Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4541 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UPPER VOLTA - SECOND RURAL DEVELOPHENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 640-UV) June 15, 1983 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet 1 cubic meter (m3) = 35.31 cubic feet 1 hectare (ha) = 100 ares = 2.47 acres 1 kilometer = 2.62 miles 1 ton (t) = 2,204 pounds (lb) ABBREVIATIONS BADEA = Arab Bank for Economic Development ERR = Economic Rate of Return FAC Fonds d aide et de Coop6ration (French Assistance) HAER Rural Development Work Department NGO Non-governmental Organization ORD Regional Development Organization RDF = Rural Development Fund RDF1 = First Rural Development Bank Project RDF2 Second Rural Development Bank Project UNDP = United Nations Development Programme NAME OF CURRENCY (abbreviation): CFAF Currency Exchange Rate: - Appraisal Year Average : US$1.00 = 238.98 - Intervening Years Average : US$1.00 = 223.83 - Completion Year Average : US$1.00 = 271.72 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UPPER VOLTA - SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 640-UV) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface .................................................................. i Basic Data Sheet ...................................................... ii Highlights ............................................................. iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. SUMMARY ...................................... ....1....... Background .................................... ...1...... 1 The Project and Its Objectives .......................... 2 Project Implementation .................................... 2 Project Impact ............................... ....3...... 3 II. MAIN ISSUES .................................. ....4...... 4 A. The Development Strategy .............................. 4 B. Coordination Among External Assistance Agencies ....... 6 C. Technical Package .............................7......7 D. Institutional Aspects ............................... 8 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Background ................................................... 13 II. Project Formulation .......................................... 14 III. Implementation ............................................... 17 IV. Evaluation of Project Impact .................................. 28 V. Institutional Performance ..................................... 33 VI. Special Issues ................................................. 36 VII. Changes in Repeater Projects .................................. 39 VIII. Bank Performance ............................................. 39 IX. Conclusions ....... .......** * **............ ............ 40 Annexes Map IBRD 11952 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UPPER VOLTA - SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 640-UV) PREFACE This is a performance audit report of the Second Rural Development Project in Upper Volta, for which Credit 640-UV was approved in June 1976 in the sum of US$9.4 million and closed fully disbursed in June 1982. The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated April 20, 1982, prepared by the West Africa Regional Office. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (No. 1068b-UV) dated May 24, 1976, the President's Report (No. P-1858-UV) of May 28, 1976, the Credit Agreement dated June 21, 1976, the Appraisal Report of the Third Rural Development Fund Project (3621-UV) of February 24, 1982 and the PCR. Internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files have also been consulted and Bank staff associated with the project have been interviewed. An OED mission visited Upper Volta in November 1982. The mission held discussions with officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Rural Development Fund, the project executing agency. The information obtained during the mission was used to test the validity of the conclusions of the PCR. A copy of the draft PPAR was sent to the Borrower for comments on March 24, 1983, and copies were also sent to the co-financiers, BADEA, Dutch Aid and FAC. No comments were received. The audit finds that the PCR covers adequately the project's salient features and the PPAM generally agrees with the conclusions. In addition to summarizing the objectives and results of the project, the PPAM expands upon the successful development strategy, explains the difficulty of coordi- nation among external assistance agencies, and identifies some institutional aspects which have importance to this as well as other rural development projects in the same region. The valuable assistance provided by the Government of the Republic of Upper Volta and the project staff met during the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UPPER VOLTA - SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 640-UV) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of Expectations Current Estimate Appraisal Estimate Project Coats (US$ million) 16.20 18.54 114 Credit Amount (US$ million) 9.40 9.40 100 Date Physical Components Completed 06/30/80 09/30/81 131/a Proportion Completed by above Date (%) 100 48 - 164/k Economic Rate of Return (%) - Land Development Work 21 17 80 - Land Development & Water Supply 16 12 75 Institutional Performance Generally good Agronomic Performance Generally good Beneficiaries - Farm families 15,000 20-23,000 140 - Water Supply n/a 125,000 - PROJECT DATES Actual or Original Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files/Timetable Government Application Negotiations 04/26/76 Board Approval 05/06/76 - 06/08/76 Credit Agreement Date 06/21/76 Project Agreement Date Effectiveness Date 09/20/76 - 01/24/77 Closing Date 12/31/80 12/31/82 CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) 2.7 4.7 7.4 9.1 9.4 9.4 9.4 Actual (US$ million) 0.6 1.6 3.2 6.3 8.1 8.9 9.4 Actual as percentage of Estimate 24 34 44 69 86 95 100 Date of Final Disbursement: Principle Repaid: (US$ million) 0 MISSION DATA Date No. of Mandays Specializations of Performance Types of Mission (Month/Year) Persons in Field Represented/c Rati /d Trend/e Problemsa Identification 10/74 3 45 n/a - - - Preparation 04/75 3 n/a n/a - - - Appraisal 10/75 5 75 a,b,c - - - Subtocal 120 Supervision I 11/76 1 2.5 a 1 1 0 Supervision II 04/77 2 10 a,b 2 1 F,M Supervision III 10/77 2 10 a,b 1 1 M Supervision IV 02/78 1 2.5 a I I F,T Supervision V 10/78 2 10 a,c 1 1 T Supervision VI 03/79 2 10 a,c 1 1 T Supervision VII 10179 1 5 a 2 2 T,F Supervision VIII 05/80 1 5 b 2 2 F Supervision IX 11/80 1 5 a 2 2 F Supervision X 05/81 1 7 a 2 1 F Supervision XI 11/81 1 6 a 2 2 F Subtotal 73 Total 193 OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Republic of Upper Volta Executing Agencies Rural Development Fund Fiscal Year October 1 - September 30 Follow-on Project Name Third Rural Development Fund Project Credit Number 1218-UV Amount (US$ million) 16.0 Date Board Presentation 03/30/82 /a From the date of Board approval. b According to component. /c a - agriculturist; b - agricultural economist; c - financial analyst. T 1 - problem-free or minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; 3 - major problems. e 1 - improving; 2 - stationary; 3 - deteriorating. /f F - financial; M - managerial; T - technical, P - political, and 0 - other. - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UPPER VOLTA - SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 640-UV) HIGHLIGHTS This was the second of a series of three rural development projects aiming at financing a variety of small and widely scattered productive invest- ments. The project objective was to increase agricultural production and improve water supplies in the Mossi plateau, where two-thirds of the Voltaic population live on about one-third of the available land. The project's main components included erosion control works, the development of bottomlands, construction of small irrigation schemes, village storehouses and wells, agricultural credit, training and technical assistance. One of the criteria in investment selection was the willingness of the people concerned to provide free labor for investment execution. Overall and despite one year delay in project start-up and imple- mentation, the project was a success; most of its investment program was implemented as planned. Participation by the local population in project works increased considerably as project benefits became apparent. At project completion, actual project cost exceeded appraisal estimates by about 14%, mostly because of higher than expected cost of management and technical assistance. More than 20,000 families, or 30% above appraisal projections, have participated in project investments which have a direct impact on agricultural production. In addition the water supply component provided important social benefits to about 125,000 people. Despite shortages of fertilizer and other inputs, due to Government financial constraints, the production of cereals significantly increased, while paddy production remained lower than expected. The overall project ERR is now estimated at 12% compared with the appraisal estimate of 16%. The project impact on institution building was positive and resulted in strengthening the institutions involved in rural development. The project success was mostly due to a sound development strategy based on a grass-roots organization at the village level and including parti- cipation by the local population, both in decision-making and free labor. The questions of project replicability and the need for continuous external aid for project survival remain, however, an important issue because of the Government's limited financial resources and the relatively high cost of project management. The following points may be of particular interest: - the discrepancies in the development approaches of different donors had a detrimental effect on the project by undermining the project authority's policy and causing confusion among beneficiaries (PPAM, paras. 19-21, and PCR, paras. 3.12 and 6.02); - iv - - the project introduced technical packages which were limited in number but well adapted to the local environment (PPAM, para. 23); - the problem of supporting the organizations responsible for agri- cultural development remains unresolved once Bank assistance is withdrawn (PPAM, paras. 25-29); - the project suffered from a lack of relations and cooperation with the various Research Institutes (PCR, para. 8.02). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM UPPER VOLTA - SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 640-UV) I. SUMMARY Background 1. Upper Volta is classified by the United Nations as one of the 25 least developed countries. In 1974, average GDP per capita barely exceeded US$80 (it was about US$210 in 1980); agriculture and livestock provided a living for 96% of the population (5.6 million) but generated less than 45% of the GDP. Agricultural output is low because of erratic rainfall and a pro- longed dry season, generally poor and shallow soils and farming systems based on shifting cultivation with little use of cash inputs. 2. In June 1972 the First Rural Development Fund Project (RDF I, Credit 317-UV) was approved, and the credit of US$2.2 million assisted in financing a variety of small productive investments scattered all over the country and in which the population was genuinely interested. The project was conceived as the experimental first phase of a larger program, and included the construction of wells, small village storehouses for farm inputs, small irrigation schemes and erosion control works, the development of bottomlands for rice cultivation, upgrading of feeder roads and a number of unidentified sub-projects. One of the essential criteria in sub-project selection was the interest of the people concerned, expressed through their willingness to provide free labor for sub-project implementation. 3. Project implementation took over four years instead of the estimated three. The overall implementition rate differed greatly between sub-projects, ranging from 17% of appraisal estimates for small irrigation schemes to 140% for erosion control. After some initial hesitation, farmers generally sup- ported most of the sub-projects and provided free labor as foreseen. At completion, the project ERR was estimated at 19% (16% at appraisal) and had benefited about 230,000 people. The PPAR's1/ main finding was that this highly innovative project had been successful, with a few exceptions, in implementing diversified and scattered sub-projects. The PPAR also mentioned, however, that the problems of supporting the organizations responsible for both project administration and maintenance of investments remained unre- solved. Some additional issues were the shortage of extension agents and experienced staff to design and implement sub-projects, the lack of a moni- toring and evaluation system, and the need for credit to farmers to acquire complementary inputs and equipment. 1/ OED Report No. 2651, dated September 4, 1979. - 2- The Project and Its Objectives 4. The Second Rural Development Fund Project (RDF II) followed the experimental first phase and provided financing for the same type of sub- projects, and for salaries and operating costs incurred by goverment agencies participating in the project. Feeder roads were to be financed and imple- mented under a separate rural roads project (Credit 579-UV). The project also provided for agricultural credit, the establishment of a well maintenance brigade, training and technical assistance to overcome staff constraints, and a number of studies. Total project costs (US$16.2 million) were to be fi- nanced by IDA (58%), BADEA (27%), FAC (4%), UNDP (3%), Dutch Aid (1%) and Government (7%). 5. The project's main objectives were to increase crop production and improve water supplies through the implementation of small-scale rural development investments over five years (1976/77 through 1979/80). While RDF I had financed sub-projects throughout Upper Volta, RDF II activities were to be concentrated on the Mossi Plateau (central part of the country, see map) where there is little potential for major agricultural development projects and where 61% of the Voltaic population lives on 34% of the available land. Based on the experience gained under the first project, the successful and well accepted program of bottomland development, erosion control works and wells was enlarged, while the program of small irrigation development and village warehouse construction was kept at the same level or slightly reduced. 6. The Rural Development Fund (RDF) established during the first project was to be ultimately responsible for project execution; its role was to appraise sub-projects, integrate them into annual programs and super- vise their implementation. The five Regional Development Organizations'/ (ORDs) of the Mbssi Plateau were to design and execute sub-projects, supervise their operation and maintenance once construction was completed and provide extension, credit and input supply -services to participants. The Rural Development Works Department (HAER) was responsible for well construction and technically complex works such as small-scale irrigation. Technical assistance, completed by a training program for nationals, was expected to strengthen the capacity of project organizations. An interministerial technical committee was to coordinate and supervise the project. Project Implementation 7. Project start-up was delayed by the Government's late signing of the Credit Agreement with BADEA and project implementation continued to lag behind appraisal estimates due to late arrival of technical assistance, problems with prefinancing, late deliveries of equipment and materials, and untrained field staff. Later, an intensive in-service training program resulted in better construction pace, design and standards. At completion, one year later than 1/ ORDs of Ouagadougou (Center), Koudougou (Center-West), Koupela (Center- East), Kaya (Center-North), and Yatenga (North). - 3 - expected, achievements were: erosion controlled on 15,051 ha (164% of ap- praisal estimates); 1,855 ha of bottomlands developed (70%); 145 ha of bottom- lands improved (48%); 203 ha of small-scale irrigation (102%); and con- struction of 22 warehouses (73%); 31-village centers (155%); 614 wells (118%) and 208 tubewells (116%). Some 2,700 sets of animal traction equipment were sold on credit to farmers, and afforestation, nurseries, cereal storage facilities, processing equipment and small-scale poultry production were funded under the unidentified component. Five studies on training, soil fertility and new agricultural development projects were completed. 8. The grass roots organization set up under RDF I became stronger in the course of the second project. Participation by the local population in project works increased considerably as benefits became apparent and demands for a number of project components, particularly erosion control works, began to exceed ORDs- implementation capacity. 