Turkey - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4018 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) June 28, 1982 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GLOSSARY MOI: Ministry of Industry MPW: Ministry of Public Works MOE: Ministry of Education MOF: Ministry of Finance SPO: State Planning Organization ATC: Adult Training Center PTS: Practical Trade School TuBiTAK: Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey MTTTC: Men's Technical Teacher Training College, Ankara ITDC: Industrial Training Development Center, Ankara ESEPC: Educational Science Equipment Production Center EFRTC: Educational Film, Radio and Television Center MTI: Management Training Institute, Gebze This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT 7URKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ............................................................. Basic Data Sheet ....................................................ii Highlights .......................................................... v PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY ........................... 1 II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES .................................... 3 Composition and Location of the Project Unit .......... 3 Percentage of Expenditures to be Financed .............. 4 Technical Assistance ..........................5......5 Physical Inplementation of the Project ................. 6 (a) Buildings ........................... 6 (b) Furniture and Equipment ......................... 7 Costs and Disbursements ................................ 7 Bank Supervision and Completion Reporting .............. 8 III. EDUCATIONAL IMPACT ......... .............................. 10 IV. CONCLUSIONS .......................................... .. 11 Comments from the Borrower ......................... 13 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations ..... ............ 21 I. Introduction .............. -o........................ 25 II. Project Background ........................... 25 III. Project Implementation ............. 30 IV. Project Cost and Financing .................... ....... 44 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. Charts and Annexes: Chart 1: Estimated and Actual Implementation and Disbursements.. 49 Annex 1: Implementation of Civil Works ....................... 50 Annex 2: Gross Floor Areas ............. . ........... 51 Annex 3: Equipment Costs .............. . ........................ 52 Annex 4: Disbursements ........................................ 53 Annex 5: Management Training Institute, Gebze (Photo) .......... 54 Annex 6: Public Sector Investments ............................ 55 Annex 7: Institutions Visited ................................. 56 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the First Education Project in Turkey, for which Loan 748-TU was approved in May 1971 in the sum of US$13.5 million. The original Closing Date was September 30, 1976. The last dis- bursement was made in June 1981 when the balance of $146,725.02 remaining in the loan account was cancelled. The audit report comprises (a) a Project Performance Audit Memoran- dum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated June 1981 and revised January 1982, prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office following a mission to Turkey by two consultants to that Department. The PPAM, in connec- tion with which no field visit was undertaken, is based on a study of the PCR and other material in the Bank's files relating to this project, including the Appraisal Report (PE-28a) dated May 10, 1971, the President's Report (P-930) dated May 7, 1971, the record of the Board discussion of this project on May 20, 1971, and the Loan Agreement (748-TU) dated June 9, 1971. The project experience has been discussed with Bank staff associated with the Project. As is customary in the preparation of audit reports, copies of the draft audit report were sent to the representatives of the Borrower; this was done on March 11, 1982. Borrower comments were received in June 1982 and are reproduced on pages 13-18 of the report; they are reflected in the report. The original 'PCR, written at a time when disbursements had not been completed and only one of the seven new project institutions had been constructed, required revision following discussion with OED. The audit memorandum examines moce critically than the PCR certain aspects of the project experience, including (a) the composition and location of the Project Unit; (b) technical assistance; (c) disbursements; and (d) Bank supervision. This more detailed examination may have relevance to future projects in the sector.  - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Estimate Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 17.91 37.8 Overrun (%) - 111 Loan Amount (US$ million) - 13.5 Disbursed - 13.35 Cancelled (as of June 11, 1981) - 0.15 Repaid (to August 31, 1981) - - Outstanding (to August 31, 1981) - 13.35 Date Physical Components Completed 9/30/75 9/84 in Months Since Loan Signature 52 160 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 30 100 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 208 Economic Rate of Return (%) - Financial Performance Institutional Performance Good Weak Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ 000's) Year ending Dec. 31 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 i. Appraisal Estimate 1410 8790 12710 13500 ii. Actual 120 200 300 3600 6100 8600 9600 9600 12600 13353 iii. Actual as % of Appraisal Estimate 9 2 2 27 45 64 71 71 93 99 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files 02/27/69 Government Application 07/24/70 Negotiations 04/19-22/71 Board Approval 05/20/71 Loan Agreement Date 06/09/71 Effectiveness Date 09/09/71 11/09/71 09/29/71 Closing Date 09/30/76 09/30/78; 03/31/80 06/11/81 09/30/80; 03/31/81 Borrower Republic of Turkey Executing Agency Project Unit, Ministry of Education Fiscal Year of Borrower March 1 - February 28 Follow-on Project None  - iii - MISSION DATA Sent Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date of Mission b Year Weeks Persons* Weeks Report Reconnaissance Bank/UNESCO 04/69 0.5 2 (g,g) 1.0 n.a. Reconnaissance Bank 06/69 0.5 1 (g) 0.5 06/26/69 Identification UNESCO/ILO 06-07/69 3.5 5 (e,g,t,t,m) 14.5 12/69 Reconnaissance Bank/UNESCO 02-03/70 1.5 3 (e,t,t) 4.5 03/18/70 Preparation UNESCO/flank 04-05/70 4.5 6 (a,e,g,m, 20.0 06/70 t,v) Appraisal Bank 09-10/70 4.0 7 (a,e,g,m, 21.0 05/10/71 t,t,v) Total 61.5 Supervision I Bank 08/71 1 1 (a) 1.0 n.a. Supervision II Bank 10-11/71 1 2 (a,e) 2.0 11/29/71 Supervision III Bank 05/72 1 2 (a,t) 2.0 05/25/72 Supervision IV Bank 01-02/73 1 2 (a,g) 2.0 03/26/73 Supervision V Bank 06/73 0.5 1 (t) 0.5 P 10/26/73 Supervision VI Bank 01-02/74 1.5 2 (a,f) 3.0 P 03/27/74 Supervision VII Bank 06/74 1 1 (f) 1.0 P 07/16/74 Supervision VIII Bank 02/75 1 1 (f) 1.0 P 05/08/75 Supervision IX BaNk 06/75 0.5 1 (d) 0.5 07/18/75 Supervision X Bank 07/75 0.5 1 (1) 0.5 08/19/75 Supervision XI Bank 10/75 1 2 (f,t) 2.0 P 12/22/75 Supervision XII Bank 02/76 1.2 2 (f,t) 2.5 03/12/76 Supervision XIII Bank 07/76 1 1 (f) 1.0 08/09/76 Supervision XIV Bank 01/77 2 2 (a,t) 4.0 02/17/77 Supervision XV Bank 07/77 1.5 2 (a,g) 3.0 09/16/77 Supervision XVI Bank 01/78 1 1 (t) 1.0 02/13/78 Supervision XVII Bank 09/78 0.8 2 (a,t) 1.5 11/01/78 Supervision XVIII Bank 06/79 1.5 2 (a,f) 3.0 07/03/79 Supervision XIX Bank 12/79 1.5 2 (a,f) 3.0 01/31/80 Supervision XX Bank 05/79 1 1 (a) 1.0 06/19/80 Completion Bank 12/80 2 2 (a,t) 4.0 06/26/81 Total 39.5 * a = architect; d = disbursements officer; e = economist; f = facilities planner; g = general educator; 1 = loan officer; m = management specialist; t = technical educator; v = education television specialist. P = graded a "major problem" project.  - iv - LOAN ALLOCATION AND DISBURSEMENT PERCENTAGES Amount of Loan Allocated and Revisions (US$ 000's) and Percentage of Expenditure to be Financed in each Category Category Original % 1st Rev. 2nd rev. 3rd Rev. 4th Rev. Final (05/74) (08/76) (07/78) (04/80) 1. Civil Works 450 15 - 2. 'Consultant Fees 30 10 - 3. Furniture 40 15 40 - - - - 4. Equipment 9,950 100 9,950 9,950 11,840 12,140 12,288 5. Technical Assistance 530 100 530 530 530 530 235 6. Interest and other Charges 830 100 830 830 830 830 830 7. Unallocated 1,670 21150 2)190 300 - - Total 13,500 13_500 13,500 13,500 13,500 13_353 Undisbursed: 147 CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Turkish Liras (LT) Year: Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average US$1 = 15 LT Estimated Weighted Average (1972-76) US$1 = 15 LT Weighted Average (1977-79) US$1 = 30 LT Completion Year Average US$1 = 80 LT  - v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) HIGHLIGHTS A loan of US$13.5 million equivalent to assist in financing the First Education Project in Turkey was approved in May and signed in June 1971. The project was estimated to be completed by September 1975 and to cost US$18 million. The project aimed at improving managerial and technical and vocational education. The Loan was intended to finance mainly equipment for both existing and new schools with construction to be financed both from loan and government funds. However, early in project implementation the construc- tion category, which involved low disbursement percentages and small loan amounts, was deleted from the allocation of loan proceeds. At this time, the Government agreed that it would construct the project schools using its own funds (PPAM, para. 9). While equipment procurement was handled expeditiously, the project encountere. severe delays in the construction of new institutions, which is not expected ro be completed before 1984, when total final costs are expected to amount to about US$38 million. Because of these construction delays about 10% of the equipment provided, costing US$1.3 million, is in storage. Loan disbursements were completed in June 1981 when the sum of US$146,725.02 remaining in the Loan Account was cancelled. The project impact has been mixed--weak in the areas where school construction was involved and strong where the project concentrated on the supply of equipment to existing institutions. The Management Training Insti- tute has not been opened (PPAM, para. 25; PCR, para. 3.29) and only one of the six Adult Training Centers has been completed; even this is not catering for the rural migrants originally envisaged (PPAM, para. 26; PCR, para. 3.24). On the other hand good use is being made of the equipment supplied to the existing Technician Schools (PPAM, para. 27; PCR, para. 3.21), Practical Trade Schools (PPAM, para. 28) and other national institutions whose operations were significantly improved by the project inputs (PPAM, para. 29; PCR, paras. 3.26-3.28, 3.32-3.36). Other points of special interest are: (i) the project unit located in the Ministry of Education was unable to coordinate project work effectively (PPAM, paras. 6-8); (ii) the technical assistance component was not fully subscribed to by the Borrower and was not satisfactorily implemented (PPAM, paras. 10-12); - vi - (iii) the Bank did not give sufficiently early consideration to a transfer from a category of expenditure which was unlikely to be fully used to another which was almost exhausted (PPAM, para. 20); and (iv) letters to the Borrower following supervision missions included a detailed annex on project status taken directly from the supervision report. This procedure deserves to be used more widely (PPAM, para. 23). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 1. Following reconnaissance missions to Turkey in April and June 1969, possible projects in the fields of (i) management and technical and vocational training, and (ii) agricultural education, were tentatively identified. It was considered that subsequent separate identification missions were necessary in these areas as the Government's agricultural education policy was not sufficiently advanced to permit an early project in this field. In the event, no project in agricultural education has yet materialized..! With regard to the management and technical education fields a UNESCO/ILO mission identified specific possible project items in June-July 1969. Following a reconnaissance mission in early 1970 the Government was assisted in preparing the project by a UNESCO mission in April-May 1970 and appraisal followed in September-October 1970. A loan of US$13.5 million (representing foreign exchange costs) was approved in May and sigaed in June 1971. The total costs of the project were estimated at US$17.9 million. 2. The objectives of the project were to improve the quality of educa- tional programs and to assist in meeting well-defined manpower needs in growing industrial areas. The project comprised: 1/ The Regional Office has indicated that another education project is scheduled for FY84. -2 - Construction and Furniture Equipment Number Staff Type of of Student Boarding Housing Student Institution Institutions Places Places Units Places 1. Management Training Institute [MTI] (new) 1 200 200 3* 200 2. Adult Training Centers [ATCs] (new) 6 1,500 1,500** 6 1,500 3. Technician Schools [TSs] (existing) 32 - - - 5,500 4. Practical Trade Schools [PTSs] (new) 12 - - - 3,200 5. Men's Technical Teacher Training College [MTTTC] (extension) 1 - - - 800 TOTAL 52 l- 9 11,200 6. Educational Science Equipment Production Center [ESEPC] (existing): equipment, materials and ten mobile units. 7. Educational Film, Radio and Television Center [EFRTC] (existing): equipment for additional program production and for training program producers. * In addition, a dormitory for 30 servicing staff. ** The Centers would operate on a double shift basis with a total enrollment of 3,000; boarding facilities would accommodate only half of the trainees. 3. It is notable how little the project changed from identification to appraisal, items 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 having already existed in more or less the same form at the identification stage. The remaining items were added to the project during the 1970 Reconnaissance Mission and were retained at appraisal. The Loan was to finance mainly equipment; the only construction to be financed under the Loan was for the MTI and the ATCs, with the Government undertaking to finance the construction of the PTSs and the extension to the MTTTC. -3- Technical assistance for the development of courses, curricula, and staff training was included in the project mainly for the MTI but with some assis- tance for the Technician Schools and the ESEPC. 4. The project was to be implemented by a Project Unit located in the Ministry of Education; appointment of key project unit staff on a full-time basis was one of the conditions of effectiveness of the Loan Agreement, which also spelled out in some detail (Schedule 5) the responsibilities of the Project Unit staff. The Loan Agreement also contained provisions relating to (i) the Industrial Training Development Center in Ankara, established in Ankara with UNDP assistance, which was to help train instructors for the ATCs; (ii) advisory committees for each of the Technician Schools; (iii) a national advisory committee on training technicians and craftsmen; (iv) the establish- ment of a minimum age of 14 years for admission to PTSs and (v) the submission to the Bank of a new five-year course curriculum at the MTTTC. 