Ecuador - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4491 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 124-EC) May 16, 1983 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS DINACE - Directorate for School Construction (called DECE until 1979) FA0 - Food and Agriculture Organization PIU - Project Implementation Unit SECAP - Servicio Ecuatoriano de Capacitacion Profesional (Ecuadorian Vocational Training Service) UNDP - United Nations Development Program This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 124-EC) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ................................................................. i Basic Data Sheet ........................................................ ii Highlights .............................................................. v PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY ............................... 1 II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES ........................... .......... 3 A. Project Generation ................................. 3 B. Project Management and Physical Implementation 4 C. The Non-Use of Boarding Facilities ......6....... 6 D. Performance of the Technical Assistance Team ....... 6 E. IDA Performance .................................. 7 III. OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES OF THE PROJECT SCHOOLS ............ 8 IV. CONCLUSIONS ............................................ 10 Attachment I - Borrower's Comments .................................. 13 Attachment II - Borrower-s Comments .................................. 15 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction .......................................... 21 II. Project Background ......................................... 21 III. Project Implementation ..................................... 26 IV. Project Costs and Finance .................................. 32 V. Operation of Project Institutions ...................... 34 VI. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................ 42 Annexes: 1 - Actual and Estimated Disbursements by Year ............. 47 2 - Compliance with Credit Covenants ....................... 49 3 - Final Total Costs Supplied by DINACE ................ 52 4 - Enrollment Comparisons and Changes in School Type ...... 53 I PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 124-EC) PREFACE This is a Performance Audit Report of the First Education Project in Ecuador, for which Credit 124-EC was approved in the amount of US$5.1 million on June 18, 1968. The originally established Closing Date was December 31, 1972; however, the last disbursement was made on April 8, 1981. In April 1981, a balance of US$18,037 remaining in the Credit Account was cancelled. The Audit Report comprises (a) a Project Performance Audit Memo- randum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated September 30, 1981, (revised June 9, 1982) prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, following a mission to Ecuador. The PPAM, for which no field visit has been undertaken, is based on a study of the PCR and other material in the Associa- tion's files relating to this project, including the Appraisal Report (No. TO-624a) and the President's Report (No. P-607) dated June 4, 1968, and June 5, 1968, respectively, the record of the Board discussion of this project in June 1968, and the Credit Agreement (124-EC) dated June 27, 1968. The project experience has been discussed with Association staff concerned with the project. Borrower comments are appended as Attachments I and II and where appropriate, some o7f these comments are shown as footnotes in the text. The Audit, although more critical of the Association's monitoring performance, supports the findings of the PCR which treats the subject exhaustively and raises issues which had not been dealt with by the super- vision missions.  - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 124-EC) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Expectation Actual Total Project'Cost (US$ million) 10.2 16.1 Overrun (%) - 57 Original Credit Amount (US$ million) 5.1 5.1 Amount disbursed - 5.08212 Cancelled on 04/30/81 (US$ million) - 0.018 Repaid to 07/31/82 (US$ million) - .23 Outstanding as of 07/31/82 (US$ million) - 4.9 1 Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/72 2128/81 In-Months Since Credit Signature (54 months) (152 months) Proportion Completed by Original Completion Date (%) 100 20 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) - 181 Institutional Performance - Poor Cumulative Estimates and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 (i) Estimated at Appraisal 0.1 1.7 4.3 5.1 - - - (ii) Actual Disbursement C 0.042 0.109 0.418 1.092 1.261 2.643 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) 0 2.5 2.5 8.2 21.4 24.7 51.8 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 (i) Estimated at Appraisal - - - - - - (ii) Actual Disbursement 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.67 4.72 5.081 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) 68.6 88.2 88.2 91.6 92.5 99.6 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files - - 05/19/61- Government's Application - - 08/25/67 Negotiations - - 04/22-26/68 Board Approval 06/18/68 - 06/18/68 Credit Agreement Date 06/27/68 - 06/27/68 Effectiveness Date 08/30/68 - 08/30/68 Closing Date 12/31/72 12/31/75, 12/31/76, 04/30/81 09/01/79, 12/31/80 Follow-on Project Name Vocational Training Project Loan Number 1157-EC Loan Amount US$4 million Loan Agreement Date September 3, 1975 /a Excluding exchange adjustment of US$0.11 million. /b Including exchange adjustment of US$0.11 million. /c Although the Bank began lending for education in 1963, it was in touch with UNESCO, which had initiated sector work in Ecuador in May 1962.  - iii - MISSION DATA Sent' Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date of Mission by Year Weeks Persons weeks Report Identification IDA/UNESCO 09/66 5.0 3 (E,G,T) 15.0 03/10/67 Reconnaissance IDA 06/66 1.0 2 (T,E) 2.0 07/25/66 Reconnaissance IDA 04/67 0.8 2 (E,G) 1.6 05/10/67 Preparation IDA/UNESCO 07/67 6.0 5 (A,Ag.,E, 30.0 08/25/67!b G,T) Appraisal IDA 10/67 5.6 5 (A,Ag.,E, 28.0 06/04/68 G,T) Total 18.4 76.6 Supervision I IDA 11/68 1.6 2 (A,G) 3.2 01/02/69 Supervision II IDA 09/69 0.6 1 (G) 0.6 11/19/69 Supervision III IDA 04/70 0.8 1 (A) 0.8 07/08/70 Supervision IV IDA 01/71 1.0 1 (A) 1.0 03/17/71 Supervision V IDA 11/71 0.2 1 (E) 0.2 10/10/71-/ Supervision VI IDA 02/72 1.4 2 (A,G) 2.8 02/25/72 Supervision VII IDA 08/72 1.4 1 (G) 1.4 09/20/72 Supervision VIII IDA 03/73 0.8 2 (A,E) 1.6 04/27/73 Supervision IX IDA 09/73 1.0 2 (A,G) 1.0 10/26/73 Supervision X IDA 11/74 1.0 2 (A,G) 2.0 12/03/74 Supervision XI IDA 05/75 1.0 2 (A,T) 2.0 06/25/75 Supervision XII IDA 11/75 2.0 2 (A,T) 4.0 01/06/76 Supervision XIII IDA 09/76 0.8 1 (T) 0.8 10/07/76 Completion/ IDA 02/77 2.0 5 (A,Ag.,E, 10.0 04/ /77 Supervision/d G,T) Supervision XIV IDA 04/77 0.8 1 (A) 0.8 06/01/77 Supervision XV IDA 07/77 3.0 3 (A,A,E) 9.0 08/10/77 Supervision XVI IDA 10/77 0.6 2 (A,T) 1.2 11/18/77 Supervision XVII IDA 03/78 0.8 2 (A,T) 1.6 03/27/78 Supervision XVIII IDA 08/78 0.4 1 (A) 0.4 09/26/78 Supervision XIX IDA 04/79 1.0 1 (A) 1.0 04/25/79 Supervision XX IDA 10/79 1.2 1 (A) 1.2 11/16/79 Supervision XXI IDA 06/80 1.2 1 (A) , 1.2 07/02/80 Completion IDA 03/81 2.0 2 (A,G) 3.0 Total 26.6 50.8 Note: A = Architect Ag = Agricultural Educator E Economist G = General Educator T = Technical Educator /a Actual work in the field (spent on the First Project only). /b Date Borrower submitted report to IDA. /c Limited supervision with a Back-to-Office Report. /d This mission was sent out as a completion mission but found that the project was too far from completion for a regular completion report to be issued.  - iv - CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (kbbreviation): Sucre (S) Exchange Rates: Appraisal Year US$1.00 = S18.18 Intervening Years (Average) US$1.00 = S25.0 Completion Year (1981) US$1.00 = S25.10 Fiscal Year: January 1 - December 31 ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (In US$). Original Actual Category Allocation Disbursement Site Preparation and Development 136,000 113,788.43 Construction of School Buildings 1,044,000 1,932,748.81 Construction of Staff Housing 39,000 Construction of Student Hostels 127,000 - Architectural Consulting Services 67,000 60,876.33 Project Unit Costs 76,000 80,170.27 Local Furniture 118,000 - Furniture Components and/or Yurniture 438,000 317,592.11 Equipment 1,975,000 2,128,355.67 Technical Assistance 300,000 448,431.11 Unallocated 780,000 - Amount Disbursed - 5,081,962.73 Cancelled - 18,037.27 Total 5,100,000 5,100,000.00  - v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 124-EC) HIGHLIGHTS A Credit of US$5.1 million equivalent to assist in financing the First Education Project in Ecuador was approved and signed in June 1968. Total project costs were estimated at US$10.2 million. The project included the building and equipping of 28 institutions, among which were 15 general secondary schools, four agricultural schools, four technical (industrial) schools and five teacher training institutions, together with related tech- nical assistance. The objectives concentrated on improving and expanding the system and relating its output to the projected needs of the economy, with particular reference to the source of middle-level manpower--the second cycle of secondary education. This would imply modernizing and improving the curricula, increasing internal efficiency and restructuring the secondary school system. The project has been completed with substantial changes in the organizational structure of the project schools, agreed between the Borrower and IDA. Extremely lengthy delays, amounting to eight years, were experi- enced. The Credit has been completely disbursed, with the exception of the sum of US$18,037, which was cancelled. Total project costs amounted to over US$16 million, involving an overrun of 57%, which was met by the Government. The project achieved some measures of success in that (i) the esti- mated appraisal enrollments were surpassed in all cases (except the teacher training schools which are still in a period of transition - PCR, para. 5.05), and (ii) with few exceptions, the project schools are considered among the best of their kind in Ecuador (PCR, para. 5.01), especially the technical schools. The unusual length of the physical implementation period prevented the proper phasing of staff training, left the project without technical assistance during the last phase of implementation, and made it difficult to coordinate completion of civil works with deliveries of equipment. Some of the software expectations set at the appraisal stage were not realized, partly because the monitoring process concentrated on the actual construction of the physical facilities. Sector policy changes which occurred during implementa- tion resulted in altering the structure of 20 out of 28 schools. However, these changes did not modify the main objectives of these schools. The project did not succeed in (a) building up, within the Ministry of Education, an adequate implementation capability, and (b) consolidating technical and agricultural schools (PCR, paras. 5.09 and 6.12). The experi- ence suggests that some expectations at the appraisal stage were unrealistic, such as, that without technical assistance, the project unit could administer a large project for the first time with widely scattered project institutions and deal with the difficult monitoring of procurement and accounting problems. - vi - The experience also suggests the need for Bank Group field missions to visit sites of project schools at the appraisal stage and during implemen- tation (PPAM, paras. 15 and 19), and to guide the Borrower more closely through appropriate site selection criteria. Other points of special interest are: - the nonfulfillment of several Credit Agreement covenants (PCR, para. 3.22); and - the need to have had precise targets for staff development programs and greater specificity of objectives in regard to the qualitative improvement expected to result from the project (PCR, paras. 2.10 and 5.21). - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 124-EC) I. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 1. UNESCO had initiated sector work for education in Ecuador in May 1962. A Bank Group reconnaissance mission visited Ecuador in mid-1966 and paved the way for two subsequent IDA/UNESCO missions that helped to prepare a project focused on secondary education. This project was appraised in October 1967. For a project estimated to cost US$10.2 million, a Credit of US$5.1 million was negotiated in April 1968, approved in June 1968, and became effective on August 30, 1968. 2. The project was part of the Government's program to expand and modernize its educational system, and to have it respond more effectively to the socio-economic needs of the country, particularly in relation to agri- cultural and technical education, as well as primary teacher training. The project was exygcted to be in line with Government strategy of providing a better quality=/ of education in the agricultural, technical and teacher training fields more economically, by consolidating resources at the upper secondary school level with boarding and staff-housin facilities. In the general secondary school sector, a rationalizationl program would also improve the quality of the education, in line with revised curricula which would include science and practical subjects. The project comprised the construction, furnishing and equipping of 28 secondary schools as shown below: 1/ It appears that the objectives of the project were more specific on the quantitative side than on the qualitative side, where some vagueness was left as to how the expected improvements in curriculum and syllabi and the effectiveness of teaching and administrative staff were to materialize (PCR, para. 2.10). 2/ The intention was that the expansion of enrollments in the project general secondary schools was to be limited to accommodate students displaced from the first cycle of the existing vocational schools of the project, and to meet shortages of places in the cities and regional capitals (PCR, para. 2.09). - 2 - Construction, Furnishing and Equipping of 28 Secondary Schools Type of Number of Construction Mode Staff Schools Grades Schools Extension Relocation New Boarding Housing General Secondary Lower Cycle 7 - 9 9 1 8 - - - Upper Cycle 10 - 12 1 1 - - - - Both Cycles 7 - 12 5 3 1 1 - - Agriculture 10 - 12 4 4 - - 230 27 Technical 10 - 12 4 3 1 - 360 - Teacher Training 10 - 12 5 1 4 - 540 - Total 28 13 14 1 1,130 27 In order to assist staff development programs for teachers and administrators the project also included 12 man-years of expert services.!