9. The number of ORD extension staff financed by RDF rose more quickly than expected but because of continuous financial difficulties the ORDs could not properly remunerate, nor provide transportation or housing to their agents; the technical level of these agents remained weak until 1977/78 when RDF initiated a training program. The number of management and support staff (Voltaic personnel) was increased by 200% over appraisal estimates. Technical assistance in terms of man-months was increased by 175% compared to appraisal expectations, reflecting the desire of the donor community to help Upper Volta and its interest in the project. At completion, actual project cost exceeded appraisal estimates by about 14%, of which more than half stemmed from the higher than expected cost of management and technical assistance. 10. Since 1979, Government had increased difficulty providing the project with timely and sufficient counterpart funds. When a sizeable financial gap appeared in 1980, the Government approached Dutch Aid, which agreed to provide the equivalent of US$2 million to carry on activities through to the eventual third project, approved by the Bank in March 1982. Project Impact 11. More than 20,000 families (about 160,000 people), or 30% above appraisal projections, are estimated to have participated in sub-projects which have a direct impact on agricultural production. Despite shortages of fertilizers and other inputs (para. 27), incremental production of cereals on sites protected by erosion control works is estimated at 2,300 tons/year (190% of appraisal estimate) due to increased yields of 20-40% for sorghum and millet. However, paddy production, estimated at 2,200 tons, reached only 41% of the appraisal estimate, mostly because of land tenure problems, poor design of some bottomland works and marketing problems which resulted in farmers' lessening interest in rice cultivation. Vegetable production significantly expanded under the small-scale irrigation schemes. The water supply component provided important social benefits to about 125,000 people. 12. Rates of return for major sub-projects are in line with appraisal estimates except for the bottomland component. The overall project ERR is now estimated at 12% compared with the appraisal estimate of 16%. While the agricultural impact is positive, questions of project replicability remain an important issue because of the Government's limited financial resources and the relatively high cost of project management. Maintenance of investments by farmers also remains a concern for the future. 13. The project impact on institution building was positive and resulted in strengthening the RDF and the five ORDs involved in the project area. An efficient monitoring and evaluation system was established. However, training provisions have proved inadequate and the input supply problems have not been satisfactorily resolved as evidenced by the inability to meet farmers- demands for fertilizer. II. MAIN ISSUES A. The Development Strategy 14. The project development strategy evolved from the conclusions of the first Bank economic mission to Upper Volta in 1969. The mission's main findings were that (i) "there was a perceived need by local communities for small-scale development actions and if these could be initiated they would be supported by the local population, and (ii) in the past, a number of projects in the rural sector had failed because of lack of local support"./ RDF I, one of the first Bank-supported rural development projects, was an attempt to test this innovative approach; the sub-projects were expected to meet the following criteria: (a) to reach a large segment of the rural population, (b) produce quick results, (c) limit organizational problems and (d) rely to a large extent on free labor provided by beneficiaries. 15. At the end of the Second Rural Development Project, it can be concluded that the project development strategy was sound and contributed greatly to the success of the project. After initial hesitation during RDF I and the starting period of RDF II, farmers fully accepted the project approach, and their participation both in decision making and providing free labor increased substantially. Demand for most of the project investments today exceed ORDs' financial and supervisory capacity. It is interesting to note that in 1979 the PPAR on RDF I concluded in respect of erosion control works that "food from the World Food Program had been a major incentive in obtaining free labor from villagers" and that "assuming large-scale voluntary labor input for project undertakings with extended construction periods under prevailing conditions in Upper Volta was unrealistic". But in 1982 erosion control works carried out on a free labor basis enjoyed the greatest success among farmers in the Mossi Plateau while food distribution in return for work was no longer considered essential by villagers. 16. Main reasons for the success of the project strategy appear to be the following: 1/ The Economic Development of Upper Volta, dated November 17, 1974. - 5 - (a) In a country where harsh climatic conditions prevent field work for six months of each year, farmers are underemployed and available for non-farming activities. Opportunities to work, even without pay, for a productive investment are likely to be accepted by farmers, if and when they are convinced that such investments are beneficial to them. In this respect, the first project, designed as an experi- mental phase of a larger program, was successful in its demon- stration effort and opened the door to the success of the second project. (b) Unlike a number of other rural development projects in Africa, where socio-economic c 9nstraints to rural development were poorly analyzed at appraisally, the project strategy proved well adapted to the traditional social structure existing in the villages. Although discussions took place within the Bank at the time of appraisal on the need to establish cooperatives or more "modern" socio-economic systems, the Bank resisted and decided to rely on strong village organizations, whereby village chiefs and councils are entrusted with administrative powers. It is worthwhile noting, for example, that erosion control works were often carried out by the whole village population while only benefiting a few individuals. This practice, which may appear unfair at first glance, fits the traditional customs which the project did not attempt to change. Traditional chiefs and village councils remain the ultimate decision makers on who of the village should benefit. In this respect, the criticism of the RDF I PPAR stating that "the adopted institutional arrangements have led to a weakening in determining priorities, especially at grass roots level" no longer appears justified. At the end of the second project it can be said that the traditional village social structure and the project authority effectively worked together, even if such a cooperation took time to be achieved. 17. It may be argued that by supporting the traditional structure, the project risked perpetuating inequalities within the village population and favored some families over others. But the risk was somewhat limited by project authority control and traditional communities in the Mossi Plateau are relatively egalitarian compared with many others in different areas. In addition, experience gained in a number of Bank Group operations2/ shows 1/ "Rural development projects aim to change the way traditional rural societies have been functioning. However, most appraisal reports, PCRs and PPARs relating to this group of projects lacked a thorough analysis of socio-economic variables." (Rural Development Projects: A Retro- spective View of Bank Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, para. 5.01, OED Report No. 2242, dated October 13, 1978). 2/ Senegal, Second Agricultural Credit Project (OED Report No. 3514, dated June 25, 1981). Colombia, Atlantico Irrigation Project (OED Report no. 3959, dated June 21, 1982). Ethiopia, Second Livestock Development Project (0ED Report No. 3977, dated July 21, 1982). -6- that systems not adapted to the country-s social and traditional context are usually doomed to fail. Finally family structure and allocation of work between family members are complex issues in Upper Volta, further complicated by the fact that many families have been severely hit by the emigration of able-bodied young men (mostly to Ivory Coast). Thus, the project approach taking into account the solidarity and the sense of unity existing among people remaining in the village was undoubtedly well adapted to the prevailing situation. 18. Indeed, the traditional structure is not able to resolve all problems arising from development; innovative actions like bottomland develop- ment have partly failed (see PCR, para. 3.04) because there were no answers to the land tenure problems which arose from the development of bottomlands. Adequate operation and maintenance of investments also remains a serious issue because it requires a change in work habits and mentality. Maintenance of wells, erosion control works and bottomlands requires farmers' continuous attention and labor; many of these investments have become inoperational in the past due to lack of maintenance. But as long as an open dialogue exists between village organizations and RDF, chances are good that most of these problems will be solved. B. Coordination Among External Assistance Agencies 19. A large number of bilateral and multilateral agencies operate in Upper Volta. In addition, about 50 Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) consisting of lay and religious groups, private foundations and associations are involved in development activities through financing and implementing small-scale projects, mostly in the rural sector. In 1981, financing from NGOs in Upper Volta reached the considerable amount of about US$20 million equivalent. NGO activities in rural development were generally similar in nature (wells, erosion control works, grain storage, village centers etc.) and location (Mossi Plateau) to those of the Bank-financed project. 20. One of the project issues arose from different development strate- gies used by some external agencies. While the Bank was advocating con- tributions of free labor from project beneficiaries, some NGOs and multi- lateral agencies paid salaries for similar investments. When loans to farmers were made under the Bank-assisted project for building and operating communal grain storage centers, the latter were given free of charge by some donors; loans for draft animals were made by bilateral agencies under terms and conditions different from those prevailing under the project, etc. In addition, maintenance by farmers of investments financed by a number of NGOs was poorly supervised. The discrepancies in the development approaches of different donors had a detrimental effect on the project by undermining RDF's policy and causing confusion among beneficiaries. 21. In a poor country like Upper Volta, there is room for all the assistance agencies. However, as already noted in other PPARs 1/, while the 1/ See particularly, Rwanda - Mutara Agricultural Development Project (OED Report No. 3520, dated June 29, 1981). - 7 - abundance of, and competition among various sources of foreign aid are posi- tive as they permit an increased flow of financial resources, a planning and coordinating effort by Government is needed. NGO assistance and multilateral aid are usually at low cost, and often designed to assist pilot projects which can be developed on a larger scale later on. Nevertheless, duplication of efforts may lead to confusion and disorder when development strategies vary from one donor to another. In addition, some programs financed by external assistance were carried out by RDF and ORDs, thus unduly increasing the work load and staffing requirements of these institutions. 22. The Bank made a special coordinating effort in this project (five different cofinancers for a US$16.2 million project) but further coordination with other donors was made difficult because most of them insisted on follow- ing their own rules and regulations. Convincing both the Government and external agencies that a national and consistent policy on the methodology of assuring local participation is needed, is the best the Bank can do at the present time. In future projects, operational cooperation between the Bank and other agencies could be substantially strengthened if development ap- proaches could be harmonized.1 C. Technical Package 23. Introducing profitable investments and sound technical packages in the project area was one of the major difficulties faced by RDF I and II. Climatic and soil conditions are poor in the Mossi Plateau; there are large fluctuations in annual rainfall; most of the soils are shallow lands of low agricultural potential allowing only for sorghum and millet cultivation. Because of the advanced deterioration of the soil, new technology and improve- ments obtained in research stations on seeds and the use of fertilizers are not easily tranferrable to most lands in the project area. As noted in many Bank supported rural development projects, production targets are often not achieved because of the severe problems or uncertainties that are associated with the recommended technical packages.2/ 24. One of the merits of the project was to introduce technical packages which were limited in number but well adapted to the local environment. Unlike a number of other Bank-supported projects in West AfricaY no attempt 1/ The International Relations Department (IRD) of the Bank has undertaken a survey of NGOs' activities in several African countries. With respect to NGOs- role in Upper Volta, IRD points out that NGOs should be able to play an expanded role in IDA projects, especially if their work could be factored into the project at an early stage. 2/ Rural Development Projects: A Retrospective View of Bank Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, OED Report No. 2242. 3/ Niger - Maradi Rural Development Project (OED Report No. 3992, dated July 7, 1982), Nigeria - Gusau, Funtua and Gombe Agricultural Development Projects (OED Report No. 3975, dated June 16, 1982). - 8 - was made to introduce the sole-cropping system which had proved alien to local traditions in many countries, or to disrupt the traditional mixed-cropping system which happens to be well adapted to adverse rainfall distribution prevailing in the Mossi Plateau. The project resisted the temptation to introduce new cash crops, as experience in other West African projects had demonstrated that the best way to promote cash-crop production is first to ensure that the farmer's food supply is secure.-Y Despite some mistakes under RDF I and with the exception of the development or improvement of bottomlands (which faced technical and social problems), other project activi- ties also proved successful. Erosion control works were particularly well accepted by the population because of the betterment and protective effects on the soils, allowing for better cultivation techniques (sowing along contour and use of improved seeds and fertilizers). However, although farmers reacted favorably to most of the technical packages introduced under the project, operation and maintenance of investments as well as continuous use of improved technology are not yet fully ensured. The problem now lies mostly in the doubtful ability of Government institutions to sustain and improve extension, credit and input supply services when the project is completed (para. 27). D. Institutional Aspects 25. Initially the establishment of a Rural Development Fund was thought of as a temporary measure to overcome the weaknesses of existing technical and financial institutions. At the end of the second project it can be said that the RDF became a major institution for promoting development in Upper Volta. The overall project organization proved effective for a project of this nature. The Rural Development Fund, established on a trial basis within the National Development Bank during the first project, became responsible to the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) during the second project, and is now an autonomous institution under MRD supervision during the on-going third proj- ect. As a result, coordination with MRD agencies and departments improved substantially. RDF was successful in channeling funds to small-scale projects as well as in its appraisal and supervision tasks. 26. As in another Rural Development Project2, the idea of providing autonomy and commercial status to the ORDs proved unrealistic and had detri- mental effects on the project. Created in the 60s, ORDs are public agencies managed by a board of directors representing the local administration and population; they are supervised by MRD and responsible for implementing all agricultural operations in their region. As originally conceived, ORDs were expected to be financially self-sufficient by making profits through their marketing operations. However, marketing of food crops became a financial drain for most ORDs because official prices of sorghum and millet to which the ORDs had to adhere were lower than those offered by private traders. In addition, although many ORDs responsible for project implementation receive funds from foreign donors, this entails a financial contribution from the Government to meet its counterpart funding of the project costs. When funding by Government is delayed or smaller than expected, ORDs have to undergo severe indebtedness which most of them experience at the present time. 1/ Mali - Mopti Rice Project (OED Report No. 3523, dated June 25, 1981). 