and an administrative/financial officer for a period of 30 months each. While the technical assistance staff will be provided by a consulting firm, the Government, by October 31, 1983, will assign to the technical assistance team counterpart staff with qualifications and experiences satisfactory to the Association (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 3.07). The Government will also submit by June 30, 1984 to the Association for its review and approval a suitable training program including any arrangements with the local technical institutions for training of CED's staff (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 4.06). (d) Assistance for urgent road maintenance needs 56. The proposed credit would include a small amount (US$450,000) to cover the foreign exchange cost of materials (cement, steel, bitumen), basic equipment, spare parts and tools required for any urgent road maintenance needs recommended by the consultants. Specific items of equipment, spare parts and tools to be financed would be decided when the needs are determined. During negotiations, agreement was reached with the Government that lists of goods to be purchased shall be submitted to the Association for its review and approval (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 3.08). Project Costs 57. The total cost of the project, including contingencies, is estimated at US$43.8 million of which US$35.2 million, or 80 percent is the foreign exchange component. Excluding taxes and duties estimated at US$0.3 million'/ the total project cost is US$43.5 million. The cost for the strengthening and improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa road reflects the price of the lowest evaluated bid of the seven bids received in October 1982. The lowest bid is about 2% below the consultants estimate. Costs average 1/ The small tax component consists mainly of the local wage tax, as the contract documents permit the contractor to procure all fuels and materials free of duty and taxes.  - 16 - between US$45,000 and US$215,000 per km depending upon the amount of work involved in different sections. The foreign exchange component of construction costs is estimated at 83%. The consultants' services required by the project include: (i) about 135 man-months at an average rate of US$8,800 per man-month for the supervision of road strengthening and improvement; (ii) about 180 man-months at an average rate of US$8,800 per man-month for the technical assistance to CED; and (iii) about 36 man-months at an average rate of US$10,000 per man-month for the road maintenance study. Financing Plan 58. The proposed IDA Credit of SDR 21.4 million (US$23 million equivalent) would finance about 65% of the foreign cost. The remaining 35% of foreign cost (about US$12.2 million) and about 50% of local costs (about US$4.1 million equivalent) would be financed by the Arab Fund. The Government will provide US$4.2 million equivalent to cover the balance of local costs. IDA and the Arab Fund would jointly finance the contracts for civil works and construction supervision. As a condition of credit effectiveness, all conditions precedent to initial disbursements under the Arab Fund Loan Agreement shall have been fulfilled (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 6.01). Project Implementation 59. The Civil Engineering Department (CED) under the Ministry of Public Works would be responsible for the implementation of the project. The Association has agreed with the Government's proposal to engage for the supervision of road construction Halerow International Partnership Consultants, who carried out the economic evaluation and detailed engineeering study of the road (para. 51). For the road maintenance study and technical assistance to CED, consultants would be employed in accordance with the Bank Group guidelines and would be selected solely on the basis of the technical competence of the firm, the personnel undertaking the assignment, and the suitability of its proposal; this was agreed with the Government during negotiations (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 3.02). 60. The road strengthening and improvement would take about 32 months beginning mid-1983 with an estimated 15%, 30%, 35% and 20% of works to be carried out in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, respectively; the road maintenance study would take about 12 months and should be completed in the latter half of 1984; technical assistance to CED will be spread over a period of 2-1/2 years starting in mid-1983. An implementation schedule was agreed with the Government during negotiations. Procurement 61. The civil works would be procured under unit-price contract(s) through international competitive bidding in accordance with the Bank Group "Guidelines for Procurement". Materials, equipment, spare parts and tools required for urgent road maintenance needs would involve a number of relatively minor individual purchases that would not attract international  - 17 - competitive bidding and would be procured on the basis of at least four responsive quotations from suppliers eligible under the Bank Group "Guidelines for Procurement". Disbursements 62. The proposed Credit would be disbursed on the following basis: (i) 50% of total expenditures for the strengthening and improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa road; (ii) 50% of total expenditures for consultants' services for supervision of the road strengthening; (iii) 90% of total expenditures for consultants services for the road maintenance study and the technical assistance to CED; and (iv) 100% of foreign expenditures for materials, equipment, spare parts and tools for urgent road maintenance works, if procured internationally; 90% of local expenditures if procured locally. All disbursements would be fully documented. A schedule of estimated disbursements is given in the Credit and Project Summary. The proposed project is expected to be completed by June 30, 