/ 3. During the course of implementation, the project content was modi- fied in agreement with IDA, because of changes in educational policies. Many of the project schools changed from their original type according to the following summary: (a) three teacher training schools became two-year post- secondary teacher training institutes in 1975. In 1980, these institutions adopted a new five-year program which includes three years of upper secondary and two years post-secondary education. One institute still serves boarding students whereas the two others do not serve boarders; (b) two teacher train- ing schools became general secondary schools in 1975, with grades 7 to 12, and abolished boarding facilities; (c) two of the four agricultural secondary schools added a two-year post-secondary program and became agricultural institutes; (d) all four technical secondary schools added a two-year tech- nical teacher training program and became technical institutes by 1977, and three of these institutes abolished facilities for boarding; (e) between 1978 and 1980, all nine lower cycle general secondary schools became complete secondary schools with grades 7 to 12. In relation to the upper cycle secondary school the five general secondary schools with both cycles (grades 7 to 12), and two agricultural secondary schools no changes occurred (PCR, paras. 5.01 - 5.02). 1/ Precise training targets were not specified (PCR, para. 5.21). The Borrower indicates a need for training local personnel in management, administration, project formulation, etc. (See Attachment II, para. 5.) - 3 - 4. The project, as modified, has been implemented, although with considerable time overruns beyond the originally expected completion date, because of initial over-estimates of implementation capacity, sporadic short- ages of counterpart funds and building materials, and lack of continuity of staff within the project. The original closing date of December 31, 1972 was amended five times and the last disbursement was made on April 4, 1981. A remaining undisbursed sum of US$18,037 in the Credit Account was cancelled on April 30, 1981. Total estimated project costs amounted to US$16 million; the Government met the overrun of about 57%. The achievements of the project are positive. The project schools are generally considered the best of their respective types (PCR, para. 5.01) and, in all cases, except the teacher training schools, estimated appraisal enrollments were surpassed. The Borrower and the PCR both state that by 1983, the three teacher training schools will increase their collective enrollments by nearly 30% (PCR, paras. 5.05 and 6.14). II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES A. Project Generation 5. The project had a long gestation period of almost six years and there had been some indication of lack of coordination between the Ministry of Education and the National Planning Office, both of which in the space of three months (in 1966) presented two very different proposals for an education project to the Association. Eventually, IDA decided to follow up on the project proposal presented by the National Planning Office. 6. At the preparation stage, it had not been possible to discuss fully the financial implications of the project nor to cover fully the manpower aspects. At the appraisal stage it was clear that, whereas the stage of readiness was quite satisfactory for the subsectors of agricultural and technical education/training, the state of affairs in the fields of general education and teacher training was much less defined. It appears that the appraisal mission misjudged, at this stage, the overall capability of the Borrower to implement a first education project of this size (28 schools), with institutions scattered throughout the country. In retrospect, it is clear that the IDA expectations were too high regarding: (i) the capability of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) to manage the physical implementation of the project (for supervision of works, in particular - PCR, para. 3.04); (ii) the appropriateness of the sites selected for the project institutions (PCR, para. 3.05); (iii) the ability, at the regional level, to meet recurrent expenditures for repair, maintenance and operation of the practical facilities (PCR, paras. 3.12 - 3.13); (iv) the Government's ability to contribute oun- terpart funds for implementing the project (PCR, para. 3.22(c));1' and 1/ The Borrower calls attention to the need to identify with precision the strategy to be followed regarding financial flows in the light of the way budgetary appropriations are handled in countries like Ecuador. (See Attachment II, para. 7.) (v) the feasibility of any attempt by 'Government to contain the expansion of the secondary school enrollments (PCR, para 5.15). It is further noted that while the Presidential Decree establishing the PIU anticipated effective coordination between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agricul- ture, this did not appear to have been realized. B. Project Management and Physical Implementation 7. By far, this is the most dramatic feature of this project. The delays in implementation were caused mainly by lack of counterpart funds and the weakness of the PIU (particularly its supervisory function). This severe time overrun of 200% placed t is project among the most delayed of all Bank- financed education projects.. The PIU, which suffered from discontinuity and scarcity of staff, was weak in supervising designs 2nd construction, and in cost control and procurement (PCR, para. 3.04).. over such a long period of time and with the changing structure within which the PIU had to operate, no institutional building was effected. It is also noted that several of the particular covenants which had been established as part of the Credit Agreement were not fulfilled or only partially so. These are detailed in the PCR (para. 3.22 and Annex 2). Design and Supervision of Construction 8. Four Ecuadorian consulting firms were commissioned to carry out design work. Although reviewed by the Association, the plans led to some significant design problems experienced in all the project schools. Mentioned as causes for this situation were the Association's failure to detect some problems because they were too detailed, the Project Unit's ignoring the suggestions of the Association, and designers' ignoring the Project Unit's instructions (PCR, para. 3.06). Buildings 9. Although tenders for civil works were advertised internationally, bids were received only from national contractors. There were delays in construction schedules from 1971 onwards because of sporadic shortages of counterpart funds and building materials. A few schools were completed in two to three years, but the majority took a much longer time (up to eight years) (PCR, para. 3.08). 1/ Nigeria Education I (Credit 72-UNI) took 13 years to complete by com- parison with 12-1/2 years for this project. The Borrower points out that the project was not adequately prepared to ensure completion within the time limits initially agreed. (See Attachment II, para. 2 and para. 6 above.) 2/ Technical and operational weaknesses persist in these and related areas. (Attachment II, para. 4.) - 5 - 10. The completion mission felt that about one-fifth of the project schools could be classified as good insofar as quality of construction is concerned; and that the remaining varied from poor to satisfactory. The construction deficiencies are well specified in the PCR (para. 3.09). In February 1977, 25 out of the 28 project institutions were incomplete, ranging from 10% to 40% of total construction. In 1977, an inventory of pending construction works was done and a large part of the facilities needed for an improved learning/teaching situation was found to be lacking in the majority of project schools. The Association pressed for a satisfactory completion of the unfinished works and agreed to extend the closing date to 1979. By the end of 1979, when the inventory was updated and reviewed, some aspects were still unfinished. The physical components were in fact not completed until February 1981. Furniture and Equipment 11. Although under the initial allocation of the proceeds of the Credit, procurement of imported furniture was provided for, the Borrower later requested and the Bank Group agreed, that furniture be financed entirely from national resources. A furniture manufacturing plant was established under the Directorate of School Construction for this purpose but it suffered from managerial and production constraints and produced furniture of poor design and durability. 12. Delays in procuring equipment were considerable. The first contract was awarded only in 1974, about five years behind schedule; some equipment was received in 1975 with the bulk arriving in 1976. There were various problems such as procedural errors made by the PIU, lengthy local procedures, the invalidation of bidding invitations by IDA and the failure of the next attempt at procurement, because of the disqualification of 12 out of 17 bidding firms. These problems reflect the inexperience of the PIU and led to extensive correspondence between the Borrower and IDA. Technical assistance competent in procurement could have alleviated some of these difficulties. 13. The equipment finally procured is said to be generally of good quality. However, the long delay in school construction did not permit coor- dination of the schedule for completion of civil works and deliveries of equipment. As in several other cases of Bank Group-assisted projects, insuf- ficient communication and consultation between school principals and the PIU staff concerning furniture and equipment distribution, and the very late provision of inventories, created frustration and confusion among the school principals (PCR, paras. 3.16 - 3.17). 14. Maintenance of furniture and of equipment has suffered from insuf- ficient allocation of funding, although in about 12 project institutions (including all the technical schools) commendable efforts were made by the schools to keep furniture and equipment in reasonably good condition (PCR, para. 3.18). - 6 - Allocation of Proceeds, Costs and Disbursements 15. The final cost of the project was US$16.1 million, a cost overrun of 57% above the appraisal estimate of US$10.2 million. This was due to the extended implementation period which witnessed a very high inflation. The completion mission analysis of estimated and actual costs by category of expenditure reveals that the actual cost of civil works was 49% above the appraisal estimate; for equipment, the overrun was 887.1 and for project administration, 209% (PCR, para. 4.01). It appears that site selection was made without regard to the requirements of basic services or provision of drainage and sewerage systems. Final site development costs exceeded those of the appraisal report by nearly 250% (PCR, para. 3.05). Approximately US$900,000 was spent on local project administration. With regard to dis- bursement of Credit proceeds, the Association showed flexibility beyond what would be considered reasonable by agreeing, on three different occasions, to change the disbursement percentage for the various categories of expenditures (PCR, para. 4.03). C. The Non-Use of Boarding Facilities 16. The project provided 1,130 boarding places in schools which, according to the PCR, are used in only two of the project schools. The under- lying reasons were the mounting problems of student discipline and the rising costs of maintaining boarding services that schools were experiencing. A ministerial decree (1973) prohibited the boarding of students in secondary schools except in special cases. There is no evidence about what impact this situation is having on the educational prospects of stu ents living some distance away and for whom the facilities were designed.. It appears that the demand and eagerness for secondary schooling are such that some students are walking distances up to five or six kilometers, while others take buses to and from homes 40 to 50 kilometers away. D. Performance of the Technical Assistance Team 17. Although there was some delay in providing the technical assistance expert services (through UNESCO), the implementation and results obtained were quite substantial and are described in detail in the PCR (paras. 3.19 - 3.21 and 5.20 - 5.21). Continuity was needed in the services for technical educa- tion and agricultural education/training at a crucial time of project imple-- mentation (1975), but was not secured. Too many of the experts were in the field when most of the project schools were not yet operational. During the later years when the project institutions had been completed, the experts had already served their contracts and had departed.3/ 1/ Including some equipment financed with local funds. 2/ The Borrower suggests that in education projects, there is a need to take into account possible political changes leading to decisions that will result in changes in educational policy orientations. (See Attachment II, para. 4.) 3/ The Borrower calls for an improvement in the system under which technical assistance is provided. 18. During their stay, the experts accomplished a limited amount of counterpart training of national staff, mainly Directors of departments within the Ministry of Education but not officers at the working level. The training program for administrators and teachers of the project schools extended over a period of seven years (1970 to 1977), was most intensive during the years between 1973 and 1977, and covered a large variety of subjects including equipment use and maintenance, accounting, librarianship and guidance counsel- ling. There are no records of the evaluation of these courses, but they appeared to have been useful and were greatly appreciated by the beneficia- ries, and described as being the first integrated approach used in a major education project in Ecuador.!/ In addition to conducting these seminars, the specialists also assisted administrators of individual project schools, produced an Administrative Manual and provided some assistance to the PIU. E. IDA Performance 19. In general, IDA sensitivity to the Borrower's difficulties in implementing the project had been considerable and formed the subject of a large amount of correspondence. However, there have been major inadequacies in the IDA supervision and monitoring of the project in the field (PCR, paras. 3.23 - 3.24 and 6.08). Until 1977, supervision had clearly been inadequate in terms of staff continuity and intensity; during the first eight years of implementation, supervision missions failed to undertake systematic visits to the scattered sites, and appeared to concentrate their attention mainly on the Project Implementation Unit and the Ministry of Education in Quito. As a result, IDA was unaware in early 1977 that 25 of the 28 project schools were not completed although many had enrolled students in their unfinished premises. Monitoring was obviously weak, especially with regard to what was actually happening on the sites, for a completion mission was sent prematurely in February 1977. Since the PIU itself was subject to constant changes in management and clear weaknesses in the Borrower's executing capabilities had been evidenced, there was a greater need for the Association to maintain continuity of its personnel with a view to strengthening its supervision and monitoring capability. 20. There had been considerable change in the IDA staff assigned to the project. Between 1977 and completion of the project in 1981, there was no supervision visit by an educator. 21. In terms of specializations, excluding the two completion missions, architects were sent 17 times and an agricultural educator went once in 12 years. Three different general educators visited a total of six times: no visits were made between mid-1972 and the end of 1974 and after 1974 for the remaining six years of the project. Given that 20 of the 28 project schools were general secondary and teacher-training schools, and the recog- nized weaknesses in the definition of these two areas at appraisal, more systematic support by general educators was needed. 