Niger - Maradi Rural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 3992 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 608-NIR) June 21, 1982 FILE COPY Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS ACOPAM Appui Cooperatif aux Projets d'Aide Cooperative Assistance Program Alimentaire en Zone Sahelienne to Food Aid Projects ALC Association Locale de Cooperatives Local Cooperative Association BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Central Bank of the West de l'Ouest African States CCCE Caisse Central de Cooperation French Government's Credit Economique Agency CEE Communaute Economique Europeenne European Economic Community CFJA Centre de Formation des Jeunes Rural Youth Training Center Agriculteurs CNCA Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole National Agricultural Bank CPR Centre de Promotion Rurale Rural Development Training Center EEC Communaute Economique Europeenne European Economic Community FAC Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation French Aid Agency FED Fonds Europeen de Developpement European Development Fund GMV Groupement Mutualiste Villageois Village Cooperative INRAN Institut National de la Recherche National Institute of Agri- Agronomique du Niger cultural Research IRAM Institut de Recherches et d'Appli- Institute devoted to research cations des Methodes de and application of develop- Developpement ment methods IRAT Institut de Recherche Agronomique Institute of Research for Tropicale Tropical Agriculture IRHO Institut de Recherche pour les Institute for Research on Oil Huiles et Oleagineux and Oil Seed OCAM Organisation Commune Africaine et Common African and Mauritian Mauricienne Organization OPVN Office des Produits Vivriers du Nigerien Grain Marketing Board Niger PCR Project Completion Report PMU Project Management Unit Prefet The chief administrator of a district (sous-prefet: in charge of a sub-district) SAR Staff Appraisal Report UNCC Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Nigerien Cooperative Union Cooperation UNESCO Organisation des Nations Unies pour United Nations Educational, l'education, le science et la Scientific and Cultural culture Organization FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 608-NIR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ................................................................. i Basic Data Sheet ...................................................... ii Highlights ........................................................... iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM............................. I. SUMMARY ..............................................1 II. MAIN ISSUES ........................................... 5 A. Agricultural Production ........................ 5 B. Bank Assistance in Project Execution ............. 10 C. Cooperatives ................................. 11 Annex 1 - Borrower's Comments ................................... 17 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. BACKGROUND ............................................. 24 II. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL .............................. 24 III. IMPLEMENTATION .................................... 27 IV. PROJECT OUTCOMES ...................................... 31 V. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESULTS .......................... 35 VI. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT ............................... 38 VII. CHANGES IN THE FOLLOW-ON PROJECT ................. 41 VIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S AND THE ASSOCIATION'S PERFORMANCE 42 Tables 1-14 43 Map: IBRD 14531 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 608-NIR) PREFACE This a performance audit of the First Maradi Rural Development Project in Niger, for which IDA Credit 608-NIR was approved on November 12, 1975 in the sum of US$10.7 million equivalent. The final disbursement was made in December 1980, and the credit closed on December 31, 1980. The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and a Project Completion Report (PCR), dated August 28, 1981. The PCR was prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office on the basis of a country visit in March 1981. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (8819-NIR) dated November 14 1975, the President's Report (P-1719) of November 25, 1975, and the Development Credit Agreement dated February 6, 1976. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) of the follow-on Maradi Rural Development Project II (CR 1026-NIR), as well as internal Bank memoranda on project issues, as contained in relevant Bank files, have also been consulted and Bank staff associated with the project have been interviewed. An OED mission visited Niger in September 1981. The mission held discussions with officials of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Rural Development .in Niamey, with project management staff and staff of other institutions and Government departments in Maradi involved in project imple- mentation. Farmers in the project area were interviewed and their farms visited. The information obtained during the mission was used to test the validity and conclusions of the PCR. A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on March 10, 1982 for comments. The comments received are reproduced as Annex 1. Some of them refer specifically to the French translation which has been amended accordingly. The audit finds that the PCR covers adequately the project's salient features and the Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) generally agrees with its conclusions. In addition to summarizing the objectives and results of the project, the PPAM expands upon its agronomic base, on the adaptive agricultural research work done during project implementation, the development of the cooperatives and the way in which the Bank may have further assisted project implementation. The valuable assistance provided by the Government of the Republic of Niger, the project management staff and the farmers in the project area is gratefully acknowledged.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER MARADI RUkAL DEVELOPMEW PROJECT (CREDIT 608-MIR) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of Item Estimate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estimate Total Project Costs (US$ million) 13.2 17.5 * 133 Credit Amount (US$ million) 10.7 10.7 100 Date Board Approval 12/11/75 12/11/75 - Date Effectiveness 05/15/76 08/10/79 - Date Physical Components Completed 12/78 12/79 27 Proportion then completed (%) - - 73 Closing Date 06/30/79 12/31/80 143 Economic Rate of Return (%) 39 16 41 Institutional Performance Good Agronomic Performance Fair Number of Direct Beneficiaries (year 6) 51,500 families CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 Appraisal estimate (US$ million) 1.7 5.4 9.1 10.7 - Actual (US$ million) - 2.0 6.1 9.6 10.7 Actual as % of estimate - 37 67 90 - Date of final disbursement 12/80 Principal repaid to (mo./day/yr.) (US$ million) nil MISSION DATA Date No. of Mandays Specializat)ons Performance Types of Mission (mo./Yr.) Persons in Field Represented Tre Problem Identification 12/71 Preparation 05/73 Appraisal 11/73 3 30 a, b, c 05/75 3 30 a, b, c Supervision 1 07/76 1 7 c 1 1 - Supervision 2 11/76 3 8 a. c, d 2 2 M Supervision 3 07/77 2 11 a, c 2 1 M Supervision 4 10/77 1 2 c - n.a. - Supervision 5 07/78 2 11 a, c 2 1 * F, M Supervision 6 02/79 2 9 a, c 2 2 0, T Supervision 7 11/79 2 9 a, c 2 1 M, T Supervision 8 03/80 2 9 a, e 2 1 M, T Supervision 9 05/80 1 16 a 2 1 M Subtotal 4_i 82 OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Government of the Republic of Niger Executing Agency Project Management Unit, Maradi Fiscal Year January 1 - December 31 Name of Currency (abbreviation) CFAF Currency Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average US$ 1.00 = 225 Intervening Years Average US$ 1.00 - 235.6 Completion Year Average US$ 1.00 - 212.72 Follow-on Project: Name Second Maradi Rural Development Project Loan/Credit Number 1026-NIR Loan/Credit Amount (US$ million) 16.7 Date Board Approval 05/20/80 Notes Project costs - increased because of longer implementation period. Credit amount - an EEC Special Action Credit for US$2 m equivalent augmented the IDA credit. Effectiveness delay - Project Management Unit established late because of procedural delays in the bureaucracy. Physical Completion - irrigation component postponed to Second Project. Follow-on project co-financed by IFAD (US$12 m equivalent) and CCCE )US$7 m equivalent). 1/ a - agriculturist; b = agricultural economist; c - financial analyst; d - rural development specialist; e = irrigation engineer. 2/ 1 = problem-free or minor problems; 2 = moderate problems; and 3 - major problems. 3/ 1 - improving; 2 - stationary; and 3 = deteriorating. 4/ F - financial; M - managerial; T = technical; P = political; and 0 = other. 5/ four individuals did all the supervision at various times.  - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 608-NIR) HIGHLIGHTS The project's objective was to improve agricultural production in parts of Maradi District, adjoining the Nigerian border. In a separate component it also aimed to assist stock-owners in the more northern, drier parts to recover from stock losses suffered during the Sahelian drought of the early 1970-s, granting credit to re-establish flocks and herds. Increased agricultural production was expected to be achieved by providing fertilizers, improved seeds and seed dressings, augmenting the rural road network to assist input distribution and the evacuation of produce, and also making improved agricultural implements available for better and more timely land preparation and interculture. Livestock health services were improved and strengthened. Institutionally, the project aimed to strengthen cooperatives, agricultural extension and adaptive research services and to establish a project evaluation unit. Training village-level cooperative officials, extension workers selected from the villages, and an adult literacy program were part of the project. It also included the establishment of village fuelwood plantations and an in-depth investigation, and development on a pilot scale, of the irrigation potential of a nearby underground water source, the Goulbi de Maradi. The project has been successful in its agricultural and rural development achievements. The pilot irrigation component has been delayed by a few years and is only now, about two years after project completion, beginning to show results. The livestock rehabilitation component, while benefiting the recipients, proved difficult to manage: many nomadic borrowers cannot be traced and loan recovery is poor. An effective Project Management Unit was established which has, and continues to, work in close coordination with expatriate advisers who are demonstrably training their counterparts to take over their responsibilities. The economic rate of return, now estimated at 16%1is substantially lower than the appraisal estimate of 39% but does not adequately reflect the material and social benefits the project has brought to this area of high- risk, marginal arable farming. - iv - Other points of interest are: - there is a need to pay more attention to traditional farming systems before recommending major changes, especially in areas that are only marginally suitable for agriculture (PPAM paras. 10-16);1/ - adaptive research programs need to be developed in a more perceptive manner, examining and demonstrating step-by-step changes, rather than drastic, modifications of the traditional farming systems (PPAM paras. 16-18); - the same attention in project supervision has to be paid to tech- nical as to financial and management issues, particularly in coun- tries with limited resources of trained manpower. This need does not diminish even when consultants assist in project execution (PPAM paras. 22-23); and - innovative pilot projects, especially if they involve many Govern- ment agencies and include the establishment of a new project management unit, need more than three years to implement, even if management is satisfactory, as has been the case with this project (PCR paras. 2.06 and 6.01). 1/ Also see OED Report No. 3975 on Nigeria Gusau, Funtua and Gombe Agricul- tural Development Projects. - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 608-NIR) I. SUMMARY 1. The Maradi Rural Development Project, approved by the Board of Directors in 1975, was the second IDA credit17 for agriculture to Niger. Following the devastating drought of 1973-74 the project was intended to support intensified Government efforts in developing the rural and agricul- tural sector, which engages 80% of the population. The drought not only eliminated Niger's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, which had regularly been achieved prior to 1973, but also destroyed the livelihood of the nomadic herdsmen who were utilizing areas where rainfed arable cropping was not possible. Almost half the population live between the southern border with Nigeria where the annual rainfall is between 700-800 mm and the 500 mm isohyet. The Maradi project is located almost entirely within this zone. Its objective was to support rainfed agriculture and to finance a pilot irrigation project in a river valley, the Goulbi de Maradi. To achieve this objective, the project's components were the following: (a) strengthening of the agricultural extension organization and provid- ing applied research, production credit and input supplies; (b) supporting the cooperative institutions, set up under an earlier project, financed by the Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC); (c) expanding the training school, [Centre de Formation des Jeunes Agriculteurs, (CFJA)] for extension workers and young farmers; (d) constructing about 80 km of feeder roads that would facilitate input and output deliveries and improve communications in general; (e) construction of houses, field offices and other facilities to support project activities; (f) studying the irrigation potential of the Goulbi de Maradi and finance a small pilot project. 1/ The first, a small Agricultural Credit Project (Cr. 207-NIR) for US$0.9 million (IDA Credit US$0.6 million) was not successful, largely because of the unprecedented Sahelian drought of 1972-74; some US$44,000 of the credit had to be cancelled. - 2- Ancillary project components were: (g) expanding an ongoing adult literacy program; (h) establishing fuelwood plantations on 500 ha; (i) improving livestock services by providing vaccination and antihel- minthic treatments; (j) providing credit to livestock owners, enabling them to replace herds lost in the Sahelian drought; (k) establishing a project evaluation unit which would record the agri- cultural and socio-economic impact of the project. 2. Project execution was planned over three years. This proved opti- mistic, because of limited previous experience with rural or agricultural development projects in the country. Only one similar project, financed by the European Development Fund (FED) - was being implemented at the same time. Eventually a Special Action Credit funded by FED (No. 43-NIR) for US$2 million was provided to complete the project and to finance operating costs until IDA's and the Caisse Central de Cooperation Economique's (CCCE) second proj- ect, Cr. 1026-NIR, became effective in late 1980. 3. In general terms, the project has been successful. In respect of agriculture support, fertilizer consumption has increased from 157 tons to 1,742 tons (PCR, para. 4.19). The use of protective seed dressing, known before the project started, has increased, although not to the extent expected at project appraisal (PCR, Table 4). The use of oxen for tillage has increased faster than the cautious appraisal estimates forecast: about 5% of the farmers have bought tillage implements instead of the estimated 2%. The sole supplier during the project, Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation (UNCC) was unable to obtain sufficent supplies (PCR, paras. 3.09 and 4.19): had they been available, the rate of increase is likely to have been faster, as witnessed by the demand under the follow-on project. The project has, moreover, achieved some success in popularizing earlier-maturing cereal varieties. 4. Farmer incomes have increased mainly as a result of the easier availability of inputs - and to a much lesser extent because of sound exten- sion advice. Owing to the late start of the Evaluation Unit, actual figures are difficult to obtain and verify. However, it is estimated that yields of farmers, using the recommended inputs, have increased for all the three main crops: cowpeas, millet and groundnuts (PCR Table 3). While there has been, as elsewhere in sub Saharan Africa during the past decade, a considerable shift from groundnuts to millet and cowpeas (PCR, paras. 