5. Project implementation was expected to be completed by September 30, 1975, and the Loan fully disbursed by the Closing Date of September 30, 1976; however, the project rapidly ran into difficulties during implementation caused mainly by extremely slow progress in building construction. In May 1974, the Loan Agreement was amended by the deletion of financing of Civil Works (with the Government thus assuming responsibility for all construction works) and associated Consultant Fees. In August 1976, the small furniture category was similarly transferred to the unallocated portion of the Loan and was ultimately used to finance equipment. At the time of the completion mission in December 1980, all the PTSs were expected to be completed in 1981, while the MTI and the ATCs were expected to be completed only in 1984 (PCR, para. 3.01). The Loan Closing Date was amended four times ending in March 31, 1981; the final disbursement under the Loan was made on June 10, 1981, and the following day the sum of US$146,725.02 remaining in the Loan Account was cancelled. II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES Composition and Location of the Project Unit 6. During the preparation of this project the Government had declined to have a single project unit within the Ministry of Education since the new institutions called for cooperation between various Ministries, a responsibil- ity which was customarily assumed by the State Planning Office (SPO). The original draft loan documents prepared for this project envisaged that the implementation of the project would be under a full-time project director from the SPO; two project units were to be established under his supervision, one in the SPO responsible for the Management Training Institute and the six Adult Training Centers (i.e., those elements for which the Loan was financing construction works), and one in the Ministry of Education for the rest of the project. 7. However, the Bank had advocated, despite the high quality of SPO staff which had contributed to the efficiency in the implementation of Bank financed projects so far, that SPO should revert to responsibilities confined to planning. When the draft loan documents which had been agreed during negotiations in April 1971 were sent to the Government for approval, the Government requested that the two project units to be set up should be com- bined as a single unit in the Ministry of Education, and that the SPO should not be involved in project management at all. Bank staff recommended to senior management in May 1971 that the request be approved subject to the Bank receiving satisfactory assurances that the Government was ready to assign cooperation functions to the Ministry of Education. 8. There is no record of these assurances having been received and it is difficult to imagine what form they would have taken as the Ministry of Public Works under 1969 legislation had the responsibility for the construc- tion of all post-primary institutions in Turkey (PCR, para. 3.02).1/ Never- theless, the Bank accepted the idea of a single Project Unit situated in the Ministry of Education. At the same time Schedule 5 of the Loan Agreement appears not to have changed from the form it had when the SPO was intended to be in charge--for example the project unit was to have the necessary powers to execute the project, including inter alia "...the procurement of civil works... including the preparation of bidding documents, the analysis of bids and the making of recommendations regarding the award of contracts; ...the regular inspection of all construction work..." and so on. These provisions in view of the 1969 law could only have been fulfilled by the MPW or by an organ which could instruct the MPW, such as the SPO. It is evident that a Project Unit situated in the MOE had insufficient powers to fulfill these functions. In the event the civil works component of this project has been severely delayed and is still by no means complete (para. 5). Percentage of Expenditures to be Financed. 9. Schedule 1 of the Loan Agreement set down six allocated categories of expenditure plus an unallocated category. The first three categories-- civil works, consultant fees and furniture--comprised less than 4% of the 1/ The actual situation may be more complex than this: in 1977 it was reported that under the Education Law the Ministry of Education was empowered to construct its own buildings. The Government has noted in its comments on the report (p. 16) that the general Directorates respon- sible for the Management Training Institute, the Adult Training Centers, and the Practical Trade Schools each had their own civil works programs. The Government indicates also that the newly established Construction and Real Estate Department in the Ministry of National Education will super- vise and maintain all school building construction. In the view of the Regional Office, the Government request for a project unit in the Ministry of Education may thus reflect the inception of a new policy, now fully in force. total loan, and the disbursement percentages to be applied to them--represent- ing the estimated foreign exchange component--were only 15%, 10% and 15% respectively. Nevertheless, the full force of the Bank's guidelines on civil works procurement in the form of international advertising and competitive bidding, Bank review of tender documents, and so on, were required. It is not surprising therefore, in view of the comparatively small sums and disbursement percentages involved, that the Government thought it hardly worth while to continue to seek financing for these items, and that they were eliminated at a fairly early stage from the categories to be financed during the first two revisions of the Loan Agreement (see Basic Data). Technical Assistance 10. This element of the project also caused problems, and these problems were also probably due to the non-involvement of the SPO in project manage- ment. Most of the technical assistance (5 man-years of expert services and 20 man-years of fellowships) was for the MTI, an element originally intended to be under the project management of the SPO (para. 6). Technical assistance for the whole of the rest of the project amounted to four man-years of expert services and four man-years of fellowships, for the Technician Schools and the Science Equipment Production Center. While the audit has not been able to trace a record of the negotiations of this project, it was reported by Bank staff as early as 1971 i:hat it had become evident during both appraisal and negotiations that the Ministry of Education did not favour project financed technical assistance. The objections of the Ministry derived from three main sources: first, the belief that such technical assistance was not really necessary granted the availability of qualified local experts; second, the view that foreign experts were extremely expensive; and third, the avail- ability of financing for such experts from UNDP or bilateral sources. 11. The Bank itself perhaps contributed to the belief that some of the project technical assistance provision was not really necessary when it suggested in July 1971, i.e., in the month following Loan Signature, that some of the technical assistance funds could be reallocated and used for other purposes - to finance a management review of the Ministry of Education to be conducted by a managemEnt consultant firm. The Government replied in a non-committal fashion to this suggestion. 12. The PCR (paras. 3.34-3.36) records the less-than-satisfactory imple- mentation of the project's technical assistance component. Some US$235,000 of the US$730,000 originally estimated for this component were disbursed, almost entirely for fellowship training abroad and bearing little or no rela- tionship to the original technical assistance provisions..! This experience 1/ The Government has indicated in its comments on this report, received in June 1982, that 29 technical teachers were trained -abroad under this component. See page 17. -6- demonstrates well the difficulties of (i) identifying technical assistance needs and (ii) implementing a technical assistance program in the face of a lack of government committment to it. While of course all the elements of a project must be 'agreed' between the Bank and the Borrower, it appears that software elements such as technical assistances are sensitive in many ways and for their best chances of success should originate more from a felt need of the Borrower than from identification by a Bank mission. Physical Implementation of the Project (a) Buildings 13. The PCR (para. 3.01) records the considerable delays in construc- tion, with none of the project institutions either constructed or equipped by the original September 30, 1976, Closing Date. At the time of the Completion Mission visit in December 1980, the PTSs were not expected to be all completed before the end of 19811/, and the MTI and all of the ATCs until 1984, with implementation expected to take over 13 years instead of the four years originally envisaged. While, as often in education projects of the period, the original implementation schedule was unrealistically short, the delay in completion of this project is likely to be greater than in any education project audited to date. 14. The PCR attributes the delay in execution of civil works by the MPW in part to the limited powers granted to the Project Director (PCR, paras. 3.02 and 3.03); however, it seems that this difficulty was of a more profound nature, originating in project design (paras. 6-8). The PCR points out that the withdrawal of civil works as a project item lessened any leverage that the Bank might have had in influencing the timely completion of the construction of buildings (PCR, para. 3.07). However, granted the very low disbursement percentages applicable to civil works (para. 9) such leverage could not have been expected to be very great in any event. The PCR observes, rightly, that a better approach than the withdrawal of civil works as a project item would have been to reduce the scope of the project, focussing on existing institu- tions (PCR, para. 3.07). 15. The PCR records (para. 3.08) that both the quality and pace of construction were very uneven, with project institutions being soundly and satisfactorily constructed in some cities but far below acceptable norms in others. The PCR attributes this state of affairs mainly to a deficient government system of awarding construction contracts allied to inadequate supervision by regional MPW directorates. 1/ It is not known whether the PTSs were all completed by December 31, 1981. In its comments on the report, the Government has said that all construc- tion under the project is planned to be completed by 1983 and gives rea- sons for the delays in project implementation (see Government comments, pages 16 and 18). -7- (b) Furniture and Equipment 16. As with civil works, furniture was ultimately not financed under the Loan, which had originally provided the small sum of $40,000 for furniture procurement. The PCR records that the furniture which was made for project schools is presently stored in a warehouse in Ankara awaiting completion of construction (PCR, para. 3.14). 17. Equipment was by far the major component of the project, accounting for 90% of loan funds at appraisal and 92% of funds disbursed. The PCR records that suitable equi_pment was procured efficiently and economically; the purchase of equipment was not continually rescheduled to coincide with the - delayed - completion dates of construction works because of rising prices and the need to complete its acquisition during the period of loan implementa- tion.!/ As a result, some of the equipment is still in storage and is deteriorating (PCR, para. 3.15). Table 5 of the PCR indicates that some 90% of the equipment has been delivered to schools with over $1.3 million worth of equipment in storage at the time of the Completion Mission, and thus running the risks of deterioration and pilferage. Costs and Disbursements 18. While the components financed by the Loan changed considerably during project implementation the project description was amended only slightly, with, for example, the project description always including the construction of the MTI and the six ATCs. The final costs of the project are thus still unknown as certain of the project elements are not expected to be completed before 1984. The PCR (para. 4.01) estimates the costs of the project when completed at: US$37.8 million involving a cost overrun of 111%. The audit understands this estimate is in current dollars; it is thus very tentative and the actual costs of the project may well differ substantially from this figure. 19. The total cost of equipment amounted to US$12.3 million, with the entire cost of equipment being financed under the Loan. The PCR has estimated the equipment costs per student place in the project institutions. These range from US$200 per student places in the ATCs to US$1,340 in the Technician Schools which the PCR considers reasonable granted the quantity and quality of the equipment provided (PCR, para. 4.04). 20. Disbursements lagged behind appraisal estimates due to delays in implementation. The PCR records that there were no problems in making dis- bursements, but this is somewhat of an over-simplification, as the following examples will show: 1/ The Government in its comments on the report has indicated that equipment allocations were insufficient because of the effects of inflation. See page 16. - 8 - (a) In 1980 the Bank was anxious to bring loan disbursements to a close. An equipment supplier wrote to the Bank in May 1980 asking that the Closing Date be extended further, pointing out that his firm (i) had already supplied some machines and stressing the need for compatibility (ii) had tried to hold down prices and (iii) could not supply by the Closing Date of September 30, 1980, but could supply in batches with final delivery in April 1981. The Bank replied saying that in the circumstances stated disbursements would not be possible. Quite apart from the fact that the Bank has often continued to disburse after an official Closing Date, in the event disbursements continued until June 1981, when the sum of $146,725.02 remaining in the Loan Account was cancelled, and financing equipment from this supplier would not have caused a problem. (b) In June 1980, the Government was informed by the Bank that with the signature of a certain equipment contract the equipment category was overcommitted. A week later the Bank informed the supplier concerned that ample funds were available. Because of these con- fused signals, the original contract with this supplier for 24 lathes was unilaterally reduced by the Borrower to one of ten..1/ During this time the Technical Assistance category of the Loan was standing largely unused. Shortly afterwards, the Bank suggested to the Borrower that funds could be transferred from the technical assistance category to the equipment category and this was done. Had this been done earlier there would have been no need to reduce the equipment supplied under this contract. Bank Supervision and Completion Reporting 21. The project was supervised by 20 supervision missions with reason- able staff continuity (PCR, para. 3.17). Frnm October 1973 to the end of 1975 the project was graded a "major problem project" because of the serious delays in project implementation and the lack of progress in particular of the project's civil works component. These civil works problems appear never to have been completely resolved. 22. The PCR has reported (para. 3.19) that the difficulties which arose with civil works design and construction were for the most part beyond the control of the Project Unit and the Bank. While this is true as far as the 1/ The Regional Office states that "the contract in question was signed and approved by the Bank in July 1980, two months before the Closing Date. Every indication was that the equipment category was indeed exhausted and the Bank suggested that Technical Assistance funds (hitherto retained by the Ministry of Education) be reallocated to the equipment category. This was done. The Bank also informed the Ministry of Education of their responsibility to meet any cost overruns. Despite the availability of funds and a further extension of the Closing Date the supplier and the Ministry of Education had agreed on a reduced order." Project Unit was concerned, it appears that the Bank could have done more to try to move along construction of civil works. Following supervision missions there was only one occaoion - in mid-1974 - when senior Bank management expressed its concern regarding lack of progress..L/ Even in this case the letter was sent to the Ministry of Education rather than the Ministry of Public Works, where the problem resided, or to the State Planning Office which would have been in a better position than the Ministry of Education to press for action on civil works construction. The letters from the Bank following supervision gave generally little indication of the serious concern of the Bank regarding project progress. 