1/ Integrated in the sense of their direct connection to a project that included buildings and equipment (PCR, para. 5.21). 22. The evident need for technical assistance to support the weak PIU during the first years of implementation, particularly in procurement, organizational and financial matters, was not addressed. III. OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES OF THE PROJECT SCHOOLS General 23. Various policy changes were introduced during project implementa- tion, which affected most of the project schools: (i) all technical schools and some of the agricultural and teacher training schools were converted into post-secondary "institutes" but retained their secondary education programs, (ii) with two exceptions, all of the project schools abandoned the practice of boarding students, and (iii) the lower cycle general secondary schools were all changed to "complete" secondary schools by adding the upper cycle. These changes did not alter the objectives of most of the schools. It is noted however, that the changes were first made, then IDA was informed and most of the modifications were endorsed. In the case of teacher training and of boarding policies, prior discussions took place between the Borrower and IDA. The vagueness concerning the objectives of the project in terms of qualitative improvement (curricular implementation, effectiveness of teaching and administrative staff) does not allow a thorough analysis of the extent to which these initial objectives have been achieved. Teacher Training Institutes 24. In 1975, two out of the five project teacher training schools were converted into general secondary schools. After a rather long period of discussions with the Borrower on clarifications about the new policy and programs concerning teacher training, the Association finally accepted this change. The enrollments in the three schools are 53% of the original appraisal estimate of 3,440 students which concerned five schools, but it is expected that by 1983, this will rise to 6771/ of the original total enroll- ment forecast (PCR, para. 5.05). One of the three institutions appears to be a genuine model; it is a success as far as organization and types of courses for prospective rural teachers are concerned, and has kept the initial concept of boarding students (PCR, para. 5.07). It is noted that the two converted teacher training institutes are now good secondary schools, one of which has outstanding status (PCR, para. 5.08). 1/ If the appraisal estimate is reduced by considering only three schools instead of five, the estimate of students would drop to 2,064. On this basis, the 1983 enrollments would show an 11% increase. -9- Agricultural Schools 25. The Borrower did not carry out its intention, expressed at the generation stage, to reduce its number of agricultural schools: the project schools are only four out of 53 agricultural schools in the country (PCR, para. 5.09). Total enrollments in the project schools exceed appraisal estimates by 42%. A spill-over benefit is mentioned (PCR, para. 5.10) in that two of the project schools also serve as regional centers for agricultural extension work as well as for in-service training of teachers. One of these schools is said to be among the best of its kind in Ecuador and could be a model as regards its program and administration. Technical (Industrial) Schools 26. In this field, the project had an outstanding operational achieve- ment: all four project schools have become leaders in technical education in the country. Two of the schools have developed their relations with private firms and all of them have added, with the approval of IDA, a two-year program which is using their facilities to prepare technical teachers who are much in demand. Furthermore, another benefit of the investment made in these schools is their inclusion in the new Government scheme as regional centers for in- service teacher training (PCR, para. 5.13). In this case also, enrollment exceeds the appraisal estimate by 77%. General Secondary Schools 27. Social pressure for secondary education has been a far more impor- tant factor than was anticipated by the appraisal team. Far from preventing the expansion of the secondary schools as expected from its undertaking with IDA, the Ministry of Education took a policy decision in 1974 to operate more than one shift in all general secondary schools. This resulted in total enrollments exceeding the appraisal target by 58% in the project schools but affected the quality of instructional programs (PCR, para. 5.15). Secondary teachers to cope with the additional demand were not available and the per- centage of qualified teachers was well below appraisal estimates. 28. All of the project schools were converted into complete schools,!/ after the Association's approval of a request from the Borrower to add the upper cycle to one of the nine schools (which were expanded initially to remain lower cycle schools in the project). Only very few of the initial Directors of schools, trained within the project, are still in these posts. The project secondary schools are considered the best of their kind, and therefore the project is seen as having achieved its goal by helping with the implementation of a diversified curriculum (PCR, para. 5.18). 1/ Complete schools in this context include both cycles, grades 7-9 and 10-12. - 10 - 29. No systematic assessment of the impact of project schools has been done so far and no tracer studies were built into the project to follow up on graduates. In the light of this it could be useful to conduct an impact evaluation study at a later stage.. The completion mission was able to obtain significant information on the output of the schools in the case of the technical (industrial) schools!/ and, to some extent, the agricultural schools. It appears that about 70% of the graduates of the industrial schools obtained course-related employment, the remainder proceeded to the university for more advanced training. As for agriculture, it is estimated that at least 60% of the graduates enter the labor market and 40% go on to university studies. As regards the teacher training institutes, in addition to their present underenrollments (PCR, para. 5.05), it must be noted that doubts are raised, in the case of the institute in Quito (PCR, para. 5.05), that a growing number of students will enter the teaching profession, because many of the students, by attending both the institute and the university, may be tempted to exercise non-teaching options which their university qualifications make possible. However, one of the three teacher training institutes remain- ing in the project is producing high quality rural teachers and is emphasizing good bilingual education (Spanish/Quechua). IV. CONCLUSIONS 30. The greatest achievement of the First Education Project in Ecuador has been to establish, throughout the country, a diversity of educational institutions at the secondary level, which are considered, with a few excep- tions, to be the best of their kind in Ecuador (PPAM, paras. 24 - 27). The success of the schools in terms of software and organization, can be partly attributed to the technical assistance component and staff development with some continuity (at least during the first five to six years of project implementation). Care was taken to (i) include teachers and administrators in the staff development program, (ii) to design appropriate curricula/syllabi 1/ The Regional Office does not support an impact evaluation study for the following reasons: (i) the unusually long implementation period coupled with (ii) the vagueness of the project-s qualitative objectives, and (iii) the fragmented manner in which completion was achieved. In their view, an impact evaluation would be exceedingly difficult to carry out. Without underestimating the difficulty, OED still considers such a study desirable. The Borrower's view is that impact studies should be prepared with great care to ensure that we have a realistic idea of the quantitative results that can be obtained from such projects. (See Attachment II, final paragraph.) 2/ Limited follow-up surveys are occasionally made by most of these schools to determine their graduates' occupation one to two years after comple- tion of their studies. - 11 - curricula/syllabi for project schools, and (iii) to support school adminis- tration. Nevertheless, several of the expectations at the time of appraisal were not achieved, including efficient execution of project construction, availability of counterpart funds, adherence to school rationalization pro- grams and execution of adequate maintenance. The implementation of the project took an exceptionally long period of time and this resulted in a considerable cost overrun borne by the Government (PPAM, para. 4). 31. Except for the teacher training colleges, the project institutions now have enrollments well above appraisal estimates (PPAM, paras. 24 - 27). In some cases, because larger numbers have had to be handled, the quality of education has been affected. 32. The project has not been successful in instituting a permanent project implementation capability within the Ministry of Education; as from 1979 onwards, the PIU was absorbed by DINACE (Directorate for School Construc- tion) and reduced to two staff positions only. Experience with this project draws attention to the following: (i) the need for more realistic expectations at Appraisal/Agreement stages, particularly in relation to (a) the maintenance of build- ings, equipment and furniture (PPAM, para. 6); (b) the difficulty for a Government to contain the expansion of the secondary school enrollments (PPAM, para. 27); (c) the capability of the PIU to manage the physical implementation of a large diversified First Education Project without relevant technical assistance (PPAM, para. 22); (d) the likelihood or otherwise of effective coordination between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture for project implementation (PPAM, para. 6); and (e) the Government's ability to contribute counterpart funds (PPAM, paras. 6 and 7); and (ii) the importance of (a) closer and more systematic supervision/ monitoring and systematic site visits on the part of IDA, in the case of a project where a large number of institutions are scattered over the country, (PPAM, paras. 6 and 19), and (b) more specific objectives for the educational achievements of the project (PPAM, para. 23), and more precise targets for project-related staff development programs.  13 -Attachment I FORM NO. 788 (1-74) IRD LANGUAGE SERVICES DIVISION CONTROL No. - A3 ATE: December 23. 1982 ORIGINAL LANGUAGEt Spanish (Ecuador) DEPT* OFT JRANS.AJoR: EIMCM:: Translation of incoming telex dated December 20, 1982 from Lic. Manuel Avila Loor, National Directorate of Education Planning, Quito, Ecuador, to Mr. Shiv S. Kapur, OED. 51782. Despite problems during the execution of project 124-EC, I feel that it did achieve part of its objectives, notably enrollment targets, assistance toward modernizing the education system, the introduction of revised curricula, and improvements in the quality of general, agricultural and technical secondary education. Credit 124-EC was the first education project in Ecuador on this scale. Regards. National Directorate of Education Planning, Ecuador Lic. Manuel Avila Loor  - 15 - Attachment II February 2, 1983 E-692/83 OED (Ecuador) DB:kc Rev:JDVS CONSEJO NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO (National Development Council) General Secretariat of Planning Quito, Ecuador January 19, 1983 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur, Director, Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Dear Mr. Kapur: 1. I apologize for the delay in answering your letter of November 30, 1982, requesting comments on the PPAR for the First Education Project for Ecuador (Credit 124-EC). 2. The preliminary draft of this report shows clearly that the execution of this project in Ecuador caused major problems. It was a wide-ranging project that was not adequately prepared to ensure successful completion within the time limits initially agreed, nor were all the desired results achieved. 3. The report prepared by your office gives us food for thought, enabling us to accumulate experience for future projects. At the time the project for the 28 schools was being prepared and coordinated, we were facing problems of a technical nature and also in the area of project management and administration. Although such problems are not unique to Ecuador and in fact are found in many Third World countries, we are still not in a position, despite relatively developed technical and administrative management, to guarantee the successful execution of projects. - 16 - 4. I feel that the factors that led to the long list of problems indicated in the report are still with us. The technical and operational weaknesses and the inadequate design and formulation of projects persist. On this point, I believe that for future projects a more comprehensive idea should be obtained of the context in which any particular project is to be developed. In other words, variables of a political nature, for example, may in some cases imply changes that will mean defective execution, as was the case with the First Education Project for Ecuador. In addition, as regards education itself, the projects will need to take into account -- as the report itself so clearly points out -- possible political changes leading to decisions that will result in changes in educational policy orientations. 5. It is also necessary for international aid and financing agencies to include as part of the execution of educational projects the training of the personnel from the borrower country in the areas of management, administra- tion, project formulation and technique. This will provide the country with an improved technical infrastructure that will ensure to the counterparts -- in this case the World Bank -- the solvency of projects during execution, thus reducing costs not only in the projects themselves but also for the governments that are the recipients of aid. 6. It is also necessary in the formulation of projects to provide for the assessment of execution and supervision mechanisms, and the conditions under which they will operate. In other words, certain characteristics of the borrower institutions should be reviewed so as to ensure an acceptable level of exe.,.:-n. 7. As regdrds matters of a financial nature, the timeliness of disbursements and financial flows during the projects should be examined so as to identify with precision the strategy to be followed in relation to events that might adversely affect the progress of operations. Current budgetary - 17 - problems mean that governments cannot escape the need to establish a very precise order of expenditure priorities with the result that projects such as the one under discussion are denied funds or see their appropriations deferred. This treatment of budgetary appropriations in our countries is nothing new and clearly calls for a study of the facts that would provide a yardstick for use in the execution of projects and enable us to determine appropriate strategies. 