2/ Rwanda - Mutara Agricultural Development Project (OED, Report No. 3520). - 9 - 27. As a result of their financial difficulties, the project's five ORDs were unable to obtain enough fertilizer and other inputs to meet farmer demands, nor do they have the necessary transport and distribution network. Low quality and poorly paid extension agents resulted in weak extension service. The flow of agricultural credit was disrupted by the project authorities' practice of using loan funds recovered from farmers for covering operational and investment expenses. 28. Unless the ORD financial status is changed the project runs the risk that farmers who adopted project investments and technical packages are unable to sustain their agricultural production due to lack of agricultural credit, inputs and adequate supporting services. In the short term this risk is still limited because the third Rural Development Fund project now supports finan- cing of salaries and operating costs incurred by the ORDs; but in the longer term after completion of the third project, the conclusions drawn by the PPAR of the first project might well apply: the problem of supporting the organi- zations responsible for agricultural development remains unresolved once Bank assistance is withdrawn. 29. A solution to this problem, now under review by the Government and the Bank, would eliminate the ORD marketing activities and incorporate the ORD expenditures into the national budget.!/ ORDs would lose the appearance of financial autonomy but would retain managerial control on the resources allocated to them. This means that the agricultural sector of the Mossi Plateau would receive subsidies from Government or would depend on continuous external aid, but the audit fails to see any alternative for reaching the full financial viability of these projects. 1/ The Region comments that marketing activities have already been abandoned by ORDs. - 11 - UPPER VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Cr. 640-UV) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT April 20, 1982 Western Africa Projects Department Agriculture Division 4 - 13 - I. BACKGROUND 1.01 The Rural Development Fund was set up under the First Rural Develop- ment Fund Project (RDF I) to provide a means of financing, through a local intermediary a variety of small productive investmaents in which the popula- tion concerned was genuinely interested but which, because of their size or scattered location, were otherwise unsuitable for convential Bank Group lending. Under RDF I, which had a nationwide focus, a number of wells (262), erosion control bunds (1395 ha protected), bottomlands (1,719 ha), small irrigation perimeters (96 ha), village stores (644) and feeder roads (366 km) were successfully built over the period 1972-1976 at a total cost of CFAF 837 million (US$3.7 million) including an IDA credit of US$2.9 million (Cr. 317-UV) 1/ (77%), French Technical Assistance equivalent to US$0.4 million (12%) and Government-s contribution equivalent to 11% of project costs. Despite delays in completion (four years instead of three), substantial variations in implementation rates between sub-projects ranging from small- scale irrigation (38%), wells (52%) to erosion control (140%), some cost overrun (7.5%) and staffing problems, RDF I, which was conceived as the first experimental phase of a longer program, demonstrated that the original project concept was sound. It was estimated to have benefitted some 230,000 people and to have yielded a weighted average rate of return of 19%. 2/ 1.02 The Second Rural Development Fund Project (RDF II) for which an IDA credit of US$9.4 million (Cr.- 640-UV) was approved Hay 6, 1976, followed on the first experimental phase providing finance for the same type of sub- projects, with the exception of feeder roads, but concentrating actions on the central plateau. In addition it provided for training and technical assistance to overcome staff constraints, financed studies of development potential in adjacent areas as well as agricultural credit and creation of a well maintenance brigade- The project was to be implemented over a five year period at a total cost of US$16.2 million for which financing included an IDA credit, US$9.4 million (58% of project costs). The credit agreement between the Republic of Upper Volta and IDA was signed June 21, 1976 and the credit was expected to be fully disbursed by the new closing date of June 30, 1982-- 18 months after the original closing date. 1.03 The report covers the period up to September 30, 1982, the end of the last complete full season, by which time 94% of the IDA credit had been committed. The majority of the construction targets had been reached by this date and the remaining funds, which it is expected will be disbursed by the June 30, 1982 completion date, will be used to maintain project services prior to the start-up of the follow-up project. The report is based on a review of IDA records, the findings of supervision missions which visited Upper Volta in May and November 1981, and analyses prepared by RDF management. In view of the need to have at least preliminary results available during appraisal of 1/ Includes US$2.2 million from Credit 317-UV plus US$0.7 million drawn from Cr. 442-UV (Drought Relief). 2/ Project Performance Audit Report. Report No- 2651,. September 4, 1979. - 14 - the Third Rural Development Fund Project IDA went ahead with the preparation of this report with the full cooperation of RDF management. The first draft report was reviewed by RDF management and their suggestions have been incor- porated. II. PROJECT FORMULATION A. Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 2.01 An identification report for a follow up project was submitted by the Director of the Rural Development Fund (RDF) early in 1975. The project was prepared by an RMWA team with Government and RDF participation in April 1975. The preparation report, which was sent to the Bank June 1975, contained proposals to continue and expand the implementation of small scale rural development activities financed under RDFI but to restrict the second phase area primarily to the central plateau. Components included. (a) land develop- ment works (b) water supply and village infrastructure (c) medium-term credit to farmers for the purchase of equipment (d) provision for unidenti- fied projects (e) financing of salaries and operating costs incurred by the ORDs and local agencies participating in the project (f) expatriate technical assistance to help implement the project. Total project costs were estimated at US$11.5 million with IDA to finance US$8.4 million (73%). FAC was to contribute US$0.9 million (b%) and Government US$2.2 million (19%). In addition Dutch Aid and UNDP had been approached for technical assistance, which they subsequently provided. 2.02 The appraisal mission composed of HQ staff, an African Development Bank staff trainee and two consultants visited Upper Volta in October 1975. The appraisal report made the following main changes in the preparation report: (a) a decrease in bottomland development from 3,600 ha to 2,700 ha, (b) a sub- stantial increase in anti-erosion works from 3,300 ha to 9,200 ha, (c) an increase in small scale irrigation and improved bottomland from 350 ha to 500 ha. 2.03 Issues raised by Government at appraisal were requests for. (a) reduction in its real contribution from 8-11% proposed by the appraisal mission to zero as under RDF I, (b) inclusion of a road component; and (c) extension of the project area beyond the central plateau. Following a strong plea from the President of Upper Volta 1/, IDA agreed to relieve the Government of any contribution to the cost of the project beyond local taxes. In order to cover this as well as an increase in the official minimum wage rate, the IDA credit was raised to US$9.4 million. Feeder roads were excluded since a rural road project (Cr. 379-UV) had just been signed and it was agreed that. with the exception of the well program, not more than 10% 1/ See Memorandum WAIDR to RVP, April 14, 1976. - 15 - of the available funds should be spent on works outside the central plateau 1/ - to avoid overlap with projects planned for other areas and overstretching management in dealing with too many ORDs. A number of policy matters were also reviewed by the decision meeting 2/ of which the more significant were. (i) need for independent auditors to carry out an audit of RDF I-- appointment of independent auditors was agreed as a condition of negotiations but subsequently dropped. The matter was satis- factorily resolved with the appointment of Coopers and Lybrand; (ii) the setting up of a revolving account to relieve the prefinancing burden on Government--although setting up a revolving account was agreed at the decision meeting, controllers- objected and the recommendation was dropped. Prefinancing proved to be a problem during RDF II, and under the third project, which was approved by the Board March 30, 1982, such an account is included; (iii) the role of RDF in managing funds for other projects (donors)--use of RDF as a channel for other funds was seen as a means of promoting coordination of small-scale financing but in an attempt to limit overburdening of management IDA-s agreement to new activities was covenanted: (iv) problems of training personnel on ORDs not covered by area develop- ment projects--a small training component was included mainly for counterparts of expatriates, the problem of training ORD field staff was later addressed by the project (para 5.13), (v) need to charge maintenance costs to users of tubewells--cost recovery arrangements were not concluded but provisions have been made under RDF III. The size of the irrigation component in relation to institutional capacity and other (FED) projects was also questioned but in spite of doubts on implementa- tion capacity the component was increased in size. .2.05 After appraisal, in November 1975, BADEA indicated they were in- terested in co-financing the project, up to US$5.0 million. Components they were willing to finance included small-scale irrigation and improved bottom- land, wells and tubewells and a maintenance brigade for tubewells. During the negotiations, which took place April 26-30, 1976, BADEA reduced its initial pledge to US$4.5 million. The agreed project costs were US$16.2 million; IDA providing US$9.4 million (58%), BADEA US$4.5 million (27%), French Technical Cooperation (FAC) US$0.6 million (4%), UNDP US$0.45 million (3%), Dutch Aid US$0.15 million (1%) and Government, US$1.10 million (7%). The project was 1/ ORDs of Ouagadougou (Centre), Koudougou (Centre Ouest), Koupela (Centre Est), Kaya (Centre Nord) and Yatenga (Nord). 2/ Memoranda WAPAl, November 12, 1975 and WAlDC December 2, 1975. - 16 - presented to and approved by the Board on June 8. 1976 under "special proce- dure". The Credit Agreement was signed June 21, 1976 the Credit became effec- tive January 24, 1977 after the date of effectiveness had been successively postponed from September 20, 1976 to December 20, 1976 and February 21, 1977. B. Project Description 2.06 The project would involve the implementation of small-scale rural development activities (subprojects) financed through RDF, the main purpose of which would be to increase crop production and improve village water supplies. The project would be carried out over five years (1975/76 through 1979/80), but most of the activities would be executed over the last four years, 1975/76 being treated as a bridging year. financed partly under Credit 317-UV and partly under RDF II. Based on past experience and assessments made by FDR, the ORDs and other agencies, the program of activities was projected as follows. (a) bottomland development, 2,700 ha; (b) erosion control works, 9;200 ha (c) small-scale irrigation and improved bottomland development, 500 ha. (d) wells, 520, (e) tubewells, 180 (f) village warehouses, 400, and village centers, 20, (g) medium-term credit for agricultural equipment, US$0.5 million equivalent, (h) provision for unidentified projects, US$0.6 million, (i) studies for economic development of areas freed from onchocerciasis. In support of the above subprojects the project also financed: (j) maintenance brigade for tubewells; (k) staff, equipment and operating expenditures incurred by FDR in executing the project, and some support for HAER and the ORDs, (1) training of Voltaic staff and (m) expatriate technical assistance to help in project execution. Whilst the project costs reflected the above development program, the physical targets were not expected to be absolute and flexibility would be maintained throughout the project period (para. 5.04 of SAR). - 17 - 2.07 The Rural Development Fund (RDF) would continue to be ultimately responsible for project execution. RDF staff would be strengthened and the Interministerial Technical Committee established for RDF I would be changed and its membership reduced to improve efficiency. The Regional Development Organizations (ORDs) and the Rural Development Works Department (HAER) would be responsible for identification, execution, and postinvestment implementation. RDF would be responsible for appraisal, end-inspection, and evaluation. RDF-s evaluation function would be considerably strengthened under the project. 2.08 The main impact of the productive subprojects would be additonal production of cereals, millet and sorghum, and paddy with incremental annual production at full development estimated at 1,200 tons "upland" cereals and 5,300 tons paddy. Farmers would benefit from increased crop production, better storage of crops and inputs and improved water supplies. It was estimated that about 15,000 farm families would benefit from the productive subprojects, and many more people from the wells and village buildings con- structed. 2.09 In calculating a rate of return. it was pointed out that (a) the project provided a line of credit for investment in small-scale subprojects and (b) some of the subprojects were directly productive while others had large social and health benefits difficult to quantify. Subject to the above mix (para 2.06) of projects materializing the ERR was calculated at 16%. Under the very difficult ecological and human conditions of the plateau, rates in excess of 10% were considered satisfactory and the appraisal concluded that the rate of return failed to reflect an important aspect, namely that the benefits would accrue to the poorest segments of Upper Volta-s population. III. IMPLEMENTATION A. Effectiveness and Start-up 3.01 Two conditions of effectiveness were included in the Development Credit Agreement for the project; namely that, (a) all conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the BADEA Loan Agreement had been fulfilled, and (b) the coordinator assigned to the director of HAER had been appointed. Although the Credit Agreement between IDA and the Government was signed on June 21, 1976, the IDA credit did not become effective till January 24, 1977. The main reason for the delay was that the signing of the Credit Agreement between BADEA and the Government did not take place until January 18, 1977. B. Physical Implementation 3.02 Project implementation experienced nearly a year's delay because. (i) works in the field had to wait for the end of the cropping season, (ii) technical assistance did not arrive until 1977. - 18 - (iii) equipment was delivered late 1977 as ICB and LCB tenders were held up following the postponement--three times--of the date of effectiveness; and (iv) the technical lycee in Ouagadougou was unable to provide the number of qualified topographers foreseen at appraisal. Physical achievements compared with appraisal estimate are shown in Table 1. Land Development Works 3.03 Erosion control works, comprising marking out by ORL topographical survey team, tracing of bunds with a tractor-drawn disc (ORD) and shaping/ compacting by farmers with hand tools, were implememted on 15,051 ha, 164% of appraisal estimates. Beneficiaries are estimated at some 12,000 families, Annex 4, Table 1. Construction started slowly, lagged behind appraisal estimates for the first three years and quality was often inadequate with bunds not being high enough and/or too wide apart and too long, in addition there was insufficient protection through planting of grass cover, hedges or trees. An intensive in-service training program of surveyors, plant operators and extension workers by project staff, mostly from HER and RDF and the Dutch volunteers attached to the ORDs, mounted during the first two years of RDF II (1976/78) began to pay off in 1979/80 when construction standards and perfor- mance improved--annual achievements in 1979/80 and 1980/61 were 4,800 ha and 5,800 ha respectively. Unit costs 1/ were reduced during the project and by 1980/81 averaged CFAF 35,740 (US$132) per ha including farmers- labor 2/ and overheads; excluding supervision and overheads (not allocated at appraisal) unit costs were 14% below appraisal estimates. Nevertheless, although correc- tion of early weaknesses led generally to a marked improvement of land survey, engineering design and construction methods after 1978/79, this did not apply uniformly to all ORDs, two of which have shown poor performance and above average unit costs. 