23. Supervision reporting was generally of a good standard, but supervi- sion reports from mid-1974 onwards generally gave no indication of places visited and persons met, thus making it difficult to judge whether the impor- tant problems involving the MPW regarding civil works were receiving attention or not. Supervision reports were generally over-optimistic, saying that improvement was just around the corner, a fairly common feature in such reports. A mid-1979 supervision report stated that financing of equipment for institutions not yet completed was conditional on satisfactory progress being made in construction. The audit has been unable to discover the basis for this statement. The letters written following supervision show generally no sign that the MPW had been consulted or requested to move more rapidly on the construction of civil works. It is also notable that, although 16 of the 20 supervision missions included either an architect or a facilities planner, nevertheless, project school construction did not proceed as planned. On the positive side, the letters to the Government usually included an annex, a fairly detailed account of the status of project implementation taken directly from the supervision report. This report to borrowers on project status is much more detailed than most Regional letters to Borrowers and deserves to be made more use of especially as it does not involve a greater expenditure of staff time than is involved in putting the original supervision report together. 24. The timing of the Completion Mission left something to be desired. The consultants who prepared the PCR were in the field for twelve days in December 1980, in respect of a project where loan disbursements were completed only in June 1981, where only one of the seven new project institutions had been completed (PCR, Summary, para. ix) and where it was expected that all the (12) Practical Trade Schools would be completed in 1981 (PCR, para. 3.01). In this, as in other cases, it would have been preferable to mount the Completion 1/ The Region notes that 90% of the supervision missions included an architect or facilities planner, indicative of its best efforts to expedite construction. The delays in construction were then frequently referenced by Country Programs missions to the country. Given the prevailing climate, the Region is not convinced that escalation of the construction issue would have resolved the problem. - 10 - Mission some six months after final disbursement (i.e., December 1981) rather than an estimated six months before final disbursement, especially as in several previous education audit reports the comment has been made that in education projects the completion mission visit has come too early to judge project outcomes even in a preliminary manner../ III. EDUCATIONAL IMPACT 25. Though substantially completed, the MTI has never been opened: equipment bought under the Loan for it is in storage (PCR, para. 3.15, Table 5) and serious deterioration of both structure and installations is taking place (PCR, para. 3.29). Four staff trained under project fellowships to form the nucleus of the MTI faculty have obtained employment elsewhere. The educational impact of this project item has thus been nil. 26. During the Board discussion of this project, the rural exodus was discussed as one of the major problems of our time, and the ATCs were described as an innovative idea to try to respond to it. Only one of the ATCs included in the project--that at Bursa--had been completed at the time of the Completion Mission. The PCR records (para. 3.24) that the 80 students enrolled did not fall into the category for which the ATCs were originally intended viz. rural migrants. The impression gained by the completion mission was that the original concept of the ATC as an institution to train persons migrating to the large cities from the rural areas was no longer a high priority of the Government, and that the ATCs when they are completed will be used as Practical Trade Schools. The PCR endorses this ultimate utilization (para. 3.25) but leaves unanswered the question of what is happening to the rural migrants the ATCs were originally expected to serve. The educational impact of this project component has thus been minimal. Most of the equipment procured under the Loan for it is in storage. 27. Most project loan funds were spent on equipment for the Technician Schools: The PCR deals well with this item in its para 3.21. It records that this equipment is well used--up to six or even seven days a week in some schools--and effectively maintained. The updating of curricula envisaged at 1/ The Regional Office states that its goal is to carry out completion mis- sions as soon as feasible, once disbursements are close to be completed. It notes that "at the time of the Completion Mission, all contracts for equipment had been signed (a deadline of October 30, 1980 had been agreed). Delaying completion by a year would also have infringed the six-month rule and not led to any appreciably different assessment of the project. Finally, resources for supervision had already been cut off sometime before, in May 1977." The Region states that it has been obliged to divert 58.2 staff weeks (to this project) from other activities in the period May 1977 through the present time (June 1982). - 11 - appraisal has been only partially achieved because of the almost total col- lapse of the curriculum committees during the period of political unrest.1/ The project schools at the time of the PCR mission had an enrollment of nearly 5,000 compared with the appraisal estimates of 5,500 but enrollment was expected to increase as calm is restored to the country. Thus the educational impact of this project component appears to have been considerable even taking into account the difficult country situation. During the Board discussion, it was thought that there may be problems of teacher supply; these appear not to have materialized. 28. Equipment for 12 Practical Trade Schools to be constructed with Government funds was included in the project. At the time of the PCR, eleven of these new PTSs were completed and in operation. The Government attaches much higher priority to PTSs than it does to ATCs, as is probably evidenced by the much better record of school construction, and it appears that the project equipment is being well used in the PTSs, although the PCR gives no specific details. 29. With regard t.o the remaining project elements, the PCR records that the MTTTC, the ESEPC, and the EFRTC are outstanding national institutions whose operations were significantly improved by the project inputs (PCR, Summary para. vii). Further details are given in the PCR (paras. 3.26-3.28, 3.32-3.36). 30. In sum, it appears that the project impact has been mixed--weak in the areas where school construction was involved, and strong where the project concentrated on the supply of equipment to existing institutions. Any future Bank lending for the education sector in Turkey should take full account of this experience, and should be preceded by a further look at the development of the institutions assisted under this project. IV. CONCLUSIONS 31. This project, the only Bank-assisted education project in Turkey to date, was geared towards the improvement of managerial and technical and vocational education. The Loan financed mainly equipment for both existing schools and new schools, with construction to be financed both from loan and government funds. While equipment procurement was handled expeditiously and the equipment provided is being well utilized in existing and newly con- structed schools, the project encountered severe delays in the construction of new institutions, so much so that at the time of the Completion Mission only 1/ The Government has indicated in its comments on the report that all provincial and national advisory committees are now functioning. See page 16. - 12 - one of the seven institutions whose construction was to be aided under the project had been completed. The construction of project institutions is not expected to be completed until 1984. An intensive Bank supervision effort, with architects or facilities planners included in 80% of the supervision missions, was not sufficient to resolve the problems of construction, which needed attention at a higher level in the Bank. Because of construction delays, while 90% of the equipment supplied under the project has been delivered to schools and is being effectively used, about 10% or over US$1.3 million worth is in storage awaiting the completion of construction of the facilities for which it is intended. 32. Experience with the project has shown: (i) where a project involves cooperation between different Ministries it is essential to have an adequate coordi- nating mechanism. In this case the project unit, located in the Ministry of Education, was unable to fill this role (paras. 6-8); (ii) the elements of the project involving low disbursement percentages and small loan amounts were eliminated from the loan early in project implementation (para. 9); (iii) the technical assistance component, which was not fully subscribed to by the Borrower, was not satisfactorily imple- mented (paras. 10-12); (iv) the Bank did not give sufficiently early consideration to a transfer from a category of expenditure which was unlikely to be fully used to another which was almost exhausted (para. 20); and (v) letters to the Borrower following supervision missions included a detailed annex on project status taken directly from the supervision report. This procedure deserves to be used more widely (para. 23). - 13 - T. C. COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER MILLI EdITIM BAKANLII (Page 1 of 5) tiletme ve Donatim Daire Baqkan1ig SAYI I 822b82.SAT. KONU : IBRD Raporuna M.E.B.0Cerabi. 27 Mayis 1W82 Operations Evaluation Department Enternational Bank For Reconstruction and Development 1818 H Steet N.\W. Washington D.C. 20433 U.S.A Dear Sirs, Ref : IBRD Loan 748 TU Draft Project Performance ludit Repart We are enclasing here with a report consists the view of the Ministry of National Education With kind Regards Y raFauthfully Tevftk E enc : One Report  15 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER (Page 2 of 5) ViEVI OF TIEi MiNISTRY OF NATIONAL ELUCATION ON YOUR DRAFT PFROX"CT 1EFTPORMANCE AUDIT REPORT The Ministry of National Education reviewed your Project Performance Audit memorandum and Project Complation report dated june 1981, Our point of view is shown below SUMMARY OF TI PROJECT-: As you know, the Loan agreement consists of provision of equipment for existing 32 Technician Schools, the design, construction, furnishing and equiping of 12 Practical Trade Schools and 6 Adult Training Centers, provision of equipment for a Technical Teacher Training College at Ankara, The Educational Film Radio and Television Center and Educational Bids Production Center, The design, construction, furnishing and equiping of a Management Training Istitute a Gebze. The Loan agreement also consists of curriculum development for the Technial Teacher Training College, for Boys modernizing production technigues in the Educational Dids Production, Center, establishment of the National Advisory Committee on training technicians and crafstmen and establishment of advisory committees for each of the Technician Schools. Also set a minimum age of 14 years for admission to all practical Trade Schools are the sub- ject of the Loan agreement. The Ministry of National Education generally agrees with the Bank view on the evaluation of the First Education project under the Loan 748 TU which was extended to Turkey dated March :1.1981 Necessary clarifications related to this project implementtation are given below. A.EQUIRJENT FROCURET.NT : a. Preparation of the equipment procurement specifications initiated September 50,1971. For all technical schools, specification catalogues were completed and forwar- ded to the technical schools to obtain their view, then version made in to English, Later submitted to the Bank for approval. Purchasing the equipment, for technical institutions which covered by the project was based on the international biding, initiated in 1974, US 9 12.437.800. disbursed under the Loan for equipment procurement, some equipment which provided to the Management Training Institute has not been delivered, yet becaused of slow progress in Management Training Enstitute building construction. Some equipment has been delivered to the Schools and being affectively used. - 16 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER (Page 3 of 5) Training equipment and office furniture for operation of the Management Training Institute, will be provided in the near futur by Turkish government. c. 1969 was the preparation year of the project, allocations and estimates were made for all project institutions. But what kind of equipment would be procured was not known. Later project unit made new requirement, but allocations were not sufficient because of influence of the inflation. d. Equipment procurement programs were arranged in three phases. First phase was for existing project Schools. Second phase planned for schools which the building construction been completed. Third phase was, planned for equipment which was not procured under the previous two phases. Also, procurement was planned on limited remaining amount in the Loan account. In 1979 purchasing activities were slow down, due to the construction and storage problems. B. CONSTRUCTION : a. As you know, the Ministry of Public Works under 1969 Legislation, had the respansibility for the construction of all post-primary institution in Turkey. This legislation, as seen, was completed two years earlier then the project agreement. b. 1[hile the loan agreement was signed site selection for 6 Adult Training centers, 12 Practical Trade schools and Management Training Institute was not completed. In the mean time above mentioned institutions were individually under the responsibility of the general Directorates which had their own civil works program. To give priority to the project instituion construction took long time. c. Recently, constructions which have not been completed yet planned to be completed in 1983 and necessary fund made available ih the this year. d. In the Ministry of National Education newly established (Construction and Real estate Department.) All construction of school building will be supervised and their maintenance will be carried out by this departement. C. EIUCATiONAL ASPECTS a. In your report you point-out that National and Provincial Advisory cammittees which have been set up earlier, recently does not completely fulfill its role. Hower all established provincial and National Advisory Committees are functioning. The Technical Advisory Cammittee had a meeting dated may 13, 1982 Minister of the National Education his excellency Hasan Sa lam was the chairman of that meeting. - 17 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER (Page 4 of 5) c. The 1.inistry planning not only Technical schools curriculum development also all the similar schools are under the planning programs. Ministry coordinates with the Advisory Committee and General Directorate which has relation with this subject. c. As you discribed .in your report the technical assistance component