8. Similarly, certain problems have to be faced as regards establishing education policies in such countries as Ecuador. For example, curriculum reform does not keep pace with changes in infrastructure or equipment; frequently these are unrelated variables that create problems in the overall implementation of projects. 9. These are a few of the issues that will need to be dealt with in the future to improve cooperative efforts with such institutions as the World Bank. Moreover, we should not overlook the weaknesses demonstrated by this project, as pointed out in the PPAR, that call for an improvement in the system under which technical assistance for projects is provided by such agencies as IDA. Appraisals in the field and impact studies should be prepared with great care to ensure that we have a realistic idea of the quantitative results that can be obtained from such projects as the current one. Sincerely, /s/ Vicente Martinez Chief, Education Section  ECUADOR COMPLETION REPORT OF THE FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Credit 124-EC) September 30, 1981 (Revised June 9, 1982) Regional Projects Department Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office  - 21 - I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 This Project Completion Report is based on the findings of two project completion missions that visited Ecuador. The first mission was carried out between February 14-27, 1977, by five mission members, and the second between March 9-20, 1981 by two mission members. There were two com- pletion missions for this project because the findings of the 1977 mission showed that substantial portions of civil works had not been completed. The first mission was sent on the basis of reports submitted by the Borrower indicating that the project was virtually completed. The mission found, how- ever, that only three out of the 28 project schools could be considered as having been completed. The remaining 25 schools had been left with un- finished works that ranged from 10 percent to 40 percent of total construc- tion. The association insisted on an extension of the project's closing date to September 1, 1979 so that the 25 schools could be finished. It deferred consideration of a new project in which the Ministry of Education was inte- rested in 1979 until the first project was completed. The situation improved after a new government assumed power in August, 1979. The project was finally completed by December 31, 1980. The Borrower did not prepare a completion report for the project. This was due primarily to the lack of Project Unit personnel because the Unit had been reduced since 1979 to two officials of the National Directorate for School Construction (DINACE). This absence of Project Unit personnel also made it difficult for the second completion mission to gather data, work with the project's files, and compile opinions about project implementation. II. PROJECT BACKGROUND Socio-Economic Setting 2.01 During the years of project generation (1962-1968) Ecuador's population was growing at an annual rate of 3.4% (among the highest in the world) and creating heavy pressures on the provision of educational services, especially in urbanized areas. The labor force, estimated at 1.6 million in 1965, was distributed as follows: agriculture 55%, small industry and handi- crafts 14%, and services 13%. An estimated 30% of the labor force was illiterate. Between 1961 and 1965 the average GDP growth was 4.9% per annum. In 1966 agriculture represented 35% of GDP and about 90% of foreign exchange earnings. Manufacturing was a small contributor to GDP, but expec- tations for increasing productivity were rising and employers were concerned about the availability of qualified workers and trained technicians. Sector Setting 2.02 Centralized control over public education (higher education excluded) was vested in the Ministry of Education which formulated and executed national educational policy. The educational system was considered antiquated and suffering from a multitude of deficiencies. A comprehensive Educational Development Plan for the decade of 1964-1973 sought to expand and modernize the educational and training system and to relate it more closely - 22 - to the socio-economic needs of the country. The major objectives of the plan were to: offer equal access to education, develop more programs that empha- sized student participation in the learning process, and improve the effi- ciency of the system. 2.03 Piimary education (grades 1-6) which was obligatory covered 80% of the 6-12 years age group, but the dropout rate was 78%. Curricular reform was introduced as a means of upgrading primary level instruction and goals were established to increase enrollments at an annual rate of 9.6%, primarily by extending incomplete rural schools so that they offered six years (grades) of instruction. More practical work for students was to be introduced by teachers. In addition, primary teacher training was to be improved by redu- cing the number of teacher training schools eliminating those schools whose programs were weak and wasteful. Secondary education (grades 7-12) consisted of two three-year cycles, the second of which provided diversified programs in general, technical, and agricultural education, as well as primary teacher training. Facilities were deficient and the teaching force was mostly unqua- lified and employed on a part-time basis. Nevertheless, curricular reform was introduced in 1966-1967 which aimed at opening the instructional process more to student participation, especially in science and vocational training courses. This, and an emphasis at strengthening vocational guidance programs, was to result in the improvement of both technical and general secondary education. These goals were unattainable given the dearth of facilities, equipment, and properly trained teachers. Higher education was marked by rapidly increasing enrollments which reached an annual rate of 13.5% for the period of 1963-1968. Liberal admission policies and subsidized tuition practices encouraged this type of growth. 2.04 The non-formal education system was enhanced in 1968 by the crea- tion of a semi-autonomous organization known as the "Servicio Ecuatoriano de Capacitacion Profesional" (SECAP). This agency's mission was to plan, coor- dinate and implement training programs for workers, supervisors, artisans, and small businessmen. Non-formal programs in adult education were also underway in the areas of literacy development and elementary work skills. Project Generation 2.05 The project had a gestation period of almost six years (1962- 1968). In May of 1962 a UNESCO mission went to Ecuador to review the sector and to advise the government on the identification of priority projects in education. Before the end of that year the Minister of Education visited the Bank to explore the possibilities of obtaining financial assistance to attend to some of the needs identified in the UNESCO mission report. This manifes- tation of interest, however, was not followed up either by the prospective Borrower or the Association. Actually very little was done to advance the preparation of the project until 1965. This was due primarily to the lack of continuity in the Ministry of Education where Ministers were being changed almost yearly. The Association, on the other hand, took no initiative to accelerate the process. Instead, it wisely assumed the position of waiting until the government showed evidence of its interest by presenting a formal proposal. Such a proposal was finally presented to the Association in October, 1965 in the form of an agricultural project. But three months later, in January of 1966, the director of the National Planning Office - 23 - visited the Bank and expressed his government's new interest in a project to improve secondary and higher education. Although this was indicative of the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Education and the National Planning Office, the Association decided to act on the new request. 2.06 A short reconnaissance mission visited Ecuador in June of 1966 and paved the way for two subsequent IDA/UNESCO missions that eventually assisted in preparing the secondary education project (higher education was not con- sidered). The request was submitted in August, 1967 and the project was appraised in October, 1967; negotiations followed in April, 1968. Board approval was obtained in June, 1968 and the Credit Agreement signed during the same month. The Credit became effective in August, 1968. Project Objectives 2.07 The project was designed to support the government's plan to expand and modernize its educational system and to have it respond more effectively to the socio-economic needs of the country, particularly in regard to agri- cultural, technical and primary teacher education. Specifically, it would further the government's strategy of providing quality technical education by concentrating resources in a smaller number of regionalized upper secondary vocational schools with boarding and staff housing facilities. The project would also improve the quality of general secondary education in line with revised curricula, including science and vocational subjects. It would include the construction, furnishing and equipping of 28 secondary schools as shown below. Type of No. of Construction Mode Staff Schools Grades Schools Extension Relocation New Boarding Housing Lower cycle 7-9 9 1 8 - - - Upper cycle 10-12 1 1 - - - - Both cycles 7-12 5 3 1 1 - - Agriculture 10-12 4 4 - - 230 27 Technical 10-12 4 3 1 - 360 - Teacher Training 10-12 5 1 4 - 540 - Total 28 13 14 1 1,130 27 The project would also include: (a) the creation of a project implementation unit; and (b) twelve man-years of technical assistance to assist in preparing and implementing a teacher/administrator training program. - 24 - 2.08 Enrollments would be increased in the project schools as shown in the table that follows: Enrollments At Projected Type of School Project Start Additional Total - 1974 Lower Cycle 615 6,785 7,400 Both Cycles 2,690 2,550 5,240 Agriculture 255 945 1,200 Technical 742 1,578 2,320 Teacher Training 2,162 1,278 3,440 2.09 With the implementation of the government's plan to consolidate vocational education into eight technical, four agricultural and ten teacher training schools as opposed to the existing 22, 16 and 38 respectively, output from the project institutions would provide for 64% of the estimated demand for agricultural graduates, 53% of technical graduates, and 50% of primary teacher needs. The plan to consolidate the vocational schools was aimed at curbing the proliferation that had developed among those schools, achieving greater economy by eliminating the small and inefficient schools, and making more effective use of existing resources. The expansion of enrollments in general secondary schools generated by the project was by design to be limited to what was needed to accommodate students displaced from the first cycle of the existing vocational schools of the project, and to meet shortages of places in the cities and regional capitals. 2.10 The objectives of the project were specific in regard to the expan- sion of enrollments and consolidation and improvement of facilities for voca- tional schools. They were less specific concerning expected qualitative improvements in curricular implementation, instructional programs, and effec- tiveness of teaching and administrative staff. Qualitative gains were pre- sumed to materialize through the inservice training program for teachers and administrators, the improvement of facilities, and the use of technical assistance, but there was vagueness about how this would happen. Modifications in the Project Content 2.11 During the course of implementation some of the project content was modified by changes in educational policies. Those modifications started in 1975 and involved changing many of the project schools from their original type to a different type as shown below. - 25 - Original Actual Type of School (1968) Type of School (1980) A. 5 Teacher Training 3 schools became two-year post- Schools grades 7-12 secondary teacher training institutes with facilities for in 1975. In 1980 these institutions adopted boarding students a new five-year program which includes three years of upper secondary and two years post- secondary. One institute still serves boarding students; two institutes do not serve boarders. 2 Schools became general secondary schools in 1975 with grades 7-12. Both schools abolished service to boarders. B. 4 Agricultural 2 schools added a two-year post-secondary Secondary Schools program and became agricultural institutes, with facilities for 2 schools remain the same. boarding students C. 4 Technical Secondary All 4 schools added a two-year technical Schools 3 schools teacher training program and became technical having facilities for institutes by 1977. Three institutes abolished boarding students service to boarders. D. 9 Lower Cycle General All 9 schools became complete secondary Secondary Schools schools with grades 7-12 between 1978 and (Grades 7-9) 1980. E. 1 Upper Cycle School No change. I/ F. 5 General Secondary No change. Schools with both cycles (Grades 7-12) More information on these modifications is given in Part V. 1/ From the initiation of the project this school (Simon Bolivar of Ambato) was considered only as an upper cycle school, but in reality it has always been part of a "complete" school. The lower cycle of this school is housed in a separate building, but both cycles are directed by the same administration. - 26 - III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Overview 3.01 The project required 12 years to complete, or three times more than the four years originally planned. The delay was caused mainly by the perio- dic lack of counterpart funds which accounted for about half of the delay, an ineffective Project Unit (about a third of the delay), procurement and con- struction problems. In 1971 the first delay was experienced due to the lack of counterpart funds. This led to the first extension of the closing date by three years to December 31, 1975. The stability of the Project Unit, which had been good, began to deteriorate in 1974 with the frequent changing of directors and architects. The result was an unstable Unit that contributed to managerial problems that impaired efficient project implementation. 3.02 A second extension of the closing date was made to the end of 1976. Reports received by the Association from the Project Unit indicated that the project would be completed by this new date; consequently, a comple- tion mission was organized in February, 1977. That mission found that 25 out of 28 project schools had not been completed. Consequently, the Association insisted that a third extension of the closing date be made for two years to September 1, 1979 to allow for the physical completion of the project. Despite an intensification of Association supervision during this two-year period little was accomplished towards completion primarily because of counterpart funding problems and the apparent lack of interest on the part of the government. The situation improved after a new government assumed power in August, 1979 and a final extension of the closing date was made to December 31, 1980. By allocating the necessary funds and developing a systematic plan to complete the pending civil works, the Ministry of Education, through its agency DINACE, completed the project in 1980 except for minor items that were finished in February, 1981. A second completion mission was carried out in March, 1981. Project Management 3.03 As stipulated in Section 4.01(d) of the Credit Agreement, a special Project Implementation Unit was established in 1968 within the Ministry of Education to manage the technical, financial, and administrative affairs of the project. While operating as an agency of the Ministry, the Unit was given independence in terms of dealing directly with the Minister, being able to rent separate offices and having a separate budget. This type of arrange- ment was maintained from 1968 to 1974 when the Project Unit was placed under the jurisdiction of the Directorate for School Construction (DINACE which until 1979 was called DECE). 