4.05-4.06 and Table - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 608-NIR) I. SUMMARY 1. The Maradi Rural Development Project, approved by the Board of Directors in 1975, was the second IDA credit!7 for agriculture to Niger. Following the devastating drought of 1973-74 the project was intended to support intensified Government efforts in developing the rural and agricul- tural sector, which engages 80% of the population. The drought not only eliminated Niger's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, which had regularly been achieved prior to 1973, but also destroyed the livelihood of the nomadic herdsmen who were utilizing areas where rainfed arable cropping was not possible. Almost half the population live between the southern border with Nigeria where the annual rainfall is between 700-800 mm and the 500 mm isohyet. The Maradi project is located almost entirely within this zone. Its objective was to support rainfed agriculture and to finance a pilot irrigation project in a river valley, the Goulbi de Maradi. To achieve this objective, the project's components were the following: (a) strengthening of the agricultural extension organization and provid- ing applied research, production credit and input supplies; (b) supporting the cooperative institutions, set up under an earlier project, financed by the Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC); (c) expanding the training school, [Centre de Formation des Jeunes Agriculteurs, (CFJA)] for extension workers and young farmers; (d) constructing about 80 km of feeder roads that would facilitate input and output deliveries and improve communications in general; (e) construction of houses, field offices and other facilities to support project activities; (f) studying the irrigation potential of the Goulbi de Maradi and finance a small pilot project. 1/ The first, a small Agricultural Credit Project (Cr. 207-NIR) for US$0.9 million (IDA Credit US$0.6 million) was not successful, largely because of the unprecedented Sahelian drought of 1972-74; some US$44,000 of the credit had to be cancelled. - 2- Ancillary project components were: (g) expanding an ongoing adult literacy program; (h) establishing fuelwood plantations on 500 ha; (i) improving livestock services by providing vaccination and antihel- minthic treatments; (j) providing credit to livestock owners, enabling them to replace herds lost in the Sahelian drought; (k) establishing a project evaluation unit which would record the agri- cultural and socio-economic impact of the project. 2. Project execution was planned over three years. This proved opti- mistic, because of limited previous experience with rural or agricultural development projects in the country. Only one similar project, financed by the European Development Fund (FED) - was being implemented at the same time. Eventually a Special Action Credit funded by FED (No. 43-NIR) for US$2 million was provided to complete the project and to finance operating costs until IDA's and the Caisse Central de Cooperation Economique's (CCCE) second proj- ect, Cr. 1026-NIR, became effective in late 1980. 3. In general terms, the project has been successful. In respect of agriculture support, fertilizer consumption has increased from 157 tons to 1,742 tons (PCR, para. 4.19). The use of protective seed dressing, known before the project started, has increased, although not to the extent expected at project appraisal (PCR, Table 4). The use of oxen for tillage has increased faster than the cautious appraisal estimates forecast: about 5% of the farmers have bought tillage implements instead of the estimated 2%. The sole supplier during the project, Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation (UNCC) was unable to obtain sufficent supplies (PCR, paras. 3.09 and 4.19): had they been available, the rate of increase is likely to have been faster, as witnessed by the demand under the follow-on project. The project has, moreover, achieved some success in popularizing earlier-maturing cereal varieties. 4. Farmer incomes have increased mainly as a result of the easier availability of inputs - and to a much lesser extent because of sound exten- sion advice. Owing to the late start of the Evaluation Unit, actual figures are difficult to obtain and verify. However, it is estimated that yields of farmers, using the recommended inputs, have increased for all the three main crops: cowpeas, millet and groundnuts (PCR Table 3). While there has been, as elsewhere in sub Saharan Africa during the past decade, a considerable shift from groundnuts to millet and cowpeas (PCR, paras. 4.05-4.06 and Table - 3 - 2) it is fair to assume that without the project and its attendant yield increases the shift may well have been even more pronounced. 5. The feeder road program, although relatively minor, has been success- ful and has revealed the need for more secondary motorable roads in the area, as witnessed by their extensive use by buses and trucks. However, since, in contrast to Nigeria1! the use of oxcarts is widespread and since rain on the highly absorbent sandy soils does not make surfacing of roads a necessity for animal-drawn transport, no tertiary road network is deemed necessary. 6. The pilot irrigation component was delayed, gathering its first harvest only in September 1981. Consequently, it is too early for an evalua- tion, but there are indications that water losses in the unlined, elevated field channels, (made necessary by the decision to use metal syphons for the furrow irrigation) and the use of 0.5 cusec (15 1/sec) expensive turbine pumps for the tubewells may require redesigning of present plans.2/ 7. Project management and administration has been effective and, under a competent Nigerien Director-General, the Nigerien and expatriate technical and administrative staff were well integrated; working relations were and are good and the Nigerien authorities are satisfied that management training has been adequate. 8. The ancillary components were of mixed success. (a) The literacy program was only a limited success, mostly because the teachers were not sufficiently well trained. (b) As originally conceived, the forestry component was unworkable: maintenance of the plantations proved an unsurmountable problem as farmers had no immediate difficulties to obtain supplies of fuel- wood. Thus, it proved extremely difficult to harness communal interests towards maintenance and protection during the early stages. Given the importance of developing renewable energy resources, especially in the remote and harsh environment of Maradi, such a component needs to be part of the education program and it is 1/ Gusau, Funtua and Gombe Agricultural Development Projects (Loans 1099, 1092 and 1164-UNI), OED Report No. 3975. 2/ The region advises that larger pumps cannot be used: the aquifer is only about 35-40 m deep and the drawdown with the 0.5 cusec pump is already about 2-3 m. -4- encouraging that a revised program is now part of the Rural Develop- ment Training Centers (CPR). Under this scheme, 5 ha plantations attached to the CPR demonstration farms have shown the suitability of the tree species selected and the technical soundness of the silvicultural techniques employed. The Department des Eaux et Forets, which now manages the forestry program, believe that larger blocks, exclusively devoted to tree production, may produce even better results in the future, and provide more meaningful quantities of fuel and timber. (c) The proposed livestock services have achieved their objective of greatly reducing the epizootic disease incidents (pleuro-pneumonia, rinderpest). The stock observed, especially young stock, have shown few signs of internal parasite infestation (admittedly after a good rainy season) attesting to the apparent success of ongoing anti- helminthic treatment programs. (d) The building program was well executed: building designs were realistic and construction sound. This is demonstrated not only by the general appearance of the buildings but also by the fact that, despite the project having taken over and having to maintain older buildings, the maintenance budget was less than 0.9% of the sum expended on buildings between 1976-79: a more usual figure would be in excess of 2%. (e) Under the project, credit was provided to livestock owners who lost their herds in the Sahelian drought. Credit distribution was under- taken by district chiefs. Their registration records were incom- plete and as most of the beneficiaries were migrant pastoralists, follow-up was almost impossible. Consequently, recovery rates stood at only 28% as of December 1979. Disbursements were halted after about 80% of the funds were distributed. Some 900 livestock owners have benefited. (f) Production credit was tied to inputs, principally tillage equipment, fertilizers and seeds. Recovery was over 80%. For seeds, which could not be purchased for cash, it was only 52%. The component has achieved its prime objective: inducing farmers to buy fertilizers, as witnessed by the fact that when credit funds were temporarily reduced, fertilizer sales were hardly affected. Implementation of the credit component has had a negative effect on institution-build- ing, however. Of particular concern is the failure of the project to establish the planned revolving fund. At completion, the fund showed a negative balance of CFAF 134 m, instead of the CFAF 280 m balance expected at appraisal. In the follow-on project the estab- lishment of a revolving credit fund has been made the subject of a loan covenant. (g) The evaluation unit was not established during implementation of the first project due to organizational and administrative problems. - 5 - 9. Establishing the project's economic and financial rates of return has been made difficult by the absence of reliable baseline, or before- the-project data; information from the Evaluation Unit is only now becoming available. Therefore, all calculations are necessarily based on samples that may not have been statistically selected. However, the audit mission's discussions with project farmers, non-project officials in the Department de Maradi and also with personnel of the Caisse Central de Cooperation Econo- mique (CCCA) based in Niamey who visit the project area frequently, make it possible to recalculate the project's returns. The audit confirms the PCR's reestimated economic rate of return at 16%. II. MAIN ISSUES A. Agricultural Production 10. The Farming System. The principal issue of this project as seen by the audit is the fact that at no time during appraisal or implementation, or during appraisal of Maradi II, have project authorities or Bank officials endeavored to examine the basic ecological principles of the traditional farming system and to explore potential benefits from its development. The sole-cropping system recommended by the Project Management Unit (PMU) and endorsed by the Bank is undoubtedly technically sound, as witnessed by yields obtained at CPR farms compared to checkplots (PCR Table 3) yet it is com- pletely alien to the local tradition of mixed cropping. Therefore by pro- moting a package based on sound technical advice alone, the project assumes-! the farmer to be a "production worker" at the bottom of a hierachically orga- nized production system, willing to change his farming pattern when told to do so and with little reference to his own personal experience of local conditions. 11. Farmers regard sole cropping as less fail-safe in seasons of adverse rainfall distribution. The rainfall pattern in the sub-Saharan region is one of steadily increasing and more intense precipitation as the rainy season progresses, and a fairly abrupt ending. The difference, as one moves from north to south, is in total precipitation and the duration of the rainy season. The traditional farming systems of the region have, of necessity, adapted to this pattern: the farmers plant their millet early and space the planting stations widely. The millet's extensive, shallow fibrous root system then creates a typical "mini-savannah" pattern: the roots spread horizontally below the surface and thus exploit moisture from the whole area between the widely separated plants. If the total rainfall remains low or irregular, nothing more is planted and the farmer is assured of at least a crop of millet: were the plant population higher, competition for moisture would result in no grain being produced, only stems. 1/ as has been the case in Nigeria (see footnote to para. 5). -6- 12. If, as in most years, the rainfall justifies a denser plant cover, the farmer interplants a groundcover crop, like groundnuts, B,amabara groundnuts (Voandzeia subterranea) or cowpeas: inter-planting more millat or sorghum is not possible because of intra-species competition. In this manner the farmer obtains, in most years, a crop of the protein-rich pulses or a cash crop, as well as his cereals. 13. Disadvantages of the traditional system lie in the -ct that, except for initial land preparation, any form of mechanization is _fficult: plant- ers cannot accommodate the wide intra-row spacings, and t-s inter-planting, even if done in rows, makes the use of oxen for inter-c- :ure difficult although not impossible. 14. Research efforts to date (para 17) have been conecr rated on devis- ing safer methods of sole cropping through introducing highcr-yielding varie- ties, devising suitable fertilizer regimes and identifying iical planting times for sole crops, with plant densities that exploit the ole land area, instead of concentrating on devising techniques to counter imatic hazards. Efforts have been mostly successful, particularly in respect : (a) the much increased use of phosphatic fertilizers .ich encourages better root development and, therefore, better u ization of soil moisture even under the traditional system; (b) the quicker maturing varieties of millet and sorgi>m :upplied by the project fit well into the rainfall pattern: they :ipen during the late rains, when crop preservation, although presating some prob- lems, is manageable and ripening more certain i- the rains stop early; (c) the seed exchange program, although operating on m oderate scale, has given access to more vigorous planting mater.L that develops quicker after germination and therefore withs-ards dry spells better; (d) the farmers changed to interplanting in straigy rows and have learned to use oxen for interculturing at least CE (e) the increased number of toolbars and oxen made e-ailable by the project are used not only on the buyers' farms bi: .lso on some of their neighbors, thereby permitting a general op od-up of vital early land preparation and planting. 15. The fact remains, however, that for the farmer, Dcsed on his own experience, the greatest risk continues to derive from r-Limatic factors and as long as research and extension propagate a technica- y:ackage which do not take this aspect fully into consideration, such a pac age will be only - 7 - partially adopted. Farmers who accept the package do so on on only a small part of their farms: about 0.9 ha out of 5 ha, or 18% (PCR, para. 4.08).1 The audit was advised by several "participating" farmers that while in most cases the advice given to them did result in good crops of millet or ground- nuts, (although one farmer reported complete failure of sole-crop cowpeas grown as advised by the extension service), they are not able to muster the necessary labor at peak periods to practise the recommended techniques on the entire farm. 16. Adaptive Research. The audit cannot endorse para. 3.07 of the PCR which states that the applied research component was "implemented satisfac- torily and encountered no special problems." On the contrary, the audit found that the consultant agronomist heading the applied research organization has made no attempt to analyze or to understand the rationale behind the traditional system (para. 10). While, undoubtedly, he has been able to develop a seemingly successful (certainly so under the favorable rainfall regime of the last few years) alternative crop husbandry system, the low rate of its acceptance, and the stated reasons therefor, clearly indicate that its large-scale adoption is unlikely. The system developed is suitable only for large-scale semi-mechanized enterprises, of which there are very few in the area; moreover, the prime objective of the project is to help the smaller farmers who have sound reasons why they cannot accept the system for their entire holding.2/ 17. The missing element continues to be truly adaptive research. There has been little feedback from the farmers to the research stations and little or no interchange of ideas between the Maradi project and three rural devel- opment projects located in northern Nigeria.2/ In these projectsA/ the 1/ Because of traditional usufructuary rights, however, several individuals can farm a particular plot of land, thus the decision as to whether or not to adopt the technical package can rest with more than one farmer; the technical package may, therefore, be applied haphazardly. 