3/ 3.04 The area of bottomlands developed with simple bunding reached only 70% of appraisal estimates. A slow-down in construction occurred when bottomlands within easy access of the project were exhausted, as no comprehen- sive survey of bottomlands available for development was carried out until 1977/78. The project had therefore to expand beyond the five ORDs initially retained for bottomland development (Annex 1, Table 2). Because it was physically overstretched, project staff could not properly follow up newly developed bottomland until 1978/79 when better development methods were introduced. Surveys indicated that about 85% of the bottomland areas were 1/ Unit costs have been recalculated from accounts data by RDF staff, 2/ Valued at opportunity cost of CFAF 170/day, 3/ Centre-Est (Koupela) and Volta Noire (Dedougou) where only 3% of the program was implemented. Table 1 SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 640-UV) Key Indicators 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 E 1/ A % E A % E A % E A % E A % Land Development Erosion Control 1,700 451 26 3,700 1,494 40 6,200 4,468 72 9,200 9,272 101 9,200 15,051 164 Bottomlands 600 305 51 1,200 774 65 1,900 1,265 67 2,700 1,500 56 2,700 1,885 70 Improved Bottomlands 50 - - 100 64 64 200 92 46 300 117 39 300 145 48 Small Irrigation 2/ 25 8 32 50 91 182 125 108 86 200 145 23 200 203 102 Infrastructure Warehouses 12 5 42 18 8 44 24 13 54 30 16 53 30 22 73 Village Centers 5 9 180 10 23 230 15 26 173 20 28 140 20 31 155 Water Supply Open Wells 100 188 188 220 314 143 360 441 123 520 569 109 520 614 118 Tube Wells - 50 - 60 87 145 120 127 106 180 160 89 180 208 116 1/ Includes PY1 & 2 2/ Includes both gravity downstream of small dams and pump irrigation 3/ Program revised from appraised 400 small stores, November 1977 E = Estimated at Appraisal; A = Actual - 20.- cultivated the first year, 70% the second year, and stabilized at about 55% from the third year. Reasons for the farmers' declining interest included: (i) land tenure problems; (ii) insufficient initial involvement and therefore participation of farmers; (iii) poorly designed bottomland development leading to poor water control and loss of crops, particularly on the margins; (iv) insufficient equipment available to farmers and a lack of inputs; (v) lack of attraction for cultivating rice, considered a secondary crop; and (vi) lack of market outlets. As with erosion control sites, unit costs were reduced during the project and there was a wide variation between ORDs' -- costs in the Centre Est ORD (8% of program) were twice the average. Unit costs in 1980/81, excludiug supervision and overheads, were CFAF 149,586 (US$554) per ha, or 5% below appraisal estimates. 3.05 Improved Bottomlands: Some 145 ha, 48% of appraisal estimates, of bottomlands were developed with improved water control through building of a small retaining dam and diversion channels upstream. Almost all of the development was in one ORD - Centre (Ouagadougou) -- and exploitation was also affected by problems similar to those with simple bottomlands. A par- ticular problem was cultivation in the second year, as ORD tractor ploughing was included only for the opening year. Average unit cost at 1981 prices was CFAF 708,255 1/ (US$2,623) per ha, nearly double (190%) appraisal estimates and 135% of estimates for RDF III. 3.06 Small-Scale Irrigation developments covered 203 ha (102% of ap- praisal estimates), of which 170 ha were downstream of small dams and 33 ha of small perimeters with pump irrigation. Small-scale irrigation was generally more attractive to farmers than bottomland development, positive aspects being the good water control achieved at most sites and the possibility of cultivat- ing vegetables. Negative aspects were the difficulty of securing satisfactory market outlets for farmers' produce and problems with supply of spare parts for pumps. Average unit cost from RDF II accounts was CFAF 1.46 million (US$5,400) per ha 2/ as against an appraisal estimate of about CFAF 1.94 million 3/ (US$7,200) per ha. Varying proportions of pump versus gravity irrigation, wide variations between perimeters and possible misallocation of expenses between small-scale irrigation and improved bottomlands prevent drawing of conclusions. Cost projected for RDF III is CFAF 1.62 million (US$6,000) per ha. Quality of construction improved during the project. 3.07 Farmers' participation and implementation problems. Once adequately informed by ORD staff, farmers' participation in earthmoving operations with 1/ Accounts data for direct costs (which include ORD and HER supervision) +12% for RDF overheads and farmers' labor (200 md/ha) at CFAF 170 (opportunity cost). 2/ Accounts data plus labor (300 md) and 12% for RDF overheads. 3/ Appraisal estimate of CFAF 1.0 million/ha for direct costs plus 20% for supervision and overheads (not allocated). - 21 - labor was sizable and timely. Maintenance of earth dikes and bunds by farmer beneficiaries led by the village extension worker also improved compared with RDF 1. Adequate hand tools are now available on site in most cases and such work is given high priority as soon as the first rains start. In some areas, vegetation cover of contour bunds has also been initiated and extension of erosion control works on new sites is approved by ORDs only after the farmers- maintenance performance on the old site is deemed satisfactory. 3.08 In addition to problems related to lack of advance funding and shortage of experienced staff, RDF II has been plagued with late deliveries of equipment and materials. Late procurement of items was the principal cause of such delays. Another was that equipment and spare parts were ordered separately and late. ORDs- maintenance facilities for equipment and vehicles are still inadequate and skilled mechanics are rarely available among their staff. Village Infrastructure 3.09 The building program was modified considerably in November 1977 with the building of 400 small stores cancelled in favor of larger warehouses to be constructed at the ORD Sector level. RDF opposed at appraisal the construction of these small stores (12 m2) and continued its opposition during implementation. Following further supervision, IDA agreed in view of ORD's needs for storage at sector level but asked that each request be fully justified. Subsequently, because of cement shortages and other constraints only 22 out of the 30 warehouses planned were completed. The number of village centers built (31) was more than envisaged at appraisal (20) and, in addition, with IDA-s agreement a number of buildings not envisaged at appraisal were constructed including: 94 houses for extension agents, 15 villages shops, 20 village training centers and 18 cereal banks. Village shops and cereal banks were linked with a credit program for financing cereal and merchandise stocks (para 3.13). OFNACER (Office National pour les Cereales) the Govern- ment-s agency in charge of purchasing cereals from farmers in areas where private traders are insufficient, experiences continuous logistic problems as well as shortages of funds. RDF-s initiative to build village grain stores has been appreciated by farmers and the project is currently training groups of villagers on how to manage the stores. Water Supply 3.10 This was one of the project's most successful components being well received by the rural population; the latter depend largely on rainwater from stagnant ponds, which dry up at least three months a year and are often a source of waterborne diseases. With 614 wells sunk, with farmers- participa- tion, the project exceeded the appraisal target of 520, by 18%. Some 208 successful tubewells (119% of appraisal estimates) were drilled--the success rate was about 70%. While appraisal targets were exceeded, missions for the - 22 - preparation and appraisal of a water supply component for RDF III noted 1/ that results with well brigades were good but tubewells were less satisfactory, and suggested improvements for the third project reporting that. (i) performance of well brigades was good at 25 to 30 wells/brigade/year and unit cost in line with appraisal estimates; cost per productive metre which fell from CFAF 127,000 (US$470) in 1977/78 to CFAF 88-96,000 (US$330-360) in 1978/79 to 1979/80 (1981 prices) was in line with appraisal estimates, although cost per well was higher as they were 25% deeper than expected- (ii) performance of the tubewell brigades of HER was less satisfactory, outputs sometimes poor due to inadequate training and little motiva- tion of staff--incentive payments paid under the drought relief project (Cr. 442-UV) had been withdrawn--and equipment was poorly maintained, spare parts were in short supply, cost per productive metre varied between CFAF 76,300 (US$283) and 59,000 (US$220) in 1977/78 - 1979/80 (1981 prices) and were not competitive with private enterprise charges of CFAF 30,000/metre without pump.. (iii) there was a lack of tubewell maintenance which was complicated by the multiplicity of pumps (at least 8 types) in the country and lack of spare parts; pumps were often replaced rather than repaired and insufficient efforts had been made to motivate the beneficiaries to participate in maintenance, (iv) maintenance costs of tubewells could not be supported on the Government budget and costs would have to be recovered from beneficiaries. 3.11 The water supply component experienced some difficulties because of old vehicles and equipment inherited from the first project. shortages of cement and irregular involvement of beneficiaries. Differences in approach between donors has affected the participation of beneficiaries not only in water supply schemes but also in land development works. They do not under- stand why they should participate in a water supply project in one area when everything is provided free in another, this aspect is also important when considering maintenance of wells and tubewells. A national water supply policy is required (and is now being developed) to avoid large conceptual differences between donors. Agricultural Credit 3.12 The project provided for some US$0.,5 million to be used as a re- volving fund for medium-term agricultural credit. The funds were to be 1/ Identification, Composantes et Cout du Programme FDR III en Haute-Volta, H. Laurent, Juillet 1980. Composante Hydraulique Villageoise du FDR III, Mission d-evaluation C. Loaec, Juillet 1981. - 23 - channelled from Government through RDF but once medium-term credits were made subsequent administration was to be the responsibility of the Banque National de Developpement (BND). Terms of the medium-term credit were to be at 8% with a repayment period of five years with one year grace. Despite several reminders from IDA in 1978 and 1979, project management continued to follow national policy and the interest rate remained at 5.5%. In 1980 rates were increased to 8.5% also in line with Government policy. In 1980 CNCA was created and in 1981 interest charges were raised to 11%. In the five years 1976/77 to 1980/81 CFAF 120.3 million (US$0.45 million) 1/ was lent for animal traction to some 2,700 beneficiaries--CFAF 44,530 (US$165) per beneficiary. Eighty percent of the loans were distributed between three ORDs--Koudougou (Centre Ouest), Yatenga (Nord) and Kaya (Centre Nord)--and the remainder in Ouagadougou (Centre) 12% and Koupela (Centre Est) 8%. Repayment rates at 9/30/81 were running at 85-90% in the Ouagadougou and Koudougou ORDs, but only 35-50% in Yatenga, Kaya and Koupela. Low recovery rates are attributed inter alia to poor staff follow-up and poor harvest (Yatenga). Under RDF II, staff resources were overstretched and inadequate attention was given to loan recovery. RDF, which was recovering repayments due against sums owed to ORDs for construction works, kept no check on recovery rates between ORD and farmer until around September 1981 when it undertook the survey on which the figures above are based. Under RDF III, responsibility for medium credit for animal traction will be passed to CNCA and ORD credit offices strengthened. RDF will continue to administer credit for cereal and village merchandise stocks and processing equipment still regarded as experimental, and will continue to be responsible for recovery of, and passing to CNCA loans made under RDF II. Other subprojects 3.13 Activities financed as part of the unidentified component included grants and/or credit to village groups for cereal storage and processing equipment, stables for manure production, small merchandise stores, market gardening, fertilizer and small-scale poultry rearing (Annex 2, Table 5). Cereal storage and processing comprised grants for construction of buildings and credit for purchase of initial stocks averaging 10 tons (18) plus credit for cereal mills (47). These actions together with poultry rearing and stables for manure conservation have also been implemented under a program of fifteen model villages (zones pilotes), selected on the basis of agricultural potential and functional farmers group, to provide a demonstration point for a range of complementary actions. Credit issued for these activities was CFAF 67.4 million (US$250,000) and recovery rates at 9/30/81 were below 50% 3.14 Under RDF II funds were also used to supplement earlier FED finan- cing for forest nursery establishment. Following FED financing of a nursery at Koudougou, from which some 600 ha of village/family level plantation were developed, the project recently financed nurseries and forest extension staff salaries in the Nord Est, Centre Nord and Volta Noire ORDs. This action is to be extended under RDF III. 1/ See Annex 2, Table 5. - 24 - Extension Service 3 15 ORD extension staff numbers financed by RDF rose more quickly than expected--from 75 in 1976/77 to 196 in 1979/80 and 1980/81. Numbers financed in the first four years were higher than justified by standards set at appraisal 1/ but 20% lower in 1980/81. Because of continuous financial difficulties, the ORDs could neither properly train and remunerate nor provide means of transportation and housing to their respective extension agents. Under constant pressure from the ORDs, RDF even initiated a costly house construction program which was later reduced but not completely shelved as IDA had insisted. Loans were also provided to the agents for the purchase of mobylettes. The technical level of the extension agents remained weak until 1977/78 when RDF initiated a training program. Despite some well motivated extension agents the overall technical standards need further improvement. Also better links than those prevailing with the training center in Bobo- Dioulasso as well as with Research would have to some extent benefitted the project. Training and Studies 3.16 The project financed a number of studies including. (i) The Training of Extension Agents (1978/79) by BDPA--this report was subsequently used by MRD to guide the formulation of proposals for restructuring the ORDs, particulary the separation of credit from the work of extension staff; (ii) Survey of Kamadema Plain carried out by ORSTOM from 1976 to 1979--the proposal was still awaiting donors in 1981, (iii) Soil fertility study in August/September 1979--the report guided the project in working out its experimental program on land protec- tion. A symposium at national level was to be convened, late 1981 but was cancelled because of RDF involvement in preparing a follow-up project, (iv) Feasibility study for Bougouriba and Koudougou rural development projects using funds allocated to the study of onchocerciasis- infected areas (see para. 3.19); and (v) Technical assistance for start-up work prior to creation of CNCA. C. Project Costs and Financing 3.17 At CFAF 4.24 billion, the actual cost at September 30, 1981 was 16% (CFAF 595 million) above the appraisal estimate 1/' see Table 2. Over half (58%) the additional cost stemmed from project management and technical 1/ Appraisal estimates also included about CFAF 60 million (US$270,000) for farmers- labor on land development works, free farm labor is not included in actual costs. - 25 - assistance. Technical assistance totalled 660 man-months (mm) against 372 mm at appraisal, with significant increases in monitoring and evaluation per- sonnel (UNDP) and volunteers 1/ (Dutch Aid) to work in the ORDs. Project management costs (Voltaic personnel and all support costs) rose from 5% to 7% of total project costs. Staff numbers including all support staff totalled 32 by project completion, main differences with appraisal estimates (16) being two additional administrative posts and three technical posts, the latter for support services to the ORDs. Operating costs were also significantly higher. Of the technical assistance, CFAF 263.2 million (US$1.0 million) was employed directly by RDF, giving a total project management charge equivalent to 12% of all other components. 3.18 While valuable in helping to develop more information and improve technical standards, the increase in technical assistance staff reflects both the desire of the donor community to help Upper Volta and interest to be associated with the project. The assistance was valuable but the easy access to funds made it more difficult for the project to be as cost effective as it might be if assistance were harder to come by. Under RDF III management will need to keep a tight check on staffing and improve cost effectiveness. 3.19 Appraisal cost estimates were also exceeded for water supply while, as expected, in the implementation of other subprojects there was some reallocation of resources within the original total. Training and studies estimates included funds for onchocerciasis studies which were reallocated when USAID financed resource studies of the oncho areas and it was realized that planning of new projects in these areas would be premature. Training costs in the form of salaries are also included under management and technical assistance items. 