was not implemented as planned at the beginning. To operate the newly purchased Incodustrial, electric and pneumatic, machinary after Banks approval, 29 technical teachers were trained abroad, in Italy, Germany and Switzerland, under this component fund. I.inistryj of National Jducation aims to provide equipment and teacher assistance to the institutions. d. Technical Teacher Training College training program, instead of 4+1 year was planned in 4 years. Therefore, new technical teachers will be graduated earlier than 4+1 years. All technical schools will have their teachers. Recently, under the new legislations, Technical Teacher Training College has been planned to be established as a faculty. D. GEEITRAL VIES a. For financing equipment procurement and operating the technical schools funds to establish a project unit were not necessary. Because in the Ministry there is a Department for operation and equipment procurement. b. According to the Loan agreement (Schedule 5 ) establishment a project unit, and respansibility of the project unit are clarified. However, Turkish Legislation system is not givG to the project staff a position suitable their responsibilities which discribed in the Loan agreement. Project staff and sup?orting personnels worked hard in this Project. c. Recently, Project unit attached to the operation and Equipment Procurement Department of the Ministry of National Education. d. The project achievement realized with coordination of some ather general Directorate institutions which are situated out of the capital city. c. Cunclustions part of the report, section (xii ) Bank Suggesed "that in retrospect, it would probably have been preferable to establish a separate small project in the Ministry of Industry." The Ministry of Education does not agree with the Bank view. Because the Ministry has the responsibility of all the education system in Turkey. Recently, with the other Ministries and industry a coordination system planned also. - 18 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER (Page 5 of 5) f. Reasons of delay of the project implementation are clarified below; I. New construction site problems were not solved and equipment procurement list was not prepared before agreement. II. Project staffs positions was not established properly and project fund was not used for employment. III. In the world and in Turkey unexpected economic changes and inflation were influencing factor. IV. Beween initiation of the project dated September 30,1971 and closing of the project dated March 31,1981 official administration authorities were changed several time. g. Turkish government as a Borrower gives importance to expansion of the technical knowledge and seriously took all the responsibility. With kind Regards. Sincerely yQurs Tevfik ERIEN - 19 - THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY (LOAN 748-TU) FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT June 1981 (Revised January 1982) Education and Manpower Development Division Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region  - 21 - SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A Bank loan (Loan 748-TU) for US$13.5 million was extended to Turkey in 1971 to initiate: (a) improved higher-level management education; (b) an expansion of higher-level technician education; (c) improved secondary level science and technical education; (d) improved radio and television programs for primary schools; and (e) a skill formation program for adults. The project provided for the equipping of: (a) 32 technician schools; (b) 12 practical trade schools (PTSs); (c) the Men's Technical Teacher Training College (MTTTC); (d) the Educational Science Equipment Production Center (ESEPC); and (e) the Educational Film, Radio and Television Center (EFRTC). It also provided for the construction, furnishing and equipping of: (a) six adult vocational training centers (ATCs); and (b) one management training institute (MTI) and for technical assistance for the MTI, the technical and vocational schools, the ESEPC and the EFRTC. ii. The completion mission visited 11 institutions equipped under the project. It also visited the sites of four project institutions which are being constructed and equipped. Through discussions with administrators and teachers and representatives of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), an assessment was made of the project objectives agreed wi-th the Borrower at the time of appraisal and negotiations. iii. While the Progect Implementation Unit (PIU) provided valuable assistance, particulary with data gathering, its participation in the evaluation process was restricted by a lack of experienced staff. The Project Director who had been associated with the project for the past five years had only recently retired. Wherever possible, the mission involved the representatives of the MOE and MPW in the assessment and evaluation of the project. iv. Although the Loan was almost totally disbursed by the final Closing Date of June 11, 1981, the Borrower's share of the project was not complete. Early in 1974, the Government requested and the Bank agreed that the civil works be withdrawn as a project item to be funded from the Loan. The Government undertook to construct all buildings from its own funds. It is estimated that approximately US$14.7 million will be required, principally for completion of civil works of the project institutions scheduled by the Government for late 1984. The Government has already incurred a total expenditure of about US$10.6 million on the construction of these project institutions and is committed to complete their construction. v. The major responsibility for this situation rests with the Borrower, who delayed almost four years from the date of Loan effectiveness before taking positive action to launch the project, although it must be recognized that site selection and acquisition, and equipment list - 22 - preparation were taking place during this period. In defense of the Borrower, it must be stated that economic and political situations in Turkey during the entire 1970's made expeditious project implementation difficult. With stronger action on the part of the Government, however, many of the delays could have been avoided. A major factor contributing to the initial delays was the failure to establish early a project unit, adequately staffed and with sufficient authority to enable it to deal effectively with all ministries, agencies and individuals involved in the project. Even towards the end of its allotted span, the Project Unit was never fully staffed and, although the Director appreciated the fact that the Unit's responsibilities went beyond the production of lists and procurement of equipment, he was never given the authority to effectively implement all aspects of the project. Construction was the responsibility of the MPW, and curriculum development that of the respective directorates in the MOE. Little supervision of the civil works or of the "software" components of the project was carried out by the Unit and its dialogue with the MPW, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the State Planning Organization (SPO) and even within the MOE, itself, was, at best, sporadic. vi. Bank supervision missions were aware of this situation and repeatedly brought to the notice of the Undersecretary of the MOE the requirements of Article III, Section 3.02, and Schedule 5 of the Loan Agreement (i.e. that the Borrower would establish and maintain the PIU; appoint qualified and experienced staff; and give the PIU overall powers relative to implementation). Although, in response, certain temporary improvements were made in the Unit's staffing levels, the Director was never given the authority he needed. vii. Despite this, many positive results have been attained. Existing institutions have been strengthened, curricula have been developed, people have been trained and new schools are being constructed. Given a few years of political calm and economic stability, all of the original objectives are likely to be realized. The MTTTC, the ESEPC and the EFRTC are outstanding national institutions whose operations were significantly improved by the project inputs. viii. Over the last two decades, Turkey followed a development strategy based on rapid growth and structural transformation of the economy towards increased industrialization. However, increases in employment were marginal, with the result that a relatively high proportion of the labor torce is still in agriculture and the rate at which industrial jobs are being created is low. Forecasts of trained manpower shortages, made at the time of appraisal, have, therefore, not fully materialized at this time. Qualitative objectives have been fully met for those existing project institutions which were to be strengthened by the project. ix. The civil works component of the project has been and is being poorly executed. The construction of the new project institutions was commenced at different times between 1974 and 1979. As a result, no new project institutions were either constructed or fully equipped by the - 23 - original Closing Date, september 30, 1976. At the time of the completion mission, only one of the seven new project institutions had been constructed. If the project is completed in late 1984, as now expected, the overall period of project implementation will have been 13 years, compared with the 4 years envisaged at appraisal. The attendant cost overrun of Government-financed construction is likely to be about US$21.0 million or 388% over the appraisal estimate of US$4.3 million, including contingencies. However, only 50% of this overrun is attributable to poor execution since the buiLdings, when completed, will contain about 70,990m2 of total gross floor area instead of the 35,395m2 financed by the project. This two-fold increase in the gross floor area was the result of an increase in planned enrollment capacity from 3,200 to 6,300 students. The main reason for the cost overrun, however, was Government inertia during the initial years of project implementation, which delayed the bulk of the construction work so that it coincided with a period of rampant inflation (1976-80), during the latter two years of which civil disorders and the difficult economic situation seriously disrupted construction work. OthEr contributing factors were: the Project Unit's lack of authority to supervise civil works and related activities; and delays in selecting, obtaining and surveying sites. x. The accommodation schedules of the project institutions, as now envisaged, are economical. If the present cost estimates prove realistic, the overall unit capital costs per place in 1984 (based on 6,000 places-- the approximate enrollment of the revised capacities on a double shift basis) will be Us$3,500 for the adult training centers (ATCs) and about US$5,900 per trainee for the KTI (assuming 1,000 trainees per year). These costs reflect current experience (plus inflation) and are considered reasonable. xi. Equipment and furniture procurement presented no major difficulties. The equip-ment and furniture are of good quality and meet appraisal specifications although a cause for concern is the fact that the equipment procured for new institutions, on which construction is lagging, is being held in storage and is suffering deterioration. However, purchase of this equipment could not reasonably be delayed to coincide with completion of construction given the necessity of completing its acquisition before the final Closing Date of the Loan. Conclusions xii. The project was initially well-conceived and planned although the planned implementation schedule of four years (Chart 1) was optimistic. Nevertheless, had early preparation work on site acquisition, building design and preparation of bid documents been expeditiously executed, the project could largely have been completed on time. All of the existing institutions assisted by the project have proved to be outstandingly successful in realizing their qualitative objectives. Only the new institutions--the MTI and the ATCs--have encountered problems. In retrospect, it would probably have been preferable to establish a separate, small project unit in thE Ministry of Industry (MUI)1/--in which the concept 1/ The Government does not agree with this view. See page 17. - 24 - of the ATCs originated, and where the objectives of the MTI's training programs for industrial managers would be realized, rather than to give the entire responsibility for the project to the Unit in the MOE. This view is strengthened by the fact that the MOE delegated its responsibility for the MTI to the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TuBiTAK) without, however, disengaging itself from responsibility for overall project completion. xiii. If other education projects should materialize in Turkey, they should aim at strengthening existing institutions and avoid financing of physical facilities in view of the severe problems of the public sector construction industry - unless the recommended improvements to the construction industry and, in particular, with regard to education facilities (para. 3.13) are implemented. Recommendations xiv. Design and construction constitute not only a major bottleneck in the efficient implementation of education projects in Turkey, but reflect industry-wide problems in public sector construction. It is recommended that the overall construction sector be the object of review and improvement. The Ministry of Education is fully aware of this problem (para. 3.12) and would appreciate Bank assistance. xv. Among the major issues to be addressed in such a sectoral review, some apply specifically to educational facilities. The mission concludes that the following actions on the part of the Government would lead to improvements in school construction: (a) the involvement of Turkish architects in private practice in the planning, design and construction of school buildings; (b) the establishment of the standards and systems approach to educational and architectural planning and design and to school building construction; (c) the improvement of the design and construction of educational facilities through an in-depth evaluation of the current process of design and construction; (d) the strengthening of the role of educators kadministrators, planners and principals and institutional staff) in developing a school planning, design and building policy; (e) the development of maintenance standards and procedures for school buildings and grounds; and (f) the development of procedures for cost and quality control of school construction for the entire cycle of planning, design and construction. - 25 - I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 In accordance with terms of reference dated December 5, 1980, a mission comprising two consultants, Messrs. E. H. Chittleburgh (technical educator) and J. E. Kulski (architect/planner), visited Turkey from December 8-19, 1980 to carry out a project completion review of the first education project in Turkey financed through Loan 748-TU in June 1971. The major objectives of the project were. (i) to improve the quality of and access to vocational, technical and management education and its relevance to the needs of an expanding and changing economy; (ii) extend the use of new instructional media; and (iii) increase the domestic production of educational scientific equipment. 1.02 The mission was to assess the actual realization of the project objectives and targets (physical, financial and educational) as they relate to the planned achievements set out at the time of appraisal and negotiations. Due to the limited time assigned to the completion exercise and to the widely dispersed nature of the project institutions, detailed analysis was restricted to a selected number of schools and establishments, with emphasis on those which were existing at the time of Loan effectiveness. It was felt that only in these institutions could a meaningful evaluation of the qualitative objectives be made. As dealt with more fully in other-sections of this report, those schools and institutes planned for construction during the project's lifetime suffered a succession of setbacks which resulted in only one of the seven being completed at the time of the project completion mission. 