3.04 The Project Unit consisted of a project director, an architect, an educator, an accountant, two construction supervisors, and three secre- taries. From 1968 to 1972 the Unit staff remained intact and thereby gained valuable experience, but from 1973 onward managerial turn-over was high. In - 27 - total the project had seven different directors and nine different archi- tects. Directors were changed for various reasons which included changes of Ministers of Education, resignations to study abroad, and lack of confidence on the part of the Minister. This lack of continuity in project leadership adversely affected the quality of management. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Project Unit proved less than effective in supervising, designs, construction, cost control and procurement. 3.05 Visits to project schools suggest that site selection was made by the Borrower without regard to the availability and installation of basic services (water, electricity) at acceptable costs, or to the provision of adequate drainage and sewerage systems. As a result, there were four cases where schools were located above the public water supply level, in areas where the supply pipes had insufficient pressure to ensure an adequate water supply, and where connection to public utility services proved costly. 2, Direct consequences of this situation are that final site development costs exceeded those of the appraisal report by nearly 250%, school construction was delayed while the problems were being resolved, and the affected schools had to operate initially with the constraints imposed by the problems of limited water and electrical services. Design of Schools and Supervision of Construction 3.06 Design work was carried out by four Ecuadorian consulting firms selected on terms and conditions approved by the Association. A review of plans, related documents and visits to 80% of the schools showed that certain design problems were common to all schools; i.e., wasteful circulation space, uneconomic construction systems, lack of standardization, defects in elec- trical design, and incomplete and poor design for detailing and finishing. In the case of the schools in Manta and Guayaquil the designers ignored the climatic conditions of the area. The plans were reviewed and approved by the Association. There is evidence that the Association recommended corrections in some cases, and even refused to approve the plans of one of the schools in Guayaquil (Otto Arosemena G6mez) for almost a year because of a design problem. In the end either the Association failed to detect some of these problems because they were too detailed, or the Project Unit ignored the suggestions of the Association, or the designers ignored the Project Unit whose supervision of their work was lax. The supervision missions of the Association prior to 1977 did not detect these problems. 3.07 Except for the initial two years and the last year of the project, local supervision of construction was negligible. Initially (1971-1972) con- struction supervision was carried out by the consulting firms that were doing the design work, but these refused to continue with supervision after a period of two years because the Borrower would not agree to their demands for an increase in professional fees. Consequently, the Project Unit assumed this responsibility but the results of its efforts were poor because of the 2/ Otto Arosemena Gomez of Guayaquil, Eloy Alfaro of Quito, Santiago de Guayaquil of Quito, Simo"n Bolivar of Ambato. - 28 - lack of appropriate and qualified staff. The Association approved the termination of the services of the consulting firms apparently feeling confident that the Unit would carry out the supervisory functions satisfactorily. This did not happen. The Association did not adequately monitor the quality of the Unit's supervision program so as to seek other alternatives if necessary. Construction 3.08 Tenders for civil works were advertised internationally, but bids were received only from national contractors. Construction schedules were adversely affected from 1971 on by sporadic shortages of counterpart funds and building materials. In general, the quality of construction of all schools visited ranged from good to poor, with 4 to 6 schools that could be classified as good. Common contruction faults included defects in reinforced concrete work, damp-proofing, metal and woodwork, plastering and painting, faults in determining levels and measurements. With regard to construction time, about seven schools were completed in 18 to 24 months; the remainder had delays of up to 8 years (including period of 1977-1980). 3.09 The first completion mission of 1977 found that 25 out of the 28 project schools were incomplete in stages that ranged from 10 to 40 percent of total construction, with most of the schools falling between the 10-15 percent range. As a result of subsequent missions, an inventory of pending construction work was drawn up and scheduled for completion by 1979. The most common construction items in the inventory were: completion of science laboratories which lacked permanently fixed tables, electrical connections, water supply and sinks, exhaust fans for fumes, water drains, and connections for propane gas; completion of workshops which had been left without triple-phase electric current to power shop machinery; completion of general electrical installations; and completion of systems for water supply and sewerage. 3.10 Despite their incomplete condition, the schools had been received by the Project Unit under provisional or final status, and had been put into use. At least five of the schools had been in use since late 1973. By the end of 1976 the Project Unit had reported to the Association that all of the schools had been completed except for some cases where minor items were in final stages of completion. The causes for this state of affairs are diffi- cult to identify, but the Project Unit clearly lost control over the process of supervision and reception of civil works. 3.11 Between 1977-1979 the Borrower again experienced difficulties with counterpart funds and the works specified in the inventory were not com- pleted, despite continuous pressure from the Association. It was not until the change of government in August, 1979 that a firm commitment was made by the new administration to complete all pending construction. DINACE updated the inventory of pending works, the Ministry of Education allocated the necessary funds, contracts were awarded, construction was closely supervised by DINACE, and all works were completed by the end of February, 1981. - 29 - Maintenance 3.12 In Ecuador, no specific budget exists for school maintenance. Principals must use whatever they can afford out of their general budgets for maintenance purposes, and that is limited because most of those funds are destined to pay for utilities and other operational expenses. The Credit Agreement contains a covenant that obligates the Borrower to ensure that buildings and equipment are properly maintained and repaired. In addition, Side Letter No. 2 of the Agreement stipulates that annual allocations will be provided to the schools for maintenance starting with 1% of construction cost one year after completion of civil works construction and rising to 1.5% five years later. This has not been done. 3.13 There is a wide variance in the maintenance practices of the project schools and the condition of the buildings varies accordingly. Six of the schools show evidence of good maintenance and about 14 schools can be regarded as fair. In the remaining eight schools maintenance is nonexistent and the physical plant is in poor condition. Five out of those eight schols have been vandalized extensively (two in Quito and three in Guayaquil). These vandalized schools are located in economically deprived areas where apparently the local administrators are weak and the support of local communities has not been forthcoming to help conserve the schools. Furniture and Equipment 3.14 Under the initial allocation of the proceeds of the Credit the sums of US$118,000 and US$438,000 were assigned for the procurement of local fur- niture and imported furniture respectively. The Association later agreed that furniture would be financed from national resources. To expedite furni- ture delivery DINACE set up its own manufacturing facility, but this did little to accelerate production and delivery because this operation developed slowly due to managerial and production constraints. Much of the furniture was of poor design and easily broken. Repair costs have been heavy. Having learned from its experience DINACE has improved its design of student desks by using tubular metal frames. As of March 19, 1981 the cost of furniture delivered to the project schools by DINACE was Sucres 26,619,045 (US$1,064,761) compared to the appraisal estimate US$1,008,000. 3.15 The process of procuring equipment started in 1969 with the prepa- ration of equipment lists and bidding documents, but it was not completed until 1976. Delays were mostly caused by procedural errors committed by the inexperienced Project Unit, and by lengthy local procedures that were required by the legal process. Although procurement was initiated in 1969, it was not until 1971 that the Project Unit published the invitations to bidders. This was done without Association approval and resulted in the invalidation of the bidding invitations because the bidding documents con- tained many errors. A second attempt at procurement was made in 1972, but it also failed when 12 out of 17 bidding firms were disqualified for various technicalities, and eight of the disqualified firms lodged protests with the Attorney General of Ecuador. After nine months of legal entanglements, the Borrower declared all bids invalid and initiated a new call for bids in 1973. This third attempt was finally successful and contracts were awarded in 1974. Some equipment began arriving in 1975 but the major portion was not received until 1976. - 30 - 3.16 This long delay resulted in a breakdown of the coordination between completion of civil works and deliveries of equipment. Those 22 project schools that became operational between 1973-1975 did not have the benefit of new equipment. They utilized their old and inadequate equipment and thereby limited the instructional improvements that the project was supposed to make possible. It was not untl 1977 when the schools had received most of their equipment, that the instructional process began to benefit from this compo- nent of the project. But even then the delivery of equipment was so disorga- nized that a state of confusion prevailed among the schools about the total amount of equipment that they were supposed to receive. The equipment was generally of good quality, especially science apparatus, workshop machinery and audio-visual machines. 3.17 School principals were frustrated at the lack of information and consultation between the Project Unit and themselves, both with regard to construction schedules and to furniture and equipment distribution. With respect to equipment, no inventories were provided to the schools until 1979 when DINACE began working to resolve inventory problems. By March 10, 1981 most of those problems had been resolved, but because of incomeplete records of equipment distribution some of the equipment could not be accounted for. 3.18 The maintenance of furniture and equipment in the project schools had the same constraints as those already cited for the buildings; namely, a lack of financial resources. The result is a variance of maintenance prac- tices among the schools but the general picture is poor. Furniture and equipment are kept in reasonably good condition in the technical schools and in about eight of the other schools. In the technical school of Ambato, for example, they have created a small factory to construct and repair student desks. In the remaining schools, however, the situation is less favorable and both furniture and equipment have deteriorated. Technical Assistance 3.19 The 12 man-years of specialist services provided under the Credit were utilized as foreseen. Three UNESCO experts, in general, technical and agricultural education were recruited. The technical and agricultural specialists each served the project for five years and the general educator for two years. The Borrower contacted UNESCO in 1970 to request technical assistance, and a year transpired before the first two specialists (technical and agricultural educators) joined the project in 1971. They were followed a year later by the general educator. When the last two specialists finished their contracts in December, 1975, two other experts were contracted under an agreement between the government and UNDP. One of these two specialists worked on the project one year while the other worked until 1978. 3.20 The work of the UNESCO specialists was partially frustrated by shortages of counterpart funds which paralyzed project operations, the fre- quent turnover in project staff, the absence of counterpart national staff and local bureaucracy. Despite those difficulties the specialists carried out a work plan that centered on the planning and implementation of an in- service training program for project school staff. That program placed emphasis on the retraining of principals and vice principals of the 28 proj- ect schools through workshops of 3-5 days that were held about every eight months between 1971-1975. An administrative manual was prepared as a - 31 - byproduct of the workshops. The specialists also provided technical assistance to adminitrators of individual schools as needs arose. 3.21 In the training of teachers the specialists worked closely with appropriate staff from the Ministry of Education in planning and implementing courses (see paras. 