3.20 From a breakdown of costs by project management, land development and water supply components (totalling 75% of project costs), projects costs were made ip by. salaries (33%), operating costs (53%) and equipment (14%). 3.21 The exchange rate remained favorable from 1976, with the dollar valued at CFAF 239, to 1978, when it levelled at CFAF 225, but because of delays the project only spent US$2.4 million of IDA funds or 25% of the total US$9.4 million, by end 1978. In 1979 and 1980, the value of the dollar dropped sharply to averages of CFAF 212 and CFAF 211 respectively, remaining even below CFAF 200 at times, at a time when the project was spending the bulk of its funds. When a sizeable financial gap became obvious, in 1980, the Government, following IDA's advice, sought an alternative source of finance and approached Dutch Aid. As the exchange rate soared to CFAF 250 and above, IDA still had about $250,000 (excluding applications due) to disburse after September 30, 1981, when normally funds should have been exhausted. 1/ Volunteers totalled 227 mm or 34% of total technical assistance. - 26 - UPPER VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Credit 640-UV) Table 2 ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL COSTS AND FINANCING 1/ (CFAF and US$ million) Actual(US$) Appraisal Actual as % of CFAF m US$m CFAF US$ % -Appraisal Project Management 174.0 0.77 313-8 1,37 7 178 Technical Assistance 266.8 1.19 473.6 2.04 11 171 Land Development Works - erosion control and simple bottomlands 1,031.1 4.58 1,102.1 4.82 26 105 - improved bottomlands & small-scale irrigation 408.4 1.81 278.8 1.22 7 67 Village Infrastructure 87.7 0.39 125.0 0.54 3 138 Water Supply 1,011.1 4.49 1,416.1 6.20 33 138 Training and Studies 424.4 1.89 234.5 1.05 6 56 Agricultural Credit 112.5 0.50 114.8 0.50 3 100 Unidentified 135.0 0.60 187.8 0.80 4 133 Total Project Cost and Financing 2/ 3,651.0 16.22 4,246.5 18.54 100 114 IDA 9.40 8.92 94 BADEA 4.50 4.50 100 FAC 0-60 0.56 93 Dutch Aid 0.15 2.38 159 UNDP 0.45 0.92 204 Government 3/ 1.10 1.26 114 1/ At September 30, 1981. 2/ Included US$55,200 balance on Credit 317-UV. 3/ Includes US$0.12 million from credit revolving fund. - 27 - 3.22 Since 1979, Government has faced increasing difficulties in providing the project with sufficient and timely counterpart funds. Reduced treasury advances from Government coupled with the use of direct payments to local suppliers consumed an inordinate amount of management time delaying project implementation further and damaging the project-s credit standing. The situa- tion improved markedly, late 1980, when the Dutch Aid agreed to provide some Dfl. 5 million (US$2 million or CFAF 480 million equivalent) in the form of a grant to bridge the financial gap between the ongoing project and an eventual third RDF project--approved by the Board in March 1982. D. Disbursements 3.23 With delays in effectiveness and early implementation problems, disbursements fell behind schedule (Annex 2 Table 7) at less than 50% of appraisal estimates through FY79, and, by 12/31/80, the original closing date, 82% of the credit had been disbursed. The credit is expected to be fully disbursed by the new closing date, June 30, 1982. Following a request by RDF management, credit funds were reallocated,l/ the major changes being an increase in IDA-s contribution to water supplies, a reduction in foreign expenditures in favor of local expenditures and lower costs of studies (para. 3.19 and Annex 2, Table 6). E. Procurement 3.24 The project continuously faced three main difficulties with procure- ment. (i) a question whether certain vehicles were unsuited to Upper Volta conditions because of poor after-sales service or general robustness, (ii) the inability to obtain quotations valid for longer than two weeks for certain items, particularly cement which was usually in short supply and (iii) the exclusion of unreliable firms. Although project management were familiar with IDA procurement procedures, tender documents were often ill-prepared and published without being approved by IDA, resulting in delays as documents had to be amended. Ultimately procedures and documents were satisfactory. Also some items--vehicles--were purchased without going for tender because of their urgent requirement. F. Covenants 3.25 Government complied with covenants included in the Development Credit Agreement except for interest rates (para. 3.12) and the following few. (a) the provision of credit to project quarterly in advance--after several reminders, advances were provided only irregularly and IDA encouraged the Government in June 1980 to seek additional financial assistance and Dutch Aid provided a revolving fund of CFAF 200 million as part of CFAF 480 million to the project at the end of 1980, 1/ Letter of January 5, 1982. - 28 - (b) the appointment of a Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Planning to assist in the execution of Oncho Studies, not later than December 31, 1976--IDA abandoned the idea in 1979, when UNDP expressed interest in strengthening the Ministry of Planning, (c) the furnishing of half yearly progress reports and expenditures summaries--the project only furnished annual budgets instead of twice yearly. This had no adverse effect since quarterly finan- cial requirements were submitted in time to the Government; (d) the establishment in consultation with the Association of an Interministerial Technical Committee to supervise RDF--although IDA was not consulted on the establishment of the Interministerial Technical Committee, it, however, agreed to the nomination of the various members of the Committee, considering this sensitive issue as an internal matter to the country. VI. LVALUATION OF PROJECT IMPACT A. Agricultural Impact Incremental Output 4.01 Some 20-23,000 farm families 1/ (about 160,000 people) are estimated to have participated in sub-components having a direct effect on agricultural production, or about 30% above appraisal estimates. While fewer than expected families benefitted from bottomland development, participation in erosion works was much higher than expected, due to the larger area developed but smaller area protected per holding (1.5 ha instead of 4 ha). 4.02 As expected at appraisal, incremental production from erosion con- trol was primarily cereals (sorghum and millet) grown on 82% of the developed area with the remainder in cotton (2%), groundnut (5%), miscellaneous (3%) and fallow (8%). Yield data from 1979, when an improved monitoring system for comparing on-site and off-site situations was installed, give increased yield of sorghum from erosion control estimated at 20-40% 2/, in the same order as appraisal estimates of 15% (north), 30% (center) and 45% (south--with 1/ Erosion control (12,000), simple & improved Bottomlands (12,100), small scale irrigation (1,000), animal traction equipment (2-700) discounted by 20-30% to allow for families participating in more than one scheme. Data for erosion control and simple bottomlands from Rapport Annuel Provisoire, Campagne 1980/81, FDR octobre 1981. 2/ Rapport Technique FDR II, Fevrier 1981, compares on-site results with those on neighboring, unimproved fields. - 29 - fertilizer) 1/. Total yield in the with-project situation in 1979/80 was estimated at about 500 kg/ha in the north, 600-800 kg/ha in the center and over 900 kg/ha in the south. but fell in 1980/81 due to poor rains. Incre- mental production of cereals from yield increases on erosion control sites is estimated at 2,300 tons/year (190% of appraisal estimate). On average incre- mental production per family represents 10-15% of total cereal requirements. RDF reports speak of some cumulative effects with yield increases rising over two to three years as soils stabilize and top soil builds up; this is yet to be quantified satisfactorily. 4.03 Incremental production of paddy rice estimated at 2,200 tons 2/ was only 41% of appraisal estimates due to the lower area developed and subsequent high rate of abandonment (para 3.04).' Average yield per hectare sown reached about 1,300 kg/ha in 1979/80 and with inputs would exceed 1,500 kg/ha (appraisal estimates). Yields vary considerably between ORDs reflecting different rainfall regimes and, within ORDs, between bottomlands reflecting the hydrology of each. Average yields on area sown in 1979/80 were from 760 kg/ha in Yatenga to 1532 kg/ha in Koudougou. 4.04 Producer prices based on official farm gate prices 3/ were some 20% higher than projected in farm budgets. In economic terms world prices were some 20% less than predicted but in the final year this was compensated by an increase in the dollar/CFAF exchange rate. Total benefit stream from land development schemes excluding vegetable production was CFAF 477 million per year at full development, or 88% of appraisal estimate; composition was different with paddy rice to upland crops at about 1:1 against 5.1 at appraisal, and full development will be reached later than predicted--1984/85 compared with 1981/82 at appraisal. Technological change 4.05 At appraisal it was expected that participants in erosion control sites would also receive a s mple package of improved technology (seed of improved varieties, seed dre3sing, fertilizer and pesticide sprays for cotton and advice on better spacing and timing of cultivation). Together with erosion control measures these improvements were expected to result in yield increments of 150 kg/ha for sorghum, 135 kg/ha for groundnuts, and 200 kg/ha for seed cotton. On a typical 4 ha farm incremental net value of production was estimated to rise by 30% and return per man-day from CFAF 157 to 204 (CFAF 260 to 340 in 1981 prices) 4/. For cereals (82% of incremental output) use of improved seeds and fertilizer were budgeted only for sites in the south. 1/ Report No. 1068b-UV, Annex II, Table 1. 2/ 1550 tons from simple bottomlands, 200 tons from improved bottomlands and 450 tons from small-scale irrigation. 3/ From Agricultural Issues Study Report No. 3296-UV, September, 1981. 4/ Report No. 1068b-UV, para 8.07. - 30 - 4.06 Results of project monitoring indicate that whilst yield increases from erosion control works alone are achieved on most sites, at least part of the area is also under improved technology, although whether uptake is higher on erosion control sites than on neighboring areas has still to be determined; visual evidence indicates it is likely to be so. Nor is hard data available to show what change there has been during the project. Improved technology used includes fertilizer, animal traction, and sowing along the contour; again no hard data is available on yields, but some limited results in the "zones pilotes" indicate sufficient responses to improved technology to justify the development approaches used. Improved sorghum varieties are being tested by RDF but general distribution is unlikely for another year. Use of fertilizer on sites fell from 52% in 1978/79, to 35% 1979/80 and around 22% in 1980/81. Average dose where applied was 65 kg/ha (NPK) in 1979/80. The decline is due primarily to problems at the ORD level on the central plateau, where ORDs- credit standing is poor and they have been unable to get fertilizer from the main supplier, SOFITEX 1/, which generally supplies to the cotton areas where repayment is more certain. The inability of Government to provide subsidy money may also be beginning to affect supplies particularly on the central plateau. Furthermore, ORDs, when supplied with fertilizer do not have the necessary transport or distribution network. 4.07 Use of animal traction was estimated at over 50% in 1978/79 and 1979/80 but fell to 39% in 1980/81 reflecting a difficult rainy season preventing farmers from ploughing at the right time. There may have been a shortage of equipment due to the large increase in the developed area. Introduction of animal traction was supported with a credit program under which some 2,700 farmers received assistance with the purchase of oxen and/or equipment. 4.08 On bottomlands use of improved rice varieties is relatively common with in 1980/81 some 80% in improved varieties of one sort or another. RDF, with the support of CERCI 2/, has made a considerable effort to test improved varieties at the farm level. Considerable variations in regime from year to year have however resulted in a number of setbacks. Use of fertilizer has been more limited, both due to fear of it being washed away and absolute unavailability. In 1979/80 and 1980/81 fertilizer at about 100 kg/ha was used on 23% of the surface area. Line sowing is well accepted (68% in 1980/81) and about 30% ploughed with animal traction. 4.09 While the uptake of improved practices is necessary to reap the full benefits of the land development program, RDF-s capacity to influence farmers is limited by its lack of control over and low calibre of extension and input supply organizations in the ORDs. Also in order to improve existing tech- nology, coordination of research organizations with ORDs and "prevulgarisation" work on the central plateau requires stepping up. Accordingly RDF have, since 1978, mounted a small team to pre-test research recommendations and demonstrate 1/ Societd Voltaique des Fibres Textiles. 2/ Centre d-Etudes de Recherches sur les Cultures Irrigu6es. - 31 - suitable improved practices. In addition, in an attempt to improve site maintenance training courses for extension staff were promoted from 1979 and focussed on aspects such as planting up bunds with grasses and shrubs. 4.10 Marketing of incremental paddy rice production from bottomlands posed a problem in some village without ready access to rice hullers and/or an urban market. Little of the incremental production is consumed in the villages but there is a ready market in the larger towns. During RDF II, small grain mills and village level grain banks were financed but--apart from one rice huller in the center ORD--the problem of rice marketing was not tackled. Under the follow-up project provision has been made for financing small rice hullers. B. Social Impact 4.11 The water supply component was expected to provide important social benefits with wells providing an assured water supply and having a significant effect in reducing diseases associated with present irregular sources. Between 1976/77 and 1980/81 a total of 614 open wells were dug and 208 success- ful tubewells sunk and equipped. Seventy percent of the water points were in the Centre-North (Kaya) ORD. At appraisal, benefits--increase in available mandays from better health and savings in collection time plus increased livestock production--were assessed at the same level as under RDF I and valued at CFAF 121,200 (1975 prices) per water point.l/ Using the same approach benefits are more or less as estimated at CFAF 212,200 (1981 prices) (Annex 4, Table 5). Some 125,000 people are estimated to have benefitted from the water supply program. C. Environmental Impact 4.12 The environmental impact of the project was not assessed at appraisal. Whilst the total area affected by the project is relatively small--some one percent of the cultivated area in the ORDs covered--the environmental impact is positive. Well-constructed and maintained erosion control works lead to a considerable reduction in runoff and soil loss, which is estimated at from 21 tons/ha/yr in the north to 2 tons/ha/yr in the south of the country in the absence of control measures 2/. Under RDF II erosion control works will have had a positive environmental impact. Under RDF III this impact is expected to increase as the relatively small (20 ha) and widely dispersed 1/ Report No. 1068b-UV, Annex 12, Table 6. 2/ 21 tons/ha year at Kolei/Ohrsi and 9 tons/ha/year at Linoghin measured by CTFT in 1977; 2 tons/ha/year at Po (Mietten/RDF 1978). - 32 - sites will gradually be replaced with a "total watershed" approach. Associated with erosion control is a program to increase the use of organic manure and ploughing-in of crop residues leading to improved soil stabilization. A pilot village and family woodlot program was initiated under RDF II which may also ultimately have a positive environmental impact. D. Rate of Return 4.13 At appraisal the economic rate of return calculation was said to be tentative as the project provided basically a line of credit to RDF. As such, separate rates of return for various subcomponents were considered as hardly meaningful and very arbitrary as it was impossible to allocate overheads accurately and to determine the annual pace of development. Rates estimated at appraisal are compared with estimates of actual returns in Table 3: Table 3: RATES OF RETURN Appraisal Actual -------- %---------- Erosion Control 30 18 Bottomlands (simple) >50 26 Improved Bottomlands 18 7 Snall-scale Irrigation 16 9 Agricultural Equipment >50 1/ Water Supply 6 7 Grouped . land development works 21 17 . overall 16 12 2/ 1/ Not calculated separately. 2/ Based on land development and water supply components comprising about 70% of project costs. 