1.03 The completion study was carried out through a review of records and reports available both in the Bank and in Turkey, by visits to selected institutions and by discussions with officials in various ministries and educational establishments. The Borrower's Project Unit provided valuable assistance in furnishing data, but its participation in the completion study process was restricted by a lack of experienced staff. The Project Unit Director who had been associated with the project for the past five years had recently retired. Wherever possible, the mission involved the representatives of the MOE and the MPW in the exercise, in an attempt to familiarize them with Bank procedures and to enable them to play a greater role in any possible future project completion review. II. PROJECT BACKGROUND Formulation of the Project 2.01 In July/August 1969, a UNESCO project identification mission visited Turkey to assist the Government with the identification of an education project suitable for Bank financing, as a result of which the Government made a request to the Bank's reconnaissance mission (March 1970) for a loan amounting to US$21.6 million. This was subsequently reduced by mutual agreement during appraisal to a loan of US$13.5 million to assist in meeting an estimated total project cost of US$17.9 million. 2.02 At the time of appraisal (September/October 1970), industry and construction were seen as the fastest growing sectors of the economy, with an annual growth rate of - 26 - 10% compared with 7% for the economy as a whole. Based on an expected continuation of this growth rate through the 1970's, severe shortages of technically trained personnel, particularly at the technician, skilled worker and craftsman levels, were forecast. Projected shortfalls of 90,000 industrial technicians and 550,000 skilled workers and craftsmen by 1977 were quoted in the appraisal report and accordingly most of the project objectives were aimed at assisting the Government to expand and improve the system of technical/vocational education. It is of interest to note, particularly in the light of subsequent developments, that the SPO expressed its priorities to the appraisal mission as: (a) the expansion and improvement of management education in Turkey through the creation of a new MTI; and (b) the establishment of new ATCs in industrial urban locations to provide pre-employment skill training to persons migrating to the cities from rural areas. 2.03 The project, as finally appraised, consisted of the following items: Table 1: PROJECT BREAKDOWN BY COST LT (Millions) US$ (Millions) % of Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Total Technician Schools 6.60 75.15 81.75 0.44 5.01 5.45 30.4 Adult Training Centers 39.79 24.73 64.52 2.65 1.65 4.30 24.0 Practical Trade Schools 2.94 33.66 36.60 0.20 2.24 2.44 13.6 Educational Science Equipment Production Center 0.90 10.80 11.70 0.06 0.72 0.78 4.4 Management Training Institute 7.55 2.82 10.37 0.50 0.19 0.69 3.8 Men's Technical Teacher Training College 0.61 7.02 7.63 0.04 0.47 0.51 2.9 Educational Film, Radio and Television Center 0.30 2.85 3.15 0.02 0.19 0.21 1.2 Technical Assistance 1.99 7.97 9.96 0.13 0.53 0.66 3.7 Contingencies: Physical (6%) 4.98 8.25 13.23 0.34 0.55 0.89 5.0 Price (13%) 12.93 16.80 29.73 0.86 1.12 1.98 11.0 Total Project Cost 78.59 190.05 268.64 5.24 12.67 17.91 100.0 Interest and other charges during construction 12.45 0.83 TOTAL 202.50 13.50 - 27 - The Socio-Economic Setting 2.04 Overall, Turkish economic growth during the 1960's and most of tie 1970's was good compared with other developing countries. GDP increased at an average annual rate of 6.4% during the First Plan Period (1963-67), 6.7% during the Second Plan Period (1968-72) and 7.2% during the Third Plan Period (1973-77). This growth rate, moreover, was achieved without the availability of large amounts of domestic petroleum or other valuable natural resources and within a basically democratic political framework. In the 1960's, development occurred with only moderate reliance on external assistance but, during the 1970's, it was supported by large increases in workers' remittances from abroad. This rapid economic growth was accompanied by significant social changes. Population growth remained fairly high (2.5% per annum), but since GDP also grew, there was a relatively fast increasC in per capita income. There has remained, however, a large rural/urban gap in incomes and standards of living, as well as large regional inequalities within the country as a whole. 2.05 Government policies of active state participation in most sectors of the economy helped to cushion temporarily the inflationary effects of the oil crisis of 1974. Subsidies on vital foodstuffs and fuels kept the annual rate of inflation low compared with many other developing countries. A change of policy between 1977 and 1978, however, triggered a rapid rise in the rate cf inflation, which, in turn, increased the cost of labor and building materials dramatically. The resulting explosion in construction costs accounts for many of the problems encountered by the project during implementation (see Table 2). Table 2: PRICE ESCALATION OF BUILDING-RELATED COSTS IN [RE 1970's Annual Rate of Inflation in Wholesale Index of Index of Cost Price Index Construction of building Year (in percent) Labor Materials 1970 100 100 1971 110 124 1972 - 119 140 1973 20.6 146 148 1974 30.0 192 146 1975 9.9 268 259 1976 15.7 327 261 1977 23.9 472 313 1978 52.6 670 496 1979 65.0 966 810 1980 105.0 - - - 28 - 2.06 Because of the series of economic crises and political instability that occurred in Turkey, changes of administration took place regularly at two yearly intervals. In the ME, for example, there were five changes of Undersecretary during the project lifetime, resulting in a lack of continuity in the management of the various components, and, in some instances, in changes in policy which affected the project outcome. The single most debilitating influence on the project has been the political instability during 1978 and 1979, with many schools and educational institutions becoming focal points for the activities of the separate factions with parents reluctant to send their children to school. This, together with the deteriorating economic situation, resulted in serious curtailment of construction of new educational facilities. With the advent of political calm following the most recent change of Government in September 1980, the system is now slowly returning to normal as confidence is restored. Government support for the education and health sectors, originally planned to be only 2.4% of public sector investment in 1981, due to the political situation, has been raised to the more realistic level of 8.2%. However, this figure is still low compared with allocations up to 1967 (Annex 6). Project Objectives 2.07 At the time of appraisal, an urgent economic need was seen to be the improvement of productivity and cost-effectiveness of industry in parallel with its continued expansion. Manpower forecasts, available at the time, indicated a heavy future demand for managers, engineering technicians and skilled workers. Of particular concern was the shortage of technicians which was leading to an uneconomic use of professional engineers in technician employment. In addition, one of the features of the employment situation, viz, rural under-employment and the movement of labor from rural to urban areas was seen as creating a demand for new training facilities capable of providing re-orientation and skill-formation programs for such migrants prior to finding employment in the urban industrial environment. 2.08 tanagement education in Turkey was also seen as being too theoretical in character and of poor quality. The need for a neI ATI was identified, which would spread modern techniques, train managers and consultants for state enterprises, train young businessmen for the private sector and offer upgrading training programs for existing managers with special emphasis on business applications of data processing. 2.09 The quality of science teaching was considered to be poor, mainly due to lack of suitable equipment in science laboratories in high schools. The ESEPC was already functioning in Ankara but there existed a need to expand its production and maintenance facilities. - 29 - 2.10 In line with M0E policies, the EFRTC in Ankara was to play an increasingly important role in the development of education in Turkey by producing audio-visual materials and educational radio and television programs for use in prLmary and secondary schools, particularly those in rural areas. Further, there was a need to expand adult education and the center was judged to b, inadequately equipped to take on these growing responsibilities. 2.11 Finally, in order to assist all the project institutions with the design and introduction of new curricula, teaching methods and production techniques, a program of technical assistance was envisaged consisting of a mix of expert services and fellowship provisions. Due regard was paid to the availability and suitability of other bilateral or multinational assistance available to Turkey when arriving at this conclusion. Project Items 2.12 Based on the above objectives, the following institutions were to be assisted and technical assistance provided (Tables 3 and 4). Table 3: PROJECT BREAKDOWN BY INSTITUTION Construction and Furniture Number Staff Equipment Type of School or of Insti- Student Boarding Housing Student Institution tutions Places Places Units Places Technician Schools 32 - - - 5,500 Adult Training Centers (new) 6 1,500 1,500 /a 6 1,500 Practical Trade Schools 12 - - - 3,200 Management Training Institute (new) 1 200 200 3 /b 200 Technical Teacher College 1 - - - 800 TOTAL 52 1,700 1,700 9 11,200 Educational Science Equipment Production Center: equipment, materials and ten mobile units. Educational Film, Radio and Television Center: equipment for additional program production and for training program producers. /a The Centers would operate on a double shift basis with a total enrollment of 3,000; boarding facilities would accommodate half of the trainees. /b In addition, a dormitory for 30 servicing staff. - 30 - Table 4: PROJECT-FINANCED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE Man-Years of Man-Years of Estimated Cost Institutions Expert Services Fellowships US$ Management Training Institute 5 20 500,000 Technician Schools 3 - 105,000 Educational Science Equip- ment Production Center 1 4 59,000 TOTAL 9 24 664,000 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Physical Aspects Overview 3.01 Project implementation was expected to be completed by September 30, 1975 and the Loan fully disbursed by September 30, 1976. Due to Government delays in the selection and acquisition of sites during the initial years of project implementation, the construction of the new project institutions commenced at different times between 1974 and 1979. Because of other delays, the installation of equipment in existing institutions commenced only in 1976 (Chart 1). As a result, none of the project institutions was either constructed or equipped by the original Closing Date of the Loan, September 30, 1976, when only about 45% of project funds had been disbursed, 6% being accounted for by interest and other charges and 39% by equipment procurement. After 1976, the delays in project implementation were caused by rampant inflation, civil disorders and shortages of local funds which continuously disrupted progress of construction work which was further aggravated by legal disputes between contractors and the Government. The Closing Date was extended four times (initially to September 30, 1978, then, in quite rapid succession, to March 31, 1980, September 30, 1980, and finally to March 31, 1981 with, however, all contracts to be signed by October 30, 1980). At the time of the completion mission, all 32 technician schools, the MTTTC, the ESEPC and the EFRTC had been fully equipped and completed. However, all PTSs are expected to be completed in 1981; the MTI in 1984; and all of the ATCs by 1984. Actual implementation of all project items is now expected to take 13 years, as compared with the 4 years originally envisaged. On June 11, 1981, 98.9% of the Loan was disbursed leaving US$146,725 to be cancelled. - 31 - Project Management Performance 3.02 Loan 748-TU was the first Bank Group education project in Turkey. In order to ensure that the project would be executed expeditiously and efficiently, the Loan Agreement (Schedule 5) clearly defined the responsibilities for sound administration of the project by a specifically created Project Unit in the MOE. The Project Unit was made responsible for administration and coordination of all component parts of the project. In accordance with the Loan Agreement, the Borrower agreed to appoint a Project Director whose functions would enable hiu to exercise overall supervision of the project and who would be given powers to deal with other ministries and government services as might be necessary for project implementation. However, in 1969 legislation had been passed which gave the responsibility for the construction of all post-primary educational institutions in Turkey to the MPW. Under this arrangement, the MOE selects the sites for its institutions and forwards the program requirements to the KPW, including layouts of workshop equipment. The central MPW determines the areas required based at least in part on the funds that have been provided by the SPO, and designs the schools (which are approved by the MOE), prepares construction documents and forwards the documents to the regional MPW directorates for bidding and supervision of the construction. 3.03 The failure of the Borrower to assign to the Project Director, the necessary powers, as described in Section 3.02 of the Loan Agreement, and the delay in execution of civil works by the MPW, has to a large degree been responsible for the inefficient and uneconomical execution of the project. The limited powers granted to the Project Director made it difficult for him to deal adequateLy with other ministries, in particular, the MPW, the SPO, the TuBiTAK--attached to the Prime Minister's office--and with the MOF. The Bank's supervision missions urged the MOE to take necessary action to expedite construction. The MOE was unwilling to draft a new legislative deccee relating to school construction arguing that it considered that such a decree was unlikely to pass through all the legislative stages, given the small majorities of the ruling governments. The single component of the project for which the Project Unit was given full responsibility--procurement of equipment--was successfully executed. Sites 3.04 The appraisal report indicated that all sites had been selected but that three remained to be acquired. A covenant in the Loan Agreement required that this occur within one year of signing, but the process was not complete until 1975 (Chart 1). This delay was partly responsible for delays in project implementation during the initial years. Most of the sites for project institutions appear to have been well-chosen; the selected sites are well-located and adequately suited to the requirements of the specific building program--with one notable exception, i.e., the Balgat PTS in Ankara, which appears to be located outside its student catchment area. The mission was informed by the principal that this is the reason why the school is presently operating at only 15% capacity. The - 32 - site is on a steep hill, with some of its academic facilities at the top, and the remainder at the bottom, creating serious difficulties for school operation and administration. Evaluation of School Building Designs 3.05 The design for the MTI was developed by architects of TuBiTAK. Originally, it was proposed that a competition be held in order to involve as many architects in private practice as possible and to arrive at the most imaginative design, but this idea was eventually dropped. Although initially there was no single authority implementing the design and construction of the Institute, and in spite of the fact that a number of government agencies and even individuals from the Turkish Management Association were involved, the design of the building appears to be adequate. Since, as of this date, there is still no charter for the Institute, leading to uncertainty as to who will finally administer it, the building remains unfinished and unoccupied, and it is both premature and impossible to fully evaluate its design. The structure (Annex 5), however, appears straight-forward. 