2/ On this issue, the Region comments, inter alia: "The consultant who was in charge of research had (in a period of three years) to establish the CPR and to participate in all agricultural programs. In these condi- tions, priority was given to determining the best cultural practices to be promoted by extension service through implementation of simple trials in accordance with the practices usually recommended by research in Sahelian countries." 3/ Regional staff point out that PU personnel has visited the Agricultural Research Institute in Samaru, Nigeria. The audit mission was also told of these visits, but the participants went on to say that during these visits they were not taken to any one of the three Agricultural Develop- ment Projects (see footnote 4/). 4/ OED Report No. 3975 and the Bank's Development Research Center's Report No. RP0671-88 of August 1981. -8- suitability of sole cropping by farmers ethnically, ecologically and tradi- tionally similar to those in Maradi has been increasingly questioned. A similar soul searching has not yet taken place in Maradi, and the Bank has so far not tried to apply the insights gained in the neighboring country.1/ 2/ 18. Some positive developments, however, are now evident, particularly in determining the priorities in the qualitative nature of the inputs (e.g., (i) improved seed; (ii) fungicidal treatment; (iii) high plant populations; (iv) use of agricultural chemicals), but there are still no quantitative investigations. Questions like: are the farmers' limited cash resources best spent on the home or distant field; on nitrogenous or phosphatic fertilizers; and what are the minimum quantities worth applying, are not being addressed.3. Consequently, during project execution, extension efforts have been hampered by the prospective beneficiaries' non-acceptability of the recommended tech- nical package.A/ 19. Fertilizer Supplies. Phosphatic fertilizer proved to be the fastest selling and most effective. Most supplies come from Nigeria where, because of the subsidized pricing structure and a de facto (if not de jure) open border, the price of fertilizer C&F Maradi is lower than through official Nigerien trade routes. This leads to some distortion in usage. The phos- phatic fertilizer from Nigeria is single superphosphate (18-20% P205) whereas from Nigerien sources only triple superphosphate (TSP) is available (46% P205)* 1/ Reference to these findings can also be found in Experimental Agriculture 15 (1979) and 16 (1980). 2/ On this issue, CPS's comments are of significance: "The PPAM....high- lights the importance of better information exchange between Niger and Nigeria on adaptive research in farming systems, to this could be added exchange visits to Upper Volta (West Volta Project) to learn of their more effective extension approach, and to Mali (Mali Sud II) to see the greater viability of their cooperatives (PPAM para. 33-36) and support for trained blacksmiths." 3/ The Bank's Development Research Center's project, RPO 671-88 "Farm Tech- nology Adoption in Northern Nigeria" shows many useful lessons which are also applicable to Maradi. 4/ The Region comments as follows: "Due to the late start of the evaluation unit in PY3 and overburdening of the project agricultural staff, a survey of farmers reaction to the new cultural practices could hardly be carried out over the project life. Such a study was programmed in 1981 for the Evaluation unit." However, the above does not resolve the question: How can one develop sound advice to farmers without taking into account their reaction to it and the reasons for the reaction. - 9 - In Maradi, (although not in Nigeria, because of the different parent material of the soils) both are equally effective per unit of P205, yet farmers, despite the explanation given by the extension officers, are deterred from purchasing the more expensive (per physical ton, but not per nutrient ton) TSP. This issue may cause a lowering of application rates once trade condi- tions change and Nigerian supplies cease.!1 A similar situation has arisen with urea (46% N) which is also, necessarily, more expensive per ton of product than other sources of nitrogen but cheaper per nutrient ton. 20. Seed Supplies. The project has made a very creditable effort to make seeds available to farmers. In terms of tonnage distributed, the major impact has been in respect of groundnuts, aided by the fact that seeds were given on credit to farmers with a satisfactory repayment record: 1979 1980 1981 -Tonnes- Groundnuts 823 820 850 Cowpeas 14 61 102 Millet 28 48 110 Source: Information given to mission by Evaluation Section, PWU. (N.B. Figures do not fully agree with PCR) Clearly, farmer uptake of millet and cowpeas is increasing rapidly. 21. Quantities distributed do not necessarily equal quantities planted; some, especially groundnuts, may well be eaten. Millet, cowpea and sorghum are exchanged with the farmers' crop on a weight-for-weight basis and no seed dressing is applied; therefore, it is probable that a certain amount of this clean, well presented material is used for human consumption. Three issues arise: (a) Groundnut seeds are only available on credit, thus farmers who are not eligible for credit cannot buy good quality seed even for cash. (b) Seeds for the other crops are exchanged, weight for weight, for the farmers' own crop. Obviously, were they to be sold at market prices for co sumption grains, the quantity misdirected would be consider- able.Z- However, a pricing policy could have been devised whereby 1/ Nigeria has no phosphate sources, is itself an importer and has subsidized fertilizer to the extent of about 80% during the last several years. 2/ The Director-General of the project believes that such misdirection does not in fact occur (Annex 1). Also, he believes that as all growers have millet grain for consumption, they are well able to exchange some of it for improved seed. - 10 - access to good seed would not be limited to those who have stocks to exchange. (c) Seed production, an expensive process, has exceeded demand by a. large margin for all crops except groundnuts..!/ 1980 1981 Given to extension service for distri- Produced-/Distributed bution32/ Distributed Millet 120 29 146 110 Cowpeas 153 61 113 102 Sorghum 45 0.3 23 4 It is clear that during project implementation, demand was consistently over- estimated which has resulted in unnecessary expenditures on seed production.3/ B. Bank Assistance in Project Execution 22. The issue of closer involvement by Bank staff in project implementa- tion was raised by the Director-General of the project and the Secretary- General of the Ministry of Rural Development. Both officials emphasized that they would have welcomed greater assistance from Bank technical staff in preparing the annual agricultural programs, reviewing results and experiences of the past season and in finalizing the budget that had to be approved by the Regional Office. They believe that their own technical staff would have benefited from closer association with the caliber of experts the Bank had assigned to supervise the project. This was not intended as criticism of the expatriate staff working on the project; rather that in their view, the wider 1/ The Director-General of the Maradi project explains that supply must exceed demand by a few percentage points to ensure that all who require seed are able to get it. However, excessive supplies will no longer be produced under the second project. In any case, since the seed was not treated with any chemical by the project authorities, supplies not required for seed could be sold for consumption (Annex 1). 2/ The two sets of supply sources ("produced" and "given to extension service for distribution") are not strictly comparable. 3/ On this issue the Director-General states that the problem is not that of an over-supply of seed but that seeds were made available at inconvenient locations that meant travel over distances of up to 30 km to obtain supplies. After 1981, this situation has been rectified. He also states that the sorghum offered proved unacceptable on account of flavor (Annex 1). - 11 - experience and more detached attitude that Bank staff can bring to bear would have been of great benefit. They further considered that missions were too short to meet the Project Management Unit's real needs and, valuable as the Aide-Memoires left behind were, more direct contacts, field visits and on-the- spot counselling would have been a most welcome and lasting supplement to the written document. Further, the combined technical and administrative/financial missions, necessarily dealing with the same senior project officials, imposed too much of a burden on project management: they would have benefited from less concentrated but more frequent visits.!V The expatriate Chief Technical Adviser to the Director-General supported this view, as did the (expatriate) adviser to the Minister of Rural Development. 23. The audit finds it difficult to contribute to the issue in other than general terms. The officials quoted realize the manpower limitations of their large but sparsely populated country, and the many demands made on it by other development projects. The Bank can undoubtedly call upon high caliber technical expertise from within its own ranks. Nigerien officials are aware of this and wish they could have made more use of staff visiting them. The audit is satisfied that in the setting of Niger, and given the favorable official and personal relations prevailing between Regional Project staff, the Government of Niger and PMU, the greater involvement desired would not have reduced the Government's or the Nigerien Project staff's commitment to, and identification with, the project's aims; a situation markedly different in other countries where such identity of purpose is often discernible only at highest government levels. Consequently, the audit wishes to raise the subject as an issue which, given the close relations between the parties involved, could be resolved in future projects in Niger to both parties' satisfaction. C. Cooperatives 24. Project Design and Organization. This project is a good example of an effort to develop a cooperative organization in which the prime emphasis is on training rural people in program implementation rather than harnessing the movement to solving specific problems, e.g., marketing. This objective deserves credit and has been, on the whole, successfully achieved. The fact that revitalization of the cooperatives is only progressing slowly is a result of factors beyond the control of the cooperative movement, e.g. pricing, and not lack of farmer interest and motivation. 25. The cooperative movement in Niger started in the early sixties with the assistance of IRAM,2/ an institution devoted to research and application of development methods. Farmer cooperatives were encouraged 1/ They also mentioned to the audit mission that it would have been better for technical missions to come in May and September and missions deal- ing with financial, administrative and management issues in April and October. 2/ Institut de Recherches et d'Application des Methodes de Developpement. - 12 - principally to extend credit to their members and to undertake marketing at the village level. Training programs, including one for literacy, were a, major component from the beginning. Following the severe drought in the early 1970s, the Government considered revitalization of the cooperative movement an important means by which development could be most effectively resumed. It was hoped that the movement would establish closer links between Government and the rural population and could provide an institutional channel to stimulate agricultural productivity and development. This concept was incorporated into the design of the project: the cooperatives and UNCCI, the cooperative union responsible for cooperative organizations, were viewed as playing a key role in this and other rural development projects (SAR para. 4.06 and 6.12-6.13). Training programs in agriculture and cooperative affairs, functional literacy and health education were accorded high priority. In addition, the cooperatives would supply credit, extension and inputs on an integrated basis, as well as assist in groundnut marketing. 26. The organization and management of the project did not, however, reflect this coordination of the support services. Under the overall control of the Director-General, financial arrangements for credit and cooperative marketing were the responsibility of the administrative section; extension and staff training that of the technical operation section; delivery of inputs and marketing that of the cooperative affairs section;V/ and motivation of the farmers that of the community development section. The newly established departments of PMU were primarily concerned with establishing themselves as operational agencies and, necessarily, gave only secondary attention to estab- lishing horizontal links with other departments that share responsibility for cooperative development. The UNCC officials, seconded to the project, reported directly to the Director General, so as to forestall problems arising out of an form of dual control and supervision, as had happened in previous projects.l/ This meant that UNCC officials were required to adapt their style of management which is essentially a collegiate one, to that of a strictly hierachical structure. UNCC continued to have responsibility, in its own right and without reference to the PMU, for cooperatives outside the project area. 1/ Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation. 2/ Which was to be staffed by officials from UNCC. 3/ Project design intended the project to be implemented by a PMU and not by existing institutions. The SAR explains this as being necessary to achieve good project coordination. However, technical assistance had been provided for many years at the "arrondisement" (sub-district) level by FAC, and this, together with the Prefet's revenue-raising power, would suggest that existing structures could have been used. Conversely, the Prefet's ability to levy taxes questions the need for a health and educa- tion component as part of the project since it can be assumed that if the need was great enough, the Prefet could raise his own revenue for the purpose. 13 - 27. Training. Training was accorded high priority during project imple- mentation, essentially covering formal programs for individual villagers attending CPR courses, for extension workers at the CFJA (Rural Youth Training Center) and informal programs for training in the villages. 28. Formal Training. District chiefs were responsible for selecting villages within their area, usually those with a good credit rating, it was then the responsibility of the village to elect a nominee to attend the CPR. Graduates ("ex-staigieres") would then return to their villages and would be given priority access to agricultural tools and inputs made available by the project and purchased by the village collectively. The CPR programl' has been generally successful particularly in respect of its effects on increas- ing productivity. Furthermore, many of the ex-stagieres are secretaries or treasurers of the village cooperatives (PMV), which helps to develop their newly acquired literacy skills as well as to improve the links between the villages and cooperative structures. Finally the fact that many of the ex-stagieres are related to village or district chiefs, who have been given an important role in the government's administrative structure, not only rein- forces the traditional authorities' support for cooperatives but creates a channel between the cooperative or GM and the government. 29. The design and emphasis of the courses given at the CPR could have been improved. Greater recognition needs to be given to (a) the fact that most farmers only derive part of their income from, and devote only a portion of, their activity to agriculture; (b) the role of women whose training tends to be confined to certain disciplines (e.g. hygiene) rather than devised in a manner that would assist their development and advancement in the social structure of the village_/ and (c) a follow-up course/program on return to the village. 30. Training of extension workers under the CFJA program has had only limited success. Less attention was given to the recruitment of trainees than was the case for the CPR program and a large number of the original stagieres had to be dismissed. More important, however, was the lack of training given to CFJA's instructors; steps are being taken under Maradi II to improve this element of the training program. 