4.14 Lower returns from erosion control reflects a much larger proportion of the developed area in the northern zone (lower yield increase) while with simple bottomlands part of the developed area was subsequently abandoned. In the case of improved bottomlands, costs were way above estimates but this reflects problems in cost allocation (para.3.05) as well as the pilot nature of the subproject. Low return on small-scale irrigation reflects the difficul- ties of making irrigation pay under conditions in Upper Volta. Under RDF III tighter cost control and more careful selection of perimeters is expected to result in returns on these more intensive investments around 12%. The weighted average rate of return for land development works was satisfactory at 17% as was the overall estimated return of 12%, although below appraisal estimates. - 33 -- V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE A. Management Organization Organization 5.01 The Rural Development Fund, established on a trial basis within the BND during the First Rural Development Fund Project, became responsible to the Ministry of Rural Development during implementation of the Second Rural Development Fund Project. Its role was to appraise subproject proposals, and integrate them into annual programs to be approved by the Interministerial Technical Committee, to be established under the credit. Project implementa- tion was to depend on close links and cooperation between the Rural Develop- ment Works Directorate (HAER) and the Regional Development Organizations (ORDs) of the central plateau. HAER was to be responsible for the engineering, design and execution of well construction, tubewell drilling and technically complex works such as small scale irrigation and improved bottomland develop- ment. The ORDs, in addition to identifying subprojects, were to provide extension, credit and input supply services to participants, and to undertake engineering design and execution of simple works such as bottomlands, erosion control measures and village buildings. To carry out those tasks, both HAER and the ORDs were to be strengthened accordingly with inter alia the Government to provide adequate funds and support to the ORDs. 5.02 RDF and HAER, which became HER in 1977/78, and ONBI, 1/ formed in 1977, were strengthened with expatriate technicians while Dutch volunteers worked in the ORDs supervising topographical surveys and construction. Because of its rather strong management RDF became more of a separate entity within a weak Ministry of Rural Development but remained without the legal status which would enable it to act as a channel of all available funds for small-scale rural investments. 2/ Towards the end of the project Government recognized the need to reorganize and strengthen the Ministry of Rural Development, and, following negotiations for the follow-up project, RDF was accorded revised legal statutes which provide it with the legal authority to act as an autonomous institution under MRD supervision. 5.03 The Interministerial Committee for the Second RDF project, designed to approve, coordinate and supervise the annual working programs, was set up by decree dated January 7, 1977. It included 15 representatives from the different government services and ORDs. Annual meetings were held regularly. 1/ Office National des Barrages et de lIrrigation. 2/ In spite of this RDF has handled funds from a number of other donors (Annex 3, Table 1). - 34 - Management 5.04 The strengthening of HER staff included the appointment of four expatriatesg-three rural engineers and one geometer4 all provided through FAC. On the creation of ONBI two of these engineers were transferred and worked 50-60% of their time on perimeters financed under RDF and the remainder on other work. The Engineer assigned to HER made a considerable contribution to the land development program. During the first year of RDF II, modifica- tions in design for erosion control schemes were successfully tested by HER and the closed system, in which the project. site was surrounded by a dike aiming at achieving total infiltration of rainfall, was replaced by the diversion system in which open intervals left between contour lands let excess runoff flow downstream thereby preventing extensive breaching that plagued the old system. 5.05 In 1979, RDF project management was reorganized with evaluation and control split between two sections: Studies and Programming responsible for appraising subproject proposals, preparing annual work program and monitoring project impact; and Project Supervision which follows up and approves all works completed under RDF. Other sections were: Training and Special Projects covering farmers' and extension workers1training and field trials and demon- strations; and Finance, Credit and Accounting. 5.06 The overall management of the project has been efficient with good cooperation within the management team. It was envisaged at appraisal to strengthen RDF staff by two evaluation officers; an agro-economist and a rural engineer. Both were provided by UNDP and arrived in December 1976 and January 1977 respectively. Because of health problems as well as unsatis- factory performance, the agro-economist's one year contract was not renewed. It took a year for UNDP to provide a replacement who arrived in 1979. The rural engineer performed well as did the replacement agro-economist. In 1979/80 Dutch Aid provided a capable economist for the studies and programming section. UNDP also provided two associate experts for evaluation and control work. An agronomist for the anti-erosion works was recruited in May 1979 through IDA's Agricultural Project Management Unit for West Africa and performed well. B. Supporting Services 5.07 At appraisal supporting services were limited to reinforcing the technical capability of HER and ORDs to undertake land development and other works plus a small training/studies component. In the course of implementa- tion it became apparent that if production was to be increased, there was a need to reinforce ORDs in their capacity to demonstrate improved technology and supply inputs. RDF has made a good contribution to increasing applied research, demonstration and training but has been unable to influence input supply. - 35 -- 5.08 Initially RDF received support from CERCI who supplied a rice agronomist to do trial work in the bottomlands. In 1978 he was seconded to RDF and in 1980 the training and special project unit was formed and an expatriate with training and agronomic experience in the country recruited through IDA. The unit has underway field trials and a demonstration program covering inter alia: (a) rice and sorghum varieties, (b) use of rock phos- phate, (c) planting up of erosion control bunds and (d) use of organic manure. Training programs have been run for extension workers and sector heads as well as demonstrations for farmers on the pilot villages. 5.09 The unit has undertaken work which should be executed by the ORDs under the control of the Agronomy Service (Direction Service Agronomique) in MDR but which were without the necessary means. Whilst there has been a reasonable degree of contact with the research institutes--primarily IRAT and IRCT--the ORDs and DSA have been insufficiently involved. Under RDF III steps have been taken to increase their participation and to improve training further. On input supply there is little progress. Some farmers have received fertilizer and seed through the unit for demonstrations but the majority rely on the ORD supply system. C. Accounting and Reporting 5.10 Accounting. Project accounts were usually up to date and well presented. This is mostly due to the continuous supervision of the accounting section by the dynamic and competent project manager. Annual audit reports were submitted regularly and in all cases concluded that project accounts were satisfactory. However, for management purposes deficiencies still exist in that improvements are required in allocating costs between sub-components; that is, better analytical budgeting and accounting is needed. In June 1981 the auditors made recommendations for improving accounting procedures. 5.11 Reporting. In addition to a detailed annual report, RDF was to prepare budgets; statements of project expenditures and progress reports, twice yearly. The project, instead, prepared annual financial and technical progress reports together with financial and technical forecasts for the following years. The reports, which included critical analyses of the situa- tion and made suggestions on ways to remove bottlenecks, were satisfactory. They show, over the years, how much project management remained aware of the constraints to be tackled, the priorities to be addressed and the actions required to make the project more effective. D. Monitoring and Evaluation 5.12 In 1979/80, the project improved monitoring of implementation and costs of the various components. The weak point, however, remained the poor follow-up of actual benefits derived from the project-s main components, since: (i) the project was spread over a large area, (ii) extension services - 36 - were ill-trained to collect data and (iii) supervisors could not properly cross-check the results for reasons ranging from poor roads to insufficient training in evaluation. Even when data had been available comparisons with conditions outside the project were seldom made until 1979-80. Although the project was in a better position to supervise its activities, it remained unable to ensure proper evaluation and identification of new subprojects. One positive feature was the valuable work carried out by the project-s Monitoring and Evaluation team, in 1980, when it prepared, with RMWA-s assistance, the RDF III preparation report. E. Performance of Participants 5.13 The overall performance of the various partners has been mixed, but better than under the first project. At appraisal the main problems of RDF I-- lack of experienced staff, inadequate subproject supervision and insufficient supporting ORD services (extension, credit, inputs)--had been generally deter- mined and proper actions suggested to address them in a follow-up project. IDA and its co-lenders strengthened RDF senior technical staff and financed ORD extension agents, machine operators and topographers. A medium-term agricultural credit component was introduced to provide farmers with farm equipment. Initial problems in project implementation were overcome and not only were physical targets reached in most components, but weaknesses in monitoring/evaluation, technology development and maintenance of land develop- ment works were also tackled. However, there is still room for improvement, particularly in controlling management costs (para. 3.17) and in addressing the issues discussed in VI below. VI. SPECIAL ISSUES Decentralization and Local_Participation 6.01 Among issues raised by the PPAR on RDF I were decentralization and the implicit objectives to establish a system with local participation in both planning and financing. The PPAR concluded that the project had been only partially successful in meeting these objectives and that in obtaining free labor from villagers food from the World Food Program (WFP) had been a major incentive. Furthermore, the absence of a farmers organization meant that ORDs had played a major role in choice of project--the Region con- sidered the lack of a farmers- organization overemphasized. 6.02 During the second project participation by the local population in land development works, including soil erosion control, increased considerably as benefits became apparent, designs improved and as better trained and motivated extension staff were better able to explain the system to farmers. - 37 - Demands for erosion control works now far outnumber ORDs' implementation capacity. WFP food aid continued to be used but proved a mixed blessing when distribution problems at the ORD level sometimes broke down. The lack of national policy on method of local participation continued to pose problems, particularly when neighboring villages found themselves offered different terms according to the source of finance--RDF or non-governmental organiza- tion. The new status of RDF should help attempts to harmonize development approaches (para. 6.05). In organizing farmers RDF worked through village groups and, following national developments, the grass roots organization has become stronger in the course of the project. RDF III will continue to emphasize this development. Recurrent Cost Financing 6.03 Linked to the question of rural participation is, first, the issue of recurrent cost financing of works at the village level, and second, the role of RDF in financing ORD costs. Maintenance of erosion control works and simple bottomlands requires primarily farmers' labor. Maintenance of erosion control works improved during RDF II and expected benefits should provide adequate incentives to farmers to commit the necessary labor. Although villages were involved in early selection, abandonment of bottomlands has become a serious problem but is due to injudicious technical selection, organizational problems on the sites concerned and lack of market outlets. Under RDF III more rigorous selection procedures will be adopted. For irriga- tion perimeters an annual land development (water charge) was introduced. Under RDF III charges will be incorporated under a national policy, which, covenanted under the Niena Dionkele project (Cr. 1013-UV), was to be in place by December 31, 1981. 1/ 6.04 Funding of maintenance costs of tubewells for potable water has become a major issue and many tubewells installed under previous projects have become inoperational due to lack of maintenance 2/. The problem was reported i% supervision and clarified during preparation of RDF III. UNDP are financing a study which will provide the basis for a national policy covenanted in the RDF III credit agreement 3/. Institutional Aspects 6.05 An implied objective of both RDF I and RDF II was to improve the planning system applicable to the many small projects financed by a wide variety of agencies, most of which are not subjected to a systematic appraisal 1/ Government did not meet this date and receipt of proposals for a national policy became a condition of Board Presentation for RDF III. These have been received, will be reviewed with Government and the credit agreement will be amended to put back the date to December 31, 1982. 2/ See report of M. Laurent, Juillet 80. 3/ To be in place by December 31, 1982. - 38 - of their technological, financial, economic or social feasibility. Although not resolved under RDF II, the institutional role of RDF was addressed during preparation and appraisal of RDF III and by the time of Board Presentation it had been established as a semi-autonomous organization in MDR charged inter alia to act as a channel for funds for small scale projects. 6.06 Under the second project RDF has continued to support the ORDs and has provided much needed technical assistance to HER and ONBI. In supporting the ORBs it has funded costs of extension staff required to supervise construction of land development works (which can be regarded as an investment expenditure), construction costs and volunteers providing technical assistance. While with land development works the link between RDF, ORD and village has worked reasonably well, with agricultural credit (para. 3.12) the arrangements have been unsatisfactory and RDF has provided funds without ade- quately monitoring results at the village level. Nevertheless, while direct participation in project funding and existing institutions has not always worked well, the move into training and supporting field trials and demonstra- tions--providing, to some extent, a service for the central plateau--has been in the right direction. RDF has provided a support structure for those ORDs of the central plateau where limited incremental production opportuni- ties prevent, at least for the time being, support of an area development project. The problem of supply of inputs has not been resolved and all farmers- immediate demands for fertilizer are unlikely to be met. however, the proposed fertilizer and food policy credit 1/ would tackle at least the funding problem (para. 4.06) at the national level. In addition, following a study, Government is reviewing ORD funding, while the Koudougou Pilot Project 2/ will begin to tackle the improvement of ORD services in selected areas of the central plateau. An area development project is planned for Koupela (Centre Est) in FY86. Agricultural Credit 6.07 Under RDF II the provision of medium term agricultural credit was a relatively small component and one of the first attempts to distribute credit outside the Southwest. It was only with the formation of CNCA in 1980 that the problems/needs of credit for the central plateau received much attention and it is evident that only the larger farms--cultivating over 5 ha on good soils--can be expected to exploit and repay medium-term credit. Under RDF III, ORD credit offices will be strengthened and with CNCA handling animal traction credit there will be a greater incentive to improve repayment rates. Training of Voltaic Staff 6.08 Training provisions were inadequate under RDF II. Provisions were modified and additional resources applied during implementation for the training of ORD level staff. Under RDF III, UNDP will provide a training officer to implement a more comprehensive program of staff development and ORD-s without assistance from other sources will receive more help. 1/ Second project brief of April 9, 1982. 