1986. Accounting, Auditing and Reporting 63. Project accounts would be maintained by CED with separate accounts for each component, and would be available for inspection by the Association during project supervision missions. CED's accounts are audited annually by the Magistrate of Accounts, an independent Government body, which submits its report to the Presidency. These audits are of a satisfactory standard. During negotiations, the Government agreed that all project accounts would be audited by the Magistrate of Accounts who would prepare a report on the audit for submission to the Association not later than six months after the end of the fiscal year (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 4.01(b)). The Government also agreed to submit a project completion report in a form satisfactory to the Association not later than 6 months after the Closing Date of the Credit (draft Development Credit Agreement, Section 3.04(d)). Environmental Impact 64. No environmental issues are likely to arise from the project and no disturbance to land use is expected to occur. In fact, improved drainage facilities along the road would benefit adjacent areas and soil erosion would be less than at present. Project Benefits and Risks 65. The proposed project would reduce transport costs on a major artery, the Afgoi-Baidoa road, which connects Mogadishu--principal port and capital city--with Baidoa, the administrative capital of the Bay region which has a vast agricultural potential. It would also protect past capital investment by extending the road's service life. The economic analysis of the strengthening and improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa road takes into account the fact that larger investments would be needed later for reconstruction of the road, if the proposed works are not carried out now at comparatively much lower costs.  - 18 - 66. The main benefits from the proposed civil works would be reduced vehicle operating and road maintenance costs; there would also be savings in deferred major reconstruction works which would be necessary if the road were allowed to deteriorate further. Benefits from improved road safety and accident reduction could not be quantified and have not been included in the computation of the ERR. Since a paved road has existed for a decade, it is estimated that traffic generated due to the strengthening and improvement works would be negligible; consequently, vehicle operating costs savings have been limited to the normal traffic on the road. Savings in transport costs of some additional traffic on the road (from the traffic carrying supplies to refugee camps and later from the Bay Region Agricultural Development Project) have been included as benefits from the project. There would also be various non-quantifiable benefits in terms of improving access to social and administrative services as well as facilitating regional development. 67. The major direct beneficiaries of the reduced transport costs would be local truck and bus operators. Since the private market is essentially competitive and the tariffs set by the Government are based on operating costs, it is expected that the benefits would be passed on to the rural population and to consumers of goods originating in the road zone. The Government would also benefit directly through a significant reduction in the transport cost of materials for a planned cement plant in the region. Finally, the refugee relief operation, which has placed heavy demands on this road for transport of needed supply, would greatly benefit as well. 68. As regards institution building, there is a high risk in Somalia of a delay in improving CED's road maintenance capability if planned local staff leave for lucrative jobs outside the Government or leave the country altogether. Given the vital importance of improving CED's capability, this risk has to be taken. The risk, however, is mitigated by the technical assistance component, included in the project, which would help identify possible sources for recruiting additional staff, draw up and implement training programs, and design incentives for retention of staff. Economic Rate of Return 69. The economic rate of return (ERR) on the strengthening and improvement of the Afgoi-Baidoa road is estimated at 17 percent. Six different road sections would have ERRs ranging from 12% to 23%, exceeding the opportunity cost of capital in Somalia estimated at about 10%. A sensitivity analysis was carried out for a 15% rise in construction costs or a 15% decrease in benefits, and in either case, the ERR of about 13% was above the estimated opportunity cost of capital. With regard to other components, namely, the country-wide road maintenance study, the assistance for urgent road maintenance needs and technical assistance to CED, substantial benefits are expected to occur through the development of the Government's capability to maintain the road network. These components are clearly justified, although the benefits could not be quantified.  - 19 - PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 70. The draft Development Credit Agreement between the Somali Democratic Republic and the Association and the Recommendation of the Committee provided for in Article V, Section l(d) of the Articles of Agreement of the Association are being distributed separately to the Executive Directors. 71. Special conditions of the project are listed in Section III of Annex III to this report. 72. I am satisfied that the proposed Credit would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Association. PART VI - RECOMMENDATION 73. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed Credit. A. W. Clausen President Attachments Washington, D.C. January 26, 1983  - 20 - AkllC.1 Page 1 of 4 SOMALIA - SOCIAL INDICATORS DATA SHEET SOMALIA REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVE,AGES AREA (THOUSAN'D SQ. KM.) - MOST RECENT ESTIHATE)- TOTAL 637.7 MOST RECENT LOW INCOME HIDDLE INCOHE AGRICULTURAL 299.2 1960 /b 1970 /b ESTIMATE /b AFRICA SOUTH OF SANAR.A AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA GNP PER CAPITA (USS) 70.0 90.0 280.0/-c 250.0 1053.2 ENEgGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVALENT) 16.1 32.9 74.3 66.5 610.1 POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS POPULATION, MID-YZAR (ThOUSANDS) 2450.0 3113.0 3914.0 URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL) 17.3 23.1 30.2 17.8 28.3 POPULATION PROJECTIONS POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS) 6.6 STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS) 19.3 YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED 2130 POPULATION DENSITY PER SQ. KM. 3.8 4.9 6.0 27.7 54.7 PER SQ. KM. AGRICULTURAL LAND 8.2 10.4 12.8 86.7 129.9 POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT) 0-14 YRS. 43.8 46.5 42.6 44.8 46.0 15-64 YRS. 53.6 51.6 53.9 52.3 51.1 65 YRS. AND ABOVE 2.7 1.9 3.5 2.9 2.8 POPL'LATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT) TOTAL 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.8 URBAN 4.8 5.3 5.0 6.2 5.2 CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND) 46.8 45.9 46.2 47.3 47.2 CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND) 27.7 24.0 20.2 19.5 15.7 GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 FAHILY PLANNING ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS) USERS (PERCENT OF M}ARRIED WOMEN) .. .. FOOD AND NUTRITION INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA (1969-71-100) 97.0 100.0 82.0 88. 7 90.7 PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORIES (PERCENT OF REQUIREMENTS) 89.0 85.0 88.0/d 90.2 93.9 PROTEINS (CRAMS PER DAY) 76.0 71.0 69.0/d 53.1 54.8 OF WHICH ANIHAL AND PULSE 47.0 45.0 41.0d- 18.4 17.0 CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE 39.9 35.1 31.6 26.7 23.9 HEALTH LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS) 35.9 39.7 43.5 45.6 51.0 INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER THOUSAND) 175.0 158.5 146.2 129.9 118.5 ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF POPULATION) TOTAL .. 15.0 33.0/! 23.9 URBAS .. 17.0 56.o/E 54.9 RURAL . 14.0 20.0/e 18.5 ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT OF POPULATION) TOTAL .. .. 47.0/f 25.8 URBAN .. .. 77.0/f 63.1 RURAL .. .. 35.0i! 20.2 POPULATIION PER PHYSICIAN 36567.0 23583.0 18485.0'd 32097.3 14185.2 POPULATION PER N'URSING PERSON 4813.0 4112.0 3264.6 2213.2 POPULATION PER HOSPITAL BED TOTAL 694.0 638.0 614.5/_ 1225.0 1036.4 URBAN 145.0 241.0 *. 249.5 430.8 RURAL 5643.0 7102.0 1712.1 3678.6 ADMISSIOh' PER HOSPITAL BED HOUS ING lVMGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD TOTAL .. .. URBAN .. .. gumRAL * 5- -d AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOH TOTAL .. .. URBAN .. .. RULAL .. .. ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT OF DWELLINCS) TOTAL .. .. URBAN .. .. RUkAL .. ..  - 21 - ANEX I Paoe 2 of 4 SOMALlA - aOCIAL INDICATORS DATA SHEET SOtALIA REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVEA^CES - MOST RECENT ESTIVATE)- MOST RECENT LOU INCOME MIDDLE INCOME 1960 /b 1970 /b ESTIMATE /b AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA AFRICA SOUTR OF SANARA EDUCAIION ADJLSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS PRIMARY: TOTAL 9.0 9.0 50.0 63.2 83.3 MALE 13.0 14.0 64.0 72.7 96.1 FEMALE 5.0 5.0 36.0 50.3 80.4 SECONDARY: TOTAL 1.0 4.0 7.0 10.2 15.3 MALE 2.0 7.0 11.0 13.2 19.4 FEMALE 0.2 2.0 4.0 6.6 11.3 VOCATIONAL ENROL. (7 OF sECONDARY)26.O 3.0 28,0 7.9 4.7 PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO PRIMARY 28.0 33.0 31.0 47.4 38.6 SECONDARY 20.0 24.0 18.0 26.2 23. 4 ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT) 1.5/& 5.0 60.0/h 34.0 35.6 CONSUMPTION PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND POPULATION 1.1 2.2 .. 3.0 31.9 RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POPULATION 9.8 16.1 20.9 34.8 71.8 TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND POFIJLATION .. .. .. 1.7 17.9 NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION 0.8 1.4 .. 2.9 19.1 CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA 0.4/' 1.7 ,. 1.1 0.6 LABOR FORCE TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS) 1016.6 1208.8 1544.6 FEMALE (PERCENT) 30.1 29.7 30.3 34.1 36.5 AGRICULTURE (PERCENT) 88.0 85.0 82.0 78.4 56.5 INDUSTRY (PERCENT) 4.0 6.0 8.0 9.2 17.7 PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT) TOTAL 41.5 38.8 39.5 41.4 37.0 KALE 58.7 55.2 60.1 53.9 46.9 FEMALE 24.7 22.8 22.1 29.1 27.2 ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 INCOME DISTRIBUTION FERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY RIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS .. .. HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS .. .. LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS .. LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS .. .. POVERTY TARGET GROUPS ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US$ PER CAPITA) URBAN .. .. 150.0 134.3 507.0 RURAL .. .. 110.0 82.9 200.6 ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (USS PER CAPITA) URBAN .. .. 65.0 46.4 523.9 RURAL .. .. 50.0 60.4 203.6 ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOKE LEVEL (PERCENT) URBAN .. .. 40.0 39.3 RURAL .. .. 70.0 69.0 Not available Not applicable. NOTES /a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic mean.. Coverage of countrieg among the Indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform. lb Unless otherwlie noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970, between 1969 and 1971; and for Moat Recent Estioete, between 1978 and 1980. /c 1981 Estimate. /d 1977; le 1976; lf 1975; /h Increase due to literacy campaign of 1974; /1. 1958  !P67 A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I-PI'TI~ ~ ~ ~~~SIA;PFPF~.r -,T_ -.In ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~~;T;;FAA'Ea-(EEFFESES?-SPIAS. I -,F!FSAFEE; C60 AF -l E;;AI AFT--O0E;FF;FP FAETrAF- -TI A AF FTs oASA 'A2 -;?TFA ;EE1AA Pr *