31. Training Courses and Post-Training Administration. The administra- tion and conditions of the training programs, and the post-training service conditions of the ex-staigieres was not uniform; in fact, it was almost divisive. Trainees of the CPR and CFJA programs have received a stipend during training because they had to leave their farms for one full growing season; those attending the health and the literacy trainers' courses did not. While the ex-staigieres working with cooperatives within the project area were 1/ which can trace its roots to the early sixties. 2/ The Region advises that after the third year of the project, the "train- ing of women was extended to literary... and now (1982) includes also home economics and agriculture." - 14 - and are paid according to current Government pay scales, those retained by cooperatives outside the area served by the first project have to negotiate their remuneration with the cooperative employing them. The result was, inevitably, the difficulty of retaining ex-stagieres who were not rewarded, or rewarded in a discriminatory manner, and also the difficulty imposed on UNCC by having two classes of employees. 32. Training in the Villages. An early attempt towards this objective was organizing literacy courses. It was expected that agricultural extension agents - the graduates of the CFJA courses - would, during the dry season when agricultural activity is virtually at standstill, teach villagers to read and write. This venture was only a limited success. Further development came in 1979 when the project sought the help of the cooperative assistance program to food aid projects (ACOPAM) for "village uplift" activities. The need for this had been reinforced by a Governmental decree of January 1979, which sought to levels of cooperative organization, which the entire working population of an arrondisement had to join. The programs required under the 1979 decree are being implemented under the second project with UNCC, in conjunction with ACOPAM taking active steps to strengthen mutual aid activities at local level.J/ 33. Cooperative Economic Activities. The success of the training and village uplift component notwithstanding, the only kind of cooperative activity that will sustain member and Government interest is one that brings financial advantages to both parties. Government needs justification for the heavy subsidies required until the operation becomes self-sustaining (estimated in Maradi to amount to CFAF 380 million per annum for five years) and members must also see that they benefit by their membership. The original project design envisaged that the cooperatives would collect and market indus- trial rather than foodcrops which, in Maradi, meant groundnuts. To ensure the continued production of groundnuts, the Credit Agreement included a covenant which said, inter alia: "Government shall (i) set producer prices of agricul- tural products at a level sufficient...to induce farmers to produce for the market, and (ii) review those prices on an annual basis" (Section 4.05). It was understood - and duly followed during project execution - that groundnut marketing would be through the cooperatives which would receive an adequate fee for this service. However, the growing of food crops, traded on the open market and only marginally subject to Government price regulations in rural areas, became more profitable than groundnut growing. Therefore, farmers increased their foodcrop areas, and the cooperatives have not been able to generate the expected income. The cooperatives have made an unsuccessful attempt to enter the trade in cowpeas, but were, at that time, undercut by Nigerian traders who bought supplies direct from the farmers. Under these conditions, the marketing of foodcrops, particularly if the principal market is close to the producers, are unsuitable for cooperatives. Moreover, since 1/ For further explanation and amplification of paras. 31 and 32 see Annex 1. - 15 - the crops grown in the Maradi area require no, or only minimal, processing before retail sales, the cooperative cannot earn additional income by process- ing. The audit was advised that future trends favor foodcrop growing in preference to groundnuts and therefore trading income for cooperatives is likely to continue to be limited. 34. Cooperatives could, conceivably, become involved in input supply, notably fertilizers!/ and animal-drawn implements. The former is made difficult by the fact that Government procures fertilizers wholesale and that at present no formula exists for its transfer to non-Government organizations to retail them. Such arrangements exist elsewhere, in some of which (e.g. Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) the Bank itself has participated. The audit is not in a position to judge whether circumstances were ripe for the Bank to encourage the Government to make similar attempts; it merely wishes to draw attention to precedents and relevant experience. 35. Marketing of animal-drawn implements, at the cooperative rather than UNCC level, hinges on the resolution of two problems: first, the pro- vision of medium-term credit to assist purchase and second, financial strength to carry inventories and spares. Whereas the need to carry inventories can be side-stepped by making the cooperatives commission agents (implying however a markup of 2%-5% rather than a dealers' margin of 15%-20%) spares must be carried, and their slow turnover, in the small market that the cooperative would provide of a single sub-district (para. 33), would also mean a heavy financial and administrative burden. 36. Consequently, the audit notes with regret that the financial future of the cooperatives, derived either from marketing activities or input sup- plies, is far from safe and one can but hope that the follow-on project will be able to ensure not only the continuation of the training and village uplift programs so well started by the first project but also that greater attention be given to the strengthening of the cooperatives' economic activity. 1/ The Director-General advises that a start has been made with fertilizers when the cooperatives have effected credit sales. In 1980, they switched to cash sales. He believes that the commission earned on the sales of seeds, fertilizers and farm implements will materially assist the func- tioning of the cooperatives.  FORM O. 78 17- FORM NO.788 IBRD ANGUAGE SERVICES DMSI')N CONTROL. No. E-12 57/2 [ADATE: HUL --'1982 ORIGINAL LANGUAGEt French MNiger) DEPT, Oper. Eval. TRSL tor JCB:mjva BORROWER'S COMMENTS Annex 1 Page 1 Republic of Niger Maradi Rural Development Project Project Management Unit April 27, 1982 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur WorldBankRep. No. 217/DG World Bank Washington, DC Dear Mr. Kapur: First Maradi Project (Credit 608 NIR) - Project Performance Audit Report Following your letter of March 10, 1982, received in Maradi on March 30, I now enclose comments on this report. Very truly yours, Is/ Ousseini Kabo Maradi Rural Development Project General Manager - 18 - Annex 1 Page 2 MARADI PROJECT Phase 1 - Project Performance Audit Report (World Bank) Comments on the text Sections 10 - 18 -- The farming system and adaptative research. The term "monoculture" (sole cropping), used several times in Sections 10 - 14, is ambiguous and should be replaced by the term "culture The project is interested in the traditional system based on inter- planting and agrees to study this, adopt it and possibly promote it in future. It does seem important to bear in mind the legitimate concerns of the farmers with respect to distributing climatic hazards over several crops with different requirements. The project is in favor of the idea of opening up in the direction of northern Nigeria, where interplanting has been the subject of intensive study for several years. At the January planning meeting, the Applied Research Service was asked to include in its 1982 program the creation of demonstration plots using interplanting techniques. The reservations contained in Section 13 will disappear with the introduction of a special crop arrangement compatible with mechanization (row interplanting). Section 19. In reality the Extension Service is perfectly aware that supplies from Nigeria are dependent on trade conditions and could cease at any time. The project is willing to modify the fertilizer component once it is no longer possible to obtain supplies from Nigeria at the subsidized price. The project (is) convinced of the effectiveness of Super Triple and will adapt - 19 - Annex 1 Page 3 its extension efforts to take account of the source of supply finally decided on for the country as a whole. But in the short term, as long as Nigeria can still supply us with fertilizer at extremely low prices, it would be unreasonable to give up this source. Section 21(a). It is certainly a good idea to let farmers buy seed for cash if they so desire. The project has already made proposals to this effect to the Ministry. The (cash) price to the farmer could even be lower than the price on credit. (b) This section contains a rather sweeping statement. Selected cereal seed sold at market price will not necessarily be used for consumption. There is no risk that the good seed will go only to those who have stocks to exchange, since all farmers have access at the same time to consump- tion millet already reserved for that purpose. (c) It cannot be said that demand has been overestimated. The interpretation of this section should be corrected and clarified to reflect the following situation: For millet and cowpeas, the farmers' needs used to correspond to the quantities produced. But the problem was that the seed was delivered to the ALC (Local Cooperative Association), which was too far from most of the farms. The farmers could not travel 10, 20, or 30 km just to pick up a few kg of seed. The situation was remedied in 1980 and 1981, when the seed was delivered to the cooperatives, bringing it within much easier reach of the farmers. The proposed variety of sorghum was rejected by the farmers because of its taste. - 20 - Annex 1 Page 4 Moreover, it is natural for the quantity produced to exceed require- ments. This does not involve any major additional expense since there is no post-harvest processing and in any case market prices are high at this time of year. Section 31. This section is difficult to interpret and it seems that some confusion has arisen among several categories of persons: - CPR graduates - CFJA alumni - cooperative self-management (auto-encadrement) - literacy instructors - paid UNCC workers - health trainers Both Phase 1 and Phase 2 have included two types of training: (a) Training at specialized centers: - for farmers selected by their villages to receive CPR training - for future CFJA extension agents - for literacy and health officers - for various project workers undergoing periodic retraining (b) Training in the villages - for all cooperative management: self-management. The various trainees naturally differ widely in terms of origin, situation and status: - The CPR trainees are farmers sent by their village to the CPRs for nine months of training, in couples, where they receive food, a stipend (p4cule) and part of the production. When they go back to the village, they receive a draft team on credit and become pilot farmers. They do not receive a wage or any form of remuneration. - 21 - Annex 1 Page 5 - The extension agents are also farmers. They go to the CFJA for 9 months of training, receiving food and a stipend. Following this training period some of them are taken on by the project and paid at the guaranteed minimum wage (SMIG), thereby becoming project employees. The others are sent back to their village and may obtain an equipment loan. Some of them become literacy instructors in the villages. - The UNCC supervisors (encadreurs) are employed and paid by UNCC. They are seconded to the project. They receive periodic retraining courses. - Cooperative self-management is assured by farmers appointed by the cooperatives to carry out certain management functions. They are not paid. They receive periodic training from the UNCC supervisors. - The literacy instructors are recruited for a few months for the literacy campaigns. - Health self-management is assured by first aid personnel and midwives. They are not paid and receive periodic retraining courses. Section 33. We dispute the statement "foodcrops .... are unsuitable for cooperative marketing." Our feeling is that, on the contrary, the cooperative movement should be strengthened and revitalized, and that technical assistance should be provided for this purpose. If not, the cooperatives are likely to gradually disappear. Section 34. During the 1st phase the cooperatives have already been participating directly in the supply of inputs on credit. In 1980, they expanded this service to include cash sales of fertilizer. This service was, and still is, provided free of charge. However, if the cooperatives were paid for this service (x F/kg of fertilizer or seed and y% of the value of the draft teams) this would encourage - 22 - Annex 1 Page 6 them and help them greatly in their operations and in the development of new community activities. (The last page identifies a few typing errors in the French and suggests alternatives to some of the terms used.) - 23 - NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CREDIT 608-NIR COMPLETION REPORT August 28, 1981 Project Department Western Africa Regional Office Agriculture III Division  - 24 - I. BACKGROUND 1.01 When the Maradi Rural Development Project (Cr. 608-NIR) was appraised in 1973, the Government's strategy for development of the agricultural sector was to promote small irrigation projects in fertile valleys, and to intensify, where feasible, rainfed agricultural production through the establishment of rural development programs. These development objectives were endorsed by the new regime in 1974. 1.02 This was the second project in Niger's agricultural sector to be financed by the Association. The first project (Cr. 207-NIR), approved in June 1970, was designed to provide credit to farmers and to strengthen the cooperative movement. The project was unsuccessful: (a) the overall project concept was not geared to conditions prevailing in Niger as the project concentrated solely on the financial aspects of agricultural credit without providing for well-defined actions to improve production; (b) Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation (UNCC) strengthened its extension service for cotton but was prohibited by Government from extending it to groundnuts; (c) Niger suffered severe consecutive droughts; and (d) Government hesitated too long before deciding to adjust the producer prices. 1.03 The Maradi project was designed to increase agricultural produc- tion through the development of rainfed agriculture in the three districts of Madarounfa, Aguie and Tessaoua and pilot development of irrigation in the Goulbi de Maradi through exploitation of the Goulbi's underground water resources. Under the authority of the Ministry of Rural Development, a project management unit was to be created to carry out these main components along with several subcomponents. 1.04 The project was appraised in November 1973, but the change of regime in 1974 necessitated its postponement until early 1975 when the Association was able to reach agreement with the new Government on the organizational structure of the project. IDA Credit 608-NIR for US$10.7 million was approved for the Maradi Rural Development Project on December 11, 1975, and the Credit Agreement was signed on February 6, 1976. II. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL Chronology 2.01 The Government of Niger expressed its intention to seek Bank Group financing for an integrated rural development project in Maradi to a Bank economic mission in February 1971. The Bank's Regional Mission (RMWA) in Abidjan was requested to help prepare the project. An identification mission visited Niger in November 1971 and submitted its report in December 1971. The report recommended the promotion of improved agricultural practices through the strengthening of the extension service and the implementation of the following components: groundnut seed multiplication, applied research, - 25 - marketing and storage facilities, feeder roads, water points, credit for farmers, and livestock development. The report also recommended that the feasibility study for the project be financed by "Fonds d'Aide et de Coopera- tion" (FAC) under the direction of a consultant. 