2/ Koudougou Agricultural Pilot Project, yellow cover PR, March 24, 1982. - 39 - VII. CHANGES IN RDF III 7.01 Principle changes incorporated under the follow-up project approved by the Board, March 30, 1982 are. (a) greater emphasis on involvement of village groups; (b) a "whole watershed" approach to land development works to reduce unit costs and achieve better environmental results, (c) agricultural credit to be handled by CNCA except for the still innovative items including assistance to village groups for cereal processing and storage; (d) special account to allow prefinancing of project expenditures (e) guidelines for more thorough evaluation of subprojects; (f) funding production of animal traction equipment; (g) financing of extension workers on a declining basis; (h) committee of experts resident in Upper Volta to be responsible for approving improved bottomland and small-scale irrigation developments; (i) RDF to become a semi-autonomous institution in MDR, and (j) more emphasis on training of Voltaic personnel. VIII. BANK PERFORMANCE 8.01 The Bank maintained as much staff continuity as possible, during the ten supervision missions that took place from 1976 to 1981; five different persons were on those missions. Relations with both RDF management and Government were always good, frank and cordial. The other co-lenders were cooperative when approached and relied mostly on the Bank missions to keep track of project performance. 8.02 Bank missions, which would have gained spending a little more time per visit, showed concern, at an early stage, at farmers apparent lack of interest in irrigation below small dams (missions 2 and 3). Potential bottom- lands had not been surveyed and data on farmers' available manpower for bottomlands was insufficient. The fifth mission stressed the need for quality rather than for targets being reached at any cost. The seventh, ninth and tenth mission increasingly advised the project to make available to farmers a simple but effective technical package, using existing local technology. The project did suffer from a lack of relations and cooperation with the various Research Institutes, a common feature for most agricultural projects in Upper Volta. - 40 - 8.03 Key indicators adopted by supervision missions related solely to physical implementation achievements when they should also have included production data necessary to evaluate and analyse the actual impact of the project. It was not until 1979 that missions focussed on additional indicators such as. (i) crop production and yields for the main crops, (ii) farmers' use of fertilizers, and (iii) percentage of farmers adopting a basic technical package proposed by the project. Had those indicators been introduced in the first mission-s checklist, earlier attention would have been given to the need for the project to: (a) contact the Research Institutes in order to determine a single technical package, (b) train extension agents accordingly, and (c) place a greater emphasis on the project impact and better define the M & E section-s priorities. IX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 Overall, RDF II was a success. The project has been well-managed, its investment program implemented more or less as expected. Although with some important exceptions, many of its institutional objectives have been realized, and the project had positive social and environmental impacts. The number of beneficiaries reached was in line with expectations. 9.02 The agricultural impact of the project was significant, in that 20-23,000 farm families participated, although the monetary impact per family was less than expected--on average about 40% of their upland cereals bene- fitting from erosion control against the larger area plus a more important bottomland development than predicted at appraisal. Monitoring and evaluation results show erosion control to have had a significant enough effect (20-40%) on yields and the yield potential of bottomlands to justify development-- provided other constraints (para. 3.04), which have led to a high rate of abandonment, can be resolved. Maintenance proved a problem in its early years of the project but improved markedly in the last two years following greater attention by project management. Nevertheless, while the agricultural impact is positive, replicability of the land development works is limited by the relative cost of resources required, for example, for survey of contour lands. Lower cost alternatives will be studied under the follow-up project. 9.03 In addition to its direct impact on agricultural production, the project has initiated some useful trial and demonstration work in a search for improved technology acceptable to the farmer on the central plateau. This work will be continued under the follow-up project. 9.04 Project cost was higher (14%) than expected and much of this was due to increases in the management and technical assistance components. This is more or less explained by the need to provide additional ORD support services (training and trials/demonstrations) not foreseen at appraisal. 9.05 MDR and ORD services have benefitted from the project but in the follow-up project a more comprehensive approach to staff training at all levels will be required. UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPPEMET FUND PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPMENT RUPAL (cR 64o-uv) PHYSICAL IMPLEMENATION OF SUB-PROJECTS/EALISATION DES SOUS-PROJETS 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 Total % a/ b/ a/ b/ a/ b/ a/ b/ a/ b/ a/ b/ a/ b/ Est./ Actual/ Est. Actual/ Est. Actual/ Est. Actual/ Eat. Actual/ Est. Actual/ Est. Actual/ Actual LAND DEVELOPMENT/AMENAGEMENTS HYDRO-AGRICOLES (ha) Erosion Control/Sites Anti-drosives 200 c/ 1,500 451 2,000 1,043 2,500 2,974 3,000 4,804 - 5,779 9,200 15,051 164 Bottomlands/Bas-fonds simples 100 c/ 500 305 600 469 700 491 800 235 - 385 2,700 1,885 70 Improved Bottomlands/Bas-fonds am4liorgs - c/ 50 - 50 64 100 28 100 25 - 28 300 145 48 Small-Scale Irrigation/Avals de Barrage et perimdtres maratchers - c/ 25 8 25 83 75 17 75 37 - 58 200 203 102 VILLAGE BUILDINGS/BATIMENTS VILLAGEOIS e/ Village warehouses/Magasins 6 c/ 6 5 6 3 6 5 6 3 - 6 30 22 73 Village Centers/Centres sociaux f/ - c/ 5 9 5 14 5 3 5 2 - 3 20 31 155 Other Construction/Autres Constructions g/ - C/ - Extension workers' houses/ logements encadreurs 21 35 20 10 8 94 - . Village Shops/ Boutiques villageoises 11 4 - - - 15 - . Training Centers/Centres de Formation 3 17 - - - 20 - * Cereal Banks/Banques de Cgrdales - - - 7 11 18 - WATER SUPPLY/HYDRAULIQUES VILLAGEOIS h/ Wells/Puits - c/ 100 188 120 126 140 127 160 128 - 215 520 614 118 Tubewells/Forages d/ - c/ - 50 60 37 60 40 60 33 - 48 180 208 116 a/ Report No. 1068b-UV, Annex 4, Table 15. b/ RDF Management/Direction FDR. c/ Recorded under RDF I/Compile sous FOR I. d/ Actual are successful tubewells, total of 302 drilled./Rgalisations sur les forages positifs, nombre de forages r4alis6s 302. e/ Appraisal Estimates of 400 small (24 m2) stores revised to 30 larger (95-70m2) stores at sector level-- see supervision report 11/17/77./Provisions pour 400 petits (24m2) magasins r6vis6s et 30 magasins (96-70m2) dans lea secteurs pr6vus--voir rapport mission Supervision 17/11/77. f/ Meeting rooms and maternity centers./Salles de reunions et P.M.I. - Centres sociaux. g/ Financed by project, in addition cash grant made for construction of 45 stables in pilot villages./Avec financement du projet, plus 1-assistance donn4e pour Ia construction des 6tables fumieres dans lea zones pilotes. H-M h/ RDF III Appraisal Report, Working Paper No. 7./Rapport d'6valuation FDR III et documents de travail no. 7. c4 - 30 - UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL (CR. 640-uv) PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SUB-PROJECTS BY ORD/REALISATIONS DES SOUS-PROJETS PAR ORD LAND DEVELOPMENT/ I/ VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE/ 2/ WATER SUPPLY/ 3/ Aménagement Hydro-Agricole Infrastructure de Village Alimentation en eau EROSION CONTROL/ BOTTONLANDS/ SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION/ VILLAGE WAREHOUSES/ VILLAGE CENTERS/ OTHERS/ WELLS/ TUBEWELLS/ Contr8le d'érosion Bas-Fonds Avals de Barrages Entrep8ts Villageois Groupements Autres Puits Forages Simple/ Improved/ Villageois Simples Améliorés (No.) . ---------- ------ ------ (Ha) ----------------------(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) Centre (Ouagadougou) 3,225 130 137 25 2 1l 37 61 - Centre-Ouest (Koudougou) 2,794 555 - 20 7 8 34 - - Centre Nord (Kaya) 3,448 304 - 33 4 5 35 426 158 Nord (Yatenga) 4,052 233 8 8 2 5 25 35 - Centre-Est (Koupela) 220 142 - 24 2 2 6 - Est (Fada N'Gouma) 280 83 - 17 5 - - 92 - Sahel 764 19 - - - - 50 Bougouriba (Diébougou) - 98 - - Ouest (Banfora) Hauts Bassins (Bobo Dioulasso) - - - 43 - 3 - Volta Noire (Dedougou) 268 321 - - TOTAL 15,051 1,885 145 170 22 31 147 614 208 l/ Source: RDF Managemant/Direction FDR 2/ RDF III appraisal report, Working Paper 7/Rapport d'évaluation FDR III, document de travail no. 7. 3/ RDF Management/Direction FDR UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVETLOPr- U RC/DEUiE PAM DE DEVELOPP-N RURAL Cr. 64o-uv) Project Costs/Cotts du Projet 1/ (CFAF '000) 1976/77 1977178 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 TOM Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Eat. Act. hat. Act. Est. Act, Project Management/Gestion FDR 19,773 31,691 32,494 39,780 32,026 64,524 43,409 86,607 47,261 91,219 173,963 313,821 Technical Assistance/Assistance technique 24,740 50,630 64,5o1 78,523 79,595 57,914 88,070 117,337 4,864 169,202 266,770 473,606 Land Development/Amdnagement Hydro-agricole - Erosion control & simple bottonlands/ Sites anti-6rosives et has fonds simples 85,125 113,716 176,272 161,586 217,304 212,692 251,938 310,344 300,501 303,747 1,031,140 1,102,085 - improved bottanlands/basfonds am4liords - - 17,o43 10,974 17,578 19,014 35,108 28,020 36,374 17,030 io6,103 75,038 - W-sale irrigation/aval de barrage et p4rimhtres - 39,569 33,610 50,844 35,731 27,006 113,072 39,406 119,841 46,933 302,254 203,758 moaratchers Buildings/BStiments - Village Warehouses/Magasins 8,544 ) 8,996 ) 14,)66 ) 20,848 ) 27.856 ) 80.810 20,i56 ) 39,9 ) 23,838 ) 18,308 ) 22,763 ) 125,044 - Village Centres/Centres Sociaux - ) 1,531 ) 1,655 ) 1,779 ) 1,905 ) 6,870 Water Supply/Hydraulique villageoise - Walls/Puits 5,030 221,327 253,170 220,831 144,865 200,763 176,859 262,110 166,255 143,018 746,179 1,048,049 - Tubewells/Forages - 56,742 - 66,533 65,946 63,112 86,361 83,364 75,881 85,233 228,188 352,986 - Well maintenance brigade/Entretien - - 11,038 - 7,211 2,876 8,943 2,577 1o,858 9,607 38,050 15,060 des popes Training/Formation - 11,518 13,390 18,596 6,250 9,681 7,478 3,042 6,947 14,062 _ 34,065 56,899 Studies - Ochocerciaisis/Etudes - onchocercose - 5,214 242,171 37,999 112,750 lo4,023 35,451 19,159 - 11,i96 390,372 117,591 Agricultural credit/Crddit agricole - 16,583 28,125 10,971 28,125 21,726 28,125 32,252 28,125 33,236 112,500 114,768 Unidentified/lion-identifids - 25,976 33,750 26,154 33,750 24,911 33,750 41,545 33,750 24,109 135,000 142,695 Forestry/Reboisement - - - - - - - 5,975 - 29,535 - 35,510 Stock/Stock - - - - - - - - - 9,624 - 9,624 TOuk - "Wm COU OaoWP-= 1432. 593,122 921091 760,770 796_V2 832,080 929,191 1,050,046 86o,418 ioio,y;4 36,50,264 6 246532 1] From RDF; Technical Services (HER & ORD) shown separately in Report no. 1068G-UV have been allocated to subprojects on basis use expected at appraisal/ Services d'appui (HER & ORD) present6 en Rapport No. 1068G-UV ont 4td charg6s aux sousprojects sur base des estimations A 1dvaluation At appraisal first year was 1975/76/A 1'6valuation API . 1975/76 / Costs for 15 monthe/CoOts pour 15 mois / Includes assistance to CNCA/y conpris assistance technique CNCA Includes beekeeping/y compria apiculture UPPER VOLTA/RAUTE-VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL (CREDIT 640-UV) ACTUAL PROJECT FINANCING/DEPENSES EFPECTIVES ET SOURCES DE FINANMFNT n/ (CFAF 'UNR) Dutch - - - ----------------IDA--------------- ovt./ ------------- - ----------------EAA------------------Gov -----------Govt, of Uppr Volta/Couvi Haute-Volta----- . Paya Bas TtlFss u 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 Total 19/77 1il/ 1978/79 1979/ g IL/ - 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/SR 1980/81 Total pa4saa Uf. Proiect Managent/Direction FDR 27,632 35,063 57,246 77,080 43,845 240,866 - - - - - - 41,955 4,060 4,716 7,278 9,527 5,419 31,000 313,821 SUB-PROJECT/Sonus-Proieta Ersion cotrol and simple bottomlandg/ 101,207 143,811 189,296 276,207 56,473 766,994 - - - - 240,294 12,509 17,775 23,397 34.138 6,980 94,797 1,102,05 sites anti-gro-ive et bas-fonde simples Improved bottomlands/Ba.-fonds amliorSé - 9,767 16,922 24,938 15,157 66,784 - - - - - - - - 1,207 2,092 3,082 1,873 8,254 75.038 Rmall-scale Rrrigatlon/Irrlgation-Maratchage 35,216 45,251 24,035 35,071 41,771 181,345 - - - - - - - 4,353 5,592 2,971 4,335 5,163 22,413 203,758 Well./PNits 4,188 - - 102,880 3,758 110,826 210,869 216,135 196,188 142,820 22,806 788,818 115,990 6,270 4,696 4,575 16,410 464 32,417 11,048,030 Tubewella/Foragss 834 - - 35,606 20,539 56,979 53,788 63,449 62,127 43.357 2,000 224,721 60,15N 2,121 1,084 985 4,401 2,539 11,130 352,984 Wel maintnance teom/Brigade entretien - - - 2,101 41 2,142 - - 2,867 216 - 3,091 9,560 - - - 260 55 265 15,059 dea pompe. Village BuildigS/BåtimentE villageo.i 17,940 35.582 21,216 16,293 20,259 111,290 - - - - - - - 2,217 4,398 2,122 2,014 2,104 13,755 125,045 TraLning/Bouse d19tudea, fornation 10,251 16,550 7,246 2,708 1,864 38,620 - - - - - - 1,267 2,045 2,434 334 230 6,312 44,932 Unidentifled project./projet« non-identifigs 23,118 23,277 22,171 36,976 21,457 126,998 - - - - - 2,857 2,877 2,740 4,570 2,652 15,696 142,695 AgRcultural credit/Cridit agricole 14,758 9,765 19,336 28,704 985 73,548 - - - - - 1,824 1,207 2,390 3,548 122 9,090 114,768 h/ Studies/Etude. 5,214 35,786 99,313 17,052 9,965 167,329 - - - - - - - 2,213 4,710 2,107 1,232 10,262 177,591 Forestry/Reboisenent - - - 5,318 5,529 10,847 - - - - 20,860 - - 657 683 1,341 33,048 Technical Assi«t. to CNCA/Assiotance - - - - 10,650 10,650 - - - - - - - - - 1,316 1,316 11,967 tehnique CNCA - Silkors & Beekeeping/S5riculture, Apiculture - - - 2,191 2,191 - - - - - -271 2,462 Stock/Stockage - - - - - - - - - - - - 9,624 - - - - 9,264 TOTAL 240,358 354,852 456,781 660,934 254,485 1,967,410 264,657 279,584 261,191 186,393 24,806 1,016,631 498,438 37,478 47,811 56,194 85,383 31,453 258,319 '3,772,927 yl Excluding technical asistance/assistance technique exclu. 6/ For animal tractio eupmnt aod ocn- other credlt under unidentified and lncludes EPAF 30,129,00 Ef,o revolvlng fud created ot all crdit operation./ulture attelé, <dquipeent et bof de traft) -autres atoos de cridiE agticole our projeto on-jdeotinfic y compria FPA 31 129 00 provenant du fond. de roolement gtabli pour ls op6ratjon de crdit. - Anse. 2/Ann~n 2 - 0f! E &A Table 3/Tabl»wu 3 soa. WLn Yt0fleT ru»sD w uan/ /pSrm rame m DzmPnm 212 (Ci. 640-U) PWTCT OT AD YMffi/CWTB 21 OrT iT FIDUMCS0 (US$ Millice/Dellara E. .illions) 1/ Actual Total as % of Appras.1 Total/ [meal Total/ Local/ Total/ Réel Total en % I .cal. Foreip/Devi.e Total Loeale Foriga/Devises Total du Total b 1'éaluation Project Managecnt/Getion FPR 0.57 0.20 0.77 0.96 0.41 1.37 178 Technical Assistance/Asistance Technique - 1.19 1.19 - 2.04 2.04 171 Iand Development/Améagents hydro-agrioles - Erosion Control & Simple bottand./ 3.31 1.27 4.58 3.42 1.40 4.82 105 Sites aenti-6roivea et bas fonda siapIe - Improved bott=land./bas fondS aMéliors 0.31 0.16 0.47 0.15 0.19 0.34 71 - Sm.11-ale irrigation/Aeal ds barrage et 0.80 0.54 1.34 o.14 0.47 0.88 65 périnbtresaatchers Buildings/Batiments - Poilaga Warnhnda/uaais 0.20 9.16 0.36 0.30 o.24 0.54 138 - villagentre./Cent-re sociau 0.02 0.01 0.03 Wator Supply/ydraliques VillageoI - wef.a/Fits : 1.62 1-69 3.31 2.64 1.97 4.61 139 - Tubeweell/Foraes 0.43 0,58 1.01 0.67 o.86 1.53 151 - Weil aintenanc/Entretien dee p.pee 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.06 36 Training/oorati-on 0.11 o.04 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.24 160 Studies Onchocorcass/Etudes Onehoc~oo e 0.17 1.57 1.74 0.08 0.73 0.81 46 Agriculture Credit/Cr6dit Agricole 0.35 0.15 0.50 0.35 0.15 0.50 100 Uidentified/Non-identifié 0.32 o.28 0.60 0.33 0.29 o.62 ) 128 Forestry/Reboiseet - 0.10 .04 o.14) Stok/Sto-k - - - 0.02 0.02 0.04 Totsl Project Coets/Conte Totaux du Projet 8.28 7.94 16.02 9.64 8.90 18.54 114 Financing -IDA 9.40 8.92 94 - BADFA 4.50 4.50 100 - FAC 0.60 0.56 93 - Dc id/Pay ä- 0.15 2.38 159 - U2DP/OD o.45 0.92 204 - Goer-ent/Etat qoltanque 1.10 1.14 103 - Other/Autre. 