3.06 The ATCs were designed by architects in the MPW together with some technical assistance from Bank architects. Input from MOE educationists was marginal for the reasons mentioned above. The designs appear simple and generally economical, but again, final evaluation of their success must await user response. The designs of the PTSs are also the work of the architects in the MPW. Construction 3.07 Early in 1974, the Government requested that civil works be withdrawn as a project item to be funded from the Loan and that the Government be entrusted to construct all buildings from its own funds. This measure was suggested since the Government wanted to use the proceeds of the Loan to cover mounting foreign exchange costs of equipment. In May 1974, the Bank agreed, and funds allocated for civil works and consultant fees were reallocated to the Unallocated Category. Though the justification was sound, the Bank naturally lost some leverage in influencing timely completion of the construction of buildings. Perhaps a better approach would have been to reduce the scope of the project, focussing on the existing institutions. 3.08 The quality and pace of construction were very uneven. While in some cities, such as Bursa and Izmir, project institutions were soundly and satisfactorily constructed, the quality of construction in other localities was found to be substandard and far below acceptable norms for school buildings in Turkey. In general, the quality of construction of buildings recently completed or under construction was found to be inferior to that of buildings completed a few years ago. This is due in part to inadequate supervision by the regional MPW directorates but mainly to poor quality construction firms resulting from the requirement that the government award - 33 - a contract to the lowest classified bidder even though the classification system is very infrequently reviewed. Construction, selection of contractors, the awarding and administration of contracts and methods of supervising construction appear to be in urgent need of reform. Among the major construction faults observed were: (a) poor quality concrete work, substandard mix, careless and out-of-plumb formwork; (b) floor finishes of such poor quality that satisfactory maintenance of workshop and other educational spaces will be extremely difficult to achieve, owing to dust; and (c) leaking roof3 and substandard electrical and mechanical installations. Maintenance 3.09 The standards of maintenance of educational institutions are very uneven. In the older, well-established institutions, e.g., the ESEPC, the EFRTC and the MTTTC, regular maintenance ranges from satisfactory to exemplary. The principals and staff exhibit a sense of pride and do not depend entirely upon the Ministry's budget for maintenance of buildings. Recently completed MOE schools, however, do not exhibit the same degree of regular maintenance, and cases of vandalism are not uncommon. Some schools, which opened in partially completed buildings, are in such poor shape that principals have given up all attempts at carrying out regular maintenance. Maintenance funds, in general, were drastically reduced during the recent economic crisis and there appears to be an urgent need to establish a realistic: national school building maintenance policy. Impact on School building Policy 3.10 As stated in para. 3.02, the responsibility for construction of all post-primary educational institutions rests with the MPW and not the MOE. Following approval of the school designs by the MOE, there is very little further coordination between the central MPW and its regional directorates and the central MPW does not monitor construction progress. The MOE, itself, due to staff limitations, does very little actual supervision and, in any case, has no legal power to intervene in case of deficiencies, being limited to reporting any problems to the MPW. 3.11 At negotiations, the Borrower agreed to appoint to the Project Unit an architect and a technical educator with clearly specified functions. It also agreed to employ architectural and engineering consultants, if required, on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank. The appraisal mission had estimated the cost of required professional consultants for the design and supervision of construction of the seven institutions to be financed by the project at about US$0.37 million. There were, in fact, a number of Turkish architects in private practice with experience and qualifications in school design who could have undertaken this work. However, the MPW--as required by current legislation--continued to exercise responsibility for design and supervision (with the exception of the semi-autonomous MTI, para. 3.05). The MPW, however, did not welcome inputs from the PIU which became increasingly concerned with equipment procurement. Although an architect - 34 - was appointed to the PIU, she was unable to make a useful contribution, given the predominance of the MPW, and resigned. Similarly, neither the PIU educationist nor other MOE educationists had much impact on the design, construction, cost or timely completion of project institutions. 3.12 The mission discussed the problems and costs associated with the existing process of designing and constructing school buildings with representatives of the Government. It was informed that the MOE, MPW and TuBiTAK are all presently seriously studying this problem and would appreciate Bank assistance. 3.13 In particular, there appears to be an urgent need to streamline school building policy through: (a) involving Turkish architects in private practice in the planning, design, and construction of school buildings; (b) establishing the standards and systems approach to educational and architectural planning and design and to school building construction; (c) improving the design and construction of educational facilities through an in-depth evaluation of the process of design and construction presently being used, and applying the lessons learned to all future school buildings; (d) strengthening the role of the educationists, both within the central administration as well as the users of the buildings-- principals and teachers--in the development of school building policies and in the planning and design process; (e) developing maintenance standards and procedures for a comprehensive buildings and grounds maintenance program; and (f) developing procedures for cost and quality control of the construction of school buildings--prequalification of contractors, improvements in contractual arrangements, etc. for the entire cycle of planning, design and construction. Furniture 3.14 The furniture which was constructed and purchased for project schools is presently stored in a warehouse in Ankara awaiting completion of construction. The furniture is of a high standard and will no doubt fulfill its function well when installed. Equipment 3.15 The Project Unit was successful in coordinating the inputs of an externally-funded specialist in preparing equipment lists for the project. - 35 - The equipment was well selected and specified and, in general, procurement of equipment was completed efficiently and economically. Purchase of equipment under Phase I[ (i.e., intended for new project institutions) was not continually rescheduled to coincide with the estimated completion dates of construction works due to the necessity of completing its acquisition during the period of Loan implementation and to the shrinking value of the Loan funds available in a period of worldwide inflation. As a result, some of the equipment is sti.ll in storage and is suffering deterioration. The quality of equipment already supplied has been generally good and the quantity satisfactory. Table 5 gives the status of equipment delivered to the schools: Table 5: EQUIPNENT DELIVERED TO SCHOOLS Equipment Equipment Procured Delivered Equipment or on Order to Schools in Store School (US$ '000's)-------------- Management Training Insl:itute 144.4 144.4 Adult Training Centers 1,204.8 - 1,204.8 Practical Trade Schools 2,059.2 1,884.4 174.8 Men's Technical Teacher Training College 1,234.0 1,234.0 - Technician Schools 6,723.0 6,723.0 - Educational Science Equipment Production Center 505.4 505.4 - Educational Film, Radio and Television Center 567.0 567.0 - TOTAL 12,437.8 10,913.8 1,524.0 -Covenants 3.16 Nost of the covenants in the Loan Agreement have been fulfilled albeit, in some cases, only partially. Among the latter are the following: (a) Section 3.01. Equipment procurement was carried out efficiently. The construction component still requires the necessary funds and services in order to be completed. (b) Section 3.02. The Project Unit Director was given full authority to carry out all aspects of equipment procurement but not to oversee the construction program or other educational inputs, e.g., the establishment of technical advisory committees. (c) Section 3.06. Records kept of construction and costs are inadequate for monitoring progress. - 36 - (d) Section 4.03. The Industrial Training Development Center (ITDC) expansion was begun, but it has not been completed. The technical advisory committees which were established after much effort have almost totally collapsed since the period of political unrest. (e) Section 4.04. The MTI is not yet established. When established, the computer facilities of TuBiTAK will be made available to the institute. Bank Performance 3.17 Subsequent to Loan effectiveness, the project was supervised by 20 Bank supervision missions (Annex 7) and there was reasonable staff continuity. The supervision effort was intensive, totalling some 180 man-days spent in the field, or an average of 20 man-days per year. The Borrower expressed satisfaction with the Bank's implementation assistance in general and with the technical assistance it provided in particular. Among some of the criticisms voiced of the Bank by the Borrower, however, were: (a) inadequate provision in the Loan for financing construction; and (b) delays in obtaining Bank approval for the designs of the ATCs. The Project Unit staff spoke favorably of: (a) the intensive supervision effort and high caliber of most supervision mission staff; and (b) the generally prompt comments and approval of requests for changes given them by the Bank throughout the implementation period. 3.18 Architects and an educational facilities planner, acting as an architect, participated in 16 of the 20 missions. 3.19 Overall, the Bank and the Government seem to have developed a good relationship. The difficulties which arose with civil works design and construction were, for the most part, however, beyond the reach of the Unit's and the Bank's control. B. Educational Aspects General Assessment 3.20 For reasons described more fully in other sections of this report, only those institutions which existed at the time of Loan effectiveness in September 1971 could justifiably be considered by the mission when analyzing the achievement of project educational objectives; and even then, current enrollment figures are not fully reliable or representative. All existing institutions assisted by the project (32 technician schools, the MTTTC, the ESEPC, and the EFRTC) are currently operating successfully and were clearly helped, through the equipment provision, with meeting their - 37 - stated objectives. Two of the covenants in the Loan Agreement, which called for pivotal Government action relating to the project, were not fully implemented, mainly: (a) an expansion of the ITDC in Ankara to cater for the practical training of instructors for the proposed new ATCs; and (b) the setting up of technical advisory committees at provincial and national levels to enable local industrial needs to be catered for by individual provincial technical/vocational schools through ensuring relevant curricula. Although neither of these inputs was included for project assistance, they were important insofar as the achievement of some educational objectives was concerned. The Technician Schools 3.21 In all cases, technician schools visited by the mission were operating effectively, although it was difficult to differentiate between the equipment utilization by three-year industrial/vocational streams and the four-year technician streams which share the same workshops. Equipment utilization was very high--amounting to six and even seven days per week in some schools--and maintenance was being carried out effectively. The updating of curricula, which was one of the benefits expected to arise from the setting up of technical advisory committees, had only been partially achieved, due to the almost total collapse of these committees during the most recent period of political unrest. At the time of appraisal, 5,500 students were expected to be enrolled in four-year technician courses in the 32 technician schools assisted by the project once the expected expansion of training capacity had been achieved. At the time of this review, in fact, this figure was reportedly 4,862, but was increasing as calm was restored in the country. Since it is Government policy to run both 3-year industrial/vocational courses for skilled workers and 4-year technician courses in the same facilities, it must be borne in mind that a total of about 15,000 students are enrolled in these schools altogether. Teacher/ student ratios average out at 1:23 and the standard of teaching in the schools is high. Once the advisory committees become re-established, it can be confidently expected that the contribution made by these schools to solving the manpower problems of industry will increase. The Practical Trade Schools (PTSs) 3.22 Prior to 1969, skilled workers for Turkish industry obtained their pre-employment training almost exclusively in the 132 trade institutes (Grades 9-11), which provided general vocational education in mechanical, electrical, building and textile trades. Girls' schools offered programs in secretarial skills and home economics. The PTSs, introduced in 1969, were intended to be an improvement on the trade institutes offering mainly two-year practical courses in new areas of technology such as tool and die making, electronics, television and radio servicing, and modern welding practice. 