2.02 The feasibilty study which was issued by FAC in May 1973 proposed that the project be implemented through the organizational structure of the UNCC and that the project should comprise four main parts: - Training of farmers through the development of extension service activities and a functional literacy program; - Development of the cooperative organization, the use of animal- drawn farm machinery, and storage facilities for inputs; - Construction and improvement of feeder roads; and - Applied research and studies on land tenure and livestock develop- ment. 2.03 Appraisal of the project was carried out in November 1973. Follow- ing discussions with the new Government in 1974 on the project's 6eneral organization, a post appraisal mission visited Niger in May 1975. Targets and Goals 2.04 The project aimed at increasing agricultural production by increas- ing groundnut output by 25% and millet and sorghum by 6% over 3 years and by improving the productivity of about 1,000 hectares of cowpeas. The total value of livestock sales was expected to increase by 9%. The key assumptions for these targets were based on research findings of the "Institut de Recherche Agronomique Tropicale" (IRAT) and the "Institut de Recherche pour les Huiles et Oleagineux" (IRHO). The use of fertilizer on cereals was rejected on the basis of experiments that concluded such use was uneconomic. At appraisal, it was considered that the improved agricultural techniques that would be promoted by the project have been tested extensively in similar ecological zones in Niger and elsewhere in West Africa, and have been shown to be acceptable to farmers. The project also included provision of credit to pastoralists for the purchase of livestock. The latter component did not aim at additional production benefits but at contributing to a redistribution of income through interest-free loans in kind to pastoral families who had lost their herds as a consequence of the Sahelian drought. Project Content 2.05 The project comprised the following components: (a) provision of production packages--extension, applied research, credit, and input supply--to improve the productivity of groundnuts, millet and cowpeas in the areas covered by 15 selected "Associations Locales de Cooperatives" (ALCs); - 26 - (b) strengthening of cooperative institutions; (c) expansion of educational and training programs, including a functional literacy program; (d) expansion of a training school for extension workers from a capacity of 40 to 100, and the provision of training fellow- ships for project personnel; (e) a study on the optimum means of developing the irrigation potential of the Goulbi de Maradi; (f) pilot development of irrigation in the Goulbi de Maradi through exploitation of groundwater resources; (g) construction of 80 km of feeder roads to provide communications within a fertile but hitherto isolated sector of the project area; (h) planting of 500 hectares of trees in fuelwood plantations; (i) improvement of livestock services in the project area and preparation of a livestock development project; (j) provision of credit for the purchase of livestock by pastoral- ists who lost their herds during the Sahelian drought; and (k) establishment of an evaluation unit to determine and record the socio-economic impact of the project. 2.06 The project was to be implemented over a three-year period, 1976-78. In hindsight such a short implementation period proved too short for a pilot project of this nature. At the time of appraisal, however, the fairly new project concept (for Niger) and the innovative organizational arrangements suggested caution, which found expression in the implementation period of only three years. The project was to be managed by a Project Management Unit (PMU) established for this purpose. The PMU was to be provided with vehicles, equipment and a headquarters building. Implementation of the project was set up to involve a number of government agencies: UNCC for cooperative development, Public Works for road construction, and the Maradi provincial services for livestock, forestry, health and functional literacy activities. 2.07 It was anticipated that after completion of this first rural develop- ment project in Niger, a follow-on project would extend its activities over larger rainfed areas and carry out a substantial irrigation program. - 27 - III. IMPLEMENTATION Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-up 3.01 Following Board approval on December 11, 1975, and signing of the Credit Agreement on February 6, 1976, Credit 608-NIR became effective on October 8, 1976. Besides the usual legal requirements for effectiveness, there were three conditions to be fulfilled prior to effectiveness of the IDA credit: (a) Creation of the Project Management Unit (Section 3.02 and Schedule 4); (b) Appointment of the heads of PMU's four sections (Section 3.03); and (c) Financing of a revolving fund account in the name of the PMU at the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA) (Section 3.04). 3.02 Because of the time required in Niger to complete legal procedures necessary for the appointment of personnel, and for the approval of new govern- ment agencies, credit effectiveness had to be postponed several times even though no particular issues had arisen. The additional time needed for the Government to fulfill the conditions of effectiveness had no adverse technical effect on the start-up of the project because the authorities concerned had sufficient time to make preparations for the growing season which began in May 1977. However the whole project was delayed by one year, thus increasing its cost in current terms. Implementation Progress 3.03 Set out below is a brief review of the implementation of the various project components and activities. 3.04 Project management. The decree establishing the Maradi Rural Development Project provided for the integration of most of the province-s rural services under the PMU, as the Association had requested prior to negotiations. The General Manager and the four section heads of the PMU were appointed in May 1976, and the Government gave full backing to the project, which was viewed as a test case for rural development in Niger. However during the first year, personality conflicts between the General Manager and the Ministry of Rural Development adversely affected project implementation. After the General Manager was replaced at the end of PY1, this situation improved greatly and close cooperation was established between the Ministry and the PMU staff. 3.05 Staffing. Middle-level positions were difficult to fill because government officials were reluctant to join a demanding project without adequate compensation for a heavy workload and for relocation far from the capital city of Niamey or from their home area. Moreover, civil servants - 28 - feared that if they were seconded to the project, they would lose their promotion rights and opportunities for fellowships or the training courses necessary for promotion. Consequently the turnover of the most qualifiea project staff was extremely high. The situation improved toward the end of the project when the Ministry of Rural Development agreed that civil servants be appointed to the project for a pre-determined period while retaining their civil service rights. Lower level extension workers were recruited under contract after training at the "Centre de Formation des Jeunes Agriculteurs" (CFJA) but in 1978, 30% of the extension staff were dismissed for poor per- formance. A lack of skilled personnel combined with the low civil-service salaries offered by the project also hampered the operation of the Admini- strative, Financial and Commercial Section; this section suffered more than others since its accounting and administrative staff, in contrast to techni- cians, had increasingly bright employment opportunities outside the civil service during the uranium boom. Despite the Association's repeated requests, the Government opposed making salaries more attractive, even for accounting and administrative staff, because such a measure would affect the whole government salary structure or, if limited to some staff, would provoke resentment from others. Government was right in its first argument, but the effect of its second argument was that many accounting and administrative staff, once trained, simply moved off to better-paying jobs elsewhere. 3.06 Recruitment of expatriates. The Bank-s Agricultural Project Kanage- ment Unit and consulting firms handled recruitment of expatriates, all three of whom held executive positions with the exception of the technical adviser to the General Manager. The recruitment of a technical adviser who could combine good working relationships, efficiency and initiative proved difficult and none of the three appointees stayed longer than a year; the problems would probably have been avoided had this post also been an executive position, or if the advisory function had been handled by short-term consultants. No problems arose with the other three expatriates, whose work was efficient and highly appreciated by project management, the Government and the Association. 3.07 Applied research. This component was implemented satisfactorily and encountered no special problems. 3.08 Monitoring and Evaluation unit. The establishment of the evalua- tion unit was delayed for more than two years because of misunderstandings between the Ministry of Rural Development and the Ministry of Planning about ministerial responsibilities for monitoring. To minimize the consequences of this delay, the project began staffing a small unit in early 1979 with the cooperation of the Planning Office of Maradi province. The work of the unit was limited to an analysis of the demonstration and checking plots during the last year of the project. 3.09 Agricultural Credit and Input Supply. As part of project design, credit activities were transferred to the project from the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA). But since UNCC was unable to provide all the required inputs (para. 4.19) as had been intended, project management took over responsibility for fertilizer procurement. This arrangement worked well in that adequate, timely supplies were made available to farmers. Equipment delivery to 5% of the farmers greatly exceeded the project targets fixed at ZA. - 29 - 3.10 Vehicle procurement. No problems were encountered in procuring vehicles for the project. To ensure better control of their use, the PMU ruled out allocation on an individual basis and established a car pool. 3.11 PMU facilities. Construction of a headquarters building for the PMU was deleted from the project, as an adequate building (the old provincial headquarters) was made available by the Government. Civil works were limited to 24 additional offices, a storehouse, fencing, housing for guards, and some improvements to existing buildings. Four administrative offices at the district level were built in 1977. 3.12 Young farmer training program. The project provided for the construction of 15 "Centres de Promotion Rurale" (CPR) and for an expansion of the CFJA to increase its output of extension workers. The 15 CPR complexes were all completed ahead of schedule, after which work began on five new CPRs which were planned for the follow-on project. At the CFJA, the appraisal construction program was carried out along with some additional buildings which became necessary as activities expanded. 3.13 Goulbi de Maradi Study. The study on the optimum means of devel- oping the irrigation potential of the Goulbi de Maradi was scheduled for PY1. A contract for the study was agreed with a consulting firm but the Ministry of Rural Development gave priority to an evaluation of two other projects contracted with the same firm. This was unfortunate, because completion of the Goulbi de Maradi study was delayed to April 1979, too late to start the implementation work under Cr. 608-NIR, but in time to ensure a quick start-up in the follow-on project (Cr. 1026-NIR), discussed in Chapter VII. 3.14 Pilot irrigation development. Since the delay of the study prevented implementation of the pilot program, the PMU decided to train and test the project's irrigation unit for further development work through two small-scale irrigation projects: (a) the irrigation of about 80 ha with water from Madarounfa lake and (b) the establishment of an irrigation scheme around three exploratory wells. The studies for the first small-scale project proved economically unviable. Work on the three wells started at the end of PY3. 3.15 Feeder roads. Construction of 80 km of feeder roads started at the very beginning of the project. Early in 1977, a supervision mission found that work on this component had started at the insistence of Government and that the agreed procurement procedures had not been followed. Payments under the IDA credit were withheld until the road was completed, and excess costs over the appraisal estimates ($500,000) had been paid by Government. 3.16 Fuelwood development. This component, which aimed at the estab- lishment of 500 hectares of trees in fuelwood plantations encountered many problems. In 1978 only 101 hectares had been planted successfully and the program was discontinued, with the exception of small woodlots at CPRs, because protection and maintenance proved too difficult and costly as dis- cussed in para 4.21. - 30 - 3.17 Health-Functional Literacy - Livestock. These programs were imple- mented satisfactorily. The livestock component also included studies for the preparation of a livestock project which started in 1979 (Credit 885-NIR). 3.18 Credit for livestock purchases. The distribution of credit-in-kind to pastoralists who lost their herds during the Sahelian drought began in 1976 (Table 8). The operation was managed by district officials, undertaken rather hastily and with inadequate provision for centralized record-keeping. Since records are in fact incomplete, full credit recovery will be impossible and, although the assistance of the provincal governor was obtained, some losses are to be expected at the end of the recovery period. Project management decided to stop the loans in 1978, which then amounted to 81% of the appraisal estimates. Covenants 3.19 Compliance with the Credit Agreement covenants relating to organiza- tional arrangements was satisfactory, although some delays occurred in staff secondment because of a lack of skilled local personnel (para. 3.05). Inas- much as implementation of the Goulbi de Maradi irrigation component was postponed to the follow-on project (para. 3.13), all covenants relating to irrigation became irrelevant. Three covenants relating to the Government's general economic policies were not complied with: (a) The interest rate for agricultural credit to purchase farm inputs, equipment, blacksmith kits and vaccines was maintained at 8% and eventually was raised to 9.5%, but the rate never reached the 10% stipulated in the Credit Agreement (Section 3.05). (b) Despite reminders by supervision missions, Government never consulted the Association on changes in subsidies for fertilizers, although for several years the latter were lower than the 50% maximum sti- pulated in the Credit Agreement (Section 4.04(a), 4.04(b)). (c) The announcements of producer prices for agricultural products were usually made too late to influence farmers' cropping patterns. The Credit Agreement (Section 4.05(a)) stipulated that the Govern- ment announce these prices at appropriate times and that the prices be reviewed on an annual basis. Each of these covenants pertained to nationwide policies, that proved to be resilient to obligations entered into for one particular project. This experience, similar to that in several neighboring countries, suggests that policy changes cannot be adequately tackled through project covenants. - 31 - IV. PROJECT OUTCOMES Economic Setting 4.01 Discussion of the project outcome will be limited to the economic setting, the agricultural production and to some project components such as extension service, training, cooperative affairs, input supply and forestry for which changes or difficulties occurred during project implementation. The other project components which faced no implementation problems i.e. applied research, seed multiplication, construction, livestock, functional literacy and health, will not be discussed. 4.02 In assessing project outcome, it is important to bear in mind that this was the first rural development project financed by the Association in Niger, and that the appraisal mission was able to obtain only very limited data on which to base its report. Moreover, the PMU started its operations from scratch and, in addition to the many problems involved in setting up a new organization, had to face a sharp decrease in the country's production of groundnuts, one of the major crops considered at appraisal. 4.03 The severe decrease in groundnut production occurred throughout the Sahelian countries, particularly in Mali. In Niger, the decrease is attributable to successive years of erratic rainfall and depleted seed stocks, crop diseases (i.e., aphids and rosette), and low official producer prices until the 1978/79 season. During the three project years, total official groundnut marketing in Niger decreased by 85% (14,200 to 2,100 tons). 