5.20-5.21 for staff training). The courses were pri- marily for the teachers in the fields of science and vocational education to prepare them to use the new facilities provided by the project more effec- tively. However, courses were also prepared and provided for teachers in other subject areas as well as for librarians, business managers and guidance counsellors. Lacking counterpart national staff they worked closely with the directors of the Ministry who headed the programs represented by the project schools (general, agricultural and technical education and teacher training). Special Covenants 3.22 The Credit Agreement covenants that received less than full com- pliance are listed below. A detailed listing of compliance with covenants is shown in Annex 2. (a) Section 4.01(a) - The Borrower did not carry out the project "with diligence, efficiency and regard to economy." (b) Section 4.01(c) - There is compliance with the maintenance covenant only to the extent that each individual school is able to implement its own maintenance program, since special funds for this purpose have not been allocated by the Ministry of Education (para. 3.12). (c) Section 4.02 - The Borrower eventually complied with this obligation for counterpart funds but it did not "at all times make available immediately as needed all funds." The most serious problem encountered by the project was the chronic shortage of counterpart funds. (d) Section 4.03 - Adequate record keeping was not maintained; although some improvement in this regard took place during the last year of the project. Association Performance 3.23 A total of 21 supervision missions were fielded by the Association during project implementation for a total of 118 days and 44.8 staff/weeks (excluding both completion missions). During the first three crucial years of implementation only one mission per year was carried out with each mission averaging five working days in duration. With the exception of 1977, when three missions were made after the first completion mission, there were never more than two missions per year, and in each of six of those years there was only one mission. During the period 1968 to 1977, 12 staff members partici- pated in supervision missions and, of these, only five participated in more than one of those missions. In short, the elements of intensive supervision and staff continuity in project supervision were not significant. In terms - 32 - of specialization the missions were mostly staffed by architects and educa- tors. From 1977 onward there was regularity of supervision as well as con- tinuity in that one staff member (an architect) participated in all of the eight missions mounted between 1977-80. 3.24 These observations point to weaknesses in the Association's super- vision prior to 1977. The Association became aware of the problems that plagued the project in due course, and intensive efforts were mounted to resolve such chronic difficulties as counterpart funding, procurement delays, approval of contracts, and frequent changes in project staff. Where super- vision fell short was in failing to detect the erroneous construction infor- mation that was being submitted (para. 3.10). Once the problem was detected in 1977, however, the Association pressed for a satisfactory completion of unfinished works, even though it meant extending the project repeatedly. This decision was sound in view of the performance of the present government in bringing the project to a close. Had this unfinished work not been com- pleted the utility of the school facilities would have been seriously reduced. 3.25 In due course the Ministers of Finance and Education and the President of the National Planning Council were informed by the Association of the incomplete status of the project schools, and of the need to finish those schools before the project could be considered completed. As stated previously (para. 3.09), the government agreed to complete the project and an inventory of unfinished works was prepared, and accomplished. There is no indication that a complete audit of the accounts of the project was ever done by the Government. IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCES Project Costs 4.01 The final cost of the project was US$16.1 million which represents an overrun of 57% above the appraisal estimate of US$10.2 million. A compa- rison between estimated and actual costs by category is given in the table that follows. - 33 - Estimated and Actual Costs US$'000 Category of Appraisal Actual Expenditure Estimate Cost Difference % Acquisition of Sites 167.3 167.3 0 Civil Works 6,078 9,043.6 +2,965.6 + 49 Professional Services 249 205.1 - 43.9 - 18 Furniture 1,008 1,064.8 + 56.8 + 6 Equipment 2,272 4,272.4* +2,000.4 + 88 Technical Assistance 300 460.2 + 160.2 + 53 Project Administration 280 864.0 + 584.0 +209 10,188 16,077.4 +5,889.4 + 57 (See Annex 3 for more details.) *Includes equipment for US$1.65 million financed with local funds. 4.02 The significant increases that resulted in all but two of the cate- gories were due to the extended implementation period which witnessed unusually high inflation. For site acquisition the increase resulted from the need to purchase one school site (all other sites were donated). In civil works there were also additional works that were not included in original contracts and extensive repairs to at least three schools. As stated earlier (para. 3.15), in 1971 an unsuccessful attempt was made to procure equipment, but it was not until 1974 that equipment contracts were awarded. During this delay equipment costs escalated. The anomaly of a reduction in professional services is due to the decision of the Borrower not to pay final fees to the construction consultants when a dispute about fees developed in 1974. Use of Credit Proceeds 4.03 Annex 1 shows the appraised and actual disbursement schedule for proceeds of the credit. Only 8% of the credit was disbursed by 1972, the year originally set for completion of the project. The Association agreed on three different occasions to change the disbursement percentage. In July of 1975 the first change affecting disbursements was made by permitting with- drawals from the Credit Account of up to 32% (from 28%) for Category 1-B (construction). The aim of this change was to restore the balance between the Association's financing and the funds provided by the government. In March of 1978 the disbursement rate for Category 2 (equipment) was raised from 28% to 50% to help the government meet claims from suppliers for equip- ment procured for the project. The disbursement rate for Category 1 (civil works) was set at 15%. In June of 1980 another disbursement change was approved by the Association in order to permit a more rapid disbursement of the remaining funds (US$482,510). At that time the disbursement percentage for Category 1 (civil works) was increased from 15% to 25% and Category 2 (equipment) remained at 50%. Despite this effort by the Association to facilitate the use of the credit proceeds, the Borrower continued to act slowly in the process. By the time the project closed a relatively small amount (US$18,037) was left undisbursed, and this was cancelled by the Association on April 30, 1981. - 34 - 4.04 After finding out in 1977 that disbursements had been made on the basis of erroneous reports from the Project Unit, the Association made a detailed review of all disbursements for civil works to determine if payments had been made for work that had not been completed. The report of that review (June 23, 1977) concluded that it was not possible to identify pay- ments for incomplete work because of the lack of adequate documentation in the files. Practically all of the incomplete construction involved sub- contracts, or additions to contracts which had not been reported to the Association. The Association, therefore, focussed its efforts on persuading the Borrower to complete the project properly. 4.05 On March 31, 1977 (a month after the first completion mission) the balance of undisbursed credit funds was US$706,723. In its insistence on having the project completed the Association informed the Borrower in April of 1977 that further disbursements against the credit would not be processed until the borrower provided detailed plans on how the completion was going to be achieved. It was not until March of 1978 that the Borrower complied with the requirements of the Association and the disbursement of funds was resumed. V. OPERATION OF PROJECT INSTITUTIONS Overview 5.01 During the long implementation period several policy changes were introduced which affected most of the project schools by changing their orga- nizational structure. All technical schools and some of the agricultural and teacher training schools were converted to post-secondary "institutes" but retained their secondary education programs. With two exceptions, all of these schools abandoned the practice of serving boarding students. The lower cycle general secondary schools were all changed to "complete"< secondary schools by adding the upper cycle. Estimated appraisal enrollments were sur- passed in all cases except the teacher training schools which are still in a period of transition due to more recent program changes. With few exceptions the project schools are considered among the best of their respective type. This is particularly true of the technical schools. Attainment of Educational Objectives 5.02 In general terms the project has attained the broad objective of assisting the expansion and modernization of the secondary education system. The extent to which this and other objectives were met by each type of proj- ect school is addressed in subsequent paragraphs. Two points must be made first, however, to place any treatment of objectives and outcomes in proper perspective. First, the unusually long implementatin period made it diffi- cult for the separate activities of the project to mesh together at a given time and thereby create a favorable environment for achieving established objectives. For example, staff training was stretched over a seven-year period (1970-1977), the arrival of equipment began in 1975 and continued into 1978, and school construction completion covered a period of seven years (1973-1980). Second, sector policy changes which began in 1975 altered the original structure of 20 out of the 28 project schools. For example, the technical schools were expanded to two-year post-secondary institutes while - 35 - still retaining one or both cycles of their secondary programs. Three of the five teacher training schools were transformed into two-year post-secondary institutes and the remaining two schools became general secondary establish- ments. The nine general secondary schools that were destined to have only the lower cycle (ciclo basico) were changed to schools having both cycles (from grades 7-9 to 7-12). Lastly, a change in the policy relative to board- ing schools has led all but two of the 12 schools that were provided with boarding facilities to abolish the enrollment of boarders. 5.03 The motivating factors that led to the abandonment of boarding services were the mounting problems that schools were experiencing with student discipline, the rising costs of maintaining boarding services and facilities, and a ministerial decree issued in 1973 which prohibited boarding students in secondary schools except in special cases. For the project schools this change started in 1976 in the teacher training schools and gradually extended to the other schools by 1978. By that time boarding facilities had been constructed and, in some cases, put into use. With the change these facilities were converted to serve numerous purposes such as special classrooms, offices for administrators and teachers, storage, and study areas. 5.04 Although these changes affected the project in various ways, they did not divert the project schools from their major objectives. In the case of the agricultural and technical schools, the addition of the post-secondary programs did not affect their regular secondary programs, enrollment patterns, or administrative organizations. The post-secondary programs gene- rally operate during separate shifts, thereby avoiding conflicts in schedul- ing the use of physical facilities. The 17 general secondary schools are the least affected by the changes. Those of this group that have become "complete" schools offering both lower and upper cycles, utilize separate shifts for each cycle. While this practice reduces the length of the instructional day for each shift, it maximizes the use of the physical facil- ities, and serves a greater number of students. 5.05 The teacher training schools have been more significantly affected by the changes that transpired during the life of the project. Because these changes resulted in two major program revisions before the project was com- pleted (1975 and 1980), the schools are only now beginning to experience stability. The unstable situation under which they had operated prevented them from achieving their enrollment targets. However, the Ministry expects the three schools to increase their collective enrollments by about 27% by 1983 (from 1,818 to 2,300). The appraisal estimate was 3,440 students on the basis of five teacher training schools, but two of those were converted to general secondary schools. Annex 4 shows how each type of school was changed and how enrollments developed. A summary of enrollment results in the project follows. - 36 - Type of Number of Projected Number of Actual School Schools Enrollment Schools Enrollment (1980) Agricultural 4 1,200 4 1,700 +42% Technical 4 2,320 4 4,100 +77% Teacher Training 5 3,440 3 1,800 -48% Lower Cycle 9 7,400 312,460 Lower and Upper Cycles 6 5,240 17 19,900 +58% TOTAL 28 19,600 28 27,500 +41% These results show that with the exception .of the teacher training schools, all of the other schools exceeded appraisal estimates by considerable margins. Practically all of the schools operate in two shifts. The 1980 figures pertain only to the secondary programs. Only approximate enrollment figures were available for the post-secondary vocational institutes, and they were generally low ranging from 25 to 70 per institute. Teacher Training Schools 5.06 As stated earlier, three of the original five normal schools in the project were converted into institutes in 1975, and the remaining two became general secondary schools. The rationale for this change was the improvement of the quality of the professional training program, and the need to produce a more mature graduate in terms of age. 5.07 Since their intitiation in 1975 the three teacher training insti- tutes have made slow progress in terms of adapting staff, organization, resources, programs and students to their modified role. Of the three, Alfredo P. Guerrero of San Pablo has been more successful, and is considered among the best of its kind in the country. This institute is well organized under a single administration and specializes in training rural teachers, many of whom are destined to teach in rural Indian communities. For this reason, the institute is developing a good bilingual education (Spanish/ Quechua) program. This program was not envisaged at appraisal. Of the three, it is the only institute that continues to enroll boarding students. The other two institutes have encountered more difficulty in adapting to the change of function. In Quito the institute (Instituto Normal Superior No. 1) has had to share about 60% of its facilities with another secondary school (Colegio Gran Colombia), which operates on a separate shift. This has caused organizational, administrative and maintenance problems. Another problem facing the Quito institute is the suspected growing number of post-secondary students who attend both the institute and the university at different times of the day. This means that the government pays twice for educating these students, and raises doubts that these students will enter the teaching profession after completing the two-year program. 