3.23 The Government requested and the Bank approved the provision of equipment under the Loan for 12 new PTSs to be constructed by the Government and to be lcated within the same complex of buildings as - 38 - technical high schools (either technician or industrial/vocational), sharing many of the same facilities. The educational arguments behind such a policy are sound since the training provided, which is based on the modular system, would benefit from the general industrial environment of the school and would not be carried out in isolation as was the case in the older trade institutes. At the time of the project completion review, eleven of the new PTSs had been completed and were in operation. About 4,000 students are enrolled in the country's PTSs. Equipment provision for the 12 new PTSs was about US$2.1 million, which was adequate. Equipment procured has been distributed to the new PTSs. The Adult Training Centers (ATCs) 3.24 This completely new type of institution, the ATC, was seen by the Government as meeting a need to train persons migrating to the large cities from their normal rural environment, many of whom were only semi-literate and whose needs were at a lower level than those of students in the PTSs. In this way, it was hoped to both augment the supply of skilled workers to industry and, at the same time, help to reduce unemployment among the group. Although originally intended for Bank financing, the responsibility for construction was taken over from the Bank by the Government at the Government's request. Only one ATC (of the five being newly constructed or extended) has been completed at Bursa within the complex of the technical high school. None of the Bank-financed equipment or furniture had, at the time of the mission, been delivered to the center, and the 80 youths enrolled did not fall into the category for which it was intended, viz, rural migrants. The mission formed the impression that this ATC would eventually be utilized also as a PTS, and that the original concept of the ATCs was no longer high on the list of priorities of the Government which may account for the extremely disappointing rate of completion during the project lifetime. All six ATCs have been or already were combined by the Government with the industrial-vocational training schools. 3.25 Educationally, the mission was not disappointed with this admittedly hypothetical judgment, since equipment procured for ATCs would be equally relevant in the PTSs and would probably enjoy a higher utilization. The Men's Technical Teacher Training College (MTTTC) 3.26 This excellent institution is undoubtedly one of the successful project elements. The shops and laboratories are first class and perform combined educational and production functions to the extent that over US$2.0 million is earned annually from the sale of products ranging from quality furniture to elaborate forge and foundry items. Production work is an essential feature of the teacher training, so that graduate teachers are given the industrial exposure so necessary for the realistic teaching of technical and vocational subjects in schools. - 39 - 3.27 The MTTTC enrollment reached a peak of about 3,600 in 1977./1 Because of a subsequent: period of severe disruption at the height of the civil unrest, the number of teachers under training declined until, in 1980, it was only 50% of capacity; enrollment is now slowly returning to a satisfactory level (Table 6). Table 6: STUDENTS AND STAFF IN THE MTTTC Number Number Number % Entering Year Enrolled of Staff Graduating Industry 1972 1,000 42 1973 1,800 71 - - 1974 1,856 90 421 21% 1975 2,737 300 301 30% 1976 3,246 274 408 30% 1977 3,559 302 575 32% 1978 1,746 85 620 48% 1979 1,521 75 595 45% 1980 1,5-J6 170 289 40% 3.28 One of the Loan covenants (Loan Agreement, Section 4.03) required the Government to submit: to the Bank for review a curriculum for a proposed new five-year course at the MTTTC aimed at training teachers for technician schools with admissions from those completing the three-year industrial streams (para. 3.21). This was, in fact, done in May 1972 and the Bank's comments subsequently were forwarded to Ankara and discussed in Turkey in October 1973. At this time, a proposed University Reform and Higher Education Bill was being prepared which, it was felt, would eliminate some of the fears expressed for the new curriculum, mainly that its very high practical and production content would encourage graduates to enter directly into industry rather than into the teaching profession. As a result of the bureaucratic delays thus introduced, the then Board of Education decided in 1975 that the new five-year course was unjustified and that the existing four-year course with revised curricula met all of the requirements for technical teacher training with admissions from those completing the four-year technician stream. According to evidence seen by the mission, no harm has been done as the MTTTC still functions extremely well and 40% of its graduates enter industry in any case, even without five years of training. Trained teachers on completion mainly go to the technician schools, whereas another technical teacher training institute in Izmir produces teachers for vocational schools. Annual recurrent costs of the MTTTC amount to about US$2.5 million, which is mainly met from the fulfillment of production contracts. The Management Training Institute (MTI) 3.29 Because of the high priority assigned by the SPO to this project component at the time of appraisal, the fact that it is still not completed /1 Enrollments in 1976 and 1977, however, included an increased number of production workers who were not teacher trainees; their exact numbers are not known. - 40 - and operational nine years after effectiveness of the Loan must be considered a major setback for the country in its efforts to improve the quality of management in both state and private enterprises. Despite an encouraging start, during which a suitable site was selected and acquired within the TuBiTAK complex at Gebze and the fact that between 1975 and 1977 progress of construction was good, the project was subsequently bedevilled with bureaucratic and construction problems. Building work was totally interrupted from 1977 onwards, mainly due to lack of funds and legal disputes with the contractor, with the consequence that serious deterioration of both structure and installations is taking place. Despite the drafting of legislation aimed at formally establishing the MTI and laying down its administrative and financial policies as early as 1975, this legislation has still not been passed into law by Parliament. Furthermore, four staff trained to form the nucleus of the MTI faculty obtained employment elsewhere. 3.30 The Bank, always aware of the importance of the MTI to the improvement in Turkish management practices, repeatedly brought this deteriorating situation to the notice of the Borrower. The fact that the passing of an MTI bill was not included among the covenants was also, in retrospect, a serious omission and took much of the urgency out of the Bank's representations to the Government. It is the opinion of the mission that the dispersed delegation of responsibility in the overseeing of progress in all aspects of development of the Institute, first by MOE to the Turkish Management Association, as far as staffing and programs were concerned, and secondly, by MPW to TuBiTAK in regard to construction, resulted in a situation where ultimate responsiblity no longer existed and certainly the Project Unit of the MOE showed signs of reluctance at becoming involved in this type of institution, with which it had no previous experience. 3.31 At this late stage, the MTI could still be salvaged and commissioned as a badly needed training resource for state and private sector managers, but achieving this will require firm and positive action at the highest levels of Government. The Educational Science Equipment Production Center (ESEPC) 3.32 The equipment supplied to ESEPC through the project was generally well chosen and enabled the center to expand and improve its production of science teaching equipment aimed at other project institutions, particularly the technician schools. The 10 mobile science units originally included in the project were found later by the Government to be no longer justifiable as most schools were being provided with permanent laboratories and were, consequently, deleted from the project by agreement with the Bank. The mission considers the production facility to be almost unique among developing countries and both the range and quality of instruments being manufactured and assembled is outstanding. Statistics since 1976 show the total output to have fallen somewhat over the past two years due to a general slowdown in the school building program during that - 41 - time. Once conditions improve, however, the ESEPC is admirably equipped and staffed to meet alL demands likely to arise for school science laboratory equipment. Table 7: PRODUCTION OUTPUT OF ESEPC Schools for Which Number of Kits Produced Equipment Kits Intended 1976 1977 1978 1979 Technician Schools: Physics 200 150 125 48 Chemistry 200 150 100 75 Biology 150 70 100 75 Math 100 25 150 75 Vocational Schools: General Science 300 200 85 80 Math 500 350 175 100 Social Science 300 100 20 40 Elementary Schools: Science 5,000 850 400 200 Math - 250 250 250 The Educational Film, Radio and Television Center (EFRTC) 3.33 Here again, the mission judged this to be a most valuable educational production resource for Turkey in the whole range of audio-visual media. Currently, production is geared to the needs of elementary schools in remote areas, with science, math and social science programs predominating. Output of films, film strips, video tape and radio programs during 1979/80 showed a decrease of about 25% from the numbers produced between 1975/76, due to reasons already emphasized elsewhere in this report, but the equipment, staff and materials are in place and ready to return to normal production once the situation stabilizes. Technical Assistance 3.34 This component of the project, originally intended to amount to US$730,000 including contingencies, must be judged to have been less than satisfactorily implemented. As early as 1973, the Government was expressing its reluctance to use Loan funds for this purpose, being of the opinion that bilateral and multilateral aid would be able to meet the need. Despite this, however, four fellowship candidates working in the ESEPC had, during 1973, been selected for training overseas through the project and the Government was reported to be seeking appropriate venues in which to place them. AE with so many other software inputs, bureaucratic inertia injected frequent delays in implementing this proposal, and although successive Bank supervision missions urged that a decision be - 42 - taken to get the trainees placed, the plan never came to fruition and was subsequently dropped. Currently, the Project Unit revived the program through a series of short training visits by 14 selected staff to equipment suppliers in the Federal Republic of Germany, England and Switzerland. By far, the largest provision in the project for technical assistance originally was to the new MTI. Four teachers selected for assignment to the Institute in 1977 were given a three-month training course through OECD auspices in Istanbul, followed up by extra training in France. The four teachers have now found employment elsewhere. 3.35 The planned curriculum development team expected to develop technician programs in the technical high schools likewise never materialized, although inputs were provided to the Project Unit by locally-hired specialists and ILO experts seconded from other projects. The mission was not able to assess the relevance of any changes made to the technician curriculum through these efforts, but found such schools as were visited to be operating workshops and laboratories using fairly conventional but satisfactory techniques. 3.36 In July 1979, four MOE senior staff members, including the Deputy Director of the Project Unit, visited the ILO International Training Center in Turin to assess its suitability for the training of instructors for the PTSs and ATCs. They reported positively to the Government and 65 candidates, mainly graduates from the MTTPC, were selected for 8-week programs in specialized fields. Vacillation on the part of the Government regarding the fees quoted by ILO led ultimately to a breakdown in these arrangements, but within the last few months, in the realization that the technical assistance funds would be lost if not taken up, a belated proposal to send 15 trainee instructors to Turin for specialized training in electronics was finally agreed by the Government and is now completed. The mission was not able to meet any of the returned fellows; but the programs of study undertaken appeared to be relevant and, provided language problems were overcome, should prove useful to the small number of instructors who benefitted. The Technical Advisory Committees 3.37 This important project component received full Government support from the outset, although the slow progress actually made towards realizing the objectives was the result of the general bureaucratic uncertainty prevalent during the early 1970's. By March 1973, about half of the proposed provincial committees had been set up and were functioning perfunctorily without official status or national directive. Several pieces of legislation were pending at this time upon which the official establishment of both the national and provincial committees depended, namely: (a) the University Reform and Higher Education Bill; (b) the Educational Reform Bill; (c) the Non-Formal and Industrial Education Bill; and (d) the Apprenticeship Bill. The political situation in Turkey at the time were such that enactment of this legislation suffered continuous delays. 3.38 A decree establishing the committees was finally approved by the Council of Ministers in September 1976 and, by January 1978, 67 local technical advisory committees had been established, of which 37 had met and submitted views and proposals regarding needs for curriculum revision in their respective locations. The National Committee, however, although eventually established, met only sporadically and did not completely fulfill its role. 3.39 During the two years of severe civil unrest (1978-80), the provincial committees became identified with the opposing political factions and, as a result, ceased to function in their intended role. At the time of project closing, the mission was unable to find any reliable evidence that they had begun to function again, although given the relative calm prevailing in the country, plus the urgent need for the work to carry on, it is highly likely that the committees will re-emerge. The greater need, however, is to constitute the National Committee to provide overall leadership and coordination. The Industrial Training Development Center (ITDC) 3.40 The ITDC was originally the subject of a covenant in Section 4.03(i) of the Loan Agreement and was later substituted, by amendment to the Agreement, for the Catalca ATC in Istanbul. The intention was that, once expanded using Government funds, it would operate as a pilot ATC, developing suitable curricula for the ATC and training instructors for the proposed new ATCs being assisted by the project. The expansion referred to in the covenant consisted of a workshop block of 2,430 m2, capable of being used for the practical content of ATC instructor training courses, particularly in industrial electronics and radio/television servicing. A UNDP-financed project being executed by the ILO was intended to provide the required technical assistance to the ITDC in producing teaching materials, developing curricula and conducting pilot courses alongside local counterpart staff. Due to the problems endemic in MPW contracts, although Bank supervision missions in 1977 reported that only minor finishing work and some electrical/mechanical installation work was required to complete the ITDC block, construction came to a stop in 1978 and since that time no further progress had been made towards completion. The MOE rightly refuses to occupy the workshops in their present state, claiming that this would imply acceptance of the buildings from MPW and result in completion being shelved permanently. As a result, the ILO team discharged its instructortraining responsibilities in classrooms and temporary laboratories quite unsuited to the task. By 1978, only 10 trainees were studying industrial electronics, 40 radio/television servicing and 16 in modular training programs designed for basic radio training in ATCs. For reasons stated above, this training is, of necessity, mostly theoretical and of doubtful relevance to the needs of future instructors in the ATCs. 3.41 In 1978, the Bank-financed equipment designated for the ATC in Catalca, deleted from the Loan because of severe construction setbacks, was delivered to the ITDC's pilot ATC in the full expectation that construction would be completed within months. However, the equipment is now back in store in Ankara along with the rest of the ATC equipment. - 44 - IV. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING Capital Cost 4.01 The project cost was estimated at appraisal to be US$17.9 million. Since the project will not now be completed until 1984 (Chart 1), the actual final cost is not known at this time, but it is estimated by the mission that it will be about US$37.8 million with the Bank having provided US$13.4 million and the Government the balance of US$24.4 million. 4.02 In summary, the total estimated project expenditures will be US$37.8 million against an estimated US$17.9 million, or an overrun in US$ equivalent of about 111%. This increase in the total cost is mainly due to the extremely high and unanticipated inflation in Turkey operating in the period 1974-80. During the period between the appraisal and completion missions, the cost of construction in local currency has increased dramatically (para. 2.05). Due to the fact that project implementation suffered years of initial delays, the bulk of construction expenditures took place during years of rampant inflation. Had the Government pursued implementation more actively during the period 1972-75, the project could have been completed more or less on time and the cost overruns would have been negligible. In- spite of delays in completing the project and after adjusting for changes in the exchange rate over the life of the project, the cost of the equipment component was held within the original appraisal estimates. This was achieved by eliminating from the originally approved lists of equipment many of the larger and more expensive items and concentrating on the small training-oriented pieces. Finally, the Bank financed the entire equipment costs which constituted about 91% of the Loan. The appraisal and completion mission estimates are summarized in the following table: Table 8: ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS BY CATEGORIES Appraisal Current Estimate % of Estimate % of Category of of Costs Total of Costs Total Expenditure (US$ Million) Cost (US$ Million) Cost I. Civil Works and Site Development (incl. Prof. Fees) 4.33 24 25.29 66.9 II. Furniture and Equipment 12.85 72 12.29 32.5 III. Technical Assistance 0.73 4 0.24 0.6 TOTAL 17.91 100 37.82 100.0 Appraisal Year: Exchange Rate US$ = 15 L.T. Estimated Weighted Average (1972-1976): Exchange Rate US$ = 15 L.T. Estimated Weighted Average (1977-1979): Exchange Rate US$ = 30 L.T. Completion Year Average: Exchange Rate US$ = 80 L.T. - 45 - Unit SDaCe Allocation Per Student 4.03 Gross areas per student place are approximately as follows: Table 9: AREA PER STUDENT PLACE Type of Gross Unit Areas in m2 Institution Appraisal Actual % Difference Management Training Institute 27.9 33.3 19 Adult Training Centers 9.9 10.0 1 Average 11.0 11.1 1 Although the ATCs werE combined by the Government with the industrial/ vocational training schools, this did not affect the average unit area per student place agreed upon at appraisal. The area per student place for the MTI was felt by the Government to be inadequate for this type of institution and was increased by about 19% over that agreed upon at appraisal. The mission agreed that combining the ATCs with the industrial-vocational schools was necessary in order to reduce the recurrent expenditures of these institutions and that increases in area per student for the MTI were also justified. Unit Costs Per Place (Equipment) 4.04 The unit costs per place shown below are for equipment only, since the construction of the buildings hab not been completed. Institutions which were not totally equipped under the project are also excluded from this comparison. Given the quality and quantity of educational equipment provided, the expenditures are considered reasonable. Equipment unit costs per place are approximately as follows: Table 10: EQUIPMENT COST PER STUDENT PLACE Type of Equipment Cost Per Student Institution Place in Us$ Management Training Institute /1 481 Men's Technical Teacher Training College 441 Practical Trade Schools 205 Adult Training Centers 200 Technician Schools 1344 /1 About US$144 per trainee. - 46 - Disbursements 4.05 Estimated and actual disbursements are shown graphically in Chart 1. Disbursements lagged behind appraisal estimates due to delays in implementation, but there were no problems connected with making disbursements. A comparison of actual withdrawals with appraisal estimates is shown by semester in Annex 4 and by year in the following table. Table 11: PLANNED DISBURSEMENTS AND ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS Cumulative Disbursements Disbursements Per Year Percent Planned Percent Actual Percent Actual Calendar (US$ of (US$ of Planned Actual of Year million) Total million) Total (US$ million) Planned 1972 1.41 10.4 0.1 0.7 1.41 0.1 7.1 1973 7.38 54.7 0.1 0.7 8.79 0.2 2.3 1974 3.92 29.0 0.1 0.7 12.71 0.3 2.4 1975 0.79 5.9 3.3 24.4 13.50 3.6 26.7 1976 - - 2.5 18.5 - 6.1 45.2 1977 - - 2.5 18.5 - 8.6 63.7 1978 - - 1.0 7.4 - 9.6 71.1 1979 - - - - - 9.6 71.1 1980 - - 3.0 22.2 - 12.6 93.3 1981 - - 0.8 5.8 - 13.4 98.9 4.06 The following table shows the actual disbursements from the Loan by category of expenditure. Table 12: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS BY CATEGORIES Original Actual Percent Type of Allocation Disbursements of Expenditure --------US$ million------- Original I. Civil Works 0.45 -- -- II. Architectural and Engineering Services 0.03 -- -- III. Furniture 0.04 -- -- IV. Equipment 9.95 12.29 123.5 V. Technical Assistance 0.53 0.23 43.4 VI. Interest and Other Charges 0.83 0.83 100.0 VIII. Unallocated 1.67 -- - TOTAL 13.50 13.35 98.9 - 47 - 4.07 Although the Loan was almost totally disbursed by the final Closing Date of March 31, 1981, the Borrower's share of the project is not complete and it is estimated that approximately USW14.7 million will be required, principally for the completion of the project institutions scheduled by the Government for late 1984 (Annex 1). The Government has already incurred a total expenditure of about UStl0.6 million on the construction of the project institutions and is committed to complete their construction.  TURKEY - FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT-LOAN 748-TU COMPLETION REPORT ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION AND DISBURSEMENTS uss 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1 l976 1977 l 1979 1979 1980 8 1981 1992 1 1983 1914 1915 1 i1213, 341 112 4 2 3141 2 3 4 1 2 234 11213 4 1. 2 1 2 4123 4 ClVILWORKS -W • - -_a Ll.-IH - 13 S -eAriiinad Surve }e er T,... -e 1. 1. W.,, a ga 1- a . Desg rd Layouts i l ei i P re p a r ~ o f T e n d re i on t T-rd.~s1 -nd A-, 10 øei.. e ød. lnD elr r 9 Tmg adAa r ffl kal .... ..... ti og #8 w G-a- P--.d s-l--e EQU1'IMENT AND FURNITURE d Prepar don Master Lmsts and Tender~~~~lø Doumnt e it i lr a a e t kl §@,. ese - s es se r Gua-ýrne P& rd lýrlm 16 mal øgle .101110111103s r s e s G ~ Pstnn. d im im ntto Osta le Eo tetens or 8maClsin Da1 Atl Clun Dt dSeptem 29. 1971 Sp mbr30, 1976 Marh 31, 1981 isi gActualImlm ntn . .- PlanndDibre et ..... m..c ei r Illns orm Belnk-231 TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Implementation of Civil Works Commencement Estimated Expenditures Incurred Project of Date of Expenditures Estimated as % of Estimated Institutions Construction Completionl/ To Date Total Cost2/ Total Cost (in US$ 000's) (in US$ 000's) Al Gebze 10/74 2/84 2,050 5,550 37 Bl Eskisehir 10/75 2/82 1,890 2,830 67 B2 Istanbul (Tuzla)!/ 7/79 2/83 344 3,120 11 B3 Istanbul (Catalca)A/ 10/78 2/84 750 4,252 18 C) 0 B4 Bursa 8/75 2/81 2,300 2,500 92 B5 Izmir 1/75 2/82 2,088 2,930 71 B6 Adana 12/75 9/84 1,214 4,112 30 Total 10,636 42 1/ Based on Government estimates of available funds. 2/ Including price adjustments and unforeseen physical contingencies. 3/ Replaced by the Kartal school in Istanbul by amendment to the Loan Agreement dated March 27, 1980. 4/ Replaced by the ITDC in Ankara by amendment to the Loan Agreement dated June 22, 1978. x TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Gross Floor Areas in m2 Project Academic and Boarding and Percentage Institutions Communal Facilities Staff Housing TOTALS Change As uilt 1.f .^Appraisal As Built it Appraisal As Built 1/ Appraisal Al Gebze 5,900 1,345 4,100 4,245 10,000 5,590 + 79% Bl Eskisehir 7,320 2,950 2,670 2,260 9,990 5,210 + 92% B2 Istanbul (Tuzla)Z/ 7,320 2,845 2,670 2,260 9,990 5,105 + 96% B3 Istanbul (Catalca)3/ 7,320 2,845 3,420 2,260 10,740 5,105 + 110% B4 Bursa 7,320 2,670 2,820 2,125 10,140 4,795 + 111% B5 Izmir 7,320 2,670 2,820 2,125 10,140 4,795 + 111% B6 Adana 7,320 2,670 2,670 2,125 9,990 4,795 + 108% TOTAL 49,820 17,995 21,170 17400 70 990 35,395 + 101% 1/ As built - when completed. Source: A-1 - TuBiTAK; B-1 - B-6 - MPW. 2/ Replaced by the Kartal school in Istanbul by amendment to the Loan Agreement dated March 27, 1980. 3/ Replaced by the ITDC in Ankara by amendment to the Loan Agreement dated June 22, 1978. - 52 - TURKEY IMT A10 08.1 I 1 (,IVAN748-TU) Annes 3 LRJT LTRIII110N IIIT EquIpment Costa Equipaunt Apprateal FAtste Cost Per Enrollment xe TTT c. Actual . Student Schools Location CapawiLL Conting C2otIg Cost Diff. ---------------(i US$ 000's)-------------- Management Training Institute Code No. Al Cebse 110.0 130.8 144.4 + 10.4 SUB-TOTAL 30011 110.0 130.8 144.4 + 10.4 481 Adult Training Centers Code No. Bl- Eskischir 233.0 277.0 200.8 - 27.5 82 Ankara (ITDC) 226.0 270.0 200.§ - 25.6 B3 Istanbul (Kartal) 226.0 270.0 200.8 - 25.6 B4 Bursa 211.0 250.0 200.8 - 19.7 85 Izmir 211.0 250.0 200.8 - 19.7 B6 Adana 211.0 250.0 200.8 - 19.7 SUB-TOTAL 6,000 1,318.0 1,56..0 1 8204.e - 23.1 200 Technician Schools Code No. Cl Adana 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C2 Adana 140.0 166.6 300.0 + 80.1 C3 Ankara 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C4 Ankara 140.0 166.6 300.0 + 80.1 CS Ankara 170.0 202.3 185.0 - 8.6 C6 Ankara 50.0 59.5 93.0 + 56.3 C7 Antalya 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C8 Aydin 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 99 Balikesir 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C1O Bursa 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 611 Edirne 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C12 Elazig 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C13 Erzurum 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C14 Eskisehir 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C15 Eskisehir 140.0 166.6 300.0 + .80.1 C16 Gaziantep 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C17 Isparta 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.1 C18 Istanbul 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C19 Istanbul 170.0 202.3 185.0 - 8.6 C20 Istanbul 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C21 Istanbul 140.0 166.6 300.0 + 80.1 C22 Izmir 310.0 368.9 345.0 - 6.5 C23 Izmir 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C24 Izmir 140.0 166.6 300.0 + 80.1 C25 Izmit 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C26 Fayseri 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C27 Konya 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C28 Malatya 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C29 Samoun 210.0 249.9 227.0 - 9.2 C30 Sivas 210.0 2A9.9 227.0 - 9.2 C31 Trabzon 150.0 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 C32 Zonguldak _ Q1O 178.5 165.0 - 7.6 SUB-TOTAL 5,000 5450.0 6,485.5 6 723.0 + 3.7 1,344 Practical Trade Schools Code No. D1 Ankara 227.0 270.0 171.6 - 36.4 D2 Eskisehir 183.0 219.0 171.6 - 21.6 D3 Gebze 255.0 303.0 171.6 - 43.4 D4 Istanbul 227.0 270.0 171.6 - 36.4 D5 Bursa 233.0 277.0 171.6 - 38.1 D6 Izmir 227.0 270.0 171.6 - 36.4 D7 Konya 189.0 225.0 171.6 - 23.7 DS Adana 222.0 264.0 171.6 - 35.0 09 Kayseri 178.0 212.0 171.6 - 19.1 D10 Elazig 161.0 191.0 171.6 - 10.2 D11 Zonguldak 183.0 218.0 171.6 - 21.3 D12 Safranbolu 156.0 186.0 171.6 - 7.7 SUB-TOTAL 10,000 2.441.0 2,905.0 2059.2 - 29.1 205 Technical Teacher Training College Code No. El Ankara 508.4 604.5 1234.0 + 104.1 SUB-TOTAL 2,800 518.4 604.5 + 104.1 440 Science Equipment Production Center Code No. Fl Ankara, 780.0 927.4 505.4 - 45.5 SUB-TOTAL 740.0 927.4 505.4 - 45.5 Educational Film, Radio and Tele- vision Center code No. Cl Ankara 2l0. 51.( 567.0 + 125.9 SUB-TOTAL 210.0 251.0 547.0 + 125.9 TOTAL 10,817.4 12,71.2 1,37.8 - 3.4 / 1,000 trafnepq will attend tie Inatitute annunlly. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY - FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) Disbursements Appraisal Estimates Actual Actual as Accumulated Accumulated % of Appraisal Significant Dates and Events FY Semester Amounts Amounts Amounts Amounts Estimate in Project Implementation ----------------- US$ 0001s------------------ 72 1 (07/71-12/71) - - - - - 6/71 Signing, 9/71 Effective 2 (01/72-06/72) 220 220 70 70 32 Date 73 1 (07/72-12/72) 1,190 1,410 50 120 9 2 (01/73-06/73) 2,670 4,080 80 200 5 74 1 (07/73-12/73) 4,710 8,790 - 200 2 2 (01/74-06/74) 3,390 12,180 100 300 2 75 1 (07/74-12/74) 530 12,710 - 300 2 2 (01/75-06/75) 510 13,220 300 600 5 76 1 (07/75-12/75) 280 13,500 3,000 3,600 27 2 (01/76-06/76) 2,000 5,600 -41 9/76 Original Closing Date 77 1 (07/76-12/76) 500 6,100 45 2 (01/77-06/77) 2,100 8,200 61 78 1 (07/77-12/77) 400 8,600 64 2 (01/78-06/78) 700 9,300 69 79 1 (07/78-12/78) 300 9,600 71 9/78 Extended Closing Date 2 (01/79-06/79) - 9,600 71 80 1 (07/79-12/79) - 9,600 71 2 (01/80-06/80) 500 10,100 75 3/80 Extended Closing Date 81 1 (07/80-12/80) 2,500 12,600 93 9/80 Extended Closing Date M 2 (01/81-03/81) 753 13,353 99 3/81 Extended Closing Date - 54 - Management Training Institute, Gebze Annex 3 r- -h 4, 4 IL. SwI» øx ~~1 TURKEY FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) Public Sector Investments (% Distribution) Originally New 1973-77 Planned Allocation 1963 1967 1972 (Average) 1978 1979 for 1980/81 for 1980/81 Agriculture 16.2 18.2 9.8 10.4 10.4 7.8 9.6 10.0 Mining 6.6 6.6 5.4 6.7 8.0 9.4 6.0 10.7 Manufacturing 10.2 14.8 29.8 23.6 20.7 23.0 30.6 21.5 Electricity 8.9 12.7 13.5 14.1 18.6 20.9 23.2 20.5 U Transportation 28.0 22.8 24.1 24.8 23.9 21.0 19.1 19.1 Education and Health 15.2 14.6 8.9 8.1 7.0 5.4 2.4 8.2 Tourism and Housing 3.8 4.8 3.3 3.1 3.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 Services 11.1 5.5 5.2 9.2 7.7 9.6 6.1 7.0 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 x ON - 56 - TURKEY Annex 7 FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 748-TU) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Institutions Visited Project Management Institute Gebze Management Training Institute Project Adult Training Centers Bursa Adult Training Center Istanbul (Tuzla) Adult Training Center (under construction) Istanbul (Catalca) Adult Training Center (under construction) Project Technician Schools Bursa Technician School Istanbul Technician School (Hayder Pasa) Istanbul Technician School (Sultan Ahmet) Istanbul Technician School (Macka) Istanbul Technician School (Sisli) Project Practical Trade Schools Ankara Practical Trade School (Balgat) Gebze Practical Trade School Istanbul Practical Trade School (Kadirga) Project Teacher Training College Technical Teacher Training College, Ankara Project Science Equipment Center Science Equipment Production Center, Ankara Project Educational Film Center Educational Film, Radio and Television Center, Ankara Industrial Training Development Center, Ankara