4.04 The first supervision mission (July 1976) acknowledged that the appraisal targets, based on rough estimates, were only indicative and sug- gested that: (a) project targets should be revised in the light of the recent drought and pest attacks; and (b) priorities for applying improved agricultural practices be reevaluated in light of the prevailing agricultural context. Consequently, project management decided to promote for all crops the use of a complete package of improved agricultural practices including improved seed, adequate plant population, use of fertilizer and better cultural prac- tices, instead of applying the various practices separately as had been envisaged at appraisal. Moreover project management introduced the use of 100 kg/ha of superphosphate, and 50 kg/ha of urea on cereals in the project area. Production 4.05 The appraisal report did not include detailed production and area targets (presumably because the baseline data were so unusually poor) and consequently, during the first two years of project implementation, project management did not pay sufficient attention to production targets and annual data were recorded with such inconsistency that useful comparison is difficult. The actual total area supervised by the extension service (Table 1) was increased by 40% in PY2 and by 123% in PY3, mainly through increased plantings by farmers of cereals, which increased by 25% and 235% over the last two - 32 - project years. After increasing by 42% in PYI, the actual groundnut acreage under extension supervision remained stable. The project's total production of cowpeas under extension supervision increased fourfold over the three years, but reached only 645 hectares compared with 1,000 hectares estimated at appraisal. 4.06 The incremental production estimates (Table 2) reflect the shift of farmers' interest from groundnuts to cereals. Actual figures show that the project attained only 37% of the appraisal estimates for incremental groundnuts, 67% for the small cowpeas component, and 108% for cereals (or a bit better than planned). The after effect of groundnut fertilizer on cereals is difficult to assess and was disregarded by project management, although it is estimated to account for an additional 11% in cereal production. 4.07 That cereals output surpassed appraisal estimates by 'only' 8% understates the project's production impact. At appraisal, it was estimated that use of seed dressing and animal-drawn implements would increase millet yields by 75%, and this was a key element in the forecast of the project's incremental cereals output. By contrast, experience has shown that use of the full package of improved agricultural practices improved the traditional yield by 62% in 1978 and 118% in 1979 (Table 3); seed dressing and animal- drawn implements, alone, could not have improved yields by as much as 75%, as had been assumed at appraisal. 4.08 On cereals the use of improved varieties (Table 4) was adopted by 20% of the farmers compared with 10% estimated at appraisal, and plant popula- tion and fertilizer, which were rejected at appraisal, were adopted by 19% and 15%, respectively. On the other hand, the development of improved groundnut cultivation met only about 50% of the appraisal estimates. Animal-drawn equipment was distributed to 5% of the farmers instead of the 2% estimated at appraisal. All these changes show that project management correctly modified its objectives, putting more emphasis on cereals as cropping patterns changed. However, while the number of farmers benefitting from the extension services roughly approximated appraisal estimates, the improved acreage per farm (0.88 ha) was still low. Extension Service 4.09 The low efficiency of extension workers became apparent during the second growing season (1978/79), and the average number of supervised farmers per extension agent ranged between 33 and 51 throughout the life of the project--far fewer than the 150 envisaged at appraisal. Although the Associa- tion recommended that the number of farmers per extension worker be increased, and PMU did take some appropriate measures, the short project life did not allow for major changes nor for significant improvement to the training program for extension workers. 4.10 At the village level, 74 extension workers were discharged from the service in PY2. Staff strengthening at "Association Locale de Cooperative" (ALC) level was difficult because of the lack of skilled personnel and also because the ALC assistants would have had to be selected from among the more efficient extension workers. - 33 - Training-C.F.J.A.-C.P.R. 4.11 The project had to train its own extension staff and for that purpose operated the CFJA, which was transformed into a center for training about 100 extension workers per year. Due to the pressure of the multiple project start-up activities, trainees in PY1 were recruited hastily without proper selection criteria; the trainees did not always receive full backing from their villages and some of them had no desire to become extension workers. Recruitment gradually improved, but the weak training organization and the lack of skilled instructors required more than two years to be fully corrected. 4.12 The CFJA also conducted a special training course for blacksmiths. Out of 73 trainees, 62 were equipped with a basic set of tools and were estab- lished in their own villages. A survey of their activities in PY3 indicated that regular supervision and refresher courses are needed to maintain and improve their skills. 4.13 Young farmer training was undertaken at the 15 CPR. The hasty recruitment of the first year's 128 trainees led to instability and a lack of motivation on the part of the trainees and their villages, however this situation was remedied in 1978. During the next two years, 528 young farmers, attended the CPR training program. The nine-month program included not only improved agricultural techniques but also cooperative organization, functional literacy and health. About half the trainees were married and attended the courses with their families, who fully participated in the training. 4.14 CPR fields are an excellent demonstration of the efficiency of the proposed package of improved agricultural practices, including crop rotation. Yields are detailed at Table 5 and compared to those obtained elsewhere at Table 3. Project management paid particular attention to CPR management and training program improvement but the follow-up of trainees after they returned to their villages was not a first priority for the PMU. Even so, a study carried out in 1980/81 by the central evaluation unit at the Ministry of Rural Development shows that 75% of the CPR trainees held information meetings at the village level and that their fields were visited by villagers. Further- more, a large majority of villagers acknowledge that the trainees' fields produce better yields than the traditional fields; among farmers using improved cultural practices, 28% were so persuaded by CPR trainees. Cooperative Development 4.15 The PMU's Cooperative Affairs Section provided training for staff of agricultural cooperatives, input distribution, credit and marketing activi- ties for 84 cooperatives and 805 "Groupements Mutualistes Villageois" (GMVs) compared with 750 estimated at appraisal. This section was staffed by UNCC and carried out all the above-described activities on behalf of UNCC. While PMU encountered problems in-supervision and monitoring of field activities, and UNCC practiced unduly frequent staff transfers, this situation did gradually become satisfactory. - 34 - 4.16 The project's training programs were carried out at the ALC level, following UNCC training methods. About 5700 cooperative presidents, secre- taries and accountants attended technical training courses; and 13,800 farmers, compared with 7500 estimated at appraisal, attended information sessions on cooperative organization, cooperative management and cooperative accounting. It soon became evident that specialized external support was required to improve the service's staff efficiency, and in 1979 project management signed an agreement with the "Appui Cooperatif aux Projets d'Aide Alimentaire en Zone Sahelienne" (ACOPAM), which seconded a specialist to the project. He effec- tively helped the project to reorganize its training programs and to prepare a larger development program. 4.17 To improve the efficiency of the cooperative system it seems that a) the 'groupements villageois' should be based on voluntary membership and should not systematically involve the entire population of a village, b) the ALC would have to be kept in operation since their disappearance is likely to create liaison problems between cooperatives and the district centers which are often very far from each other and c) a source of income has to be found for cooperatives, a problem which is particularly important at a time when it becomes more and more difficult to recruit unpaid volunteers for specific tasks such as health services. In addition, the government's deci- sion to transfer cereal marketing to village chiefs is also likely to hamper cooperative development. 4.18 A major change occurred in the young farmer training program ini- tially to be carried out by Cooperative Affairs because the appraisal proposal to conduct two-week training sessions, separated by two weeks on the farm, did not prove feasible; attendance was very irregular. With the Association's agreement, it was then decided to establish the CPR training centers described in para. 4.13, where the trainees could remain for a full growing season, and to transfer management of the CPRs to the Technical Operation department. Input Supply and Credit 4.19 UNCC was unable to satisfy farmers' demand for inputs and equipment in a timely manner. This was due in part to poor planning of procurement and distribution, but also to inadequate funding from the capital budget, controlled by the Ministry of Planning, of the total subsidies required to satisfy demand at the (subsidized) prices, decided by the Ministry of Rural Development. To remedy the situation, project management decided to procure fertilizers directly, and the volume increased over the project life from 152 tons to 1411 tons for superphosphate and from 5 tons to 331 tons for urea (Table 6). Unfortunately, the only supplier of equipment was UNCC, from whom deliveries were erratic and inadequate, and the subsidy funding problem could be deferred but not solved (para. 5.03). 4.20 As a result of the application of strict credit allocation proce- dures, the credit recovery rate was satisfactory over the project life, averaging 81% for short-term and 93% for medium-term credit (Table 7). The cancellation by the Ministry of Rural Development, in 1980, of all short term credit operations had no effect on the increasing demand for the well-known - 35 - superphosphate; however, the use of urea, newly promoted in the project area, diminished by 35%. Although the recovery rate for seed credit improved during the last project year, it remained very low (52%). Forestry 4.21 As designed at appraisal, village woodlot development in the project area proved to be impracticable, for the following reasons: (a) difficulty to mobilize farmers on a community basis, (b) lack of interest on the part of farmers, (c) high competition between plantation and maintenance work on the plantations at the peak time of the growing season, (d) protection and mainte- nance difficulties, (e) low return to farmers, and (f) poor site selection for the first plantations in PYI. Out of a fuelwood plantation program aiming at 500 hectares, 153.5 were planted in 1977, of which only 9 hectares were deemed worthwhile to be maintained, and 92 hectares were established in 1978 (para. 3.16). A misunderstanding in PY1 led the General Manager of the PMU to create plantations common to three villages; this soon proved to be impracticable because of difficulty in getting the villages to cooperate. Hence, in order to sensitize young farmers to the fuelwood problem, and with the Association's agreement, project management decided in PY2 to limit new plantations to one 3-hectare plot attached to each CPR, where the necessary protective and maintenance work could be more easily carried out by CPR staff and trainees. This solution proved successful and all woodlots (101 ha.) are growing satis- factorily. 4.22 The PMU's decision to discontinue the village woodlot development was based on the findings of a survey which indicated that other important issues were involved besides those mentioned in the above para. Plantation protection with barbed-wire fences proved to be ineffective against goats, thus requiring guards to keep them out of the planted areas, and this led to an increase in implementation cost, which at CFAF 153,000 (US$612) per hectare was more than double the appraisal estimate. Moreover, such woodlots would not yield a return until eight years after they were planted and a 3-hectare plot would produce only 30 m3 of fuelwood every eight years, or the equi- valent of the annual consumption of 30 persons per year. Such a limited benefit cannot be expected to be attractive to a village. Due to the pre- vailing conditions described above, it seems that the only way to promote woodlot plantations is to base them on individual or family plantations such as household plantation, grove, thickets, shelter belts, line fencing or windbreaks. V. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESULTS Project Costs 5.01 The total project costs as derived from the Source and Application of Funds Statement on Table 13 equalled the appraisal estimate of US$13.2 mil- lion. The IDA credit for US$10.7 million was fully disbursed by December 18, - 36 - 1980, twelve months after completion of the project physical components on December 31, 1979. Two major cost variations occurred and are reflected in the disbursements by category, in Table 9: (a) Staff salaries and operating costs increased by 52%. This was mainly caused by (a) the high inflationary trend in vehicle operating costs and (b) staff costs, which increased by 30% as a result of the overall increase in local salaries directed by Government. (b) The cost of the irrigation component decreased by 76% as this pilot program was postponed, as explained in para. 3.13. 5.02 Farm input costs were well contained through direct procurement (rather than through UNCC), since local suppliers bid on the basis of obtain- ing supplies from across the border in Nigeria, where fertilizer prices benefit from Government subsidies. Project Financing 5.03 The financing of project costs as agreed during negotiations was as follows: IDA credit--US$10.7 million; Government's share--US$2.5 million (including taxes), or US$1.2 million (excluding taxes), for a total project cost of US$13.2 million (including taxes), or US$11.9 million (excluding taxes). Exchange rate fluctuations did not materially affect project finan- cing. During project implementation, a number of problems arose which adversely affected project financing: (a) Disbursement of the IDA credit generally lagged behind schedule by about 12 months, as shown in Tables 10 and 11. Disbursements started slowly because of the PMU's inexperience with the Bank's reimbursement claim procedures. A major consequence of this slow disbursement of the credit proceeds was the need for the project to use borrowed funds from commercial banks in order to keep going, despite the Government's initial contribution of CFAF 125 million (US$0.5 million) to working capital. (b) A shortfall of US$0.2 million occurred because the actual amount of the Government's contribution to project financing was US$2.3 million and not the agreed US$2.5 million. (c) The Government's commitment to finance the price difference between official and subsidized agricultural inputs was not fulfilled to the extent of US$0.7 million (Table 12). 5.04 To cope with the financial constraints resulting from the problems described above, the project had to rely rather extensively on commercial bank short-term financing. The overdraft situation gradually worsened over the project life, as shown below. - 37 - CFAF million US$ million 1977 254 1.1 1978 293 1.3 1979 446 2.0 1980 332 1.4 The reduction in 1980 is attributable to a late Government payment of US$0.6 million. 