5.08 The two former normal schools that have become general secondary schools (Juan Montalvo and Zoila U. de Landivar) have made that transition successfully. Juan Montalvo has maintained its status as an outstanding secondary school with good administration and a quality instructional program. The boarding facilities in both of these schools have been converted to staff offices and classrooms. - 37 - Agricultural Schools 5.09 The project has not succeeded in helping the Borrower reduce the total number of agricultural schools in the country. There are now 53 schools offering agriculture where there were 16 such schools when the project was initiated. Total enrollments in the four project schools exceeded appraisal estimates by 42% (see Annex 4). Lacking precise follow-up data, school principals estimate that at least 60% of the graduates enter the labor market and the other 40 percent enter university studies. Boarding students have been eliminated at all but one of the four schools, and there the number has been reduced from 200 to 80 (At Luis A. Martfnez of Ambato). Where boarding has been eliminated, the boarding facilities have been converted to special classrooms, store rooms, and offices. 5.10 In 1976 two of the schools (Luis A. Martfnez and Simon Rodrfguez) added a two-year post-secondary program and became Technical Agricultural Institutes. The change, which was approved by the Association, has streng- thened the training of agricultural technicians by providing two additional years of preparation in agronomy and livestock production. Two of the schools (Luis A. Mart(nez and Gallo Plaza) are also serving as regional centers for agricultural extension work and for teacher inservice training. While these results are not directly related to the original objectives, they represent examples where project schools have had good spillover effects. 5.11 One of the schools (Luis A. Mart(nez of Ambato) is considered a leader among the country's agricultural schools because of the effectiveness of its program and good administration. This school is maintaining its facilities in reasonably good condition, but the same cannot be said for the other three agricultural schools where buildings and equipment show evidence of neglect. Technical (Industrial) Schools 5.12 There is general agreement among national school authorities that the four technical schools of the project have become the leaders in tech- nical education in the country. 'This is attributed not only to the improve- ment of their infrastructure, but also to operational improvements. They have generally maintained good administrations which utilize the departmental system for organizing and managing their institutions. Although not systema- tized, at least two of the schools have developed procedures to check perio- dically with private firms to get feedback that may be used to improve train- ing programs, counsel trainees, retrain staff, and in general make the programs more relevant to the realities of the job market. Tracer studies are not conducted by the Ministry, but limited follow-up surveys are occa- sionally made by most of the schools to determine what their graduates have done one or two years after graduation. The results of such surveys indicate that about 70% of the graduates obtain course related employment, and the rest proceed to more advanced training at the university level. The prin- cipal of the school in Ambato stated that all of the graduates of his school who seek employment are easily absorbed by private industry and public entities. - 38 - 5.13 As stated earlier, the four technical schools have added two-year post-secondary programs and are now called technical intitutes. The school in Quito (Central Tecnico) was the first of the four project schools to add the post-secondary program in 1975 with the approval of the Association. By 1978 the other three schools had also made the change. The main purpose of the post-secondary training program is to prepare technical education teachers to alleviate the shortage that exists in that specialized teaching area. In 1980 the Ministry of Education initiated a technical teacher inservice training program which is not yet fully implemented, but which includes the use of the four project schools as regional inservice training centers. These unplanned developments are being garnered without impairing the original purpose of the project schools. 5.14 Total enrollments in the four schools have exceeded appraisal esti- mates by 77% and crowded conditions prevail especially at Central Tecnico of Quito. All of the schools operate in two shifts. The equipment that was acquired through the project is generally considered good, but all principals complain about the difficulty of providing proper maintenance because of budget constraints. General Secondary Schools 5.15 Total enrollments in the general secondary schools have exceeded appraisal estimates by 58% (see Annex 4). This gives some evidence of the demand for secondary education in Ecuador where enrollments in the sub-sector grow at an annual rate of 12%. There is no doubt that the 15 general secon- dary schools have assisted in absorbing some of the impact of this growth in enrollments, but this has been done at the expense of the quality of instruc- tional programs. All of the schools operate in two and sometimes three shifts, a practice that reduces instructional time by limiting a school shift to about five hours. The policy requiring schools to operate with more than one shift was adopted by the Ministry of Educaion in 1974 in response to the demand for student places. Such a policy was not foreseen at the time of project appraisal. In at least six of the schools the quality of the instructional programs has been adversely affected by a combination of over- crowding, poor student discipline and weak school administration. The Association has called this particular situation to the attention of the Ministry and suggested measures for improvement, but the matter has not been given much attention. 5.16 All of the 15 general secondary schools are now "complete" schools in that they offer both lower (grades 7-9) and upper cycles (grades 10-12). In the original plan nine of these schools were to,offer only the lower cycle, but in 1974 the Association approved a request from the Borrower to add the upper cycle to one of the nine schools (Santiago de Guayaquil) by using a double shift. In 1977 the first completion mission reported that a few other schools had either made a similar change or were planning to 'do so. By 1979 all nine schools had carried' out the change by using the double shift system, where one cycle would use the school plant in the morning and the other cycle would operate in the afternoon. 5.17 The quality of school administration varies widely among the 17 schools (this includes the two former normal schools), but in general it is from good to fair, except in about six schools where it is poor. School - 39 - administration received high priority in the staff training program carried out between 1970-1977, and it was given particular emphasis by the UNESCO technical assistance specialists from 1972 to 1975, when they worked closely with the project school administrators in planning and training activities. However, because of the long life of the project, only three of the original 28 principals are still directing project schools. The others have been replaced through the process of normal attrition. The Borrower created separate administrations in some cases for those schools operating with more than one shift and the results were negative, as administrators failed to exercise proper planning and coordination in using the common physical facilities. This resulted in administrative problems, disruptions in the instructional program and costly damage to the facilities. 5.18 The extent to which these project schools have fulfilled the general objective of helping to modernize secondary education is not clear, but the fact that they have contributed toward that goal is not in dispute. With the exception of those 5 to 6 schools that have failed to measure up to even the minimum achievement of objectives, the rest of the schools have made a contribution. These schools, and their counterparts in technical and agricultural education, are generally looked upon as among the best of their kind. They have until now, possessed some of the best facilities and programs that the secondary level has at its disposal. The national curri- cular "reform" of 1964, under which the project developed, was implemented with more success in the project schools than in most of the other secondary schools of the country. The reason for this was that the project schools were much better prepared to carry out one of the principal goals of that reform, i.e., to implement the concept of practical classes in science and vocational subjects and thereby achieve a more balanced curriculum. The project schools acquired this advantage through the integrated design of the project, which included the simultaneous improvement of physical plant, equipment, and staff training for administrative and teaching personnel. Each of these three components focused on the same objective: to give the student a greater participatory role in the teaching-learning process through instructional methods that made proper use of well equipped science labora- tories, vocational shops and other school facilities. The project, there- fore, achieved its goal of improving the implementation of a diversified curriculum. Unfortunately, some of the potential effectiveness of the proj- ect was dissipated by the many implementation problems described previously, but enough of that potential was realized in most of the project schools to put them ahead of most other schools. 5.19 There is no evidence that the general secondary schools of the project have had any positive spillover effect on the rest of the secondary education system. The Ministry of Education has not taken any initiative to replicate any of the more successful programs found in some of the project schools. As in the case of the agricultural and technical schools, the Ministry should use some of the best general secondary schools as regional centers for teacher inservice training, thereby exposing more teachers to what can be done with better training methods and facilities. This could be linked to the need to prepare teachers to implement some revisions that were made to the secondary curriculum in 1979. Those revisions aim primarily at: giving teachers more flexibility in adapting the national curriculum to local needs; motivating teachers to use updated teaching methods; and, as in the 1964 "reform," changing instruction so as to give the student a more active - 40 - role in the classroom. All of those aims are attainable in those project schools that have met the original objectives of the project. Staff Training 5.20 The training program for administrators and teachers of the project schools started modestly in 1969 but gained momentum after the arrival in 1971 of the UNESCO specialists. Most of the training courses were provided between 1973-1977 with 1977 marking the end of the program. Various institu- tions and organizations collaborated with the program by providing teaching personnel and facilities; these included the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, universities, the National Vocational Service (SECAP), the Organization of American States, UNESCO, consulting firms, and some firms that supplied equipment for the schools. 5.21 Records of the evaluation of the courses were not found by the completion missions but some persons who participated in those courses hold the opinion that they were generally satisfactory. Those persons also point out that the effectiveness of the courses was enhanced by their connection to a developing project that also included buildings and equipment. They observed that such an integrated approach had never before been used in a major education project in Ecuador and that it was a good experience for the educational system. The courses covered a wide range of subjects in shool administration; general teaching principles; teaching methods in science, and technical education; shop administration; equipment use and maintenance, and accounting. A general summary of the scope of the program follows: Staff Training Program for Project Schools Total No. Total No. Total No. Length of Courses Participants Course Hours Courses Total Cost 60 2,250 13,896 20 to $13,954,000 1,000 hours (US$158,160) These training results cannot be compared with any targets because sucht targets were not established in the project. - 41 - Operating Costs 5.22 The table below shows actual and appraisal estimates of the operational costs per student by type of school: a/ Project Appraisal All Public Schools Estimate Schools ---------------- Us$---------------- (1977) (1974) (1977) General Secondary Schools (excluding former teacher training schools) 113 143 92 Agricultural Schools 288 270 107 b/ Technical Schools 150 270 107 b/ Teacher Training (San Pablo only) 307 148 370 a/ 1977 best available data. b/ Not strictly comparable because statistics were available only for 29 agricultural, 29 technical and 60 commercial schools. Generally, the operating costs for the project schools compare favorably with national averages, but are well below the appraisal estimates measured in 1970 prices. Large enrollments and class sizes have resulted in higher student/teacher ratios (except in the agricultural and teacher training schools) than envisaged in the appraisal, and this has contributed to the lower costs. In fact, the unit costs for general secondary and technical schools were low in terms of adequately supporting their respective programs. A comparison of actual and appraisal estimates of student/teacher ratios follow: Student/Teacher Ratio Type of School Appraisal Estimate Actual Difference General Secondary 27:1 31:1 +4 Agricultural 23:1 19:1 -4 Technical 19:1 28:1 +9 Teacher Training 25:1 18:1 -7 - 42 - VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Project Generation 6.01 Project Scope. In retrospect it seems clear that the scope of the project was too ambitious for a Borrower who had not had previous experience with integrated project implementation under Association financing. It included a cross-section of the entire secondary education system, including that part that pertained to primary teacher training. Performance probably could have been better if the number and types of schools had been more limited, for example, if project scope had been limited to general secondary and technical education, and the total number of project schools had been around fifteen. This could have made the project easier to implement and finance. The experience in this project underscores the importance of limiting the scale of initial projects. 6.02 Project Objectives were specific in terms of enrollment patterns and the consolidation of secondary vocational education, including primary teacher training. However, objectives were too general in regard to educa- tional programs, as they primarily aimed at modernizing secondary education through diversification and reforming the teaching process by stimulating greater student participation. More specific objectives should have been developed in regard to student achievement, staff training, and tracer studies. Other objectives should have aimed at replicating some of the successul programs and practices of the project schools in non-project schools. Project Implementation 6.03 Unforeseen factors that adversely affected the project during implementation included political instability, rising inflation, and an unusually unstable Project Unit. Political changes during the life of the project not only resulted in frequent changes of Ministers of Education, they also impaired the development of a strong commitment to the project on the part of the government. Escalating inflation contributed heavily to the government's difficulties in providing national counterpart funding for the project on a timely basis. Lastly, the complete breakdown of any semblance of continuity in the leadership of the Project Unit obstructed all aspects of implementation. 