2/ 0.12 - i6.o 18.54 114 J - F Appraisal/Ealuation - 225.00 Actuol/1976/77 - 247.11 RIS.1 1977/78 - 232.30 1978/79 - 214.73 1979/80 - 207.79 1930/81 - 256.35 g/ Credit revolvng fund/fonda de rilent crédit agricleU UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA SECOND RURAL DRVELOIENT FUND PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL (CR. 64o-uv) TECHICAL ASSISTANCE/ASSISTANCE TECHNIQJE lf (CFAF '000) --------1976/77----------- -------------197778----~ -------1978/79-------- ------------2197/80-------------190/81------ -- - - .2 / - --/ / 219 8 _ A. UND? Agric. Economist/Agro-Economiste (FAO) . (9) 9,072 (12) 12,376 (12) 13,608 (12) 13,041 (3) 3,780 (12) 13,948 - - (36) 39,365 (8) 26,460 Rural Engineer/Ingnileur GR-CTP (FAO) - - - - - - - (5) 6,814 - (2) 21,450 - (17) 28,264 Rural Engineer/IngInieur GR (FAO) - (9) 7,749 (12) 12,376 (12) 11,592 (12) 13,041 (12) 12,852 (12) 13,948 (12) 15,508 - (12) 21,450 (36) 39,345 (57) 69,131 Rural Enginer AE/Ing49nieur GR.EA (FAO) - (1) 714 - (12) 8,946 - (3) 2,331 - (12) 8,829 - (12) 10,735 - <49) 31,555 Economist AE/Economiste RA (FAO) - - - (6) 3,528 - (12) 7,938 - (20) 15,676 - <12) 12,760 - (36) 39,904 Agronomi.t Vol./Agronome (VNU) - - - (3) 1,134 - (9) 3,780 - (12) 5,998 - (12) 6,478 - (»0) 17,39 B. ID17,535 24,752 38,808 26,082 30,681 27,896 52,827 - 72,873 (72) 78,730 (3M) 212,724 B. IDA Agronomigt/Agronoe - - - - - - (11) 12,713 - (12) 14,125 - (13) 26,838 C. Dutch Governent/Gouv. du Pays Bas Economist/Economiste - - - - - - (7) 8,330 - (12) 15,379 - (a9) 23,709 Volunteerø/Voontaires (18) 4,177 (36) 9,440 (36) 8,763 (36) 10,880 (36) 9,419 (36) 11,250 (36) 10,074 (58) 21,470 (61) 26,115 (126)32.433 (7)71 4,177 9,440 8,763 10,880 9,419 11,250 10,074 29,800 - 41,494 32,4 ~ 1 864 D. FAG Rural Engineer/IngØ;nieur GR (ONBI) (6) 5,140 (12) 6,055 (12) 10,786 (7) 7,258 (12) 11,592 - (12) 12,398 (7) 7,349 - (12) 16,130 (42) 39,916 <3~) 36,792 Rural Engineer/Ing6nieur TR (OnBI) (6) 3,856 (12) 6,222 (12) 8,089 (12) 7, 347 (12) 8,694 (6) 9,927 (12) 9,299 (4) 4,562 - (12) 14,652 (42) 29,931 (44) 42,710 Rural Engineer/ingénieur Géo. <ER) (6) 3,856 (12) 4,919 (12) 8,089 (12) 5,916 (12) 8,694 (12) 6,056 (12) 9,299 (12) 10,086 - (12) 9,928 (42) 29,93M (60) 36,905 Welle Engineer/Ingé,ieur "uit; (ER) (12) 7, 711 (12) 6,459 (12) 8,089 (11) 8, 314 (12) 8,694 - (12) 9,299 - - (48)- 337 (23) 14,773 20, 563 23, 655 35, 053 28, 835 37, 674 15, 983 40, 295 21, 997 - 40,710 133, W4 131, 180 TOTAL 24, 740 50, 630 68, 568 78, 523 73, 175 57, 914 78,265 117,337 169,202 (372)244.748 473,606 1/ Estimates fro report no. 1068b-UV; cost of scholarships excluded; actual from RD? Management/ Prévisionz dans rapport no. 1068b-UV; étudeo et bourses exclues; colts réels Direction IDR. 2/ E.tiate/Prévisions. 3/ Actual/COts réels. 4/ Men-nths/homes ois. UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL (Cr. 640-uv) Credit subcanponents/Sous projets crédit (CFAF '000) 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 TOTAL A. Unidentified Projects/Projets Non-identifies 1. Cereal Processing & Storage/Transformation et Stockage des Cereales Cereal Processing/Trans ormation des Cereales - (6) 3,740 (17) 14,333 (-) - (24) 21,260 (47) 39,333 Cereal Banks/Banques de Cereales - - (7) 4,620 (11) 8,910 (18) 13,530 2. Livestock/Elevage Cattle fattening/B2bouche Bovine - 1,540 - --- 1,540 Poultry/Aviculture - 217 1,577 1,150 *2,944 % 3. Market Gardening/Perimetres Maraichers - 653 1,153 1,351 1,066 4,223 4. Village Stores/Boutiques Villageoises 250 1,000 - - - - 1,250 5. Fertilizer/Engrais - - - 363 1,133 1,496 6. Group Assistance/Appui Groupements - 2,895 210 - - 3,105 Subtotal/Sous-total 250 8,289 17,453 7,911 33,519 67,421 B. Animal Traction/Culture Attelee 15,734 13,547 16,304 14,323 60,372 120,280 (No. beneficiaries/No. de beneficiaires) (1,173) (308) (325) (278) (617) (2,701) C. Mobylettes - 8,214 6,409 14.120 11,476 40,219 TOTAL CREDIT DISTRIBUTED/CREDIT ALLOUE 15,984 30,049 40,166 36,354 105,367 227,920 Source: RDF Management/Direction FDR. C - 48 - Annex 2/Annexe 2 UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA Table 6/Tableau 6 SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT/ DEUXIEME PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL (Cr. 640-UV) Credit Allocation/Affectation du Cr6dit Disbursed Original at Allocation Reallocation 1/ 3/31/82 US$ '000 -------- ------ Category I All project works and related supporting services for wells, tubewells, and tubewell maintenance brigade components of the project 200 600 599 Category II All project works and supporting services except those covered under Category I (a) directly imported goods and foreign consultants' services 1,200 450 467 (b) other eligible expenditures 5,000 7,565 7,233 Category III Studies for economic development of areas freed from onchocerciasis (a) internationally recruited staff 160 - - (b) consultants' services 1,140 765 715 (c) other expenditures for vehicles, operating costs and local counterpart staff 100 20 20 Category IV Unallocated 1,600 - - TOTAL 9,400 9,400 9,034 1/ January 5, 1982 - 49 -- Annex 2/Annexe 2 Table 7/Tableau 7 UPPER VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT/ DEUXIENE PROJET FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL (Credit 640-UV) Schedule of Disbursements/Retrait des Fonds Actual or New IDA Appraisal New 1/ Estimate as % of Fiscal Year Estimate Actual Estimate appraisal estimates 1976/77 December 31 1,500 June 30 2,700 646 24 1977-78 December 31 3,700 1,163 31 June 30 4,700 1,597 34 1978-79 December 31 5,700 2,412 42 June 30 7,350 3,204 44 1979-80 December 31 7,900 4,537 57 June 30 9,100 6,323 69 1980-81 December 31 9,400 7,670 82 June 30 - 8,122 8,600 86 1981-82 December 31 8,411 8,900 89 June 30 - 9,400 100 1/ at 04/81 UPPER VOLTA/HAUTE VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROIET FONDS DE DEVELOPPENT RURAL (CR. 640-UV) FUNDS MANAGED BY RD1F 1972-1981/Fond. sos geotion FDR 1972-1981 1 (CFAF '000) Total 1972/1973 1973/1974 1974/197 1975/1976 1976/1977 1977/1978 1978/1979 197918 1980/1981 TOTAUX/ IDA Credit/Accord de Cr4dit IDA - 31$ 21,910 131,585 226,633 72,211 36,978 - - - - 489,317 - 442 - - 184,744 184,365 71,253 - - - - 441,062 - 64o - - - - 240,358 354,852 456,781 660,934 254,485 1,967,410 Loan/AP BADEA - - - - 264,657 279,584 261,191 186,393 24,805 1,o6,630 Governet/Etat Voltalque 4,448 26,954 46,419 14,970 45,052 47,81 56,194 85,383 31,453 358,541 Dutch Government/Pays Bae - - - - - - - - 498,438 498,438 Revolving Fund/Fonds de Roulement 2] - - - - - - - - 32,129 32,129 Drought Relief progra/Programme de rel6veent du Sahel apr6s la S6cherease (US AID) - - 405,794 173,612 107j135 38,762 - - - 727,303 Small Projects EDF/Micr.41sations FED 2 - - - - - 51,891 138,198 60.619 90,967 341,675 P.I.A.S. (US AID) - - - - 29,996 56,219 23,292 11,546 14,537 135,590 E.T.I.I.F.D. (US AID) - - - - 3,769 4,313 3,207 - - 11,289 UNDP Capital Fud/FENU (PMUD) - - - 20,986 7,289 - - - - 28,275 Swiss Aid/Mat6riel agricole Financeent Suisse - - - - - 157,178 66,923 3,538 - 227,639 TOTAL 26,398 158,536 863,590 467,964 807,187 990,610 1,005,786 1,oo8,413 946,714 6,275298 2] Source: RDF Manageent/Direction FDR R 2 evolving fund from agricultural credit operations of ORD/ Fonds de roulment constitud Per rembouraements des ondrations de crddit effeetuds per les ORD. Technical control/contrBle technique ANNEX 4 Page 1 UPPER VOLTA SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Cr. 640-UV) Project Completion Report Economic Rate of Return Economic rates of return have been calculated on and development works and water supply components using the following assumptions: (a) In calculating returns on erosion control and simple bottomlands, revised cost allocations prepared by RDF were used and local costs adjusted to border prices at Standard Conversion Factor (SCF) of 0.83. Returns on improved bottomlands, small-scale irrigation and water supply were calculated on the basis of costs included in the accounts prepared by RDF at 09/30/81. Local costs were similarly adjusted to border prices. (b) Output prices (1981 terms) were based on actuals and Bank forecasts at December 1981 1/, with marketing margins derived from data in the Agricultural Issues Study. 2/ In converting project costs to 1981 terms, imported goods were adjusted on the basis of the revised MUV index at March 1982, 3/ and local expenditures using the GDP deflator for the country. (c) Rates of return for individual components were based on effective lives for structures of: erosion control and simple bottoulands (10 years), improved bottomlands (15 years), small-scale irrigation (20 years), water supply (20 years). Cd) Farmers' labor has been costed at CFAF 170 per man-day. 4/ (e) A management charge of 12% - which excludes monitoring/evaluation, research and training costs - has been added to sub-projects to cover technical assistance (to RDF) and management costs of project supervision; technical assistance to ORDs, HER and ONBI has been allocated directly to sub-projects. 1/ Commodity Price Forecasts - Updating, December 24, 1981. 2/ Annexes to Agricultural Issues Study, Report No. 3296-UV. 3/ Guidelines on expected price increases and real interest rates, March 17, 1982. 4/ See Upper Volta - Economic Cost of Farm Labor, Notley and Harrold (WAPA4), September 17, 1981. 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Area sn/Supeficie nblavee (ha) - 243 910 1188 1o95 1037 869 611 341 210 0ield/Rseeent (kg/R) - 950 1110 131p 145. 1,00 150 1509 1500 1509 1)00 150 1ducti (es/tont) - 130 660 936 1405 1782 1556 _1301 -91,_____- 17 _5_12 _ 328 ee /-evenu (CAI millon) - (63) 19.40 (6 .6) 43.80 (7L) 69.0 (12 0.3,.0 I 103) 1d3.0 (19W 168.70 (110) 172.10 (11) 150.00 (115) 105.5 (115) 53.90 (115' 36.60 EGONOM91 COSTS/MUTS ECONOMTQUES (CFAF million) Cons trucI or Equienet, operating cest., HEF/oRD support/ Eculpement, foetioneent et serv-e T'appeti FRk/UJ 111.39 56.6 48,2'- 30.66 35.07 - - - - . u-'ento 19.94 15.06 8.02 9. 7 1.48 - . -D' maagment/FOR cos de gestio 3.82 4.78 3.45 2.0 3.11 - - - farmes' labnr/main-d'oeuvre ('300 md/h:j) (21.4) 3.64 (32.8) 5.5_ _34.4) 5.85 (16..>) 2.81 (27.0) 4.9 Sub-Lta/lSus-tal 68.79 ¯8-07 6e.5 lE.1 53.5 - - - - - - Extension and Maintenace/Vulgarisation et Entretien Eten.sion/Vlgarisation 1.67 9.50 7.71 6.0 6.4 - - - Mintenarnc/Enrenie ('003 md/hj) - (1.9) 0.2 (4.8) 3.81 (5.7) 0.96 (7.,) 1.k2 (9.5) 1.61 (8.8) 149 (8.3) 1.41 (7.0) 1,19 (4.9) ,83 (2.7) o.45 (1.7' 0.28 . s-ll tol/Otiln - - - 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.43 0.31 0.17 0.11 Sub-totlj/S.-oteal 1.67 3.82 8.52 7.5- 5.72 2.20 2.04 1.93 1.52 1.4 0.6' 0.39 P0,uction . ipus/Intrants - 1.99 4.17 5.85 11.33 16.53 1').24 15.11 14.P9 10.05 5.61 3. 3 Farm labor/Main-d'oeuvre --0 6.20 15.17 18.11 2 .71 30.29 27.912 26.44 22.11 1 8.70 __ - .41 Sub-tetal/So-to'al 8.19 19._14 23.96 36.04 46.82 43.l6 41.55 36.95 25,63 1T,31 8.94 1t bene it withouL Project/Brn6fiex met hes erojet 0.85 2.10 1.'0 P.50 7.4o 7.30 7.30 7.30 7.90 5.50 3.10 P.90 TOTAL C08T=/COUTS TOTAUX 71.31 96.]8 si,73 79.16 104.41 56.3 52.50 50.78 45.97 3'.07 18.03 11.e îT BE IT STREAMNI/BENEFICE NET (71.31) (76.78) ()0-.9) (9.56) 8.49 16,.68 116.20 121.82 104.03 73.23 40.87 25.27 1 see Annex 1, TaLle 1/Voir Annexa 1, tableau 1. Average aea per family ising from 13.5 arnes in 1976/77 'o 16.; in 1980/81/Superficie moy,nne pas fanille, 'neere 13 are es e 9/6/77 1 16,5 et 1990/91. Asea 0own felling frm 85% developed are yecr 1, 70% Year 2 and 55% yea 3/S,perIel emblaeve 1 5, sfa-n aménae e1 700 a et 55 a 3. 1977/78 - 1979/90 from technical reports/1977/78 - 1979/80 voir rapports LochniLque. Prsees derived from Agr>cultural lesies Study/Prix eonmiques basés sur 1'etude des probllmes ag'icoln. 9% U, FFR topoa H c aind design aid and small tl - RDF data with lceal sts (59%) c'rre ed using 0' 3.83/RD, IJEf topographique et. quipemert - donn'es préparées par TR avec I-Ute lecaux (e9l) orriges par F' 0,83. 7 Supnevision %y 9-: end Dutc olucnteers - data from RDF ith lceel csta (2?) crreted cing SCF, 0.83/9-pervisior par HER e- volunaire néetrlandais - données FR avec no,'s leeoc (2/) corrigé per FCS 0,83. 8 D data witnJ -cal sts (71/) reed with SCF 0.83/Donnes FDM aec ts locaux ('1% corrigés par 190 ,3. 9/70 d/h p r la 0 CFA1 170 per d/ihj. 13 Flrm rf/FE. / d ed/hj per ha, CFAF 170. j/ CFAF 50/ha from year 6/CYAF 500/ha g partir de l'an 6. 13/ Seed a 80 kg/na plus fertiliz~r actual use through 1979/80 - 5o% a 120 kg/ha thereafter/Rmence, à 89 kg/ha plu,j en,-i, Lil*.'ion auelle usu'4er 1979/80 - 50% à 100 kg/ha par le suite. ,4/ 1S0 ed/hj per ha a CFAI 170 per md/hj. 15 25, of area already cultivated a 400 kg/ha less production costs/25% de la superficie d'jà cultve e T 400 ,/ht. moins les ~ct. de prooet-loc. ’〔‘！〕！〕‘:！〕’！爭 s~~~;77 377~7 --° 8 | is 7; ü 7;!a a ±;7;77 8;777 ;"7 ;;7 7 $3 $7- $3;v; å 3+7$$7 ;7 3 m s sI --2 I - 77. - -'-3 - ~-- 72h$77;' ; $7 -~ 7; 3 7;å 1 7'- -. 8 337; §. 7 *1 1 s > 3 e a 3 777;;77; 3; + 3+e 37; - 56 - 1i Fn Technical Reports and Annex 1/Rapports Techniques et Annexe 1 2/ See telex 04/14/82/Voir telex 04/14/82 3/ 0.2 ha per family/0.2 ha par famille 4/ At 90% of area downstream of dams/A 90% de la superficie en aval du barrage 5/ At 50% of area downstream of dams and 90% of small perimeter/ A 50% de la superficie en aval du barrage et 90% du pgrimatres maralchers 6/ At 3 tons/ha/a 3 tonnes/ha 7/ At 10 tons/ha/A 10 tonnes/ha 8/ Prices based on Bank forecasts and marketing costs from agricultural Issues Study/Prix basgs sur pr6visions BIRD 9/ From Annex 2, table 1; covers ORD and ONBI with local costs (54%) corrected using SCF 0.83/Annexe 2, tableau 1; coats ORD et ONBI avec coats locaux (54%) corrig6s avec FSC 0.83 10/ Technical assistance 50% of ONBI charges in Annex 2, table 4/Assistance technique - 50% coGts ONBI Annexe 2, tableau 4. 11/ At 12% of construction cost/12% Coat de construction 12/ 300 md/hj per ha 13/ Based on report 1068b-UV,Annex 9, table 1/Voir Rapport 1068b-UV, Annexe 9, tableau 1 14/ 50 md/hj per ha 15/ 1% of construction cost/1% coat de construction 16/ Paddy 80 kg seed + 100 kg NPK and 100 kg urea, for vegetable assumptions see RDF III Working Paper 2 table 6/Riz - 80 kg semences + 100 kg NPK et 100 kg urge, 1gumes voir RDF III document de travail 2, tableau 6 17/ Paddy/Riz 185 md/hr per ha; vegetable/16gumes 360 md/hr per ha. At CFAF 170 per md/hr. 18/ Running costs at CFAF 20,000/ha/Fonctionnement a CFAF 20,000/ha -57- 12 ': T1VOTA/ITATT VOLTA Annex a/A,nxe 4 SECOND PURAL DEVELE!OP1I' FUN PROJECT/DEUXIEME PROJET DP FOWDS DE DEVELOPRPEENT RUTAL (cr. (S4o--Uv) WATER SUPPLY/PJiTS ET FORAGES - 1981/82 1976/77 1977/73 1978/79 1979/Bo 1930/81 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999/2000 2000/2001 (2) (3) (4) () (6-21) (21) (23) (2h) Physical Implementation/Ralisations 1 Wells (no) 188 126 127 128 43 Tubewells (no.) 90 37 40 33 48 Total water points 238 163 167 161 93 ECONOMIC COSTS/COUTS ECOEOMIQUES (CFAF millions) 2J . Well program/Paits 296.79 246.83 208.64 246.98 129.45 * Tubewells/forages 76.09 73.53 66.2o 8o.o4 73.31 . Pump Maintenance/Entretien - - 3.06 2.55 9.21 9.35 7.45 5.61 3.93 1.96 Sub-total/Sous-total 372.88 320.36 277.90 329.37 216.97 9.35 7.45 5.61 3.96 1.96 . Technical assistance 9.56 10.25 - - - . RF management/Gestion FDR 44.75 38.44 33.35 39.55 26.04 Sub-total/sous-total 34.31 48,69 33.35 39.55 26.o4 TOTAL COSTS/COUTS TOTAL 427.19 369.05 311.25 369.12 243.01 9.83 7.45 ).61 3.96 1.96 BEITITS/BENEFICES No. of water points/points d'eau (ace.) - 238 4oi 568 729 822 584 421 254 93 Economic benefit/b6n6fice doonmique /- 90.50 85.09 120.53 154.69 174.43 123.92 89.34 53.90 19. 73 NET BENEFIT STREA/*BENEICE NET (427.19) (318.35) (226.16) (248.39) (88.32) 165.08 116.47 83.73 49.94 17.77 Annex 1, table 1/Annexe 1, tableau 2/ Annex 2, table 1; local costs corrected using SCF 0.83 and all data in 1981 prices/Annexe 2, tableau 1; coats locaux corrig6s avec PCS 0.83 et chiffres dans prix 1981 3/ HER V At 12% of investment cost/& 12% cot de l'investissement 5/ Using basis in Report PA-127a, annex 13, table 4/Bas6 sur Rapport PA-127a-UV, annexe 13, tableau 4 - 58 - ANNEX 4 UPPER VOLTA Table 6 SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND PROJECT (Cr. 640-UV) PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIVES Appraisal Actual Report ( acbievement) Project Objectives or Focus: Increased acreage x l/ 45% 3/ Increased cropping intensity x 1/ - Increased productivity (yield) x 80Z Shift to higher value crops x l/ 60% Technological innovation x 2/ 80% Integrated rural development x 80% 4/ Improved village water supplies Project Organization Project unit Existing Good Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee Modified Adequate Rural Development Works Department (HER) Existing Good National Dams and Irrigation Office N/A Adequate Regional Development Organizations - Existing Adequate Institution Building and Wider Sector Efforts Focus of efforts x 80% S/ Means x 100% Achievement of objective x 50% Wider sector effort z 50% Consultant Use and Performance Identification Preparation Appraisal x Good Technical assistance to RDF, ORDs & HER - Focus of effort x Good - Means x Adequate - Achievement of objective x Good - Wider sector effort x Adequate x Included at appraisal 1/ Rice and vegetables in bottomland and small-scale irrigation development. 2/ Development of range of complementary actions principally in pilot zones. 3/ Area of bottomland developed below estimates and area cropped only 55% by third year. 4/ mamber of water points achieved but maintenance problems not resolved. 53-.RDF and implementing agencies achieved main objectives but deficiencies in link with rural population and development self-sustaining village organization. IBRD 11952 DECEMBER 1975 PEPI IELV¯ .F UPPER v L SECOND RURAL DEVELOPMENT UPER VOLTA FUND PROJECT A H E L AFR CA - -- - \ . ..O BOGANDE D E DOU0G Us. NOUNA OTOMA F A D A N G 0 U R M A DEDOUGOU UGOU UAGADOU U TENA0O KOUPELA O uA G A D U G O U FADA-N'tOUJRMA DIAPAGA GrUBac OROMO/ ENKODOGO Samr'o'rogouan K 0 U P E L A vestck rolc -K O U D 0 U G 0 U rHOUNDE LEO ORODARA -DEOGU +B E N l N r TSmaTwa) BANFORYA CG H { T O G BOUGOURIBA BA NF 0 R A \ i~~mply enosmn raetneby the, l\V 0 R Y CO0 A S T 4 2, 2
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Performance Assessment Report
Upper Volta - Second Rural Development Fund Project
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Всемирный банк