5.05 During the last seven months of the project while preparation of the follow-on project was underway, interim financing was obtained for a specific investment program: US$2.0 million under EEC Special Action Credit 043-NIR, and US$2.3 million in additional credit from the national agricul- tural bank (CNCA). As the project activities did not end when the IDA credit was fully disbursed, the closing balance sheet is not clear-cut. The financial situation as of June 30, 1980, as shown in the balance sheet at Table 12, shows a net current asset position almost in equilibrium i.e., it should be able to free itself from short term liabilities soon; it also shows a medium- term credit to farmers of CFAF 134 million (US$0.6 million), for which there is good hope of recovery. But what is of concern is that the agricultural credit fund of about CFAF 280 million (US$1.2 million), which the project was supposed to have created, is available only to the extent of the farmers' debt of CFAF 134 million (US$0.6 million); the project-will therefore have to continue relying on bank short-term loans for the financing of agricultural inputs, or else pass on this financing to CNCA, unless Government's indebted- ness to the project CFAF 148 million (US$0.9 million) is paid back which would thus help restore the fund to its expected level. Economic Returns 5.06 The project's production impact was higher than foreseen at appraisal for millet but lower for groundnuts (para 4.05); the net effect was that the aggregate production impact was lower than foreseen. During this three-year project, however, momentum had been built up so that, with no further invest- ments other than for additional inputs, further increases in production could reasonably be expected. This was one of the problems that confronted the appraisal mission of the follow-on project; taking the two projects together as'two phases of an eight-year project, what benefits arising in the second phase ought properly to be ascribed to the costs incurred in the first phase? 5.07 The assumption finally adopted by the appraisal mission was that, without the second phase, production would further increase beyond the third and last year's output of the first phase by 20%, 15%, 10% and 5% in the following four years and remain stationary thereafter. The first year corresponds to the 1980 harvest for which full results are not yet available. It was undoubtedly a very good year but so, too, were the rains; even when the full results are available, it will not be possible accurately to separate out the rainfall effect and pinpoint the genuinely incremental production due to the project. This problem will be further compounded beginning with the 1981 - 38 - harvest, when production will also be a function of the recently-started second phase. Thus no data are available nor are likely to become available as a check on the appraisal mission's best assessment of the spin-off from the first phase. 5.08 The economic rate of return for the completed project had been appraised at 39% over 30 years. At appraisal of the follow-up project, economic rates of return were estimated as follows: Maradi 1 16% Maradi II 28% of which: rainfed 36% irrigation 14% Maradi I and II 23% Key assumptions are stated at para 8.02 of the Maradi II appraisal report. If these rates of return were to be recalculated at 1981 prices, the results would be slightly more favorable in view of the relative price changes of project outputs and inputs. VI. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT Project Management 6.01 The Maradi Rural Development Project was the first of its type to be implemented in Niger, and it was also the first autonomous development structure of the Ministry of Rural Development. This situation exacerbated the problems usually encountered in setting up a new organization, mainly because it involved the transfer of the Ministry's departmental responsi- bilities to the project and the secondment of required staff. After the replacement of the first General Manager at the end of the first project year (para. 3.04), the situation improved greatly. 6.02 In accordance with the appraisal design, project implementation was carried out by the Project Management Unit, which was established prior to credit effectiveness (para. 3.01). In line with appraisal recommendations, a clear-cut organizational structure was established and decentralization of operations was successfully carried out through district level down to the ALCs. The Administrative, Financial and Commercial Department was headed by an expatriate who, due to his strong personality and high efficiency, played a leading role in project management. The evaluation unit was not established until 1979, two years later than planned (para. 3.08). Some project com- ponents and activities, such as livestock development, health, and functional literacy, were satisfactorily carried out through the specialized departments of Maradi Province, which had full power to implement their respective programs. - 39 - 6.03 The accounting system was established at the beginning of the project in accordance with the accounting plan of "Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne" (0CAM), which is compulsory in Niger and includes both a general and a cost accounting system. The general accounting system worked fairly well but, due to the general complexity of the cost accounting system no periodic analytical financial reports could be prepared. However, audits of the project accounts were carried out by a firm of foreign auditors and their reports have been satisfactory. 6.04 Although not all the appraisal objectives were met, the PMU's achievements have established a strong base for a larger agricultural develop- ment project. The project structures are well set up, key positions are filled by efficient personnel, and a sound accounting system is being estab- lished, thus paving the way for a quick start up of the follow on project. Staffing 6.05 Project staff at the upper level were recruited from among govern- ment officials, but the general shortage of qualified personnel in Niger caused many positions to be filled by personnel of lower grades than required. Moreover as explained in para 3.05, civil servants were reluctant to join the project because all members of the PMU staff, including the expatriates, had extremely heavy work loads throughout the project life, to cope with the many difficulties involved in setting up a new type of project and implementing it as efficiently as possible. 6.06 Two PMU sections, Cooperative Affairs and Community Development, were staffed by personnel seconded by their departments, and consequently these sections became subordinate to two managements. This caused many minor but irritating problems, and also made thorough supervision of their activi- ties by project management somewhat difficult. Good personal relationships helped a great deal in easing the situation, which improved progressively over the project life. 6.07 Project staff at the village level were recruited under contract from among CFJA trainees. Their selection was aided by the fact that after graduation from the CFJA training school they could either be recruited for extension work or receive animal-drawn equipment and return to their villages. The latter option allowed the PMU to make a thorough selection of extension workers during project implementation (para. 3.05). 6.08 At the end of the project, the total number of project staff (603) was higher than estimated at appraisal (503). This is attributable to (a) the low efficiency of unskilled personnel, which was a particularly acute problem in the Administrative, Financial and Commercial Section and obliged the Proj- ect Manager to increase the staff; and (b) a normal tendency to make up for low staff efficiency by increasing the number of personnel, as was apparent in the case of the extension service. This problem was pointed out by a super- vision mission in PY2, and the Project Manager took appropriate action to stop recruitment, improve the selection of extension workers, eliminate the least efficient among them, and increase their work load. - 40 Training 6.09 Training was carried out for field-level project personnel, coop- erative staff, blacksmiths and farmers. The project did provide for a specialist for this purpose, but instead the general manager recruited an Administrative, Financial and Commercial director, who was badly needed; hence, instructors of limited proficiency implemented poorly-designed programs that included too much theoretical teaching. Middle and senior project staff, because of their extremely heavy work load, had no opportunity for fellowship or training outside the project. Farmers' Benefits 6.10 Farmers in the project area benefitted from extension support and from a training program for young farmers at CPRs which, since 1978, has had an annual attendance of about 300 young couples. In addition, training in cooperative management was provided through the PMU-s Cooperative Affairs Section. To develop improved agricultural practices, the project supplied 10,000 farmers with seed, fertilizers, fungicides, and equipment, and in the meantime the Cooperative Affairs Section marketed increasing quantities of crops. The farmers also benefitted from the project's livestock development, functional literacy, and health programs. 6.11 Due to incomplete data on traditional check plots and a lack of monitored farm budgets, there are no accurate figures on the project's impact at the farm level. However according to the production of pilot farmers, in the northern part of the project area, the use of improved agricultural practices over an average of 0.88 hectares per farm, or about 16. of the total surface, is estimated to have increased net farm income by 15% or a total net increase of 94% if the whole farm had received the same treatment. Consultants' Performance 6.12 Because of the lack of trained local personnel, the project financed the services of four expatriates, three of whom held executive positions on the project staff. Two of the expatriates were recruited through the Bank's Agricultural Project Management Unit, and the others were recruited through consulting firms. Except for the adviser to the General Manager, they were well integrated in the project staff and they performed very efficiently. As mentioned in para. 3.06, the technical adviser held a more ambiguous position; in retrospect, this job should also have been an executive position, or the advisory function should have been handled by short-term consultants. 6.13 A consulting firm was selected by the Ministry of Rural Development to prepare the study on the optimum means of developing the irrigation poten- tial of the Goulbi de Maradi. As mentioned in para. 3.13, this study was delayed at the Government s request and was satisfactorily completed in April 1979. The same firm was also selected by the Ministry to carry out the feasibility study for the follow-on agricultural development project. - 41 - Follow-on Project 6.14 To assure a smooth transition and fill a gap of about six months which was expected to occur between the Maradi Rural Development Project and the follow-on project, an EEC Special Action Credit (para. 5.05) was granted to Niger under the same conditions as for Credit 608-NIR. The EEC credit financed (a) the purchase of earth-moving equipment, pumps and vehicles; (b) construction of the irrigation network; (c) construction of an electric power line to the Goulbi irrigation scheme; and (d) 42 man-months of the services of internationally-recruited staff for the PMU, including a foreman, a chief mechanic for the irrigation section, and a training specialist to design and launch an improved training program for extension workers. Operating costs and local staff salaries were borne by the Government. VII. CHANGES IN THE FOLLOW-ON PROJECT 7.01 The Second Maradi Rural Development Project (Cr. 1026-NIR), approved on May 20, 1980, took into account the valuable experience gained under the first project and all components were modified in the light of this experi- ence. The project was designed to provide the PMU with clear targets for development, and an adequate monitoring capability to measure performance, as well as well defined staff responsibilities and adequate staff training. The main project components: extension, training, and irrigation were either reorganized or strengthened to improve their impact. The forestry component, which faced implementation problems, was adapted to existing possibilities and the community development division, which was not essential to the project implementation, was transferred back to the provincial department. 7.02 More conservative objectives were determined for agricultural production, to be promoted by the extension service, whose training and work programs were completely revised. The ratio of 245 farmers per extension agent is expected to be attained at project completion. In the meantime, CPR trainees will be integrated as pilot farmers in the extension system to increase their impact on village farmers. 7.03 The establishment of a cooperative development program was one of the main concerns of the mission but it was hampered by the preparation at national level of a new cooperative organization which was still being debated during appraisal. Since the main elements of the new structure were still unknown, no clear decision could be made and it was decided that the specialized ACOPAM expert, seconded to the project would have full latitude to support the new organization as soon as it is known and that he would adapt the project cooperative training program to the new trends of government policy in order to start a pilot program in the project area. - 42 - VIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S AND THE ASSOCIATION'S PERFORMANCE 8.01 During negotiations of the Maradi Rural Development Project, the Government proposed to integrate all of the province's agricultural services under the PMU--a move that the Association had previously urged the Government to take to ensure the project's efficient implementation (para. 3.04). After the first year, the project benefitted from the full support and cooperation of the Ministry of Rural Development. While all of the project management's requirements could not be satisfied, in most cases this was because of exist- ing government regulations and procedures, such as those pertaining to staff salaries, which could not be easily modified. 8.02 The Government failed to meet part of its financial obligations toward the project: (a) it did not pay its contribution to project financing on a timely basis, and did not pay its full share (the shortfall amounted to US$0.2 million); and (b) it did not refund to the project the agricultural input subsidies of US$0.7 million. As a consequence, the project had to rely on short-term borrowing from CNCA. 8.03 The appraisal report for Cr. 608-NIR had to be prepared from very limited and unreliable data and, following the recommendations of the first supervision mission, appraisal targets had to be revised and the agricul- tural practices had to be redefined by project management (para. 4.04). In addition, the project design had some other weaknesses: a) it did not provide project management with a clearly defined list of agricultural targets to be reached annually, including areas and production for each crop to be improved and b) the improved agricultural practices were evaluated separately whereas it soon became evident that only the full package would be efficient. 8.04 It was assumed in the appraisal report that the PMU could establish an entirely new structure from scratch and at the same time efficiently implement a new type of rural development project. In view of the working conditions and staff situation prevailing in Niger, this was an overly opti- mistic assumption. 8.05 Supervision missions were undertaken twice a year, as scheduled, with the exception of 1978. The effectiveness of the first missions was hampered by a dearth of information on implementation progress during the first year. The project's weaknesses did not become apparent until the beginning of the second year, and they were then corrected by the PMU with effective assistance from successive supervision missions.  