6.04 The Association overestimated the implementation capacity of the government and the managerial capacity of the Project Unit. The present policies of the Bank/IDA which require detailed project preparation before commitment of funds, which were non-existent when this project was prepared, would have provided early indications as to the seriousness of this problem. The placement of the Project Unit, whereby it was isolated from the Ministry of Education, led to adverse effects. It created jealousies within the Ministry toward the Project Unit which damaged coordination and the image of the Unit. It made it difficult for Ministry staff to identify with the project and give it their support. - 43 - 6.05 Provision of infrastructure proved to be the most serious oper- ational problem faced by the Project Unit. Although the problem of insuffi- cient counterpart funding was the primary cause for delays in the construc- tion program, the poor management of that program by the Project Unit served to compound the difficulties that were encountered. The weakness in the process of local supervision of construction resulted in omissions in the majority of the project schools, which had to be rectified after they were detected in 1977. This indicates the importance of maintaining a sound and efficient supervisory process that will protect the investments made in construction. 6.06 The covenant on maintenance of school building has not been fully met by the Borrower (para. 3.12). The Ministry of Education should undertake to comply with this covenant. The Association, for its part, should seek ways to achieve more effective agreements with the government on maintenance. 6.07 Procurement of furniture and equipment by the Project Unit was ineffectual primarily because of the inexperience of the staff. Technical assistance from the Association or some other source would have been useful, especially during the process of international competitive bidding. The Association exerted a great deal of effort in advising the Unit on the correct use of the process, but continuous assistance over one or two months was needed to guide the Unit through the process. To this must be added the need to develop an effective system for equipment inventory control, either at the start of the project or before the equipment arrives. 6.08 The performance of the Association could have been improved by intensifying supervision during the early years of implementation, and by verifying the status of school construction during later stages of implemen- tation. More intensive supervision could have detected weaknesses in imple- mentation and assisted in applying appropriate remedies before larger problems developed. The Borrower's support of the project was high during' those initial years, and its receptivity to the views and suggestions of the Association was also positive. During the later stages more on-site super- vision could have detected errors in the reports from the Project Unit rela- tive to the completion of civil works. The need for effective financial control during implementation stands out clearly in this project, since the Borrower's accounting and auditing capacity proved to be inadequate. In regard to the performance of the Association in assisting and encouraging the Borrower to resolve the problems of implementation, the record shows that it acted with diligence, patience, and appropriate insistence. The decision to extend the project beyond 1977, in restrospect, was appropriate. It would not have been in the best interest of the Borrower if the Association had cancelled the project at any time after about 1974, because too much had been invested in it by that time, and the government might not have been able to complete it with its own resources. Project Outcomes 6.09 Educational and operational outcomes in the project schools have been difficult to trace because of the long implementation period and the scarcity of recent educational data in Ecuador. The Ministry of Education has not conducted any studies to evaluate the impact of the project; nor does it conduct national student testing programs and tracer studies on an ongoing - 44 - basis that would have provided data for analysis. Data collection was further complicated because the Project Unit has been inoperative since 1979, except for those persons managing the completion of constructon. 6.10 Educational policy changes affected the organizational structure of most of the schools but they did not alter the design of the secondary educa- tion programs. For example, the addition of post-secondary programs in the vocational schools has not had any effect on their programs at the secondary level. The only group of project schools that have experienced difficulties because of policy changes are the teacher training institutes, where the changes have kept the institutions from meeting their enrollment targets and from developing stabilized programs. This indicates the importance of con- sidering at the appraisal stage the effects of possible alterations in the educational structure. The likelihood of educational policy changes points to the need to design project facilities that have flexibility so as to be used for multiple rather than single purposes. 6.11 The elimination of boarding services, not only in the project schools but throughout the system, marks a reversal of the boarding policy under which the project was designed. The schools affected by this change have adjusted to it without major problems. There is no evidence indicating that the elimination of boarding services has deprived a significant student population of educational opportunities. The long term feasibility of board- ing should have been investigated more thoroughly at appraisal. 6.12 Policy changes relative to boarding services were closely tied to another change whereby the government modified its policy toward the consoli- dation of secondary educational services. The project schools were to con- tribute to a consolidation effort that would regionalize vocational secondary education. That goal has been abandoned primarily because of the rapid growth of secondary education, and also because of local resistance to con- solidation. This underscores the difficulty of achieving consolidation objectives in educational projects. It also stresses the importance of making a good analysis at the time of appraisal of the prospects for gaining such objectives. 6.13 In operational terms the quality of the project schools varies from poor to good. Those schools that are doing well are generally considered among the best of their kind in the country. The government should utilize these good schools by appropriately replicating some of their programs and practices in other schools, or by using them, as in the case of agricultural and technical institutes, as centers for teacher inservice training. In those project schools whose quality is poor the government should strive to protect its investment by strengthening the administrative staff, establish- ing some inservice training for teachers, maintaining a good maintenance program for physical facilities, and developing community/school programs aimed at curbing vandalism and student discipline problems. In regard to the administrators of the schools the project showed that there was a need to provide continuous administrative training to allow for staff turnover and to train new administrators. 6.14 Despite its many problems and shortcomings while under implementa- tion, the project seems to have achieved a modicum of success on the basis of - 45 - having met most of its objectives; i.e., enrollment targets, helping to modernize the system, application of the revised curricula, improving the quality of general secondary, agricultural, and technical education. Where the project fell short in meeting its objectives was in the improvement of primary teacher training and regional consolidation of vocational education. In the latter case the policy on consolidation was changed. In regard to the teacher training schools, the project may eventually fulfill its objective when those schools are allowed to carry out their revised programs during the next five years without further changes.  - 47 - ANNEX 1 ECUADOR FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT Credit 124-EC Completion Report Actual and Estimated Disbursements by Year US$'000 IDA Actual Actual as Fiscal Total Appraisal Percentage of Year Disbursement Estimate Estimate 1969 0 100 0 1970 40 1,700 1.3% 1971 100 4,300 2.3% 1972 410 5,100 8.0% 1973 1,080 21.0 1974 1,250 24.5 1975 2,630 51.5 1976 3,520 69.0 1977 4,020 78.8 1978 4,520 88.6 1979 4,680 91.7 1980 4,720 92.5 1981 5,081:* 99.6 * The final amount undisbursed was US$18,037.15. This was cancelled on April 30, 1981.  - 49 - ANNrX 2 Page 1 of 3 ECUADOR Credit 124-EC Compliance with Credit Covenants Conditions Met Yes, No, Section Content In Part Comments 4.01(a) Project to be carried out No Project took 12 years to with diligence, efficiency complete and cost was 57% and regard to economy. above appraisal estimates. 4.01(b) Project schools to promote Yes Educational objectives objectives of Borrower and were not totally met because staffed by qualified of policy changes that trans- teachers and adminis- pired during long project trators. implementation. 4.01(c) Buildings and equipment to In Maintenance responsibility be well maintained and Part was delegated to individual renewals and repairs to schools with result thac be made. about 30% of schools ignored maintenance and about 70% of them have complied. 4.01(d) Establish and maintain Yes Project Unit functioned an adequately staffed from 1968 to 1979 after Project Unit to properly which it wqs reduced to execute and supervise the only two positions. project. 4.01(e) Employ qualified/ In These consultants were experienced architec- Part employed until 1974. tural consultants acceptable to Association and Borrower. 4.01(f) Project to be carried out Yes by contractors acceptable to Borrower and Association. - 50 - ANNEX 2 Page 2 of 3 Conditions Met Yes, No, Section Content In Part Comments 4.01(g) Borrower to obtain Yes Association agreement on plans, specifi- cations, contracts and work schedules for construction, master lists of equipment and furniture and modifica- tions thereof. 4.02 Borrower shall at all In Counterpart funding was times make availzble Part a constant problem in immediately as needed implementation and caused all funds, facilities, most of the delays encoun- services and other tered by the project. resources for carrying Special funds for mainten- out project and for ance have not been provided. operation and mainten- ance of the schools and facilities of project. 4.03 Borrower to maintain In Record keeping became adequate project Part faulty as time elapsed and records to identify changes in management took goods, to record place. Files for the Project progress, to show good are now incomplete and dis- accounting practices. organized in DINACE. and all Project information requested by the Association shall be provided. 4.04 Borrower and Association In Information provided by the shall provide each other Part Borrover in regard to with Project information, construction status vrior to inform each other of 1977 was found to be incorrect. problems affecting the Project, and Association to have opportunities to visit Project. 4.05 Borrower to take out Yes insurance of buildings and facilities and insure imported goods against marine hazards. - 51 - ANNEX 2 Page 3 of 3 Conditions Met Yes, No, Section Content In Part Comments 4.08 Borrower to have Yes title to all land used to carry out Project and no contracts for construction to be awarded unless title to land is held. 4.09 Borrow to employ six Yes By mutual agreement 3 advisors acceptable to advisors were employed. Association to assist Two served from 1971 to in training administra- 1976 and one from 1972 to tors and staff of project 1974. Two replacements schools. served from 1976 to 1978. - 52 - ANNEX 3 ECUADOR 124-EC Final Total Costs Based on Data Supplied by DINACE's Accounting Office (as of March 18, 1981) Sucres '000s US$'OOOs Site Acquisition 4,182.2 167.3 Design 4,674.5 187.0 Soil Studies 451.9 18.1 Building Construction: (i) as of Dec. 31, 1977 176,909.6 7,076.4 0 (ii) from January 1978 to Dec. 1980 49,179.8 1,967.2 Furniture 26,619.0 1,064.8 Equipment (i) financed from the proceeds of the Credit 65,402.5 2,616.1 (ii) financed with local funds 41,407.6 1,656.3 Technical Assistance 11,505.4 460.2 Project Administration (i) until Dec. 31, 1977 9,543.7 381.7 (ii) since Jan. 1978 to Feb. 1981 12,056.7 482.3 TOTAL 401,932.9 16,077.4 - 53 - ANNEX 4 ECUADOR Enrollment Comvarisons and Changes in School Type Name and Estimated Actual No Type of School Enrollment Enrollment Change Has Changed to: Agricultural Schools (grades 10-12) 1. Luis A. Martinez 300 610 Agricultural Institute* 2. Simon Rodriguez 300 289 Agricultural Institute* 3. Galo Plaza 300 382 X 4. Odilon Gomez 300 428 X Sub-total 1,200 1,709 (+42%) Technical Schocls (grades 10-12) 5. Central de Quito 720 1,555 Technical Institute* 6. Simon Bolivar 720 904 Technical Institute* 7. Arboleda Martinez 320 466 Technical Institute- 8. Bolivar de Guayaquil 560 1,200 Technical Institute* Sub-total 2,320 4,125 (+77%) Teacher Training Schools (grades 7-12) 9. Juan Montalvo 1,000 (1,643)-/ 2 cycle general secondary 10. Manuela Canizare-- 1,000 721 Teacher Training Institute* 11. Angel P. Chavez 520 420 Teacher Training Institutek 12. Zoi1a U. de Landivar 520 (1,516)2/ 2 cycle general secondary 13. Alfredo P. Guerro - 400 677 Teacher Training Institute* Sub-total 3,440 1,818 (-48%) General Secondary Lower Cycle (grades 7-9) 14. Otto A. Gomaz 1,000 921 2 cycle general secondary 15. Francisco Orellana 1,000 1.956 2 cycle general secondary 16. Eloy Alfaro, QLIto 1,000 915 2 cycle general secondary 17. Santiago Guayaquil 1,000 1,075 2 cycle general secondary 18. Sucre 520 485 2 cycle general secondary 19. Rocafuerte 520 878 2 cycle general secondary 20. Eloy Alfaro, Esmeraldas 960 1,039 2 cycle general secondary 21. Eugenio Espejo 1,000 1,668 2 cycle general secondary 22. Andres F. Cordova 400 544 2 cycle general secondary General Secondary Upper Cycle (grades 10-12) 23. Simon Bolivar, Ambato 560 1,032 X General Secondary Both Cycles (grades 7-12) 24. Benigno Malo 1,240 1,395 X 25. Pedro V. Maldonado 1,160 1,537 X 26. Atti II Pillahuazo 1,160 1,594 x 27. 8 de Noviembre 520 1,075 x 28. Abelardo MoncaFo 600 705 x Sub-total 12,640 19,978 (+58%) Total 19,600 27.630 (+41i) * Institutes have upper cycle secondary and 2 years post-secondary (grades 10-12+2). 1/ Manuela Canizares was eliminated as a project school in 1975 but remained in its old location as a general secondary school fL.r girls. 2/ Added to sub-total enrollment of Ceneral Secondary Schools. 3/ Created in 1975 to replace Canizares