WAR._W #%#A t"!g ~ rE.04EllT Pau.iEICl/P0i1t DE 1!E0rP5c 8 III1k.cl I5 NASAN F30igCT tvLT0I JE5O9T/MP0ST D'ACN8VSNENT 8>ui Plu ET EXTElUNU A¢NJIVEMlfrs/BEA.,SATIUNS 0E LA VUL4tA88SAT80E Acr.ag (hlal Surfacc Faruara1/ Faatera g? 78 /72 1979/00 1977178 19716/79 U979/80 5. TOTAL PO T AEA 206tNw 2060 0 206000 37500 31500 37500 1. E DU al. NAIN INPUiS lSin8UTEW 2, (tun¥) åI. PMINCIPAUl INT 818T889016 2/ (IUOBS> Superpcc apik.s 214 381 881 Suprpho.phat Ur- 5 l08 288 MrL Croundput Su.da 105 843 820 sammacus Arackld kl&lat/sorgum Sudd - 289 Satecs 8W/srgo~ I . AMEA N LFITING FR MH 8å. IRME: ENfi C.y INPUTS DISTIIUTION ONLT Seed 1321 7960 8000 2013 13250 9300 se111d1s rarciliaer Dla åla (8400) ala ala 98 Engral. % at Total ProLect 0.6 3.92 4.12 3.43 31.38 26.39 a I r Projet Total IV. AREA UNWIER EXTENSION COTL V. 3011gg g~gg mha?Wlm mg Lam 1g08ggagg ) Us o INPOVIO cULTU~AL PACTICIL jI t) UTILIATION 618 M8ATLUfl 9u I~F @8.88Eg 3 Us of 2 improved culturot practtces - 353 358 '331 407 Måagd d 2 ra quaa cILturalmå omjitlra~ Us of 3 laproved cultural praccicas - 82 3668 818 4118 MUae de 3 pratiqu** eulturalos anigrd Udd at 4 Improved culaural praccice 50*0 1879 7817 79153 974 8132 Uaae de 4 pratiqua caltural6 aMlords sA.l 080 7044 81183 / 792 88485 A107L 2) Ciops 2) 2TUBES Millet 1890 2351 6334 3000 3921 6268 all Killet * Groandauta - - - - 1237 eI dt arachid arGundoute 3/ 3000 4256 4801 4762 6654 364 Arachten 3/. C0upeas 820 407 641 840 756 680 UUbo Sarahun or Kaixa - 26 99 - 13 94 Doriho ou Ma!. Nihcellaneous - - - - 27 334 -ivar. LTAL 1080 7044 18883 7952 88413 12707 Toa. I of Total Proiec& 2.41 3.48 5.43 21.28 29.88 33.9 9 du projes Total 1 ut progresaton - -40.08 +123.03 - +44.03 +60.03 1 de progreecaa vV. EUInXMEL DE VIFA8De88 awN Extansom Ag*aga 3/ I56 264 279 156 264 279 Agnt d. vul rå &tm} Impruved aurfacc pur goit(hajt 32 27 40 - - - emporfict = tar par a8aa(ha) Föreura pur Agat - - - så 43 45 Ferera par Faoal laproved acreatim pur farw*r(ba) 0.63 0.62 0.88 -- - uprcia orepar agäntt(be) &&proved farm acream 2 8.5. 18.32 16.02 - - - Superfice .aSåiurgu par exploltation t / Estiated tutal taraurs In 15 ALC & 37500 / Total dem foraler, oattu daqp C5 A8mj - 2500 2/ 5., de.tail in Tabl. 6 1 L1ai1 dan4ö au Tablesu 6 3/ IncludJng ~eed aeltiplicaLia / Hultipliciatjum den me~n#a iclua~. - 44 - im Naan:1 ua. auenint n0sr/e §s navammVrr WSa, fs Wma fmJG GNULET ~II E M 0T~ D'M:llVUg OU PaUJar |MMfAL PUOU~!01tW ftoJE07/riUC!T10 SUPTEEfttAttg Dg 110Jgt amea mu = m/m I P/aenAe 3 P/Mde 4 ium5 t0 4100 30 780 1640 3Imo 490 37% asmda .'(LI/sorghum •• 760 1300 1270 4000 3700 5300 5730 108 N1iserske cowp.se 200 100 600 190 600 650 1400 940 67% U144 (produstion eutaLg) (total produetio) Darivd fro ?bl« I and 4/ Calcu"L d'a~è es l abLauam I dt 4. NIGER MARADI itRU DEVEL4)PmENT PROJECT/PiRojET.DE DEVELOPPEMENT IRURAL. DE MARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION EFORT/RAPPORT D'ACIIEVEMENT DU PROJET AVERAGE YIEL.DS/RENDEMENTS MOYENS (With use ot tult package of impruved cultural praclices) (Avec utiliuation de l'ensemble des méthodes culturdles amalorien) PROJECT AVERAGE/bk)YENNE MADAROUNFA AGUIE TESSAOUA 1977 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 MILUET IL CIR 495 1046 1218 1024 1281 1129 1236 1014 1123 cn CFIA 1500 2078 1500 2078 - - - - CFJA Demoncratton Plots 1321 910 1299 858 1405 1108 1269 765 Parcelles de ddmisration Pilot Farmers 1052 833 1022 551 12,89 1100 838 848 Fermiers pilotes Check Plots - (650) 382 - 419 - 430 - 297 Temaoine CRUUNI)NUTS ARACHIDE CFR 408 532 1303 561 995 709 1585 365 1554 Cr CFJA 554 1305 554 1305 - - - - CFJA Demunstratiun Plots 579 1261 601 1507 1456 1042 451 1236 farcelles de démunâtration Seed Multiplication Prograu 582 - 661 - 564 - 460 - Programme de MuILIpltcationa de buences Pilot Farmers 716 1030 781 837 1245 421 1008 Fermiers piloteus Check Plats - (410) 786 - 858 657 843 Temaois AWVEAS týlL6E CPk 362 878 1094 939 1320 855 924 819 907 CP1 CFJA 1055 1157 105t 157 - - - - CFJA DemonetracIun Plots 1265 - - - 1550 - 981 Parcelles-de demons.ration 'llut Farmers - (463) (1014) - 1104 - 766 (463) 1173 Ferraiers pilotes Chueck Pluts 497 - - - 490 - 504 Temoine NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVELOPPEENT RURAL DE HARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET ADOPTION OF IMPROVED CULTURAL PRACTICES IN PY3/ADOPTION DES METHODES DE CULTURE AMELIOREES EN ANNEE 3 (Percentage of farmers - total units 37500/Pourcentage des fermiers - nombre total 37500) Appraisal Actual % Evaluation Rdallej Groundnuts Arachide Seed dressing 75 13 Traitement des semences Improved varieties 30 t4 Varidtda amdliordes Seed population 20 10 Densitd a Fertilizer 18.6 10 Engrais Millet and Sorghum Mil et Sorgho Seed dressing 40 19 Traitement des aemences Improved varieties 10 20 Varidtds amdliordes Seed population Non prdvu unexpected 19 Densitd Fertilizer Non prdvu unexpected 15 Engrais Oxen-drawn Cultivation 2 5 Culture.attelde CEwEeas (acreage) 1000 ha #45 ha Nidbd (surface) MARADI NuS DEVELOPMENT PROJRCT/PROJET D DEVELOPPEET RURAL DL HAADI (CREDIT 608-MIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET CPR'S YIELDS (kg/ha)RENDEMENTS DES CPj (kg/ha) DISTRICT MILLET/ MIL GROUNDNUTS/ARACHID9 COMPEAS/mlu AsOWDISSREMT 1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979 HADAoLA (7 CPRa) 495 1024 1281 408 561 995 362 939 1320 MADAUNFA (I CPR) AGUIE (I Cats) - 1129 1236 - 709 1585 - 855 924 AGUIE (3 CPo) TESSAOUA (5 CPRa) - 1014 1123 - 365 1554 - 819 907 T!ssAOUA (S CPS) W. Average 495 1046. 1218 408 532 1303 362 878 1094 Mayanne pond&X6e - 48 - Table 6 NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL DE MARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHRVEMNT DW PROJET EMUIPMnEN AND INPUTS / EQUP=MS ET INTRANTS Supplied by the 'Affaires Coopdvatives',' Distribude par les'Affaires Coopdracives' Description 1977/79 1978/79 1979/80 Total Ddsigntion o= (pair) 127.3 328 440 895.5 Paire de boeufs Donkey - - 30 30 Ane Tool bar 86 725 437 1248 btti de base Canadian cultivator (5 teeth) 86 450 46 582 Canadien 5 dents Canadian cultivator (3 teeth) 36 il 401 448 Canadien 3 dents Ridger - 13 49 62 Buttoir CuLtivator (d=nkey) - 41 41 82 Boua asine Planter 35 102 342 479 Semoir Oma Cart 73 149 329 551 Charette bovine Donkey Cart 20 19 53 92 Charette asines Yoke 109 158 354 621 Joug Rayonneur 153 105 274 532 Rayonneur Lifter 81 624 256 961 Jeu de lames S/5 Triple superphosphate 20,700 kg 2191 kg 1000 kg 23,891 kg Superphosphate triple Superphosphate 152,400 kg 375582 kg 883250 kg 1411,232 kg Superphosphate Urea 4,600 kg 108147 kg 287812 kg 330,559 kg Urde Fertilizar 15-15-15 139,300 kg 3500 kg 45275 kg 188,075 kg Engrais 15-15-15 Fumgicide (packages) 212,393 110642 160982 484,017 Fongicide (sachets) Groundnuts Seeds 105,400 kg 823462 kg 820263 kg 1749,125 kg S-nces arachide Millet " - 26094 kg 28465 kg 54,559 kg Semences cail Cowpeas " 5,000 kg 14299 kg 13462 kg 2761 kg Semnces niébd Sorghum " - 1798 kg 324 kg 2122 kg Semences sorgho - 49 - Table 7 NIGER KARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL DE MARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET Credit Situation / Etat du Cr4dit (CEAY) Year Credit Reimbursement Amount Due Reibursement Anade Crddit Remboursement Sommes dues Rbouamt Short-Term Craiit/ Crddit court termse 1977/78 7,860,954 5,677,455 2,183,499 72.22 1978/79 11,232,627 9,329,145 1,903,482 83 1979/80 20,986,335 17tl10,560 3,875,775 82 Sub-total 40,079,916 32,117,160 7,962,756 81 Sous-total Msdium-Term Credit/ Crddit gann term 1977/78 15,111,674 14,831,929 279,745 99 1978179 11,096,142 10,783,090 313,052 98 1979/80 19,330,726 16,641,520 2,689,206 86 Sub-total 45,538,542 42,256,539 3,282,003 93 Sous-total Groundaut Seed Loans /Pr8ts semence arachide 1977/78 4,230,679 1,645,230 2,525,449 38.89 1978/79 3,761,912 2,630,215.5 1,131,696 69.92 1979/80 2,140,267 990,417 1,149,850 47 Sub-total 10,132,858 5,265,862 4,866,995 52 Sous-cotal *50 - NuesAD EUM. DIVUmnaHT FWIUPIOJar De Unum00UrT hflh> Dasa 1UOJET 0WPL!TIM UEfET/IAfl0UT 0' M DU Pu vJET LITIT8 10C-48MA CET/ 10<5 mUR ACAr DWaU 10TAT. 1URABED (3 TUERS) 12AEE! C08TS (CFAP) eal des acha t r¶ggeoa_ ammnet (C&A) tcgL hiciti c kfIr t&. ~M.. 1970 1977 1978/79 Toj TOa df es Däe~o 346 y1 1,4u y 79 y 20,000,000 8,000,000 35,00,000 63,000,000 124 y - 237 70 - G,00,O - 6,000,000 100 Uaabt8 980 3,442 5,000,00021,0,00 - 26,000,000 504 Ta~ao1. 18.000 80 T 2,7 ,587 25,000,00053,000,0 3^00 113,000,000 908 es W sd aatua for 1978/79 ACIA 35,000,000) mot.aci~. ee as g de. a e pour å9 n/I9 (d 000 000 &A) am 0op. NICE£ HARADI &URAL DEVEL~PMENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVPOPPDENT &URAL 9 MMI (CUDIT 608-MIR) PROJECT COKPLETIOM EORTIAPPORT D'ACEVENENT DU ?ROJET COMPAISoN OF ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISMIUSEMENT/COWMAAISON DES ESTIMATIONS ET DE Dtm~SEMENTS BEfl. Iecrca* (Dec) Ag .eå of total Digburammnt of Total over Appraigal Categorieg Accord de Crddit du total Ddbourseamat rdel % du total a n ( 1. Civil worka 1200 12 1394 13 i. 0date civil II. Veicles & Equipment 600 6 777 7 6 II. Vdhiculag et dqmipement III. Farw Inputa 1000 .9 1218 11 -11. Intraatte IV. Animal Purchagen & Vaccine 600 6 528 5 (28 IV. Achat daaimaux et vecIna V. Expatrimte Statt Salarie 900 8 929 9 (16) V. Palaire. peronne e tptrid VI. Local Stat Salare 6 ope~rtina Coata 2400 22 4463 42 32 VI. Salatrea peraonnel local et VII. Irrigation Fuad 900 8 265 2 (76)I d4 rnOtienet VIII. Studien, Audit, Dcholarahip VIII. Etudma, audit, bournen et & Techaical Amtiatance 1200 11 1126 11 (23) • astarance techaique II. Unallocatad 1900 18 IX.- eo alluda Total 10700 100 10700 100 Total If After allocation of category II to the other categori*#, at the same rate (22%) as it. *bare in the diaburasemet categoreas per he Credlt Agreement. NICER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL DE HARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT DACHEVEHENT DU PROJET DISBURSEMENT TIMETABLE/TABLEAU DES DEBOURSEMENTS (US$ 000) Fiscal Year Z Z & Semester &praisal Dbursements Actual Disbursements Evaluation Dfboursemenis Re D6boursemnts 1976/77 $ $ 1976/77 lt Semester 1700 16. 1ar samtre 2nd Semester 3300 31 700 6 2er semstre 197778 lt Semester 5400 50 2000 19 ler semeatra. 2nd Sementer 7500 70 3800 16 2iae seuatr& 1978/79 1978/79 1st Semester 9100 85 6100 57 ler seuestre 2nd Semester 10700 100 7700 72 2ame semetre 1979/80 1979/80 1st Semester - 8600 80 ler seestre 2ns Semester - 10700 100 2ame samtre - 53 - Table 11 NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL DE MARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS / DEBOURSEMENTS CUMULES 11 million 10 - 9 'i 8 ., 7 ' 6 - 5 i 4. 3 2 1 million 1 Sea, 2 Sem 1 Sem. 2 Sem. 1 Sea. 2 Sem. 1 Sem. 2 Sem. IDA Fisc.Years 76-77 77-78 78-79 79-80 Ann6es fiscales App. Evaluation IDA Act. Rgel AZAD* rtAL DeVEWpNNT ROJECT/IE E DEVEL ~ DE Ka (Cnta1T 608-um) MUJILT CUMLETLION REOT~IArIDBT D~ANEVEMNT Du PRIEIKT ALANCE SwEETIS (CFAF millns) 31.12.77 31.12.71 31.12.79 30.6.10 SINTM Il91 ASSETS 9 25 186 5. ACT[ gpCTs Capitalie.d beVeIoyment Epn. 2001 Depese de developpeat 1ema ee less inlanced by nber äxtfralI ~urc., / - - - (143) A déduirea Et=aaeu.at pai autres meurces que projet I/ 2. VIXED AssETS 2/ 410 418 594 638 2. ~IILISATIow 21 Lad Devulopeunt 167 112 Ml9 220 iKM en Våleur des tarra Foreatry 21 36 35 36 Förtå Luildlagå and lanstllatioe el 115 199 205 aatimeet. er installetien VehicIes 95 9g 102 180 Vabicules equipmunt .4 51 73 144 Equpemen les finaanced by other exteraml Gource - - - (A99 m34: tiKMG=tc per d'autres source 3. MEDwUM-TEN LOANS 90 142 170 134 3. pras a M,YKM tERE Current abera 182 523 AUtres valeurs Smbie Livgstock 1 n -leva stocka l09 150 225 235 Stocka ieblor. (Farmers) 8 11 26 1 D"biteura (Farmlera) Debtor62 15 28 302 Debeur (Autre) Cash 2 11 7 26 Lquide afnk - - 20 A~oir en banque 4. less CURR.ENT LIAIILLTJS 295 än 592 450 4. Natasa DETTES A COURT TENI Creditors I 60 ht 449 r Baks 254 293 446 343 lanquen temas du by other 6aternal ~ources / - - s (342) - entgammeeta dea finacemete extkriaurs y Mut current esset* (3-4) •51j) 0 (1) Valeura fallsebl. a court terma rot (3-4) 5. COdoernuut Subsidiks duG 44 88 148 148 5. Subveotions aouvrn-atals exIgiS >ET ASSETS 2468 ACU1 !ereeted~1i byprdsaaj par G. COVEa~E CRANTS (kMi) 4/ 205 205 372 492 6. Fndt de dotatiom de Idta& (Fel) 4/ IDA CREDiTS 5/ 513 17 2096 2291 Crdit 1D0 # / jJ lepresente coutå finaaffd by 043-MIR d ICA eed t ci itta. BeprrseA las cota fimnmae par Cr. 043-8l1 et Iacilits ds crädi de l <ISCA. 2/ FiMed asMts ar abu~ at Groas sook Valu.s a o deprciatioa te pvdd for om h~tia at State Accou.tlng ptocedurea, a1,6 1~obli&atlos flguent a la valeur bruta et coortmnRt aum prcdures cupaau emnvarms.etala. aucune däpficiation Glest pr&vus. 3/ lnclude. clIs pendiogs. Deanodes en cours de renhouröe~t Iljumea. D 4/ 120 &tillun was received ta ch* tirt quarter 1980 for a total cotibutgon a 512 gillion. 120 ailliona ot åta Kesus au outa du pramier tiastta 1960 sur une comtråbutiou totala du 512 DilIona. i/ IA fimda are made availabla to ae projlet in tha tota ofa govlnt årant. Iee fonda IDA sont attribufs du projet oums ft~ de dun du govenemnL. MARADI RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT/IPROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL DE MARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT C0MPLETION REPORT/RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS/SOURCES ET EMPLOIS DES FONDS (CFAF million) 7 nouthe 7 moisif 31,12.77 31.12.78 31.12.79 31.7.80 Total 1. SuaCeiS 1001 1054 993 LU IM 1. SOURCE DES FONDS IDA Credit 513 904 520 448 2385 CrAdit IDA Government Grants 211 6 175 120 512 Dos du Gouvernammnt Bank Overdrafts 254 --A 153 (1311 32 Dcouvert baetre, 978 949 848 445 3220 Sales to farmers 2 23 105 145 36 309 Vantes aux (oratres !/ 2. USES OF FUNDS 953 856 1010 489 3308 2. IMPLOI DES FONDS Creation of Assets 410 68 116 115 709 Cout des invetaisements Operating Costs Y 293 578 657 372 1900 Frata de fonctionnement ,I Agricultural Inputs & Vaccines 250 210 237 2 699 Intrants at vaccine -I 3. NET INCREASE (DEC) 3. AUGMENTATION(OU DIMINUTION) in Working Capital g 48 198 (17) (8) 221 du fonda do roulement AL 4. USMS oF TQA CRI 5 904 Mo 448 2385 4. UTILISATION DU CREDIT IDA Cat. 1. Civil Works 89 52 187 43 28 310 Cat. I - Ganie Civil Cat. It Vehicles Cat. II - Vhicules i tquipeonat & Equipment 100 119 53 11 - 187 Cat. III. Agric. Inputs 100 104 131 42 2 279 Cat. III- Intrants Cat. IV. Animate Cat. IV - Animaux at Vaccine & Vaccines 100-89 92 1 31 - 124 Cat. V. Consultants 100 6 69 45 78 198 Cat. V - Consultants Cat. VI. Local Staff Cat. ft - CoOt du Personnel Local Costs 89 110 299 312 262 983 Cat. VII. Irrigation 89 - - 5 50 55 Cat. VII - Irrigation Cat.VII. Studies 100 30 164 31 24 249 Cat..VIII- Etudes if Figures tor 7 months to 31. 7.80 were extracted from disbursement statement from Controller and converted to CMAF franca on basis of 1 US$ - CFAF 213. Lea chiffres pour 7 moi au 31.7.80 proviennant des 6tats do d6boussement du Controller at soat couvertIS en francs CYA sur Ia base de 1 dollar US = 213 CFA. 2/ Includes both cash sales and repayment of credit sales. Comprend vantes au comptant at remboursement des ventes A cr&dit. 1-3 3/ Includes both incremental and non incremental costs. Cororend les coGta suppl&mentairea at non supplmnentairea. 4/ lIcludes unpaid Governaant Subsidies - 1977 - 45m; 1978 - 43m; 1979 - 60m. Csprund snbfventions uvernementales impayees - 1977 - 45a; 1170 - 43 a; 1979 - 60 i. NIGER MARADI RURAL DEVELOPHENT PROJECT/PROJET DE DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL DE HARADI (CREDIT 608-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION RMPORTIRAPPORT D'ACIEVEMEW OU PROJET INCOME AND EXPENDITURF ACCOUNTS/ETAT DES REVENUS ET DEPENSES (CFAF million) 6 months 6 maie S.A.R. .31.12.77 31.12.78 31.12.79 30.6.80 Total M* val. INCÎME ELVEUS Sales 114 143 173 - 430 147 147 Vante • Less:Cost of Sales 112 229 237 - 578 377 44 oinsa: CoOt des Ventes (Profit)/Loue ~F2) 86 64 - 148 230 300 (Profit/pertes) Other Revenue (6) (12) (4) (4) (26) Autres revenus EXPENDITURE 3/ 295 553 651 244 1743 1328 160 DEPENSES 3/ Stores ised 98 60 155 s3 396 Hatieren consommables Salaries & benefits 4/ 116 183 282 - 652 503 598 Salaires et indemnités / Outaide services _ 95 245 133 109 511 Service des tiers Si Official Traval 10 30 30 - 70 Déplacements officiels Training 36 44 60 - 140 Formation Other Expanses 34 48 14 37 133 Autres dépenses Interest Banka 5 22 4 15 46 Intérdts bancaires Less:iorke on Force Account (99) (79) (27) - (205) Moins: Travaux en régie DEFICIT 6/ 287 627 711 240 1865 1028 1900 ERFICIT 6/ 1/ Without contingencies/Sana imprévus 2/ With contingencien/Avec imprévue 3/ SAR figures details not comparable except for salaries and bouefits Les détails des chiffres figurant au Rapport d'Evaluation ns sont pas comparables, sauf pour salaires et indemaitis / a) Does not include state tuployees on Covernment payroll. b) Coste for 6 monthe te 30.6.1980 amuated to 143a, but financed by outaide sources (CNCA), thus removed for comparison purposes with SAR. a) lie couprend pas les fonctionnaires payés par le Gouvernement. b) CoÛt pour 6 mais jusqu'an 30.6.1980 se montant à 143 millions, mais financé par des sources extérieures (CHCA), donc exclu pour comparaison avec l'Evaluation. 5/ Includes the follouins expenditure on agricultural studios carried out at Maradi Coufbi by consultants: (1977 - CFAF 22; 1978 - CFAF 163)/SAR 188. Comprend les dépenses suivantes d'études agricoles menées par due consultants sur le Coulbi de Haradi (1977 - CFAF 22; 1978 - CFAF 163)/SAR 188. o Carried u Balane Shire ma dpens velop pee end ciaA iliséed. Porté au bilan au titre de dépenses de développement et Immobilisées. 斗一：